Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 81, No. 2, Sub-Saharan Africa (Mar., 2005), pp. 427-439 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3568897 . Accessed: 05/03/2013 08:40
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley and Royal Institute of International Affairs are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Thedarksideofhuman rights'
ONORA O'NEILL
in France Edmund Burke asks In his Reflections on therevolution The question to foodor medicine? a man'sabstract Whatis theuse ofdiscussing right I shall In that deliberation them. and administering ofprocuring is upon themethod rather than theprofessor andthephysician advise to callin theaidofthefarmer always ofmetaphysics.2 More speciBurke's questionis sharp.What is the point of havinga right? unlessyou also have a way what is the point of havingan abstract right, fically to?Why shouldwe prizenatural it is thatyou have a right of securing whatever And ifwe need to ifthereis no way of ensuring their or abstract delivery? rights and the physician'not merelyof secure their delivery,are not 'the farmer but also of greater use thanpositive or naturalrights, use thanabstract greater to claim food or medicine?For a hungry person,positiveand justiciable rights thatare notjusticiable: to food are to be sure betterthanabstract rights rights store and cook food are more but those who know how to grow, harvest, still.When we are ill,positiveandjusticiand havingthe food is better useful, thatare not to healthcare are to be surebetterthanabstract able rights rights theiris and nurses are more doctors and but skilled useful, receiving justiciable: still. care better abstract to food or In a way it is surprising to findBurke discussing rights came to fullprominenceonlyin the late healthcare,forthesepresumedrights and contrasted twentieth century.They are commonlycalled welfarerights, of these with liberty This, I think,is a misnomer.The salientfeature rights. to the welfareof the recipient is not thattheycontribute (althoughthey rights to goods or services.If thereare to are likelyto do so), but thattheyare rights those goods and servicesmustbe provided,and to goods or services, be rights
Lecture This is a revisedversion of the MartinWight given at the London School of Economics on I4 fora number of helpfulcommentsat and followingthe lecture,especially October 2004. I am grateful fromConor Gearty,Nick Rengger and Chris Brown. 2 Edmund Burke, in France, Conor Cruise O'Brien, ed. (London: Penguin on therevolution Reflections Books, 1984), pp. 151-2.
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OnoraO'Neill and the more specifically provided by someone-forexample, by the farmer physician. which Burke campaignedwere the rights Most of the abstract against rights of theRightsofMan and of the Citizen of I789 proclaimedin the Declaration The shortlistin (Declaration rights. of1789).They are what we now call liberty statessuccinctly 'the naturalrights of man, which Article2 of the Declaration to and resistance must not be prevented... are freedom,property, security is not to be understood as a to property Needless to say,the right oppression'.3 oftenure but as a right to security ofproperty: to some amountofproperty, right it too is a libertyright,not a rightto any goods or services.4Much of the to processneeded to makeliberty withtherights Declaration of1789 is concerned to the rule of law, to habeas corpus,to whatwe would rights justiciable:rights The rights of theDeclaration now call accountablepublic administration. of1789 are rights all others and all institutions. are universal-and Liberty against rights so are the corresponding obligations. They are compromisedif anyothersare exemptfromthose counterpart obligations.If anyone may infringe my rights to freedom, and security, or to resist I have only incomproperty oppression, of thesesorts. plete and blemishedrights On closerconsideration, matters have turnedout to be rather more complicated. The institutions for securingand enforcing libertyrightsrequire an allocation of certainobligationsto specifiedothersratherthan to all others. to respectliberty First-order mustbe universal, but secondobligations rights orderobligations to ensurethat mustbe allocated. everyone respects liberty rights There is no effective rule of law withoutlaw enforcement, and law enforcement needs law enforcers who are assignedspecific tasks;thereis no effective of public administration without institutions that allocate the accountability tasksand responsibilities and hold specifiedoffice-holders to account. Neverbetween abstract theless,the asymmetry libertyrightsand abstract rightsto goods and servicesis convincing:we can know who violates a liberty right withoutanyallocationof obligations, but we cannottellwho violatesa right to have been allocated. goods or servicesunlessobligations This well-knownpointhas not impededthe riseand riseof an international human rights culturethatis repletewith claimsabout abstract to goods rights and services, now seen as universal humanrights, but oftenmuddledor vague, or both, about the allocationof the obligations withoutwhich theserights not merelycannot be met, but remain undefined.The cornucopia of universal humanrights includesboth liberty and rights to goods and services, and rights5
3 Declaration Citizen, I789, http://www.magnacartaplus.org/french-rights/ ofManandofthe ofthe Rights 4 Note alsoArticle andsacred no one 17 oftheDeclaration of1789: 'Property, beingan inviolable right, ofit;unless it,andjustandprior maybe deprived publicnecessity, legally investigated, clearly requires hasbeenpaid' compensation 5 Set outin theUN International Covenant on CivilandPolitical also I966 (CCPR). ThisCovenant Rights, various that arenotliberty See http://www.magnacartaplus.org/uno-docs/ 'recognizes' rights rights. covenant.htm.
I789.htm
428
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
429
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OnoraO'Neill of greatimportance.There is somethingto be said for this justiciable rights Declarationsand Covenants as ideological documents view of human rights but many that can help mobilize energyfor action that makes a difference, would see thisas cynical. of human rights claimswould be wholly at In any case, thisinterpretation Both liberty and rights to of rights. odds with ordinary rights understandings or entitlements thatare valid are standardly seen as claim rights goods and services obligations. Rightsare seen as one side of a againstthosewith the counterpart and obligation-bearers. We normally betweenright-holders normative relationship thatnobody is obliged to respector regardsupposed claims or entitlements An understanding of thenormative honouras null and void, indeed undefined. dislink underlies and that to professional daily rights obligations arguments human rights, and of the specialrights cussion both of supposedlyuniversal createdby specific actionsand transactions contract, voluntary (treaty, promise, There a to are cannot be claim that etc.). against nobody, rights rights marriage will be rights or nobody in particular: universal all comers;special rights against will be rights others. rights againstspecifiable in favourof of rights understanding Only ifwe jettisonthe entirenormative link a merely can we break the normative between and view, rights aspirational their counterpart obligations. If we take rightsseriouslyand see them as Ifon the rather thanaspirational, we musttakeobligations normative seriously. otherhand we opt fora merelyaspirational view, the costsare high. For then we would also have to accept thatwhere human rights are unmetthereis no breach of obligation,nobody at fault,nobody who can be held to account, have to We would in effect nobody to blame and nobody who owes redress. that human claims are not real claims. accept rights would be reluctant to jettisonthe thought Most advocatesof human rights in favour of seeing them as merely that they are prescriptive or normative We generally view human rights claims as settingout requireaspirational.I? mentsfromthe standpoint of recipients, who are entitled to or havea claimto action or forbearance with corresponding From a normby others obligations. ativeor prescriptive view, thepointof humanrights claimswould be eroded if to meettheseclaims.A normative view nobodywere requiredto act or forbear of rights claimshas to takeobligations since theyare the counterparts seriously, to rights; it mustview themas articulating the normative thatfall requirements either on all or on specifiedobligation-bearers. Few proponentsof human would countenancethe thought thatthereare humanrights thatnobody rights is obliged to respect.(The converse thoughtis unproblematic: therecan be are defined;such 'imperfect' obligationseven where no claimants obligations are generally seen as moral obligations, but not as obligationsofjustice with counterpart rights.)
Io
See recently thebestphilosophical between account ofHumanRights and Griffin, James 'Discrepancies theInternational Law ofHumanRights', Aristotelian CI, 200I, pp. 1-28. Proceedings ofthe Society,
430
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
431
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OnoraO'Neill
ifobligations arethecreatures ofconvention, so too are obligations; conversely therights. These unwelcome of taking the humanrights documents at implications facevaluemight be avoidedin several One well-known is ways. thought that ourselves to liberty there is no allocation so longas we confine rights problem, ifall others sincetheserights are onlycomplete are obligedto respect them. We can coherently see universal as of institutions or liberty rights independent and read the of instruments that deal with as transactions, parts liberty rights rather thancreating thoserights suchclaims would be a affirming (justifying that do notfacean allocation further But thefact task). liberty rights problem to those them raises that offers small comfort just (although enforcing problem) forexample who hope to show thatrights to goods or services, to foodor human A areuniversal rather than thecreatures ofconvention. medicine, rights view of human cannot view and normative to food medicine as rights rights whiledenying that there areanypre-institutional pre-institutional counterpart orobligation itmust takea congruent viewofthecounterholders; obligations But this that suchrights must be special, institutional part obligations. suggests than of rather universal human There course, is, nothing rights rights. wrong or problematic aboutconventional or institutional but ifDeclarations rights, andCovenants create to goodsandservices, claims that areuniversal rights they or human lack Declarations and Covenants cannot showthat justification. rights and someparticular of institutional is configuration rights obligations univeror desirable, or evenjustifiable. sally optimal Thisdilemma be fudged to goods theideaofhuman might byallowing rights A viewofrights andservices to drift between twointerpretations. to goodsand services as independent of institutions and transactions could be cited as a basis for somerather than other institutional offering justifying arrangements. A viewofrights to goodsandservices as thecreatures ofconvention couldfit withwell-defined institutional but offers no claims counterpart obligations, abouttheir other than thefact that havesigned (some)states justification up to is a desperate them. this Yet is Equivocation strategy. equivocation justificatory in discussions of claims. common human rights disconcertingly withinnormative This dilemma views of rights and obligations can be inmore resolved than oneway.We couldconclude that arefundaliberty rights anduniversal, andclaimthat mental canbe justified without reference to they or institutions, but concedethatrights to goods and services Covenants are thatcan be justified positive) rights special(institutional, onlyby appealto suchas signing andratifying Covenants. We couldtry to specific transactions, of specialrights a configuration and the institutional that structures justify them andtheir we might secure Forexample, that counterpart obligations. argue certain to goodsand services and their rights counterpart obligations protect or thattheyhave utilitarian basic humanneeds or interests, or economic that andsecure Or we couldjustify institutional structures define justification. andobligations moredeeply to a theory ofthegood special rights byappealing
432
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
State obligations
These are awkward but I think that others problems, maylie deeper.The deepest problem may be thatthe obligationsassignedto statesby some of the most Declarations and Covenants are notthe corollariesof the human significant thatthe documents rights proclaim.The Covenantsdo not assignstates straightforward to have to be all, liberty (after obligations respectliberty rights rights respectedby all, not only by states),but rathersecond-orderobligationsto secure respectforthem. Equally, theydo not assignstatesobligationsto meet to goods and services, but rather second-orderobligations to ensure that rights that theyare met. For example,Article2 of the CESCR proclaims Each StateParty to thepresent Covenant undertakes to takesteps, and individually international assistance and co-operation, economic and technical, through especially to themaximum ofitsavailable witha viewto achieving the resources, progressively fullrealisation of the rights in the present Covenantby all appropriate recognized theadoption oflegislative measures.'2 means, including particularly the fullrealisation of ... rights... by all appropriate 'Achievingprogressively means' is evidently not merelya matter of respecting the rights recognizedin CESCR. It is a matterof ensuringthatothers-both individualsand instituthatcorrespond to thoserights. Latercomments tions-carryout the obligations of the Office the Commissioner for Human by High Rightsspell out some of the obligations thatstates are takento assumeiftheyratify thetwo Covenants.I3 An immediateand encouragingthoughtmightbe that if the obligations Declarationsand Covenants are notthe assignedto statesby the international the of human to counterparts rights proclaimed,but second-orderobligations ensure or secure respectforsuch rights, then thismay resolve the allocation to goods and services.Statesparty to a Covenant are seen as problemforrights and the instrument. It would acquiringspecial obligations by signing ratifying
12 I3
Article 2 CESCR at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm. Thenature Art. Fifth ofthe 2, para.I oftheCovenant, session, I990, Office ofStates parties obligations, for HumanRights, CESCR General comment HighCommissioner 3, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3 .En?OpenDocument.
433
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OnoraO'Neill did not have counterthenbe clearthatthosespecial,second-order obligations universal humanrights. let alone counterpart They are second-order partrights, of first-order and obligations. rights obligationsto secure some configuration are withoutcounterpart This thoughtmay be helpful:since obligations rights withoutcounterpart we can coherent(unlike rights obligations), normatively view of the obligations assumedby statesthatsign and ratify take a normative Human rights enter the Covenants,and can see themas setting requirements. of of as the content second-order into the Covenants only indirectly aspects stateobligations. But a second thoughtis farless congenial to those who would like to see Ifthe obligations thatthe Declarationsand Covenhumanrights as normative. to states are not thecounterparts ofthehumanrights theseinstruments antsassign declare or recognize,then theyalso do not definethe first-order obligations of human rights.Rather the problem of giving a that are the counterparts of Declarationsand Convenantsis devolved instantiation coherentnormative for which may (or may not) set out to securepositiverights to the states party, documentshave normative theircitizens.If the claims of the human rights force they must be matched by obligations;if they are not matched by theyare at best aspirational. obligations, if the supposed As I suggestedearlier,it may not be wholly a misfortune in the and Covenants are seen as declared Declarations aspirations. Legal rights commentators mightbe willingto say thatthereis stillsubstancein there,in to realizetheseaspirations. Nonthatthe Statespartytake on real obligations make the mistakeof thinking that Declarations and lawyersmay habitually universalhuman rights, but Covenants claim that there are pre-institutional theirmistakeis not necessary-althoughpolitically convenient-for progress of the underlying towardsthe realisation once stateshave signed aspirations, This a is coherent but to be withthosewho seek position, unlikely popular up. which theysee to base ethicaland politicalclaimson appeals to human rights, as normatively fundamental rather thanas the creatures of the conventionthat to realize aspirations to are anchoredin the Covenants thatassignobligations states. And thereare further If we read Declarationsand Covenantsas difficulties. instruments by which statesassume second-orderobligationsto define and allocatefirst-order thatcorrespond to certain humanrights (now no obligations seen as all with A universal lie states? why should the obligations longer rights), and only states, have the powers necesplausibleanswerwould be thatstates, the relevant second-order to defineand allocatefirstobligations saryto carry The story orderobligations and rights to individuals and institutions. is told of a journalistwho asked the bank robberWillie Suttonwhy he robbed banksand we mightreply got the puzzled answer:'That's where the moneyis'. Similarly to anyone who wonders why Declarationsand Covenants assignobligations thatare to secure human rights to states by pointingout thatthat'swhere the power is.
434
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The dark sideofhuman rights to But the thought thatit makessense to assignall second-order obligations to states because they,and only they,have the defineand allocate obligations is oftenless thancomforting. theseobligations power to discharge Many states violaterather thanrespect humanrights. second-order to Assigning obligations defineand allocatefirst-order and rights to agentswho do not even obligations thatcorrespondto those rights obligations reliably respectthe first-order may like putting foxesin chargeofhen houses. It is trueenough thatthose be rather the fullrealization of humanrights who are to achieve progressively musthave capacitiesto do so-but it does not followthatthosewith (a good rangeof) the to do so. Some states-not only those we necessary capacitiescan be trusted thinkof as rogue states-disregardor overridemany of the Covenant rights. Some sign and ratify the relevantinternational but make limited instruments, efforts to work towardstheirfullrealization. Other states lack thepower to carry the obligations to 'achieve progressively the full realisationof the rightsrecognized' in Declarations and Covenants. Weak states-failed states, such demandingobligaquasi states-cannot carry tions. Althoughthey may not alwaysviolate them,they cannot secure their stillless can theyensurethattheirinhabitants inhabitants' have liberty rights; effective entitlements to goods and services. It is an emptygesture to assignthe to weak states, obligationsneeded forhuman rights comparableto the empty gesturemade by town councils in Britainin the I98os thatproclaimedtheir towns nuclearfreezones. Indeed, even strong and willingstates may findthat the fullrealisation of the rights theycannot 'achieve progressively recognized' in Declarationsand Covenants.Strongstates mayhave a monopolyof thelegitimate use offorcewithintheirterritories; but theyseldomhave a monopolyof the effective ofpower. There are plenty use of otherforms of reasonsforthinkabout thespecific character ofstatepower,and forquestioning the ing carefully assumptionthat powerful-let alone weak-states can carrythe range of second-orderobligationsthattheyostensibly take on in signingand ratifying human rights instruments. Given these realities, it may be worth reconsidering whetherall secondorderobligations to securehumanrights shouldlie withstates. Perhapssome of themshould lie with powerfulnon-state actors,such as transnational corporaor major religious,cultural, tions,powerfulnon-governmental organizations, and professional and educationalbodies. The assumption thatstatesand states alone should hold all the relevantobligationsmay reflect the extraordinary dominanceof statepower in the late twentieth rather thana timeless century, solutionto the problemof allocating to providegoods and services obligations For presentpurposes, I shall leave these unsettling effectively. possibilities and politicalcosts unexplored,but say a littlemore about some of the cultural that are linked to persistent confusionbetween normativeand aspirational views of human rights.
435
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Onora O'Neill
andblame Control
but are groundedin universal are not pre-conventional, If humanrights rights, then thereis-at the veryleast-an the special obligationsassumedby states, awkward gap between realityand rhetoric.The second-orderobligationsof states are discharged by imposing first-order obligations on others and and statepower, and thatof The is that state them. agency reality enforcing institutions that (partially) secure is used to construct derivativeinstitutions, and to controlthe action of individuals and thatto do thisit is necessary rights, If to the and in detail. states are secondinstitutions discharge party systematically humanrights and ratifying orderobligations Covenants, theyassumein signing are respectedby all, but must they must not only ensure that libertyrights will deliverrights to whose discharge obligations assignand enforcefirst-order will not Human it is be the to all. and services evident, beings, merely goods but will carry the intendedburdens. of theseobligations, intendedbeneficiaries The system of controlthatstatesmustimpose to ensurethatthese obligais likelyto be dauntingly tionsare discharged complex. Yet, as Burke pointed if we are to have food and medicine is the active what we need out, really be of 'the farmer and the physician'.Can thatactive engagement engagement secured or improvedby imposingdetailedand complex obligationson those There is much to consider first-order the relevant who are to carry obligations? comhere,and I offer verybriefcommentsunderfourheadings:complexity, pliance,complaintand compensation.
Complexity
Detailed controlis needed to 'achieve progressively the fullrealisation' of very of be sets which must rights, mutually conflicting adjusted. potentially complex in the age of human rights has become prolix It is no wonder thatlegislation it have to seek to ensurethatindividuals and and demanding.Those who frame institutions conformto a verylarge numberof constraints in all activities, so have to set and enforcevery detailed requirements.I4 It is now common in imposeshighlycomplex procedures developed societiesto findthatlegislation withdutiesto register, dutiesto obtainpermission, dutiesto consult, thatbristle as well as to to discloseand to record, requirements rights appeal, proliferating to report.Such legislationis typically supplementedby copious regulation, forms relentless 'guidance', prolix codes of good practiceand highlyintrusive of accountability. These highly detailedforms of socialcontrolmaybe unavoidable in a public culturethataimsto 'achieve progressively thefullrealisation' of an extraordinarily so has to impose complex demands complex set of rights, and burdenson all activities and all areasof life.
I4
state: MichaelMoran,TheBritish modernism andhyper-innovation Oxford (Oxford: University regulatory high is neither its that thenew regulatory state liberal nordecentralizing, Press, despite 2003). Moranargues commitment to human Rather itis bothinterventionist andcentralizing in waysthat colonize rights. andthephysician. hitherto domains ofcivil those ofthefarmer relatively independent society-including
436
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Compliance
who are subjectto hypercomplexlegislation, and control Individuals regulation two roles. As obligation-bearers theirrole is compliance; as right are offered holdersthey are permitted and encouraged to seek redressand to complain on whom firstwhen othersfailto comply. The individualsand institutions are imposedin the name of securing humanrights are offered orderobligations limitedoptions:theycan soldierloyallyon in compliancewith the obligations states theycan exitfromthe tasksthat impose; theycan voice theirdiscontent; have been made too burdensomeby the excess complexity of legislation and regulation.'5Loyal compliancebecomes harderand more burdensomewhen the sheer number and complexityof requirements imposed damages the be with which substantive tasks can achieved. Voicing concern and quality objecting to these controlsprovides some, but limitedrelief.Exit fromthe activities thathave been made too burdensomemay oftenbe the mostreasonable and the preferred and the physician',exit means option. For 'the farmer givingup growingfood and caringforthe sick. There maybe waysof extending humanrights thatdo not carry thesecosts, thatuse a 'lighter touch', thatachieve 'betterregulation'.i6 But thejury is out At present, in the UK, thejuggernautof human on thismatter. and certainly
'5 See Albert andloyalty: 0. Hirschmann, todecline andstates Exit,voice infirms, responses organizations MA: Harvard a classic ofthese Press, I970), for (Cambridge, University analysis options.
I6
The UnitedKingdom established a Better in 1997.It promotes TaskForce the government Regulation 'five ofbetter whicharesaidto be Proportionality, regulation' principles Accountability, Consistency, andTargeting is a nicetouch!). website See thetask force's athttp:// Transparency (consistency www.brtf.gov.uk/.
437
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Onora O'Neill and of the regulatory demands,at everystageoflegislation rights process,tends to increasecomplexity even when the costsfor'the farmer and the physician', and the damage to the servicestheyprovide,are high and well known.
Complaint
First-order are also right-holders, and it may be that the obligation-bearers are burdenstheirobligations the impose recompensed by rights theyenjoy as a result of others discharging their obligations.However, the experience of is not symmetric with thatof obligation-bearers. Individualsact right-holders as right-holders when In has that situationthey only something gone awry. and compensation.The legislation and regulation may complain,seek redress of statesthattake human rights oftenprovide a rangeof remediesseriously for those with the time, energy,courage (or foolhardiness) to pursue them. When complaints redress be achieved work, and, compensationmay be may secured.But oftenthe experienceof complainants is less than happybecause the processof achievingredress is complex,exhausting and frustrating, and the remediesless thanwould satisfy and assuagea sense of injury.Since the role of is too oftenone thatexhausts, demoralizes and undermines active complainant engagement, manywho are wrongeddo not choose thiscourse of action. For 'the farmerand the physician' and for many others the choice is mainly between loyaltyand exit: givingvoice is not generally a positiveexperience, since it requires complainantsto see themselvesas victims ratherthan as activelyengaged.
438
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
whichdraws on earlier 5. Thistranslation, received canbe found at TheNietzsche channel's athttp://www.geocities.com/ website versions, e 15. thenietzschechannel/onthe3 .htm#3 '8 Bernard Ethics andthe limits Williams, (London:Fontana, ofphilosophy I985),p. 177.
439
This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 08:40:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions