End of first and Tird Lectio Introduction of the order of discovery The order of discovery among the sciences

Maybe put the Ethics six distinction of understanding, art, prudence, science and wisdom here, before going into the order of discovery of the arts and sciences and after the abstraction of the universal. Moving from the path from the senses into the mind to the order within the mind, there is an order in the discovery of universals, arts, and sciences themselves. First the arts and sciences concerned with the necessities of life were discovered. Later, some arts were discovered which pertained more to the pleasures of leisure and the prerequisites of science. First those arts which were closest to the senses were discovered, arts which were more necessary for daily life. Those who discovered arts which extended beyond the senses or perceptions1( ) were more esteemed and generally thought to be wise. After all such arts were discovered, the sciences which are neither for necessity nor pleasure were discovered. Et quod speculativae scientiae non sint inventae ad utilitatem, patet per hoc signum: quia, iam partis, id est acquisitis vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi, quae possunt esse ad introductionem in scientiis2, vel ad necessitatem vitae, vel ad voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem: speculativae non sunt propter huiusmodi repertae, sed propter seipsas.3 Only once the sciences that are for supplying needs or pleasures, were discovered, did man begin to engage in speculative science. The liberal arts, like grammar and logic, are discovered before the speculative sciences: mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. Metaphysics was last of all, being the least necessary: idest sapientia...omnibus aliis habitis ipsa quaesita est.4It is the
' ' ' , , . 981b.15 ' This seems to be related the principle that we first know what is closest to the senses. Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 1 n. 30-1: licet aliquis sensus cognoscat quia, tamen, non propter quid cognoscit. Tactus enim iudicat quod ignis calidus est, non tamen apprehendit propter quid: ergo experti qui habent singularium cognitionem causam ignorantes, sapientes dici non possunt....Quilibet autem inventor artis habetur in admiratione, propter hoc quod habet sensum et iudicium et discretionem causae ultra aliorum hominum sensum, et non propter utilitatem illorum quae invenit...
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Logic, see 3.5 on the order of learning Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 1 n. 33 4 . for when nearly all the things necessary for life, leisure and learning were acquired, this kind of prudence began to be sought. Cf. Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 7: Sola autem haec scientia est propter seipsam: ergo ipsa sola est libera inter scientias. And Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 8: omnes aliae scientiae in eam ordinantur sicut in finem. The final cause is last in the order of generation!!! in ordine scientiarum, quia scientia quae est de causis altissimis, scilicet metaphysica, ultimo occurrit homini ad cognoscendum, et tamen in scientiis praeambulis oportet quod supponantur quaedam quae in illa plenius innotescunt... All the other sciences are preambles to metaphysics. In what sense are the other sciences preambles to metaphysics? Is it in the via generationis??? What else?? What is the difference between learning a science and generating a science?? Isnt a science generated through being learned???
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knowledge which is most for its own sake. Metaphysics is the least necessary but the most noble of all the sciences.5 Being the end to which they are all ordered6, it is not itself a means to any other science, while other sciences are ordered to metaphysics and are means of approaching it.7 So, speculative sciences were first discovered in places where they had the leisure for contemplation, as in Egypt where the priestly class who first discovered the mathematical arts were supported from public money.8Aristotle tells us that the least necessary, most free, and most intellectual of the sciences is the last to be discovered.9Only once all of the necessary and practical sciences were discovered did that science which is the most for its own sake appear. Man needed freedom from mundane cares to speculate about things which were farthest from the necessities of daily life. In this way, the order of the discovery of the scienceswhich is the history of philosophy itselfmirrors the order of the generation of mans cognitive powers, and the order of learning the sciences which anyone must follow. We first know what is closest to the senses, which are first in our knowledge. The progression of the history of philosophy mirrors the progression of the individual intellect, which Thomas tells us, proceeds from the less universal to the more universal causes. Sed quantum ad investigationem naturalium proprietatum et

Thomas defines preamble: Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 4 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. [...]-5 metaphysica, quae est omnibus superior, utitur his quae in aliis scientiis sunt probata. Et similiter theologia, cum omnes aliae scientiae sint huic quasi famulantes et praeambulae in via generationis, quamvis sint dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum.
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Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 14 Ex his autem ulterius concludit, quod omnes aliae scientiae sunt necessariae magis quam ista ad aliquam vitae utilitatem: minus enim sunt propter se quaesitae. Sed nulla aliarum dignior ista potest esse. 6 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 8: omnes aliae scientiae in eam ordinantur sicut in finem.

That passage from CBT about how almost all the other sciences are needed for doing metaphysics
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Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 6. 981b.20 , It may not be by chance that the first science which Aristotle mentions in his narrative of the discovery of the arts and sciences is mathematics. It is clearly first also in the order of learning. It is the speculative science with which children first become familiar. Is he suggesting that mathematics was the first speculative science discovered my man?
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It would be in keeping with the principle that the more necessary and useful arts and sciences are discovered first, for mathematics is the most immediately useful of the speculative sciences. Geometry seems to have been born of the necessity of measuring land. Cf. Super Isaiam, cap. 3 l. 1. [...]-32 Universalis sapientia est quae est ultimum in omnibus artibus et scientiis;9 et ista est per quam homo ponitur in cognitione nobilissimarum rerum, substantiarum scilicet separatarum, vel spiritualium. Et haec, secundum philosophum, est metaphysica, et secundum nos theologia.
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causarum, prius sunt nota minus communia.10For, similarly, the first philosophers reasoned about the matters which were nearest at hand, which were in fact less universal causes than the more hidden universal causes which they were later compelled to wonder about, like the motion of the sun or the generation of the entire universe. Thomas concludes when reflecting on the wiseman, that he knows what is most difficult to know, that the science of metaphysics arrives last in the order of learning, just as it seems to have been discovered last among the branches of philosophy in the history of human thought. [I]sta scientia, quae sapientia dicitur, quamvis sit prima in dignitate, est tamen ultima in addiscendo.11 Philosophers first grasped the most manifest causes before moving on to contemplate the more hidden though powerful ones. The presocratics never arose to the contemplation of the separate substances which underly material reality, for example. They were too bound by the sensible origins of our knowledge.12Everything which enters into the imagination, from which we reason, is material, and it is difficult for us to pass from the sensible to that which is beyond the sensible, individually, just as it was for mankind generally in the history of philosophy. Each individual must progress in reasoning from that which is closest to the senses to that which is farthest, and the history of philosophy also progresses from the discovery of the causes which are closest to the senses to those which are farther away. Philosophers begin at first to wonder about what is closer at hand (manifesta, 13). Slowly, step by step, they wonder about things more difficult and farther
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Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 2 n. 11, a comparison of the history of philosophy in general and the progression of every individuals thought in the context of these two paragraphs. For Thomas and Aristotles understanding of the history of philosophy we can turn to book 7, S.T. I.42!!!, book 5!!!. In fact the history of philosophy, as it is introduced here in the proemium could be an independent locus in and of itself.
Thomas explains here how the philosophers first reasoned about particular casues before more universal ones. See lib. 7 l. 2 n. 15.Decepit autem antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes, ignorantia formae substantialis. Non enim adhuc tantum profecerant, ut intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia ; et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt, quae sunt sensibilia propria vel communia. Huiusmodi autem manifestum est esse accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et huiusmodi. Forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens; et ideo ad eius cognitionem non pervenerunt, ut scirent ipsam a materia distinguere. Sed totum subiectum, quod nos ponimus ex materia et forma componi, ipsi dicebant esse primam materiam, ut aerem, aut aquam, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Formas autem dicebant esse, quae nos dicimus accidentia, ut quantitates et qualitates, quorum subiectum proprium non est materia prima, sed substantia composita quae est substantia in actu: omne enim accidens ex hoc est, quod substantiae inest, ut habitum est. The Pre-socratics never saw beyond accidental form because they never saw entirely beyond the directly sensible: Communis enim philosophorum [e.g., the Pre-scocratics] positio ponentium ex nihilo nihil fieri . . . veritatem habet secundum illud fieri quod ipsi considerabant. Quia enim omnis nostra cognitio a sensu incipit, qui singularium est, a particularibus considerationibus ad universales consideratio humana profecit. Unde principium rerum perquirentes particulares factiones entium tantum consideraverunt, inquirentes qualiter vel hic ignis vel hic lapis fiat (SCG 2.37. n.2). Since our understood knowledge takes its beginning from the senses, it begins with particular consdierations, like how particular things come to be. The most universal considerations come at the end of our knowledge. Therefore, since the proper understanding of creation from nothing comes only with the study of universal being, it comes last in our learning: nec ad naturalem philosophum pertinet huiusmodi rerum originem considerare: sed ad philosophum primum , qui considerat ens commune et ea quae sunt separata a motu (ibidem). At first, our minds consider the way the particular things under the senses and in motion change. The consideration of how being itself or existence comes to be is reserved for metaphysics. The Pre-socratics did not understand creation because we first know the sensible motion from one place into another, but creation takes place without motion: nomen factionis motum vel mutationem importet, in hac autem totius entis origine ab uno ente intelligi non potest transmutatio unius entis in aliud, ut ostensum est (ibidem). The Pre-socratics never saw beyond the kind of change or motion that took place with particular things, subject to our sense experience (enim omnis nostra cognitio a sensu incipit ). The consideration of the coming to be of being, which occurs without motion, is a later consideration.
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??? See Bk. 7 and 5 13 ,

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from the senses: a principio admirabantur dubitabilia pauciora, quae magis erant in promptu, ut eorum causae cognoscerentur: sed postea ex cognitione manifestorum ad inquisitionem occultorum paulatim procedentes. Aristotle, demonstrating the path, from the manifest to the hidden, that philosophy must always follow, first lists among the more occult questions astronomical problems and ends with what Thomas tells us is a metaphysical question, the generation of the universe: de totius universi generatione.14 The history of philosophy proposed by Thomas in book 7 suggests that philosophers first only grasped accidental, sensible causes: decepit autem antiquos philosophos...ignorantia formae substantialis.15Because they were ignorant of substantial form, they could not grasp the material. The first philosophers were unable to rise above the level of sensible, accidental forms (accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et huiusmodi). Later philosophers, however, progressed little by little to substantial form and the causes of existence itself: antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia (I q. 44 a. 2 co.).16In the beginning, philosophers believed that only sensible bodies existed, and, if they allowed any motion at all, it was accidental (accidentalium transmutationum).17Later, however, philosophers per intellectum distinguished between substantial form and matter.18This applies also to the later philosophers who distinguished the metaphysical principles of being, who take an even farther step from the directly sensible into the intelligible: Et ulterius aliqui [i.e., philosophi] erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. The PreSocratics of course considered more or less exclusively the elemental, material causes. , 982b.15 , . 14 See SCG 2.37. n.2: nec ad naturalem philosophum pertinet huiusmodi rerum originem considerare: sed ad philosophum
primum, qui considerat ens commune et ea quae sunt separata a motu
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Decepit autem antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes, ignorantia formae substantialis. Non enim adhuc tantum profecerant, ut intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia; et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt, quae sunt sensibilia propria vel communia. Huiusmodi autem manifestum est esse accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et huiusmodi. Forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens; et ideo ad eius cognitionem non pervenerunt, ut scirent ipsam a materia distinguere. Sed totum subiectum, quod nos ponimus ex materia et forma componi, ipsi dicebant esse primam materiam, ut aerem, aut aquam, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Formas autem dicebant esse, quae nos dicimus accidentia, ut quantitates et qualitates, quorum subiectum proprium non est materia prima, sed substantia composita quae est substantia in actu: omne enim accidens ex hoc est, quod substantiae inest, ut habitum est. Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 2 n. 15
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Cf. also ST I.75.1 ad1: the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved, and that the soul is moved per se, and is a body.
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Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. I q. 44 a. 2 co.
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Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Idem.

The fact that there are numerous practical and useful disciplines subordinate to the other speculative sciences, mathematics and physics, but none subordinate to metaphysics, is also a sign that it is the most desirable in itself. However, it is only after the disciplines necessary for human life and ease were invented that ones that were ends in themselves were discovered. Metaphysics did not even begin to be sought (incoepit quaeri) until all the practical and useful disciplines were developed. We see this also in the lives of individuals, only if one has leisure can he persue a liberal education. Moreover, it seems that physics and even mathematics are necessary for doing metaphysics (see CBT). Even these purely speculative sciences are less desireable in themselves than metaphysics. They also partake of that which is desirable or for the sake of another insofar as they make possible the study of metaphysics,19 as well as being the source of useful practical sciences like medicine and mathematical physics. Thomas also makes reference here to the order in which we learn the sciences. The logical sciences are necessary for doing the speculative sciences and therefore they were sought before the speculative sciences (see 3.5???, CNE 6, etc. etc.). We can introduce the locus of the order of learning the sciences here!!!!! Therefore again, Aristotles proemium to the Metaphysics repeats the themes of Platos Cave Allegory and the divided line: the path from ignorance to understanding, the senses to reason, and from the first science in the order of learning to metaphysics. Plato introduces the theme of the division of the sciences and the order of learning. Maybe use this as an introduction to the treatment of the proem, of the whole thesis???? The other speculative sciences are for the sake of metaphysics, while metaphysics is for the sake of itself.

This is seen also from the history of philosophy, wherein natural philosophy is first taken up, before the discovery of metaphysics, and mathematics before natural philosophy. It is a sign of the per se desirability of metaphysics that it was taken up last, after all fields of study with any possible practical applications were already known. There are many practical sciences, like medicine and optics, which are subordinate to physics and mathematics, but no practical science is subordinate to metaphysics. There is no practical or applied metaphysics. The necessary sciences and arts come first: metaphysics is the least necessary of all the sciences. However, those who discovered arts, which extend beyond the senses20, are generally thought wise. Among them, those who discovered something which is Thomas refers to the other speculative as preambule disciplines??? This seems to be related the principle that we first know what is closest to the senses.
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not merely for the sake of necessity are thought wiser. After all such arts were discovered, the sciences which are neither for necessity nor pleasure were discovered.21 The inventors of arts22are more esteemed on the basis of their grasp of the causes of things than on the basis of the utility of what they discover, therefore, being more esteemed, sciences which consider causes are more worthy of the title of wisdom. The Order of the Discovery of the Arts and Sciences First, the arts for necessity and pleasure were discovered. The discoverers of the arts for pleasure are more esteemed than those who discover arts for mere necessity??? Only then, once there was a certain amount of leisure, was it possible to discover the speculative sciences which are not useful, but are knowledge for its ownsake. Thus, the order of discovery and of ascending nobility seems to be, first, the arts of the necessary, of the pleasant, and then knowledge for its own sake. There is also a distinction between utility and that which is for its own sake in the Cave Allegory. The philosopher kings must turn back into the cave, to serve the state. Aristotle in speaking about the prerequisites of science is essentially telling us how science comes about, much as Plato does in the Allegory. Only once all the useful arts and sciences had been discovered, did the speculative sciences come to light. [A]cquisitis vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi, quae possunt esse ad introductionem in scientiis (see 3.5 on logic)23, vel ad necessitatem vitae, vel ad voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem: speculativae non sunt propter huiusmodi repertae, sed propter seipsas. Only once logic, and all the other useful arts and sciences were discovered, did the purely speculative sciences begin to be discovered. Since the lesser sciences are all more useful and necessary than metaphysics, metaphysics was discovered last of all.24Justs sight is the least necessary sense but the most perfect, metaphysics is the least necessary or useful science but the most perfect. Moreover, as sight is the last sense to be generated, so is metaphysics the last science to be discovered.25

Text!!! Segway to the order of discovery of the arts and sciences 23 segway to 3.5 24 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 1 l. 1 n. 33 25 text?????
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