Digest in Spec Pro

Case digest in Special Proceedings under Atty. Chato Cabigas Rafael D.
Pangilinan
Grounds for revocation of administration PADILLA v. JUGO Held: In the present case the court did not base the removal of the petitioner on any of the cause specified in the respondents motion for said relief, but on the conflicts and misunderstandings that have continuously existed between them. It is undeniable, however, that said conflicts have really existed from the inception of the administration and have redounded to the detriment of the interests of the administration. Due to such conflicts and to the lac of good harmony between the petitioner and the respondent, the former showed incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, which gave rise to the filing of inaccurate inventories and accounts which, in turn, re!uired the filing of oppositions thereto, the hearings of which absorbed the attention of the court for !uite a long time. COBARRUBIA !. DI"O# Held: "oss of confidence in the integrity of the administrator is a ground for his removal. D$ BORJA v. %A# Held: #n order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. $n the other hand, an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable. %he powers and functions of a special administrator are !uite limited. # special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator is authori&ed to collect and ta e charge of the estate until the !uestions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed. # special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and sub'ect to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. (aturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. $n the other hand, a co)administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. H$R&A#O !. ABADA 'acts: *aponong died, owing plaintiffs sum of money. +is widow #bada was administratrix. *ommissioners to appraise estate and pass on claims against estate were appointed. #bada leased +acienda *oronacion to ,ayco. #bada married #lvare&. "ease was transferred to #lvare& by ,ayco. (early - years after death of *aponong, plaintiffs filed suit in *.I against #bada personally and as administratrix, alleging that *aponong owed plaintiffs P/0-12.-34 that #bada, personally and as administratrix, had been receiving money and effects used by her for +acienda *oronacion4 that account of defendant showed balance in favor of plaintiffs of P5032-./64 and that defendant recogni&ed only about P/3777 which however hadnt been paid. Defendant admits that she owed P1666.-1 as administratrix, and the balance was due by her personally. 8uardian of minor children of *aponong as ed permission to intervene. +e denied the claim and alleged that the estate of *aponong didnt owe plaintiffs anything. Parties presented motion stating that they made an amicable settlement. *ourt dismissed the action. %he settlement was that defendants recogni&ed that *aponongs estate was indebted to plaintiffs in sum of P51,5//.7/, to be paid with /79 interest in - e!ual annual installments4 defendants agreed to give plaintiffs first mortgage on all property of *aponong and all property belonging exclusively to #bada4 and defendants agreed to mortgage also the carabaos on the hacienda. %he mortgage of the hacienda was executed. :ut the carabaos were not mortgaged. %he compromise was approved by the court. Plaintiffs allege that defendants had let 0 installments go by without paying anything4 defendants refused to sign the agreement mortgaging the carabaos4 and defendants were about to transfer their property not mortgaged. Plaintiffs prayed for attachment on property of defendants. *ourt granted attachment order. Plaintiffs filed a motion and as ed court to appoint a receiver. *ourt granted this motion. Receiver too charge of property and defendants were ousted from the house.
Case digest in Special Proceedings under Atty. Chato Cabigas Rafael D. Pangilinan
#bada and the guardian filed answer that claim of plaintiffs against the intestate proceedings of *aponong had been allowed in sum of P/0,-12.-3 by commissioners4 the property belonged to children of deceased4 the only interest of #bada was her usufructuary interest in /;5 of the property4 all the property was in custodia legis and could not be attached4 and the compromise agreement and the mortgage executed were obtained through fraud and false representation. <udge dissolved the attachment and discharged the receiver. <udgment was also given for plaintiffs to recover from administratrix P1666.-1 with interest. Personal 'udgment was also given plaintiffs against #bada and #lvare& for P-==-7.0/. #bada appealed personally and as administratrix. Issues: /. whether the compromise agreement and the mortgage were valid 0. whether the carabaos could be attached 2. whether appointment of receiver was proper Held: /. (o. %he claim of plaintiffs against estate of *aponong had been fixed. *ourt says that its approval was meant to include only the amt actually due by estate4 the balance was intended to be approved as against #bada personally. Plaintiffs allege that their orig claim against estate was only P/0-12.-3 and that the balance was due from #bada as administratrix and personally without stating how much was owed by her personally and how much was owed by her as administratrix. *an the court authori&e the mortgage in this case> *ommissioners shall pass upon claims against estate. %he law fixed the limit of the estates liability. %he court could not charge it with debts that were never owed by it. %he administratrix could only charge the estate with reasonable expenses of administration. %he estate owed plaintiffs less than P/2777 when commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this was paid, leaving balance of P1666.-1. Plaintiffs made advances to administratrix until their claim was more than P51777. It is urged that a ma'or part of this P51777 is administration expenses but no reason is given why such expense of administration should be so great. #dministration expense would be the necessary expenses of handling prop, protecting it against destruction or deterioration. :ut if plaintiffs let the administratrix have money and effects till their claim grow to P51777, they cant be permitted to charge this amt as expense of administration. :y expense of administration we understand to be the reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the prop and managing it till debts are paid, and of dividing it so as to partition it and deliver to the heirs. %he court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate debts it never owed. If it did, its approval is a nullity. (either executors, unless specially authori&ed by will, nor administrators, have power to bind estate of deceased by borrowing money. %he statute grants no power to administrator to borrow money upon mortgage of real estate of decedent. ?uch an act is foreign to the policy and purpose of administration which aims to close up, not to continue the estate. %he mortgage was void. %rial courts should exert themselves to close up estates within /0 months from time they are presented4 they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors or administrators who do not actively labor to that end. 0. (o. If they were in the name and possession of administratrix, they were in custodia legis, and could not be attached. 2. (o. Case rulin(s on inter)countr* ado+tion R$PUBLIC v. COUR% O' APP$AL 'acts: <ames #nthony +ughes, a natural born citi&en of the @nited ?tates of #merica, married "enita Aabunay +ughes, a .ilipino *iti&en, who herself was later naturali&ed as a citi&en of that country. $n 0= <une /==7, the spouses 'ointly filed a petition to adopt Aa. *ecilia, (eil and Aaria, all surnamed Aabunay, minor niece and nephews of "enita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. %he minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.
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Issue: whether or not <ames #nthony +ughes and "enita Aabunay +ughes are !ualified to adopt under Philippine law Held: (o. <ames #nthony +ughes is not !ualified to adopt. Bxecutive $rder (o. 07=, otherwise nown as C%he .amily *ode of the Philippines,D is explicit. #rt. /13. %he following persons may not adoptE F/G %he guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation4 F0G #ny person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude4 F2G #n alien, exceptE FaG # former .ilipino citi&en who see s to adopt a relative by consanguinity4 FbG $ne who see s to adopt the legitimate child of his or her .ilipino spouse4 or FcG $ne who is married to a .ilipino citi&en and see s to adopt 'ointly with his or her .ilipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. #liens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt .ilipino children in accordance with the rules in inter)country adoption as may be provided by law. Hhile <ames #nthony un!uestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph F2G of the afore!uoted article, "enita, however, can !ualify pursuant to paragraph F2GFaG. %he problem in her case lies, instead, with #rticle /16 of Bxecutive $rder (o. 07=, expressing as followsE #rt. /16. +usband and wife must 'ointly adopt, except in the following casesE F/G Hhen one spouse see s to adopt his own illegitimate child4 or F0G Hhen one spouse see s to adopt the legitimate child of the other. "enita may not thus adopt alone since #rticle /16 re!uires a 'oint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with #rticle /13. R$PUBLIC v. %OL$DA#O 'acts: Private respondents spouses *louse sought to adopt the minor, ?olomon <oseph #lcala, the younger brother of private respondent Bvelyn #. *louse. Private respondent #lvin #. *louse is a natural born citi&en of the @nited ?tates of #merica. +e married Bvelyn, a .ilipino on <une 3, /=1/ at $longapo *ity. $n #ugust /=, /=11, Bvelyn became a naturali&ed citi&en of the @nited ?tates of #merica in 8uam. %hey are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting ?olomon, a twelve F/0G year old minor. ?ince /=1/ to /=13, then from (ovember 0, /=1= up to the present, ?olomon <oseph #lcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. ?olomon gave his consent to the adoption. +is mother, (ery #lcala, a widow, li ewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. Issue: whether private respondents spouses *louse are !ualified to adopt under Philippine law Held: (o. @nder #rticles /13 and /16 of Bxecutive $rder FB.$.G (o. 07=, otherwise nown as C%he .amily *ode of the PhilippinesD, private respondents spouses *louse are clearly barred from adopting ?olomon <oseph #lcala. #rticle /13, paragraph F2G of Bxecutive $rder (o. 07= expressly enumerates the persons who are not !ualified to adopt, viz.E F2G #n alien, exceptE FaG # former .ilipino citi&en who see s to adopt a relative by consanguinity4 FbG $ne who see s to adopt the legitimate child of his or her .ilipino spouse4 or
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FcG $ne who is married to a .ilipino citi&en and see s to adopt 'ointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. #liens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt .ilipino children in accordance with the rules on inter)country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent #lvin #. *louse is not !ualified to adopt ?olomon <oseph #lcala under any of the exceptional cases in the afore!uoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former .ilipino citi&en but a natural born citi&en of the @nited ?tates of #merica. In the second place, ?olomon <oseph #lcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses *louse 'ointly filed the petition to adopt ?olomon <oseph #lcala on .ebruary 0/, /==7, private respondent Bvelyn #. *louse was no longer a .ilipino citi&en. ?he lost her .ilipino citi&enship when she was naturali&ed as a citi&en of the @nited ?tates in /=11. Private respondent Bvelyn #. *louse, on the other hand, may appear to !ualify pursuant to paragraph 2FaG of #rticle /13 of B.$. 07=. ?he was a former .ilipino citi&en. ?he sought to adopt her younger brother. @nfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating #rticle /16 which mandates a 'oint adoption by the husband and wife. It readsE #rticle /16. +usband and wife must 'ointly adopt, except in the following casesE F/G Hhen one spouse see s to adopt his own illegitimate child4 or F0G Hhen one spouse see s to adopt the legitimate child of the other. #rticle /16 re!uires a 'oint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with #rticle /13. Cases on ,a-eas cor+us &O#CUPA v. $#RIL$ 'acts: Bfren *. Aoncupa was arrested on the allegation that he was a (ational Democratic .ront F(D.G staff member. #fter two separate investigations, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organi&ation. :oth investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree (o. 22. *onse!uently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the *ourt of .irst Instance of Ri&al and the other for violation of P.D. 22. %he respondents, in their return of the writ 'ustified the validity of petitioners detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. +owever, on #ugust 27, /=12, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on Aay //, /=12, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Ainister temporary of (ational Defense with the approval of the President. %he respondents stated. C?ince the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases. Issue: whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioners temporary release Held: (o. It is to be noted that attached to the petitioners temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. %hese areE /G +is freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Aetro Aanila. 0G +is liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also re!uired in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence. 2G +is freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not Cparticipate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security.D 3G +e is re!uired to report regularly to respondents or their representatives. %he reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Ar. Aoncupa. ?uch restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is in!uired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
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$rdinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. :ut the instant case presents a different situation. %he !uestion to be resolved is whether the ?tate can reserve the power to re)arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent 'urisdiction has absolved him of the offense. #n affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely Itemporary it follows that they can be re)arrested at anytime despite their ac!uittal by a court of competent 'urisdiction. He hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. @nder this principle the moment a person is ac!uitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re)arrested for the same offense. %his concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration. # release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Hhere a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subse!uent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. %O.O%O v. RA&O .actsE 8erry %oyoto, Bddie 8on&ales and Dominador 8abiana belong to a group called the C@rban PoorD which conducted a march, demonstration and rally along (orthbay :oulevard in (avotas, Aetro Aanila, on $ctober 02, /=12. ?ubse!uently, %oyoto, 8on&ales and 8abiana Famong othersG were accused of violating Presidential Decree (o. /126 F*odifying the Jarious "aws on #nti)?ubversion and Increasing the Penalties for Aembership in ?ubversive $rgani&ations. %he petitioners were arraigned and they pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. %he order of dismissal was dated (ovember =, /=13, but on December 6, /=13, when the petition for habeas corpus was filed, the respondents had not released and they refused to release the petitioners on the ground that a Preventive Detention #ction had been issued against them. It is to be noted that the petitioners had been in detention for over one year for they were arrested on $ctober 02, /=12. %he return filed by the respondents states that petitioners %oyoto, 8on&ales and 8abiana were released to their relatives on December 1, /=13, pursuant to the order of the Ainister of (ational Defense. %he order is dated (ovember 27, /=13, and orders the Ctemporary releaseD of the petitioners. %he respondents pray that the petition be dismissed for having become moot and academic in view of the release of the petitioners from detention. Issue: whether the habeas corpus case is moot and academic because petitioners were already released from detention Held: (o. $rdinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. :ut the instant case presents a different situation. %he !uestion to be resolved is whether the ?tate can reserve the power to re)arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent 'urisdiction has absolved him of the offense. #n affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely CtemporaryD it follows that they can be re)arrested at anytime despite their ac!uittal by a court of competent 'urisdiction. He hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. @nder this principle the moment a person is ac!uitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re) arrested for the same offense. %his concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration. ALI&POO v. COUR% O' APP$AL 'acts: %he #ccused Reynaldo Aos!uito was detained by the *hief of Police of :ayugan, #gusan, by virtue of a Harrant of #rrest issued by the Aunicipal <udge in the *riminal *ase, which was a prosecution for Robbery with "ess ?erious Physical In'uries. %he place allegedly robbed belonged to the $ffended Parties. *ontending that the Harrant was issued without the observance of the legal re!uirements for the issuance thereof, the #ccused, then detained, and his wife instituted the +abeas *orpus case before the %rial *ourt. %he *omplaint of the #ccused was premised on the alleged violation of #rticle 20cranadF3G, F1G, F/6G, F/5G, F/-G and F/=G of the *ivil *ode, and #rticle 05= of the Revised Penal *ode, by defendants therein who were said to have been instrumental in causing the detention and arrest of the #ccused. #fter due hearing in the +abeas *orpus case, respondent %rial <udge issued the appealed $rder declaring the detention of the #ccused illegal and granting the Hrit of +abeas *orpus. Issue: Hhat is the nature of a writ of habeas corpus>
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Held: # +abeas *orpus proceeding is not a suit between parties. Hhile the issuance of the writ is to all intents and purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the proceedings by +abeas *orpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. It is an in!uisition by the government, at the suggestion and instance of an individual, most probably, but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign. It may be analogi&ed to a proceeding in rem and instituted for the sole purpose of fixing the status of a person. %he person restrained is the central figure in the transaction. %he proceeding is instituted solely for his benefit. #s it is not designed to obtain redress against anybody, and as no 'udgment can be entered against anybody, and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there can be no suit in the technical sense. In +abeas *orpus cases, the 'udgment in favor of the applicant cannot contain a provision for damages. It has to be confined to what is provided for in ?ection /6, Rule /70, which readsE C?B*. /6. Hhen prisoner discharged if no appeal. K Hhen the court or <udge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.D %he sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and ordinarily it cannot properly be used for any other purpose. %hus it has been held that the writ cannot properly be usedE %o enforce a right to service4 to determine whether a person has committed a crime4 in determine a disputed interstate boundary line4 to punish respondent or to afford the in'ured person redress, for the illegal detention4 to recover damages or other money award. Issue: whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy for the accused Held: (o. %he remedy available to the petitioner is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to !uash the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Aunicipal <udge or by the Provincial .iscal. #s a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy, such as appeal or writ of error. :ut the existence of another remedy does not necessarily preclude a resort to the writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from illegal detention, especially where the other remedy is deemed not to be as effective as that of habeas corpus. AL!A/A v. GA$LA 'acts: # petition for habeas corpus was filed by by the spouses .rancisco ?alvaLa and Aodesta ?aliendra to recover the custody of their daughter .elicisima ?alvaLa, a /6)year old single girl who is in the custody of the respondent and appellee, "eopoldo 8aela, 'ustice of the peace of "ucban, %ayabas. 8aela answered that he never had the slightest intention of detaining said .elicisima ?alvaLa and depriving her of her liberty, her stay in the undersigneds home being due not only to the re!uest of the petitioners herein, but also to that of .elicisima ?alvaLa, herself, who does not want to live in her parents home, because they maltreated he and wished her to marry a certain individual named #ndres "aguador, whom she does not care for. Issue: whether habeas corpus will lie for the recovery of the custody of an unemancipated minor daughter who is under the custody of a third person of her own free will Held: Mes. ?ection 606 of the *ode of *ivil Procedure provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted. #rticle /63 of the *ivil *ode provides that the father or, in his default, the mother may exercise parental power over their unemancipated legitimate children4 and article /66 imposes upon them the duty of eeping such children in their company, educating and instructing them. ?ection 662 of the *ode of *ivil Procedure recogni&ed this parental power in providing that the parents are the natural guardians of their minor children entitled to their custody and care for their education. ?ince the petitioners)appellants are entitled to the custody of their minor daughter .elicisima ?alvaLa, they are also entitled to recover her by habeas corpus, in accordance with the provision of section 606 of the *ode of *ivil Procedure cited above.
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%he fact, then, that a minor daughter is in the custody of a third person of her own free will, and without said persons having the slightest intention of detaining her, is no hindrance to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpusto enable her parents to regain custody of her person. Issue: whether the mere fact that the parents of a minor daughter have sought to compel her to marry a young man of their choice, whom she does not care for, and the mere fact that they have refused to consent to her marriage to another young man whom she favors, and with whom she has eloped and by whom she is pregnant, are sufficient reasons for depriving said parents of their parental power and custody of said minor daughter Held: (o. ?ection 662 of the *ode of *ivil Procedure, while recogni&ing, as stated heretofore, the parental authority of the parents over their unemancipated minor children, with the right to their custody and education, empowers courts to appoint some suitable person as guardian of said minors, as the best interests of the latter may re!uire. (ow then, to what extent and within what limits may courts exercise this discretional power to deprive parents of patria potestas and the custody of their unemancipated minor children> In regulating the relations between parents and children in regard to the custody and education of unemancipated children, the *ivil *ode, as well as the *ode of *ivil Procedure, has had in view the interests and welfare of said children4 for this is the basis of article /-/ of the *ivil *ode, which authori&es courts to deprive parents of patria potestas or to suspend its exercise, if they treat their children with excessive cruelty or, by orders or advices given them or example set them, tend to corrupt them4 and section --7 of the *ode of *ivil Procedure grants the courts the same authority, Cwhen the parent or parents of any minor child shall be unable through vagrancy, negligence, or misconduct to support such child, or if able, shall neglect or refuse to support such child, or when such parent or parents shall unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat such child, or cause or allow it to engage in common begging. . . .D %a ing the provisions of the *ivil *ode and of the *ode of *ivil Procedure together, it appears that the discretional power conferred upon courts by section 662 of the procedural law above cited is limited or conditioned by the provisions of article /-/ of said *ivil *ode and section --7 of the *ode of *ivil Procedure, enumerating the cases when parents may be deprived of patria potestas and, conse!uently, of the custody of their unemancipated minor children. %he concrete facts upon which the trial court relies to deprive the petitioners)appellants of the custody of their minor daughter, denying their petition for habeas corpus areE %hat they have sought to compel their aforesaid daughter to marry a young man against her will, and refuse to consent to her marriage with another young man with whom she eloped and by whom she is to)day six months pregnant. (either the act compelling their unemancipated minor daughter to marry against her will, nor the act of refusing to give their consent to her marriage, is included in the causes established by the laws we have cited for depriving parents of patria potestas and the custody of their unemancipated minor children. #lthough in the ma'ority of cases when parents oblige their unemancipated minor children to marry against their will they have at heart the welfare of those children, we disappove of such a practice, for while in time and through fond and tender treatment, affection may follow and with it the happiness of the family, above all should there be children, since marriage should be based upon mutual love and sympathy, there are not a few cases where marriages not precluded by such sentiments have been unfortunate4 and when the means employed by parents to ma e their unemancipated minor children marry against their will is such as bring about moral or physical sufferings, the intervention of the courts to deprive such parents of patria potestas and the custody of said children will be 'ustified. In the present case, however, it does not appear that the parents of the minor .elicisima ?alvaLa insist upon her marrying against her will, nor do we believe they will insist upon it on account of her present physiological condition4 the cruelty having ceased thereby, which would otherwise have 'ustified depriving them of parental authority, and if they now desire to eep her in their company, notwithstanding such condition, it is because they love her. It may be that by marrying the man by whom she is now pregnant, she would be happier than by living with her own parents, but since the law does not authori&e the deprivation of parental authority on the ground that parents refuse to consent to the marriage of their unemancipated minor children, it would be a direct violation of that law, depriving said parents of their parental authority. @nemancipated minor children, due to the incomplete development of their mind and intellectual faculties, and to their lac of experience in the world, need the counsel, care, and guidance of their progenitors
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in order to prevent the impulse of passion, excited by worldly illusion which their undeveloped intellectual faculties are not strong enough to overcome, from leading them to serious conse!uences. UAR$" v. COUR% O' APP$AL 'acts: Respondent Aanese filed with the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus against petitioner Renato ?uare&. :efore she could finish the presentation of her evidence, respondent Aanese filed a motion to dismiss without pre'udice to her right to file another action for custody of minor under Rule == of the Rules of *ourt, contending that the issue as to who between the parties has the rightful and legal custody of the minor child could be fully ad'udicated in another action and not in the present action for writ of habeas corpus.%he trial court issued a resolution granting the motion with pre'udice. %hereafter, respondent Aanese filed another action for custody of minor and support before the trial court against petitioner. %he latter moved to dismiss the action on the ground of bar by prior 'udgment. %he motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied by the trial court. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the denial which was also denied. Issue: whether or not the order of dismissal with pre'udice in the action for the writ of habeas corpus is res 'udicata to the present action for custody of minor and support Held: (o. %here are four well nown re!uisites to the principle of res 'udicataE F/G there must be a final 'udgment or order4 F0G the court rendering the same must have 'urisdiction over the sub'ect matter of the parties4 F2G the former 'udgment is a 'udgment on the merits4 and F3G there is between the first and the second action identity of parties, of sub'ect matter, and of causes of action. In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff states that it was without pre'udice to the filing of an action for the custody of minor on the ground that the issue as to the custody of the child would be properly determined in a second action to be filed under Rule == of the Revised Rules of *ourt. *learly, the purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing the first action for a writ of habeas corpus was not to end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody of her child but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this time for custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the ground upon which respondent Aanese filed her motion for dismissal is erroneous since the !uestion as to who shall have the custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule /70, Revised Rules of *ourt without the necessity of filing a separate action under Rule == of the said rules for that purpose. (evertheless, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the first case with pre'udice to the filing of the second action without stating the reasons or basis thereof %his should not prevent the filing of the second action for custody of minor, since no opportunity was granted by the trial court to the plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court in the habeas corpus case. +ence, the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus cannot be considered as a valid ad'udication on the merits which would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor. GAL!$" v. COUR% O' APP$AL Issue: whether a petition for habeas corpus can be properly filed together with petitions for certiorari and mandamus Held: Mes. %he writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. # writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the 'urisdictional matters, but not the record. # writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. +ence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. +owever, habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having 'urisdiction over the person and the sub'ect matter. Issue: Hhat is the nature of writ of habeas corpus> Held: # writ of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invo ed. +abeas corpus is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine 'urisdictional !uestions that may arise. It has to be an exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. In the absence of special circumstances re!uiring immediate action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of a determination of his case in court. In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.
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$#RIL$ v. ALA"AR 'acts: In the afternoon of .ebruary 0-, /==7, ?enate Ainority .loor "eader <uan Ponce Bnrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director #lfredo "im of the (ational :ureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by +on. <aime ?ala&ar of the Regional %rial *ourt of Nue&on *ity :ranch /72. %he warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of ?enior ?tate Prosecutor #urelio *. %rampe, ?tate Prosecutor .erdinand R. #besamis and #ssistant *ity Prosecutor Bulogio Aanan!uil, <r., charging ?enator Bnrile, the spouses Rebecco and Brlinda Panlilio, and 8regorio +onasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from (ovember 0= to December /7, /==7. ?enator Bnrile was ta en to and held overnight at the (:I head!uarters on %aft #venue, Aanila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. %he following morning, .ebruary 01, /==7, he was brought to *amp %omas Oaringal in Nue&on *ity where he was given over to the custody of the ?uperintendent of the (orthern Police District, :rig. 8en. Bdgardo Dula %orres. ?enator Bnrile filed the petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having beenE FaG held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute boo s4 FbG charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process4 FcG denied his right to bail4 and FdG arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the 'udge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. Issue: whether a petition for habeas corpus was the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial Held: (o. %he criminal case before the respondent <udge was the normal venue for invo ing the petitioners right to have provisional liberty pending trial and 'udgment. %he original 'urisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. %he correct course was for petitioner to invo e that 'urisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the wea ness of the evidence against him. $nly after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review 'urisdiction of this *ourt have been invo ed, and even then, not without first applying to the *ourt of #ppeals if appropriate relief was also available there. PAR$D$ v. A#DIGA#BA.A# 'acts: *eferino ?. Paredes, <r., then the Provincial #ttorney of #gusan del ?ur, applied for a free patent for "ot (o. 27=-) #, P"?)5-, with an area of /,2=/ s!uare meters, located beside the Hashington +ighway in ?an .rancisco, #gusan del ?ur. +is application was favorably acted upon by the "and Inspector, #rmando "uison. Bight years later, on <une 0-, /=13, the ?angguniang :ayan of the Aunicipality of ?an .rancisco passed Resolution (o. 37, re!uesting the ?angguniang Panlalawigan of #gusan del ?ur to assist it in recovering "ot (o. 27=- from #ttorney Paredes because the land had been designated and reserved as a school site. %he ?angguniang :ayan re!uested the provincial fiscal to file a per'ury charge against #ttorney Paredes, <r. %he resolution was approved by the ?angguniang Panlalawigan. # civil case for annulment of #ttorney Paredes title was filed in court. During the pendency of the case, %eofilo 8elacio, former vice)mayor of ?an .rancisco, #gusan del ?ur, filed with the %anodbayan a criminal complaint charging #ttorney Paredes with having violated ?ection 2FaG of the #nti)8raft P *orrupt Practices #ct FR.#. 27/=G because he allegedly used his office as Provincial #ttorney to influence, persuade, and induce #rmando "uison, "and Inspector of the District "and $ffice in #gusan del ?ur, to favorably indorse his free patent application. %he fiscal issued a resolution finding aprima facie case of violation of ?ection 2FaG of R.#. 27/= committed by the accused. %he .iscals resolution was approved by %anodbayan. #n information was filed against 8overnor Paredes in the ?andiganbayan and a warrant for his arrest, fixing bail of P07,777 for his provisional liberty, was issued and served upon him +e refused to post bail in protest against the in'ustice to him as 8overnor. *onse!uently, he was detained in the municipal 'ail of ?an .rancisco.
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# petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife, Ars. Bden Paredes, against the ?andiganbayan. ?he alleged that the warrant for her husbands arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information against him had already prescribed. Issue: whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy in this case Held: (o. %he writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has 'urisdiction to do so. %he petitioner alleges that the information against 8overnor Paredes is invalid because the preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. %hose circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. %he absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the courts 'urisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. %he remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lac of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. %he court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation. ILAGA# v. $#RIL$ 'acts: $n Aay /7, /=16, #ttorney "aurente *. Ilagan was arrested in Davao *ity by elements of the P*)I(P and detained at *amp *atitipan on the basis of a Aission $rder allegedly issued by the Ainistry of (ational Defense. $n that same day, fifteen lawyers from the I:P Davao *hapter visited #tty. Ilagan. $ne of the visiting lawyers, #tty. #ntonio #rellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Aission $rder. $n Aay /2, /=16, the military sent word to the I:P Davao *hapter that #ttorney Aarcos Risonar would li ewise be arrested. %he latter went to *amp *atitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Aission $rder signed by 8eneral Bchavarria, Regional @nified *ommander. # petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the *onstitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Aission $rders. Issue: whether the filing of an information in court renders a petition for habeas corpus moot and academic Held: Mes. %he petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional %rial *ourt of Davao *ity and the issuance of a Harrant of #rrest against them. %he function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to in!uire into the legality of ones detention. (ow that the detained attorneys incarceration is by virtue of a 'udicial order in relation to criminal cases subse!uently filed against them before the Regional %rial *ourt Davao *ity, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. If the detained attorneys !uestion their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Hrit of +abeas *orpus but a Aotion before the trial court to !uash the Harrant of #rrest, and;or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to as for an investigation;reinvestigation of the case. +abeas corpus would not lie after the Harrant of commitment was issued by the *ourt on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. LU#A v. PLA"A 'acts: %here is a valid complaint charging the accused ?imon "una with the crime of Aurder filed with the respondent <udge authori&ed to conduct the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause before the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest. %he complaint is supported by the statements of the witnesses under oath in writing in the form of !uestions and answers and other documents attached to the complaint. :efore the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, the respondent 'udge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution on their statements ta en by %)?gt. *andido Patosa by reading the !uestions and answers all over again to the affiants who confirmed to the respondent <udge that the statements contained in their sworn statements are true. :eing satisfied that the !uestions and answers contained in the sworn statements ta en by %)?gt Patosa parta e of the nature of his searching !uestions and answers as re!uired by law, the respondent <udge adopted them as his own personal examination of the witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause, the order and the warrant of
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arrest were issued to ta e the accused into custody for the commission of the offense charged. %he petitioner waived his right to the preliminary investigation and applied to be admitted to bail. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without the due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent <udge in violation of Republic #ct (o. 2101. Issue: whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this case Held: (o. %he remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to !uash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Aunicipal <udge or by the Provincial .iscal. C,an(e of name .U v. R$PUBLIC 'acts: <oselito Mu, represented by his guardian ad litem <uan ?. :arrera, filed a petition to have his name changed to Ricardo ?y. Petitioner avers in his petition that he is a minor of /2 years, and a *hinese citi&en who has been a resident of Aanila for more than three years prior to the filing of the petition. #s grounds for the change of name he alleges that as far as he can remember has been using the name CRicardo ?y,D that he grew up under the care and custody of <uan ?y :arrera, his guardian ad litem4 that he is enrolled in school under the said name and that he was bapti&ed CRicardo ?y with his real name also stated.D Hithout a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule /72 of the Revised Rules of *ourt may not be invo ed by aliens. Issue: whether Rule /72 of the Revised Rules of *ourt may not be invo ed by aliens Held: (o. Rule /72 does not say that only citi&ens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. ?ection / provides that Ca person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the *ourt of .irst Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the *ity of Aanila to the <uvenile and Domestic Relations *ourt.D +ere the word CpersonD is a generic term which is not limited to .ilipino citi&ens, but embraces all natural persons. %he rule does not even re!uire that the citi&enship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth FaG that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three F2G years prior to the date of filing4 FbG the cause for which the change of name is sought4 and FcG the name as ed for F?ection 0G. %he rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the re!uirements, and .ilipino citi&enship is not one of them. # change of name as authori&ed under Rule /72 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, ones existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom4 nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter ones legal capacity, civil status or citi&enship. Hhat is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in spea ing of or dealing with him. %he situation is no different whether the person whose name is changed be a citi&en or an alien. Case rulin(s on c,an(e of name R$PUBLIC v. H$R#A#D$" 'acts: Private respondent spouses, Jan Aunson y (avarro and Regina Aunson y #ndrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Oevin Barl :artolome Aoran, duly alleging therein the 'urisdictional facts re!uired by Rule == of the Rules of *ourt for adoption, their !ualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to #aron <oseph, the same being the name with which he was bapti&ed in eeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since Aay 5, /==2 when he arrived at private respondents residence.
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Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. Issue: whether the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee can be made 'ointly in the adoption case Held: (o. #rt. /1= of the .amily *ode enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoptionE F/G .or civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall ac!uire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters4 F0G %he parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised 'ointly by both spouses4 and F2G %he adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. *learly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary conse!uence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. +owever, the given or proper name, also nown as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. %he creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered *hristian or first name. %he automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. (either is it a mere incident in nor an ad'unct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. %he name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with 'urisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. *hanging the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authori&ed without a 'udicial order. %he purpose of the statutory procedure authori&ing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in eeping with the ob'ect of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally ma e its decree recording such change. %he official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural re!uirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule /72 of the Rules of *ourt, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. @nder Rule /72, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name as ed for. #n order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the ?olicitor 8eneral or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the 8overnment at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may ad'udge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said 'udgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register. # petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the re!uirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with 'urisdiction for its ad'udication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. # fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. %o consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system. %he sub'ect petition is deficient insofar as it see s the change of name of the adoptee, all of which ta en together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
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deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law. (either can the allowance of the sub'ect petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be 'ustified under the rule allowing permissive 'oinder of causes of action. # petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Bach action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. %hese two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopters fitness and !ualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly. $n the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is loo ed into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name. +ence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other. Issue: whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name Held: (o. # persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is nown and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in spea ing of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. %he name of an individual has two partsE the given or proper name and the surname or family name. %he giver or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. %he surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. %he given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. :y #rticle 371 of the *ivil *ode, a persons birth must be entered in the civil register. %he official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. %hat is his name in the eyes of the law. #nd once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, #rticle 2-5 of the same *ode seals that identity with its precise mandateE no person can change his name or surname without 'udicial authority. %his statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the ?tate in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. :y reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule /72 of the Rules of *ourt. .or purposes of an application for change of name under #rticle 2-5 of the *ivil *ode and correlatively implemented by Rule /72, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. # petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the re!uisites therefor in order to vest the court with 'urisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. # change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the conse!uences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. :efore a person can be authori&ed to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may 'ustify such change. QQQ <urisprudence has recogni&ed, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of nameE FaG when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce4 FbG when the change results as a legal conse!uence of legitimation or adoption4 FcG when the change will avoid confusion4 FdG when one has continuously used and been nown since childhood by a .ilipino name and was unaware of alien parentage4 FeG when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a .ilipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without pre'udice to anybody4 and FfG when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would pre'udice public interest. *ontrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was bapti&ed by another name, under which he has been nown and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. .or, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine !ua non to a change of name. (either does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become nown by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authori&e a change of name.
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# name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is nown in the community K when at variance with that entered in the civil register K is unofficial and cannot be recogni&ed as his real name. %he practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. $nce such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. %his effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit 'udicial approval. .A I# v. JUDG$0 HARI1A DI %RIC% COUR% 'acts: +atima *. Masin, a Auslim, filed a petition to resume the use of her maiden name considering that she and her former husband are already divorced under the Auslim *ode and the latter is married to someone else. Issue: whether or not petitioner who has been divorced needs 'udicial approval to resume the sue of her maiden name Held: (o. %he true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register. Hhile it is true that under #rticle 2-5 of the *ivil *ode, no person can change his name or surname without 'udicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the *ivil Register. Petitioners registered name is +atima *enti M. ?aul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not see to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to +ad'i Idris Masin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Auslim law. #rticles 2-7 and 2-/ of the *ivil *ode providesE #rt. 2-7. # married woman may useE F/G +er maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or F0G +er maiden first name and her husbands surname, or F2G +er husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as CArs.D #rt. 2-/. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. +owever, she may choose to continue employing her former husbands surname, unlessE F/G %he court decrees otherwise, or F0G ?he or the former husband is married again to another person. Hhen a woman marries a man, she need not apply and;or see 'udicial authority to use her husbands name by prefixing the word CArs.D before her husbands full name or by adding her husbands surname to her maiden first name. %he law grants her such right. ?imilarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authori&ed by the Auslim *ode, the widow or divorcee need not see 'udicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husbands name is optional and not obligatory for her. Hhen petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. (either was she re!uired to secure 'udicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law re!uires it. R$PUBLIC v. COUR% O' APP$AL 'acts: *ynthia Jicencio was born on /= <anuary /=-/ to the spouses Pablo *astro Jicencio and .e Bsperan&a de Jega "eabres. $n /7 <anuary /=-0, after a marital spat, Pablo Jicencio left their con'ugal abode then situated at Aeycauayan, :ulacan. ?ince then Pablo Jicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Brnesto Mu who had come to the aid of .e Bsperan&a de Jega "eabres and her children. .e Bsperan&a "eabres filed a petition for dissolution of their con'ugal partnership, which was granted. ?ometime in /=12, petitioners mother filed another petition for change of name, that is, to drop the surname of her husband therefrom, and after hearing a decision was rendered. In /=13, petitioners mother again filed another petition for the declaration of Pablo Jicencio as an absentee, and which petition was granted. $n /6 #pril /=15, petitioners mother and Brnesto Mu were 'oined in matrimony in a ceremony.
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Issue: whether private respondent can change her surname to that of her step)fathers surname Held: (o. %he following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change nameE FaG when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce, FbG when the change is a legal conse!uence of legitimation or adoption4 FcG when the change will avoid confusion4 FdG when one has continuously used and been nown since childhood by a .ilipino name and was unaware of alien parentage4 FeG when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a .ilipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without pre'udice to anybody4 and FfG when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would pre'udice public interest. %he touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be Cproper and reasonable causeD for which the change is sought. %he assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which re!uires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Private respondent *ynthia Jicencio is the legitimate offspring of .e "eabres and Pablo Jicencio. #s previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the conse!uences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. *onfusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents parentage because of her surname. :ut even, more confusion with grave legal conse!uences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step)fathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. LIO#G v. R$PUBLIC 'acts: Petitioner see s to change his name from +aw "iong to #lfonso "antin. +e is 3- years old, married, and an employee of the "eyte #sia %rading *ompany. +e has been a resident of %acloban *ity for more than 07 years. +e wants to change his name to #lfonso "antin because he is called by his .ilipino friends as #lfonso and the name of his father is Placido "antin. +e wants to have a .ilipino name because he will soon be a .ilipino citi&en. +e came to the Philippines in /=06 and since then his .ilipino friends have been calling him #lfonso. Issue: whether petitioner can change his name from +aw "iong to #lfonso "antin Held: (o. :efore a person can be authori&ed to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may 'ustify such change. $therwise, the re!uest should be denied. %he following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of nameE F/G when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce4 F0G when the re!uest for change is a conse!uence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is ac nowledged or legitimated4 and F2G when the change is necessary to avoid confusion. Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may 'ustify the re!uest for a change of name other than his desire to adopt the name #lfonso for the reason that he has always been nown by that name by his .ilipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his father which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. :ut this claim which is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning as +aw "iong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate. %he fact that he claims to be the son of one Placido "antin, a .ilipino is of no moment because if the same were true it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth is +aw "iong and he had to file a petition for naturali&ation to become a .ilipino citi&en. %his indirectly belies his claim that the name that should be given him is #lfonso "antin because that is the family name of his father Cto conform with the customs and traditions and also for sentimental reasons.D %he true situation however is that in his business dealings with other people he always signed as +aw "iong and never used the name #lfonso "antin4 that he came to be called #lfonso by his friends only when during the <apanese occupation his .ilipino friends as ed him how he was called and he told them that his name was #lfonso, and since then they started calling him by that name4 and that he is nown in %acloban *ity as +aw "iong and has not contracted with any person under the name of #lfonso "antin. (o proper or compelling reason that may 'ustify the change of name desired by petitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to.
/6
R$PUBLIC v. I#%$R&$DIA%$ APP$LLA%$ COUR% 'acts: Private respondent Oenneth Hong Aan "eung was born in +ong ong on (ovember 2, /=62. +e came to the Philippines as a :ritish sub'ect sometime in /=5=. +e was then nown as Hong Aan "eung, which is the name set out in his #lien *ertificate of Registration as well as in his ??? Personal Data Record. +e was bapti&ed on Aarch 0, /=-6 at the Parish *hurch of ?ta. Aaria at Iloilo *ity, and given the *hristian name, Oenneth4 his baptismal certificate declares his full name as Oenneth Hong Aan "eung. %en months later, in the same church, he married Aaylinda Map, his name in the marriage contract being Oenneth Hong Aan "eung alias Oiana ?o. +e was naturali&ed as a .ilipino citi&en on .ebruary /7, /=-5 in accordance with Presidential Decree (o. 125. In his *ertificate of (aturali&ation, his name is given as Oenneth Hong Aan "eung alias Oiana so4 and this, of course, is how his name is recorded in the $ffice of the "ocal *ivil Registrar of Iloilo *ity. $ther documents set forth his various names and aliasesE the certificate of birth of his son, Dexter, states his name as Oiana *huen *o4 the ??? members Data *hange or #dditional Report states his name as Hong Aan "eung Oenneth FOiana ?oG4 his income tax return declares his name as "eung, Oenneth Hong Aan, and the official receipt evidencing payment of the tax has his name written as "eung, Oenneth, the official records of ?olid 8as Inc., Iloilo, of which he is the 8eneral Aanager, show his name to be Oenneth Hong Aan "eung alias Oiana ?o4 his residence tax receipt and all the clearances obtained by him from the *ity *ourt, the *ourt of .irst Instance, the *ity .iscal, and the police authorities of Iloilo *ity, give his name also as Oenneth Hong Aan "eung alias Oiana ?o. It was his wish to rid himself of such a burdensomely long name as Oenneth Hong Aan "eung alias Oiana ?o and to avoid confusion resulting from inadvertent but fre!uent rearrangements of its various parts4 his desire to adopt not only a shorter and more easily Identifiable name, but also a .ilipino name which would associate himself more closely with his countrymen by adoption4 and the further fact that he has since come to be publicly nown as Oenneth Oiana ?o, which prompted Oenneth to see and obtain 'udicial approval of his change of name. Issue: whether petitioner correctly stated his real or official name and fulfilled the 'urisdictional re!uirement for a change of name Held: Mes. #t the time Oenneth filed his petition for change of name, the records of the "ocal *ivil Registrar officially showed his name to be Oenneth Hong Aan "eung alias Oiana ?o, this being the name under which he sought and was granted .ilipino citi&enship by naturali&ation pursuant to PD (o. 125. +is petition did therefore state his real or official name and fulfilled the 'urisdictional re!uirement in this regard. Aoreover, the petition also alleged his former name as a :ritish sub'ect, CHong Aan "eungD as then appeared in his alien certificate of registration. PADILLA v. R$PUBLIC 'acts: Dolores 8emora and Jincent *o, a *hinese national, were married on Aay 6, /=63. %his matrimonial union begot five children, namelyE Aichael *opuaco, #bigail *opuaco, Rafael *opuaco, 8abriel *opuaco, and #nnabelle *o. ?ometime in (ovember /=57, Jincent *o left the con'ugal abode and has since never returned to, or even visited, his family. It is alleged that he was a fugitive from 'ustice, having been charged with several offenses of estafa. :ecause of his continuous absence, the court on petition of Dolores 8emora, issued an order declaring Jincent *o as an absentee. $n $ctober 27, /=56, Dolores 8emora contracted a second marriage with ?gt. Bdward Padilla, an #mericas serviceman stationed at *lar #ir :ase, #ngeles *ity. %he five minor children, who had been living with said spouses, were generously supported by Padilla and were treated by him with affection as if they were his own children. %his harmonious relation existing between said minors and their stepfather prompted Dolores 8emora to file the instant petition for change of the minors surname from C*opuacoD or C*oD to CPadillaD, which petition was granted by the lower court after due notice and hearing. Issue: whether petitioners can change their surname to that of their stepfather Held: (o. $ur laws do not authori&e legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their father. ?aid minors are the legitimate children of Jincent *o4 and #rticle 253 of the *ivil *ode explicitly provides that Clegitimate children ... shall principally use the surname of their father.D
/5
%o allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mothers second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Bdward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit. D$L PRADO v. R$PUBLIC 'acts: 8ertrudes <osefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, *ora&on #dolfo *alderdon, filed a petition, praying that her name C8ertrudes <osefina del PradoD be changed to C8etrudes <osefina *alderon.D It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, born on Aarch /-, /=65, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Aanuel del Prado with *ora&on #dolfo4 that the surname CDel PradoD which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has become the sub'ect of unfair comments4 that the surname which the petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people4 that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Bngineer Romeo *. *alderon4 and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from CDel PradoD to C*alderon Cwhich is the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother. %he Provincial .iscal of Davao, representing the ?olicitor 8eneral, filed an opposition to the petition upon the ground that the change of surname of the petition is unwarranted, considering that said petitioner was born out of a bigamous marriage and as such she has the status of an ac nowledged natural child by legal fiction and under the law she should bear the surname of her father Aanuel del Prado. Issue: whether the petition for change of name is based upon proper and reasonable cause Held: Mes. # petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. Hhen the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo *. *alderon is the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the childs using his surname. %he mother had considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate father. Hhile it is true that the *ode provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall principally en'oy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from ta ing another surname with the latters consent and for 'ustifiable reasons. If under the law a legitimate child may secure a change of his name through 'udicial proceedings, upon a showing of a Cproper and reasonable causeD. %here is no reason why a natural child cannot do the same. %he purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule /72 of the Rules of *ourt, is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. DI!I#AGRACIA v. R$PUBLIC 'acts: ,osima (aldo&a was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on Aay 27, /=-7. %hey begot two children named Dionesio, <r. and :ombi Roberto. ,osimas husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. +e never returned to the con'ugal abode. +e allegedly swindled *ongressman Aaglana in the sum of P67,777.77, one 8alagar in the sum of P/7,777.77 also Bloy 8allentes and other persons. %he classmates of Dionesio, <r. and :ombi Roberto allegedly teased them about their father being a swindler. %wo criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two minor children and their scapegrace father, ,osima, filed a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia to (aldo&a, her surname. Issue: whether two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their fathers surname and should use only their mothers surname Held: (o. %he minors Dionesio, <r. and :ombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their fathers surname F#rt. 253, *ivil *odeG. %o allow them, at their mothers behest, to bear only their mothers surname Fwhich they are entitled to use together with their fathers surnameG and to discard altogether their fathers surname thus removing the prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. %he mothers desire should not be the sole consideration.
/-
%he change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for such change F?ec. 6, Rule /72, Rules of *ourtG. Hhere, as in this case, the petitioners are minors, the courts should ta e into account whether the change of name would redound their welfare or would pre'udice them. In this case, the reasons adduced for eliminating the fathers surname are not substantial enough to 'ustify the petition. %o allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. %hat would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records. A-sentees R$.$ v. AL$JA#DRO 'acts: Petitioner)appellant Brlinda Reynoso Reyes filed a petition to have her husband Roberto Reyes declared an absentee, alleging that her husband had been absent from their con'ugal dwelling since #pril /=50 and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts un nown. %he petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts. Issue: whether it is necessary to 'udicially declare the husbands absence Held: (o. .or the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse 'udicially declared an absentee. %he declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the *ivil *ode has for its sole purpose to enable the ta ing of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. .or the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only re!uires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not now his or her former spouse to he living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. %he need to have a person 'udicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be ta en cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the *ourt F#rticle 213, *ivil *odeG4 the spouse of the absentee is as ing for separation of property F#rticle /=/, *ivil *odeG or his wife is as ing the *ourt that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her F#rticle /=5, *ivil *odeG. %he petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the con'ugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and ad'udicated in the same proceedings. JO#$ v. HOR%IGU$LA 'acts: In December, /=/3, Aarciana BscaLo married #rthur H. <ones in the suburban catholic church of ?an (icolas, Province of *ebu. $n <anuary /7, /=/1, <ones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In $ctober, /=/=, proceedings were institute in the *ourt of .irst Instance of Aaasin, "eyte, at the instance of Aarciana BscaLo, to have her husband 'udicially declared an absentee. $n the 06th of said month, the court issued an order declaring #rthur H. <ones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article /15 of the *ivil *ode, with the proviso that said 'udicial declaration of absence would not ta e effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. ?aid order directed the publication thereof in the $fficial 8a&ette and in the newspaper CBl IdealD. Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the $fficial 8a&ette during the month of December, /=/=, and <anuary, .ebruary, Aarch, #pril, Aay and <une, /=07. $n #pril 02, /=0/, the court issued another order for the ta ing effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the $fficial 8a&ette and in CBl Ideal.D $n Aay 5, /=0-, .elix +ortiguela and Aarciana BscaLo were married before the 'ustice of the peace of Aalitbog, "eyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage. Issue: whether 'udicial declaration of absence is necessary Held: (o. .or the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse 'udicially declared an absentee. %he declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the *ivil *ode has for its sole purpose to enable the ta ing of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. .or the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only re!uires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not now his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
/1
Petition for c,an(e of first name and (ender IL!$RIO v. R$PUBLIC 'acts: Petitioners name was registered as CRommel <acinto Dantes ?ilverioD in his certificate of live birth Fbirth certificateG. +is sex was registered as Cmale.D +e is a transsexual, having undergone a sex reassignment surgery abroad. +e then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from CRommel <acintoD to CAely,D and his sex from CmaleD to Cfemale.D Issue: Aay a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery> Held: (o. ?ection / of R# =731 F*lerical Brror "awG providesE ?B*%I$( /. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. R (o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a 'udicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nic name which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this #ct and its implementing rules and regulations. R# =731 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. @nder the law, therefore, 'urisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. %he intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules /72 F*hange of (ameG and /71 F*ancellation or *orrection of Bntries in the *ivil RegistryG of the Rules of *ourt, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subse!uently denied. It li ewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not 'udicial. R# =731 li ewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowedE ?B*%I$( 3. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. R %he petition for change of first name or nic name may be allowed in any of the following casesE F/G %he petitioner finds the first name or nic name to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce4 F0G %he new first name or nic name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly nown by that first name or nic name in the community4 or F2G %he change will avoid confusion. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. +e intended to ma e his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. +owever, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. R# =731 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. :efore a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason 'ustifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be pre'udiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any pre'udice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary 'urisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under R# =731. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the $ffice of the *ivil Registrar of Aanila where his birth certificate is ept. Aore importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not pre'udice him at all.
/=
Aoreover, under R# =731, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule /71 of the Rules of *ourt. %he entries envisaged in #rticle 3/0 of the *ivil *ode and correctable under Rule /71 of the Rules of *ourt are those provided in #rticles 37- and 371 of the *ivil *odeE #R%. 37-. #cts, events and 'udicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. #R%. 371. %he following shall be entered in the civil registerE F/G :irths4 F0G marriages4 F2G deaths4 F3G legal separations4 F6G annulments of marriage4 F5G 'udgments declaring marriages void from the beginning4 F-G legitimations4 F1G adoptions4 F=G ac nowledgments of natural children4 F/7G naturali&ation4 F//G loss, or F/0G recovery of citi&enship4 F/2G civil interdiction4 F/3G 'udicial determination of filiation4 F/6G voluntary emancipation of a minor4 and F/5G changes of name. %he acts, events or factual errors contemplated under #rticle 37- of the *ivil *ode include even those that occur after birth. +owever, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can 'ustify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. %o correct simply means Cto ma e or set aright4 to remove the faults or error fromD while to change means Cto replace something with something else of the same ind or with something that serves as a substitute.D %he birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. #ll entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. (o correction is necessary. #rticle 37- of the *ivil *ode authori&es the entry in the civil registry of certain acts Fsuch as legitimations, ac nowledgments of illegitimate children and naturali&ationG, events Fsuch as births, marriages, naturali&ation and deathsG and udicial decrees Fsuch as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturali&ation, loss or recovery of citi&enship, civil interdiction, 'udicial determination of filiation and changes of nameG. %hese acts, events and 'udicial decrees produce legal conse!uences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. %heir effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in #rticle 37-. (either is it recogni&ed nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. 2 tatus3 refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation Fthat is, the sum total of capacities and incapacitiesG of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. :ut there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. %his is fatal to petitioners cause. Aoreover, ?ection 6 of #ct 2-62 Fthe *ivil Register "awG providesE ?B*. 6. !egistration and certification of births. R %he declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. ?uch declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child. In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following factsE FaG date and hour of birth4 FbG se4 and nationality of infant4 FcG names, citi&enship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not nown, of the mother alone4 FdG civil status of parents4 FeG place where the infant was born4 and FfG such other data as may be re!uired in the regulations to be issued. @nder the *ivil Register "aw, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. %hus, the se" of a person is determined at birth# visually done by the birth attendant Fthe physician or midwifeG by examining the genitals of the infant. *onsidering that there is no law legally recogni&ing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
07
Hhen words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. %he words Csex,D CmaleD and CfemaleD as used in the *ivil Register "aw and laws concerning the civil registry Fand even all other lawsG should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as Cthe sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a femaleD or Cthe distinction between male and female.D .emale is Cthe sex that produces ova or bears youngD and male is Cthe sex that has organs to produce spermato&oa for fertili&ing ova.D %hus, the words CmaleD and CfemaleD in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. .urthermore, Cwords that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well) nown meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.D ?ince the statutory language of the *ivil Register "aw was enacted in the early /=77s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term CsexD as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post)operative male)to)female transsexual to be included in the category Cfemale.D .or these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authori&es the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. %hus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Constitution of famil* ,ome &OD$5UILLO v. ALI#A 'acts: # 'udgment was rendered by the *ourt of #ppeals against respondents <ose Aode!uillo and :enito Aalubay. %he said 'udgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued to satisfy the said 'udgment on their goods and chattels, among which was their family home. # motion to !uash and;or to set aside levy of execution was filed by Aode!uillo alleging therein that the family home is built since /=5= prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under #rticles /60 and /62 of the .amily *ode except for liabilities mentioned in #rticle /66 thereof, and that the 'udgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under #rticle /66 of the .amily *ode. Issue: whether the residential house and lot is exempt from execution Held: (o. #rticles /60 and /62 of the .amily *ode provide as followsE #rt. /60. %he family home, constituted 'ointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. #rt. /62. %he family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. .rom the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. @nder the .amily *ode, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. %here is no need to constitute the same 'udicially or extra'udicially as re!uired in the *ivil *ode. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. %hus, the creditors should ta e the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. #rticle /66 of the .amily *ode also provides as followsE #rt. /66. %he family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment exceptE F/G .or non)payment of taxes4 F0G .or debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home4 F2G .or debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution4 and F3G .or debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. %he exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
0/
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether 'udicially or extra'udicially under the *ivil *ode. It became a family home by operation of law only under #rticle /62 of the .amily *ode. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the .amily *ode on #ugust 2, /=11 not #ugust 3, one year after its publication in the Aanila *hronicle on #ugust 3, /=1- F/=11 being a leap yearG. %he contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in /=5= is not well) ta en. @nder #rticle /50 of the .amily *ode, it is provided that Cthe provisions of this *hapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.D It does not mean that #rticles /60 and /62 of said *ode have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the .amily *ode and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the .amily *ode. #rticle /50 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the .amily *ode, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the .amily *ode. #rticle /50 does not state that the provisions of *hapter 0, %itle J have a retroactive effect. %he debt or liability which was the basis of the 'udgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on Aarch /5, /=-5 and the money 'udgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on <anuary 0=, /=11. :oth preceded the effectivity of the .amily *ode on #ugust 2, /=11. %his case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the .amily *ode.
00

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Case digest in Special Proceedings under Atty. Chato Cabigas Rafael D.

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