Environmentalism among Nation-States Author(s): Thomas Dietz and Linda Kalof Reviewed work(s): Source: Social Indicators Research,

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THOMAS DIETZ AND LINDA KALOF

ENVIRONMENTALIST!

AMONG NATION-STATES

(Accepted

13 June, 1991)

of international to offer a better understanding This article attempts ABSTRACT. state environmentalism. We examine whether environmental by measuring cooperation on to various international there is a structural response agreements by nation-states the environment. scaling, we create an environmental Using alpha and theta reliability to take political action in support of the propensity of a nation-state scale that measures as indicated by the ratification of key international treaties. Our work the environment, that of nation-states is, in fact, a structural characteristic suggests that environmentalism leads them to respond in a patterned way to environmental policies.

INTRODUCTION
International to the behavior of nation-states in

agreements

regulate

seen as a key to protecting the global environment. creasingly Global environmental change, including global climate change, loss of ozone cannot be solved biodiversity, depletion and acid precipitation, are by any single nation or even a small group of nations. Solutions to these problems require coordinated efforts on the part of most or all nation states. As a result, research on international agreements is a high to in understand human of the efforts dimensions global priority change (U.S. National Research Council, 1991). date, most work on this subject has focused on case studies of specific treaties or regulatory regimes. Drawing on the so-called 'neorealist' and public choice traditions, this literature attempts to elucidate the factors that led nations to endorse a particular treaty or environmental To of an international regulatory regime in a that led to the development or hegemonic domain of environmental particular policy.1 Neorealistic theorists emphasize the influence of one or a few dominant actors. These hegemons use their power to orchestrate consensus on proposed treaties (e.g. Gilpin, 1987; Krasner, 1985; Strange, 1983). In contrast, rational choice theorists focus attention on the benefits and costs of a
26: 353?366,1992. Printed Publishers.

Social Indicators Research ? 1992 Kluwer Academic

in the Netherlands.

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354

T. DIETZ AND L. KALOF

regulation to each nation and the rational calculus of deci proposed that follows from awareness of these benefits and costs sion-making 1970; Young, 1975; 1982). But both (e.g. Schelling, 1960; Tullock, approaches use the case study in support of their arguments. We offer a complementary approach to the study of international environmental cooperation. We ask if various international agreements on the environment constitute a consistent body of stimulae to which nation-states respond in a structured way. That is, we look at the much of nation-states which regard to environmental accords in the same way that a social psychologist would look at a repertoire of questionnaire responses or behaviors, and ask if the responses can the results of an underlying belief or attitude. Rather be considered than looking at individual accords and theories that attempt to explain state environ why they have been adopted, we attempt to measure behavior range of topics, including ozone trade in endangered depletion, pollution species and of nor rational preservation unique ecosystems. Neither hegemonic choice models of nation-state behavior implies that a nation would adopt a similar stance across the dozen major environmental treaties, Existing since each generate may be may and will treaty may be viewed differently by hegemons different costs and benefits. Our approach suggests that there structural factors that do generate consistent r?ponses. This be a result of a generalized environmentalism on the part of a treaties cover a broad of the oceans,

mentalism.

state, which in turn may be the result of the strength of or of susceptibility to pressure indigenous environmental movements from the international environmental movement. Or itmay be that the general position of a nation in the global political economy consistently influences benefits and costs, whether the specific issue is biodiversity or marine pollution. In any event, in this paper we limit our inquiry to or not whether it to is of state environ examining meaningful speak hegemonic
mentalism. We conceptualize state environmentalism as a characteristic

of nation-states that leads them to ratify international agreements on the environment. Thus state environmentalism can be considered a latent variable that influences the observed ratifications.2

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STATE ENVIRONMENTALISM DATA AND METHODS

355

from World Resources 1990?91 (World Resources 1990, Table 25.1). The data include information on the response of 146 nations to a dozen global conventions on the environ ment promulgated from 1963 to 1989. We did not include the various in our analysis because the potential 'Regional Seas' conventions signatories to each regional convention vary. We have scored nations which are contracting parties (i.e. which have ratified the treaties) 1, Data Institute, other nations are scored 0.3 Note that nations scored 0 include some which have signed the treaties but have not ratified them. Signature but in democratic requires only the consent of the administration, societies ratification requires further political action, so we consider ratification the more reliable indicator of environmentalism. Table I are the the of treaties and which contract nations displays proportion ing parties. TABLE I
Global environmental protection conventions nation-States (n and proportion 146) of contracting (ratifying)

are taken

ConventionDate Nuclear Test Ban Wetlands (Ramsar) and Toxic Biological Weapons World Cultural and Natural

Established

of Contracting Proportion Nation-States

1963 0.75 1971 0.33 1972 0.69 1972 0.68 0.38 1972 1973 0.64 1978 0.34 1979 0.20 1982 0.25 1985 0.37 1987 0.33 1989 0.01

Heritage Ocean Dumping Endangered Species (CITES) Ship Pollution Species Migratory Law of the Sea Ozone Layer Vienna CFC Control Montreal Hazardous Wastes Movement

We use two methods to analyze the patterns of response by nations to the 12 treaties. The first is alpha reliability scaling, which assumes
that the latent variable, state environmentalism, can be considered a

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356

T. DIETZ AND L. KALOF

linear sum of observed variables, implicitly assigning each observed theta scaling, which variable a weight of 1.0. The second is Armor's also assesses the reliability of a linear sum of variables, but uses a to assign components analysis and related eigenstructure principal so as to to each item maximize additive reliability (Armor, weights 1974). Examining the change in alpha reliability that would result from for dropping deleting a variable from the scale provides a mechanism variables that do not tap the underlying dimension of state environ mentalism. Loadings on the first principal component provide both a way of estimating the link between the latent variable and the observed national behavior, and also of dropping those variables with loading too low (below 0.4 by convention) to be considered reliable indicators. RESULTS Table II displays the alpha when an item is deleted, TABLEH
Factor from analysis, loadings, alpha if item deleted reliabilities for 12 environmental conventions and alpha and ? (n 146) Alpha Deleted theta

the factor coeffi

Factor Convention Loading

if Item

Nuclear Wetlands

Test Ban 0.43834 0.74660 0.40117 0.26665 0.65385 0.7210 0.6885 0.7299 0.7376 0.6960

and Biological Toxin Weapons World Heritage Ocean Dumping Endangered Ship Pollution Species

(CITES)

0.46722 0.58787
0.50120 0.7148 -0.15353 0.79565 0.6852 0.81148 0.14643

0.7197 0.7117
0.7726 0.6804 0.7406

(MARPOL)
Migratory Species Law of the Sea Ozone Layer Vienna CFC Control Montreal Hazardous Wastes Movement

Alpha =0.7359 Theta = 0.7845

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STATE ENVIRONMENTALISM cient

357

and the alpha and theta reliabilities using all twelve items as indicators of state environmentalism. Three treaties, theWorld Heritage the Law of the Sea Convention and Hazardous Waste Convention, do not seem to be reliable indicators of state Movement Convention, North-South environmentalism. Debate around the Law of the Sea often focused on relations and on the role of the private versus state content may have been less and thus its environmental enterprise,

important to national response than these other issues. The Hazardous Waste Movement convention was only instituted in 1989, so most nations have not yet had time to ratify it. The reasons that participation in the World Heritage Convention is not a reliable indicator of state are less clear. This convention was established environmentalism in 1972 to protect valuable cultural and natural heritage sites and implies some global control over or interest in such areas. Perhaps some nations consider it a threat to national sovereignty in ways that other environmental treaties are not. They may be reluctant to participate in this particular regime even though they cooperate in other environ mental accords. ronmentalism, sovereignty,
alone.

If that is the case, ratification is related to state envi also to nationalism and concern with territorial and thus it is not a reliable indicator of environmentalism but

Table III displays the results obtained when these three items are deleted. The Biological and Toxin Weapons now has the Convention weakest link to state environmentalism. We have included it in our final scale although the alpha and theta scaling criteria would allow either its inclusion or deletion. All other items have strong or moderate relation ships to the underlying factor, and the overall scale is quite reliable. The second principal component has an eigenvalue of only 1.1, and explains only 12% of the overall variance compared with 39% for the first thus our assumption of a single underlying principal component, seems justified. dimension of environmentalism Table IV displays the value of state environmentalism for each nation in the sample. We provide two measures. One is simply the unweighted sum of the nine variables, that is, the number of accords to which the nation is a contracting party. We include this simple measure because it is easy to interpret and nearly as reliable as the weighted sum based on principal components analysis. The second scale weights each

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358

T. DIETZ AND L. KALOF TABLE HI

Factor from analysis, and alpha and theta loadings, alpha if item deleted = conventions reliabilities for remaining nine environmental (n 146) Factor Convention Loading Deleted Alpha if Item

Nuclear Wetlands

Test Ban0.44072 0.73912 0.39780 0.65048 0.7845 0.7495 0.7922 0.7625

and Biological Toxin Weapons Ocean Dumping Endangered Ship Pollution Species

(CITES) (MARPOL)

0.45014 0.59989
0.7802 0.50789 0.80954 0.7419 0.82356 0.7395

0.7875 0.7708

Migratory Species Ozone Layer Vienna CFC Control Montreal

Alpha =0.7890 Theta = 0.8013

ratification according to its loading on the first in principal component the principal components analysis. We call these scales State Environ mentalism A and B. The unweighted scale, A, has a range of 0 to 9, mean 4.6, median 4.00, and standard deviation 2.55. Figure 1 is a stem and leaf plot of this variable. The is standardized and weighted scale, B, so ranges from ?1.40 to 1.93, with mean 0.00, median ?0.224, and standard deviation 1.00. To establish the validity of our measures, we have examined their available for a relationship to two other indicators of environmentalism large number of nations. Table V presents the correlation between our measures and both the percentage of national land area protected under scientific reserves, national and provincial parks, etc., and the percentage of years that the nation has met the reporting requirements of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. These data are obtained from World Resources 1990?91 (World Resources Institute, 1990, Tables 20.1 and 20.3, respectively). Both are related to national action to alleviate problems of biodiversity. Unfortu nately, no indicators related to policies on other global environmental

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STATE ENVIRONMENTALISM TABLE IV

Value of Environmentalism Scale A (unweighted) for 146 nation-states

359

and Scale B (weighted)

Nation-State

Scale A

Scale B

Africa Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Chad Comoros Congo Cote d'lvoire

Rep

Djibouti Egypt
Equatorial Ethiopia Gabon Guinea

Gambia, The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia

Libya
Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique, Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo People's Rep

-0.32608 -1.40679 -0.23675 -0.84413 -0.42599 -1.13729 0.20390 -0.48310 -0.84413 -0.36336 -1.40679 -0.89029 -0.36765 -1.40679 1.30827 -0.92602 -0.89029 0.35062 -0.84413 0.74405 -1.13729 -0.86664 0.76720 -1.15980 -0.48169 -0.48310 -0.84413 -0.84413 -0.59764 -0.66487 -0.59714 -0.01183 -1.13729 0.21202 1.12759 -0.59714 0.21202 -0.86664 -0.77690 1.57841 -0.84413 -1.11363 -0.84413 -0.59714

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360
Table

T. DIETZ AND L. KALOF

IV (continued) Scale A Scale B

Nation-State

Tunisia Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe North & Central America Barbados Canada Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Trinidad and Tobago United States South America Argentina Bolivia Brazil

1.93880 0.31593 -0.21360 -0.84413 -1.13729

-1.15980 1.21597 -0.21360 -0.77626 -0.21360 -1.11363 0.76720 -1.02325 -0.21360 -1.15980 0.94646 -0.59714 1.49003 0.13667 1.57841

Chile
Columbia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela Asia Afghanistan Bahrain Bangladesh Bhutan China Cyprus India Indonesia Iran, Republic of 4 1 3 2 6 4 6 3 4

-0.21360 -0.59714 0.14884 0.59555 -0.23469 -0.59714 -1.13729 -0.52991 0.24607 0.41785 0.69484 0.38367

-0.21360 -1.15980 -0.59714 -0.86664 0.62961 -0.23469 0.57446 -0.48169 -0.14837

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STATE ENVIRONMENTALISM
Table IV (continued) Scale A

361

Nation-State

Scale B

Iraq Israel Japan Jordan Kampuchea, Korea, Dem Dem Rep People's Republic Dem

Korea, Kuwait Lao People's Lebanon Malaysia Mongolia Myanmar Nepal Oman Pakistan

Rep

Philippines Qatar Saudi Arabia Singapore Sri Lanka Syrian Arab Thailand

Rep

Turkey United Arab Emirates Viet Nam Yemen Arab Rep Yemen, People's Dem Europe Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Denmark Finland France German Dem Rep Fed Rep Germany, Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Malta

Rep

1 4 8 7 1 2 3 2 2 3 4 2 2 3 2 5 4 1 1 5 5 4 5 2 3 1 1 2

-1.11363 -0.12130 1.57841 1.21597 -1.15980 -0.79736 -0.50420 -0.86664 -0.86664 -0.50420 0.13667 -0.86664 -0.75119 -0.39536 -0.66081 0.21202 -0.21360 -1.15980 -1.15980 0.38367 0.38367 0.22961 0.38367 -0.86664 -0.04245 -1.15980 -1.15980 -0.86664

0 7 8 4 3 9 9 7 8 9 7 9 7 7 9 6 6

-1.40679 1.19487 1.57841 -0.05544 -0.50420 1.93880 1.93880 1.28525 1.57841 1.93880 1.30890 1.93880 1.30890 1.30685 1.93880 0.74405 , 0.83243

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362
Table

T. DIETZ AND L. KALOF

IV (continued) Scale A Scale B

Nation-State

Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Yugoslavia Oceania Australia

USSR

1.93880 1.93880 0.32810 1.64564 -0.86664 1.93880 1.93880 1.57841 1.93880 1.57841 0.32810

Fiji
New Zealand Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands

1.57841 0.11416 1.21597 -0.21360 -0.77626

problems are available for a broad sample of nations. The correlations indicate that both our scales have reasonable external validity, and that scale A actually has slightly higher correlations with these policy measures than the more complex weighted scale.

CONCLUSIONS
State environmentalism propensity of a nation appears to be a viable concept describing the state to take political action in support of the

9:99999999999 8:8888888888 7:7777777777 6:6666666666 5:5555555555555 4:44444444444444444444 3:33333333333333333333 2:2222222222222222222222222222 1:1111111111111111111 0:0000
Fig. 1. Stem and leaf diagram of Environmentalism Scale' A

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STATE ENVIRONMENTALISM TABLE V

Pearson's mentalism

363

Scale A, state Environ coefficients for state Environmentalism correlation land area protected, of national and percentage of years Scale B, percentage of endangered reporting requirements species convention met by nation. Protected Lands Reporting ReqsMet 0.2733 Environmentalism Scale B Environmentalism Scale A

Protected Reporting

Lands Requirements

= (>i 146) (n-136) 1.0000 Met (w= 136)

1.0000

1.0000

Environmentalism

Environmentalism

(n 1.0000 ScaleA (unweighted) (n ? 146)

Scale B (weighted)

= (n 146) 0.4658 = (? 136) 0.9924 = 146) (n -146)

0.2244

0.2541 0.5033

(n-146) = (/z 136)

environment. Of course, our measure is based on ratification of inter national accords, and ratification does not always produce compliance, even as attitudes measured in a survey instrument have only moderate correlation with observed behavior. But the moderate correlations between our measures and two indicators of state action suggest that the measures are valid. And the protracted domestic and international debates over these treaties indicate that nations do take ratification seriously. Our results suggest at least two lines for further research. First, the implementation of domestic laws and regulations to protect the envi ronment needs to be examined, as does the impact of both international accords and domestic policy on the environment. Commoner (1990) has argued that even when implemented many environmental laws and regulations have little effect on the state of the environment. This suggests that research is needed to determine the consequences of state and in particular, the conditions under which state environmentalism produces any change in environmental conitions. A second line for further research looks to the causes of state environmentalism. The neorealist and rational choice theorists in inter national relations have proposed theories about specific policy choices them using case studies. We believe that quantitative cross-national comparisons, emphasizing the structural situation of the nation state, including both its position in the global political economy and examined environmentalism

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364
and

T. DIETZ AND L. KALOF

and social structure, have much to internal political, economic to understanding state environmentalism and thus to an to of human environmental response understanding global change.4 For we of that the environmental indigenous hypothesize strength example, contribute movements is an important influence on state environmentalism, but of the political that its impact depends on the democracy system (Bollen, 1980; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). We also suspect that strong influence from multinational envi corporations, which often offshore' ronmentally degrading activities to the Third World, will lessen state (Covello and Frey, 1990). the causes and consequences of state environmen Understanding talism is a topic for further research. In this paper we have tried to
that contemporary nation-states have a generic pattern of

environmentalism

demonstrate

response to proposed environmental policies, whatever their responses to specific policies. We hope that this notion, and the scales resulting from it, will prove useful in research on the state and environmental policy. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT An of this paper was presented at the 1991 Eastern in Providence, Rhode Island, U.SA. We Sociological Society Meetings thank Amy Hubbard, Marvin Olsen, Thomas Rudel, Oran Young and the Social Indicators Research reviewers for their comments. The research was supported in part by the Northern Survey Virginia earlier version and Anthropology, Science Foundation

of Sociology Laboratory, Department Mason and U.S. National George University by Grant SES-9109928.

Research

NOTES
1 (1989a, b) provides a review and synthesis of this literature. 2 Young A reviewer noted that we state environmentalism in terms of what we operationalize ? are here describing as an effect of environmentalism the ratification of treaties. A full structural include other variables, such as domestic environ equation model might mental policy, that could serve as indicators, and also incorporate causes of environ mentalism and consequences other than treaty ratification. This would provide better

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STATE ENVIRONMENTALISM

365

of the causes and consequences of state environmentalism and enhance understanding the validity of measurement. 3 a reviewer this means We have analyzed data. As that the noted, unweighted ratification of the Ocean Dumping has the same Treaty by land-locked Afghanistan of the Nuclear impact on our analysis as ratification by the U.S., and the ratification as the actions the same weight Test Ban Treaty of Benin. by the Soviet Union the practical of treaty ratifications will differ across countires, Obviously, significance and the significance of each country's in a regime will differ across participation cases because we are trying to identify a common treaties. We have not weighted factor accross these differences that underlies treaties extent and nations. The of state across nations, and itmay be that the structure of varies considerably environmentalism environmentalism also differs. Certainly has a different meaning for treatly ratification for large than for small nations, and so on. Further research rich than for poor nations, as well as examining should explore these differences, the causes of state environ mentalism. 4 of the determinants must be attentive to of environmentalism analyses Empirical For example, the international treaties we use as indicators were drafted chronology. between 1963 and 1987. Over the quarter century involved, many changes occurred in the structural situation of most, if not all, nations. Care must be taken to insure that the structural variables used in an analysis refer to the period during which ratification took place, or other forms of environmental policy were implemented.

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