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M AY 2 0 0 8
out after September 11 for contributing to the Iraq, which has created much resentment and
rise of terrorism because their authoritarian- convinced many that the United States would
ism engendered frustrations that led to terror- use strong-arm methods elsewhere to get rid
ism. Such criticism angered the governments of regimes it did not like.
but did not point to specific steps they should The rhetoric about democracy elicited
take, much less to overall reform strategies. three contradictory responses, simultaneously
But occasionally the United States also applied and often from the same people. The first and
pressure to obtain specific responses. For ex- most prevalent was anger against U.S. hubris
ample, the administration halted negotiations and interference in Arab domestic matters.
for a free trade agreement with Egypt early The second was the opposite: anger because
in 2006 to show its displeasure about human the United States had supported authoritar-
Marina Ottaway special-
rights violations and put pressure on President ian regimes rather than democracy in the past,
izes in democracy and post- Hosni Mubarak to free former presidential and because it was still not doing enough to
conflict reconstruction issues, candidate Ayman Nour. Although Washing- support change. The third was the more com-
with special focus on prob- ton did not succeed in this instance, the pres- plex: a grudging recognition that, regardless of
lems of political transforma- sure had a clearly defined goal and, applied the problems of U.S. policy, the political defi-
tion in the Middle East and consistently, might have brought results over ciencies of Arab countries are real and change
reconstruction in Iraq, the long run. In contrast, the United States is badly needed. Of course, Arabs did not start
Afghanistan, the Balkans, had some success in extracting limited legal re- discovering the political problems of their
and African countries. She form in Oman and the United Arab Emirates countries and developing a desire for change
is a senior associate in the through free trade agreement negotiations. when President Bush started discussing de-
Democracy and Rule of Law
The third element of Bush’s democracy pro- mocracy. There is no doubt, nevertheless, that
motion has been the Middle East Partnership the flood of mostly hostile writing elicited by
Program, a research endeavor
Initiative (MEPI). Funded at just $430 million the launching of the freedom agenda did have
that analyzes the state of
over the six years since its launch in 2002, the the effect of stimulating debate and creating a
democracy around the world
program consists of small-scale initiatives to degree of excitement.
and the efforts by the United
promote women’s rights, education, or entre- Real change was another matter. Once
States and other countries to preneurship in seventeen recipient countries. past the initial moments of uncertainty about
promote democracy. The projects are based on the reasonable as- U.S. intentions, incumbent regimes saw little
Her extensive research sumption that democratic transformation re- reason to rush into reforms, particularly as
experience is reflected in quires social, economic, and cultural change, it became clear that the Bush administra-
her publications, which not just a change in political institutions. The tion would welcome modest, even cosmetic,
include nine authored books disparity between MEPI’s ambitious goals and reforms with exaggerated praise. Not surpris-
and five edited ones. Her modest funding, however, condemned the ingly, the pace of reform continued to be driven
most recent book, Beyond program to marginality from the start. by domestic factors. With incumbent regimes
the Façade: Political Reform firmly in control and the opposition weak,
in the Arab World (edited
Smoke Without Fire governments decided on the type and extent
The actual content of the U.S. freedom of reform. This led to economic and adminis-
with Julia Choucair-Vizoso),
agenda—the details of what Washington has trative reform measures in some countries and
was published in January
actually been doing—is little understood in even some political reform, as long as it could
2008.
the Arab world. MEPI is virtually unknown be done without undermining the power of
outside a narrow circle of grant recipients. the regime. Bahrain, for example, allowed the
Diplomatic pressure exerted on specific gov- partial election of one parliamentary chamber,
ernments is mostly out of the public eye. What guaranteeing that the opposition would re-
has received attention, apart from the high- main a minority presence. But nowhere in the
flying rhetoric, is the military intervention in Arab world in the last five years has there been
Democracy Promotion in the Middle East
a redistribution of power away from the king the United States had been advocating for the
or the president and toward the legislatures, region but not of the results it had envisaged.
nor an increase in the influence of the opposi- In Egypt, 88 members of the Egyptian Mus-
tion. A factor that greatly helped Arab regimes lim Brotherhood, a banned organization, won
curtail reform was the presence of Islamist po- parliamentary seats by running as indepen-
litical parties and movements. Governments dents. In Palestine, the more radical Hamas
were able to play up the danger these parties defeated the incumbent Fatah and won a large
represented and cast themselves as the bastion majority of seats.
against the rise of Islamic states, thus defusing In Palestine, the U.S. response was immedi-
U.S. pressure. ate and harsh. Because Hamas has been desig-
nated as a terrorist organization, refuses to rec-
Lessons Learned ognize the state of Israel, and has an Islamist
Despite their singular lack of success, the bent, Washington did not recognize the gov-
spasmodic attempts to stimulate democratic ernment it formed as legitimate, imposed sanc-
change undertaken by the Bush administra- tions, and did not hide its support for Presi-
tion may help devise a better approach in the
future if the lessons of their failure are heeded. While it is imperative that the U.S. abandon the
The first lesson concerns the United States,
simplistic assumptions and missionary fervor of the last
its goals in advocating political reform, and
its risk tolerance, which has proven to be low few years, ignoring the need for reform and supporting
and is likely to decrease even further as a re- friendly regimes is not a viable alternative.
sult of the region’s multiple crises. The Bush
administration never pondered at the outset dent Mahmoud Abbas, a Fatah member, over
what democratization entails: that the redis- Prime Minister Ismail Haniyya, who repre-
tribution of political power is always a con- sented Hamas. Washington also helped under-
flictual process, and that in the Arab world it mine a Saudi-brokered government of national
would be driven not by liberal political parties unity including both Hamas and Fatah. The
and western-style organizations of civil soci- show-down between the two factions eventu-
ety but by movements based on religious and ally turned into an armed clash that left Hamas
ethnic identity. Nor did it take into consid- in control of an increasingly embattled and be-
eration that any real progress toward democ- sieged Gaza and Fatah in control of a West
racy would produce unpredictable outcomes, Bank fragmented by Israeli settlements and se-
which would undermine hostile and friendly curity barriers. The experience in Palestine also
regimes alike and empower untested political left the United States in a quandary, leery of
players. When events showed that increased elections and the people’s choice.
political participation could lead to results un- U.S. response to the electoral success of the
favorable to the administration, Washington Muslim Brotherhood was less dramatic. The
quickly retreated. Brotherhood won only about 20 percent of
Since the launch of the freedom agenda, the seats, many more than it ever had, but not
there have been only two instances in which enough to threaten the stability of a well-estab-
the change brought about by an electoral pro- lished regime with a strong security apparatus.
cess led to a real shift in the distribution of Nevertheless, the election outcome virtually
power. The parliamentary election in Egypt in put an end to U.S. pressure on the Egyptian
late 2005 and the elections for the Palestinian government to reform. In April 2008, after
parliament in January 2006 were the embodi- Hosni Mubarak’s government won about
ment of the more open election process that 98 percent of seats in the municipal council
POLICY BRIEF
ties and movements. Some Gulf monarchies promoters more uncertain, and the prospects
where political life remains largely confined to for change more dim.
relations within the ruling family as well as a
regime like Libya’s that has suppressed politi- Working Within Our Means
cal organizing of any kind are exceptions. The The United States’ extreme aversion to the
relative capacity of these groups to attract sup- risk inherent in democracy promotion, the
port on the basis of both their message and realities of the distribution of power among
their organizing skills (or to impose control political actors in the region, and the grow-
in the case of regimes) will determine each ing international climate of democratic re-
country’s political course. Civil society orga-
nizations, often extolled as the key to demo-
The goal of the U.S. should not be to shape an Arab
cratic transformation, play a much lesser role
in practice. Incumbent regimes are the most world in the Western image, but to help Arab countries
powerful of these actors, with considerable ca- in the task of realigning their stagnant political systems
pacity to co-opt or repress opponents and thus with changing socio-economic realities.
maintain the initiative. They may want a de-
gree of economic and administrative reform, trenchment and backlash against democracy
but they reject power-sharing. Secular parties, promotion all suggest that renewed efforts by
which the West sees as potential partners, are the United States to support and encourage
extremely weak. They have difficulty formu- political reform in the Arab world should be
lating a message. Liberal parties tend to focus quite different from those of the recent past.
on abstract principles, and leftist parties, al- The goal of the United States should not be
ready tainted by the failure of Arab socialism, to try and shape an Arab world in the Western
have lost their traditional demand for social image of liberal democracy but to help Arab
justice to Islamist organizations. Furthermore, countries in the difficult task of realigning
most secular parties have not made a major in- their stagnant political systems with changing
vestment in organization. The Islamist parties, socioeconomic realities. In some cases, this
however, are a force to be reckoned with. This realignment might lead to greater democracy
does not mean that they have the allegiance of in the foreseeable future. In others, Western-
the majority of the population—in fact, many style democracy may be too distant an idea to
Arabs fear Islamist organizations—but they be worth discussing seriously at this time. Do
have an attractive message, deliver valuable so- we really know, for example, what the road
cial services, have invested heavily in organiz- to democracy might be in a country like the
ing, and have a reputation for moral integrity. United Arab Emirates, where over 85 percent
The third lesson, which is becoming pain- of the population is made up of noncitizens?
fully evident worldwide as well as in the region, What would participation mean if only pres-
is that democracy is now in retreat. The post– ent citizens participated? Conversely, how
Cold War “end of history” euphoria about the could a country absorb such a high propor-
inevitability of democracy has been replaced tion of diverse new citizens and maintain a
by sobering evidence that progress toward de- sense of common identity?
mocracy is neither inevitable nor irreversible. The immediate issue in most Arab coun-
Democracy promotion is being increasingly tries is not democracy, but an effective political
challenged and resented, and semiauthoritar- system that can meet the challenge of change
ian or even authoritarian regimes are recon- rather than simply repress manifestations of
solidating in many countries. This makes in- discontent and maintain control at all costs.
cumbent regimes more confident, democracy Most Arab regimes do not sit easily on their
POLICY BRIEF
societies at present, despite the continuing want democracy in their own countries and
strength of their repressive apparatus. They do who organize and agitate to that end. There
not know how to adapt to the rise of new po- is no use pretending, however, that the United
litical forces and new cultural trends—Saudi States is likely to go beyond encouraging care-
Arabia is talking about the need for “ideologi- fully controlled change from the top in the
cal security,” for example. This environment foreseeable future.
leads not only to repression but also to inca- Nevertheless, even within the limitations
pacity to devise long-term solutions. For Arab imposed by U.S. politics, the balance of forces
governments, for citizens, and for outsiders in the Arab world, and international demo-
concerned about protecting their interests in cratic backsliding, the United States can still
such unstable conditions, the question is how play a useful role in steering reform in a posi-
to move forward at all. The demotion of de- tive direction. But this will require a number
mocracy from an immediate, high-priority of changes in the U.S. approach:
goal to a long-term prospect will undoubtedly
n First, the United States needs to draw a clear
be extremely frustrating for Arab citizens who
distinction between regime change and
democracy promotion. The forcible over-
throw of a hostile regime may be necessary
MEPI “Success Stories” at times—this is not the place to discuss
when this might be justified—but it should
n Increased the transparency of Lebanon's
never be presented as an effort to promote
historic elections in 2005 through tar-
democracy. Conflating regime change and
geted technical and material support to
democracy promotion is not only bad
domestic monitoring organizations, voter
policy but also creates confusion and alarm
education, journalists, and candidates.
among both Arab regimes fearful of U.S.
n Provided support to over 2,000 domestic intentions and reform advocates who do
election monitors for Egypt's first multi- not see military intervention as an answer
candidate election. to their problems.
n Supporting the only live satellite broad- n Second, the United States should set mod-
casts of Arab parliamentary sessions. est goals for a limited number of coun-
n Supporting national and local political
tries and pursue them quietly—but not
party organizations and their members
secretively. The most promising projects
in countries that will have new rounds of
are those where the interests of the United
municipal and parliamentary elections in
States, of the regime, and of reform advo-
2005–2007.
cates overlap to some extent. For example,
Egypt has practically destroyed all avenues
n Strengthening the role of civil society for political participation outside the ruling
in the democratic process by facilitat- party—most political organizations have
ing dialogue among activists, NGOs, and been gutted and the Muslim Brotherhood
foreign ministers at G8/BMENA meetings is becoming disenchanted about democ-
and by awarding more than 70 indig- racy. A revival of political life would serve
enous civil society organizations with everybody’s interests by channeling Egypt’s
direct grants. growing social unrest in a constructive di-
http://www.mepi.state.gov/c16050.htm (April 18, 2008) rection. A modest but useful goal for U.S.
efforts could be to encourage revision of the
Democracy Promotion in the Middle East
procedures for registering political parties, a Although the steps advocated here repre-
first step toward a long-term goal of plural- sent a retreat from the flamboyant rhetoric of
istic politics. In countries of the Gulf that the recent past, they are not a retreat from the
are struggling with the problem of how to
handle their large and restive foreign labor
Washington should make clear that contact
force, the United States should help gener-
ate ideas on how to tackle this complicated
with a broad range of political and civil groups
issue in a way that maintains stability and is not a sign of support, but a reflection of the
also addresses a serious human rights issue. need for knowledge.
n Third, the United States should address is-
promotion of political reform, which requires
sues of political reform in all countries with
not words but consistent action. Democracy
more questions than answers. It should ad-
promotion in the Middle East has led to no
mit, for example, that while it can identify
positive results, while undermining U.S. cred-
a more open process of party registration as
ibility across the region. Neither incumbent
a crucial step in normalizing political life
regimes nor reform advocates believe any lon-
in Egypt, the details of how this should be
ger that the United States is seeking the dem-
done are complex and need much discus-
ocratic transformation of the region. Credi-
sion. To be sure, U.S. values and beliefs
bility will not be restored by new rhetoric but
must determine the broad direction of any
by consistent efforts to promote attainable
attempt to promote political reform: creat-
goals. n
ing opportunities for citizen participation,
improving human rights, and increasing
The Carnegie Endowment normally does not
transparency of government actions. But
take institutional positions on public policy
what does that mean in practice in spe-
issues; the views presented here do not
cific countries? Rather than assuming it
necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment,
has all the answers, Washington should
its officers, staff, or trustees.
consult and listen before drawing its own
conclusions about which changes it should
© 2008 Carnegie Endowment for International
support.
Peace. All rights reserved.
n Finally, the United States must take one step
in the opposite direction to the less asser-
tive posture that has been suggested here
so far: It must be very clear in affirming its
right to maintain contacts with the greatest
possible number of political and civil soci-
ety actors in all countries, because it cannot
work effectively toward any type of politi-
cal reform without understanding the ac-
tors. Washington should make it clear that
contacts with the broadest possible range
of political and civil society organizations
are not a sign of support or a declaration
of their legitimacy but the reflection of its
need for knowledge.
www.CarnegieEndowment.org
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