A

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

May
155 177 195

& Sept. 1986 Volume 14 Numbers 2 & 3

Joseph

Cropsey

The Dramatic End

of

Plato's Socrates
and

Charles Griswold, Jr.

Thomas J. Lewis

Philosophy, Education,
Refutative Rhetoric
as

Courage in Plato's Laches

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

211 265

Thomas F.

Curley

III

How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy The Armed Founder Machiavelli

and versus

Joseph Masciulli

the Catonic Hero:

Rousseau

on

Popular

Leadership

281 299

William Mathie
Peter

Reason

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

the Savoyard Vicar: the Profession

Emberley

Rousseau
of

versus

Faith Considered

331

Mackubin Thomas

Owens, Jr.
353 Peter Simpson

Alexander Hamilton Autonomous

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

Morality

and

the Idea of the Noble

Review Essays
371

Ernest L. Fortin

Faith

and

Reason in
of a

Contemporary

Perspective

Apropos

Recent Book

389 415

Joseph J. Carpino Nino Langiulli

On Eco's The Name of the Rose

Affirmative Action, Liberalism,
and

Teleology:

on

Nicholas Capaldi's Out of Order

431

Robert R. Sullivan

The Most Recent

Thinking

of

Jurgen Habermas

Book Reviews
441 Will

Morrisey

Jerusalem

versus

Athens

by

Paul

Eidelberg
edited

448

How Does the Constitution Secure Rights?

by

Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra

Short Notices
455 456
Will

Morrisey

Freedom of Expression

by Francis Canavan by

Joan Stambaugh

Philosophical Apprenticeships

Hans-Georg

Gadamer

interpretation
Volume 14

JL

numbers 2 &

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Copyright

1986

Interpretation

The Dramatic End

Joseph Cropsey

of

Plato's Socrates

University

of Chicago

How does the

structure of a philosophic exposition contribute to the

of a philosophic argument? context

shall

try

to say something about the the context

question

meaning in a
the

that is special and limited but not trivial

corpus.

of a segment of

Platonic

The dialogues to
and

which

want

to draw

attention are

those

be

tween the

Theaetetus I
mean

the

Phaedo;

and

before

doing

plain what particular

by

"between."

That

explanation

anything else, I must ex will serve to introduce the

meaning

of structure

that will appear in the rest of this paper. The dia

would

logues

"between"

the Theaetetus and the Phaedo that Plato

wrote

be, by

one conventional order

reckoning, the
the dialogues
a

ones

in that

order.

Of course, the

in

which

were written remains

largely

conjectural,

and whatever

depends

on

firm determination into

of that order

is equally in doubt. There is, however,

another

order

which a number of

the

dialogues, especially
may be

those "between the The

aetetus and

the

Phaedo,"

can

be

placed with much greater called

certainty, namely,

dramatic

order.

If the

order of composition
which

the poietic order of the

dialogues,
called

the order

in

the conversations are depicted as occurring may be

poietic order one might

the dramatic order.

Of the

author's

intellectual development; the dramatic

order reveals

say that it reveals the his intention. I am

going to suppose not only that Plato's intention is more distinctly inferrable from the dramatic order in which he placed his inventions than any poietic order is

inferrable from any

portant

evidence

that survives, but also that his intention is more im

to

our comprehension of

his thought than is his development

point

as a thinker.

concede with regard

to the latter

that significant truths about an author's

intention may lie concealed within his development; after all, his development is the growth or decline of his intention; yet even if only to follow the course with to mean dra the less speculative premise, I shall throughout consider
"structure"

matic order.

The Theaetetus is
more

Socratic dialogue that is The dialogue

recounted

others,

some number of years after

the words

by one man to one or being reported are repre

Socrates'

sented as
must go

having

been

spoken.

ends with

saying that he

to the

stoa of meet

the

king

in

order

to answer to Meletus's

indictment, but

that he expects to
sation.

the company

again

By
of

ending the Theaetetus

and

with

in the morning to continue the conver this brief passage, Plato indicates that the
at

trilogy Euthyphro,
cluding

Theaetetus, Sophist

Statesman is

least

a quartet

that includes the

the dialogue that takes place at the porch of the king. The same con
that the quartet occurs within weeks or months of

passage makes plain

Prepared for

delivery

at the

1979 Annual

Meeting of the

American Political Science Association.

156

Interpretation
Socrates'

the end of

life. (Also indicated is the

quartet

need to

interpret the Euthyphro

means

as

a component of on

the

into

which

Plato

cast

it. This

that the

argument

the civil and theoretical implications of piety toward gods and fathers
articulated with the arguments presented

should

be

It follows from the

trial of
other

connection of

in the neighboring dialogues.) Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman with the

Socrates that that group of dialogues is linked in dramatic time with the famous trilogy of Apology of Socrates, Crito, and Phaedo. In crowding
a

these seven works upon each other

as a unity of some kind, Plato's Socrates.

in time, Plato signifies his conception of them unity that it is convenient to call the dramatic end of
"structure"

Of
ute

course one wonders

how the

supposition of and

this
of

could contrib

to the interpretation of the texts

conjecture

the disclosure

Plato's thought. An
end

easy

is that Plato has devised

Phaedo:

Socrates'

an account of

his indict

defense, Apology, Crito,

ment,

condemnation and execution and

that transcends the

limits

of

the

an enhanced version of

the trial

of

Socrates. This

speculation assumes that

the quartet should be drawn towards the

trilogy for in

terpretation, that the center of gravity of the seven dialogues is the judgment of Socrates in a sense that is dominated by his civic indictment even though it tran
scends

his

public accusation and

his

own

defense. I

shall

try

to show, in the bulk

needs to

of what

follows,

that

useful

though this conjecture may

be, it

be

stated

differently. When the

still

seven

dialogues

are examined

concretely,

they

point to a

larger

structure of contain

cause

it does

Platonic dialogues, a larger structure that interests us be a judgment of Socrates, but on so broad a plan as to leave

the trial as such shrunken

viewed.

by

the expansion of the horizon within which it is

Specifically,

the reader of the first

trilogy

will

be

aware that the

three dia
of of

logues are, in different ways, penetrated by the presence of two famous rivals Socrates, Protagoras and Parmenides. Protagoras is important to the argument
the

Theaetetus,

so

important that Socrates impersonates him in

Protagoras'

long

speech

in

which

Socrates does justice to

with such success an active

views on

perception,

motion and

knowledge
ration.

that Theodorus expresses

his

enthusiastic admi

Theodorus,

if

sometimes reluctant

Protagorean though apparently also appears to be Protagorean,

perhaps

with reservations.

His

although
not

because Protagoreanism is
and

very docile a bad preparation for Socratism. (Of

interlocutor, is himself a pupil is Theaetetus, who to the argument of Socrates,

Simmias
we

turn to the

spirit

Kebes, the Pythagoreans, similar things will be said below when Phaedo.) As one might say, the Theaetetus is suffused with the of Protagoras; but it is not for that reason an un-Socratic dialogue, rather if

anything the reverse: Eucleides reports that he wrote this conversation down and that in the course of doing so, he would consult Socrates whenever he needed

help
the

place

in clearing up a doubtful point. This consultation would have to have taken in the short and presumably preoccupied period between the indictment and
of

execution

Socrates.

Besides embodying the

active

collaboration

of

The Dramatic End of

Socrates in its raphy to its
A
of

Plato'

Socrates
the

157 Theaetetus
contains an

written

preservation,

autobiog

Socrates,
another

what one might call

his

obstetric

autobiography,

with a view

content and also

in

order

to distinguish it from the autobiography in the

Phaedo

superficially un-Socratic dialogue. has been made of the Protagoreanism of the Theaetetus; but there is a dialogue called Protagoras, in which the thought of Protagoras is obviously prominent. Do the Protagoreanisms of Theaetetus and Protagoras harmonize?
point

Why
and of

are

two

Protagorean dialogues
the Theaetetus

necessary?

Whatever the
gravitate

answers to these

questions

may be,

and

Protagoras

toward one another,

the Protagoras

becomes

attached a

to the basic structure of the septet

by

line

filiation. In the Statesman

on

same

way,

line

of attachment

develops between the Sophist

on

and

the one hand and the Parmenides

the other,

for Parmenides

is

as

tagoras
a

actively present in the latter dialogues through the Eleatic Stranger as Pro is in the Theaetetus. The recurrence of themes in the Platonic dialogues is
would

familiar fact that

lead to the

attachment of the

Meno to

our

growing

structure

Phaedo.
matic,

by the link of the doctrine of anamnesis, employed prominently in the Many other examples could be given. If carefully pursued, the dra
and personal

thematic,

ligatures

would

include

some

large part,

perhaps

all,

of

the Platonic corpus.

not come so

I have
rather

far in

order

to suggest that there is a Platonic cosmos, but

to speculate on what guided

Plato in the

construction of

it.
of

Raising
not

the

question

is

meant

to

set aside

the routine reply that the

real one not

cosmos was governed

by

the shape of the

shaping because that is

the Platonic true

but because it is

not what

the already discerned structure indicates most point

edly, namely, that

and must
rizon

a great weight of non-Socratic thought presses on

Socratism

be

reckoned with.

The

presence of non-Socratic

thought defines the ho

in

which

the transpolitical or philosophic critique and apology of

which not

Socrates
sur

may be found. The cosmos to prising degree the theoretical,

the

the Platonic cosmos corresponds is to a

the natural cosmos.

Taking advantage of the body of the argument to

be
wise

privilege claimed

by introductions,

will

introduce it
would
non-

come with an as yet unsupported assertion:

not

to

assume

that Plato

fashioned his

world and populated

it

with

Socratics merely to
while

mirror

the intellectual milieu that

Socrates inhabited and,

for Socrates to deflate every living and dead pretender to understanding beginning with Homer. It cannot be denied that Socrates is shown slaying his thousands; but his antagonists often have little
sketching that world, to set the scene
enough

to

say for
put

themselves and are not of great stature.

Plato does

cause

his

Socrates to

the armies of the fee-takers to the sword, but he also shows him at
without a proclamation

times occupying their towers

to announce the appropria

armed with

tion. Most surprising, Socrates occasionally goes

weapons whom

into direst battle

borrowed from

unidentified armories

that

belong

to other champions

Plato's

contemporaries could and

did

name and who are recognized even

by

us.

I have in mind, to

give one

striking example, the doctrine

of

invisible

and

158

Interpretation
intelligibles

most real

by

which and

by

which alone

the

phenomenal world

is to

be
to

understood.

This
of

was Pythagorean tradition

be thought invention from the

by

us as
when

Socratic idealism. It is
Parmenides
asks

Parmenides (130b),
own apart

likely time, recalling that, in the Socrates whether the ideas are his

Socrates'

by

though

worth

and whether

he

thinks that there

concrete things that participate

response appears sets

unity and plurality in these ideas in themselves, Soc

and
second

is likeness

rates says

yes, but his

directed to the

question, the

first

going

unanswered.

When Aristotle

of thought about

causes, he

sketches

out, in Metaphysics 1, to give the history a picture of Greek intellectual life that the Platonic dialogues. In

should remind the reader of the mosaic panorama of

history, Plato looms large, as Socrates does in Plato's. Aristotle says that Plato was a Heracleitian both early and later in life, for he saw the world of
Aristotle's
phenomena as always could construct

in flux (Metaphysics
out
of

987a34).

Is it

not

Plato-Socrates
a view of

Pythagorean idealism

surprising that one and Heracleitian

greatest
with
pre-

flux? In brief, there is depictor

and of

Plato

and
and

Socrates,
Socrates

and are

Aristotle is the

it, according

to
as

which

Plato

intimately

bound in

must

be discussed

belonging

to the milieu of that host we call

Plato-Socrates'

Socratic. In that view, the

sever

recognition of

preeminence

does

not

their historical connection with their predecessors, nor

predecessors.

does it

entail their

freedom from debt to those

a

The Platonic
with

corpus seems at

first like

depiction

of

the

same pre-Socratic

landscape,

Socrates included in

it, but
whose as per

in a completely different perspective from Aristotle's. Those thinkers thought Aristotle diligently distills and criticizes appear, when they exist
sonae of

Plato's dialogues, like

mere

foils for the virtuosity

a giant

of

Socrates. Plato's

perspective seems to make cence

Socrates

even as

among the dim or semidim. Aristotle saw Plato, who was

perspective was not

among mediocrities and a lumines Did Plato not see Socrates on a human scale
called

divine in his

own

lifetime? I believe
and

that Plato's
show

this. But

if it

was

less detached than Aristotle's, thus clear-sighted, why was it given the

shall

try

to

appearance

by

its

author of no

being
no

the apotheosis of

Socrates,

the perfect philosopher with no

debts,

peers,

errors, the

man who cannot even proclaim

his ignorance

without

adding luster to the testimonials of his wisdom? What was the unprecedented achievement of Socrates that justified so extraordinary a portrayal? The closing
words of

the Phaedo do not constitute an adequate answer. What to move toward

an

follows here is
of a

an attempt

explanation, through the

interpretation

few

el

ements of

the Theaetetus and the Phaedo.

perhaps

My

general

intention is to

argue that

the Platonic corpus contains

that one
the

of

the

instruments
those

of

the appraisal of Socrates; and simply is appraisal is the depiction of Socrates as a man in
whom

company
whom or

of all

with

it is
he learn.

useful

to compare

him,
from

whom whom

he

taught, learned

he

could not

teach,

whom

refused to

teach,

and

he

conceivably The Theaetetus is recounted in Megara (whither Plato is

death
of

even refused to

said

to

have

gone af

ter the

Socrates). In the

recounted

dialogue proper, Socrates is engaged

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

in
conversation with

159
an associate of

Theodorus,

who

is

geometer,
to the

Protagoras,

and a teacher of
whom

Theaetetus.

Plato himself studied in the known that

tradition, he is someone with According in Cyrene. Theaetetus is introduced into the dialogue
group of young men who are approaching. It be in the group is Young Socrates, the interloc have been
at

as the youth comes

utor of

middle of a

one of the others

must

the Statesman. There

least

one more youth

in

order

for

Theaetetus to have been "in the

wise

middle,"

but

no other youth

is

named or other

identified. Theaetetus is described

resembles

as

Young Socrates
respects about

him

of course

resembling Socrates in appearance, in name. Plato maintains silence in all

the conjectured third youth. Socrates begins his interrogation of

Theaetetus
poses

by

enumerating, in the form

with

Theaetetus to be studying
and arithmetic

of a question, the subjects that he sup Theodorus: geometry, astronomy, har

mony,

("music"

cites

(145c, d), which the youth confirms. This list is the same being substituted for "harmony") as the list of arts that Protagoras re when, in the Protagoras, (3i8e) he derides the vulgar sophists who force
rather

their pupils back to the distinct conventional arts

than

teaching them,

as

he

himself

effective as possible

in domestic and civic affairs so that they may be as in the city both in action and in speech. Protagoras is said to look at Hippias while speaking; it may be understood that he would look as pointedly at Theodorus. In pursuing the interrogation of Theaetetus, Socrates

does,

good counsel

asks whether
whether

the increase

of

knowledge is the

same as

increase

of

wisdom,

and

knowledge
what

and wisdom are the same.

Now

arises the chief question of

the dialogue:

is knowledge? Theaetetus
the arts,

answers

by

referring to Theo
shoemak-

dorus 's

of saying wanted. adduces a where a one is This is the same itself it is; many thing objection with which Socrates confutes Meno's definition of virtue [Meno 72a, what

adding also the productive arts such as ing. Socrates turns this answer back because it gives examples instead
curriculum of

the

b). What

might

be

called

the routine position of

Socrates,

namely, that the intel

ligible is

unity to which the multiplicity must

Protagoras's
apparent reason offer an assortment,

resemblance to

be referred, bears an unexpected for disapproving of the ordinary itself in its

unity. and

sophists;

they

he

purveys wisdom

Theaetetus
encourages

admits to a concern over the and go

meaning

of

knowledge

Socrates

him to take heart

forward,
about

offering to put his own peculiar

occa a statement that might

powers at sion

Theaetetus's disposal

during the
Socrates

investigation. This becomes the

for

lengthy

statement

by

himself,

be

called his obstetric autobiography because he discloses in the course of it that he is a midwife of thoughts. His self-description is a curious mixture of depreciation
and

pretension,
able

for he

appears as a

barren god, incapable he has within,

of

generating

a thought

but
that

to deliver

a man of those

distinguishing
false

the pregnancies

isue in progeny from those that have

that this characterization of his
where

spurious

beneficence, fostering ticing

forth in the Meno,

the true and exposing the

fruit and, like a god in his offspring. It is worth no

dialectic pedagogy differs from the one set Socrates claims to be able to elicit all knowledge from

160
all men

Interpretation
everyone

knows everything by virtue of the only to be reminded. There is a tacit with drawal from that doctrine in the Theaetetus, where memory plays indeed an im

by appropriate questioning: immortality of the soul, and needs

part, but the memory in

portant

question

is

of

the ordinary, earthly kind and de

of

pends on perception rather of

than on

immortality

the

soul or on

the availability

ideas

as objects visible

in

a realm above.

This is the

more

in

need of consider

ation

because the Theaetetus begins the Socrates

argues the

sequence that ends soul

in the Phaedo, the

on

place where

immortality of the

partly

the premise of

anamnesis.

question what
of

In any case, the Theaetetus ends inconclusively, aporetically, for the is knowledge is not answered. Socrates does not repeat the success
where

the

Meno,

he induces the

boy

to

discover, i.e.,

to discover

in himself, be
shown

an application of what we call

the Pythagorean theorem. If the Meno tends to ar

right method all normal men can

gue

that through the application of the

to possess all

knowledge,

the Theaetetus can be said to show that the quest

for

knowledge

even about

knowledge itself

staggers through an arduous process of

trial and error and reaches the edifying conclusion that

will make

failure in the investigation

to avoid

Theaetetus
what

gentler with others and

better

able

believing
with

that

he knows
onstrated

he does

not

know. How important this

wisdom might

be is dem

in the

immediately

subsequent conversation of

Socrates

Euthy

phro, in the next dialogue. Whether the practical circumstances surrounding Socrates' end and the willfulness of the men who brought it about have anything to do

Plato's intention in closing the Theaetetus with aporia would require a separate investigation. For the present, it is necessary to inquire into the path by which Plato brings the Theaetetus to the conclusion it reaches.
with

Stimulated knowledge

by Socrates,
another,

Theaetetus

replaces

his first

suggested

definition

of

with

which

is that knowledge is
and as of all

perception.

Socrates im
of

mediately identifies this as Protagorean, Protagoras that runs "Man is the measure

tantamount to the formula

of

things,

the things that are that

to

they

are and of

the things that are not that

not."

they

are

Socrates interprets this

mean

that each man

is the judge
and

of

the coldness,

hotness

and other qualities of perceived appear raises

the things
ance of

he perceives,

there is no way to go

beyond the

things to their

being
be

in truth. In

an unobtrusive

remark, Socrates

(152c)
be

what will prove to

one of the most

difficult

points

that he and Theae

tetus will have to contend

able to settle:

with

throughout the

What is
and

error?

The issue

arises

dialogue, and which they will not because, if what every man per
be
wrong.

ceives

is true for him

the

there

is

no

truth beyond the truth of perception, or how

things appear, no

judgment

about a

thing

can

By

the end of the dia

or

logue,

interlocutors have

ror than ment of

in

defining

better in accounting for knowledge. In this sense, "the problem of

succeeded no

defining er
is
an ele

error"

the discourse that survives to the end of the

which arises out of of

empiricism-relativism, survives the

dialogue. This problem, refutation in the dialogue

the original premise, namely,

out of which

knowledge is

sure")

it grows,

which

perception (or "man is the mea is surprising in the highest degree. Particular

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

importance
unresolved

161
argument survives unrefuted or

should

be

attached

to

whatever

in the

through to the end

because, in

an argument

that ends

formally

in

apo

ria, one

must ask whether the work

has in fact

no affirmative conclusion or

whether perhaps the conclusion consists somehow of whatever

has been intro

refutation.

duced into the

argument

but has

not

been

eliminated

from it

by

The

Theaetetus especially calls for the consideration of some such hypothesis be cause the dialogue consists overwhelmingly of trial and error, of three major ten
tative

definitions
be

of

knowledge,

all of them overthrown when shown

by

Socrates
survives

to be untenable. It is possible that

must sought

in

such a

case, some part of what

in the negations, the

statements of objections that

effectually
a nega not

eliminate

the affirmations which are cast out of the discourse.

Obviously,
and

tive that eliminates permanently some factor of the argument

contradicted should
whole.

is

itself
as a

be

counted as

Collecting

those negatives

permanently belongs to the fullscale interpretation

affirmed

in the discourse

of the

di

alogue and not aporetic

to the present paper. I note, however, that in reflecting dialogue may be said to affirm formally, one might have to include the undisposed of issues raised by refuted positions, and the contradicting arguments
which refuted proposals are eliminated.

on what an

by

I doubt it

will

have

escaped notice of

that this

dialogue, in
above as

which

the

participants

fail to find the meaning

by

trial and error

tient labor in vain

proceeding throughout in act what obstetrician and his pa the seemingly teaching to bring forth. If the dialogue were thus to present its teaching
error,
was
work as a whole ends

described

in act, then the judgment that the be

modified:

in be

aporia would embedded

have to
ac

the genuine resolution of the

issues

would

in the

tion or structure of the

discourse

as a whole.

The dialogue has the

efforts

appearance of

being
it in

an enactment of error which

fails in its

to articulate

error or

to define

words.

Because the definition

of error and

the definition of knowledge are

mutually dependent, the dialogue inevitably has also the appearance of being an enactment of knowledge which fails in its efforts to articulate knowledge or to

define it in
"structure"

words.

If the Theaetetus doctrine

were

designed to

present

its

own action or a se

(i.e., Form)

as the paradigm of
of

knowledge, it

would

be offering

rious alternative to the

mortal soul and

ideas

as vorjrd

that are remembered

by

an

im

that are drawn out of

latency

through a method of

interrogation.

It

would

be presenting knowledge

and therewith

learning

as well as
as

teaching in

purely terrestrial medium, within the linked to perception and ratiocination. However far this is from
realm of experience

one might

say,

defining
can

knowl

edge, it does indicate that the definition is to be expected to lie in some realm of

being

that

is

not out of touch with perception or appearance.

der if this

speculation

"it reply on behalf of the Protagorean view, that

with

only won is to any extent supported by Plato's causing Theaetetus to (or, "it seems so") when Socrates argues provisionally,
perception

One

is

always of what exists

and,

qua

knowledge,
us

cannot

be false (152c).
the
surmise

Let

hold in

abeyance

that the aporia of the Theaetetus might

be

162
resolved

Interpretation

in the

retained elements of

the argument and in the action or Form of the

dialogue

as a whole, and

let

us return to

the

progress of
perception

the

argument.

Theae
unno

tetus,

as was

said,

proposes

that knowledge
reverses

is

(i5ie). Socrates,

ticed and without explanation,

the

order of

the terms and then proceeds

to the identification of "perception

mount

is

knowledge"

as

Protagorean

and as tanta

measure."

to "man

is the
to

By

this understanding, each

thing is

as, and

what,

it is

perceived

be

by

the one perceiving

it,

and error or

prehension

becomes impossible. Socrates

one and a self-same
of things:

now asserts
itself"

falseness in ap doctrine is the this that

view that

"nothing is

thing
ever

from

movement and the mixing nothing that is, all the philosophers except Parmenides he (I52d). On says, this, ing concur, as well as the loftiest poets Protagoras, Heracleitus, and Empedocles

but everything proceeds is, but is always becom

of

the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus

no mention of
will attempt

in comedy

and

Homer in tragedy. It is
offers

surprising that there is

this position,
with
which

Pythagoras. Socrates

in

support of

he

eventually to weaken, that

and

motion

does

go

being

and

life,

and rest with

fire,

the source and support of other

nonbeing things, is

dissolution;

and

that heat and

provi

caused

by

motion.

However

sional this
played

advocacy

might prove to
Socrates'

be,

very important

part will

ultimately be

by

heat

or

fire in

unretracted

thought as brought out

by

the end

of

the Phaedo.

Socrates

elaborates

in

considerable

detail

(156a-

"Protagorean"

157c) the
percipi

doctrine that

all perception

is born

of

the

motion of

the endlessly moving

ent and object of perception.

Attached to this
motion,

"kineticism"

is the

notion

that

per

ception, the

vital concomitant of

cannot

be

"wrong."

One

can

only say

about perception

that

it

occurs.

Protagoras, Socrates moves the state of dreaming, insanity,

in those
states that can

Apparently in order to refute the kineticism of to attack the infallibility of perception by referring to
and

illusion, arguing
called

that we have

"perceptions"

surely be
them

false. Socrates

pursues the theme of

would

dreams in his further

prove

refutation of of

Protagoras, asking Theaetetus how he

not

that

the

two

were

dreaming

their

actual

conversation.
sophism

Theaetetus

allows

that the

thing is
asleep

too hard to prove. This

paltry

is fol

lowed in be

by

the astonishing remark of

weight

because

we are

and awake

Socrates (i58d) that the previous point gains for equal periods of time. I take it
the use of

that when an assertion

regarded as

is

refuted

by

feeble

or

false contentions, it may

having

survived

the refutation. In any case, the

frivolity

of

this

and other arguments

speak soon

in the vicinity is implied

by

Socrates
a

when

he begins to indis

(166a) in

the name of

Protagoras, delivering

defense to

which we will

turn. For the present, two

points seem to emerge:

first,

that

in

some

tinct way the Protagorean or materialist-kineticist ascription of special tance to

impor

motion and

sons at

its force, and with it so much of the Protagorean doctrine of multiplicity in the all as must accompany it; and second, that for rea present at least equally unclear, the Protagorean view that man's percep
retains

heat

tions are the measure of the

being

of

things is also

permitted

to remain alive in

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

some small

163

degree. It

should
mean

been
a

said

is intended to

emphatically clear that nothing that has that Plato's Socrates is a crypto-kineticist. There is

be

made

very

energetic

denunciation

of

the Heracleitians or

"Ephesians"

(i79e-

180c),
re

which sisted

happens

by the

way to be delivered He
enlarges on

by Theodorus,

and which

is mildly

by Socrates,
in

who suggests

that those sectarians perhaps speak the theme of

differently

in

private and

public.

dissimulation, distinguish

ing

the ancients, who concealed their

and

parently Homer, i8od), very

the moderns,

kineticism from the many with poetry (ap who blurt out their wisdom so that the
belief that
some

cobblers will abandon the commonsense

things are

in

mo

tion and other things are at rest. He reminds himself that there are those who teach the opposite, namely, that all

is

one and at

rest,

doctrine that

can appar

ently be

harmful effects, for nothing is said about the wisdom own arguments of concealing it. Whether this has anything to do with and positions is exceedingly hard to judge. He goes on, however, to refute radi
published without
Socrates'

cal

kineticism

by

showing the

impossibility
of

of

saying anything

about

all

things are always moving

concludes not

and

changing, that
the

is, becoming
of motion

rather than of

anything if being.
associated

He

only the critique Protagorean doctrine of "man the

man

theory

but

the

measure"

by rejecting that formula except if the

be

sensible

rejection or

(cbgoviuog) (i83b,c). To see how far this insight constitutes a refutation of Protagoras, we must return to an earlier point in the
at

dialogue.

Beginning

166a, Plato

causes

Socrates to deliver

a remarkable speech

in

which he impersonates Protagoras rebuking Socrates for the levity of his disputa tion to that point and then going on to present Protagoras's understanding with
"Protagoras"

unimpaired seriousness.

asseverates
"know"

ing
and

is

unique and will perceive and

his belief that every human be idiosyncratically, in a literal sense

"idiotically", but
the
when

this

flatly

does

not mean

that there

is

no such

thing

as wisdom

wise man.

The

wise man

bad things

appear and are

to us,

is precisely he who can so deal with us that he can cause good things instead to appear
man and

and

to be. The first illustration is the sick

the physician. To the sick

on a change

man, food tastes and is bitter. The

condition

physician will

bring

in him to

in

which

food

will

taste and be sweet.

of

The

sick man

is

not

ignorant

nor

is the
that

healthy

man wise

because

the

unwisdom or wisdom of

their opinions;

is,

the correction of the sick man is not a matter of rectifying

"Protagoras."

his thinking: to is from

make a man wiser

is impossible,

says

The

required change with

a condition

that is not good to one that

is better. Physicians do this

(Adyotc).

drugs,

"Protagoras"

teachers of wisdom
argues

(oocpiorfjg)
a

with arguments or words

that it

is

not a matter of

truly but

rather of

making a man who thinks (do^aom) falsely think bad condition (i^ig) of the soul so that the man remedying

will experience perceptions

{(bavrdouara)

that are

better, but
to

"true."

not more

The Socratic

"Protagoras"

now makes a remarkable observation: physicians are

those who correct the condition of the

tions or sensations, and

body

with a view

improving

farmers

are the ones who treat sick

its percep plants, replacing bad

164

Interpretation
in them
with

perceptions

good,

healthy

and

true perceptions

{alodrjoeig)
in the

(167c).
cit

Wise

and good orators make noted

the good rather than the

word

wicked seem
"good"

just to the

ies. It is to be

that in each case, the

for
not

expression

denoting
XQr)OTog

the perception of the

which

better

condition
"useful"

is

dyaddg but

some

form
of

of

has

Socrates'

an overtone of

impersonation

Pro

tagoras continues with

interesting

assertions that

we can omit

from the

present on

discussion. What has difference between

emerged

wisdom

is this: in the first place, Protagoras insists and the absence of it. There is such a thing as
and

the

a wise

man, he differs from ordinary people,

the measure of

his

perceptions of

the

world might

be

it if his

wisdom qualifies

him

Socrates'

as the

cpgdvipiog of
wisdom

remark

(i83b,c)

referred

to earlier. While the wise man's

far

exceeds

the vulgar

understanding, the two have something in

as tinged with stand those

"Protagoras"

common. man could

sees

the good
under

the

beneficial,

needful,

terms. There are good

any conditions, and health is

moral standpoint
would

useful as

readily

a paradigm of

them. to be

So

also

is

possession of abundance of wealth

Protagoras

sees no reason of

apologetic about
man with

his

own

fee-taking. His

is that

the ordinary

his

average

perceptions, perceptions that

be

called natural

if nat

ural means perceptible

primary

and unmodified either

experience,

by belief in any force or criterion higher than gods or eternal ideas. Nothing further from his
depreciation
of

thought can

be imagined than
its

Socrates'

life

and

body

in favor

of

death

and

soul, as in the

Phaedo,

which would seem

to him demented. "Pro

tagoras"

speaks of soul and references

e^igor

habitual

condition

(i67bi), but his

of a

curious

to the

perceptions or sensations of plants are

indicative

dency
with other or

toward materialism in

his belief in

motion as primary. and

his doctrine, a tendency which would He appears at first to alienate from

which

strong ten harmonize

each

Good, Truth,

Wisdom,

Socratic philosophy

strives to reconcile

in fact his philosophy reconciles them, though on the plane of the empirical, terrestrial, and natural. His thought reflects energetically on ex perience, but it remains on the level of its own objects: transcending and even de
to amalgamate; but

spising

mere

opinion,

it does

not

hypothesize any entity that

opinion

the

prephilosophic conclusions

from

experience

cannot encompass.

In

an earlier

passage,

(i62d) Socrates
have

presents a

for him

might

given to

Socrates'

reply that Protagoras or someone speaking injection of the gods into the discussion.

The reply is to the effect that the being or nonbeing of gods is excluded from Protagoras's speech and writing. One might say that he has no need of that hy
pothesis,
nor of

ideas

either.

No

standard

higher

or more

enduring than
may
prove to

man and

his

experience comes

to sight, and the

and

soul

itself has

no pronounced primacy.

"Man is the
able

measure" perception"

"knowledge is
so

be

unten

propositions, but

they have

deep

foundation that they have

our own time.
Socrates'

reasserted

themselves

in

one shape or another

down to

numerous
as

refutations of mits while

them and of their

implications

are uneven

in their gravity,

he

ad

impersonating

judgment

on

Protagoras. To determine precisely the details of his Protagoras would be a considerable task, but it seems as if one

The Dramatic End of

might

Plato'

Socrates

165

say that Socratism

clashes

the

practicality of wisdom. wise man is a healer or improver Socrates

world of as

seriously with Protagoreanism on the issue of with his Protagoras seems to replace
"truer" "better;"

of

bodily

or psychic conditions.

One thinks

of

teaching

the natural

impulse

of

the philosopher to recoil from the

practice,

beginning

with politics and

including

acquisition and other

Socrates'

business. The simplicity of this pattern is disturbed by demonstrations in various places that the true king, the true rhetor,
affairs
of

and

if

Xenophon is to be believed
of

the true proprietor of an estate (and the true teacher

generals) is the

philosopher.
a

I believe there is
might

another conflict

between Soc
might

rates and serve

Protagoras,

disagreement that
effectually

be

called

practical, that

to

keep

them

apart as

as most other

differences. Protagoras
as

teaches that what seems good to the city is so for as

long

the opinion

holds,

just
this

as each man

is the

measure

for himself. Whatever

one might superimpose on

way of distinctions between the wise and the others, this doctrine must put it into the mind of every city and every man that he or it knows (176d, 177a). If all the world were Protagorean, the hope of persuading anyone of the impor

by

tance of

knowing

that

or what

he does

not

know

must

inevitably

decline. How
too obvi

this point bears on the argument of the

ous

Euthyphro,

the next
and on

dialogue, is

to say. How it bears

on

the

Apology

of Socrates

Athens itself is if any

thing more obvious. While the empiricism, materialism, and apparent atheism of Protagoras, and their underlying premise of universal motion, might not make it
impossible
to name or
and obstruct

the rule
a sign

of

discuss anything, they do help to democratize the polis the wiser sort. Protagoras's wise man is capable of be
wisdom recommends of value.

coming rich,
those
course a

that his

who can

pay, as a

thing

The

wisdom of

itself to the many, or at least to Socrates brought him of

of

very different compensation,

relation

which

is foreshadowed in the last lines

the present dialogue.

Is the
ment?

between Socrates The

and

Protagoras

one of unrelieved

disagree

Probably

not.

argument of

the Theaetetus

is

mucn

too complex to be

summarized, and for the present purpose only a few points

need

be

mentioned.

After heard

extensive efforts at someone

defining knowledge, Theaetetus

opinion

recalls
with

(201c, d) having
reason, and that
replies curi

say that knowledge is true

not subject

together

the things that are

to

reason are not

knowable. Socrates

dream for another, something that he thought he heard some ously, offering people say, in exchange for what Theaetetus heard someone say. (A dream
one

seems to

anonymous source.

speech emanating from an have something in common with a rumor Cf. page 162 above, on dreams.) What Socrates heard is that
elements or components of ourselves and of all composites are not or

the primary
subject

to reason
addresses

to

being

explained or accounted

for

by

reason.

That is,
un

Socrates

first

that part of Theaetetus's

formula that introduces the

knowable. Clearly, if there

are things that are unknowable

by virtue

of

being

in

tractable to reason (whatever that might mean), then about such things there
could

be

at

best only true

opinion.

How

one could

know that the

opinion about

166

Interpretation
not

them is true is the Euthyphro

clear, but that the argument is

and

drifting

toward the

problems

of

piety

the gods

seems

likely. At any rate, Socrates turns

composite things

the discussion to the question whether the primary elements of things are unintel

ligible
enter.

or are more or

less intelligible than the

into

which

they

He
of

concludes that the

letters

the alphabet and

primary irreducible things {jtgcjra), of which the the musical notes are illustrations, are if anything more up
of

intelligible than the

composites made

them: the things of perception, the

things we see and hear stand high in the order of

reaches

knowability (206a, b).

"one
idea,"

Socrates if re
203c,

the

conclusion

that the syllable, the paradigm of a composite, even

idea"

garded as

"some

one

indivisible

(205c)

and

(205d;

also

from unintelligibility by the intelligibility of the letters, those par ticles known to us in the only way in which they can be known, not by explana
204a) is
saved

tion but

by perception.
now

There

seems

to be some sense in

which

knowledge is

per

ception and perception

knowledge.

Socrates turns
for
son
us?"

(2o6d)
be

to the
of

Without the

formality
added

that which is to

intended to signify it down that rea he lays asking Theaetetus, to true opinion to form knowledge means one
question

"what is

reason

of three things: the verbal reflection of of

of

thoughts in speech; rendering an account

things in terms of all of their elementary parts; explaining something in terms

the characteristic that

distinguishes it from everything

claim of

else.

Socrates

proceeds

not

by

reason

supporting or refuting the but rather by showing that

any

of

the three to be the definition of

no matter which

definition prevailed, true

senses

opin

ion

plus reason would not

be

tenable definition of knowledge. He does this

by

showing that the

error,
and that

possession of reason

in the first two

is incompatible

with

the third

Theaetetus Theaetetus

will until

not enter

involves tautology (209c): the peculiar snubnosedness of into combination with my (true) opinion that that is it has already been distinguished in my mind from all other
that I have
ever seen

snubnosednesses on

and this

by

its

having

been impressed

my memory in the first

place

in its difference from

with all

the other characteristics

of

others; and similarly Theaetetus. Once that impression in terms of

all

singularity has occurred, meeting with you again tomorrow, i.e., seeing you, will remind me and cause me to have right opinion of you. In brief, Socrates has
come round again to perception plus

tion.

He

seems to

have

rediscovered

memory quickened by a renewed percep Protagoras's empiricism and terrestrialized

shows

collection.

We turn

next to of

the

Phaedo,

dialogue that

Socrates

demonstrating the
demonstra

immortality

the soul

during

his last hours,

and

in the

course of that

tion exalting the soul over the

body

life (59b). In

order to accomplish

maintaining that death is preferable to his purpose, Socrates introduces his familiar
while

theory
vable
states.

of

ideas,

the

intelligible
to

and eternal

archetypes,

of which we retain our

revi-

impressions

as we pass

through

our

disembodied toward

incarnated

Contributory

the effect

his showing the immortality of the soul is an argument to that things are brought into being by their contraries, as pleasure fol-

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

lows
run

167

pain and life itself is consequent upon death. By the time the dialogue has its course, the reader has been made to wonder how far Socrates himself be lieved the soul to be immortal, to what extent he considered the soul to be inde

pendent of the

body,

and whether

he had

not admitted ponderable variations of

the orthodox

idealism is

always associated with related

his

name.

The

conversation who

is

by Phaedo,
death

who was present, to

Echecrates,
group

Phliasian

remembered as a

Pythagorean

and who shows a sympathetic

in
of

terest in Socrates. Also present at the

of

Socrates

was a sizable

Athenians

and

others,

of a

variety

of philosophic persuasions.
sick"

It is

made explicit or

that Plato was not there: "Plato was, I

mention of
rates'

think,

(59b). Whether
there"

how this

Plato's

absence

is to be

connected with

Phaedo's remark,

after

Soc

account of

the ideas

as

causes, that "all

who were

thought

Socrates

had

thing wonderfully clear, must remain more or less conjectural (102a). Eucleides and Terpsion, the Megarans of the recounting of the Theae tetus, were there. So also were Simmias and Kebes, two Thebans who are de
made

the

scribed
who

by
said

Socrates

as pupils of

Philolaos (6 id). Philolaos is the Pythagorean

esoteric

is

to have sold the written report of the

and

tenets of Pythagorean-

ism to Plato himself. Simmias

Kebes

are

the

principal

interlocutors

of

the

Phaedo,

together with

Socrates,

and their reservations and

doubts,

as well as

their unquestioning concurrences, are instruments that Plato uses in giving the
argument much of

its

shape.

As the thought
the

of

Protagoras
ways

moves

in the Theae only illustrate

tetus,

so that of

Pythagoras

affects

Phaedo, in

that I can

here
I
ners

with great should

incompleteness.

like to begin
of

by

in discourse

Socrates

asking why Simmias and Kebes are made the part during most of the dialogue. I believe that an indi

cation of

the answer

is to be found in the
Simmias

following

places rather

early in the

conversation.

First,

at

64c, Socrates
a

tion of the soul

death is anything but the separa from the body. Without hesitation Simmias replies that it is noth
asks
whether

ing

but that. This is

begging

of

the question that forms the context of the ex

change, for if it were known that death consists of such a separation, it would be known also that the soul is capable of and has an independent existence, a point
which

Socrates in fact
70a, Kebes
upon

attaches to the question to which sees

Simmias has

given an

affirmative answer.

Simmias

Next,
that the

at

wishes to
separated

nothing hear dispelled the

arguable

here.
common would

fear that the

soul

disintegrates

being

from the body. He

like

some assurance
when

soul exists and

has any

power and

intelligence {(pgdvnoig)
that
we

the man
to the

remem

has died. Socrates

refers to

"some

ancient account

effect that the souls go

from here to the infernal

region and return and are

born

from the dead. And if this is so, he asks, if the living are born again from the dead, how might our souls not exist there? The support for the affirmative is to be
found in the doctrine is born
of pain and

of the generation of all things

from

opposites.

As

pleasure

everything that becomes becomes from the opposite of what it

168
turns

Interpretation
so also

dying follows living. Kebes accepts this astonishing mixture of an old story and a flimsy analogy with out a murmur, although he is not generally a passive interlocutor. Strengthening
into,

living

arises out of

being

dead just

as

this argument
reciprocation

with

another, Socrates declares that if there

opposite

were not a universal

between

states, the

universe would collapse makes an

into

ubiqui state

tous death. Kebes is persuaded, and

Socrates

unusually strong

ment,

declaring that

it

seems to
of

him that it is

altogether

exactly thus,

and that re

turn to life and the birth

of

the

living

from the dead

and the existence of the souls

the dead are the reality (72d). Kebes

a

agrees and confirms all of

the

foregoing
re

by introducing
proof. ceived

favorite Socratic doctrine, Of course, if the soul carries forth into life before birth, it
must

that of anamnesis, as an additional

various

impressions that it
would

have lived

on somewhere.

Simmias

like to be

reminded of omy.

the proof of this position, and Kebes furnishes

can answer well-put questions about

it

with notable econ

Human beings

anything, which

they

would not

be

able to

do if the knowledge

were not within

them. In order to rein

force

from anamnesis, Socrates refers without explanation, as if it were self-evident, to a man's knowledge of things as gained through seeing, hearing, or other perception (73c). The aporia of the Theaetetus seems to dis
argument

Kebes'

solve

in the tacit

acceptance of the spurned

Protagorean

suggestion.
made

Returning
rators of

to the question why Simmias and Kebes are

the chief collabo

Socrates in this

them as pupils of

dialogue, I think that which means Pythagoreans, Philolaos,

ultimate

Socrates'

description

of

gives a clue

that gains

quiescence

in plausibility by their conduct in the exchanges just summarized. Their easy ac in the most problematic assertions apparently comports with their Py training,
which would

thagorean

have

put

those conceptions, thought to be pe

culiarly

Socratic,

well within

the range of the familiar or the authoritative. As

one might

say, Plato could not

find
them
at

more agreeable

interlocutors

with

Socrates

on

questions of

immortality
by

and

the migration of souls than Pythagoreans. The same

indoctrination

would prepare

tion of opposites
cribes

opposites,

equally well to accept the theory of genera least if Aristotle is to be believed when he as is

to the Pythagoreans the belief that "contraries are the first principles of

things"

(Metaphysics

986b3).

All

of this

said without

intending

to minimize

the weight of the objections that

of

Simmias

and

Kebes

will oppose

to the doctrine

the eternal vitality of the soul as distinguished from its capacity to survive the body for a limited time. Perhaps Simmias and Kebes are imperfect Pythagore ans, as Theodorus
was a

deviating

Protagorean. It is
on

not possible now

to

try

to

clarify these

relations of

detachment
Kebes

the part of certain members of philo

sophic sects when

they

contemplate their orthodoxies.

make objections to

It is

well worth

noticing,
of

though, that Simmias

mortality, and that,
whole

Socrates'

and

doctrine

im

upon

the completion of the

statement of

those objections, the

party is disconcerted
an unassailable

by

the inroads that have been made on what was

thought to be

position, to such an extent that

doubts
in his

about reason own

charac-

itself

arise.

Beginning

at

88b, Phaedo breaks into the

account

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

ter with certain remarks to Echecrates.

169
relates

Phaedo

how Socrates

caressed

him,

and

drew

misplaced

between misanthropy and misology: both arise out of trust too readily given, followed by repeated disenchantment until
a parallel

eventually hatred of all men or of all reason ensues. The lesson is caution, not dogmatic skepticism. What this speech that Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates
betokens for Plato's

ily

matter

for be

understanding of philosophic sectarianism is necessar speculation. At any rate, here at 9od, Phaedo concludes his ex
own
and resumes

change with what might

Echecrates
called

the

report of

the

argument

proper, ending

the Phaedo section. If one

were

to wonder why this crucial

serve as

work was named after a character who

did nothing in the dialogue but

addressee of

the admonitions

that Plato attached much

just related, I think one might plausibly conclude importance to the chief point of the Phaedo section.
of a given passage

Those

who

find the location

in

text significant
as a whole

will wish

to

know that the Phaedo

equal parts.

section

divides the dialogue

into very nearly

elaboration

Let it be
of

supposed a

that Plato has injected Pythagoreanism into the

some

Socratism in

way that indicates

on

other.

By

these tedious evolutions, we

congeniality of the one doctrine to the seem merely to be rediscovering the judg
although

ments of

Aristotle

Plato's provenience,
which

doing

so

by

concrete refer

ence

to the

dialogues,
of

Aristotle does only

on occasion.

There is, however,

that
to

another

feature
pay

Plato's

critical method of order to

constructing the argument to which

seems
with regard

one must some

attention

in

interpret the texts. It

weighty

issues, Socrates
last
almost

makes powerful representations which

presents with reverse.

he himself
or per

unobtrusively qualifies, certainly

the utmost

tentativeness, for
a proof

haps
low
soul

even seems at

to

In

order

to observe this,

we must

fol

an argument that not

develops
the

after

Kebes has

shown a need

that the

body only Socrates declares that this is tantamount to

preexists

but is

altogether

imperishable (95b
a thorough

et seq.).

demand for

investigation

of

the

cause of generation and corruption.

Socrates

now gives a remarkable ac

count of

his intellectual how his

experiences as a seeker after

knowledge

about causes. material

He

relates

explorations

into

natural

philosophy, apparently on

istic principles, led him into

confusion and

ally to forget even what common Then he discovered Anaxagoras,

cause of

sense

discouragement, causing him eventu had plainly if insufficiently taught him.

dictum that
mind

whose

is the

arranger and

everything delighted him. He

to the
good: mind causes

reasoned

that mind does all that

it does

with a view

the

generation and corruption of each

thing

in

order to procure what

is best for it. Thus

the study of generation and

tion

is really the study of good. Great was his disappointment when went on to introduce air, aether, water and many other foolish things as causes, i.e. to vitiate his doctrine with matter, as if any such could explain why (that is,
,

corrup Anaxagoras

with a view

to

what

good) anything

came

into

being
He

or

happened. Anaxagoras,

in mixing
conditions

matter

with mind, lost sight of the distinction between cause and the
operation of a cause.

necessary for the

and others

ignore the good,

170

Interpretation
than any other power to

more powerful

keep

the

whole together.

Now Socrates
cause.

describes his
gins

second or post-Anaxagorean voyage

in

search of

the

He be

by stating his method of inquiry. He adopts each time some explanation (Xoyog) as a hypothesis that he judges to be the strongest, and he posits as true whatever agrees with it and rejects as untrue whatever does not (iooa). Now he
will

hypothesize the
the

existence of

the beautiful in

itself,

and

the good, and the

great and all

others.

"If

you grant me

this and concur

in the
you

being

of

these

things, I hope to be
immortal."

able

to demonstrate cause, and to prove to

grants

that the soul is

Astonishingly, Kebes
We
present

the

existence of

the things themselves

without a question.

might notice at

this point that the doctrine of the

ideas,

at

least in the
stration of

context, is
of

subordinate to

theory
what

of cause and

the demon

the

immortality
thing is,

the soul.

Briefly,
in
which

each

or rather

is

made

to

be,

it

participates.

A beautiful thing is

made calls

by that "thing beautiful by beauty itself, by

answer

it is

itself"

its

"participation"

in the beautiful. Socrates

this "the safest

said

can

give"

to the question "what

is the

cause?"

(It must be

immediately

that a few

pages

only safe but stupid. So we must not jump to conclusions about his naivete.) Socrates praises the clarity of the re sults of his method, and Echecrates breaks into Phaedo's report to join in the

later, Socrates

will call

this account not

praise.

Phaedo replies, be larger than

as was said

above,

with

the remark that everyone there

thought Socrates had clarified everything amazingly. Now Socrates shows how a
man can

one man

but

smaller

than another: he can participate in

cause

the great and the small,

which can

simultaneously

him

or

be

present

in

him, but
in its
site,

neither the great nor

the small, the

thing itself,

can admit or participate

opposite without one of

being

destroyed. When the

opposite approaches

its

oppo
of

them

must either withdraw or

be destroyed. The importance

this

for the life Now

of the soul will appear soon.

an unnamed

interlocutor

notices that

beauty's

being

the cause of

beauty

means that eration guishes

like is

caused

by like,

which contradicts

the earlier doctrine that gen

is

by

opposite of

opposite,

as pleasure out of pain.

Socrates easily distin

are generated

"things"

from "things in
as

themselves:"

the

former

through

opposition, the latter

ety.

has just been

said are repelled or

destroyed by
heat
and

contrari cold or

Socrates takes the heat

next

important step
but hot

by distinguishing
they
are

fire,

coldness and snow. snow are not

Heat

and coldness are what

and coldness

and cold.

in themselves, fire and His point is that the things in

them.

themselves

have its

surrogates which

behave like them but differ from

be

Thus,

if fire
can

approaches

snow, one

or the other must withdraw or

destroyed;

neither

tolerate
to

contrary.

Sometimes, Socrates
same name

says, "not only the idea itself

and

(aim
which,

eldog) deserves the

forever
called

ever, but also

while not

being

that

idea,

always whensoever

it

exists

something form" has that

it is
not

(i03e). For example, three may

always

be

three, but

although

The

Odd, it may
as

also always and

be

called odd.
as

Now three
would

will oppose

anything Even just

three contains the

strenuously

eternally

Odd itself

do, because

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

idea
of odd.

171

Obviously, Socrates has

"If
you ask

prepared a position that goes

made so

beyond his
now

first
says you

argument that

something beautiful is
me,

by Beauty

itself. Socrates

(iosb.c),

what causes

that safe but stupid answer that it is

something to be hot, I will not give Heat, but rather out of our present work a
if you
ask what causes

more sophisticated

reply, that it is

fire;

and

the

body to

be

sick, I

(in Greek, something like "fieriness"). say Sickness but All this comes to an immediate head in a brief passage in which Socrates
will not

fever"

shows

that the soul is to Life as fire is to Heat. Soul is not Life itself but Life's
and

surrogate,
stroyed.

it

and

death

are opposites when

that must

flee

one another or

be de
must

Thus it follows that

thus its survival
and cannot of

death descends is
proved.

upon

the

body,

the soul

flee,

and

the

body

The

reason

that the soul must

flee death
given when

stay to be destroyed by its opposite, as snow is by heat, is thus: if the deathless is also indestructible, the soul cannot be destroyed death approaches it (106b). One thought that the question was precisely
the deathless is necessarily also

whether seems

indestructible. The demonstration

What

now

to take the form "if something is

of

deathless, its vitality is

must

the same as or

is

the sign
this

its

insusceptibility

to

destruction."

live

must

be. But does

formula mean, what must live must be alive as long as it exists, and it cannot exist once it no longer lives; or must the formula mean, life is of the thing's es
sence, it
and must

be in life

and

there is no way to think

of

it

without

implying

its life is

thus its existence? This latter

of proof of

formulation

will

certainly
a

remind of a particu

lar kind
of

the existence of God: if there is

no

being

such

that existence

its essence, then there is

cessity of its existence. has something of the appearance destructible? is

of existence. plicit

way to discuss it without acknowledging the ne In either case, as the demonstration is left by Socrates, it
of

begging the question.

as

Is the immortal die

soul

in

answered with the assertion that what cannot conclusion

could

cannot pass out

That this

is

interesting

to gods as to men

is

made ex of

(io6d). At any rate, it

have been

asserted as well at

the

beginning

the argument as at its end, for nothing in the argument proper visibly addresses this issue.

is puzzling also in that, while the soul is characterized as the carrier or surrogate of Life, death acts for itself, capable of approaching and, presumably but only for a while, withdrawing. Is death the surrogate of a larger Idea, or is there a Death Itself, the Idea of Death? The demonstration
of the soul's

imperishability

death simply a negative, the privation of life? What is the ontic status of privations? Are they nothing? If death is ontically nothing, a nonentity, does it Is
not

for that

reason cease to

be discussable
that death is

or cease to

be

a source of anxiety?
or

The di

alogue never suggests

not

discussable

that it is

not a source of

anxiety to man and perhaps even, if rarely, to Socrates. The is not an explicit theme, but it is an active one, in ways that I
and of which

status of privations cannot take

cold

up here
the

will give

heatless
about

or unhot and

only the hot is

a single example.

At 106a, the

is

called

called coldless or uncold.

Socrates

says

how far

one can go

in translating anything into the

privation of

nothing its oppo-

172
site.

Interpretation
and cold can

If heat

be

named

by

some process of

reciprocating

privation of

life be similarly named? After all, the absolutely living negatives, is called in Greek as in English the deathless, and Socrates says of "the very idea (106c). There is a special of (adrd rd rfjg ^cofjg eldog) that it is
can

death

and

life"

"deathless"

reason

for raising the

question through the particular conjunction of the examples

of

heat

and cold alongside

life

and

death,

as will appear.

I think it is fair to infer

Pythagore-

foregoing that Plato presents Socratism as both affected with anism and as being developed by Socrates in ways that differ from the simple or thodoxies of Socratic idealism. A question opened up by this inference, but espe cially by the second branch of it, is how far the conjectured attributes of Socratism belong to thought and how much to Plato's. On this I shall have to difficulty nothing say now.
from the
Socrates'

In
ties

what

direction does the Platonic Socrates

seem to withdraw

from the rigidi

of

the ideas and even perhaps of the superiority of death to life? I can give
one

only one suggestion, Socrates. Crito is

Socrates'

that arises out

of

the

place of

Crito in the
which

world of

Socrates'

interlocutor in

famous dialogue in

Crito tries

to persuade Socrates to save himself from death. In the present

resists
means

dialogue, Crito

to prolong

death to the very last moment, urging him to use any small life and this after the colossal efforts of Socrates on behalf of

death. One inclines spontaneously to say in spite of, but I mean to suggest that one should perhaps say because of Crito's imperviousness to the radical depreci
ation of

body
and

and

life, Socrates

shows

him

a marked and

touching
sense,

affection.

wonder whether

Socrates doesn't like him for his

unshakeable adherence

common

healthy

hu

manity,
ence.

his

to the simple dictate of natural experi

avoided as over all

Nothing can make Crito see death as anything but fearful, bad, and to be long as possible, and he cannot feel anything but unashamed grief
Socrates does
from
not spurn

the loss of one he loves.

manifold abstractions was not

him because, I suspect, for

experience,
our

his

body

and contradictions of natural

Socrates
selves

completely in

accord with

his

own orthodoxy.

Blinding

to this, we will probably be poor readers of Plato's

Socratic dialogues. I

find

some

imponderable
his feet

support

for this

speculation

in two facts included

by
the

Plato in the Phaedo:

Socrates'

when

bonds

were removed

from his legs

by
a

jailers, he
die (6 id);

put

on the ground and sat wife came a

thus until the time came for him to

and when

his

to bid her seventy-year-old

arms.

husband

last

farewell,

she was

carrying

babe in

However this may be, the argument of the dialogue is not yet over. Having shown that the soul is imperishable as well as immortal, Socrates desires to de pict its fate after its emancipation from the body. This requires him to give a de
scription of the nether scription of
persuaded earth

regions,

the

whole world.

description that unobtrusively becomes a de Socrates presents it as something of which he was

a

by

someone unnamed.

To begin with,

and stated needs

conditionally, if the
support

is

round and

is in the heaven

middle of and

heaven,

it

nothing to

it but

the

homogeneity

of

its

own equilibrium or equipoise

(looggosria).

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

The
of earth

173

does

not

fall because it is in
As for the

a place and condition of perfect opposition

forces,
like

and thus of rest.

earth

itself, it is
of

dented
sages

and whose

interior is hollowed

and channelled with an

body whose surface is in intricacy of pas

myth of

a system of arteries and veins.

The bulk

Socrates'

the earth

describes the fluids

pitted surface and earth.

primarily water, air, flux

and aether

that lie

in

and over the

that circulate through the great passages

and oscillation

within

the

It is

a scene of endless of the

brought on,

as

he says,

body of by the

bottomlessness
Greek term, reciprocating
no

"basis"

fluids. The cause, he says, is that the fluids have, in the or step, nothing on or with which to stand. There is a
side to side, and out of this melange of

rush of

fluids from

fiery,

muddy fluxions comes an equipoise. Socrates, who professed his dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras as a doctor of causes, appears to have lapsed into Anaxagorean-

ism

or some

form

of a

Heracleitianism
of

at the

last

moment.

The

subversion of

body
sim

has drifted toward

ple mechanism of cause of

hypothesis
and

body as cause.

What he

admits as cause

is

matter,

it

would

that intricate contraption

be straining credulity to maintain that the of fluids in motion is the good, namely, the just
rather

accommodation of

departed souls,

than the equilibration of spherical earth

cause of

that must

hang
not

without support good

in the heavens. The is tantamount to

the

world order

is

certainly
man.

the

if the

good

or

implicated in the
I

good of

There is
to draw

one

last

conjunction of notions

in the Phaedo to

which

should

like

Early in the conversation, (63d) Socrates notices that Crito has been trying to say something, and he asks him what it is. Crito replies that the man in charge of the poison was trying to admonish Socrates to talk less because
attention.

speaking warms one up and the heat counteracts the poison. Later (105b, c), when Socrates is transcending the safe but stupid dictum that the cause of heat in something is The Hot, he gives as an illustration of the improved conception the
statement

that

what causes

the

body
,

to

be

sick or

is

not

the presence in
excess.

it

of

Sickness

in Itself but
of

rather of

fever,

i.e. fieriness,
of

heat to

In the last

sentences

the

dialogue,

the effect

the poison on Socrates

is described

as a

growing

coldness

beginning in his feet and rising, like death itself, through his limbs until it reaches his heart, when not only his members but himself died. I wish to sug
that

gest

life itself is
any

portrayed as some condition of a man or rather of

his body,

indeed

of

animal or

its body, in
that

which

heat

and cold are

in

a state of equilib
without

rium or such as

rest,

an equilibrium and that can

can

be

upset

by

things
some

introduced from

drugs,

be affected,

at

least in
be

men,

by

an

activity

of

the

mind such as speech. or triple

(It is

not clear whether

of man can

Socrates in

fact required the

double

dose.) How far the life

problematic.

understood

through the Phaedo as

equilibrium of

a mechanical

thermal equilibrium, a microcosm of the

fluid

the
at

world,

is

One

would

like to know

what

significance, if any, to
an(l

tach to the fact that the Greek word

for

soul

is ^XV

for cooling

\\>v%u>.

Can

one

be

certain

that

Socrates'

last words, the his

reminder

to Crito to pay the debt

pain-

to Aesculapius,

were not a mark of

gratitude

to the great druggist for a

174

Interpretation

less death through cooling numbness rather than for release from life as if it were a disease? What the text does seem to make clear is that the intention of Plato cannot be discerned unless his Socrates is seen in his depth, free from the bonds
of an exoteric

dogmatism that

is,

after

all, incompatible

with

his famous irony.

Plato portray a large variety of philosophic schools, human types, and professions. To understand Plato is to grasp the outcome of the for talk. How many dramatic meetings in which those actors are brought together should lead him to discussions those outcome of the reader perceives the many
The Socratic dialogues
of

Plato's premises; but

come

we are

tempted to reverse the

process and

to derive the out

examine some of

from

some prejudgment of
work

Plato's
as

premises.

I have tried to

parts of

Plato's
and

Socrates;
ment of
was. open

presupposing I have done so for the sake

was

little
of

as possible about
what

his judgment

understanding

Plato's true judg

what

Socrates
I

and

therefore, from Plato's perspective,

conclude

Socrates
an

I have tried to
mind,
and

keep

an open mind on the question whether

Plato kept

was

led to

that he had

done

so.

I do

not

find that Plato

blinded himself any more than Aristotle would do to the ligatures that bound Socrates to the thought of his predecessors, or that he believed that alone among men Socrates had no origins to speak of. Nor does it appear that the doctrines for
which

Socrates is

most

famous

were

held

by

him

as

dogma

or without regard to

their value as exoteric.

What
that

entitles

Socrates to the
was

encomium of

Phaedo just

at

the end

of

the dialogue
whom

Socrates

the best

and wisest and most

man of

that time of

those about

him had

experience?

Perhaps the

answer

lies in this: that he

achieved

the decisive translation of Greek philosophy onto the plane of sobriety. to

He

seems

have taken Pythagoreanism it for

prudent men.

with

its

cultic and other extremes and a

domesti

cated ward pears

This domestication included

drastic reformulation, to
other

restraint, of
to

philosophy's political pretensions.

On the

have

elevated

Protagoreanism

which moved

the Pythagoreans were

only too

by frantically

reminding it
aware.

of soul and

hand, he ap heaven, of
have

Socrates

seems to

among the schools and professions of the Greeks like a judge in the midst
poets and

of

enthusiasts, pedants, mountebanks, thinkers, climbers, connivers,

others.

straint of

After he had done his work, the stage was set for the seriousness and re Aristotle. That the achievement of Socrates was a historical achieve
to be some
part of

ment seems of

the burden of Plato's Socratic corpus. How

an enormous question

much

that achievement was

in fact Plato's is

that must remain

present to the mind of anyone who

hopes to

understand

Plato. in
all

Socratism
cautious

appears as a

turning
its

point

in Greek

and thus

thought,

as

the

deradicalization

of

extremes of

spiritualism, cultism,

and metaphys

ical dogmatism, accomplished through a careful sifting of the best resources available. There is reason to think that the history of philosophy in the modern age has been a record of the radicalization or intensification of the primary con
ceptions, a course opposite to that which came to a climactic point with the

The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

philosophizing of Socrates. If this observation dicate that the decline of society is compatible
tions of man's theoretical existence. One

175
were with

to prove correct,

it

would

in

the most contradictory evolu

must

be singularly devoted to truth, to

be

cheered

by

this

discovery.

Philosophy, Education,
Charles L.
Howard

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

Griswold,

Jr.

University

A very

popular error:

having the courage

of one's

convictions;

rather

it is

a matter of

having
I
When
arise

the courage for an attack

on one's convictions!

!!

Nietzsche1

we consider

the

relation

between philosophy

and

courage, three issues

immediately. The first

concerns the

philosophical attempt

to say what courage is.

interesting enough
dition to

to

focus

large

section

philosophy of courage, that is, the Plato, for one, thought this attempt of a dialogue on it (the Laches), in ad
second

passages of other

dialogues. The

issue

concerns

the question as
answer

to whether the pursuit of

philosophy

requires courage.

At first glance, the

If
a

to this question seems contingent upon

risks punishment

historical

circumstances.

Socrates

by

persevering in philosophizing, he is to be congratulated,

perhaps,

on

his

courage.

Indeed,

students of the

Apology
which

and

Phaedo
met

sometimes

wax poetic about ment.

the uncompromising manner

in

Socrates

his

punish

A Bertrand Russell,

liberal

democracy,
under such

and

by contrast, has relatively little to fear from a modern courage does not seem to be a prerequisite of philoso
Yet
might not

phizing

tolerant conditions.

the

pursuit of

philosophy
might

nevertheless require another sort of courage regardless of the political conse quences? case

Having

the courage "for

might

convicti

an attack on one's

be

in

point.

So too, in fact,

be the We

courage required to sustain one's con

might refer

viction

that it is
of

worth philosophizing.

to both

of

these as cases of

the courage
might

the philosopher. Thus a species of the philosopher's courage to say what courage

be

required

itself is,

as

Socrates

suggests at

Laches

194a.

knowledge if
Socrates'

The third issue, finally, is whether all courage requires philosophical courage is to be beneficial. However difficult it may be to defend,
position on

this last issue is

fairly

clear: courage must

be

combined

with

knowledge if it is to be beneficial (e.g., Meno 88b, Prot.

paper

3590-3606).

In this

shall

focus

on

Plato's

view of

the second of the

issues just

ad-

Drafts of this paper were presented at Prince George's College, Maryland (Feb. I, 1982), Mary Washington College, Virginia (Feb. 29, 1984), and Malboro College, Vermont (April 4, 1984). I am grateful to Professors Edward Regis and David Roochnik for their helpful criticisms of an early draft
of this essay.

1.

Gesam. Werke, 23
see

vols.

(Munich: Musarion. 1920-29),

3rd ed.
of

vol.

16,

p. 318.

The

translation

is

W. Kaufmann's; have
used
emendations.

his Nietzsche,

(Princeton: Princeton

R. Sprague's translation
Unless

the Laches (Indianapolis:

page numbers

University Press, 1968), p. 19. I Bobbs-Merrill, 1973). wifh slight directly

in the text
or advert

otherwise noted,

Stephanus

included

to

the Laches. Except

where

noted, when

refer

in this essay to Socrates, Laches,

Nicias I

am ad

verting to

these characters as

Plato

portrays them.

178

Interpretation
about

umbrated, though I must necessarily say something

since all
philosopher"

the other two

issues

three are interrelated. For example, if something like "courage of the

exists, it

would

presumably be

covered

by

the definition of courage

as

such,

and

the definition of courage was the first of our issues. Since the Laches

is the only Platonic dialogue in which courage is a major theme, it is a logical place to begin an investigation into the nature of philosophical courage, and I
shall

therefore discuss the issue in terms of this dialogue.

are connected
seems

Moreover,

our

first two

issues

in that,

as

already noted, the effort to define courage philo

our

sophically

to require the courage to philosophize. We might then charac

terize the relationship between

first two issues

a

as

among
yov)
of

other

things,

an effort

to give

Xdyog

of what courage

follows. The Laches is, is; the deed (egof

giving this

Xdyog requires

courage.

Thus the definition

courage, and

the philosopher's courage, stand to each other as word to deed. the relationship between words and
mony"

As it turns out,

deeds (and in

particular

the need for a "har

between the two levels) is itself a prominent and explicit theme in the Laches. These two strata of meaning throw a considerable amount of light on
each

other, as we shall

see.

Our third issue, namely the necessity for philosophical knowledge in every sort of real courage, is also connected to the effort to define courage (our first is
sue). often

Indeed,

Nicias'

one of

definitions in the Laches (which Nicias

says

he has

heard from

Socrates) is
form
of

that courage is a kind of wisom (i94d). If

philoso

phy itself

requires a

courage, then our second and third issues are also

connected.

would prefer reasons

to concentrate on the matter of the philosopher's cour

other two

age, but for the

ticularly
It is

of

just adumbrated, discussion of the the definition of courage) is unavoidable.

noting that the
all the plausible than the view that

issues (par

worth

view that all sorts of courage require

philosophy is from any

initially less

the philosopher requires courage to phi to be the

losophize. Of

virtues,

courage seems

furthest

removed

connection with

have performed, it seems, very courageous acts. Not just the ability to act courageously, but also to recognize instances of courage, seem widespread and in little need of the phi
men and women

knowledge. Unphilosophical

losopher's help.
help. Thus
what

Only
he

the effort to say what courage

what courage

is

seems to require such

out

is, Laches believes that he knows say it is (i94a-b), a claim Socrates does not dispute. However, Socrates points that if we cannot say what courage is even though we are ourselves coura
while cannot our

geous, then

deeds

and words are not

but

not the words

"participate"

in

courage

"participate"

in

courage at all, even

that event, the deeds (193c). The ability of human beings to if in an inarticulate way, would seem to be a

harmonized. For in

prerequisite of our courage might ease philosopher to seem to

which

ability to

give a

Xdyog of courage.
some

The very accessibility

of

the philosopher's task considerably;

know,"

indeed,
is

the

ability

of

the

"already

in

sense,

what

good or noble would

be

a prerequisite of

his ability to say

what virtue

is. This is

a point

to

shall

subsequently

return.

Philosophy, Education,
Before

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

would

179
of edu

delving

into the Laches I

like to

consider

why the issues

cation and

the philosopher's

courage are

worthy

of reflection.

They
the

are

inti
im

mately
word

connected with several general philosophical questions of

utmost

portance.

In necessarily brief terms, this point may be stated as follows. As the is the love of one of the four Platonic virtues, implies,
"philosophy"

namely
compels
wisdom

wisdom.

If

we accept what

"philosopher"

loves

Symposium speech the teaching of he lacks, not the lack itself. Love or desire (egwg)
the

Socrates'

away from the lack by attaining what he wants, that is, (203b-204b). A prime question for the interpreter of Plato, if not for the
move

him to

philosopher as show

such,

concerns
wisdom

the

"justification"

of not

this erosophy. Plato

someone possessor.

must

that the love of

is

"good,"

just because
and

has the desire And this

as

for it, but because

sumes

wisdom

is

good at

in itself least to

for its

that

wisdom

is possessable,

scription of uous one.

philosophy actually

conveyed

some extent. In my opinion, the de in Plato's dialogues is not an unambig

For example, the way in which philosophy is practiced in the dialogues makes it look simply negative and even skeptical, to the point that the refutation of ar guments is substituted for sound arguments which establish positive results. The
numerous myths and prise

images to the degree

of

effect

that philosophy is a beneficial enter

are

yielding tmoxr\\ir). They

some

emorfjun

themselves

not

examples a

of

might

be taken

as

expressing the

hope that philosophy is

de

fensible enterprise, but hope is not an argument. In the Symposium, moreover, Socrates also says that egwg is (203d5) as well as being a "philosopher through all of life, a clever enchanter
sophist"

"courageous"

and

sorcerer and

(203d7-8). Socrates
"egwg'

concludes

his

encomium

by

saying

that

now as

before he
of

courage"

praises virtues

power and

(2i2b7-8). Socrates
courageous egyov

does

not

link any
act)

the other the

to egwg.

"Egwg is

the

(work, deed,

of

philosopher.

If

one were to emphasize this

line

of of

thought to the exclusion of others in the philosopher's egwg is just the

"courage."

Plato,

then it

"virtue"

would seem

that the

strength

and perseverance

it supplies, the

But then philosophy would ultimately become a Sisyphean, or rather, Quixotic enterprise. It would be reduced to the decision of desire, that is, to the fulfill
a

self-conscious choice and resolution to

paradigms.

desire in the face

of nonexistent

Philosophy
the

becomes
power

a meditation on

the agony of desired

decision;
simply,

or

the

celebration of

to

create or will what we

practitioner.

desire;

or,

more

just the

subjective preference of

its

The

abounds with proponents of

"ontological"

these conceptions, or
"Entschlossenheit"

philosophy reductions, of philosophy. The

recent

history

of

pivotal

role of

(resoluteness) in Heidegger's
Courage
plays a promi
Sisyphus.3

Sein

und

Zeit is

conception.2

a good example of such a

nent role

in Nietzsche's writings,
e.g., Sein
a
und

as well as

in

Camus'

The Myth of

2. 3.

See,
For

Zeit (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1972),

pp. 297ff.

discussion

of the

issue in the

context of

Camus,

see

my "The Myth

of

Sisyphus:

Re

Philosophy in Context 7 (1978),

pp. 45-59.

180

Interpretation

Despite the important differences among the thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Camus, it is safe to say that in their writings courage occupies a very impor Laches' tant place and that its meaning is much closer to endurance (with which

first definition has to do; I92b9-ci) than to wisdom (with which definition has to do; I94d4~5). under these conditions becomes the
second
"Courage"

Nicias'

ability to create choices and to hold to them in the face of an unfriendly universe. This conception of courage and of its relationship to philosophy is tied to a larger
picture of man and world.

In

general

terms, from the

standpoint of the

"existentialist"

thinkers just mentioned there exists no

"wisdom"

in the Platonic

sense,

since no

soul,

no

man and eternity.

The

"Whole"

Whole (or cosmos), and no natural harmony between is thought of as the multiplicity of parts, coming

together and

dissolving

through

history

in

unanalyzable ways and

for

unknowa

ble

ends.

The Platonic in the

counter

to this view requires a very complex thesis about

the connection between egwg and reason, soul and reality, and
"goodness" "intelligibility,"

finally

about of

the the

"harmony,"

"measure"

sense of

and

cosmos such as a

in itself
the

and

for

us.4

This is the
and

sort of

thesis Plato presents in dialogues

Phaedrus, Republic,
comprehensive

Philebus.1

While the Laches does

the
ways

not offer point

comparably

discussion, it does in

shall

specify

us

to a connection

which are

between philosophy and courage, the defended in the just mentioned dialogues.
efforts to

presuppositions of

The

Laches'

define

courage are undertaken

in the

more restricted not

context of a

discussion

of education.

The issue

of courage

does

explicitly

arise until the

dialogue is half over, becomes

and at

the conclusion of the Laches the theme

of education once again

explicit.

The

nominal connection

between the

controlling theme of education and the subsidiary theme of courage consists in

the thesis that the purpose of education is to put virtue in the soul, courage
a virtue.

being

While there
to

are contextual reasons

for the

selection of courage rather

and

than one of the other virtues (in particular,

are presumed

Laches

Nicias

are generals and

suggests a antici

know

what courage

is),

shall argue that the

Laches

deeper,

albeit

restricted, connection between education and courage. To

an exercise

pate, the philosopher's effort to understand is essentially

and ipyxaywyia

in pedagogy

teach others,
with

but

more

(Phaedrus 26ia8, 271010), not just in that it is an effort to importantly in that the philosopher is above all concerned
self-knowledge.

educating courage is finally the

tions about the
4.
tonic'

himself with

The issue

of

the philosopher's
and

same as that of philosophical

education,

the questions

previously discussed in this

paper about the nature of this courage are also ques

possibility

of education the

in

Socrates'

peculiar sense.
position and an argument

For

an extended criticism of

"existentialist"

in favor Rosen

of

the "Pla

position see

S. Rosen's Nihilism (New Haven: Yale

"courage"

Heideggerean/Nietzschean
restoring
wisdom as a

University Press,

1969).

argues that

leads to

"nihilism,"

partially

accessible object of
notion of education.

storing the by now 5. I examine the

(New Haven: Yale

"classical"

a disastrous consequence to be avoided by love (Nihilism, p. 221 and context), and so by re

Phaedrus'

formulation
1986).

of

this thesis in

Self-knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus

University Press,

Philosophy, Education,
In the

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

I
shall

-181

next section of this paper

discuss the

problem of education as of

it is
and

formulated in the Laches. In

in the final
pher's

section

III, I turn to the definitions

between

courage,

section

I discuss the

connection

education and

the philoso

courage,

again

in terms

of

the Laches.

II
Plato
volves,

deftly sketches the topic of education, by means of the drama of the dialogue.
are

as well as the problems

it in

Melesias,

trying
that

to find teachers for their children, Aristides

Two parents, Lysimachus and and Thucydides.

to educate their children.
when

They

recognize

they

themselves

are not qualified

That they

cannot

be

educated

to do so becomes obvious

Lysimachus

unself-consciously confesses that he is not suited to philosophical discussion: for he often forgets the questions he intended to ask, and then forgets the answers

too, along

any other arguments that are brought up in the conversation (i89c-d). He and Melesias will listen to the conversation and then do whatever
with

Laches, Nicias,
their

and

Socrates

recommend.

Lysimachus

and

Melesias have this in

favor: they know that they are ignorant and incapable of either learning and teaching. Yet their knowledge of ignorance seems wholly unsuited to providing a
not

basis
ers

just for educating their

again the

children

themselves, but for choosing

and

the teach

for their
Here

children as well as the

kinds

of subjects the children should

learn.
two

drama is

revealing.

Lysimachus
as advisors

Melesias
of

selected

prominent
propriate

generals, Laches

and

Nicias,

teachers.

They

take the

finding the ap generals to a display of armor fighting put on by

has
a common-sense

in the task

Stesilaus. The

parents'

choice of advisors and subject area

quality to it:
rfyvn which
ors and out.

select prominent people of great reputation who seem

to possess a

is eminently
the

useful.6

As it turns out, both the

selection of

the advis

the

selection of

the subject area

Indeed,

generals show

(military science, in effect) are ill thought themselves to be incapable of defining the very
art

virtue on which most

the success of their

note that
even

depends, namely
and

courage.

It is

of the ut as

importance to

Lysimachus

Melesias did
often

not select

Socrates

an educator or

advisor,

though Lysimachus had

Socrates'

heard

about

Socrates be

from the

children and

had known
(180c).
dialogue,

father

well.7

Socrates

appears to

in the vicinity

by

chance

6. The dramatic date

military
not

of the

somewhere

between 424

and

418,

would make

the utility of

science and the

reputations of

the historical Laches and Nicias especially visible.

Nicias"

The Laches

may take place before or after the "Peace of

(421 ); in
of

either

case, the Peloponnesian war can

be far from

everyone's mind.

For further discussion

the dramatic

date,

see

R. G. Hoerber,
a remark

Laches,"

"Plato's
7.
which

Classical
says

Philology 63
he
never

(1968),

pp. 95-96.

Lysimachus

that

had

a single

difference

Socrates'

with

father (i8oe),

in any suggests that they did father was a distinguished man, but his
not engage

philosophical

discussions

with each other.

Lysi
cf. as

virtue

did

not pass on

to Lysimachus

(I79d;

Meno
we

94a).

The

case

is the

reverse

for Socrates,

since

he

possesses a character not equalled, so

far

know,

by

his father.

182

Interpretation
Lysimachus'
Melesias'

Further

problems arise with

and
Stesilaus'

program

for

educat

ing fighting
him in

their sons.

They

have

all

just

watched

demonstration

of

his

fancy

techniques.

ances are

Stesilaus is allegedly an expert. But it turns out that appear deceiving, since the technique he is demonstrating made a fool out of

(183d- 184a). an actual combat situation

Simply
(and

because Laches

one

has the
out,

reputation

among nonexperts for being an expert Stesilaus does not demonstrate his art in Sparta where he
experts; 183b),
Stesilaus'

as

points

would

be

surrounded

by
to

real

one

is

not

necessarily

an expert.

To

make matters

worse, the
as

two experts in warfare who are present, namely Laches and

whether each cite at some

Nicias, disagree
a nonexpert

technique

is

or

is

not a good

thing for

the boys to learn.

They
to de

length their

reasons

for their

views.

How is

cide

between them?
answer seems obvious enough: consult a third expert.

The initial been

Socrates has

accepted as an expert

by

both Laches

and

Nicias. For

one

thing, Socrates

his time conversing with youths ( 1 80c) and has already advised Nicias on a suitable music teacher for his son (Damon). Moreover, Laches points out that Socrates distinguished himself in battle at Delium (181b), and for Laches deeds
spends speak

louder than in

words.

The inclusion

of

Socrates

as an expert

in the

matter of

education and nique of

particular

the matter of educating

by

Stesilaus'

means of

tech

has have

a certain

irony

to

it, for Socrates

will claim of

that he has no knowledge

these matters, only knowledge of his

recommended
point

ignorance

them. In any event, the ex

perts

to nonexperts another expert.

settle the

At this

Lysimachus invites Socrates to

issue by. casting the

deciding vote (i84d); when the experts disagree, let the disagreement be decided by majority vote. Socrates wastes no time in showing why this procedure is
unacceptable. given what

But his analogy to has already transpired,

rather

gymnastics
since

sult

the experts

than take a vote.

(184c) seems question-begging it merely indicates that we should con He adds, however, that we must also in (xexvtxdg, i85ai) in
the matter at

vestigate whether anyone present

is

an expert

hand,
the

and

if none is

an expert we should

find

someone who

the actual

educating of the children cannot go boys have exactly one line in the dialogue (which they pronounce in unison; i8ia3), and no attention is given to educating First we must discover
them.8

is. Until this is done, forward. And as a matter of fact

who the educators are.

one the parents used

Socrates clearly has in mind here some procedure quite different from the in selecting Laches and Nicias. Yet any such procedure

for

discovering
.

the experts seems vitiated at the outset. The the

impasse Socrates

or puzzle

(dnogCa)
8 At the

concerns
end of the

ability

of nonexperts
prevails upon

(among
Socrates

whom

classifies

Laches, Lysimachus
Aristides. Socrates
son

to come and see him the next

to discuss the education of

Evidently he

day

succeeded

Aristides;
so

at

Theae.

151a

says that

Lysimachus'

failed to bear
educate

good

thoughts (also Theages 130a).

fused to
(327C2).

Nicias'

in persuading Socrates to try to educate son Aristides left his company too soon and At Laches 20od we learn that Socrates has re
said to

Niceratus. Niceratus is, though,

be

present

in the Republic

Philosophy, Education,
himself)
qualified

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

183

to pick out the experts. For to do so: only experts

precisely by being nonexperts they are not have the knowledge to distinguish charlatans up
with a version of

from

experts.

We thus

seem

to end

Meno's

paradox

(Meno

8od): if

you are a

nonexpert,

you will never

chanced upon an expert you would not you are

find the true expert, and even if you know that he possesses the knowledge have
no need of

looking for.

If

you are an expert you either

finding

true

experts or you

disagree
blind

with other experts about who a species of

the true experts are. The

who

Laches begins to look like know they

refer

comedy,

are

leading

the blind

who

do in

not

story about the blind know they are blind. I

shall

to this situation as the

"dutogia

education."

of

The ditogta is, differ

to make an
an education.

ently put, to determine how those

An
assumption

who are

need of education are

educated choice about who will give

them or their children

suggestion

Socrates'

underlying

that

they look

to the

ex

perts rather than

take a vote

is that there is

a xsxvn of education

comparable,

say, to the
the

art of gymnastics. and

However,

this assumption is nowhere

casts

justified in
as

Laches,
is

indeed the dialogue gradually

straits without

doubt

on

it (below). The

sumption

nevertheless a commonsensical

one,

and parents might well think parents

themselves

in desperate

it. Perhaps this is why

As
so often

(including
like

Melesias

and
who

Socrates
ever,

Lysimachus) did claimed not to be

is
made

not send

their children to study

with a man

an expert.

by starting ually showing that they are not. In the Laches, true an art but the artless practice of Socratic dialogue.
progress

with assumptions thought

in Plato's dialogues, how to be true, and grad

turns
out

education

to be not

The interlocutors
xtxvn of

of the

Laches begin
"education"

by by

assuming

not

just that there is in

armor.

education, but that the

xtxvn concerns the art of

fighting
have be

That

is, they
take

are

which

implicitly defining Socrates immediately

they

means of an example of

it,

a mis

focuses

on.

The

parents

not yet

thought

through what the experts

are

seeking

are supposed to
not suffer

experts

in. The

choice of what sort of experts we want

gia which

infects the

choice

as

to what

we want experts

may among experts of a given sort. Indeed, the decision to be experts in is not itself a decision which can be
the question. The decision

from

quite

the

same dico-

made

by

an expert without
were.

begging

is

a metatechnical

one,

as

it

It

requires

reflection, in

a general philosophical

sense,

on what

education
well as on

is for,

and therefore reflection on the value of

the nature of the persons to

be

educated.

understanding things as Somehow nonexperts must

orient themselves

before consulting the

experts.

Socrates

proceeds

by

pointing out,

once again

selves, the difference between

the doctor not
eral

means and ends

by analogy with the arts them implicit in them. Just as we go to

sake of xtxvn

for the

sake of the medicine

but for the

sake of

health,
for

and

in

gen

just

as we consult an expert not

for the

his

but for the

sake of

the

r^vry's

ends, so
end

now we are

considering the

art of education
men

a certain end

(i85c-e). This
ment

is the

care of the soul of

young

(185c).

is very

controversial.

Even though

no one present

Now, this state objects to it, the fact is

184

Interpretation
it
or subject

that many people either reject

it to

such varied

interpretations as to

empty it
that the

of

definite

significance.

Not surprisingly, the

soul,
a pervasive theme at 1

effort to
and

defend the

view

purpose of education

is

cultivation of the

to specify the mean

corpus.

ing

of

"education

soul,"

of

the
of the

is

in the Platonic

The introduction

"soul"

85e2

means

automatically that techniques

are

for caring for the body, including be considered only as means to a further discussion. One
would expect

Stesilaus'

technique of fighting in armor, are to

end.

Hence they
who

dropped from the

Socrates to
are to

go on

to say that it

define

what

is

meant

by

soul

if we

determine

is

qualified to care

is necessary to for it.

He does

not

do

so and

that fact severely limits the scope of the Laches. More

of virtue

over, there is

no

definition

in the Laches. These limitations

are almost

inevitable
wine

given as

the level of the interlocutors. One should not begin pottery on a

jar,

Socrates

means/ends argument

In any event, is that the interlocutors are freed from

says

(187b;

cf.

190c).

an

upshot of

the

having
focus

to concern the

themselves
educator
"how"

explicitly is to put into

with xtxvn.

Instead,

the argument
not

will

on what

a soul to make

it educated,

how he is to

educate

it. The

question will,

however,
issue

receive an answer

in terms

of the egyov of the

dialogue.
Socrates
strategies education: returns to the
of

finding
of

an

expert,

and suggests two

further
if not, knows

for

deciding

whether

any

those present is an expert in the matter of

first

see whether anyone present

has had

successful

teachers,
are,

or

see what their products

(egya)

are

(185c). In this case, the

products

presum

ably, students (186b). Both strategies are question-begging.

"good"

For if

one

what a

student or

teacher

is,

one would

Moreover, Socrates explicitly

present subject.

claims

already be expert in the field. that he has not had any teachers on the

We

are not told whether or not made anyone

dents

or whether

he has

he has had any outstanding stu better (cf. Apol. 3ib-c, 33a). Surely the
the present one
make

reader

is

meant to ask whether or not conversations such as

Laches
not

and

Nicias better. Socrates

art of education

also claims

in

no uncertain and

terms that he has

discovered the decide

himself (18605)
dead
end:

tent to

which of

the claimants to expertise

reached a

We seem, then, to have

expert

thus that he is not compe is speaking the truth (i86e). for how is Socrates to ascertain the
when

competence of putative experts

(Laches

and

Nicias)

he knows he is

not an

himself?
to
me

It

seems

that

Socrates'

abrupt redirection of the argument at i89ei

is

response to

this dnogia.

Socrates suddenly inform

us who

says that

instead

of us

teachers

and students

there is another

looking

at our

path which will

point"

among those pres from the beginning. It had already nearly been established that education is undertaken "for the sake of the souls of young (185c). Socrates now argues, again by analogy with the art of medicine, that the specific way in which education cares for souls is by in putting them (i89e-i90b). How does this about virtue inquiry us to
ent)
and which

(that is,

bring

to the "same

which will

the true experts are

begins

somewhat more

men"

"virtue"

(a) bring

the same

Philosophy, Education,
point as the

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

and

185
"more nearly
the

previously from the beginning"?

The
answer

projected

inquiry?

(b) how does it

start

to

(a) lies in

the epyov of the dialogue. In the

and

Laches,

inquiry

itself demonstrates that Nicias

lished in
and a

Laches

are not

in fact
of

competent to educate

the young, contrary to their own initial evaluations

themselves. This is estab

the results that Laches beg Nicias voluntarily disqualify themselves as educators. The deed of at words to tempting to define courage has spoken louder than words (e.g.
not

way that does

the question;

so clear are

Laches'

the effect that the the "same

definition is
about the

not

difficult;
of

i9oe).

We have thus been brought to

and

point"

competency

Nicias

Laches;

we

are not the experts. accordance with

One

might

say that the test of

offered at
as

competency has

know that they proceeded in

criterion of

the

criterion

Socrates

185c, namely the

the

"err/ov"

quality issue

of one's

now

interpreted
in the

"philosophizing"

rather

than

with

reference

to one's students. We are also

closer

(b)

to the the

beginning
or

(dgxrj). The
"fundament"

of virtue

is

closer

to the

dgxrj

"ground"

sense of

which constitutes

the true
and

beginning

point.

This

dgxrj

of education

is the

soul

(see i85e, 190b),

virtue, that
would

thus education is for the sake of the soul. In

we are more
Laches'

talking

about

is,
we

the soul's excellence,

nearly

at the
are.

dgxrj

than we

be if

discussed

Nicias'

who

and expert

teachers
were

Paradoxically,
him to
agree to

up looking like the dialogue Lysimachus overcomes

ends visit

Socrates

they

seeking, and at the end of the

Socrates'

protests and presses about

his house the length

next

day

for further discussion be

educating the children.

and

Immediately
at some

before the
about

abrupt shift

in the discussion Nicias

to
examined
and can

Laches

speak

their

willingness
Socrates'

by

Socrates. Nicias has

that anyone who

had

previous experience with

words,

testify

converses with

Socrates life his

will

be

compelled to answer questions about

his

present

and past manner of

(187c- 188a). words.

Laches has had

Socrates'

experience with
when a man

deeds in

war

but

not

Unlike Nicias, Laches insists that

be in deed worthy of his words, else a Dorian harmony discusses virtue between deeds and words is lacking and the man is not truly musical. principle is not just that deeds and words should be harmonized, but that deeds
he
must
Laches'

speak and

louder than

words.

In the Laches, Nicias

courage.9

Laches the priority of deeds, as is evident It is obvious that neither Laches nor Nicias
For further discussion
101 ; and
of the characters of the

for the priority of words, from their respective definitions of

stands exhibits

the desired harLaches,''

9.
100-

Laches

pp.

185-225;

andS.

M. Blitz, "An Introduction to the Reading of Umphrey, "On the Theme of Plato's

Laches,"

R. Hoerber, "Plato's pp. Interpretation 5 (1975), Plato's Interpretation 6 (1977), pp. 1-6.
see
Laches,"

I add that Laches does most of the swearing in the dialogue gods once), while Nicias does none of it (Socrates swears
Hera). but
Laches'

egcog is strong but relatively

(swearing by Zeus four times and by the by Zeus, and Lysimachus once by inarticulate, while Xdyog is relatively complex
once
Nicias'

not animated

by

the

desire for truth.

faults. It is "not
at 185c

Nicias'

attitude

towards Socratic

dialogue is it
as

revealing.

He

claims

to be acquainted
of one's

with

its inevitable turn to self-knowledge,

unusual and not

and regards

"not

bad thing to

unpleasant"

be

reminded"

for him to be

questioned

by

Socrates (i88a-b). Yet

as well as

he is

his

comments at

the end of

typically Socratic turn of the discussion. This, by the dialogue, suggest that he does not take seriously enough the
surprised

the

186

Interpretation
words and

mony between
about

deeds in this

matter of courage.
can

Laches has

partially
remarks

true opinion about what courage is and

identify

true

courage

(as his

Socrates show)
cannot

as well as

the sham (as his

as we also

remarks about

but he
and

say

what

it is. Laches,
of

know,

served

Stesilaus show); honorably in battle

more articulate

died

a soldier's

death (in 418,

at

Mantinaea). Nicias is far

expedition

than

Laches, but in the deed

the advice of

battle (in the led the

to Syracuse of 415) he

relied on

seers and so

expedition seers as relied

to disaster. As if to
who

drive
in

home the point, Plato has Nicias defend the

those
on

have the knowl

ungrounded

necessary to deeds; he too is not

edge

courage

(i95e).10

Nicias

words

"musical."

At least initially, Socrates looks

more

like Laches

like Nicias, for he distinguishes himself in battle but claims to know only his own ignorance. Indeed, in the Laches Socrates offers no definition of his
than
own.

This

seems

odd

at

first glance,

Nicias'

since

bent towards

Xdyog

and

knowledge

seems closer

to philosophy than does

Laches'

bent towards deeds.

Socrates,
clearly).

moreover, does not insist that his interlocutors prove themselves in

will

deeds before he

speak

with

them (as the Charmides shows especially

Laches'

Yet there is something

Nicias'

sound about

position and

something

un

sound about

position,
exhibits a out

a point which will

help

us

to understand the sense

in

which

Socrates

harmony

of words and

deeds.
clear

Whatever may turn words nor deeds can

Laches'

to be the case with

Socrates, it is
each
other.

that neither

stand

independently
mut

of

Correspondingly,
definition

Nicias'

and of courage.

definitions

be

combined to yield an adequate

Let

us

turn now to these

definitions.

Ill
The Laches
None
the these
contains

four

main

definitions

of

courage, two

of which are com

pelled to undergo several modifications

of

before

definitions is

decisively

refuted;

being passed over for instead, each is shown

possibility
that

the next.
not

to be

whole of

definition

of courage.

This leaves

open the

they may be
in the

parts

the

definition,

though this

possibility is
the wrong

never made explicit

Laches. The first definition

courageous man
not even account

(19004-6) is

of

in

a specific

situation,

not courage

logical form. Laches defines the itself. The definition would from Delium
which

for the

courage of
said

Socrates'

retreat

Laches

praised.

However, nothing is

to

disprove

Laches'

contention that the man

exhibit

working of Socratic questioning and so is not truly in anogCa. Nicias fails to praises in word. Correspondingly, Laches twice accuses Nicias of

in deed

what

he

"adorning"

himself

with words

(196b,
cian

197c).
a

in

law

Aexonian"

Nicias is speaking like a d97d6-8; cf. the sarcasm at 200C2), like a rhetori (196b). Laches certainly does not want to run the risk of speaking like a "typical (197C8-9) himself.
court
an account of

"sophist"

10.
reminds

For

these events see

Thucydides, Books VI

and

VII. At Laches

199a

Laches

and

Nicias that the general

Socrates

should command the seer, not vice versa.

Philosophy, Education, behaving

required.
Laches'

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

187

to know why

in the way described could in fact be courageous. We learn instead that he is courageous a more philosophical grasp of courage as such is
second

definition
what

of courage

is "endurance
soul"

soul,"

of

the

which

is rap
to

idly

modified

into "wise

endurance of the

(i92c-d). Laches is

unable

specify satisfactorily
Laches
contradicts

he

means

by

"wisdom."

Having

a conception of wisdom as an

tmoxfjun

or xtxvn of

uncritically accepted how to do X successfully,

himself

by

successfully
nate all risk risk seem

master a situation

admitting enduring in knowing how to is not courageous. For such a man would elimi
that a man

to himself. Laches also admits that those who endure in

since

facing

great

foolish, they lack the knowledge to minimize the risk. But fool ishness is something bad and courage something good. Even though knowledge was included in the definition of courage precisely to ensure that courage not be
seems

come

foolish endurance, that is, something bad, the very inclusion of knowledge to make courage risk free and so not courageous. The root of this dilemma
equation of
reject.

is the

knowledge

with xtxvn

(art,

skill),

an equation which we must

therefore
gous

The

"knowledge"

a
"knowledge"

truly
point

courageous man possesses

is

not analo

to the technical

a physician

has,
a

or to that which an expert

in

archery has (see necessity

xtxvn),
of

1926-1930).

This

is

of capital

importance. I
other than

note

that the
or

"endurance"

"wisdom"

and

(in

sense

bnoxfjpir)

as well as risk

to oneself as components of courage is not

questioned."

It is in

at

this point that Socrates invokes philosophical courage; we must stand fast

our search

for

the

definition,

and endure

else we will not

have harmonized

our words and

deeds.
proposed

The third definition is kind

geous, it is
that he is

by Nicias,

and

it

picks

of wisdom courage requires. clear

It is first formulated

as

up on the issue of the "if a good man is coura

man, not the qual

wise"

(i94d4~5;
the

note that again the

error

ity, is defined,
war and

a mistake which parallels

in

Laches'

first definition). The

and

definition then becomes "courage is knowledge in every

element
other

of the

fearful

the hopeful in
on

situation"

(i94ei

i-i95ai).

The insistence

knowledge

as a

key
of

in

courage means courageous

that,

contrary to popular opinion, animals and

avoids the pit of

children are

rash, not

(i97a-b). Nicias successfully

fall

identifying

wisdom with

instrumental xtxvr\; it is, rather, knowledge life is

worth

what

is

good and evil

for

a man and so of when

living

and when not value with

(I95c-d). That

is, if there is
coward.

to be courage, life

cannot

be the highest

out qualification.

On the contrary, the

person who

highest

value

is the

The knowledge
which

of when

holds life to simply be the life is worth living and

claims

when not

is,

of

course, the knowledge

Socrates

is the

most

impor
worst,
not

tant for a too

man

to possess.

Again,

the third definition

other elements

of

the Laches

is,

at

narrow since

it does

not

include

I have mentioned; but it is

Laches,"

Cf. G. Santas, "Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Metaphsics 22 (1969), p. 439: "Not everything in the answers [to the "what is
11.

Review of

courage'

question] is

188

Interpretation
merit.

completely without fearful and hopeful. When

pushed

Courage is, among Nicias

other

things, knowledge

of the

by Socrates,
is

agrees that what and

is fearful is bad,
directed to the
are

and what

is hopeful is good,
knowledge
present,
this as
cludes

and that while good and

fear

hope

are

future,

the

of what

bad is knowledge
must

of

things as

and

future. His definition

second

thus

be

corrected of

in the past, they and restated (I refer to

Nicias'

definition,

that

is,

the fourth

the dialogue): courage

together"

in

knowledge

of

"practically
This

all goods and evils put

(19905^3;
knowl
courage,

cf.

Charm.

I74a-c).

almost amounts
such.12

to saying that courage is the

such

edge of what

is

good and evil as

If

knowledge is

part of

then even the most ordinary sorts of courage require philosophical knowledge.

The last definition is

not modified or refuted on

its

own grounds at all.

Rather,
"part"

it is

shown

to

contradict a

separately

agreed

to premise

the courage
of the

is

a of vir re

of virtue.

For

we now seem to
contradiction

have is

supplied a

definition

"whole"

tue.

Indeed,
the

the

generated

only because Socrates quickly

with

"practically"

"all"

places

qualification
Nicias'

(19906)

the

unconditional

(i99d5-6)

and gets wisdom

ambiguous assent

to the question suggesting that

having
holy.13

such

is
not

sufficient

condition

for

being

temperate, just

and of

Socrates does

himself

answer

the question, and the truth or

falsity

this last definition

is

not examined

further.
referred

On the
a

surface the

Laches

ends

indnogCa. It is therefore
the point

to at times as

dialogue

whose outcome of courage and

is

"negative,"

having

been to

refute various

definitions
not experts of

in the

matter.

correspondingly to show that Nicias and Laches are To take that position is, however, to overlook the role
supplies us with a splendid

the reader as a partner

in the dialogue. The Laches

is true
of all

example of

something
read on at

which

the

be

understood as pedagogical texts aimed

towards the reader

dialogues; namely that they must by Plato, and so that

of the oral

they

must

be

least two levels. The first level is that

dialogue

which

alogue

fiction) taking place between the characters. The second is the di taking place between Plato and reader by means of the written text. Thus Plato, like Socrates, may well (for pedagogical reasons) intentionally withhold
dialogues,
so as to

is (in the

the solutions to dnogiai posed in the

force his (Plato's) inter

locutor (the reader) to find the answer for himself. To introduce considerations of this sort is to invite a discussion of irony, Platonic rhetoric, and a host of other
considerations.

ever, it

can

Without going into this controversial matter any further, how fairly easily be seen that the Laches does supply the key to theCOTOand

gia about

courage,
"Ideas"

in

a sense to

the

deeper cbiogia

about

education.14

12.

The

comes close

Nicias'

13.
Socrates"

actually mentioned in the Laches, but the passage under examination of evil (consider Rep. 4756-4763). especially if there is an assenting phrase is (literally translated): "You seem to me to be saying something, (19962).
are not

to

doing

"Idea"

so

assuming a number of important exegetical principles, the detailed justifica may be found in the introduction to my Self-knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus; in the In troduction to S. Rosen's Plato's Symposium (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); the Intro14.
am of course

tion

for

which

Philosophy, Education,
An
the
adequate

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

of

189
the reasons for

but

still rough

definition

courage, along

with

definition,

can

be

arrived at

tempted

definitions

offered

gathering in the Laches. This definition

an endurance of

by

together elements of the four at

would

be something
xtxvrj) of

like the following: 'courage is

the soul, in a situation containing

not a

risk to oneself,
goods and evils

endurance accompanied

by

knowledge (which is

hoped for

and

feared,

that is to say,

evil

in the

sense of

knowledge
and

of when

life is

worth

by living

knowledge

of good and
not.'

and when

I do

not pretend

that such a

definition

solves all problems, of course.

quite close

But in
IS

general

it

is

fairly

good

definition,

is in fact

to Aristotle's.

IV
In the final
philosopher's

section of

this paper I would like to return to the meaning

of

the

courage,

as well as

the solution to the cuiogia of education. We

have

seen

that the two are closely connected. The philosopher's courage, that
on

is,

the courage to

keep searching for (in this particular case) a definition of cour age, is mentioned once in the Laches explicitly (19431-5). But it is never de fined for us explicitly, anymore than the above mentioned definition of the whole
of courage was made explicit.

that we may use

The very formulation of the point at 194a suggests the definitions of courage as elements in the definition of the it took to
Laches'

philosophical courage

generate
search

the definitions themselves. We

says.

must

hold

our ground and endure

in the

for courage, Socrates

We

cannot one's

help

but to think in the face

of

of of

first two definitions

and endurance of

of courage

(holding

ground

the enemy,

the soul). The formulation of

the nature

the

philosopher's courage

is

to that extent quite Lachean.

a

However,
ful
and evils put

Nicias'

two

definitions (courage is
courage part of

kind

of

knowledge

of the

fear

hopeful in

all

situations;

is

also

the knowledge of
of

all goods and

together)

must also

be

the nature

the philosopher's courage.

For the

philosopher cannot undertake

his

quest unless
order

he is

animated

by

the hope
un not

to for wisdom and the fear of ignorance. And in eagerly he must derstand that ignorance is evil and self-knowledge good, and so that life is
search

the highest

value without qualification.

living"

As Socrates

says

in the Apology, the

of the

"unexamined life is
self,

not worth

(38a). In sum, the

"deed"

Laches it

considered as an effort

to say

what courage

formulating
this kind
of

Xdyog

of the philosopher's courage.

is, supplies us with a basis for But, we want to know next, is

Can the
the
philosopher as

knowledge in fact

available to the philosopher?

in fact

get anywhere

in his

philosophizing?

If not,

said at

beginning

of

duction to J. Klein's A

Commentary

on

Plato's Meno (Chapel Hill:

University
Platonic
as
and

of

North Carolina

Press,

1965);

and

the Introduction to R. Brague's Le Restant: Supplement aux

1978).

Commentaires du
Socratic

Menonde Platon (Paris: J. Vrin,

For

an extended

discussion

of

irony see

in Literature my "Irony and Aesthetic Language in Plato's Murray Krieger, ed. Douglass Boiling (New York: Haven Press, 1987).
15.

Dialogues,"

Art: Essays in Honor of

Nicomachean Ethics Book

III,

vi-vii.

190

Interpretation
his
"courage"

this essay,

comes

down to

mere endurance

in the face

of an unin

telligible

universe.

The

answer

to these questions are to

us on

withheld

from the

Xdyog of the Laches, but

established,
as

are once again given make progress.

the level of the

egyov.

For the dialogue does in fact

are

Points

about

the nature of definition

is the

par

tial

falsehood
are given
and of

We
eral

definitions. And for the reader, much more than this is gained. grounds for formulating our own definition of both courage in gen
of

the philosopher's courage in particular. The

deed

of

the

Laches
philoso

teaches among other things that there is

phizing.

learning,

and thus progress

in

cation"

This may seem an insignificant fact discussed above.

until we recall

the "cutogia of edu

Still

further,

the Laches shows us the solution to thednogia of education. The

solution

to the problem of nonexperts selecting experts in the matter of education

nonexperts must educate ourselves

is that the
selves.

themselves become educators

We

by educating them by learning to ask the right questions. And this is to

exhibits.

be done
one

engaging in the kind of dialogue the Laches thereby receives is not, however, education in an art

by

The

education

comparable to medicine

or carpentry.
pher.

Consequently,
and others.

the solution

is that

one should

become

a philoso with re

And this is himself

of course what

Socrates is bent
of the

on

bringing
as

about, both

spect to

The deed

Laches,

I said, is the

"proof"

that

education courage

in this

philosophical sense

is possible, Of course,

and so

that the philosopher's

proclamation of one's

is

not a matter of

foolish

endurance or of

defiant

desires in the face

of an absurd world.

good explanations of this abil

ity

to get anywhere in a conversation are not

not attempt

Laches does
seem

it. But like

designed to

show us

easy to formulate in detail, and the many Platonic dialogues the Laches does that the deed of learning speaks louder than the skep
so

tic's words to the effect that

we know for example, by experiencing the search for it, realizing that some definitions will not do, that others are better, and so forth. At the end of this dialogic experience we know our way about the issue of courage,

learning

is impossible. We know that

something

about

courage,

so

to speak. And if we are willing to reflect on what we

we will also

have done

during the pro

cess,

know

our

way

about

the issue of education. None of this is

something that could be proven to a skeptic prior to his undergoing it. Similarly, in the Meno Socrates says that although he is not sure that
should

be

called

"recollection,"

learning
deed" idle"

he is
be

prepared to

do battle "in

word and

for the

proposition that we shall

"better, braver (dvdgixwxegoi),

and

less

if we think it necessary to look for or search out that which we do not know (86b6-c2). Indeed, Socrates refutes Meno's pardox with a demonstration of the deed of somebody learning something, not with a theoretical attack on
the para

dox. Now Laches,

words and

we

recall, is the proponent

the

of not

just

deeds, but
to

harmony

between
ob-

of

foundational
thednogia

nature of

deeds. We have

seen that the

Laches

points

a solution of

of education

through its deeds. This

Philosophy, Education,
servation rather

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

name the

191
after

helps to

explain

Plato's decision to

dialogue

Laches

than

Nicias.16

As it turns out, then, the

gained

education of the soul educator.

through the search

for the

own educators.

someone who

But how, more has not reached the is

for which we are seeking is We thereby become in large part our specifically, can the search be conducted by
end of the search?

That

is, let

us grant

that

philosophical conversation

not an own

art; how

are we to
and yet

tion?

Socrates knows only his

that

ignorance
the word

carry is able to both inquire

proceed.

on such a conversa and

show others
edge

they

too are
calls

ignorant. He knows how to

"techne"

This knowl
sense) his

is

what
art"

Socrates

(using

in

an equivocal

"erotic
the

or

"knowledge

matters"

of erotic

ability to ask questions which arouse and this, his words participate in the philosopher's
suggested,
participated

(Phr. 257a, Symp. fj-jd-e). It is guide egwg. Since Socrates can do

plicitly called and deed. Any

of complex

courage. His deeds too, as Laches (though only at Symp. 2i9d5 is Socrates ex "courageous"). Socrates thus exhibits a harmony between word

in

courage

effort

to explain

Socrates'

erotic

dialectic limit

must consider a number myself

metaphilosophical questions.

must

here to making
of

some suggestions about these questions with reference to the

Laches.11

The

progress of

the dialogue depends very

heavily

on a

variety

opinions,

particularly
constitutes

opinions about
"knowledge,"

the noble and the base and

on opinions about what

as well as on an

immense

stock of

information

which

every human being possesses by virtue of being nity. For example, the modification of
pends on agreement with the opinion

a resident of a civilized commu second

Laches'

definition explicitly de
thing"

that courage is "a fine and noble

not

and

ignorance "harmful
connection arguments

injurious"

and courage and

(i92c-d). Had this

could not

been admitted, the

no

between in favor

knowledge

have been drawn. Yet

of

these judgments about value are offered.

Similarly

the arts

which are called upon

repeatedly in the

second

half

of

the dialogue are the

foun

dations for
of

Socrates'

analogical reasoning.

It is

assumed

that these arts are kinds

constitute

knowledge; but

there

is

no attempt

to prove that

Many
16.

more examples of

the

reliance on opinion

they do could be
no

knowledge.

mentioned.18

They

in-

Hoerber

explains

Plato's

choice of title as

follows: "Plato in

doubt

named

the treatise after

Laches because Laches

ter
Laches,"

represents

the level of the masses

need of

education, and does make a

bet

showing than Nicias at the conclusion of the composition by attacking Nicias with some p. 209. p. 104. For still another explanation, see Blitz, "An "Plato's Metaphiloso17. The metaphilosophical questions are explored at greater length in my "Plato's
Introduction,"
phy,"

success."

in Platonic Investigations,
1985),
pp.

ed.

D. O'Meara (Washington: Catholic is based

"seems"

University
to

of

America

Press,
18.

1-33.
selection of courage as a theme
Stesilaus'

Even the

on what

be the

case

to

"every

one"

(I90d) in

the light of

demonstration. In

spite of

the

fact that

we

learn

right

from the

quality of courage itself, repeatedly adduced as a means of deciding whether or not a given definition is adequate. Also, Socrates refutes the first definition by citing counterexamples of behavior opined to second definition leads to a contradiction because Socrates cites six examples be courageous.
start

that

we are

to define not the courageous man or act but rather the single

instances

of courage are

Laches'

192

Interpretation
of

dicate that the dialectic

Opinion is kind

the Laches is

thoroughly
or

embedded

in dd^a,

and so

in

the perceptions and judgments about the nature and

knowing"

worth of things and

deeds.

"pre-judice."

of

"already
"mere"

It

seems clear

that with

out shared opinions resses on

the discussion could

not progress.

the basis of

opinions, then the

"education"

But if the discussion prog we have been dis

cussing would not amount to much. The opinions truth if they are to be more than mere dogma. Plato's talk
"recollection"

must

be

grounded

in

some

about

(dvduvnoig) is
may
not

meant

to explain just this phe

nomenon, namely, the groundedness of some opinions in truth. Of course, the

people at

holding the opinions

part of

in

question

know this. But dialectic

which we

consists
know"

least in

"reminding"

ourselves of

the truth

and speak

in

an opinionated way.

The Laches does

not refer

to

"already dvduvnoig
Laches'

How

ever, the

word/deed

distinction may

imply
that

the same

doctrine.

principle

that deeds speak

seriousness of

louder than

words and

deeds

are

the necessary basis for the

lowing
present

the corresponding words could be given, in this context, the fol interpretation. The nature of courage, among other things, is partially

to the soul

in

a prediscursive way, and this

it.19

is the basis

of

the soul's abil

ity
in

to articulate something true about

That is, the

egyov of courage

is

visible

part through our actions and

in

part

through our opinions, but the philosophical

logos is difficult. Without the grounding egyov, however, the

merely
an opinion. point

Xdyog

would

be

The
which

am
of

making is implicit

at

the crucial juncture in the Laches in

the

issue

the philosopher's courage is made explicit (194a). Laches

complains that although

he knows

what courage

is he does

not

know how to

ar

ticulate it adequately.

denies that Laches does know, in some what courage is. The way, superiority of Laches to Nicias lies in just that fact. (failed to "recollect") what he is talk Nicias, by contrast, may have ing about; this is why, in effect, his answers are too discursive, too verbal. Laches is not altogether wrong in suggesting that Nicias speaks like a sophist,
never
"forgotten"

Socrates

of actions that meet the specifications of the

courage (i92e- 193c).
dom,"

definition but
specify

which are not

Nicias is

compelled to

what

popularly thought to exhibit he intends in his first definition by "wis

.

by

means of a series of examples produced

by Laches ( 1 95b) Nicias does

so

by getting agree
would expect

ment to the opinion

that in some cases it is better to be dead than alive (I95c-d). One

Laches to readily assent to some such proposition, but no proof for it is offered. The requisite knowledge is thus that of goods and evils to be feared and hoped for, that is, that death is not the summum malum and that loss of liberty is more fearful than death. Nicias is led to modify his definition by means of reflection on the examples of medicine, farming, and generalship (I98d-e). The knowledge of goods and evils lying in the future requires knowledge of practically all goods and evils as such. Having arrived at this result on the basis of (undemonstrated) opinions and analogies, Socrates makes his final point to the effect that having such wisdom entitles one to temper

fighting

men such as

Nicias

and

ance,

justice,
or

and

holiness.
no

19.
"sidoc"

Yet there is
"Idea"

talk in the Laches or, so

sense of
"Form"

far

as

(in the

or

"Idea")

of courage.

Socratic dialogue Studies in Ancient

with the notion of

"anamnesis"

I know, in any of the other dialogues about an For an interesting attempt to connect
G. Vlastos, "The Socratic
Elenchus,"

see
pp. 27-70.

Oxford

Philosophy

(1983),

Philosophy, Education,
that

and

Courage in Plato's Laches

193

is, as someone whose talk is clever but not founded on sound insight. Even Nicias, though, has some sense of what courage really is; and so do most of us.
although

Thus

the search

for

definition

of courage not

is,

on

the surface, unsuc

cessful,

no one concludes

that courage does

in fact

exist.

Similarly,

while

in

the Lysis two young people are unable to the

define friendship, Socrates terminates

dialogue

Socrates
state

observing that they are nevertheless friends. In the Laches his usual view that if we know something we must be able to it (19006). But, as I have been suggesting, it is not simply true that if we
repeats

by

cannot state
we are

some sense we must already know what for in order to search for it. discursively searching The whole Socratic search for wisdom, as well as the related notion of educa
we

it

do

not

know it. For in

tion,

makes sense

semantic

only on the assumption that what is being searched for is not a definition but the thing itself. The corresponding notion of recollection
in the cosmos,
a view

implies

a complicated view of man's place

fundamentally
I
am and

opposed

to the
now

"existentialist"

view adumbrated at the start of this paper.

suggesting
ticular

that Plato's opposing view is implied

of egyov

by

the

Laches,
deeds

in

par

by

the

"priority"

to

Xdyog

Laches

associates

with

truth

(i83di-4). Socrates holds to

a philosophical version of

the same point, and this

spite of

is why he is in the final

cian

analysis closer

to Laches than
"knowledge"

Nicias, in
It

the lat

ter's greater verbal sophistication. The

which
intuitive.20

the Socratic dialecti

has is thus in

part nonpropositional or

requires

insight. One
put, our in

might ask

why, if this is true, speech is required at all. The partial failures of the
give us an

definitions in the Laches

sights are unclear. what we want

indication

of

the answer.

Simply
not

It may be that
at

we cannot

talk without in some sense

we

knowing
what we

to say, but
until we and

the same time

it is true that

do

know The

think we

know

have

subjected ourselves to questioning. our

gradual

process of

refining

tying down

insights is, Plato

not

wants

to say, recollec
"revelation"

tion (Meno 97e-98a). Recollection does truth

unambiguous

furnish

a complete

of

in its clarity
recalling
to
able

and meaning. and

The

experience of

sharpening
this

one's

insights has his

no substitute.

Socratic dialectic is
his

bring

experience about

through the powerful

readers.

means of questioning.

Plato

performs a similar operation on

He does

not tell
shows

readers

the
a

solution

to the problems of

education and

courage, he

it to them in
the
work

dergoing
deeds

un way that invites them to articulate of philosophizing they discourse about their insights into the

it for themselves. In

of men and so receive an education

in

philosophical courage.

20. A very strong version of this view is argued by W. Wieland in his Platon Wissens (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982).

und

die Formen des

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720 PHILOSOPHY HALL, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NYC 10027

Refutative Rhetoric
Thomas J. Lewis
McMaster

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

University

Plato
gias and

explores

the subject

of rhetoric

in

a number of

dialogues, but
a great

the Gor

the

Phaedrus

contain the most extensive examinations of rhetoric.

How

ever, the differences between these two dialogues have led to

deal

of per

plexity

rhetoric

Plato's view of rhetoric. As Edwin Black observes, in the Gorgias is denounced in satirical, contentious, and refutative language, whereas, in the Phaedrus, Plato offers a constructive and affirmative judgment of rhet
about
oric.1

Black his

notes

the usual two responses to these differences: That Plato

changed

mind about rhetoric

between the time he

wrote

the Gorgias and the

what

Phaedrus,
meant

or

".

that Plato did not mean

by

"rhetoric"

in the Gorgias

he He
as

by
of

"rhetoric"

in the

Phaedrus."1

But Black

rejects

both

responses.

presents pects

the two dialogues as expressions of

different, but

complementary,

Plato's understanding of rhetoric. He argues that the Gorgias is refutative, because Socrates is mainly concerned to define and to condemn false
rhetoric;
and

that the Phaedrus

rhetoric and

is

constructive, because Socrates is

at

engaged

in

defining
self

true

in

demonstrating

least

one

of

its

practical

applications

the persuasion of a young man such as Phaedrus to commit him

to

philosophy.3

agree

that the two different forms of rhetoric can be

circumstances.

accounted

for

by

the

different dramatic
and

In the Phaedrus Socrates is

alone with one able

inquisitive young man, who is readily attracted by an alluring image of phi losophy. In contrast, in the Gorgias Socrates is confronted with three interlocu tors defending art, and two of these, Polus and Callicles, are willing to
Gorgias'

go on

the offensive

to impugn

Socrates'

character,
art. of

and

Gorgias'

challenges

the propriety of the defenders

Thus,

Socrates'

task

his way of life, if he in the Gorgias is to

denounce itor to

and refute

the false

rhetoric which serves as a compet

philosophy.

In both dialogues
to the

Socrates'

rhetoric, be

it

constructive or

refutative, is

appropriate

particular circumstances.

However,
the two

there appears to be one important

of rhetoric as complementary.

fact that does

not

fit the

view of rhetoric

forms

In the Phaedrus

Socrates'

is successful; Phaedrus is drawn to

no evidence
I. 2.

philosophy; whereas,

in the Gorgias, there is

convinced

that

Gorgias, Polus,
of

or

Callicles have been Quarterly Journal

by

Socrates.
361-74.

Edwin Black, "Plato's View

Rhetoric,"

of Speech, 44 (1958),

Ibid.,
Ibid.
,

p. 361.

p. 374.

Black's interpretation
work
Rhetoric,"

of

the use of rhetoric in the Phaedrus and the

Gorgias has

by Rollen Quimby and David Kaufer. See Quimby's "The Growth of Plato's Perception of Philosophy and Rhetoric. 7 (1974), 71-79; and Kaufer's "The Influence of Plato's Developing Psychology on his Views of Quarterly Journal of Speech,
served as a

basis for further

Rhetoric,"

64(1978), 63-78.

196 At best

Interpretation
each

has been

overpowered and silenced

but

Socrates'

not persuaded.
conclusion

failure to

persuade

his interlocutors

appears to

lead to the

that Plato
and

is

depicting

the unsuccessful use of refutative rhetoric in the

see

Gorgias,

it is

difficult to

how

unsuccessful refutative rhetoric can

be the

complement of

constructive rhetoric.

Indeed, Charles Kauffman's

in the Gorgias

assessment of

the extent of the

failure
that

Socrates'

of

rhetoric

appears

to undermine Black's view

complementary.4

Socrates'

use of refutative and constructive rhetoric are persuade

Socrates does fail to

suggest that

his interlocutors in the Gorgias,

however,

this fact is not itself evidence of the failure of his refutative rhetoric.
not portray Socrates as them; rather, he portrays Socrates as manipulating Gor Callicles in order to persuade a very different audience the
Gorgias'

It is

not evidence of

failure because I believe Plato does

attempting to
gias,

persuade

Polus,
of

and

group young men who have assembled for Phaedrus it is appropriate to judge the success
on

display

of words.

In the

Socrates'

of

rhetoric and the audience.

by

its impact

Phaedrus, because he is both

the Gorgias

the

interlocutor

But the dra

If the primary audience for refutative rhetoric is this group of young men, then it may be sufficient for Socrates to only silence his interlocutors in order to persuade this audience.
matic structure of
Socrates'

is

more complex.

I
ric

suggest that eyes

in the

rheto silencing his interlocutors Socrates discredits of the primary audience, and that this discrediting is the initial step

by

Gorgias'

in attracting the

audience to philosophy.

Thus, his
of

refutative rhetoric

does

serve

as a complement of

the constructive form

true rhetoric in the Phaedrus. In ad

dition, his
Socrates'

refutative rhetoric

illustrates his

prowess

in

a public

forum, for despite

than able to

disclaimers, in
in
public

the Gorgias Plato portrays him

as more

hold his To

own

debate.
and

essary to
uses

refutative rhetoric it is nec his identify primary audience; to articulate the shaming tactics Socrates to discredit art in front of this audience; and to explicate the way
of
Gorgias'

appreciate the

intent

the force

Socrates'

Socrates

covers

up his

rhetoric

by presenting himself

as someone who speaks

only the truth regardless of the consequences.

THE PRIMARY AUDIENCE IN THE GORGIAS

The Gorgias
rates urges
a

consists of three conversations and an exhortation

in

which

Soc
also

Callicles to

abandon rhetoric and to take

and

up

philosophy.

There is

brief exchange between Polus

Chaerephon,

which provides a

transition be

tween the

phon and the

opening pleasantries surrounding the arrival of Socrates and Chaere initial conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. The dialogue begins with the arrival of Socrates and Chaerephon in the interCharles Kauffman, "Enactment
114-29as

4.

Argument in

the

Gorgias"

(1979),

Philosophy

and

Rhetoric

12

Refutative Rhetoric
lude between
public
Gorgias'

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

of

197 his

formal demonstration
will

his

art and the second part of

audience.

display

where

Gorgias'

ond part of

any demonstration does

he

take

questions
not

from the
place.

But the

sec

take

It is

replaced

by

the con

versations that make

the same audience. The

presence of ence self

up the Gorgias, and these first part of the Gorgias

conversations take place

before

provides good evidence that the

wants

the audience is not

incidental, but rather that Socrates

moment.5

the audi

to be present. He wants a public conversation, and to get

proceedings at the appropriate
Socrates'

it he injects him
Socrates has
allows of

into the
"

Callicles
come as

acknowledges

arrival with the comment that

(447a).6

that

he has

arrived

they say you should take part in late, and Callicles informs him
late for
of
Gorgias' Gorgias'

warfare"

Socrates

that he has

missed a

feast

words

by being

display. Socrates does

not comment on

Calli
to

cles'

depiction

speech as a

feast, but he
arrival.

allows

this

evaluation

stand

by blaming

Chaerephon for his late He

Chaerephon
a

accepts of

his

culpa
can

bility
cles

and offers a remedy.

claims that since

he is

friend

Gorgias he

arrange another

display
his

either now or

expresses

surprise:

later, "What, Chaerephon? Is Socrates

whichever responds: and

best

suits

Socrates. Calli
anxious

to hear
we are

Gorgias"

(447b). Chaerephon

here"

(447b).

Clearly

Callicles

"This is the very reason why Chaerephon have different views of

Socrates'

interest in

Gorgias'

feast

of words.

Callicles is

surprised

that Socrates

would

be

interested; Chaerephon insists

mit

that

Socrates is interested; Socrates does

and

not com

himself

either way.

Callicles then invites Socrates

Chaerephon to
and where

come to
will

his home,

where a spe

Gorgias is staying
cial

on this visit to

Athens,

they

be treated to

display

of rhetoric

by

Gorgias (447b). Socrates thanks Callicles for this

asks whether

offer, but he gently demurs. He exhibition,

and
would

Gorgias, instead

be willing to

converse with them about

providing the nature of his

of

an art

just

what

it is that he teaches (447c). Callicles

since

suggests that

Socrates

ask

Gorgias himself, is
pleased

Gorgias has just

said

he is

open to all questions.

Socrates

to have

his

concerns raised with

forward in his
not

place:

"Splendid!

Gorgias, but he presses Chaerephon (447c). Chaerephon does Chaerephon, ask

him"

know

what

to say

and relies on

Socrates to formulate the

question

(447d).

When Chaerephon

finally
who

does

manage

three questions along the lines suggested

answers

by Socrates, Polus,
place of

rudely injects himself into the conversation,

not

in

Gorgias (448a-c). Socrates,

and

Chaerephon,

states

that the answers are

conclu-

unsatisfactory
5.

Gorgias

asks

for

an explanation

from Socrates for this

Some

There has been disagreement

about

the location of the conversation.

Callicles'

commentators

have For

interpreted the text to indicate that the

eral agreement

conversations

take place at

home. There is

now gen

that this view was

mistaken and

that the conversations are at some public place.

current agreement on

for the summary of this controversy and the basis Plato's Gorgias (Oxford, 1959). P- l88logues of Plato,

the text see E. R.

Dodds,

6. Citations from the Gorgias are from the translation by W. D. Woodhead in The Collected Dia eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1961).

198
sion.

Interpretation
clarifies art

Socrates
what

his

Polus'

criticism of

answers and

invites Gorgias to tell

them
oric

his

is

and what

it

should

be

called.

Gorgias
and

says

it is the

art of rhet

(449a),

and the conversation

made of

between Socrates

Gorgias is
appears

underway.

What is to be
meet

this

beginning? First, Socrates

to have come to

Gorgias for his

own

reasons; he has not, for example,

come at

the

instiga
late

tion or
with

insistence

of

his

companion

Chaerephon. Second, Socrates has

come

the feeble excuse that Chaerephon detained him

real

by insisting

that

they stay in
either com con

the market. There seems to have been no

impediment to Socrates
loitering.7

ing

alone or

insisting

that the obliging Chaerephon quit

chosen to come surprise
Gorgias'

We may
that

clude

that Socrates has

expression

late,

which

is entirely

consistent with

Callicles'

of

at

Chaerephon 's
Gorgias'

presumption

Socrates indicates

would

be

anxious

to hear

exhibition.

Choosing
art.

to come late
says

that

Socrates

wants a conversation about what

Socrates

this explic

itly (447c),

but

he does

not

say is that he

wants

the conversation to be in the

words.

presence of

the audience that has just feasted on

and

Gorgias'

Notice that

Callicles invites Socrates Gorgias

Callicles'

Chaerephon to
raises

at

home. Socrates
Callicles'

the

stead of an exhibition at

home,

and

relatively by possibility of a conversation in it is with that possibility in mind

private exhibition
question that

that Callicles

invites Socrates to
ask

question

Gorgias. But the

Socrates

has Chaerephon

Gorgias is

not whether
Callicles'

Gorgias

will

discuss his

art with them

in lieu his
art.

of a second exhibition at

home; instead, it is
discussion
at

a question about

The possibility

of an exhibition or a

Callicles'

home is

not

raised again.

Socrates

initially
manner

questions

Gorgias

about the art of rhetoric

in

a polite and

inoffensive have to

(4493-4553). He then

briefly

summarizes what

covered and says that go at about

because he is

not yet clear about

the art of rhetoric

they have they will

way
of

the matter in more detail (455a- c). Then

he

suggests a

thinking

his relationship to Gorgias

and

the audience.

And so, imagine that my interest is on your behalf, for perhaps some of those present are anxious to become your disciples there are some, I know, quite a number in

fact
when you?

who would

be bashful

perhaps about

questioning

you.

And so, just imagine that

associate with

inquire, they
just

too are asking.

What

shall we

gain,

Gorgias, if we

On

what subjects shall we

be

able to advise the city, about right and

wrong alone,

or the subjects

mentioned

by Socrates? (455cd)
can, if Gorgias is willing to employ

Socrates

offers to serve as an agent who

Gorgias'

him,

facilitate
his

purpose.

Gorgias
to

wants to

be

questioned

in

order to

display by

ability.

He may simply

wish

bask in

public

acclaim, but Socrates

suggests

that he also wishes to recruit

disciples

or students.

Socrates flatters Gorgias

as

suggesting that his exhibition has been so

7.

impressive

to risk

being

self-defeat-

Commentators have generally not remarked on the problematic nature of Socrates' late arrival. noted by Arlene W. Saxonhouse in her recent article "An Unspoken Theme in Plato's Gorgias: Interpretation, 11 (1983), p. 140.

However, it is

'War,"

Refutative Rhetoric
ing.

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

so grand

199

According

to

embarrassed

to question

Socrates, Gorgias appears him, and thus they

advantages of
as a substitute

fully

appreciating the

that these young men are be denied the opportunity of may with him. Gorgias accepts this associating

method of self
Gorgias'

display

for direct

questions

from the

audience.8

audience

is

portrayed as

young

and ambitious.

These young
what

men are

interested in

prominent public

positions,

and

Gorgias

responds

by holding
they

out

the achievements of Themistocles and Pericles as examples of

pire

can as

to

if they

master

his

art

(455c). To be

sensitive to the potential persuasive

Socrates'

ness of

refutative

rhetoric,

we must

be

aware that the

honour"

for seeking
the

public office was cpiXoxiuia,

"love

of

primary motive the desire for recog

matters.9

nition as a man who

city"

a man must art provides

directs the city on the most important To "advise be able to prevail in a public forum, and Gorgias claims that Gorgias
produces agreement on a number of as
of

his

the means to speak and to prevail.

Socrates'

conversation with

pects of rhetoric:

the scope of rhetoric is to persuade the soul

the listener the ba the

(453);
sis of

there

are

two

forms

of

persuasion, one that produces

conviction on

knowledge,
practiced
numbers

and another that produces conviction without

knowledge;

latter is

in

courts of

law

and assemblies

because the
use of

combination of

large

and shortness of suggests

of

time precludes the

extent

the

former (454e, it is
not an art

455a).

Socrates
the truth

that to the

that rhetoric does not require a knowl

other arts and perhaps

edge of

its

subject

it is inferior to

at all

(459bcd). He

also suggests that since

Gorgias teaches his

pupils

how to

convince others about what either

is just

and unjust and noble and and

base,

a student must

have knowledge in rhetoric, Otherwise

when

of

the just and unjust

must

the noble and

base before his in

to have

struction
matters.

or

Gorgias

begin

by instructing his
from Gorgias be

students about such

one who

learns

rhetoric

would appear

knowledge
not

he does not,
allows

and would appear to

a good man although

he is

(459de). Gorgias
agrees with

that he does instruct his

students

in this

manner and

he

Socrates that the true

rhetorician must also

be just (460c). But that, if a student of to be blamed for

concludes that

then Socrates reminds Gorgias that he previously allowed

rhetoric were

to

misuse

he had taught the

skill

his skill, the teacher of rhetoric was only for good use (457bc). Socrates

not

Gor

gias seems to be saying that by his very nature the rhetorician must be just and do just actions, but also to be saying that the rhetorician may misuse his skill. Since there seems to be an inconsistency here Socrates suggests it will require a long discussion to determine the truth of the matter (46iab). Polus sees the inconsis

tency

that arises

from

Gorgias'

admission

that knowledge
contends

is

necessary

condi

tion for

becoming

a student of rhetoric.

He

that Gorgias was simply

the silent dramatic

8.

Socrates'

role as an

interviewer
noted

of

Gorgias before

a composite audience of

audience and ample

9.

by Steven Rendall, "Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Ex of Plato's Philosophy and Rhetoric, io (1977), 105-79K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974),
the
reader

is

Gorgias,"

226-34.

200

Interpretation
say otherwise,
and

ashamed to
Gorgias'

that Socrates is tasteless to have taken advantage

of

sense of shame

(46icd). his
conversation with

Socrates displays

a somewhat skeptical tone throughout gentle and

an

Gorgias, but his irony is

spirit of camaraderie. overall

he

adopts a

tone of

puzzlement and even a

Socrates'

There is

underlying mockery in
and

words, but

he

speaks

politely to

Gorgias,

Gorgias

maintains

the gracious and

who

dignified

pose

befitting

a man of

his age, experience,

and

reputation,

has

given yet another

impressive

performance.

The dramatic setting provides the part in the conversation is dependent

rangement and

reason on

for

Socrates'

Socrates'

politeness. sufferance.

Gorgias'

Both

by

prior ar

by

virtue of

his impressive

performance

the audience

belongs to

Gorgias. He is free to decline further

someone else.
Gorgias'

questions or

to simply invite questions from to the audience he needs

Thus, if Socrates is

not

to

lose

access

auspices. If Gorgias is treated too roughly he may simply call it a day, Polus has already provided an adequate excuse by explaining that Gorgias has had a long day and is tired (448a). After a fairly lengthy conversation with

and

Gorgias, but

still with no answer

to the

inquiry

in sight, Socrates is

raises the possi

bility
more;

of

ending their discussion.

Gorgias'

response

revealing.

He

says

he is

willing to go on but that do (458b).

Gorgias'

he is

concerned that a

the audience may not

and

wish

to hear

they have already heard

concern

long demonstration

may have

other

things to to

for the

audience seems

exaggerated; he

appears

be

looking
of

for

a graceful

way to end the

audience

discussion, but he does

eager

not succeed.

Chaerephon indicates that the

is

to hear more (458c). The word

enthusiasm.

ing

Gorgias'

agreement to continue

indicates his waning

I personally
concern

"It

would

be disgraceful it

of me

to refuse,

when

volunteered to meet

any

question makes

that might be
possible

put"

(458d).

Gorgias'

for his

public reputation

for Socrates to

oblige

him to

continue.10

Socrates has first

au

his way in front of audience and then by appealing to that dience he has made it difficult for Gorgias to dismiss him.
wheedled
Socrates'

Gorgias'

effort

to gain access to

Gorgias'

audience

has

a clear parallel

in the
of

10.

For

Gorgias'

a similar conclusion about

character,
1-22.
Gorgias'

see

Adele Spitzer, "The Self-reference

contends that

Gorgias,"

the
about

Philosophy
how he
appears of

and

Rhetoric, 8 (1975),
is
at

She

to others

the core of

character, and
Gorgias'

overweening concern that his gentleness is only a

Gorgias'

char offending his audience (7-9). Kauffman recognizes this aspect of acter but he contends that it does not encompass later comments at 497 and 506 where Gorgias urges that the conversation be pressed on to a conclusion. to Kauffman these pas result of

his fear

According

sages provide evidence that

(458), even if Kauffman claims, and what he says appears to indicate a different aspect of his character. However, the truth-seeking Gorgias can be reconciled with Spitzer's position if, as I have argued, Gorgias is not only expert at knowing what pleases an audience, but also if he has a sufficient degree of self-control to put this knowledge to use
as earlier claimed

Gorgias is interested in the truth

he had

the pursuit of truth reflects

badly on his reputation.

Gorgias does

speak as

by

always

appearing

as

pleasing

as possible.

Unlike Polus

and

make matters worse

by appearing to be a poor loser. Furthermore,

what

Callicles he has the good sense not to he is sensitive to the audience's de

can extricate

sire

to hear and so he gives them

they

want, especially if he

from

directly

Socrates'

himself,

as

he does,

suffering

cross-examination.

Refutative Rhetoric
first
part of

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

201

the Phaedrus
as the

speech,
play.

just
a

(227-2300). Phaedrus has been impressed audience in the Gorgias has been impressed by

by

Lysias'

Gorgias'

dis

Socrates Phaedrus would normally welcome his But because Phaedrus wishes to practice the speech and then use it to
of

As

friend

company.

own rhetorical

ability, he does

ter Socrates notices that

and surmises what

entirely welcome Phaedrus is hiding a copy of the

give

not

Socrates'

display his presence. Only af

his
cloak

speech under

tion.

Phaedrus is up to does Phaedrus Socrates accosts Phaedrus, insists on hearing he

suggests
a quiet spot.

up his intended
speech,
and

decep
insure

Lysias'

to

an uninterrupted conversation

they leave

the

city

and walk

along the

river to

The importance Socrates

attaches to

influencing

Phaedrus is

soon made clear

by

Socrates'

the area

unfamiliarity with the terrain. He describes himself as a stranger to and refers to Phaedrus as his guide (23od). Phaedrus responds that
oddest of men

Socrates is the
and

because he

so seldom sets
Lysias'

foot

outside

the walls,
could

Socrates jokes that

all

with speeches such as

for bait Phaedrus

lead him

around of

Attica

or anywhere else

(230c).

Knowing

what

Socrates

really thinks

Lysias'

speech we

effect of the speech on

his friend,

Attica. Nonetheless,

Phaedrus'

given

may conclude that in order to counter the Socrates might be willing to be dragged around interest in rhetoric, his friendship for Soc

rates, and the absence of any complicating third party, it is relatively easy for Phaedrus' Socrates to capture attention; whereas in the Gorgias Socrates cannot

lead the
ence, he

audience must

away physically. If he is to counter do so in the presence of, indeed, with the

Gorgias'

effect on participation

the

audi

of, the

de

fenders

of rhetoric.

PORTRAYING RHETORIC AS INDECENT

Gorgias'

To

counter

the effect

of

display

Socrates

manipulates the conversa

tion to associate

Gorgias'

rhetoric with shamelessness or

indecency. There

are

two stages to this manipulation.

to enter the conversation on

First, Socrates induces Polus and then Callicles rhetoric. Second, he provokes behalf of
Gorgias'

Callicles to say things, which appear to violate the city's sense of decency. As this process of manipulation unfolds a further complication about the audi
ence arises. signed to

suggest

that what Socrates says to

assembled audience

each of

the

interlocutors is de

influence the

the primary
a

audience.

However,
Polus

throughout the
and

conversation with

Gorgias there is Socrates is in

and

secondary
are

audience of

Callicles,

and what

is

said

by

part calculated

to draw Polus into

the

conversation.

Similarly, Gorgias
than

Callicles

the secondary audience

during
trated

the conversation with Polus. But

rather

to Callicles

by

what

it is clear that Socrates is playing mainly for it is Callicles who is so astonished and frus Gorgias, he hears that he thrusts himself into the conversation brushing

Polus

aside.

202
The

Interpretation
process of

drawing

Polus into the

conversation overlaps somewhat with of the

Socrates'

effort to establish

himself in front
to enter

Polus displayed his

nature of

eagerness

primary audience. Earlier the conversation. But the unsatisfactory

the conversa that

his
a

responses moved

Gorgias to intervene. Now, however, Gorgias is

to welcome the chance to
pass

way tion to Polus. The

claims

looking

for

out and appears

sequence of events

is important. It is

at 457e
not

Gorgias

that he teaches rhetoric only for good use and so he is

to be

blamed if

it is

misused

by

a student.

Socrates

suggests

somewhere;
what

at

the very least it

said.

will require a

inconsistency lengthy cross-examination to clarify

launch into the
cross-examination.

that there may be an

Gorgias has

But Socrates does

not

Instead, he
mary
and

suggests

that Gorgias may not

want

to continue, prompting the pri

press

audience as well as
Gorgias'

Chaerephon

and

Callicles to for it

for

continuation,
oth

erwise
on

eliciting (458e).

agreement

to go on

would

be disgraceful to do
afford to press

Only

after

he has

this agreement can

Socrates

hard

the

inconsistency, giving Gorgias

replaced

a good reason to withdraw

but

now without

the freedom to close the conversation down.

Although Gorgias is
rates continues

by

Polus

Socrates'

as

main

interlocutor, Soc
he
can say.

to treat

Gorgias'

presence as a constraint on what

He

invites Polus to
give

question

him
of

about rhetoric

but indicates that he is hesitant to

Gorgias'

frank

answers

for fear

permission to proceed

offending Gorgias, and he waits to obtain (463). Only then does Socrates present his analysis

of

rhetoric as part of a general

typology

of

flattery. Rhetoric, he says, is the false

form

of justice and

just

as medicine

is impersonated

by cooking,

gymnastic

by beau-

tification,
Polus'

legislation

reluctant admission use to

by sophistry (463-466). Finally Socrates obtains that the knack or technique of rhetoric can be of no
oneself and one's

doing

any man except to accuse in order to expose one's

friends

and relatives of

wrong

wickedness and ensure punishment.

Also, if it

were right

to harm enemies, rhetoric could be used to protect one's enemies from

being

punished

for their

wickedness

(48o-48ib).
ask

These
rious or

assertions provoke

Callicles to
Callicles'

Chaerephon

whether

Socrates is

se

simply hear

joking

(481b).

question expresses the same mixture of

in his initial question about whether Socrates really demonstration (447b). As before, Chaerephon responds that Socrates is quite serious and he invites Callicles to confirm this by asking Socrates (481b). Socrates responds to question with a long speech
surprise and skepticism as wished to
Gorgias'
Callicles'

(4810-4820) affirming his radical assertions about rhetoric. This is too much for Callicles; he has run out of patience with Socrates, Gorgias, and Polus. Jokes
and spoofs are one

ther

Gorgias
the

nor

thing, but if Socrates persists in spouting nonsense and nei Polus can expose it for what it is, then he, Callicles, will. Here,
Socrates'

as at

Socrates

beginning of the dialogue, Chaerephon takes initially took advantage of Chaerephon's apparently
for arriving late, but
now

words

literally.

guileless nature to
and

make excuses

Chaerephon's trusting

literal

accep-

Refutative Rhetoric
tance
vokes
Socrates'

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

203
and pro

of

assertions about rhetoric set

further irritates Callicles

him to

things straight.

Callicles
because he
contends
Socrates'

agrees with

Polus that Gorgias became

entangled

in inconsistencies

he really believed. However, Callicles that Polus has fallen into the same trap. He was obliged to agree with ludicrous assertions about rhetoric only because he agreed to the prem
was ashamed to assert what suffer

ise that it is better to

not

injustice than to do it;

be
ensnared

and

he

agreed with this premise

because he believed it but because he

cannot courage to admit the consequences

was

ashamed to

deny

it (348de).

Callicles boasts that he

has the
taken the

Socrates in this way because he of his assertions. Callicles has finally

by

bait; he has been

he thinks

goaded

to say what

without

into the conversation, and he has been induced concern for public decency. The stage is set for the
Socrates'

association of rhetoric with shamelessness.

Callicles
or radical.

rightly understands
then

assertions about rhetoric to

of us mortals must

be

extreme upside

If true, ".

surely the life

be turned
what we

down

and

apparently

we are everywhere

doing

the opposite of

should"

(481c).
suffer

Socrates'

view of rhetoric rests on

the radical notion that

it is better

to

wrong than to

do it. Callicles feels

extreme assertion:

obliged to match

Socrates'

radical as

sertion with an

equally
is to live
them,

Anyone

who

aright should suffer

his

appetites to grow to the greatest extent

and not check

and through courage and

intelligence

should

be

competent to

minister to them at their greatest and to

(492)."

satisfy every

appetite with what

it

craves

Any

opposition

to this way of

living

on

the basis of justice

or shamefulness

is,

according to Callicles, simply

and to conceal their own
of

an attempt

by the

inferior to

constrain the superior not accuse

inferiority

(492bc). Callicles does

Socrates

having

to

invoke

a sense of shame

to hide his inferiority. On the contrary, he

says that

or natural

Socrates is potentially a superior man who has been blinded to the right form of human life by his preoccupation with philosophy (484cd). If
would

Socrates
Socrates
spected
1 1

only
study

abandon

philosophy he
rhetoric

would see

the truth of

Callicles'

words, and he

would allow and

his

superior nature to

develop

fully. Indeed, if only

a useful and re
without

would

employ

he

could

become

member of

the

community.

Whereas, Callicles contends,

The

views expressed

by

Callicles
and

lic

(336b- 354a).

Both Callicles

are closely related to those of Thrasymachus in the Repub Thrasymachus are frustrated and angered by what Socrates has

obliged

his

previous

interlocutors to
are

agree

to,

and

both thrust themselves into the Socrates to

assert the

conversation to set

matters straight. and tyranny.

consciously In the Gorgias these views in

Both

provoked
serve

by

benefits

of radical

hedonism

to associate rhetoric with political

Thrasymachus'

indecency for the be

Glaucon,
it.
set out pres respond to

nefit of the audience, whereas

Thrasymachus'

in the Republic

speech serves

to draw out

who restates

position

praise of

the unjust life and

which

insists

that

Socrates

Socrates triggers the

the basic
ent

reckless eloquence of

Thrasymachus,

in turn

provokes

Glaucon to
no

position examined

throughout the night

by

Socrates. But because there is

Glaucon

in the Gorgias there is

no scope

for

a sustained examination of rhetoric.

204

Interpretation
of rhetoric

knowledge At the

Socrates

can

be

of use

to no one.
court on

He

can not even protect

charges

himself from those

core of

who would

drag

him into is the

can

false

(486bc).
satisfac

Callicles'

assertion

premise that pleasure

is the

tion of appetites and that no distinctions

good and pleasures

be drawn between
this premise

pleasures

that are

that are

evil.

Callicles

affirms

by

allowing that

he is thinking of appetites such as hunger and thirst and the pleasure that results from eating and drinking, and by analogy he extends this meaning to all other ap
petites

(494bc). Socrates

urges

Callicles to hold to this

will

position and not shame aside

to falter

through shame. He adds that he too

have to throw

(494c).

Socrates then

asks whether someone

which never ceases and can

suffering from an appetite such as an itch be scratched forever can be said to be happy. The

possibility of one such appetite as the basis of happiness is diminished as absurd by Callicles. However, having equated all appetites, Callicles is obliged to affirm
that
such a man would

be

happy

(494d). Socrates

presses

Callicles

still

further:

socrates
question

If it

was

only his head that he

what you will

wanted

to scratch

or can

push the

further? Think is

answer,

Callicles,

if

anyone should ask all the

questions that catamite

naturally follow. And

not that

as a climax of all such cases, the

life

of a

such people are

shocking and shameful and miserable? Will you dare to say that happy, if they have what they desire in abundance?
Are
you not

callicles

ashamed,

Socrates,

to

drag

our

discussion into

such

topics?
socrates

Is it I

who

cally that pleasure,

guish

whatever

do this, my noble friend, or the man who says so unequivo its nature, is the key to happiness, and does not distin

between

pleasures good and evil?

But enlighten
or

me

further

as to whether you

say

that the pleasant and the good are

not good.

identical,

that there

are some pleasures which are

callicles
same.

To

avoid

inconsistency if I

say they

are

different,

assert

they

are the

socrates

Then

you ruin your earlier

statement,
speak

Callicles,

and you can no your opinions

longer

properly investigate the truth

495a)-

with me,

if you

contrary to

(494e,

Although Callicles is

pressed to affirm

his

position that all pleasures are the

same, he does so without conviction and only to avoid

repelled and

by

his

sense of shame

like any decent person into indecency. Callicles knows that he has been trapped Gorgias and Polus managed to avoid the trap; they chose
public purposes the small price of

inconsistency. Callicles is from affirming the consequence of his assertion, he rebukes Socrates for dragging a polite conversation

by Socrates. decency at what

Both

is for

logical inconsistency. Callicles, on the other distanced himself from Gorgias and Polus with the claim that he could not hand, be shamed into inconsistency. Further, he claimed that not to be bound shame

by

was

the

mark of

the superior man

the

man who understood

that the morality the

that gave rise to

feelings

of shame was

simply

an

instrument

of

inferior

man.

Refutative Rhetoric

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

morality is
a

205
a protective

According
device
For home

to

Callicles,
the

all conventional

false morality,

used

by

a public

impotent many man like Callicles,

of

to chain the
whom

energy of the superior man. Socrates describes as "in love with the
the

demos"

because

his

need

to pander to
a

it,

description

of

the demos as the

politician

of a

sheep morality is
anger and

very imprudent

statement.

The aspiring

can seldom afford

Callicles'

to make such views public whatever his private views. But

frustration have driven him to

sides with

air

these views.

Further,

al

though
self

initially by criticizing Socrates, he finds him polite and decent behav indirectly attacking Gorgias by associating iour with a sheep morality. However, having staked out this ground in order to
Gorgias
Gorgias'

Callicles

best

Socrates, Callicles

now

finds that his

the

rash claims about of

the life of the supe

rior man

have led him to

affirm

happiness

the life of a catamite. He is dou

bly

ashamed:

prove

of such

First, like any decent and conventional Athenian for seeming to ap a way of life; second, because of his claim of being above
also ashamed of

conventional

morality, he is

being

ashamed.

He is humiliated.

To this

point the conversations with the three

defenders is

of rhetoric shown

display

common element. premise

In

each case the

defense

of rhetoric

to require a

that is shameful or
and each

indecent,
chose

a premise that offends

the morality of the

community,

is

offered a choice

between

rhetoric and

decency. Both
unaware

Gorgias
that

and

Polus

instinctively

decency

and seemed to

be

largely

they had

undercut the type of rhetoric

not

chagrin,

Callicles, determined
indecency.12
Gorgias'

they had intended to defend. To his to be beaten by Socrates, is goaded into

Socrates'

choosing to dissuade
route

Forcing
audience

this choice is a central part of

attempt
see rhetoric as a

from

following
in

Gorgias.
life

They

for

able and ambitious men to

take in order to gain access to public office

public
requires

and public acclaim

must

(455d). But

success

respectability; one
then

publicly

embrace

the community's norms

whatever

they may be. Only

can a

If

rhetoric

must

honour him for his services. community entrust its decisions to is to be the route chosen by ambitious young men and their families it appear respectable, otherwise it will not serve their purposes. Both analyt
a man and and

ically
toric.13

dramatically

Socrates has

stripped off the respectable

face

of rhe

Greece and Rome, xxxi, George Klosko, "The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's hedonism is far more extreme than is necessary to support his (1984), 126-39, argues that view of natural justice. Thus, he is more easily refuted than had he advanced the more moderate argu
12.
Callicles'

Gorgias,'

ments suggested
Callicles'

by
in

Klosko. I

concur with

Klosko that Plato

puts these extreme arguments

into

Socrates to deal effectively with hedonism. However, Klosko stops with the logical defeat of Callicles. He does not explore how the shaming tactics used on Gorgias and Polus are preliminary to the more ruthless use of these tactics on Callicles, leading to the dramatic de
mouth order

to allow

feat

of

Callicles. The
need

13.

for

foreign teacher to take

care

to

appear acceptable also pats

to the community
on

he

visits

is

explained

in the Protagoras (316C-317C). Protagoras

himself

the back for successfully

of managing this problem for so many years. In the Euthydemus Plato lampoons the "wordy Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus in much the same manner as Aristophanes characterizes

warfar

206

Interpretation
offered

Socrates has
through
ric with

an

analysis

of rhetoric
and

as

indecent pandering,

and

his questioning ideas that violate the

of

Gorgias, Polus
he is

Callicles he has

associated rheto

norms of political shameless

decency, but in

so

doing

he has

provoked

the

allegations

that

(461c, 483c,

489b, 494c, 494e),

a mob orator charges.

that

he

speaks

unfairly

or

deceptively,

and that

he harangues like

(482c, 4836, 489c, 489c, 494d, 5i9d). However, when he eventually admits that
claims

At first Socrates ignores the

there may

that he is

not at

fault; he is

obliged

to

speak

like this

be something to them, he by the ideas or be

the conversation with
serve

haviour

of others

(494c, 494c,
and

5i9d).

The final

part of

Callicles (521-522)
these
charges

the concluding

exhortation

(523-527)

to

meet as

by

presenting Socrates

as respectable and pious, and

philosophy

a respectable alternative to rhetoric.

The

conversation

has been

long

and

very difficult for Callicles. He has lost

wishing to
restate

all

enthusiasm

for it,

and

he

gives no sign of

the

reasons

he

had originally given Socrates persists; he

Socrates'

in urging Socrates to
Callicles'

abandon

evokes

earlier

philosophy for rhetoric. But advice and urges him to specify

role

in the city

and what need

he

will

have for
of care
a

rhetoric.

socrates

Then distinguish for battle

with

me what

kind

for the city

to
make

you recommend

to me, that of
possible,
or

doing

the

Athenians, like

doctor,
first,

them as

good as

to serve and minister to their pleasure? Tell me the

as you spoke your mind

truth, Callicles, for it is

to

only fair that,

what you think.

And

so speak

up

frankly truly and bravely

to me at

you should continue

say

now.

callicles

I say then, to serve and minister. Then you invite me, my noble friend, to play the flatterer? socrates callicles Yes, if you prefer the most offensive term, for if you do not

(521).

Having
licles'

pressed

Callicles to

reiterate

advice with goes on

would

the "most offensive

his initial position, Socrates labels Cal curtly interrupts Callicles, and
term,"

to summarize the dire consequences that

Callicles had previously

said

dramatically rejects rhetoric and claims that he is well aware that this leaves him helpless in defending himself in a court of law, and that if brought to court his trial would be like that of a doctor prosecuted by a pastry cook before a jury of children (52ie, 522a). He claims that all he could do
befall him. Then Socrates

in

court would

be to tell the truth

and as a result

But he insists that he

use of

would rather meet

anything might happen to him. his death than save his life through the
concludes with a tale about the afterlife
and

flattering

rhetoric

(522d). Socrates
claims to

and an exhortation.

He

believe the tale

he

contends that

it demon

strates

the correctness of his decision to reject rhetoric. The tale also provides a
with

basis for equating philosophy

Socrates
spectable as a sophist

piety

and

justice, for

the assertion that

philos-

in the Clouds. The Euthydemus

when

also exhibits the contempt and

disgust

of re

Athenians for sophistry

its

practitioners

fail

to exercise the prudence of Protagoras

(Euthydemus 304d~305b, 3o6d~307e).

Refutative Rhetoric
ophy
provides

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

207
and

the only true qualification for public life

(527d),

for the

claim

that philosophy
527c)-

is the way to happiness in this life

that

and

the life hereafter

(526c,

In his

original recommendation

Socrates

(484c -486e), Callicles

rhetoric

emphasized the great

abandon philosophy for rhetoric difference between philosophy and

Socrates'

in

order to show

how

misguided was

preoccupation with phi

and rhet

losophy. Socrates does nothing to close this gap between philosophy oric; instead, he uses it to advantage. Socrates portrays rhetoric as
Callicles'

indecent,
philos

allows

claim

that there is

virtually nothing in

common

between

ophy and rhetoric, and then embellishes the easy, although perhaps misleading, inference that philosophy as the antithesis of rhetoric must be respectable, de
cent, and at one with the community's sense of justice.
chooses
with

Therefore,
clear.

a man who

philosophy
and

chooses the welfare of message to

his fellow

citizens and

he finds favor

the Gods.

Socrates'

Gorgias'

admirers

is

only Polus
art are

Callicles

wrapped

in

a veneer of respectability.

Gorgias is really Gorgias and his

fundamentally disreputable;

you

follow him

at your peril.

SOCRATES'

REPUTATION FOR SPEAKING THE TRUTH

When
that

accused

by

Callicles
he

of

he condemns, Socrates
respectable,
and

responds

employing the very techniques of mob oratory by depicting himself and philosophy as pi

his courageous devotion to philosophy it for pandering rhetoric even at the cost life.14 of his But the anomaly pointed out by Callicles is now compounded. Socrates has wrapped himself in the cloak of public morality by using to good
ous and
with

emphasizes

the claim that he

will not abandon

effect used

the manipulative techniques of persuasion in the sphere of opinion. He has

man who speaks

these techniques to portray himself as a

the truth

and es

chews such techniques.

Socrates'

If

refutative rhetoric

is to be

understood as part of true

as

rhetoric,

use of manipulative speech to establish a reputation

speaker of truth requires

further

analysis.

The initial

Socrates'

part of

conversa

tion with

Gorgias in the

provides a

Early

conversation

way to Gorgias

approach this

issue. illustrate the

power

offered two examples to

of rhetoric

(456b-c). First, he

recalled

the many times he had employed rhetoric

to convince patients to submit to the medical treatment prescribed

cians.

by

their physi

In his

second example,

Gorgias

considered the situation of an orator con

tending
in

with a

doctor before

an audience.

Gorgias held that the

the
master of

orator would al other art or craft

Gorgias'

ways prevail over the

a public

doctor,

or

indeed,

over

forum. The
remarks on

second example

is the

one of

any interest to

audi-

14.

Aristotle

the rhetorical

force

of

being

seen

to

choose

the honourable as opposed

Achilles'

to the expedient, and cites

1358b-

decision to kill Hector

makes

as a powerful example,

Rhetoric I, 3,
to

1359a.

In the Gorgias, Socrates

his

choice with no explicit reference

Achilles,

whereas

in the

Apology (28cd) he does invoke

the example of Achilles.

208

Interpretation

ence, for as Socrates has just indicated

art as a means

(455c-d), they

are

interested in

Gorgias'

to a successful public career. Socrates

characterizes

the second use

of rhetoric as

ignorance prevailing
Gorgias'

over

knowledge (459b),

and

throughout the

dialogue he

castigates

art as

pandering to the ignorance of an that in first example the techniques

Gorgias'

ignorance prevailing over knowledge by audience. Socrates does not mention the fact
of rhetoric are

in the

service of

knowledge

knowledge
The

of

the body. But for this very reason the example

is

worth examining.

use of the techniques of rhetoric to

implant the

conviction

necessary to improve the body appears to be rhetoric found in the Phaedrus, where
In
Gorgias'

another example of

the constructive
conviction

Socrates'

rhetoric

implants the

necessary to lead Phaedrus to philosophy and to a healthier soul.

first

example of the power of rhetoric

the knowledge of the physi the

patient

cian cannot

be

used

for the

welfare of

his

patient unless

is

convinced

that he

should undergo

the treatment. The physician's conviction that the treat

ment should

be

administered rests on

his knowledge

qua

physician, but the

pa

tient

does

not share rather

this knowledge so he must be convinced on the basis

than knowledge. The physician

of opin
"truth"

ion

or

belief

is

able to speak
of

the

within

the scope of

his art, but because

of

the patient's lack

knowledge the
the need

physician

is

not capable of

implanting
is

the required conviction;

thus,

for

the

rhetorician. and

The

rhetorician

assumed not

to have the knowledge of the phy

of medical

sician,
edge.

therefore he cannot speak the truth in the sphere

confined to

knowl

The rhetorician, like the patient, is

rhetorician must
is"

the

realm of opinion or

ig
his

norance, and the

implant

conviction on the
be,"

basis

not of
be"

knowledge

of

"what

but

of

"what

seems

to to say?

or

"appears to

even

though it "is

not."

What then is the

rhetorician

Presumably he emphasizes
of

the seriousness of the patient's condition and the

bleakness

the prognosis if left

untreated, minimizes the distasteful aspects of the treatment and the convales cence, and holds out the expectation
what of

the

best possible,

and

therefore some
the areas of

unlikely,

recovery. and

In

addition

the rhetorician can go

and pander

beyond

diagnosis, treatment,
tites or

prognosis,

to the patient's particular appe

ing

the great

desires. For example, he may appeal to the patient's vanity by emphasiz improvement to be expected in his appearance, or to his desire for
and wealth secure

honour

by showing how his

successful

treatment

will enhance

his

ability to

both. In short, the

and

rhetorician's persuasiveness

is based

on set

ting

the prescribed treatment within the context of what the patient would

like to

avoid and/or

obtain,

then showing the patient how the treatment would sat

isfy
and

his desires.
addition

In

to the

knowledge
how to

of

the patient's

hopes,

aspirations,

and

desires,

the

knowledge

of

present the

treatment to make it

appear

to satisfy

these

desires,

the rhetorician must also know

how

to secure and maintain a repu

tation as a person who can

can

be trusted to

give concerned and

helpful

advice that

be

relied upon.

The

rhetorician needs the reputation of

being

a man who can and decep-

be trusted,

a man who would not manipulate others

through distortion

Refutative Rhetoric
tion.
edge

as

True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

the power
of rhetoric

209
service of

Thus,

Gorgias'

example of

in the

knowl

indicates two

somewhat

different tasks for

rhetoric:

first,
is
at

the persuasion of

the patient, and second, the maintenance of the rhetorician's public reputation.

Because the
dent
on

effectiveness of

the persuasion of the

patient

least in

part

depen
in
to

having
he

a reputation as a man who would not resort rhetorician must attempt

to the use of the tech

conviction

niques of others

persuasion, the

to

implant the

that

would not attempt

to do what he in

fact does do. He

must appear

be

other

than

he is in

order

to be an effective servant of knowledge.

example of the use of rhetoric to
Socrates'

In
of

order

to apply
one

Gorgias'

manner

speaking,

detail

must

be

modified without

changing

the essential proper

ties of the example. In

each assumed

Gorgias'

example the role of rhetorician and physician are

by

different
in the

person.

Let

us suppose

that the two roles are as the

"art"

by implanting
sumed

one person who conviction

has

mastered

both the

art of medicine and

of

realm of opinion.

both

a practitioner of an art

based

on

Thus, the doctor can function as knowledge, and as a practitioner of the

in his
patients to ensure

technique of

implanting

the necessary conviction

all

they

benefit from his

knowledge,

the time

taking

care to polish

his

reputation as an

honest

and

trustworthy

person who would not

deceive.
in the Gorgias, Socrates does
The
characters, just
al

Now, despite his

low that there is
of

condemnation of rhetoric

a true art of rhetoric analogous to the art of medicine.

of men's souls or

object

this art is the improvement

medicine

as the object of art of rhetoric

the art of
uses

is the improvement

of their

bodies. The true

words, not to gratify men, but to improve them

(502e,

503a).

The true

art of

rhetoric

is the basis
and

of statemanship, suggests that

ticed

(517a)

he

he

claims that to practice

but according to Socrates it is seldom prac he may be the sole practitioner (52ide). Also, this true rhetoric is comparable to doing battle
"

possible

with

the Athenians like a doctor to make them as good as that a

commitment

(521a). But
or at

he

also claims

to this true

rhetoric precludes

the use of,

the the

knowledge of, the techniques of the flattering false rhetoric, thus, his fate hands of a jury of children prosecuted by a pastry cook.
If
the
Socrates'

commitment

to a true

rhetoric

is

analogous

to medicine, then
patients

like
citi

doctor he too is faced

submit

with

the problem of convincing

Gorgias'

his

(fellow

zens) to
ness to

to the necessary treatment.

presence and

his

attractive

the

audience requisite

dergo the

which manipulates

difficulty of convincing these young men to un the need for refutative rhetoric: a rhetoric thus, treatment, his three interlocutors. However, silences then and
increases the
Socrates'

manipulation of

Callicles

goes

beyond the immediate

a good

purpose of

weaning the This

au

dience away from Gorgias. Callicles sees technique and repeatedly accuses Socrates
cusation

deal

Socrates'

of

persuasive ac

of

engaging in

mob oratory.

forces Socrates to defend his

reputation
Callicles'

reputation.

Accordingly, he
makes

undertakes

the the

task of

defending his
for

for honest
and
Socrates'

and plain speech regardless of

consequences.

astuteness

aggressiveness

this

defensive

rhetoric necessary,

otherwise

persuasive effort

may be

undermined

210

Interpretation
Socrates'

by

Callicles'

exposure of

techniques

of persuasion.

However, Callicles
Socrates

also provides manages

the

raw material

for Socrates defense Gorgias

of

his

reputation.

to associate the
and

rhetoric of reject

with the

shameless statements of

Callicles

then to piously

this pandering

rhetoric. audience

Socrates

uses

refutative rhetoric

to dissuade the

from
his

following
reputation

Gorgias,
high

and

he

continues

to

manipulate rhetoric.

his interlocutors to

polish

as someone who

has

no use

for

ground of public

morality
noble

By rejecting rhetoric Socrates claims the regardless of devotion to the commonweal

in the
warm embrace of civic

the personal costs. He wraps himself

virtue; like

Achilles, he

will

do the

thing

come what may.

CONCLUSION

Refutative
rhetoric.

rhetoric and constructive rhetoric are refutative rhetoric of

The

complementry parts of true the Gorgias serves to dissuade the audience

whereas, the constructive rhetoric
which of

from the false Phaedrus

The

rhetoric

of

Gorgias;

the

creates an

alluring image

draws Phaedrus towards

philosophy.

heavy

reliance on refutative rhetoric

the sustained defense of

false

rhetoric

in the Gorgias is necessary because of mounted by Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. demonstration
and

Socrates
to press
mined

arrives

in the

Gorgias'

middle of
and

finds

way to insert
presence

himself between Gorgias defense

his

audience.

Socrates then

Gorgias'

uses

his denunciation through to its

of

conclusion.

Callicles

mounts a

deter
reck

rhetoric, but Socrates transforms this determination

into

by associating it with ful hedonism. Although Callicles is eventually humiliated

and then art notices that

lessness,

discredits

Gorgias'

Callicles'

shame and

silenced, he
claims

Socrates is using the very techniques of persuasion that he eschew, and Socrates finally does move to meet the charge of being a
tor.

to

mob ora

To

polish

his

reputation as a man who speaks

Callicles'

Socrates
portrays

embellishes

only the truth no matter what, distinction between rhetoric and philosophy, and
who would

the philosopher as a man

of

gladly face death

Socrates'

rather

than stoop

to the

deceptive techniques
no

false

rhetoric. refutative rhetoric on the public

There is drawn the

direct

evidence of the effect of

a

audience, but there is

audience

basis for inference. The desire for

whom
Socrates'

honour has

to

Gorgias, from
of

ing

in

public

debate. But due to

they hope to learn the art of prevail intervention they are treated to the

spectacle of the

defenders

the art shamed into silence

by

what

they

are pressed

to say. Plato leaves us to draw our own conclusion about the tacle on the audience.

impact

of this spec

How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy

Thomas F. Curley III

I. INTRODUCTORY

Boethius'

read and revered

Consolation of Philosophy, for centuries one of the most widely books in the West, is now little more than a historical curiosity.
all, educated people have heard
reasons of

Most, but
seem to

not

it;

some

have

read

it;

very few
than

like it. But the

for the

work's neglect are more significant

our common

twentieth-century

amnesia toward what one might term

"the tradi

tion".

place we are separated by a centuries-long tradition of philoso from the intellectual context which gave rise to synthesis of Plato phy and Aristotle. Minds such as Descartes and Kant have so altered the cast of west
Boethius'

In the first

ern

thinking

that it is all but

impossible,

at

least

at

first glance, to take Boethius

of

seriously
eth

as a philosopher.

What is more, the two dominant tendencies

twenti the

century philosophy, the analytic school in England and

schools of existentialism and
Boethius'

America,

and

continental

phenomenology, are in radical dis

agreement with

most
would

basic

assumptions. author of a short and scope

What, for instance,

cessible philosophic of the at

A.J. Ayer, the

comparable

popularly
text,1

ac

manifesto,

in

to the Boethian
and

make

the

following exchange between the very beginning of the work:

mundum

character

Boethius

Dame

Philosophy

Turn ilia: Huncine, inquit,

credis ei regimen

temerariis agi

fortuitisque

casibus putas an ullum

inesse

rationis?

Atqui, inquam,
hac

nullo existimaverim modo ut for-

tuita temeritate tarn

scio nee umquam

certa

moveantur, verum open suo conditorem praesidere

qui me ab sententiae veritate

deum
pr.

fuerit dies

depellat (Bk. I,

6,

3-4).

(Then

she said,

"Do

you think that this world

is driven

by

reckless and
it?"

haphazard

chance or
no

do

you

believe there to be any

rational

direction to

And I said, "But in

reckless

rather a

way would I think that such regular phaenomena are moved I know that the creator god presides over his handiwork,
which might

by

haphazard;
be

and there will never

day

drive

me

from the truth

of this

opinion.")2

Because Ayer dismisses metaphysical questions and answers as not only wrong but nonsensical, he could continue reading only on the assumption that he was perusing a text indicative of the philosophical errors of the past.
Thomas F. College
1984,
1.
2
.

Curley

and was a

tween poetry and

at

III (B.A. Amherst 1976, Ph.D. Princeton 1981) taught Classics at Hamilton at Johns Hopkins University. His exploration of the relationship be of which this paper is a part, was cut short by his death in October, philosophy,
Mellon Fellow
and

the age of thirty-one.

Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth,

All
translations are

Logic (1936; New York: Dover,

1946).

my

own and are meant

vance

for their literalness

which at

merely as trots for the Latin, thus I times lapses into clumsiness.

apologize

in

ad

212

Interpretation
what would

Likewise,
defines
of

Sartre,
in

who

in

an accessible manifesto of

his

own make

existentialism as

the

conviction

that existence precedes

essence,3

the

following
si

argument

which existence

is treated

as a predicate

like any

other and

derivable from the

in

essence of the good:

Quo fit ut,

tum

quolibet genere

imperfectum

quid esse videatur,

in

eo perfectum quod

quoque aliquid esse necesse

perhibetur exstiterit ne

sit;

etenim perfectione sublata unde quidem potest

illud

imperfec

fingi

(Bk.

Ill,

pr.

io, 4).
example of a given

(Thus it happens that, if there

should

be

seen to

be any imperfect imperfect

genus, it is necessary that there should also be a perfect example of that genus; for it is

impossible to imagine

whence

that

which

is

considered

might

come. to exist,

if the

perfect

is removed.)

In Sartre's

case as well

further reading

could

only

proceed on

the assumption that

proficient

he

was engaged

in the merely

academic exercise of

becoming

in the

history
of

of philosophy.

Thus there
Boethius'

exist significant

intellectual differences to

account

for

our neglect

text and our failure to appreciate it. I suspect,

however,

that other

equally important factors come into play. The Consolatio, in addition to being a work of philosophy, is also an intricately crafted work of literature: a dramatic

dialogue between two fictional

prose.

characters composed

in alternating
we
Boethius'

verse and

This

blending

of

poetry

and

philosophy,
our

categories

tend to

keep
as

strictly apart, is as great an is the incompatibility of his

tieth century. We

obstacle

to

understanding

intentions

philosophical presuppositions with those of the twen

philosophers'

prose (that pay lip service to the clarity of certain of David Hume and A. J. Ayer, for example) and to the wit and style of (Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's, for instance); but in fact we believe that philo

others'

thing, poetic invention quite another. We simply do not philosophy as poetry, or poetry as philosophy, which is pre text. cisely the response demanded by This distance from the work, both intellectual and aesthetic, clarifies the na
sophic exposition one

is

know how to

read

Boethius'

ture and

limitations of Boethian scholarship in the last century. Modern research into the Consolatio may be dated from the publication in 1877 of Hermann Usener's Anecdoton Holderi.* In this monograph the author dismisses the Con
Usener
and the

solatio as an unoriginal compilation of

grants as

Boethius'

own an

metra,

which

he

rates

Aristotelian and Neoplatonic sources. introduction (up through Bk. II, pr. 4, 38) very low; otherwise he sees the text as an amateur
better
expressed elsewhere.

ish

pastiche of philosophical arguments approach was

On the

one

hand, Usener's
3. 4.

obviously determined by

the twin tendencies of

Sartre, J. P., V Existentialisme est un humanisme (Paris: Nagel, 1946). Usener, Hermann, Anecdoton Holderi. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostgothischer Zeit, Bonn, 1877. The fragment here analysed is claimed by the author to belong to a lost historical
work

by Cassiodorus.
his

sociated with

name which,

Consolatio.

The fragment itself explicitly ascribes to Boethius theological treatises long as however, many found impossible to ascribe to the author of the

How to Read the Consolation

century German other, such blindness to the
nineteenth

of

Philosophy

-213

scholarship: analysis and

"Quellenforschung";
only be

on the

nature and merits of the text can

Boethius'

explained on

the basis of a
stance.

deep

lack

of

sympathy

with

philosophic and poetic

One

might characterize

twentieth-century scholarship
of

on

the Consolatio as
and

constituting two possible responses to Usener's thesis:

the

defense

illustration

of

integrity

and

originality

the

work or

increasingly

sophisticated

investiga

tion of the sources exploited

by

Boethius in the

composition of

his text. The first

and reasoned re such scholars as

camp is led by E. K. Rand, buttal of Usener's point of

Klingner
and

who

view.5

in 1904 produced a thorough His lead was followed by

Boethius'

Reichenberger,
sources

who made considerable progress

work and

towards demon

strating the very complex structure of

the methods

by

which

he

made

his

his

own.6

On the

other

hand

scholars such as
of

Courcelle,
on
was

Silk,

and most

recently,

Gruber, have brought

it is
now clear

the analysis

the

influences

Boethius to the
extraordinary.7

point where

that his command of his sources

was at

If Boethius

was a mere

compiler, he

least

a compiler of

the first rank.

Thus the in the

result of

the last century's researches into the Consolatio

is,

as often ori of

world of

scholarship, the conclusion that the debate over

question.

Boethius'

ginality

was a

false

It has turned

out that

in

almost

every line

both

the prose and verse sections Boethius can be detected echoing, if not quoting, the

literature
that

and

he has

shaped

philosophy of the past; nonetheless it has become his material into a complex pattern of his
then
us

increasingly clear
own contrivance.

The

question

becomes,

what are the

dynamics

of this curious

work,

so re

moved small

from

group

of

both philosophically and aesthetically. And in recent years a scholars have begun to address this issue. L. Alfonsi has traced
personal and

the relationship between the

the universal as

dramatized in the dia

logue between Boethius Payne has

attempted

and

Dame

Philosophy.8

to

read

the work as an

More recently still, F. Anne example of Menippean Satire, while

Anna Crabbe has

sought the

key
St.

to the

work

in its

essential eclecticism which

embraces and transcends the responses to

adversity

of such exemplars as

Ovid,

Cicero, Seneca, Socrates,

5.
,

and

Augustine.9

Consolatio Rand, E. K. "On the Composition of Classical Philology, 15, 1904, pp. 1-28. 6. Klingner, F., De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae, Berlin,
tersuchungen
zur

Boethius'

Philosophiae,"

Harvard Studies in
Un-

192 1.

Reichenberger, K.,

literarischen
1954.

Stellung

der Consolatio Philosophiae Kolner Romantische Arbeiten,

,

N.S. 3, Cologne,
7.

Silk, E..

"Boethius'

Consolatio Philosophiae

as a
pp.

Sequel to Augustine's Dialogues

and So-

Courcelle, P., La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition litteraire: Antecedants et posterite de Boece, Paris, 1967. Gruber, J., Kommentar zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1978. Convivium, N.S. 8. Alfonsi, L. "Storia interiore et storia cosmica nella Consolatio
Harvard Theological Review, 32, 1939,
I9~39boeziana,"
,

liloquia,"

3, 1955,
9.

pp. 513-21. and

Payne, F. Anne, Chaucer

chapter 3:

Menippean Satire,
as

University

of

Wisconsin Press, Madison,

pp. 55~85-

1981,

"The Consolation of Philosophy

Menippean

Satire,"

Crabbe, Anna,

214 The

Interpretation
problem with this trend of criticism
Boethius'

is that its
manifold

practitioners

have

either

limited themselves to

one aspect of

text or

have become ten

What has

dentious in championing an idiosyncratic approach to the been most lacking is a comprehensive approach which takes into
the philosophic and

work.10

account

both

literary
This

aspects of paper as

the work and seeks to demonstrate how

they inform
shall

each other.

is intended,
readers

Because the Consolatio,

take this very
around three aspects of sophical

many

least in part, to fill that gap. have pointed out, is so eclectic, I

at point and organize

eclecticism as

my starting

my argument

the text's diversity. First of all, since the work is a philo

cal content.

treatise, it is necessary to clarify the structure and drift of its philosophi I shall not be concerned to label the provenance of this or that argu

ment, a task

largely completed by

other more competent make clear and

scholars, most notably,

Gruber. I will, however, endeavor to thius has molded his Platonic, Aristotelian,
since

the structure into which Boe

materials.

Neoplatonic

Second,

Boethius

chose

to cast his work in the form of a

dialogue,

the

implications
glance at

of this choice on

the philosophical content must be gauged before a full under

standing

of the work can

be

achieved.

To do

so

shall

have both to

the

tradition of philosophic

Augustine,
Boethius

and

dialogue in antiquity, most importantly Plato and to uncover the dynamics of interaction between the character

and

that curious genre, Menippean

response

Dame Philosophy. Finally, since the Consolatio is an example of Satire, it is incumbent on me at least to hazard a form
of

to the question why Boethius chose to write a philosophic dialogue in

the very artificial

alternating

verse and prose.

II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTENT

is

smitten with

The Consolation of Philosophy is essentially a dramatized therapy. Boethius despair over his fall from fortune and Dame endeav

Philosophy
on

ors

to restore her pupil to a state of

cure

insight

and calm.

As first step

Boethius'

is the diagnosis
end of

which

Dame

Philosophy

performs

the way to in Book I,

prose

6. At the

her

examination of the

patient,

she summarizes

his illness

under three points:

Nam
esse

quoniam tui oblivione

confunderis,

et exsulem te et exspoliatum propriis

bonis

doluisti;

quoniam vero quis sit rerum

finis ignoras,

nequam

homines

atque

nefarios potentes

felicesque arbitraris;

quoniam vero quibus gubernaculis mundus

"Literary Design
ed.

in the De Consolatione in Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influ Margeret Gibson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, pp. 237-74. ence, 10. Payne attempts to read the Consolatio as an example of Menippean Satire, which is a per fectly reasonable endeavor; but her characterization of what constitutes Menippean Satire, especially in a sixth century context, has little if anything to do with the Boethean text. For a more detailed cri tique of Payne's conclusions see pp. 242-43 of this paper.

Philosophiae"

How to Read the Consolation

regatur oblitus morbum

of

Philosophy

-215

es, has fortunarum vices aestimas sine rectore fluitare: magnae non ad

modo, verum ad interitum quoque causae (Bk.

I,

pr.

6,

19-19).
you

(For

since you

have been

confused

by forgetfulness of your self,

that worthless and evil

have

complained not

that you are in exile and dispossessed of your own goods; and since you do

know the

purpose of

happy;
judge
not

and since you

things, have forgotten

fortune
as

you think

men are powerful and

by

what means the universe

is governed,

you

that these changes of

of

are

in flux

and without

any direction:

great causes

only

illness but

of

death

well.)

This

passage

is clearly
second

meant

to be programmatic
concerned with

for the

structure of
Boethius'

Books 1 1
Boethius'

through

V. The

book is

loosening

attachment

to the gifts of

fortune and, as Dame Philosophy repeatedly points out, to the rise and fall of fortune is occasioned by his lack of a vulnerability
self:

sense of

Quid igitur,
tibi te tu

0 mortales, extra petitis

intra

vos positam

felicitatem? Error

vos inscialiquid

tiaque confundit.

Ostendam breviter tibi fortuna

summae cardinem
si

felicitatis. Estne

ipso

pretiosius?

Nihil, inquies. Igitur

tui compos

fueris,
pr.

possidebis quod nee

amittere umquam velis nee

possit auferre

(Bk. II,

4, 22-23).

(Thus,
to you

within yourselves.

why do you seek outside yourselves the happiness which is placed Error and ignorance are confusing you. I shall briefly demonstrate the essence of the greatest happiness. Is there anything more precious to you
o mortals,
"Nothing,"

than yourself?
you will able to

you say.

Thus if

you should

be in

possession of

yourself,

be in

possession of that which neither you would wish to

lose

nor

fortune be

remove.)

Thus Book II in its

long

discussion

of the various gifts of sense of

fortune is in fact
bonum"

an at

tempt to restore to Boethius a

seeks to make clear
"telos"

strong
a

identity."

Likewise, Book III

which

to Boethius the

existence of

the "summum
which

is

the

of all things.

First

by

kind

negativa"

of

"via

demonstrates

that wealth,
then in a

fame,

power,

and pleasure cannot

embody the highest good,

the

and

more positive

manner, Dame

Philosophy elucidates
and

the good, and happiness.

ways of

Finally, Books IV
nature of

seek as

it

were
as

identity of God, to justify the

the goal of all
rela

God to

man.

The

the human self and of God

and

things has been

established

in Books II

III; in these final two books the

as

tionship between these two entities is depicted in all its complexity, logue ranges over such topics as theodicy, free will, determinism,
dence. Thus the
most

the dia

and provi rather

readily

apparent structure of

the

Consolatio is the

straightforward succession of three arguments calculated to address

Boethius'

the three as

pects of

illness

as

diagnosed in the first book: ignorance

relationship between the two.

of

self,

of

the

"summum bonum",

and of the

But the
might

situation

is far

more complex

than these preliminary observations out, the mode or style of

argu-

indicate. As many
See Book II,
pr.

scholars

have

pointed

11.

4,

8;

pr.

4, 24-29;

pr.

5, 24-29;

pr.

6,

16-20;

pr.

7, 21-23.

216

Interpretation
in the Consolatio
changes as ame

mentation

Philosophy procedes in her exposi

tion. F

Anne Payne's summary is

names

a good example of such analysis:

The

give the

four

II-Bk. Ill, pr.9), Platonic (Bk. Ill,

pr.6-Bk.
Boethius'

V,

m.i), and
sources

her (i.e. Philosophy's) argument Cynic (Bk. Aristotelian (Bk. pr. IV, 5), IV, Augustinian (Bk. V, prs. 2-6) are not intended to indicate
sections of m.9-Bk.

literal

to

which

the sections

for these sections, but rather techniques and points of view allude. The analogies between Lucian and the first section have

already been discussed. The Platonic section begins with a paraphrase of Plato's Timaeus, and two proses of the discussion on evil contain a paraphrase of the Gorgias. The Aristotelian debate
about section ends with an allusion to
relation of

Aristotle's definition
will

of chance.

The de

the

foreknowledge

and

free

in the final

section of

the Con
a

solation, which contains one

indirect

allusion to the

City

of God (Bk. V, pr.4), is

bate

always associated with

Augustine.12

The

question

then arises, how is this philosophic eclecticism rendered coherent?

is that the Consolation may be seen as a succession of three in creasingly lofty and comprehensive disquisitions on the order of the universe. In Books I and 1 1, the ways of the world are viewed as they appear to the eyes of the
answer

One

unregenerate

human soul, that

is,

under

the aspect of
of

"fortuna"

In Book

III,

the

way is

opened

up towards a clearer vision

and

the universal order, that

is,

under

its

aspect of

"fatum";

strated with great rigor

rise

in Book IV, fate's determination of events is demon and detail. Finally, in Book V, the discussion seeks to
and rational point of view and to adumbrate
"providentia"

beyond the merely human

stans"

God's

own perspective on the

universe, that

which

is the

viewpoint of the
"personal"

"nunc

of eternity.

Thus, in

addition to what one might

term the

structure of the work, that

sonal

by

which the

text is organized according to the per

dilemma

of

Boethius,

there is a second structural

device,

the cosmological,

which articulates the text

tuna", "fatum",

and

according to three "providentia".

aspects of cosmological order:

"for

Finally
to call the

there is a third set of structures at work in the

"epistemological"

and which

is the

most

text, that which I choose important of all three struc divine

providence.

tural systems. At prose 4 in Book

V, in her attempt

to explain

Dame

Philosophy
Omne
.

makes

the

following

observation:
cogno-

quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed secundum

scentium potius comprehenditur

facultatem (Bk. V,
not

pr. 4, 25).

(Everything which is known is understood ing to the capability of those knowing it.)
She then
Sensus
ria

according to its

own power

but

accord

goes on to enumerate the

four

"faculties"

principal

of

knowledge:

figuram in

subiecta materia constitutam,

imaginatio

vero solam sine mate

iudicat figuram; ratio vero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam singularibus inest universali consideratione perpendit. Intellegentiae vero
12.

quae
celsior
ocu-

Payne,

op. cit., pp.

69-70;

also see

Gruber,

op.

cit., pp. 36ft.

How to Read the Consolation

Ius exsistit;

of

Philosophy
4, 28-30).

-217

supergressa namque universitatis ambitum

ipsam illam

simplicem

formam

pura mentis acie contuetur

(Bk.

V,

pr.

(The

senses

judge

of

form

embodied

in underlying matter, the imagination judges

of

the mere

form

without

matter; reason transcends even this latter form and

by

a univer

sal meditation weighs of

the idea itself which is present in individual things. But the eye

intellection

exists on an even

higher plane, for it transcends the

ambit of the uni

verse and with

the pure vision of the mind contemplates that simple idea

itself.)
end of

Although this
the

hierarchy of knowledge
it becomes
for the his

is

articulated

only towards the very

text,

upon reflection

clear that

these four categories have

provided

a structural scheme

work parallel

The fact that the

the physical

work opens with

details

of

decay
laxa

are

to the two already described. Boethius writing an elegiac lament in dwelt upon:

which

Intempestivi funduntur

vertice cani cutis

et tremit effeto corpore

(Bk. I,

m. 1

1 1

12).
of

(Prematurely
shakes.)

white

hair

covers

my head

and

the loosened skin

my

weakened

body

indicates that he is

mired

in the

material

world, reacting to the

universe

by Philosophy
terms
Boethius'

means of

his he

senses.

As token

of this

first

sensual stage of perception

mainly Dame

adapts

herself to

Boethius'

capacities and responds to

of

his

condition

in

which

can

comprehend, namely, those

touch. Thus she

diagnoses

initial

silence and causes

him to

recognize

her for

what she

is,

all

by

touch:

Cumque

me non modo

taciturn
.

sed elinguem prorsus mutumque

.

vidisset,

ammovit

pectori meo

leniter
(Bk.

manum et

oculosque meos

fletibus

undantes contracta

in

rugam

veste siccavit

I,

pr.

2,

5-7).
was not

(When

she perceived that

speech, she

lightly
a

touched

merely silent but mute and my breast with her hand and with a
eyes which were

quite

incapable her

of

portion of

garment

drawn into

fold

she

dried my

overflowing

with

tears.)

The

realistic

detail

of

the phrase, "contracta in rugam veste",

is very

rare

in the

"sensus"

Consolatio

and

is

appropriate

In Book II Dame
mological

only at this preliminary stage of Philosophy begins to employ the next faculty in her
the imagination. Whereas
Boethius'

episte

hierarchy,
the

in the first book

attention was

fo

cused on

particulars of

immediate situation, in the

second

book
a

Philosophy
which can of

leads her

pupil towards a consideration of with

fortune in general,
most

step

this strategy
and

be taken only occurs in

the aid of imagination. The

striking

example

prose 2 where

Philosophy
verbis

puts on

the mask of "For

tuna"

interrogates Boethius
autem pauca

on

his

claim

to the gifts of fortune:

agitare; tu

Vellem

tecum Fortunae
pr.

ipsius

igitur

an

ius

postulet

animadverte

(Bk. II,

2, 1).

(I

would

like to discuss

few

matters with you

in the

words of

Fortuna herself. There

fore

consider whether

her

claim

is

just.)

218
In fact

Interpretation

is here using one of the imagination's greatest achievements, the theater, to effect her own purposes. This recourse to the imagination is further underscored when, during her speech in the persona of Fortuna, she alludes to

Philosophy

various works of the

imagination
regem

such as

legend, tragedy,
paulo ante

and epic:

Nesciebas Croesum
miserandum rogi

Lydorum Cyro

formidabilem

mox

diende
praeterit
Tragoedia-

flammis
deflet

traditum misso caelitus

imbre defensum? Num te

Paulum Persi

regis a se capti calamitatibus pias

impendisse lacrimas? Quid

rum clamor aliud adulescentulus

nisi

indiscreto ictu fortunam felicia

xov uev eva xaxwv xov pr.

regna vertentem?

Nonne

5vo Jtidovg,

de

exegov

idwv in Iovis

limene iacere didicisti? (Bk. II, (Were

you unaware of

2, 1 1
of the

13)

Croesus, king
when

Lydians,

an object of

fear to Cyrus

and

then an object of pity, who,

handed

over to the

flames

of the

pyre, was saved

by

a miraculous shower of rain?

shed pious

And it has

not escaped your notice,

tears over the misfortunes of the Persian

else

king,

whom

has it, that Paulus he himself had

captured? perous

does the shouting of tragedy bewail but fortune overturning pros kindgoms with a sudden blow? As a student, didn't you learn that "two jars, the
What
goods"

one of evils and the other of

stand

in Jove's threshold?)
urges

And throughout the book

situation of the rich means

Philosophy

constantly

Boethius to imagine the

man, the powerful man, the famous man, and so on, as

fortune.13
"imaginatio"
"ratio"

towards understanding the vanity of human

At the
signalled

beginning of Book III the transition from by the following statement by the character Boethius:
summum

to

is

O, inquam,

lassorum

solamen

animorum, quam tu me vel sententiarum

pondere vel canendi etiam

iucunditate

refovisti, adeo ut

iam

me posthac

imparem

fortunae ictibus
modo non

esse non arbitrer!

Itaque

remedia quae paulo acriora esse

dicebas
pr.

non

perhorresco, sed audiendi avidus vehementer efflagito (Bk.

minds,"

II,

1,

2).

("O

greatest comfort of afflicted

your proposition or

I said, "how

you

have

restored me, whether

by

the weight of

the

delight
of

of your

singing, so that I do not think

that

hereafter I

shall

be

unequal to the more

blows
not

which you said were

slightly

bitter,

fortune. Therefore, those remedies, only do I not fear them, in fact I am

strongly desirous

of

hearing

them.")
throughout Books III
and to elucidate
and

The harsher
to

remedies of strict reason are employed

IV

demonstrate

the existence of the

"summum

bonum"

its

rela

tion to the universe

in

general and

to man in particular. In this section

and

Boethius'

borrowings from Plato

Platonic

are

particularly frequent
9
of

particularly

appropriate.

The

imagery

of metrum are

Book III

and

the arguments

drawn from the

the universal

Gorgias in Book IV
scheme of things.

incorporated into
not

a rational explanation of

Furthermore,
to be

only

are

the

instruments
way, in
II.14

of reason employed a

in this section, they

the criticisms of
13.

are also reflected on

in

a critical and

fashion

parallel to

poetry

found in Books I
pr.

14.

See Book II, pr. 5, 3ff.; pr. 6, iff.; See Book III, pr. 12, 30-38.

7, 3ff.

How to Read the Consolation

of

Philosophy

-219

Finally, Book V

constitutes an attempt to explain to the

highest

faculty

of

human understanding (ratio) the nature and scope of divine understanding (intellegentia). We have been led through the various stages of human knowledge:

"sensus", "imaginatio",
cate
eternity.

and

"ratio"; Dame Philosophy

strictly
rational

now seeks

to

communi

to Boethius some indication of how the universe appears to the eyes of

The

exposition remains rational

in form, but because

reality
mys

beyond the

humanly
work:

is

being described,

there is a religious, almost

the

tical, tone to Philosophy's speech, which lines

of

breaks forth, for instance, in

final

the

Magna

vobis

est, si dissimulare non vultis,

necessitas pr.

indicta probitatis,

cum ante

oculos agitis

iudicis

cuncta cernentis

(Bk.

V,

6,

48).

(Unless

you wish to pretend

otherwise, a great necessity of acting virtuously has been

all

pronounced

to you, since you act under the gaze of a judge who discerns

things.)

Thus the

philosophical content of

the Consolatio is

three different but parallel sets of

categories.

First

of all

organized according to Philosophy's exposition

is

structured

to correspond to
points

Boethius'

particular situation: she

"telos"

first

restores

his

sense of

self, then

to the end or

of

things,

and

finally demonstrates

the relationship between the individual human reality the universe, God.

and

the Alpha-Omega of

Second,
and

the content also falls into the three-fold division of

fortuna", "fatum",

"providentia". That
of the

is,

the same cosmos

is

portrayed un
"sensus"

der three different lights: that

human

being

as possessor of

and

"imaginatio",
and

that of the human as rational animal, and that of God as

of the universe.

immediate

all-encompassing knower

Finally,
a

these personal and cos

epistemological struc

mological sets of categories are set

in

relief

by

four-fold

ture:

"sensus", "imaginatio", "ratio", and "intellegentia". The human being, as a human, has access to the first three modes of knowledge; the fourth can only be
hinted The
at

by

the highest

means at

hand,
of

namely, the

rational.

common purpose of all

three sets of categories is to cure

Boethius,

to

effect a conversion, or

turning

about,

his
a

soul.

The

work

is

entitled a of

"Conso
of the

lation"; it is in fact
soul sis.

"therapy"

But it is
us

very different kind

therapy

from that

most

familiar to

in the

twentieth century, that

is, psychoanaly

Whereas in the contemporary analyst's office the patient does all the talk prison cell Dame Philosophy is the principal interlocutor; and ing, in whereas modern analysis proceeds on the assumption that the higher faculties of
Boethius'

imagination fore
her

and reason are explicable

in terms

of unconscious
of

drives

and there

"epiphaenomena"

reducible

to the

rank of soul and at

"sensus", Dame

Philosophy

Boethius'

effects

cure of

by leading
points

him

upward

from the senses, to the

"intellegentia".

imagination,
The
the
next

to reason,

last

to the

ultimate reality,

problems and

dilemmas
than
set

of one

level

are resolved

by
a

level

rather

by descending

backwards to

proceeding upward to lower level. This proce

"intellegentia"

dure is

clearly Boethius has just formulated his

most

forth in the

crucial

step from

"ratio"

to

inability to maintain the

seemingly contradictory

220

Interpretation
"providentia"

propositions of

and

human free will; be

reached

Philosophy

responds

by

stat

ing

that a higher

vantage point must

before this

contradiction can

be

resolved:

Cuius

caliginis causa est quod

humanae

ratiocinationis motus ad

divinae

praescientiae

simplicitatem non potest relinquetur ambigui

ammoveri;

quae si ullo modo cogitari

quest, nihil prorsus

(Bk.

V,

pr.

4,

2).

(The

cause of this

cannot reach

the simplicity of divine

obscurity is the fact that the impulse of the human power to reason foreknowledge; if this latter could in any way be
would remain

conceived, absolutely nothing

unclear.)

Nonetheless, it is important
conflicts of one

to note that although

level

by

appealing to the next

are not rendered

Philosophy resolves faculty up in the hierarchy,

of

the the

lower

and

intermediate levels
"providentia".

insignificant in the light

"intel

legentia"

or

Rather,

throughout the work

condition of

Philosophy
Boethius'

is

careful to

accommodate

her

mode of

discourse to the
on

soul.

What is

more, the whole process

surpasses

is based

the assumption that although a given level

that lower

that below the

it,

nonetheless

level is

encompassed and per

fected

within

wider scope of

the higher:

Superior

comprehendendi vis amplectitur

inferiorem, inferior

vero ad superiorem

nullo modo consurgit. species

Neque

enim sensus aliquid extra materiam valet vel universales

imaginatio

contuetur vel ratio capit simplicem

formam;

sed

intellegentia
(Bk. V,

quasi

desuper
quo

spectans concepta

forma

quae subsunt etiam cuncta

diiudicat,

sed eo modo
pr.

formam ipsam,

quae nulli alii nota esse poterat, comprehendit

4,

31-32)

(The higher
rise nor

faculty

towards the

of understanding embraces the lower; but the lower can in no way higher. For sense perception is good for nothing apart from matter, contemplate universal as

categories, nor does reason grasp the if looking down from above, both perceives the form and also discerns everything which lies below, but in the same manner in which it comprehends the form itself, which was incapable of being known to any of the other
pure

does the imagination

form;

but "intellegentia",

faculties.)
It is precisely in this

harmony

of all aspects of

the cosmos: of the human and the

divine, of the temporal and the eternal, of becoming and being, of change and or der, that the central point of the Consolatio as a work of philosophy lies. This

harmony is
of a

not achieved

through the

blurring

of

distinctions, it
insists

consists, in

fact,
in

hierarchical
of this

articulation of the various aspects of the universe.

The

particular

beauty
soned,

hierarchy
it is

is that,

although

Philosophy

on a strict protocol

the relation of lower to

rather

higher,
a

nonetheless the

lower is

never

completely jetti
higher.
order

embraced and validated within the context of the

Thus
apparent vealed.

Philosophy
flux
of

has

double task: to

make manifest

the

divine

in the

the world and to validate

human striving striking

the
which

within the order thus re

Thus double task is indicated

at

by certain

verbal echoes

in the text.
in-

For

instance,

the end of the

first book, in

interlocutors have been

How to Read the Consolation

troduced and the nature of
gives

of

Philosophy

221

Boethius'

illness has been diagnosed,

Philosophy

her

"alumnus"

straightforward moral counsel:

Tu

quoque si vis claro

lumine

cernere verum,

tramite

recto

carpere callem:

gaudia pelle,
pelle

timorem

spemque nee

fugato
adsit

dolor

(Bk.

I,

m.

7, 20-28).
with clear vision and

(If you, too, desire to discern the truth

the straight path, cast out

to make
nor

your

joys,

cast out

fear,

put

hope to flight,

let

sorrow

way along be

present.)

This
sion,

stoical

appropriate to

warning against the power of the passions to cloud intellectual vi Boethius at this stage of dismay and self-pity, is turned on its
sentences of

head in the final

"providentia"

Philosophy's disquisition
where she

on the on the

harmony
validity

of

divine human

and

striving
Quae

within

human free will, the context of divine

manet

insists

of

order:

cum

ita sint,

intemerata

mortalibus arbitrii

libertas

nee

iniquae leges
. . .

solutis omni necessitate voluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. sunt

Nee frustra

in deo

positae spes precesque, quae cum rectae sunt

inefficaces

esse non possunt.

pre-

Aversamini igitur vitia,

ces

volite virtutes, ad rectas spes animum

sublevate, humiles

in

excelsa porrigite

(Bk.

V,

pr.

6,

44-47).

(Since this is the case, human free

rewards and punishment

will remains

inviolate

nor

for

wills

freed from

all necessity.
are

do laws unfairly propose Nor are hopes and

cannot

prayers,

placed

in God, in vain;

as

long

as

they

correct,

they

be ineffectual.

Therefore

avoid vices, cultivate virtues,

prayers on

lift up

your mind

towards proper

hopes,

ex

tend humble

high.)
one might well point out

By

way

of

summary,

that this central message of the

and the

work, the
reflected

essential

harmony

between the

microcosm

macrocosm, is

in the

relation

among the three parallel structures of the work's philo

structure

sophical content. rance: of

The first

is based
and of

Boethius'

on

three points of

igno is

"telos"

self, of the
and as such

of

things,

the means

by

which

the cosmos

"personal"

governed,
the

may be

termed the

The
and

second structure views

world under

three

aspects:

"fortuna", "fatum",
The

"providentia",

and can

"cosmic"

thus be properly labeled the

third structure, that of

"sensus",
may be For
the

"imaginatio", "ratio",
seen as the

and

"intellegentia", is clearly

epistemological and

harmony

of the

first two

structures,

the

personal and

the cosmic.

the

concerns of

the microcosm, man can only be seen as

when

in

harmony

with

laws

of

the macrocosm, the universe,

man and cosmos are

the possible epistemological rela

and understood.

tions between

defined, distinguished,

222

Interpretation

III. THE DIALOGUE FORM

But this

philosophical content

is

couched

in the form
of

of a

dialogue,
of never

and what

though

is more, in the form of a very deducible from certain

peculiar

kind

dialogue. First

all, the setting,

scattered

hints

within

the text, is

clearly in

dicated. Because Boethius

Et quid, inquam, tu in has
supero cardine

at one point says

to

Philosophy

exsilii nostri

solitudines, o omnium magistra virtutum,

pr.

delapsa

venisti?

(Bk. I,

3, 3)
virtues, descended from on high to enter

(And why, I said, have you, O teacher

of all

into

the

loneliness

of

my exile?);

because
question

at another point

he

gestures towards

his

surroundings with

the rhetorical

Haecine
in
(Bk. I,

est

bibliotheca,

quam certissimam

tibi sedem nostris

in laribus ipsa delegeras,

qua mecum saepe residens pr.

de humanarum divinarumque

rerum scientia

disserebas?

4, 3)

(Is this the

library

which you yourself chose as your most

fixed
on

abode

hold, in
human
and

which you often used

to sit with me and

discourse

the

in my house knowledge of things

and

divine?);
at the end of states

because

his

"defense"

before Philosophy,

as

if before

a court

(Bk.

I,

pr.

4), he

Nunc

quingentis

fere

passuum milibus procul muti atque

indefensi

ob studium

propensius

in

senatum morti proscriptionique miles

damnamur (Bk. I,

pr.

4, 36).

(Now

about

fifty

away,

unheard and without

defense, I
behalf

am condemned to

death

and proscription on account of

my too

great zeal on

of the

senate.);

infer that the setting is a prison cell, or some place where Boethius is being held under house arrest, at some distance from Ravenna, Theodoric's capital in
we

Italy. And

our ancient

testimonia corroborate these hints

when

within

the text: it seems

a

that Boethius

fell from Theodoric's favor

he defended

fellow senator,
was soon ac

Albinus,
cused of
ad.15

who was

being

prosecuted

for treason. Boethius himself

the same crime, tried and convicted in absentia, and executed in 524 Thus the reader is aware that Boethius is in prison, under sentence of alone,
and

death,

in exile; but

we are never

told

for how

long

or where

Boethius

has been imprisoned,

vagueness of

nor when

he

expected to

die,

the case of the most obvious model for

Boethius'

are, for instance, in text, Plato's Phaedo. This

as we and

setting,

with

its

associations of

solitude, exile, alienation,

with

im

pending his

doom, is clearly

meant to make

identification

the character Boe

thius all the more easy. It renders

real self and purpose.

him

an

everyman, lost

and out of touch with

15.

See Gruber,

op. cit., pp.

8-13.

How to Read the Consolation

of

Philosophy
Boethius"

223
raises the question: where

Now,

the very mention of the

"character

is Boethius in the text? Our

the author of the

sources and the manuscript tradition assure us that

Consolatio is indeed the historical Anicius Manlius Severinus the Roman senatorial aristocracy, who was adopted by the Symmachi and grew up giving every evidence of extraordinary literary and intellectual ability. He married the daughter of his adoptive father and had two sons by her. While pursuing a political career as a high official under

Boethius,

an orphaned member of

Theodoric, he
vres of

conceived the enormous project of

translating

the respective oeu

Plato

and

Aristotle, producing
a

commentaries on

the two systems of thought. In addition

them, and harmonizing to the Consolatio there remain extant a

music,
and a

few theological treatises, Aristotle's

textbook

on

translated introduction to

Organon,

which seems

to represent

as

far

as

he

progressed

in his life
the text.

before his early And because the text is such

long

project

death.16

Thus

"Boethius"

is the

author of

highly
on

wrought

object, combining

all manner of one can

discourse in the alternating something about the been extraordinarily

quaintance with
author

verse and prose of

Menippean Satire,

say

based

the fact of the text. He must therefore have

this time. Not only does

learned, especially for

Latin

he

exhibit a
an ac

command of all possible

prose styles and

meters, he also displays

uity but with knowledge of Greek in the West had Boethius

western

Greek philosophy, not only with the Neoplatonism of late antiq Plato and Aristotle as well, a phenomenon rare in an age when
all

stands as

Europe

enters

lonely last citadel definitively into what

answer

but disappeared. In fact, the author of the Greco-Roman tradition before

we

rightly

or

Dark Ages". Thus the first

work

to the question of

Boethius'

wrongly term "The presence in the

is that he is the author, heir

of ancient

by birth, breeding,
literature.'7

and education to the twin

tradition

philosophy and But Boethius the author is not the only Boethius present in the text. Boethius the narrator of his encounter with Dame Philosophy and Boethius the character
within

that narration constitute two

further

personae of

the

author.

This double in the first

aspect of

Boethius

within

the text, as

narrator and as

character, makes for certain

striking
person:

effects.

Thus the

work opens with an elegiac poem spoken

Carmina

qui quondam studio

florente
inire

peregi,

flebilis, heu,
(I,
who

maestos cogor

modos

(Bk.

I,

m.

i, 1-2).

in my

youthful zeal composed

verses, am

now

forced tearfully to begin

sad

lamentations.)
The
reader

naturally

assumes that

the

speaker

voice contrasts

the first

prose section one

its unhappy discovers that the

narrator-

present with a pleasant

voice

is the author, especially since the past; but at the beginning of

pronouncing the
poem was

be

ing

quoted

by

the

voice of
1-8.

the

whole work:

16. 17.

See Gruber,
See Gruber,

op. cit., pp. op. cit., pp.

24-40, for

an

indication

Boethius'

of

breadth

of

learning.

224

Interpretation
mecum

Haec dum
signarem
.

tacitus
pr.

ipse
i,

reputarem querimoniamque

lacrimabilem

stili officio

(Bk. I,

i). over with myself and

(While I silently thought these things

inscribed my tearful lament

by

means of a stylus

.)

These two passages, the first

couplet of

the metrum and the

first

clause of

the

prose section, taken together express the

within the text. First of all, the character Boethius

complexity of the Boethian presence has a past, a history which has

brought him to the

upon

point of

despair

expressed

in the opening
of

elegy.

Second,
which

hearing

the narrative voice at the

beginning

the prose section,

we realize

that the character Boethius also

will transform passage

has

future

ahead of

him,

development

the character into the

condition

narrator.

The distance to be traveled in the is

emphasized

from the former

narrator

to the latter

throughout the

first
to

book. Thus the

describes the

character's

elegy

as a

"querimoniam lac
and appeal

rimabilem"; likewise the narrator dismisses the character's

defense

God (Bk. I,
Haec

pr.

4 &

m.

5)

as mere

barking:
.

ubi continuato

dolore delatravi
all

(Bk. I,

pr.

5, 1)
. .

(When I had barked

that

with uninterrupted

self-pity

.)

Clearly

the

distraught

and preoccupied character narrator.

has

long

way to

go

before

at

taining the firm calm of the Finally, the emphasis within

a

the text

upon

writing

as opposed to speech serves

double purpose, illustrative Boethius the

narrator.

of

the relationship between Boethius the character

one

and

On the

hand the description

of

the interaction be

tween the elegiac Muses and the character expresses

despair: both the

course which

character and

the narrator

his passivity at this stage of depict the Muses as dictating a dis

Boethius merely

copies

down:
m.

Ecce

mihi

lacerae dictant

scribenda

Camenae (Bk. I,
what

3).

(Behold the mourning Muses dictate

am to

write.)

Quaeubi
tes

poeticas

Musas
1, 7)

vidit nostro assistentes

toro

fletibusque

meis verba dictan-

(Bk.

I,

pr.

(When
tears
. .

she saw
.)

the poetic Muses

standing

by

my bed

and

dictating

words to

my

This passivity, whereby the character Boethius merely transcribes the words of others is strongly contrasted with the more active response demanded of Boe
thius
cure partner pr.

by

Boethius'

Dame Philosophy. After routing the elegiac Muses, her first action is to blindness and dumbness, thus enabling him to become an active
which will constitute written

in the dialogue

his therapy (see Bk. I,

pr.

2, 1-7, &

3,

1-3).

This transition from

of

the

development

Boethius the dynamics

character of

poetry to spoken dialogue, parallel to into Boethius the narrator, is reminis

cent of

the theme

and

Plato's

Phaedrus,

which

may

well

have been

the source of this

motif

in the Consolatio.

How to Read the Consolation

But it is important to
spoken

of

Philosophy
dichotomy

225 between
written verse and

note

that in this

prose, the

former

element

The

fairly
,

frequent
,

mention of at

I,

pr. i

&

"bibliotheca"

is not simply negated in the face of the latter. at Bk. writing and its products (e.g. "stili Bk. I, pr. 4, 3) reminds the reader that what he has
Boethius'

officio"

before him is

a written

text. In particular the character

mention of a

li
li

brary
brary,

surely draws
an
"library"

attention

to the fact that the text before us

is

a veritable

anthology have

of all available

forms

of

discourse

and philosophic argu

ments, a

which

only

an

author,

who

had

spent much of

his life among

evolution of

books,

could

composed.

Thus in

addition

to underscoring the

Boethius the
sus spoken of

character

into Boethius the narrator, the

motif of written

dialogue
which

also

hints

at

the further evolution of

poetry ver Boethius into the author

the poem

is the Consolatio.
complex presence of

To

sum

up the

Boethius in the Consolatio,

one might

say that the author of the text assumes the persona of the narrator in order to por

tray

the story of the character. The

character

is

pictured at

the
a

beginning

of

the

text as

indulging

in poetry; the

author of

the text is obviously

of

poet, for the text

poetry are very different and much of the dynamics of the Consolatio has to do with the process whereby Boethius the character develops to the point where he is identical with Boethius itself
constitutes a poem.

But these two forms

the

narrator and

foreshadows the figure

the

of

Boethius the

author. can
.

In

other

words,

Boethius
prose or

must undergo

therapy

of

philosophy before he

handle

narrative

imagistic poetry in other than self-destructive ways Thus the dialogue in the Consolatio must be viewed as taking
Dame Philosophy,
as reported

place

between

the character Boethius and

by

the narrator Boe to make of the

thius,
of

and as

fashioned

by

the poet Boethius. What then are

we

other participant

in the dialogue, Dame Philosophy? She is, first

and

of

all, the voice the

mouth

being,

eternity,

truth, in

contrast with

the character

Boethius,
and

piece of

of appearance. not

suffering humanity, subject to the vicissitudes of time That Dame Philosophy is the spokeswoman for eternity is clear the fact that she guides the character Boethius towards an aware from only

the deceptions

ness of

being

in the

midst of

becoming

but

also

from the description

of

her ap

pearance

in Book I:
mihi supra verticem visa est mulier reverendi admodum

Astitisse

vultus,

oculis

ardentibus et ultra communem

hominum
aevi plena

valentiam

perspicacibus, colore vivido atque

inexhausti vigoris,
(Bk. I, (There
pr.

quamvis

ita

foret

ut nullo modo nostrae crederetur aetatis

1, 1).

dignified aspect, with my head a woman of a most with a glowing complexion eyes shining and piercing beyond the usual power of men, no way could it be and inexaustible strength, although she was of such an age that in
appeared

standing

above

credited of our

life span.)

That Dame
and old
where

"aeternitas"

both young ("colore vivido atque inexhausti vigoris") ("aevi plena") foreshadows her own disquisition on eternity in Book V, is defined as:

Philosophy is

226

Interpretation
vitae

interminabilis

tota

simul et perfecta possessio

(Bk.

V,

pr.

6,

4).

(the completely
that

simultaneous and perfect possession of

life

without

beginning or end.);
simultane

is,

a state where all time

is

contemporaneous.

Dame Philosophy's

ous youth and age of all time.

clearly indicates that

represents not

she embodies eternity's comprehension

But Dame

Philosophy

only eternity but

never

also a certain aspect of

the character Boethius. This assertion tradition of philosophic dialogue

great

is

explicitly
of which

made

in the text, but the

in antiquity,
when

the Consolatio is the

last

example,

makes

it

evident

that,

the character Boethius

is in

conversa

tion with

way talking to himself. At one Thaeatetus Socrates describes the process of thinking as follows:

Philosophy, he is in

some

point

in the

Aoyov 6v autr) itoog.

el&cag,

aurnv

f| tyvxi]
yap

6iE^EQxeTaL
um

^EQ1 wv av oxojttj.

(be,

ye

ur)

001 ajrocpaivoum. totjto

IvSaX^ETai

6iavooufievr]

oux aM.o ti

f\

biakeyBoftai, aurr)
(pa.oy.ovaa. otav

Eauxrjv EQCotcbaa xai eite

aJtoxQivofiEvn,, xai cpdoxouoa xai or)

eite xai

6e 6pioaaa,

(3pa6uxQov

6^tjteqov EJta'i^aoa,
wot'

to

EycoyE to cpfj xai \ir\ &iarar|, 66|av xavxr]v Ttf>E(Xv auTfjg. 6o^a^eiv XeyEiv xdkib xai ttjv 56|av Xoyov lor|UEvov, ou ^ievtoi jiqoc, ctXXov

arjxo

fj&r|

ou6e

epeovjj,

aKka

oiyf\ node,
the

aurov

ov

6e ti;

(189c- 190a).

(As

discussion
I'm
sure

which

soul maintains with

itself concerning
to
me

whatever when

it is

consid

ering.

must seem a

fool, but it

seems

that the soul,

it is thinking,

is

engaged

making rushing to it quickly, and is in agreement its judgment. So that I define the process
statement pronounced, not to another nor

claims and

in nothing other than talking with itself, asking and answering questions, denials. And when it comes to a decision, whether slowly or
and no of

longer differs

with

itself,

we call

this

thought as

discourse
and

and

judgment

as a
what

audibly, but silently

to oneself.

But

do

you

think?)
accomplished

What Boethius has

to

by introducing
is thought.

the persona of

Philosophy

is

dramatize this interior dialogue

Both the Platonic and,
as

which

far

as we

know,

the Aristotelian

dialogues

portrayed same

interpersonal dialogue
procedure.

and

by

and

large the

ancient tradition

followed the

But in late antiquity there appear certain intrapersonal dialogue, that is, with thought. The
as when

signs of a preoccupation with

phenomenon exists
of

in Plato,

Socrates

stands

on how long he will remain lost in thought (Symposium 220cd), but it is always portrayed from the outside, as a withdrawal of the person from interaction with others, never from

I74d-i75b)

or when

meditating his fellow soldiers take bets

outside the

house

Agathon (Symposium

standing,

the
as

inside

as a

kind

of

interaction

with one's self.

However, in later
where

works,

such

Marcus

Aurelius'

Meditations ("ra elg tavxdv"),

Plotinus'

the author is both

speaker and

audience, and

Enneads,

which often read

like

a man think

ing

aloud, one sees the roots of a systematic portrayal of

interior dialogue. A link

between these first tentative

full-blown

accomplishment

ventures into the dramatization of thought and its in Boethius is to be found in Augustine's Soliloquia,

How to Read the Consolation

where

of

Philosophy

227

the author recounts to

his dialogue
is in

with a personified

"Ratio",

who

is

explic

itly

stated

be both
is

divine figure

and an aspect of

Augustine

himself.18

Now if Dame
what aspect

Philosophy
Since the

some

she?

author as

way an aspect of Boethius himself, just Boethius is the remarkably learned man he
to

was, when

he

portrays

himself
and

talking
whole

himself, he does

so

by

recording

dialogue between himself

as

the

tradition of Greco-Roman philosophy,

voice of

he had learned

and appropriated also an

it. Thus Dame Philosophy,

or

eternity

and aspect of

Boethius, is
course of

image,

icon, representing
end point.

the centuries-long

tradition of thought of which

Boethius is the

losophy
our

in the

the dialogue avail herself of

Not only does Dame Phi every conceivable kind of

philosophic argument:

Stoic, Platonic, Aristotelian,

and

Augustinian; but
role as

also

first

encounter with

her in Book I clearly indicates her

image

of

the

philosophic

tradition:

Vestes

erant tenuissimis

filis

subtili artificio

indissolubili

materia

perfectae, quas,
speciem, veluti

uti

post eadem prodente cognovi, suis manibus

ipsa texuerat;
"0"

quarum

fumosas imagines solet,

'TI"

caligo quaedam neglectae vetustatis obduxerat. supremo vero

Harum in
atque

extremo margine

Graecum, in

legebatur intextum

in

utrasque

litteras in

scalarum modum gradus quidam

insigniti videbantur,

quibus ab

inferiore

ad superius elementum esset ascensus.

Eandem tamen

vestem violentorum

quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas quisque potuit abstulerant. quidem eius

Et dextra

libellos,

sceptrum vero sinistra gestabat

(Bk. I,

pr.

3-6).

(Her

clothes were

made,

by

subtle craft, of the

own

finest threads

of an

indissoluble
her
own

mate

rial; and as I later learned from her

lips,

she

had

woven

them

with

hands.

certain

duskiness

of

long

neglect

had darkened their appearance,

as

is

often the case

with

images
a

smudged with smoke. was

On the lower hem

Greek "IT',

on the upper

border

"0"

to

be

read

inwoven;

and certain embroidered steps were

to

be

seen

between the two letters in the

cent

manner of a

ladder, by

which

there

was a means of as

from the lower to

the higher

letter. But the hands

of certain violent

individuals had

rent this garment and

Finally,

she carried

they had taken away those portions that each was able to. books in her right hand, and in her left she held a scepter.)
explanation of

Furthermore, Dame
trays
a critical

Philosophy's
of

how her

garments were torn

be

understanding

the

ing quite
Cuius

in

Boethius'

accord with

own
and

history life-long task of reconciling the two

Aristotle:
cum

of ancient philosophy, an understand

foun-

tainheads of the tradition, Plato

(Socrates'

and/or

Plato's) hereditatem

deinceps Epicureum ire

vulgus ac

Stoicum

certerique pro sua quisque parte raptum

molirentur meque reclamantem

renitentemque velut

in

partem praedae

traherent,

vestem quam meis

texueram manibus

disciderunt
pr18.
of

abreptisque ab ea panniculis

totam me sibi cessisse credentes abiere (Bk.

I,

3.

!)
"Augustinus"

For the

relation of

the two

interlocutors,

and

"Ratio",
dies

see the

opening

passage

the

work:

"Volventi mihi multa ac varia mecum

quidve mali evitandum

diu,

ac per multos

sedulo quaerenti

memetip-

sum ac

bonum meum,

esset; ait mihi subito, sive ego

ipse,

sive alius quis

"

extrinsecus, sive

quia,

I,

1).

intrinsecus, nescio; nam hoc ipsum est quod magnopere scire molior See Silk, op. cit., for possible influence of this text on the Consolatio.

(Solilo-

228

Interpretation
and or and

(When thereafter the Epicurean

own me

Stoic crowd,

and others, endeavored, each and when

for his

part, to steal
as

his

(Socrates'

Plato's inheritance

they

were

dragging
gar

away

if I

were

booty

shouted and struggled against

them, they tore the

ment which yielded

I had

woven with

my

own

hands

to them the whole garment,

when

they away believing in fact they had only snatched tatters from
and went

that I had

it.)
Thus the figure
she of

Philosophy, like
eternity, an tradition. This

the

figure

of

Boethius, is

also multifaceted:

is the

voice of

aspect of

Boethius,

and a representation of

the

whole philosophic pects allows

refraction of

the interlocutors into several as the interior dialogue which

would appear as

for

a complex

dramatic

portrayal of

is

thought,

a phenomenon

which, from the outside,

distant

and

opaque as the

figure
as

of the abstracted

Socrates.
philosophy,
which

That Boethius,

heir to the

gregarious tradition of ancient context of

was almost always pursued

in the

the academy, the porch, or the garden, should

human intercourse, be it the agora, be so cut off as to take refuge in

of

the dramatization of thought, is

perhaps

the most poignant aspect

the Conso

latio. Comparison
condemned

with the

Phaedo

will make

this point quite clear. Although

with

by
his

the city, Socrates is portrayed as engaging in conversation

as

family
has to

and write

friends

he

prepares

to drink the

hemlock.19

In contrast, Boethius

own swan

song, for there is no one present to whom he can talk

memory.

and who might preserve

his

What is more, this

solitude

in

prison and

in

the

face

of

someone

death is merely who had digested

and

a concrete

image

Boethius'

of

essential solitude as

and could manipulate the twin

tradition of
all

ancient

philosophy

poetry

at a

time

when

Western Europe had

but forgotten the

tradition and

plunging into the simplifications of popularized Christianity. Now how does this peculiar kind of dialogue play itself out and how does it
was

inform the
ter

philosophic content of the work? silent until

Boethius falls
after

Philosophy

After the opening elegy the charac loosens his tongue by her touch; in Book

V,

maintaining both God's providence and hu free will, the character Boethius again falls all but completely silent, while Philosophy delivers her disquisition on eternity which constitutes the end of the But these two discourses and their subsequent silences are very different expressing the
paradox of
man
work.20

from

one another and

the process whereby the character Boethius progresses

from the former to the later is the

ophy.

history

of

his

progress

in the therapy

of philos

From
19.

beginning

to end Boethius the character remains the spokesman for

beings is the focus

perhaps a

What is more, Socrates is consistently portrayed as insisting that talk with his fellow human of his philosophical life (Phaedrus 23ode); he even goes so far as to speculate that

happy

after-life would consist of the

opportunity
Boethius the
silence

to spend

eternity in

conversation with the

likes

of

Homer

and

Hesiod

(Apology
4, 16;

40e-4ic).
answers character says

20.

Except for short, perfunctory

pr.

Book V (Bk. V,

4,

8;

pr.

pr.

6,

19).

His

is drawn

attention to
order to

strategy of herself supplying her ing (Bk. V, pr. 6, 25, 37, 39).

nothing after metrum 3 of by Dame Philosophy's

uncooperative

interlocutor's lines in

keep the discussion go

How to Read the Consolation

of

Philosophy

229

suffering humanity. He bemoans his fall from fortune in the opening elegy and presents his case before Philosophy and God, as if in a court of law, in prose 4
and metrum

of

the

first book. Thereafter, throughout the therapy

which

Philos

ophy applies, Boethius continues to insist on, to focus attention on, the plight of man in an apparently unjust universe. In response to Philosophy's prosopopoeia
of

"Fortuna", in

which she challenges

Boethius'

claim to the gifts of

fortune,

the

character

Boethius

replies:

Turn

ego:

Speciosa haec

quidem

ista sunt, inquam,

oblitaque rhetoricae ac musicae melle

dulcedinis turn tantum itaque

pr. cum

cum audiuntur oblectant. sed miseris malorum altior sensus est;

auribus

insonare desierint insitus

animum maeror praegravat

(Bk. II,

3,

2). arguments are

(And then I said, "Those

the

indeed

splendid and covered as

as

they
are

are with

honey

of rhetorical and poetic sweetness

they delight
an

long

as

they

being
and

heard; but in
when

the case of the wretched the sensation of misfortune

lies deeper,

thus,

these arguments cease to ring in their ears,

innate

sadness weighs

down their

mind.")

This

elicits

from

joyed, but he
Turn
ego:

responds with

Philosophy a list of the variety of good fortune Boethius has en the following reformulation of his sense of suffering:
commemoras, o virtutum omnium nutrix, nee

Vera, inquam,
nam

infitiari

pos

sum prosperitatis meae velocissimum cursum.

Sed hoc

est quod recolentem

vehemen-

tius coquit;

in

omni adversitate

fortunae infelicissimum

est genus

infortunii fuisse

felicem (Bk. II,

pr.

4,

1-2).
you

(And then I said, "What

swift course of
when

my I look back, for in every adversity tune is to have been happy.")

prosperity.

say is true, O nurse of all the virtues, nor can I deny the But it is just this very fact which troubles me even more
of

fortune the

most

unhappy kind

of misfor

This in turn

moves

Philosophy

to catalogue the benefits of fortune to

which

which

Boe

thius, despite his

misery, still enjoys;

he

replies:

Et haereant, inquam, precor; illis

enatabimus.

namque manentibus, utcumque se res

habeant,
4, 10).

Sed

quantum ornamentis nostris

"anchors"

decesserit

vides

(Bk.

II,

pr.

tinue to

(And I said, "I pray that they (the hold, for as long as they remain, But
you see

of

father-in-law,

wife, and children) con

whatever

the situation

is, I

shall

stay

afloat.

how

much

has disappeared

of

my honors.")

Although he has

made some progress:

Et ilia: Promovimus, inquit,

pr.

aliquantum si

te

nondum

totius tuae sortis piget (Bk.

II,

4,

ii)she

(And

said, "We

have

made a

little

progress,

if

you are no

longer completely

dissatisfied

with your

lot.")
insists that

Boethius the
ously.

character still

Philosophy

take his immediate pain seri

230

Interpretation
after

Likewise, later in Book II,

worldly glory, the
sonal character

Philosophy
objects

has

made clear

the vanity of

Boethius

that he sought office not

for

per

glory but in
ego:

order

to

exercise virtue:

Turn

Scis, inquam, ipsa

7, I).
yourself

minimum nobis ambitionem mortalium rerum

fuisse

dominatam; (Bk. II, pr.

little hold my

sed materiam gerendis rebus optavimus, quo ne virtus tacita consenesceret

(Then I said, "You

know that

ambition

for the things

I
sought

of

this

world

had very whereby

over me; rather

in the

governance of affairs

the

occasion

virtue might not grow

old, passed over

in silence.)
of noble

To

which

Philosophy

replies
with

that this desire is the last weakness

minds,

thus acknowledging,

reservation, the validity of certain human aspirations.

bonum"

After
of

Philosophy
and stresses

fortune

has demonstrated the relationship between the false goods in Books II and III, the character the true "summum his
private

Boethius
tinues to

suffering less
attention on

and

less; but

all

the same he still con

the

focus Philosophy's

the

apparent contradictions of

hu

Thus at the opening of Book IV, after admitting the validity of Philosophy's arguments, he claims that the problem of theodicy remains un
man condition.

solved:

Sed

ea

ipsa

est vel maxima nostri causa maeroris quod, cum rerum

bonus

rector

existat,

vel esse omnino mala possint vel

impunita

praetereant; quod solum quanta

aliud maius adiungitur; nam

dignum

sit ammiratione profecto consideras.

At huic

imperante florenteque
torum
3-4)-

nequitia virtus non solum praemiis

caret, verum etiam

scelera-

pedibus subiecta calcatur et

in locum facinorum

supplicia

luit (Bk. IV,

pr.

i,

(But that is precisely the greatest cause of my grief, that, although there exists a good lord over things, evils are able to exist at all or to go unpunished, which fact alone you
yourself judge to even greater,

be worthy

of great wonder.

But in

addition to this there

is something

for,

while evil rules and

flourishes,

not

only does

virtue go without re

wards,

but it is

even cast at

the

feet

of

the wicked and trod upon and

it

suffers the pun

ishments due

to crimes.)
on

This insistence

human condition seriously elicits from derived from the Gorgias, by which good men are proven to be naturally happy, evil men naturally unhappy. And Boethius the character, while granting Philosophy's points, nonetheless maintains a hu man, down to earth, attitude towards the issue:

taking

a paradox of the

Philosophy

the Platonic arguments,

Turn

ego:

Fateor, inquam,

nee

injuria dici

video vitiosos, tametsi

humani

corporis

speciem servent,

in beluas tamen

animorum qualitate mutari; sed quorum atrox

scelerataque mens 4,D.

bonorum

pernicie

saevit, id ipsum eis licere noluissem (Bk I V

pr

(Then I said, "I

though

admit and

I do

not consider that

it is

said

wrongly that the

vicious, al

they keep

the appearance of their

human body,

are nonetheless

transformed

How to Read the Consolation

into beasts
with respect to the

of

Philosophy
intention

23 1

quality

of

their minds. But I would prefer that it not be

rage

allowed them that their

fierce

and criminal

for the destruction

of the

good.")

Accedo, inquam,
deserti

sed uti

hoc infortunio
(Bk. IV,
pr.

cito careant patrandi sceleris possibilitate

vehementer exopto

4, 6).
of the

("I agree", I said, "but I strongly wish that, deprived plishing evil, they soon lack this misfortune.") Turn

possibility

of accom

ego: Cum tuas, inquam, rationes considero, nihil dici verius puto; at si ad hominum iudicia revertar, quis ille est cui non credenda modo sed saltern audienda videantur?

(Bk. I V,

pr.

4, 26)
reasoning, I think that nothing is
more

(Then I said, "When I

consider your

truly

said;

but if I

revert to the

judgment

of mankind, who

is there to

whom

these arguments

would seem not

only worthy

of

belief but

even of

hearing?")

Soon thereafter Boethius the

shines on good and

character asks
what

the decisive question, if the sun

a cosmos ruled

bad alike,

is the difference between

by

God

and a chaotic universe:

Minus
meum

etenim mirarer si misceri omnia

fortuitis

casibus crederem.

Nunc

stuporem

deus

rector exaggerat.

Qui

cum saepe

bonis iucunda,

malis aspera contraque

quid est quod a

bonis dura tribuat,

malis optata

concedat, nisi causa

deprehenditur,

fortuitis
("I

casibus

differre

videatur?

(Bk. IV,

pr.

5, 5-6)

would

domly. But

be less bewildered, if I believed that everything was mixed together ran now the idea of a controlling god increases my bewilderment. Since he

of

ten apportions pleasant things

for the

good and

bitter for the bad, but

also

bestows is
appre

hardship
hended,
This
vine of

on the good and their

what

heart's desire to the bad,

situation

unless some cause

distinguishes this

from

pure

chance?")

question

leads

Philosophy
and

into

discussion

of

providence,

fate, fortune, di
pages

predestination,

human free

will which will

occupy the remaining

the text and

which represents

the height of human understanding of the uni

verse.

Finally, in Book V, first in

Boethius
cile restates the

prose

(3)
the

and then

in

verse

(3),

the character
recon

human

aspect of

work's central

problem, how to

divine

providence and

human free

will:

Igitur

nee sperandi aliquid nee

deprecandi

ulla ratio

est; quid

enim vel speret quisque

vel etiam

deprecetur

quando optanda omnia series

indeflexa

conectit?

(Bk. V,

pr.

3,

33)

("Therefore there is
anyone

no reason

to hope

for

or

to seek to

avoid

anything, for what

might

hope for

or seek to avoid, when an unchangeable order

binds

all objects of

hope together?")

In the

verse

section

he

goes a

step further

and views the problem as one of

epistemology:

232
An

Interpretation
discordia
veris

nulla est

semperque sibi certa

cohaerent,

sed mens caecis obruta membris

nequit oppressi

luminis igne
(Bk.

rerum tenues noscere nexus?

V,

m.

3,

6-10)
and are

(Or is there
other,

no contradiction

between truths
the

they firmly
of

connected one with

the

while

the mind,

buried in

imperceptive limbs

the

body, is

unable to per

ceive the subtle

interweaving
3

of things

by

the

flame

of

its buried vision?)

Taken together,

prose

and verse

of

Book V

parallel prose

Book I. In both

passages

the

character

Boethius first

explains

and verse 5 of his dilemma in

prose and then again same meter

in

(Anapestic

fact, the two verse sections are composed in the Dimeter Acatalectic), a particularly striking coincidence,
verse.

In

for

verse

since

3 in Book V is the first time Boethius the character has spoken in verse verse section 5 in Book I. The purpose of this parallelism is to demonstrate

that from

beginning
in

to end the
contrast

character

Boethius

continues

to

focus

on

the hu

man point of view

to Philosophy's

tendency

to

view

the issues at hand

from the

viewpoint of eternity. change and

Boethius does Book I

remaining the spokesman for humanity develop. Whereas his formulation of the problem in
But
while
which

was personal and

naive, a performance

the narrator

Boethius

char

acterized as

"barking",
less

this

formulation in Book V is
than

intellectually

sophisticated

and motivated

by self-pity
in the

by

an

honest bewilderment

at man's episte

mological position

universe.

What is more, this final

ends.21

articulation of the
on

problem elicits

the best

Philosophy

has to offer, her disquisition

eternity

and

its relationship to temporality, with which the work Let us now consider more closely by precisely what
thius

stages the character

Boe
so

develops from

the naive self-centeredness of

Book I to the

intellectually

phisticated and

phy

appears

emotionally balanced maturity of Book V When Dame Philoso and scatters the elegiac Muses, Boethius the character falls into a
Upon receiving the
such

state of speechlessness.

healing
ignoble

touch of

Philosophy
To
which

he im
Philos

mediately

recognizes

her

and expresses surprize

that

such an august personage

should condescend to

inhabit

lowly

and

environs.

ophy responds, by listing many examples of martyrs to philosophy, that her dev otees have always been subject to unjust suspicion and punishment. The first re
mark

by

the character

must resolve

Boethius neatly expresses his "problem", that which he before perceiving the cosmos correctly, namely, his inability to

reconcile the
and

suffering diagnosis: the things,

21. metrum

reality of being, truth, and goodness with the reality of human ignorance. As Dame Philosophy will sum it up after performing her
character

Boethius

suffers

from ignorance

of

self,

of the end of

and of

the means
the poems

by

which

the cosmos is governed.

Likewise,
4
of

following

these respective metra, namely metrum 6 of Book I and

Book V, each constitute both composed in glycenics.

a response on

Philosophy's

part to

Boethius'

dilemma

and are

How to Read the Consolation

of

Philosophy

233
on

At this preliminary stage of his therapy Philosophy insists dies before proceeding to harsher medicines:
Sed
quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum

using

mild reme

tumultus incubuit diversumque te dolor ira

contingunt.

maeror

distrahunt,

uti nunc mentis

es, nondum te validiora remedia

Itaque

lenioribus

paulisper

utemur, ut quae in tumorem perturbationibus influentibus

induruerunt

ad acrioris vim medicaminis recipiendam tactu

blandiore

mollescant

(Bk.

I,

pr.

5, 1

1-

12).

(But

since a great crowd of passions

has

settled upon you and pain,

anger,

and grief

pull you

in different

directions, in

your present state of mind stronger remedies are not us make use of milder ones

yet appropriate

for

you.

Therefore let

for

a while, so that of

those

faculties,

which

have hardened into

a tumor under the soften so as to

influence become

disturbing
to the

passions, might,

by

means of a gentle

touch,

receptive

power of stronger

medicine.)

The

effect of

these mild remedies of towards

general

poetry

and rhetoric

is to

encourage

Boethius
suf

to take his

first step

health

fering
11).

Fortune has in

by admitting that despite his immediate been kind to him. As Philosophy puts it:
II,
pr.

Promovimus, inquit,

aliquantum si te nondum totius tuae sortis piget (Bk.

4,

("We have

progress,"

made some

she

said, "if

you are no

longer completely dissat

isfied

with your

lot.")
judges that slightly
patient:

Shortly
plied

thereafter she

stronger remedies

may

now

be ap

to her recuperating
quoniam rationum

Sed

iam in te
pr.

mearum

fomenta descendunt,

paulo validioribus

utendum puto

(Bk.

II,

5, 1).

(But

since the good effects of

my reasoning

are

penetrating into you, I think that I may

now use stronger

ones.)
reviewed all

And

when

Philosophy has

the gifts of fortune and demonstrated that

at the

opening of Book III, in which she will clarify the difference between the false goods of for tune and the true good, Boethius states:

they

can neither

really benefit

nor

harm Boethius in his essence,

Itaque

remedia quae paulo acriora esse

dicebas

non modo non pr.

perhorresco, sed

audiendi avidus vehementer efflagito

(Bk. Ill,

1, 2).
not

(Therefore those
of

remedies which you said were a

little harsher,

only

am

not afraid

them, in fact I

am eager

to hear them and earnestly

expresses

beg

for them.)
to undergo the

Thus for the first time he explicitly

stages of

his

readiness

harsher

his therapy. When Philosophy has definitively demonstrated the inadequacies of all for in tune's gifts and is about to delineate the form of the true good, the following
terchange takes
place

between the two interlocutors:

234

Interpretation
mendacis

Hactenus

formam felicitatis

ostendisse suffecerit; quam si perspicaciter

intueris,
nee

ordo est

deinceps

quae sit vera monstrare.

Atqui video, inquam,

nee opibus

sufficientiam nee regnis potentiam nee reverentiam

dignitatibus

nee celebritatem gloria

laetitiam

voluptatibus posse contingere.

An

etiam causas cur

id ita

sit deprehen-

disti? Tenui
malim

quidem veluti rimula mihi videor

intueri,

sed ex te apertius cognoscere

(Bk. Ill,

pr.

9,

1-3).
you

("Let the preceding suffice to show the form of false happiness; if seen into it, the next step is to demonstrate what true happiness
see,"

have clearly

is."

"And indeed I do

I said, "that sufficiency

nor

cannot appertain to wealth, nor power to

nor

kingship,

nor

honor to office,
causes

glory to

fame,

pleasure."

joy to

"But have
as

you also grasped a slender

the

"I think that I catch a glimpse why this is the but I prefer learn would to more clearly from you.") crack,

case?"

if through

Here for the first

cern

time the character

still needs

Boethius

expresses a
of

for himself, but he

the tutelage

dawning ability to dis Philosophy to attain full in

the true good

sight.

Later in Book III,

and proclaimed

when

Philosophy

has

explained the nature of

that it is to be sought within and not without, Boethius again

states that

he

can anticipate

Philosophy's line
vehementer

of reasoning:

Turn

ego:

Platoni, inquam,

assentior; nam

me

horum iam

secundo

commemoras, primum quod

mole pressus amisi.

memoriam corporea

contagione, dehinc cum maeroris

Turn ilia: Si priora, inquit, dudum

concessa respicias, ne

illud

quidem

longius

aberit quin recorderis quod te ait

nescire confessus es.

Quid? inquam. inscitiam

meam

Quibus,

ilia,

gubernaculis mundus regatur. sed quid afferas, pr.

Memini, inquam,

me

fuisse confessum, desidero (Bk. Ill,

(Then I said, "I
me of

licet iam prospiciam,

planius tamen ex te audire

12, 1-3).
agreement with

am

in strong

Plato,

since

for

a second time you remind

those
a

then
she

for

things, the memory of which I first lost through contact with the body, and second time, because I was overwhelmed with the weight of Then
you consider the points you
you remember what you

grief."

said, "If

long
said.

before
"The

recently

have already conceded, it should confessed you did not is

controlled."

not

know."

"What,"

be very I

means,"

she said, confessed

"by

which the universe

"I

remember,"

said, "that I
nonetheless

my ignorance; but, although I already foresee the answer, I desire to hear it more clearly from your lips.")

Here, too,
he
can

the character Boethius expresses

things. Even more

importantly, he has

reached a
as

his ability to level of

the education

see

into the

nature of

self-awareness where

the truth, that

accurately describe his condition is, the Consolatio portrays

that of one who has twice forgotten

of a neophyte

not

but the

re-education of a

lapsed

philosopher.

Boethius'

increasing

insight

and self-con
reasons

fidence

are expressed

in the

following passage,

where

for the first time he

for himself

without the aid of

Dame Philosophy:
dubitandum
putabas.

Mundum, inquit, hunc deo

quidem

regi paulo ante minime

Ne

nunc

arbitror,

inquam,

nee umquam

rationibus accedam

breviter

exponam

dubitandum putabo, (Bk. Ill, pr. 12, 4).

quibusque

in hoc

How to Read the Consolation

("Recently,"

of

Philosophy
now,"

235

she

said, "you

were of

the opinion that in no way could it be doubted that

so said you the

this world

is

ruled

by

God."

"Nor do I think

I, "nor shall I ever think that

it

can

be doubted,

and

shall

briefly lay

before

reasoning

by

which

came to

this opinion.)
makes the bold assertion that evil does not, prop Boethius the character is by now an active enough interlocu erly speaking, exist, tor to question her reasoning and to suggest that her argument might be circular: when

Finally,

Philosophy

Ludisne, inquam,
qua egrediaris

me

inextricabilem labyrinthum
nunc vero quo

rationibus

texens,

quae nunc quidem

introeas,

introieris egrediare,
(Bk. Ill, weaving
pr.

an mirabilem quendam

divinae
("Are

simplicitatis orbem complicas?

me,"

12, 30)

you

playing

with

I said,

"by

an

inextricable labyrinth

with your

arguments, so that

now you enter where you

exited, and

now you exit where you en

tered,

or are you

winding

some marvelous circle of

divine

simplicity?")

Thus

he is

by the end of Book 1 1 1 the character Boethius has reached the point where beginning to see things for himself and to take a more active role in the dia
with

logue

Philosophy.
pointed

As I have already
states

out, the

character

Boethius in Books IV
more and more more

and

re

the central

question

of

the Consolatio in

sophisticated

terms and thus elicits

sponses

from

Philosophy

(see Bk. IV;

pr.

1, 2-5, & Bk. V,

progressively pr.3-m.3). He
longer

sophisticated re

remains a spokesman

for the human

point of

view, but he is no

plagued with

blindness

and

dumbness; he
taking
place

can now manipulate and

and

determine the direction

at

of the

discourse

between him

Philosophy. Thus
to

the opening of Book V

he is
ir

confident enought of

his

abilities

insist that is fraught

she
with

discuss the

question of chance

despite her
relevant

claim that the question

difficulty

and

is

somewhat

to the progress of his therapy:

orationisque cursum ad alia quaedam

Dixerat Turn

tractanda atque expedienda vertebat. tuaque prorsus auctoritate

ego:

Recta quidem, inquam, dudum de Quaero

exhortatio

dignissima,
esse

sed quod tu
experior.

providentia quaestionem pluribus aliis

implicitam

dixisti

re

enim an esse aliquid omnino et quidnam esse casum arbitrere.

promissionis absoluere viamque

Turn

ilia: Festino, inquit, debitum

reveharis aperire. paulisper aversa

tibi qua patriam tramite

Haec

autem etsi perutilia cognitu tamen a propositi nostri

sunt,

verendumque est ne

deviis fatigatus
vereare;

ad emetiendum rectum

iter
ea

sufficere non possis. quibus maxime

Ne id, inquam,
agnoscere.

prorsus

nam quietis mihi

loco fuerit

delector

Simul,

cum omne

disputationis tuae latus

(Bk. V,
speech

indubitata fide constiterit, (She had

nihil

de

sequentibus ambigatur

pr.

1, i-7).

spoken and was about other matters.

to turn the direction of

her

towards

treating

and of

explaining

Then I said, "Your before

is."

exhortation

is

proper and most

worthy
tied

your authority, with

but

what you said

about

the question of providence

wonder whether you

being

up

many

others,

now experience

in fact. For I
Then

think chance

exists at all and what sort of of

thing it
up

she said,

"I

am

in

hurry

to

my

promise and

to

open

the way

by

which you might return

to your

pay the debt fatherland.

236

Interpretation
although useful

These matters, however,

to

know,

are nonetheless somewhat removed

from the
you not would

path of our

undertaking

and

it is to be feared, lest, fatigued

journey."

by
I

side-tracks,

be up to completing the right be like a rest to become acquainted

since

"Have

no

fears

all,"

at
which

I said, "for it
most

with

those things in

delight.

Likewise,

conviction,

every let there be

side of your argument no

has been

constructed with the strongest

doubt

about what

follows.)
the function of

Thus

we see

that the

character

Boethius, by assuming

determin

ing the course of the dialogue, instead of merely reacting to the initiatives of Dame Philosophy, is approaching the status of Boethius the narrator. What is more, by his restatement of the problem in epistemological terms in verse 3 of
Book V, the only time he speaks in Boethius also approaches the status
all

verse after verse of

of

Book I, the

character

the author Boethius

who can manipulate

kinds

of

discourse, both
is the text
of

prose and

verse, in the construction of the elaborate

poem which

the Consolatio. So

by

the end of the work the character

Boethius,

while

undergone a

remaining the voice of the human condition, has nonetheless transformation from a passive and prostrate victim of fortune to an

active and vigorous partner

in the

quest

for the

solution to the central

human di

lemma: how to harmonize The

Boethius'

being

and

becoming.
sections of

character

silence

in the last

Book V

and

the

fact

that
of

the author Boethius

has

not

framed his

vision of

Philosophy

with a

description

her departure have troubled many readers work is But if my analysis

unfinished.22

and

have led

some to suspect that the

of

of the

development

Boethius the

character

is correct, the ending is

conclusion

sible

satisfying

longer problematic; it is in fact the only pos to the work. Boethius the author has portrayed the
no

evolution of

the character Boethius into the narrator Boethius and has

of

hinted

at

the

further development

Boethius the
at

narrator

into Boethius the

author of

the

text. Thus the voice of trasted

with

Philosophy
voice of

the end of the work, which had been con

character
and recounted

the

human

Boethius the

by

Boethius the narrator, is now seen to be one of the voices of Boethius the author. And what the voice says represents the successful completion of the work's cen
tral project, to

harmonize just

being
as

and

becoming, for human hopes

determinism
of

and prayers are

validated within a universe under

the strict

God.
refracted

We have

seen that

Boethius'

presence

in the text is

into three
appear

facets: author, narrator,

under three guises: age of

and

character, so, too, does Dame

Philosophy

the voice of

being,

an aspect of

the whole tradition

undergoes a

of ancient philosophy.

Boethius himself, and an im Likewise, just as the character

his dialogue
with

Boethius
"Sybil"

transformation in the

course of

Philos
to
are

ophy, so, too, does

she undergo an analogous

as

transformation from

"Icon"

Furthermore,

I
to

shall

demonstrate, Philosophy's
specific capabilities at

transformations

calculated to correspond

Boethius'

any

given stage of

his therapy.
22.

For

discussion

of the question about

the work's ending

see

Gruber,

op. cit., pp. 414-15.

How to Read the Consolation

The
ter
most efficient

of

Philosophy

237
of

way

of

making

clear

the evolution

Philosophy's

charac

is

by

reference to the epistemological structure of the

work, whereby the text

to

follows the

progress of

Boethius from

"sensus"

to

"imaginatio",
different

"ratio",

and

finally

towards

"intellegentia"

My

claim

is that Dame

Philosophy

adapts

herself
to

to each stage of this progress and

thereby

presents a
of

appearance

Boethius the

character at each of

the four

levels

knowledge.
portrayed as mired a

Thus in Book I,
realm of

where the character

Boethius is

in the

the senses,
order

reacting
to make

to the blows of

fortune in

merely
uses

personal way,

Philosophy, in
he is
an
prepared

herself

apparent to

Boethius,

the only means

of

to understand, namely, the senses. Her first appearance is that

of whose person and raiment shadow course of

icon,

the

imagery

forth her

nature as

it

will unfold

itself in the

the dialogue.
with a

the elegiac Muses to rout and is

avails

faced

Furthermore, when she has put dumb and blind Boethius, she again
7).

herself of the senses, in this

also

case

the sense of touch, in order to restore his

pr.

powers of speech and sight

(see Bk. I,

2,

In

addition

to sight and touch, towards reaching

Philosophy

has

recourse

to the sense

of

hearing

as a means

Boethius in his

present condition:
paulisper utemur, ut quae

Itaque lenioribus

in tumorem

perturbationibus

influentibus
(Bk.

induruerunt

ad acrioris vim medicaminis recipiendam tactu

blandiore

mollescant

I,

pr.

5, 12).
us make use of milder remedies

(Therefore let
which

for

while, so that those

of

faculties,

have hardened into

a tumor under the

soften so as

influence

disturbing

passions, might,

by

means of a gentle

touch,

to

become

receptive

to the power of stronger

medicine.)

Here "tactu
stage of

blandiore"

Boethius'

obviously therapy is one

where

refers

to the

gentle

touch of verse,

which at

this

of the principal means of care. seeks to

In the

second

book,
of

Philosophy
she

lead Boethius from

an exclu

sive preoccupation with

his

personal situation and

to instill

in him his

an understand

ing

of

the nature

fortune in general,
the human

begins to

exercise

faculty of imagi
from its
puts off

nation,

which allows

being

to

perceive

the general form apart

28).

specific embodiment

in

matter

(see Bk.

V,

pr.

4,

Thus

Philosophy

her

persona of

icon

and puts on

that of Muse. This transformation

is strikingly
at most power

signaled

in the

second prose section of

Book II,

where

Philosophy, in her

tempt to

reconcile

Boethius to his lot,

employs one of

imagination's

ful instruments, the theater,

course of

her

speech

herself.23 And in the playing the role of Fortuna alludes to various products of the Fortuna as Philosophy

by

imagination

such as

history, tragedy,

and epic
reason

(see Bk. II,

Boethius'

pr.

2, 11

-13).

The transition from imagination to

23.

in

therapy
prosopopopoeia of

and the

analo-

Socrates'

Perhaps this

procedure was suggested

by
Fortune's

the laws in the Crito

of

(50a ff.). In both

case of the

case the

powers personified

defend their

prerogatives

in

kind

"apologia". In the

Consolatio Philosophy's

assumption of

role

hints

at what

is

made explicit

in the
and of

last

prose section

(#8)

of

Book II, namely, that Fortune,

when

properly understood, is

not

in

itself

an evil

but

a great

teacher.

238

Interpretation

gous transformation of

Philosophy from Muse

"Magistra"

to

is clearly
also

marked at

the opening of Book III (see pr. i, 1-3). Boethius describes himself as en
chanted

by

the charms of Philosophy's poetic

remedies"

discourse, but
response

ready for the

"somewhat harsher
terizes the
apy:

of pure reason.

In her

Philosophy charac

nature of

poetry

and

the function it has served in a philosophic ther

eumque tuae mentis

pr.

habitum

vel exspectavi vel, quod est verius,

ipsa

perfeci

(Bk. Ill, (And I

about.)

1, 3).
condition of your mind

was

expecting this

or,

what

is truer, I

myself

brought it

That

is,

she emphasizes

the affective

power of

poetry to

change moods and

dis

positions which was needed of pure philosophy.

to render Boethius receptive to the stronger medicine

Thus throughout Books III, IV, phy will play the role of a delivers lectures in which
she sets pr.

and the

"magistra"

opening sections instructing her

7ff.);

of

Book V Philoso

"alumnus"

Sometimes

she

forth doctrines in

a straightforward

format
so

(e.g., Bk. Ill,

as

pr.

2, & Bk. IV.

6,

sometimes she questions

her pupil

3, 58"., & Bk. IV. pr. 7). At times, as we have already pointed out, Boethius himself comments on the argumentation, sets forth arguments of his own, and initiates new avenues
pr. of

to involve him in the process of reasoning

(e.g., Bk. Ill,

discussion. The

purpose and effect of

this process are concisely represented at

the opening of Book

of the soul:

IV,

where

Philosophy
in

borrows Plato's image

of the wings

Pennas depulsa

etiam tuae menti quibus se sospes

altum

tollere possit adfigam,

ut perturbatione

in

patriam meo

ductu,

mea

semita, meis etiam vehiculis revertaris (Bk.

IV,

pr.

1,9).
shall attach wings

(And I

to your mind

by

means of which

it

will

be

able to

lift itself on
your

high,

so

that,

with all

disturbance

removed, you might

and

safely

turn

back towards

homeland

under

my guidance, along my path,

by

my conveyance.)

The image

of wings and

the insistent travel motif characterizes reason as a spe

cifically human
realm of

mode of with

knowledge. Since the human

of

being

is born into the

becoming,
But the

its dimensions from

time and space, the appropriately hu to another, must be forever in

man mode of motion.

knowing

must move

one point

ultimate goal of

this movement is the

a

"homeland",

the realm of
not

being
work

and eternal rest.

Thus "ratio", though it is

way towards the truth, is

the truth

itself. This
second

problem and

its

solution will constitute the conclusion of the

in the

half
of

of

Book V.
character changes the course of the
which

At the

dialogue

beginning by focusing

Book V Boethius the

on

the question of chance,

focus in turn leads to the

human free
main-

felt

contradiction

between the two concepts, divine

providence and

will.

By

redirecting the conversation and

by articulating

the paradox of

How to Read the Consolation taining seemingly contradictory

command of

of

Philosophy
up the
of

239

propositions

Boethius both displays his full

ultimate

the

faculty, bound
"wings"

faculty as it is by
have
of

of reason and shows

limitations

of

that

the human

dimensions

time and space. Thus the

"ratio"

of

conveyed

Boethius

to the

frontier

they
this

are

incapable

bearing
off

him into the

the mask of
wisdom.

realm of eternal

his "patria", but being itself. To effect

of

final step into the

realm of

the eternal Dame

Philosophy

undergoes

her final

metamorphosis: she

takes

"magistra"

and assumes the persona of

Sybil,

the mouthpiece of
change of

divine

This

character

Philosophy's role, Boethius, is represented by

of

and thus

by implication
in the

of the role of

the

a sudden change verse section

nature of the
a

dia very

logue. In the first half

active part

Book V (through
once

3) Boethius takes

in the

discussion; but
ways of

Philosophy dazzling
and

begins to
says

speak as a prophet
more

ess, propounding the

God to man, Boethius

little

than a per

functory
of

"yes"

or on

"no". Throughout her

the

disquisition
and

on the

four

modes

knowledge,
of

difference between

"aeternitas"

analogous

distinction between

"providentia"

"perpetuitas", in the "praevidentia", and on the two

revealing divine truth to
subsumes and a

forms

necessity,

Philosophy
as she

speaks as an oracle

hu

man audience.

But

herself

says

concerning the four modes of

as

knowledge,
of

the higher does not

invalidate the lower, it merely

transcends it

(see Bk. V,

pr. as

4,

24-39).

Philosophy

Icon, Muse,
able

Likewise, Philosophy and Magistra; rather

her

Sybil is is the have

not

the negation

she

culmination of progressed

her

former roles,
sition where

roles without which

pupil would never

to a po

he is

to receive her divine teachings.

eratic

Thus, although at first sight Dame Philosophy might seem an unchanging, hi figure, an appropriate appearance for the mouthpiece of eternity, nonethe
most

less her

important

role

in the dialogue is to

constitute

the second voice

mediator

which makes

the interior dialogue of thought possible and to serve as

between the
whereby

character

Boethius

and

the realm of being. This Hermes-like role,

capabilities of

Philosophy
nor

adapts

herself to the

Boethius

and

interprets

being

to him in terms he is prepared to understand, that

is,

a power neither

merely human
realms.

fully

divine

which

acts

as

intermediary

between the two

The

epithets with which underscore

Boethius the

character

from time to time

addresses

his

interlocutor
that

Philosophy's function
refers to

as

her for the first time Boethius

her

as

"nutricem

intermediary. Upon recognizing (Bk. I, pr. 3, 2),

meam"

is,

as

his

nurse.

his transition from

"Fortuna"

Philosophy is that power which oversees his growth, intellectual infancy to adulthood. After Philosophy's prosopo
Thus
in Book II, Boethius
adresses

poeia of
trix"

her
but

as

"virtutum

omnium

nu-

(Bk. II,

pr.

4, 1), that

is,

as nurse of all the virtues. own private nurse

Thus

Philosophy

is

now

Boethius'

characterized not as

as a

the

excellencies of the

human
of

soul.

This

address represents a

force nourishing all development in

Boethius'

understanding

his interlocutor: he

his

own personal point of view.

no longer sees her merely from What is more, he aptly describes Philosophy, not

240

Interpretation

as excellence

itself, but

as

the nourisher of excellencies,

enamored pursuit of character claims

much as

in Plato,

phi

losophy
to

is

not wisdom
when

but the
Dame

Book III,

Boethius the

At the opening of that he is cured of his addiction

wisdom.24

fortune, he

addresses
pr.

Philosophy
is,
is
a

as

"summum lassorum

solamen

ani-

morum"

(Bk. Ill,

i, 2), that

as the greatest comfort of

Philosophy
or

as a curative means

figure

whose

monic"

"hermeneutic",
addresses

that

is,

to be the guide

weary souls. Thus function is essentially "de of the soul from one state to an
the first prose section of Book
luminis"

other, in

other

words, a psychopomp.

Finally, in
"veri

IV, Boethius
that

Philosophy

as

praevia

(Bk. IV,

pr.

1, 2),

is,

as guide most

to the true light. Here Philosophy's

expressed: she

function

as guide or not

interme
the

diary
itself.

is

clearly

is the way towards the light

was also signaled at

light

This

"hermeneutic"

aspect of

Philosophy

the very begin

were

ning of the text, where the figures embroidered on her garments The pi (the practical) and the theta (the theoretic) connected by

described.

a series of steps

constituting a means of ascent from the former to the latter are clear images of Philosophy's role in the text. As mouthpiece of eternity and aspect of Boe
thius himself she embraces "ra
Oewgexixd"
ngaxxixd"

of the

human

condition

and

"rd

of

affording access itself which conveys Boethius from the depths vinity

divine wisdom; she further provides the means, the ladder, to the higher realm from the lower. This ladder is the dialogue
of

humanity

to the heights

of

di

by

means of

discourses drawn from the

to correspond to

whole

tradition of

Greco-Roman
at

Boethius'

antiquity

all calculated

stage of

receptivity
of

any

given rung.

To summarize, therefore, the

significance of the

dialogue form

the Conso

latio, dialogue,

one could

say that,

although

firmly

within

tradition of ancient philosophic to a degree

which no previous

Boethius'

use of

the genre is
attained.

internalized
This

practitioner of the genre

had

interiority

reflects the alienation of

Boethius the author,

master of

the tradition at a time

also enables
with

when

the tradition was in

danger

of

being forgotten;
dialogue

but it

tion available to

him, interaction
allow

this interior
trait of

him to dramatize the only interac himself. What is more, the dynamics of him to achieve a great deal more than a simple por
and complex

intellectual alienation; they constitute a subtle individual human being's epistemological condition.
First
of

image

of

the

all, the three-fold persona of

Boethius in the text:

as

author,

as narra

tor,

and as

character,

mirrors with remarkable whenever

self-identity.

Every

human being,

accuracy the complexity of human he or she pronounces the word "I",

"I"

is involved in just this three-fold

problem of

tence, "I bought the paper this morning", the who bought the paper within the story of that
Both the

identity. For instance, in the sen first of all refers to the character
But the
with
"I"

sentence.

also

identifies
of

that character with the speaker of the sentence, that

24. maieutic

is,

the narrator

the
of

(Theaetetus

150b

ff.)

and the

Socrates

cast the philosopher not as the wise man

but

as

in

demonic (Symposium, passim) aspects some fashion on the way to wisdom.

How to Read the Consolation

story.

of

Philosophy

241
"I"

Finally
of

the use of the word

"I"

suggests that elusive

which

is beyond

"I"

the

the character and the narrator, which is always subject and never ob

ject,
of

which

determines

what stories

the narrator

"I"

will

tell and in what manner.

of

What Boethius has

accomplished

in the Consolatio is the depiction

of

the process text in

integrating
he,
as

these three aspects of "ego". As author he narrator, tells the story

was capable of

composes a

which

stage where portant

he

how he, as character, developed to the becoming both narrator and author. But it is im simply he carefully
collapses the three aspects
articulates the

to note that Boethius never

into

an

undifferentiated

whole;

rather

drama whereby the

three aspects

interact.
with

of any Platonic in in the Theaetetus concerning thought as an in terior dialogue, the striking thing about introduction of Philosophy as the second interlocutor in the dialogue is its accuracy as a depiction of the pro

Likewise

Dame Philosophy. Beyond the importance

remarks
Boethius'

fluence,

Socrates'

such as

cess of

human thinking. We have

all

had,
do

or

nearly

had,

the embarrassing experi

ence of

being

caught unawares

talking

to ourselves. The impulse to do so and the

so are

embarrassment at

being observed to
only
proceed

both instructive. On the

of a

one

hand,
The

for

human being, to think implies the staging

of thought can points of view. as

drama
and

within one's self.

activity of different
aloud or

through the give

other

take of different voices,

On the

hand,

to be observed

doing

so,

either

silently

in the

examples of either

sidered somehow ment most

strange,

Socrates in the Symposium, is to be con praetematurally wise or a fool. This embarrass

is

significant, for clearly our human ability to think has as its basis our characteristically human means of communicating with each other, lan
also

guage.

rather than to another, is in some way unusual or sign either of a great mind or of the failure to interact satis it is the "unnatural"; factorily with our fellow humans. Thus what Boethius has accomplished by in

Thus to talk to oneself,

cluding the necessary second voice in any interior dialogue, and which had never been done quite so systematically before him, is the dramatization of the process
of

thought.

Now if the human

voice,

"I"

is three-faceted, it is in
order

natural

to expect that the second

which we contrive

to talk

with

ourselves, would also

be

three-

faceted, depending
And
so

on what aspect of

the self the voice

is felt to

correspond

to.

it is

Boethius'

with corresponds

Dame Philosophy. As the

voice of

phy obviously

to Boethius as the author of the text,

eternity Philoso for both are in a

in
an

position to comprehend the sequence of time and the expanse of space stantaneous and all-inclusive grasp.

in

In

a certain sense

both

stand outside

the text:

Boethius

as

fashioner
all

of

transcends

stories.

Philosophy as the image of eternity which Dame Second, Philosophy as the representative of the
the story
and

whole tradition of ancient

of

the

story.

Both have

philosophy history: the

as the

can

be

associated with

Boethius

as narrator

narrator

has his

as character

in the story he
narra-

tells, Philosophy
phy, their rise

has hers

history

of

the

various schools of ancient philoso

and

fall,

and

their interaction. Likewise both tell a story: the

242

Interpretation

tor recounts the progress of the character,

of of

Philosophy

unfolds

the whole content

Greco-Roman
Boethius the

speculation

in

a sequential order

character.

as that second voice

Finally, Philosophy as necessary for interior dialogue, clearly

converses with

corresponding to the progress an aspect of Boethius himself,

corresponds to and adapts

Boe

thius the character.

self to

She

him throughout the text

her

his

capacities at
whom

Thus

Sartre,

merely for reasons of tention, in fact, with a

ases

every stage of their conversation. in my introduction I portrayed as pursuing the Consolatio general education, should now be reading with greater at
certain

fascination. For,

apart

from

whatever

dogmatic bi
of

Boethius may hold, he has, by means taken great pains to depict the existential knowledge. On the her tendentious relativity Chaucer
of all other

of the

dialogue form
of

the work,
and

conditions

human thought
what

hand,

criticized

F. Anne Payne for

I felt to be in

characterization of

the Consolatio as a text signaling the absolute

understanding.25

human discourse
of

and

By

now

am

better

position to

specify the terms

and

my disagreement. At one point in her study, Menippean Satire, she describes the final effect of the work as

follows:
There is
tune,
no

inevitable

sequence

in the

subjects she

(i.e.

happiness,

evil, providence and

fate,

chance,

foresight

Philosophy) discusses (for and freewill), nor does

is the
times, partly because recognition that he
no

Boethius

ever reach

his "home", the

goal promised a number of

"home"

he keeps asking questions, partly because for lives in time, that the dialogue will continue, that there
swers

man will

be insights, but

final

an

(p.

59).

First

of

all, there is indeed

a clear and ordered sequence of subjects

I have demonstrated in my

remarks on the philosophical content.

Boethius'
"patria"

discussed, as Second, as Phi

kind
of

very early in the work, residence in which or exile from homeland,

losophy

states

is

a special

which

is

a matter of

internal disposi

tion not external necessity:

An ignoras illam tuae

non esse quisquis

civitatis antiquissimam

legem

qua sanctum est ei

ius

exsulare

in

ea sedem

fundare

maluerit?

Nam

qui vallo eius ac munimine

continetur, nullus metus est

ne exsul esse

mereatur;
pr.

at quisquis

inhabitare

earn velle

desierit
(Are

pariter

desinit

etiam mereri

(Bk.

1,

5, 5).

you unaware of

that most ancient law of your

home his

city,

according

to which

it is

declared illegal is
protected

to exile whoever prefers to establish

residence there. should ever

For

whoever

by

its

moat and

walls, there is no
to

fear that he

deserve

to

be

an

exile.

But

whoever stops

wanting

live there, likewise

ceases to

deserve to do so.)
the

Thus, if I have rightly

character

understood the

dynamics

of the

dialogue, Boethius

by the end

of the work

has

evolved to the point where

erly disposed for

entrance

into the
in his

city.

he is in fact prop Third, the fact that Boethius the character

the human condition

insistently
25.

asks questions

role as representative of

See footnote

10.

How to Read the Consolation

does
not prevent

of

Philosophy

243
sophisticated nature of

his final

questions proves

him from entering the city, indeed, the him ready to enter.

Finally,
cation of

the claim that

home for
As

man

is in time

and

that there are no final an

swers, though similar to certain strains within the

Boethius'

stance.

a pupil of

the

paradox

that,

although man
and utter

Consolatio, is a great simplifi Plato, Boethius is accutely sensitive to lives in the "metaxy", that is, in the realm be
a part of

tween pure
another
platonic

being

nonbeing,

him is

nonetheless nostalgic rare exceptions

for
the

home in the

realm of

eternal, unchanging being. With

tradition takes both sides of this paradox seriously

achieves a

with

the result that at

relativism

its best Platonism

and

delicate balance

of emphasis

between the

uncertainty
Boethius'

of our

human

condition and the

instinct for being, which, though

completely realized, it would be false to deny as characteristically human. refusal to depict true being in a straightforward and simplistic Thus
never
manner

does

not

imply

the denial of

being

as

real, it merely
which

represents a pro

found
much
which

respect

for the

givens of

the human condition,

and

reality"

Although Plato
various

Boethius

might

"cannot bear very fashion literary objects in

or

are

portrayed

aspects of

the human being's progress,

lack

thereof, towards being, the great truth itself is always treated as a mystery, which, because it cannot be portrayed directly, must not be. Boethius, by his use
of

the dialogue

form,

exhibits an awareness, rare

for

philosopher, that there is proceeds, informed

all other

no such

thing

as a

simple, declarative sentence,

and then cut off

by

this awareness, to trace how one human

being,

from

human be

ings,

might, in the drama of his

own

thought,

approach

being.

IV. THE MENIPPEAN-SATIRE FORM

But this only is the

highly

wrought

text has been

elaborated

in

yet another

fashion. Not dialogue

philosophical content structured

according to three different but analo

gous sets of categories; not

only is the

work couched

in the form
been
cast

of a

between two
artificial which ate

multifaceted

interlocutors;

the text

has
of

also

in the

highly
prose,

form

of

Menippean

Satire,

had

enjoyed a

long

and various

alternating medley history before Boethius chose to

Menippus
of

verse and

appropri

it for his The Syrian

of

own purposes.

genre seems who

to have

originated with

Gadara,

Greek-speak
He
used

ing

flourished in the first half

verse and prose

of the third

century

bc.

the

form

alternating

to

write essays expressive of a

Cynic's

serio

comic attitude towards the world and mankind.

It is unclear, however, exactly

original

how the

verse sections

in his

works

compositions or

lowed
course

by

merely quotations his fellow Gadarean, Meleager,

around bc

functioned: they may have been from previous literature. Menippus

who produced a

was

fol

body

of

Cynic dis

in the Menippean form

ioo.

The

genre was

taken over

into

Latin

by

Marcus Terentius Varro (bc i 16-27),

who wrote no

books

of Menip-

244
pean

Interpretation
which some

satires, of
foibles.26

600 fragments

are extant and

in

which

he

mocked

human

In the first century ad Varro's lead was taken up by Petronius in the Apocolocyntosis Likewise, in the second in the Satyricon and by
"Seneca"
.

century ad, Lucian of Samosate wrote a ippean influence is strong and in which as character. But, although Lucian shares
not choose

series of

dialogues in himself

which

the

Men

"Menippus"

sometimes appears

Menippus'

seriocomic

stance, he does
to which

to employ the format of alternating

given

verse

and

prose

Menippus had

his

name.

The form then

seems not reappears

seems

to have

attracted practitioners

for

almost

three centu
character

ries;
is

and when cynic

it

in the fifth have

at

and

early

sixth centuries

ad, its

istically
it is
of

tone

to

undergone a radical

transformation. No

longer

the genre used to poke

an aspect of

fun

the pretensions

and vanities of

mankind; instead

the baroque complexity of

composition characteristic of much

the literature produced in the Latin West

c.

during
and

this

period.

Thus Martianus

Capella (fl.

425)

casts

his

highly

elaborate

allegory, De Nuptiis Mercurii et

Philologiae, in
cal

the Menippean Satire

of

form;

the same in the first book

his

collection of

Fulgentius (467-532 ad) does allegorical interpretations of classi

the time Boethius inherited the

myths, Mitologiarum Libri Tres. Thus

by

genre

it had
on

long

lost its

associations with

the mocking tones of the Cynics and

had taken
ies

the status of a genre appropriate for the explication of the technical

lofty myster
The

and expressive of

literary

mastery

of

its

practitioners.27

question medium

then arises, why did Boethius choose this strangely artificial form as

for his Consolatiol

observation

The first

to be made about
of

Boethius'

use of

Menippean Satire is
text.

the systematic pervasiveness

Fulgentius, employ the form only intermittently; furthermore, their use of verse appears merely decora tive and at times gratuitous. In contrast, Boethius alternates verse and prose from
rough and

Both his

alternating contemporaries, Martianus Capella

verse and prose throughout the

beginning

to end of the

Consolatio

and

he

endows verse with

functions throughout the

points made
metra of

progress of

the

work.

many important At times it serves to illustrate

,

in the

prose sections with

Book II);

sometimes

of

Book V);

sometimes prayer

the more vivid images of poetry (e.g. the it actually advances the argument (e.g. metrum 3 it is reserved for purposes less appropriately treated in
,

prose, namely,
sometimes

(e.g.

metrum

it

serves to refresh

5 of Book I & metrum IX of Book III); Boethius the character between strenuous dialec
of

tical workouts
26.

(e.g.,

metrum

Book IV).

Finally,

the effect of the verse

sec-

The

most recent edition of

et

Meippees (Edition, Traduction

1972. 27.

Varro's Menippean fragments is: Cebe, J. P., Varron, Satires Commentaire), Ecole Franchise de Rome, Palais Farnese, Rome,

tire

format
be

This is my central disagreement with Payne's approach: to take seriously the Menippean Sa of the Consolatio is an important task for contemporary Boethian scholarship, but one
careful

must

to specify correctly the characteristics of that genre as it was practiced in late

antiquity.

How to Read the Consolation

tions

of

Philosophy

245

in the Consolatio is
works

analogous

iad. In both
encountered which

these respective
stark settings of

in many ways to that of the similes in the Il devices interject aspects of reality not to be
main action.

in the

the

In the Iliad, the

entire plot of

is

restricted

to the

bleak

plane

running from the Trojan

chores.

citadel

to the sea,

the similes afford glimpses of the natural world of plants and animals, and of the

workaday

world of

humans

at

their

domestic

Likewise in the Consolatio,

verse sections continu and

all of which

takes place

Boethius'

within

prison

cell, the

ally

present

images

of natural

phenomena, both terrestrial

celestial,

and

sometimes refer

to the characters of

history

and myth

(e.g.,

metrum

of

Book

II;

metrum 12 of

Book

III;
of

metra

Menippean Satire format

comparable works.

3 & 7 of Book IV). Thus, on first reading, the the Consolatio appears more integrated than in other
stands,
what end could not

But the

question still

does Menippean Satire

have?28

allow

Boethius to achieve,
existed

which otherwise

he

There
even

throughout Greco-Roman antiquity an

inveterate feud,

which

pute",29

in the fourth century bc Plato could refer to as a "certain ancient dis between philosophy and poetry. The most common expression of this
and

launched by philosophical critics against poetry false. As early as Xenophanes, most articulately in certain Pla tonic passages, and as late as Boethius, poetry is accused of beguiling the mind with dangerously deceptive fabrications. On the other hand, philosophy itself felt
tension was the repeated attack
as

fictitious

the strong

pull of

poetry; in

fact,

much of what we

term ancient philosophy was

and

composed as

poetry, if

not verse.

For

example

both Parmenides

Empedocles

chose to couch

their thoughts in the heroic hexameters of Homer and

Hesiod;

Plato
set

wrote philosophical closet and

dramas; Lucretius followed in Latin

chose the

the example

by Empedocles;
which
present

Boethius

highly

artificial

form

of

Menippean

Satire in poetry is

to compose his Consolatio. A

Boethius'

tension between philosophy and

of their

throughout
of

teraction is accurate, the outcome

the

text; but if my understanding feud is a draw.

in

Before proceeding I should forestall a possible confusion of terms. Menip pean Satire is often defined as a potpourri of verse and prose, which is as good a definition
as any.

But

when

speak of the

losophy
tions
are

in the Consolatio,
prose and

I do

not mean to suggest

relationship between poetry and phi that Boethius has cast his

philosophy in

his

poetic aspirations

in

verse.

The

verse and prose sec

specific mode of although the

equally poetic, or literary; the philosophy is not to be found in any one discourse but in the arrangement of the work as a whole. Thus,

following

analysis concentrates on the

functions

of

the metra,

much

the same

arguments could

be

applied

to the variety

of

discourse to be found in the

prose sections as well.

Verse in the Consolatio functions

28.

as a

"pharmakon",

that

is,

as a potent

sub-

I have treated this

Literature,"

question

in

somewhat greater of

detail in "The Consolation of Philosophy

1984.

as a

Work

of

in The American Journal

p.ev

Philology, Fall

29.

Republic X 607b: "naXaia

rig dia<j>oga

<j>iXooo(t>ia re xai

246
stance of

Interpretation
mysterious, almost magical, properties, the pharmakon and how it is
which can either cure or
kill.30

Who

applies

applied are essential

factors

contribut
at

ing
is

to its eventual good or bad effect. Thus the

whole work can of

be read,

least

on one

level,

as the

history

of

the right and wrong uses

this pharmakon which

verse.

The Consolatio
tune in a
poem

opens with
within

Boethius the

character

bewailing
elegy.31

his fall from for

firmly

the tradition of Latin

Dame

Philosophy
her

then appears and scatters the elegiac

own

Muses, but

she

immediately

substitutes

Muses in their

stead:

Quis, inquit, has

lores Sed
abite

scenicas meretriculas ad

hunc

aegrum permisit accedere, quae do-

eius non modo nullis remediis

foverent,

verum

dulcibus insuper
meisque eum

alerent venenis?

potius, Sirenes usque in exitium

dulces,

Musis

curandum

sanandumque relinquite
("Who,"

(Bk.

I,

pr.

I, 8 & ii).

she

said, "has allowed these theatrical bawds to approach this patient? Not
not

only do they

tend him

with

sweet poisons.

But

off with

you,

any remedies, in fact, in addition, they feed him on you Sirens sweet even unto death, and leave him to

be

cared

for

and cured

by

my Muses.")

Thus

verse

is

not viewed as on

beneficial, depending
Boethius'

essentially pernicious; its effects can be harmful or how it is used and by whom. And the first book of the

Consolatio may be read as an account of how hands and appropriates it for her own

Philosophy
uses.

removes verse

from

After expressing his inabil

ity

to perceive the hand of God in human affairs in the fifth metrum of Book I
character will not speak

Boethius the

in

verse again until the third metrum of

Book V. Meanwhile lated to further the The first

Philosophy

will wield verse

in

variety
shall

of

ways, all calcu

Boethius'

progress of

therapy.

use made

by Philosophy

of verse

is

what

term "the

affec

Early in Book I, after giving Philosophy asks Boethius:

Sentisne, inquit, haec
("Do
you perceive

the stoical advice to resist

fortune (Bk. I,

m.

4),

atque animo
things,"

illabuntur tuo

an

ovog Xvgacf! (Bk. I,

p.

4, 1).
or are

these

she said,

"and have

they penetrated your mind,

you as an ass

to the

lyre?")
"pharmakon"

I of course owe the concept of poetry as a in Plato's Phaedrus in "La Pharmacie de Platon," in La
30.

to J. Derrida's treatment

of

the theme

Dissemination, Editions
,

du

Seuil, Paris,

1972,

pp.

108-33.
are the meter and

31.

Not only

specific well-known passages of echo

many of the topoi conventional to the genre Boethius also echoes Latin Elegy, especially from Ovid's Tristia. Thus the first four lines

Trista v, 1,

56:

Flebilis

ut noster status

est, ita

fiebile carmen,

materiae scripto conveniente suae.

while

lines 5 & 6 clearly

quoque

allude to

Tristia iv,

19-20:

Me

sola

Musa levat loca iussa petentem, comes nostrae perstitit ilia fugae.

How to Read the Consolation

The implication is that in his
the

of

Philosophy

247
of

present condition

Boethius is incapable lyre hints

at

receiving

healing

truth of

philosophy

and the mention of the

the instrument

necessary change of heart, namely, verse. Ac cordingly, later in Book I, Philosophy describes her use of verse as calculated to
which will

be

able

to effect the

Boethius'

respond

to

emotional state:

Sed

quoniam

firmioribus

remediis nondum tempus

est, et earn mentium

constat esse

naturam ut quotiens abiecerint perturbationum caligo verum mediocribus

veras, falsis opinionibus

confundit ut

induantur,

ex quibus orta

ilium

intuitum, hanc
pr.

paulisper

lenibus
tenebris

fomentis

attenuare

temptabo,

dimotis fallacium

affectionum

splendorem verae

lucis

possis agnoscere

(Bk. I,

6,

21).
of minds

(But

since

it is

not yet put on

time for stronger remedies and the nature

opinions as often as

is

so consti

tuted that

they

false

they divest
while

themselves of true ones and

which clouds

from these false

opinions there arises a

shall attempt

fog of disturbing passions

a

the ca

pacity for true insight, I

treatments
you might
of moderate

for

little

to

disperse this
of

fog

with mild

strength, so that,

with

the shadows

false

affections

removed,

be

able to recognize the splendor of the true

light.)

This

affective use of

poetry

will prevail

throughout Book
Boethius'

II, in

the

course of when

which

Philosophy

appeals

principally to
the
ultimate pr.

imagination. Even

Boethius himself
viate of

complains of

deeply

rooted sorrow

(Bk. II,
most

3, 2),

inability of verse and rhetoric to alle Philosophy insists that at this stage
tui remedia, sed adhuc contumacis

his therapy poetry is the

Et ilia: Ita est, inquit; haec
adversum curationem

he

can expect:

enim nondum morbi quaedam

doloris fomenta

sunt;

nam quae pr.

in

profundum sese

penetrent cum tempestivum

fuerit

ammovebo

(Bk. II,

3, 3-4).

(And

she

said, "So

it is, for

these measures are not cures

for

your

illness, they
For

are

merely time is right, I

certain comforts shall

preparatory to the

cure of your persistent pain.

when

the

apply

those measures which penetrate

verse comes

deeply.")
into play, that
passage
which

In Book III,
choose to call

second, loftier use of

to illuminate.
at

its

power

Already
most

in Book I, in the

recently
central

cited,

Philosophy had hinted

the

power of verse

to reveal, to shed light on real

exercised

ity. This ability of verse to illumine is prayer to God as ruler of the cosmos:
O
qui perpetua mundum ratione caelique

effectively

in the

gubernas,

terrarum

sator,

qui

tempus ab aevo

ire iubes
(O

stabilisque manens

das

cuncta moveri

(Bk. Ill,

m.

9, 1-3).

you who govern

the

cosmos with constant

reason,

begetter

of earth and

heaven,
enable

who order

time to proceed
move

from eternity,

and who, while

remaining stationary,

all things to

)
in the
entire

This is the only

verse section

Consolatio to be
the

composed

in dactylic in the text

pre-

hexameters;
indicates its

which

fact taken together

with

poem's central position

status as

the acme of verse's

career

in the

work.

Accordingly it

248
sents a which

Interpretation
cosmology, derived in large measure from Plato's
philosophical content of

Timaeus, in
of

terms of

the whole

the second

half

the text

will

be

ex

pressed.

At the very heart

of

of a philosophical

treatise, designed to demonstrate the

placed a

harmony

being
nature

and

pressing the

becoming, Boethius has of God as beginning, middle,

. .

hexameter

poem ex

and end of all

moving things:

tu namque serenum,

tu

requies

tranquilla piis, te cernere

finis, I,
m.

principium, vector,

dux,

semita, terminus idem (Bk.

9,

26-28).

(For

you are

the cloudless sky, peaceful rest for the good, the goal is to perceive you,

beginning,
But
soon

conveyor,

leader,

path, end,

all

in the

same

being.)
of

thereafter the

status of verse as an

instrument

philosophy begins
the

to decline. Book III ends with a poem

pheus

describing
on

the descent into Hades of Or

in

order

to rescue Eurydice. The

of

stated significance of

legend,

to be

found in the text

the

poem

itself, is that

the

soul's voyage

towards celestial

truth it should not look back on terrestrial realities:

Vos haec fabula

quicumque
mentem nam qui

respicit

in

superum

diem

ducere quaeritis; Tartareum in specus

victus

lumina flexerit, inferos (Bk. Ill,

m.

quicquid praecipuum trahit perdit cum videt

12, 52-58).
your mind

(This tale

concerns you who seek to

lead

to the

daylight above, for he

who

is

overcome and
when

bends his

sight

towards the Tartarean cave, loses whatever excellence

he bore,

he

sees the world

below.)
type of the poet in much Latin
literature,32

But because Orpheus

am sure
gest

was a stock

that this description

of a poet's

failure to

regain

his

wife

is

meant

to sug

the ultimate

inability
poem

of verse

to grasp and

keep

whatever

truths it might

convey.

Therefore,

though not a

definitive dismissal

of verse

der Philosophy, this

the

does indicate the

decreasing

from its employ un importance of verse as is it

therapy of philosophy advances. Accordingly, in Books IV and V,

whereas

verse will appear and ended

less frequently;

nor

insignificant that,
closes with prose.

Book I began

in verse, Book V

opens and

Furthermore, Philosophy explicitly describes

She
prefaces a

verse's

dimin
on

ished

role at

this stage of philosophic therapy.

with

long

lecture

"providentia"

these words

Quodi te

musici carminis oblectamenta

delectant, hanc

oportet paulisper

differas

voluptatem

dum

nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes

(Bk.

IV,

pr.

6, 6).

32.

For Orpheus

as the type of the poet see

Virgil, Georgics.

iv.

453-527; Ovid, Metamorpho

ses, x, 1-77;

Seneca, Hercules Furens

569-91.

How to Read the Consolation

(But if the delights
while

of

Philosophy
you,
you must

249
defer this
pleasure

of musical

song

please

for

little,

weave

together lines of reasoning connected one

with

the other in strict order.);

and concludes

the same

lecture

with

the

following

remarks

Sed

video

te iam dudum et pondere quaestionis oneratum et rationis prolixitate

aliquam carminis exspectare ulteriora centendas

fatigatum firmior in
(But I
see

(Bk.

dulcedinem; IV, 6, 57).

accipe

igitur haustum

quo refectus

that for some time now, burdened

by the

weight of the question and

fatigued

by

the extent of our reasoning, you look forward to some poetic sweetness;

receive

therefore a

draught,
longer

restored

by

which you might all the more

firmly struggle onward.)

as

Verse is

no

characterized as affective or
no

illuminating,
longer
works

it had been in
with

Books I-III; it is

merely restorative; it towards philosophy curing ignorance, it only

now

hand in hand

serves as a rest

stop

on the arduous

way towards truth. But this is not the last in Book I Boethius the just
about

word on verse

in the Consolatio. Since the fifth in

verse. verse

metrum

character

has

not once spoken

Then suddenly, (Bk. V,

m.

as

his last

words

in the text

at

all, he breaks into

on

3) be

fore
on

Philosophy
and

launches into her disquisition

"providentia"

the four modes of

knowledge,
the

eternity

perpetuity,

on

and

"praevidentia",
complained:

with which

works comes to an end.

In Book I Boethius had

Omnia

certo

fine

gubernans

hominum

solos respuis actus

merito rector cohibere modo.

Nam

cur

tantas
.

lubrica
.

versat

Fortuna

vices?

Rapidos,
firma
(You

rector, comprime fluctus

et quo caelum regis

stabiles

immensum
m.

foedere terras (Bk. I,

things
with

5, 25-29 & 46-48).

who govern all

fuse to

contain as ruler within

the deserved

fixed purpose, it is only human affairs which you re measure. For why does slippery fortune
rushing waves,
and with the same

turn such changes?

you control

Ruler,

quiet the

bond

by

which

the great
puts

heavens, fix
matter as

and stabilize

the earth.)

In Book V he

the

follows:

Quaenam discors foedera

causa resolvit? veris statuit

rerum

Quis tanta deus

bella duobus

ut quae carptim singula constent eadem nolint mixta

iugari?
veris

An

nulla est

discordia

semperque sibi certa

cohaerent,

sed mens caecis obruta membris

nequit oppressi

luminis igne
(Bk.

rerum tenues noscere nexus?

V,

m.

3, 1-10)

250

Interpretation
undone

(What discordant cause has

contention

the

bonds

of

things?

What

god

has

established such

between two truths,

so that the same propositions, which, when taken one

by

one, are valid, should refuse to be joined together? Or in fact is there no discord
and

among truths imperceptive

they

always

limbs, is
of

firmly cohere one with the other, but the mind, buried in unable by the fire of its buried vision to discern the subtle
final
Boethius the

interweaving

things.)
note

It is important to
couched

that these

words

of

character are

in the

same meter as

the last verse he spoke in Book I (Anapestic Dime

ter

Acatalectic)
and

tion as the former

being
less

verse section poses essentially the same ques is the relationship between the realm of unchanging but that it does so in the unpredictably various world of humanity and that this
what

latter

personal and emotional

terms and with

greater self-consciousness and episte

mological sophistication.

I interpret this development from

Boethius'

as the

last

stage of verse's career

removed

throughout the
of

Consolatio. In the first book Dame

verse

"pharmakon"

Philosophy

the

hands

much as a mother would

take a

potentially dangerous
Boethius'

object

from her infant

child.

Philosophy
of

then proceeds to make use of that same

course of verse

"pharmakon"

as one means

among many in the

therapy.

Thus, depending
Boethius the newly
beneficially.33

on

the stage

therapy involved,
in
verse one

fills

more or

less impor
his
and

tant functions. In the end, as token of his successful cure and new maturity,
character speaks

last time, thus

demonstrating
correctly

acquired

ability

to manipulate the

"pharmakon"

of verse

Throughout its it

career

in the Consolatio, verse,

as well as

styles, is judged according to the criteria

puts at

of philosophy.

the variety of prose As Dame Philosophy

the opening of Book II:

rhetoricae suadela non

Adsit igitur
nostra

dulcedinis,
hac (Bk. II,

quae

turn tantum recta calle procedit

cum

instituta

deserit

cumque

musica pr.

laris

nostri vernacula nunc

leviores

nunc graviores modos succinat

I, 8).
power of

(Therefore let there be

vances
as a

sweetness'

present rhetorical

persuasion,

which ad

along the straight path, only when it does not abandon our handmaid in our household, it sings measures now soft, now

precepts and while, grave

in its music.)

In this

regard

its

ancient

feud

the canon of

Boethius may be seen as coming down on the side of philosophy in with poetry, for the value of the latter is strictly determined by the former. But the situation is considerably more complex than
at

this, for Menippean Satire,

33.
of that

least

as

Boethius handles it, is

more than a simple

parallel to the character where

book,

Philosophy

whole work opened with

Boethius'

in Book V may be seen in the first metrum illustrates her definition of chance in elegiac couplets. Just as the lament in elegiac couplets, so, too, is the first metrum of the final
use of verse

Boethius'

book

composed

in that

same meter.
vehicle

But for

meter

losophy
stration.

has transformed the

Boethius'

is the only thing the two poems have in common; Phi self-pity into an instrument of philosophic demon

How to Read the Consolation

alternation of verse and

of

Philosophy

251

prose, it constitutes

a veritable encyclopedia of available

,

forms

verse (Bk. I, m. i), visionary literature (Bk. I, pr. i literature (Bk. I, pr. I, 7 n), didactic verse (Bk. I, m. 2), Cynic-Stoic diatribe (Bk. I, pr. 3), prayer (Bk. I, m. 5), forensic oratory (Bk. I, pr. 4, 2ff.), philosophic dialogue (Bk. I, pr. 6), and expository prose (Bk. I, pr. of

discourse. Elegiac

1-6),

allegorical

5)

are

just

some of

work.34

Thus the texture

the many genres included in this extraordinarily eclectic of the composition is one of great variety and one
almost proudly.

which

displays its artificiality openly,

his
reader

That

is, Boethius

the au

thor is consciously playing the whole gamut of ancient

wants

literary

genres and

he

to be aware of the fact. But again, to what end?

which

One answer,
Boethius

does

not

manipulates various

really get to the heart of the matter, is that forms of discourse according to a canon of propri

ety of form to content. Thus Boethius the character bewails his fall from fortune in the tones traditional to Latin elegy; Philosophy's first appearance is described according to the Muses recalls the
conventions of ancient vision

literature

and

her

rout

of

the

allegorical methods of a

Prudentius;

when

presenting the case

a

for his

despondency
form
and

Boethius the

character speaks as

if before

jury, employ
on

ing

the

many topoi traditional to Roman forensic oratory; and so

medium

throughout the work. Moreover this correspondence of

ganized

to message

is

or

according to the
character

same

hierarchical

structure which

informs the

philo

sophical content and shapes

with

the progress of the dialogue. Thus the

work opens

the

Boethius

indulging

in the lachrymose
on

strains of couched

closes with almost

Dame Philosophy's disquisition discourse to

"ratio"

"providentia"

elegy and in a lofty, The

evo

oracular,

prose reminiscent of certain such passages another

in

Plato.35

lution from
"sensus"

one mode of
"imaginatio"

follows the

same progress

from

to

to

and

finally towards "intellegentia",

in
so

which we

have traced in

other contexts. of

In this

regard as well and

poetry to the demands

on a

philosophy

doing

Boethius is clearly subjecting he implicitly ranks poetry

level lower than

fiction

philosophy.

But the fact that the Consolatio itself

crafted
which

as a

text is essentially a poem, that

is,

Boethius the author presents to the reader as an obviously implications. At the very core of the work, in the further has object, exact middle of the central Book III (metrum 9), at the hexameter hymn to God
wrought
34.

For I

a thorough analysis of the genres exploited

op. cit., pp. 3-34.

by

Boethius in the

composition of the

Con

solatio see

Reichenberger, thinking
of

35.

am

the kind of diction

naoa addvamg.
rravXav

exemplified

by

the

following
"

passage
8'

in the Phaedrus

(245c5-246ai):
akkov

"tpvxfi

to

yag

c\eixivnxov adavamv e%ei

rd

akko xivovv xai

xivovuevov,

xivijoetug,

rravXav

uoi)g

2-5:

"Deum igitur
aeternitas

aetemum esse cunctorum ratione

degentium
pariter

commune

Compare Book V, pr. 6, iudicium est. Quid sit

scientiamque patefecit. ex collatione tempoprocedit.
.

igitur

consideremus;
est

haec

enim

nobis

naturam

divinam

Aeternitas igitur
ralium clarius

interminabilis

vitae

tota simul et perfecta

possessio.

Quod

liquet. Nam

quicquid vivit

in

tempore

id

praesens a praeteritis

in futura

Although the Gorgianic features

rhythmic and

are more marked

in Plato, both

passages are alike

in exemplifying

highly

wrought philosophic prose.

252
Dame
out

Interpretation
addresses a prayer

Philosophy
poem

to the fashioner of the

universe.

Through

this

God is depicted
the

as

crafting the "mundus", orderly

which

is Latin for "cos

mos", that

is,

universe as an

structured whole:

qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,

terrarum caelique sator, qui tempus ab aevo

ire iubes

stabilisque manens

das

cuncta moveri, causae

quern non externae pepulerunt

materiae

fingere
insita

fluitantis

epus verum

summi

forma boni livore carens, tu

ducis

cuncta superno

ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus

ipse
(Bk. Ill,

mundum mente gerens similique perfectasque

in imagine formans
m.

iubens

perfectum absoluere partes

9, 1-9).

(O

you who govern

the

world with constant proceed

reason,

progenitor of earth and

heaven,

who order all

temporality
motion,

to

from eternity,
highest

and while

things

with

whom no external causes

remaining stationary endow forced to fashion this work of incon

stant matter

but the innate idea

exemplar on

of the

good

lacking all envy.

perfect parts

You
a

bring forth all

world

things from the

and

high,

yourself most

beautiful wielding

beautiful

shaping it according to

like image, ordering the

to complete a per

fect whole.) Then in Book V it becomes

verse an act of clear

that not only

is God's
creation

generation of

the uni

"poiesis", his

perspective on

his

is that

of an observer

viewing

a work of art:
vero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum

Intellegentiae

ipsam illam
(But the
verse

simplicem

formam

pura mentis acie contuetur

(Bk. V,

pr.

4, 30).

eye of

intellect

exists on a

higher plane, for transcending the

vision.)

circle of the uni

it beholds the
eye

simple

form

with pure mental

To God's

the universe does

not appear as a

history,

that

is,

as a sequence of

events, but as a poem, that

and

is,

as a wrought object capable of

being immediately

completely

perceived:
vitae plenitudinem

Quod igitur interminabilis

cui neque

totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet,

futuri

quicquam absit nee praeteriti

fluxerit, id

aeternum esse

iure

perhibetur mobilis

idque

necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper assistere et

infinitatem

temporis

habere

praesentem

(Bk.

V,

pr.

6, 8)

(Therefore that

which

beginning or end,

and

equally grasps and possesses the whole fullness of life without from which no future thing is absent nor has the past flowed by,
always

that is rightly held to be eternal, and it is necessary that, possessed of itself, it is present to itself and holds as present the whole infinity of moving time.)

Finally,

the

Consolatio

closes with a vision of

God

as

eternally

fashioning

and

eternally contemplating his

Manet
etiam spectator

creation:
cunctorum praescius

desuper

deus

visionisque eius praesens

semper aeternitas cum nostrorum actuum

malis supplicia

futura
45).

qualitate concurrit

bonis

praemia

dispensans (Bk. V,

pr.

6,

How to Read the Consolation

(There
also remains as spectator present

of

Philosophy
God
who

253
foreknows
all things and the ac

from

above

constantly

tions,

dispensing
within

as

eternity it does

of

his

vision

is in for

accord with the evils and

punishments

future quality of our rewards for good actions.)

Because

the text God

is

portrayed as a poet and

his

creation as a

poem,

the Consolatio as a poem assumes great significance. Although verse throughout

the

work

has been

criticized and subjected

to the

purification of

philosophy, the

goal of

philosophy, which, in the Platonic tradition, is

fiction"

always a means and never

an

end, is the appreciation of the "supreme

as

which

is the

cosmos. so

Thus

just

God fashions the

author

universe and contemplates

his

work of

art,

too

does
to

Boethius the

fashion

text, the
can view

purpose of which

is to

guide

the

reader

wards a perspective where

he

the world as God

does,

that

is,

as a poem.

Therefore the
must

critique and subordination of verse not as

to philosophy

within

the text
casti-

be understood,

the dismissal of an inferior technique, but as the

dangerous human capacity for not living up to its potential, for not constituting the human fiction which might adequately reflect God's supreme fiction. In the end, Menippean Satire allows Boethius to compose
gation of

the highest and most

kind

of

metapoem, that

is,

a poem

freed from the

conventional constraints of

traditional

literary

genres,

able

to subordinate those genres to the demands of

analogue

philosophy, and capable of reflecting on itself as an

universe.

to

God's poem, the

We have
Sartre

seen

how the dialogue form

of

of

the

work allows

Boethius to portray
as

the development
might of

Boethius the

character

into Boethius the narrator; or,

ditions
present of

have put it, dialogue allows Boethius to portray the existential con human knowledge. Likewise, Menippean Satire allows Boethius to himself as a poet as opposed to a dogmatic philosopher. The implication
unlike

this strategy is that,

that

philosophy's proper medium

A. J. Ayer for instance, Boethius does not believe is a succession of simple declarative sentences
voices and

but

highly

wrought

text, the many

tones of which interact so as to

produce a pattern

mirroring the complexity

of the cosmos.

V. CONCLUSION

On the

strength of

the preceding

analyses of

the

philosophical

content, of the

dialogue form,

and of the

format

of

Menippean Satire

we can at

last draw

some

firm

conclusions as

to how one

might

best

approach

the text, in other words, how

one should read the

Consolatio.
clear

On the

one

hand it is
or

that we

cannot

treat the text as a

which, such as

straightforward

philosophical

essay

treatise, the best

elements of

definitions,

propo

sitions,

and arguments, are

understood when read most

literally
when

and as

di

rectly

expressive of

the

author's

intention.

Thus, for instance,

the statement

Boethius the

character concludes

the opening elegy

with

254
Quid

Interpretation
me

felicem totiens

iactastis,
ille

amici? gradu

Qui cecidit,

stabili non erat

(Bk. I,
of

m.

21-22).

(Why, my friends, did you

that he
was not

so often

boast

my

prosperity?

He,

who

has

fallen,
least

proves

in

a secure

position.)
not as

we are not meant

to assume that he speaks for Boethius the author, at

these
when

words stand

in their immediate
metrum of

in the final

have already seen, Likewise, Book I Dame Philosophy advises Boethius to cast
context. as we

out all
phy's

hopes

and

fears,

this exhortation cannot

never mind as

be simply

accepted as

Philoso

last

words on

the subject,

the

opinion of

the author, for the

same character of

in the last
hand to be

sentences of the

text

will

eloquently defend the validity

to

human hope (Bk. V, On the

other

pr.

5,

44-48).

subject

the text to a
at

structuralist analysis or

decon

struction would

inappropriate,
or

least

at

this stage of our understanding, for

both these
the text

methods arrogate

to their practitioners a privileged position vis-a-vis

conscious

and of

downplay

ignore the

craftsmanship,

and

thereby

the in

tention,

the author. In the case of the Consolatio the

foregoing

pages will

have

given us good reason

to suppose that whatever strategies we may tease out of the

text were

deliberately

inserted

by

the author as elements in a larger construction.

we understand

Thus,
would

until we are confident

that

the intended
of

interaction

of ele

ments within

the text and the intended implications

the text as a whole, it

"difference"

be

rash and wrongheaded

to reduce the Consolatio to a set of structural

categories or

to a representation seeking to conceal or

attentive reader will notice that the

display

its

For example, the

makes reference

text

on several occasions

to the theme: "To every

heaven"

thing
m.

there

is

a season and a

time to
m. 1).

every But to latch

purpose under
on

(e.g. Bk. I,

to this motif as one element

1, 11; Bk. I, m. 6; Bk. Ill, in an underlying structure or

time this

as evi

dence
tivus"

betraying an anxiety
failure to
theme

about the existence of an appropriate

would con "tempes-

stitute a

appreciate

both the few

generic status of the text

Boethius'

being

one of the

elements which
literature36

Consolatio

shares

with

more conventional examples of consolation

and the signifi

cance of

this motif

within

the larger

dialectic

of

time and eternity, order and

approach might

chaos.

am not

claiming that

a structuralist or

deconstructionist

not uncover some

fascinating
us

material; I
that
we are

am

saying that the his

work.

elaborate

intricacy of

the text should

indicate to

up

against a master of construction and

instill in both the

us a

healthy humility

with regard to

How, then,

should one read

the

Consolatio! I
that of a poet

would respond

that it

requires

mind of a philosopher and

fully to appreciate the dynamics

and significance of reacts

the work. When confronted with the world the philosopher

by

giving

an account.

"ratio",
36.

and

the Greek archetype,

example,

The English word, "account", its Latin forerunner, all denote a rational explanation and
"logos"

See, for

Seneca, Cosolatio

ad

Helviam Matrem 1,
solacia

2:

"Dolori tuo, dum

et

recens nam

saeviret, sciebam occurrendum non esse, ne

morbis quoque nihil est perniciosius quam

ilium ipsa

irritarent

accenderent;

in

immature

medicina."

How to Read the Consolation

further

of

Philosophy

255

Thus the properly philosophic mode of illumine reality by coming up, as it were, with a formula corresponding to the interaction of the elements of reality. On the other hand, the
connote mathematical proportion. attempts to

discourse

poet responds

to experience

by telling a story.
both

This

poetic response shares certain

features

nance of certain

reality and the conso English words, such as "to and "to tally", "to and "to count", suggests that in some ways the poetic story is a kind of philosophic account. But always present and operative in the telling of a story is the mode, "it is as if"; in other words, the poet's story, although meant to reflect reality, is al
tell"

with

the philosophic:

attempt to represent

recoun

consciously fabricated fiction. Thus the "ancient between philosophy and poetry is feud. The philosopher and poet, like Cain and Abel, like Eteocles and
ways a
disagreement"

family

Polynei-

ces,

desire the

same

end, to

represent what

is, but

their respective means, the ac

count and

the story, although

they display
whole,37

a common concern

for the orderly

the phi to

arrangement of parts within a

appear

to be

irreconcilable, for
story likeness
ceases

losopher's if
read as a

account cannot tolerate

fiction

and the poet's

function

formula. As is true

of all

family feuds,

the very

of the com

batants

renders

the conflict all the more vehement.

achievement and

Therefore the Boethian demands

Boethius'

the response which that achievement

are

bold

ones

indeed, for they

poetry.

constitute various at

nothing less than the

within pr.

recon

ciliation of

philosophy and elegy at Bk. I, m. Fortuna

at

The

"stories"

the text (e.g.

pro

i and

his defense

Bk. I,

4; Philosophy's

sopopoeia of

Bk. II,
3,
and

pr. 2 and

her retelling
7)

of ancient

legends

at

Bk.
to a
of

Ill,

m.

12, Bk.

IV,

m.

Bk.

IV,
and

m.

are all subject and subordinate epistemological

philosophic account expressed most

clearly in the
account

hierarchy
story

"intellegentia"

on

"sensus", "imaginatio", "ratio", the other hand, that philosophical

Boethius'

(Bk. V,

pr.

4, 24-39);
of

is

contained within the placed

encounter with

Dame Philosophy: it is

in

context, it is led up
of a char

to

by dialogue,

and

it is

preferred not

in the

author's words

but in those
respond

acter within the story.

The implication merely

seems to

be that to

to reality

merely
the end

as a philosopher or

as a poet

is insufficient, for

being requires both

be
endured.

an account and a

story,
of

and the tension

between these

modes must
fiction"

In

the depiction

the

universe as

God's "supreme

suggests a possi

ble

harmony

both to But
phy

purge

between philosophy and poetry. Philosophy's account is required human fictions and to lead man towards God's perspective; but
the
world constitutes a poem and must

from this

perspective

be

read as such.

what

in

practice

does it

mean

to

read a

text

with

the dual

focus

of philoso

and poetry?

The

clearest response

is to

give a specific example.

Thus it is
the

very

likely
It is

that the reader of this paper, and

stressing this

very
and

certain

that the

reader of

37.

worth

common

feature

of

poetry

philosophy, namely, a care

for the

co

herence
rather

of parts within a whole,

in

order

to clarify the

real

difference between the two

operative

modes.

Thus

the issue is the

beauty

conflict

vs. truth, for there is a kind of aesthetic is between two approaches to the truth.

in

all philosophic

accounts;

256

Interpretation
will

Consolatio itself,
the
question of

have

realized

by

now

that the the

central

theme of the work

question

is

the

order and coherence of

universe.

The

is

not a

new

one,

even

for Boethius; but his

of

means of

addressing the

question

is

novel. com

The first formulation

plaint

the

question

is the

Boethius'

character

distressed

in the

middle of

the first book:

Omnia

certo

fine

gubemans

hominum

solos respuis actus

merito rector cohibere modo

(Bk.

I,

m.

5,

25-27). affairs which you re

(You

who govern all

things

with

fuse to

contain, as ruler, within the

fixed purpose, it is only human deserved measure.)

His
of

claim

that order

seems

to

reign over

human fortune is

Dame

implicitly Philosophy maintains that a

it:

countered

every aspect of the universe except that in the very next verse section, in which universal order does obtain and that it is man's

duty

to conform to

Signat tempora
aptans ofliciis nee quas

propriis

deus
cohercuit

ipse

misceri patitur vices.

Sic

quod praecipiti via

certum

deserit

ordinem exitus

laetos (God

non

habet

(Bk. I,

m.

6,

16-22).

stamps the seasons,

cles which

assigning each to its proper duties; nor does he allow the cy he himself has bound to be confused. Therefore whatever in its headlong

course abandons this

fixed

order

has

no

happy

outcome.)

Here two opposing conceptions of man's taposed. As Boethius the character sees
order

does

not extend man

to the realm of
exiled

simply jux it, mankind is in exile, because God's human affairs; while from Philosophy's
position

in the

universe are

point of

view,

has

himself by

failing
fact,

to

conform

to the

order

inherent
ques read

in the
tion
as a

nature of

things. What

is important to

note

is that

neither side of

the

is

guaranteed as

the author's own; in

the entire Consolatio may be

.

dialogue between these opposing

represents an attempt on

points of view

Book II

Philosophy's
are not

part to convince

Boethius the
of

character not

only that the gifts

of

fortune

by

right
of

the possession

any

human

being

but furthermore that the

apparent

flux

fortune in reality

consti

tutes a kind of order:

Constat

aeterna positumque

lege est,

ut constet genitum nihil

(Bk.

II,

m. 3,

17-18). stands

(It

stands

firm

and

fixed

by

eternal

law that nothing born

which all

firm.)

This law
suffer

of

change, according to
and

highs

lows in the turn

of

sublunary creatures are destined to fortune's wheel, when properly understood,

How to Read the Consolation

no

of

Philosophy

257
usual persona

longer functions

as

the

deceptive seductress, fortune's

teacher:

in

philo

sophical

texts, but
plus

as an effective

Etenim

hominibus

reor adversam quam prosperam prodesse cum videtur

fortunam; ilia
est,

enim

semper specie

felicitatis,

blanda, mentitur, haec

pr.

semper vera

cum se

instabilem

mutatione

demonstrat (Bk. II,

8,

3).

(Therefore, I believe that bad fortune is

ter,
while

of more use to mankind than good, means of the appearance of change

for the lat

it

seems propitious,

deceives

whereas

the

former is

always

true, for

by by its

happiness,
essential

it demonstrates its

instability.)
This
pedagogical power of
when

fortune

was

foreshadowed

and

dramatized early in
paradox of vision of

Book 1 1
address

Dame

Philosophy

put on

the mask of Fortuna herself in order to

Boethius'

complaints

(Bk. II,

pr.

2,

iff.).

What is more, the

change as
"amor"

the order of fortune gives rise at the end of Book 1 1 to the

as

the

principle of order

in the

universe:

Hanc

rerum seriem

ligat
(Bk. II,

terras ac pelagus regens

et caelo

imperitans

amor

m.

8,

13-15).
and which controls

(Love,

which rules supreme

in heaven,

both land

and sea, also

binds this

series of

things.)
response

Thus

we

have the first

thought chaotic turns out verse, seen in the light

dilemma: the very fortune which he to function according to a law proper to it, and the uni
to

Boethius'

of

fortune's law, is
author's

governed

by

tensile

harmony, best
of uni

described lated
on

"amor"

as

But again,

one must remember that this

description

versal order

is

not

necessarily the

opinion; instead it

represents a calcu

attempt

by

Dame

Philosophy

to

communicate with

Boethius the

character

terms

which

he is

capable of understanding.

This

point

becomes

all the more clear when

in Book III

we see that certain as question.

pects of this
metrum of

first

conception of universal order are called

into

The first
poems

Book III

reads

very

much

like

metrum

of

Book I, both
the

preach a proper order which

it is

man's

duty

to

imitate; but in

section,
certain

#2,

which seeks

to describe the
emerge.

nature of

this order

very in greater detail,

the
poem

next verse

troubling

traits begin to

Dame

Philosophy

opens

by

governs the uni stating her intention to sing of the means by which nature's illustrative of examples verse. There follow three ability to reassert her self despite the artificial interventions of humanity: the tame lion, who once he

"Natura"

tastes

blood,

recovers

his

wild

nature; the caged

when

bird,
to

who, though

well

fed

by

its

haunts; human captors, breaks into song tree, the top of which has been bent to the ground, snapping back straight up when released. In all three cases man appears as in some way not belonging to
it
escapes natural

its

and

the

the

nature of

course

things, for the emphasis is on nature's capacity to maintain its own despite human interference. In addition, all three examples bear associa-

258

Interpretation
which might well

tions of violence or ingratitude

ease about
and again

instill in the

reader a certain un

the operations of

nature.38

Likewise in the fourth

and

final example,
1

no place process

for

in the concluding lines man. The return of the

of man's

of

the poem, the natural order

sun

described holds
.31

every morning

at

dawn (i

-33)

is

independent

control;

and

the concluding generalities about the

"eternal
of

return"

of nature

certainly

suggest man's

things, for he is just that creature who seems ginning and thus to enter into the eternal round of
Repetunt
proprios quaeque recursus

singularity in the larger scheme unable to join his end to his be

nature:

redituque suo singula gaudent

nee manet ulli

traditus ordo
ortum

nisi quod

fini iunxerit

stabilemque sui

fecerit

orbem

(Bk. II,

m. 2, 34-38).

(All things any

order

seek out

their proper cycles and everything rejoices

except

in its

own

return,

nor

is

handed down to anything,

that it join its

beginning

to

its

end and

make a stable circuit of

itself.)
things celebrated in the second book is

Thus the
have

natural order of

here

shown to

precious

little to do
"amor"

with

the realities of the human condition. What is more,

as

the principle

of

no

longer functions law

of

it did in the final

verse section of

Book II,
world.
"amor"

where

it

constituted a

In Book II the turning

were seen as

or bond uniting the disparate contraries of the Fortune's wheel and the cosmic principle of

for

more

(Bk. II,

m.

counterbalancing man's lawless appetites, his eternal desire 2); thus the book can end on a triumphant note of achieved desire:

harmony

between

order and

O felix hominum

genus

si vestros animos amor quo caelum regitur regat

(Bk.

II,

m.

8,

28-30).

(O

happy

race of

men, if the love

by

which

heaven is

ordered orders your

minds.)

But in Book III

nature's eternal return

"amor"

is

suggested to

be

of

little

concern

to

man

kind final
man

and

metrum of

loses its status as a principle of order. When in the consequently Book III Orpheus attempts to rescue Eurydice from Hades, a hu
with

interference

the cycle of nature parallel to those described in the second

"amor"

metrum, he fails because his "law": 'Donamus

comitem viro

cannot

bear to be

constrained

by

Hades'

emptam carmine sed

coniugem;

lex dona coherceat,

What is more, the literary background to some of these images conjures up very unsettling Thus the image of the lion calls to mind the famous Aeschylean lion cub in the Aga memnon (717-36), while the bent tree echoes the Bacchae grisly demise of Pentheus in
38.
associations.
Euripides'

(1062-75).

How to Read the Consolation

ne

of

Philosophy

259

dum Tartara liquerit

sit

fas

lumina

flectere.'

Quis legem det

Maior lex ('We

amantibus?

amor est sibi

(Bk.

Ill,

m.

12, 42-47).
a song.

grant as companion to gift:

her husband this wife, bought for

But let

one

law

hedge in this

it is
a

not allowed to on

look back

until

he has left the infernal

regions.'

Who may impose

law

lovers? Love is its

own greater

law.)
to

Thus

all

that has

happened in the intense

progress

from Book I

Book III is the

at

tainment of a more
with

and more sophisticated sense of man's

disjunction
are

the

universe.

The up

realm of

fortune

"amor"

and

as

described in Book II

in Book III
does

shown

as

of course this

is

not the

in reality excluding all properly human aspiration. But whole picture; Boethius the author is not a Camus, he
in
"absurd"

not envision man as

an

relation with

the

world.

What has been

lacking

throughout Books II and III is a sense of man's proper place in the uni
answer

verse; but the

to this

lack,

which will

be treated in detail in Books IV

and

V, has already been foreshadowed in

the central verse section,

#9,

of

Book III.

There, in
of

the context of a prayer, all that will become explicit in the disquisitions
"homeland"

final two books, is succinctly summarized. Man does have a but he is in exile from it and his re-entry into it requires not only
the
within one

movement

dimension, but the

passage

from

one

dimension to
as

another.

it is his

possible

to characterize man's place or homeland

the lack

of a

Likewise, home, as
is
on the

pilgrim status

way towards

some

in the universe, but only very definite goal

.

with

the proviso that

man

In Book I V the
certain precision.

means of

progressing towards this

wing
the prose

goal are mapped out with a

The

significance of the
arguments of

imagery

in the first

verse section

is

elucidated not

only in the

sections

but,

even more strik

ingly, in
metrum

the

measures of

the verse sections.

not

Thus in the fifth

metrum while

the obstacle

to man's return

is declared to be,
reminiscent of

distance, but ignorance,

ignorance
and potential

in the

sixth

the

object of man's

actual

knowledge is de
"amor":

scribed

in terms

"amor"

in Book II, but

with certain all-important

differences. God is
Hie

portrayed as

harmonizing

the cosmos

by

means of

est cunctis communis amor

repetuntque

boni fine teneri, durare

queant

quia non aliter

nisi converso rursus amore refluant causae quae

dedit

esse

(Bk. IV,

m.

6,

44-48).
seek

(This is the love

common

to

all

things, whereby they

to be

contained within

the

boundary

of

the good;

for

not otherwise are return

they

able to endure, unless, with

love

turned back

full circle, they

to the

cause which gave

them

being.)
is
pro

But the

relation

between the

principle of order and

the ordered universe

foundly
"amor"

different from that drawn in the final

metrum of

Book II. There the

in the world regulating the cosmos was depicted as immanent

itself,

260
whereas

Interpretation
here the
principle of order as

is radically

transcendent.

The world,
m.

as

be

fore, is depicted but, in contrast,

empt

the agent of

6, 6-33), moving in eternally order is exempt from this circularity, for he is ex

repetitive circles

(Bk. IV,

from

all movement:

Sedet interea

conditor altus

rerumque regens

flectit habenas
et origo,

rex et

dominus, fons

lex

et sapiens arbiter aequi,

et quae motu concitat

ire firmat (Bk. IV, in

m.

sistit retrahens ac vaga

6,

34-39)-

(Meanwhile the

lofty

creator sits

control

turning
and

the reins of

things, the

king

and

lord,

the

fount

and

source, the law and

wise arbiter of

justice,

and what

he has

put

into

motion,

by

pulling back, he brings to

halt,

he

stabilizes what otherwise would

wander.)

Thus
agree

by

the end of the fourth book Boethius the character and Dame

Philosophy
an activity:

that there

is

an order

to the universe and, what

is

even more

important,

order which makes sense

to human beings

and makes sense of

human

Ite nunc, fortes,

ubi celsa magni

ducit

exempli via.

Cur inertes

terga nudatis?
sideradonat

Superata tellus
(Bk.

IV,

m.

7, 32-35).
the

(Now

go

forth, heroes,

where

lofty
of

path of

the

great exemplar

leads. Why, inac bestows the

tive, do
stars.)

you

keep
this

your

backs free

burdens? The

earth once overcome

What

renders

order

humanly

satisfying, in a way
some

which

the order described

just as man is way what makes this of transcendence is But in some way very quality this order so inaccessible to man, for if man is in one sense out of nature, he is
in Book II
was

not, is the fact that it is in

out of nature,

out of nature.

even more solution

to

obviously bound to nature. The expression it will constitute the content of Book V.
pointed out

of this

dilemma

and of the

As I have strikingly in the

in

more

than one context, metra 3 and

metres of

of

Book V

echo metra

and

of

Book I. The

the respective poems are

the same; in the

second

first

of each pair

Boethius the
somewhat

character expresses

his dilemma;
The

Dame Philosophy,

obliquely,

suggests a solution. poems

real and significant sent

difference lies in the fact that the two

of

in Book I

repre verse

the mere juxtaposition

two opposing points of view,

expresses elicit

whereas

in

section

and

of

Book V Boethius first

which

his dilemma in from Dame in

sophisticated

terms, terms

eventually

intellectually Philosophy the

strong

epistemological poem which

is

verse section

and

which she makes a

case

for the

existence of

the more active and creative

mental

faculties. In Book I
to harmo
de-

Boethius

says one

thing, Dame

Philosophy

another; there

is

no attempt

nize their respective points of

view, because it

will require

the

whole process

How to Read the Consolation

picted
speak

of

Philosophy

261
as

the same

in Books II, III, and IV before Boethius and Philosophy can, language. The various philosophical doctrines and

it were,
the

arguments

employed are process

important in
a

whereby

themselves, but human interlocutor progresses to

and of condition

even more

important is

the point where he is on the

verge of

viewing his human

pair of poems

from

radically different perspective, that,

as

in fact,

of eternity.

For the

in Book V portray Boethius

critical

change of procedure
Boethius'

from thought to

thought and

making the decisive Dame Philosophy as

wonders

completing
and

tentative venture into epistemology. Boethius first

why the universe is so constructed as to allow the paradox of divine providence

human free

will

(Bk. V,

m.

3, 1-5) but

immediately

thereafter asks the

paradox

more self-conscious and sophisticated

question, is this apparent

merely
m.

the result of our

limited

powers of perception and reasoning?

(Bk. V,

3,

6-10)

The

remainder of the poem

mixture of

knowledge

and

is taken up with reflections on the peculiar ignorance which is characteristic of the human mind.

In the fourth
workings of man mental

verse section

Philosophy

continues these

investigations into the

an

the

human

mind and claims

that essential to the

mind's

activity is

an appreciation of

understanding of hu active role in perception,

imagination,
mind's

and reason.

Thus in

metrum

capacity for

creative thought while

3 Boethius the character exhibits the in metrum 4 Dame Philosophy draws

her
revelation of

general conclusions

from this in the

not

one example as prelude to

the

mysteries of eternity.

We

see then that

progress

from Book I to Book V the

it
might

question of

the or

der

of

the universe is
of an

handled

as

have been in

an

Aristotelian treatise.
we are pre as polar
other

Instead

sented with a
posites

exclusively rational account of the problem at hand, dialogue between two interlocutors who at first appear in the
end complete each other's arguments.

op

but

who

we are not

of

the

merely presented with a story, as rise of universal order; essential to it

and

hand, for instance in Hesiod's Theogony,

Boethius'

On the

story

are

the various

arguments contained within

which structures

the over-arching epistemological

of

hierarchy
even more
or order

it.

By

the

blending

these two modes of discourse Boethius

the author contrives not only to dramatize the process of

thought, but

significantly, to dramatize the emergence, on the

epistemological

level,

itself. That is, Boethius not only gives an account, in fact several accounts, of or der in the universe; he also tells a story about the revelation of order in the pro cess of human thought. He seems to imply that it is inadquate merely to give an
account without

story Thus poetry

mutually

without

placing that account in the context of a story, or just to tell subjecting it to the rigor of a philosophical account.
and

philosophy,

exclusive modes of requires an

along with many in antiquity feel to be discourse, are here used to complement each other.
which we
an

Every

story

explanation,

interpretation;

and yet

merely to explain, every

explanation
a

to interpret,

or

to give

an account

of, is

by

itself

unsatisfying:

must lead to another, better

story if it is

not

to remain sterile.

By

constructing

262
text in

Interpretation
which various stories are subject

to the critical account of philosophy,

in

which various philosophical accounts are contained within a

larger story, in

hierarchy, hierarchy ushers in the vision of God creating and viewing his creation as a poem, by intertwining all these strategies Boethius manages not only to produce a subtly nuanced and delicately balanced
which structured

that larger story

is

according to an epistemological

and

finally,

in

which that epistemological

depiction
such a

of

the human condition, he also demonstrates

reconciliation of

what

is

required

to make

depiction possible, namely, the

poetry

and philosophy.

Early

in the

same

century in

which

Cassiodorus

composed

his Institutiones

that model of perfection for the ossification of the Greco-Roman tradition under the aegis of the Christian cult, and in
rough and guide
which

Benedict

produced

his Regula in the

ready

patois

that spoken Latin had become in the sixth century as a

to the practice of

"holy ignorance",
on

Boethius

contrives a

text which avoids

the complementary pitfalls of merely academic erudition and religious igno

rance, which, in

fact, betrays

its

author's part a

mastery

of

the ancient tradi

tion and an ability to handle that tradition creatively. Boethius himself was no

doubt nominally a Christian: for all intents and purposes there was no other cult available in the Latin West; one could not hold official posts without being a

Christian;

and

it is

as certain as

these matters can be that Boethius in fact wrote

him.39

the theological treatises ascribed to

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were convinced

But the fact that many scholars of the that Boethius the author of

the

Consolatio

could not

have

composed

Christian theological treatises together

with

the further fact that medieval commentators were

Boethius'

by

and

large

anxious

about ciation or
Boethius'

orthodoxy,

whether

they

expressed that

anxiety in direct denun

passages,40

by

attempting to
and

gloss over certain

troubling

suggests that

Christianity,

thus his role in the transition from antiquity to the

European Middle Ages, is an unusual and complicated one. are echoes of Christian doctrine and of the Christian scriptures to be found here and there in the Consolatio,*'1 but the truly significant fact is that in
western

There

the final analysis the text, though not anti-Christian,

Faced
39.

with

his

own

mortality Boethius
are

refuses to cut the

is profoundly non-Christian. Gordian knot by throwde

divinisub-

The theological treatises

De Trinitate, Utrum
substantiae

pater etfilius et spiritus sanctus eo quod sint

tate substantialiter praedicentur,

stantialia

Quomodo

in

bonae

sint cum non sint

bona (or De Hebdomadis), Contra Eutychen et Nestorium. The De Fide Catholica is com monly agreed not to be the work of Boethius. 40. See Courcelle, op. cit., pp. 333-44 for an enlightening discussion of the medieval tradition
of

Boethian

commentaries.

The information in the early

which

Courcelle

marshalls makes

it

clear that although

Boethius
read the and

was a standard author

middle ages and

into

the twelfth century, the monks who

of

Consolatio carefully For

a

were struck and puzzled

by

its lack

any

overt mention of

Christianity

by
41.

certain arguments at variance with

Christian
to

orthodoxy.

handy

list

of possible references

Holy

Scripture

see:

Severini Boethii Philosophiae

pols, 1957, p. 109.

Consolatio, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina

Beiler, L., Anicii Manlii 94, Tumhout, Bre-

How to Read the Consolation

of

Philosophy

263

ing himself onto the

tricacies of that

mercy of a God made man; rather he carefully traces the in knot and produces a portrait of man, ignorant and hungry for for immortality. Although
and

wisdom, mortal and nostalgic

eral occasions appropriated

Christianity has

on sev

philosophy

poetry

as

handmaidens to revelation,
with

it is
the

nonetheless slow

deeply

suspicious of

the artifices of poetry and impatient

hard

work of philosophy.

Boethius, in contrast,

works with and through

these two modes of

as one of
middle

discourse

and produces a philosophical

poem,

which serves

the few examples of

philosophy"

"doing
question of

available

to the early Latin

ages, and

which provided a store of poetic strategies

to

be

exploited

by
to
not

the likes of Dante and

Chaucer. The

Boethius'

personal allegiance

Christianity
done among
one another.

is probably
gentlefolk

is certainly in bad taste to force simplistic statements of belief or

unanswerable and

it is just
unbelief

from

What

we

do know,

what

Boethius

allows us

to know is that, con

fronted

with

death, he

chose to practice

philosophy

and poetry.

social research
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The Armed Founder

Machiavelli
and

versus

the

Catonic Hero:

Rousseau

on

Popular

Leadership

Joseph Masciulli
St. Francis Xavier

University

I. INTRODUCTION

In The Prince
posed

to the

sance of

a political education op Christian that was dedicated to the renais prevailing understanding Roman republican virtue. The core of Machiavelli's doctrine of educa

and

Discourses, Machiavelli disclosed

tion

is

republican allows

in

spirit

albeit

harsh,

expansive republicanism. rule

whether

Its periphery,
tied to a

however,
notion of

for the

alternative of

princely

kingship

the common good or

tyranny

under some circumstances.

Machiavelli's unscholarly readers, however, have concluded after reading The Prince that his advocacy of tyranny is the center of his consciously revolutionary teaching. A majority of Machiavelli's scholarly readers, on the
Most
of
other

hand, have

sought

to explain away his simultaneous

recommendation of re

publican

statesmanship,

kingship,

and

tyranny by viewing
this
now

the latter two as sub

was one of

ordinate means to the attainment of

republicanism.1

Rousseau

the

first
of

and most

influential thinkers to

encourage

dominant scholarly

view

tion in the Discourse

considered

Machiavelli's theory. In putting forward his own republican political educa on Political Economy and the Social Contract, Rousseau
Machiavelli
tyrants
and

kings

important ally who only feigned to give the better to teach the people how to attain and
an

advice

to

safeguard

their freedom.

following analysis, I will attempt to show that there are suggestive par allels or family resemblances between Machiavelli's and Rousseau's doctrines of
In the
popular statesmanhip, more specifically, of their notions of the armed prophet or

founder,

the

senatorial

hero,

and the

legislator. I

will also

contend,

however,
virtue

that

Rousseau's teaching quite foreign to Machiavelli's essentially

aims at

gives primacy to a tragic,

own preference

inward-looking for a daring and warlike

fortune in

virtue which

is

that

overcoming the power of

political affairs

to the

greatest extent possible.

II. POPULAR STATESMANSHIP VERSUS TYRANNY

Rousseau

makes clear

in the Political

Economy that he

and

Machiavelli

are on

the same side

i of

upholders of popular

freedom

and opponents of tyranny.

Only

Cf.

Harvey

C. Mansfield's introduction to his

1985), pp. vii-viii.

translation of

The Prince (Chicago:

University

Chicago Press,

266

Interpretation
on

statesmanship based
statesmanship between the
will"

the

general

will, says

Rousseau, is legitimate:
there

the

kind

of

characteristic of a regime

in

which

is "a unity

of

interest

and

people and

anny, has
are

prevailed

its leaders. Nonetheless, the very opposite, tyr in the historical practice of politics, and tyrannical maxims
archives of

inscribed in the

history

and

"the

Machiavelli"

satires of

(P,

in,

247).2

Machiavelli, Rousseau
he teaches
censures

suggests, is writing on two levels: on the surface level, how to dominate peoples; but on a second, deeper level he tyrannical domination from the perspective of popular republicanism.
princes us

Rousseau tells

in the Social Contract that he

Florentine Histories. This

was convinced of

this

interpreta

tion of Machiavelli's
on

teaching from comparing The Prince

comparative

to the Discourses

Livy

and the

analysis, he claimed,
gave some

showed

that "in pretending to give lessons to

kings, [Machiavelli]

people."

very

good ones

to the

Machiavelli,

the lover of

liberty
every

and profound po

litical thinker, was the enemy of the papal (Book III, Chapter 6: P, m, 409, 1480). 3
In his
moved

court and of

other

king's

court

comparative

reading,
praise

one would

surmise, Rousseau was especially

by

Machiavelli's
who

in the Florentine Histories for those

leading Flor

entine

citizens,

in their

city's conflict with

the pope, acted so as to demon

strate that

they
7).

cared

III, Chapter
defense defend
p.

for their earthly fatherland more than for their souls (Book More importantly, Rousseau could be confident of his interpreta

tion of Machiavelli's

teaching

of popular republicanism popular rule against

in view of the latter's pathbreaking in the Discourses. In this work, attempting to the charges of "all the (Book I, Chapter 58;
as republican
writers"

262), Machiavelli declares that it is

not without reason one sees

likens

the voice of a people to the voice of

opinione

God: because

one

that a universal opinion [una

universale] arrives at marvelous

results

in

its prognostications; foresaw its

so much so that

it

seems as

if by

some occult virtue

it [the people]

own evil and good.

With

regard to

its

judgment,

when two speakers of

equal skill are

heard advocating different alternatives, very rarely does one find it [the people] failing to adopt the better opinion, and incapable of appreciating the truth it hears. And, if in bold things and those which appear useful, as it is said above, it errs,

2. See the CEuvres completes de J. -J. Rousseau, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, 4 vols, thus far (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959-). P, in, 247 means vol. ill, p. 247, etc. For Machiavelli I have used the Opere, ed. Sergio Bertelli (Milano: Feltrinelli, i960). References

for the Prince

and Discourses are to vol. 1 and for Florentine History, vol. vn. For the Political Economy, I have consulted the Cole Everyman trans, and the Masters St. Mar tin's trans. For the Prince, I have of Dallas Press, 1980); usually cited Alvarez's trans.

(University

for the Discourses I

cited

Fr. Walker
used

trans.,

most accessible

in the Penguin Books

ed.
rev.

For Plutarch's Lives, I have Hugh Clough, pp. 918-60.

3.

the Modern

Library
see

ed., trans. John Dryden and

Arthur

On Rousseau's relationship to
and as

Machiavelli,

the excellent
et son

survey
ed.

of the works

Cucchi, "Rousseau, lecteur de

PP-

Machiavel,"

by

Paolo M.

in Rousseau

temps,

M.

Launay

(Paris, 1968),

17-35;

or

Political

Satire?"

background to satire, Garrett Mattingly, "Machiavelli's Prince: Political Science The American Scholar, vol. 27, no. 4 (Autumn 1958), 482-91.

The Armed Founder

many times It is

versus the

Catonic Hero
passions,

267

more errs a prince

in his

own

and these are much stronger than

those of a people.

found, too,

that in the election of magistrates the people makes far better

nor can the people ever

choice than point

does the prince;

a vast

be

persuaded that

it is

good to

ap

to such an office a man of

and

infamous life
be

or corrupt

easily

in

variety

of ways

persuaded to

habits, whereas a prince may do so (i, 58; p. 264).

A people,

says

Machiavelli,
balance

can

universal or general opinion

effectively be guided in its future actions it has about what is good or evil for it.
is less
or

by that
and

Though
less

on

a people

subject to

blind

passions than

kings

likely

to choose

incompetent
when

infamous

and corrupt

statesmen,

still

Mach
when

iavelli

grants

that a people can make mistakes. It can err most easily

deciding foreign

affairs,

bold

and useful projects are at

issue. But,

as

well,

a people can make mistakes when

deliberating

about

domestic

matters.

For,

Machiavelli asserts,

a people will

usually

adopt the

better

opinion and

be

able to

distinguish truth from

falsehood,

provided

the speakers who are putting forth

not always

various alternatives are of equal skill

which, of course, is
popular rule

the

case.

Thus Machiavelli
must

stipulates that

for

to be

defensible,
must not

the people

be

"well-ordered"

(Dis. 1, 58;

p. 264).

That is to say, it

be corrupt,

but
or

rather

law-abiding

and united. pp.

And to become united,

cf.

a people needs

heads

leaders (Dis. 1, 57;

in
goodness and

260-61;

1,

1-2):

perior to peoples
new

glory the people is by far superior [to princes]. And if princes are su in ordering laws, forming codes of civic life, establishing statutes and
much superior

orders, peoples are so

adds to the

it

indubitably

glory

of

in maintaining things once established, that those who ordered them (Dis. 1, 58; p. 265).
means

In this context,
to

by

"princes"

Machiavelli

the

leading

actors

in any

regime:

armed prophets or

founders,

statesmen, and legislators. For a republican regime

be well-ordered, there must be a reciprocal, symbiotic, and dynamic relation ship between the few and the many grounded on their respective needs and pow
ers.

The princely leaders have the

power

stemming from their

virtue to order the

people

into

an effective whole either through new orders or reformed ones.

goodness

For

as

its part, the people has the it preserves their orders in the
present and

to

manifest

its

gratitude

towards its

leaders recog
on

new or renewed reciprocal

and gives them glorious

nition

future. This

contributes the

conditions

for order, prosperity,

relationship and independence based

in

which one side

im is

perial power, while the other side provides stable adherence and support

Machiavelli's formula for

over, Machiavelli's
tial
"humors"

effectual

justice (Dis. 1, 1;

pp.

131-32).

It is,

more essen

version of an

implicit

social contract

between the two

that constitute society: the great who wish to

dominate
9).

and

the

common people who

desire

not to

be dominated (cf. Pr., Ch.

Like Machiavelli, Rousseau sees the broad outlines of a solution to the prob lem of political unity in the reciprocal relationship of the exceptionally virtuous few and the many who have the potential to acquire a popular or general will. In

268
the

Interpretation
section of

introductory

the Political

Economy, Rousseau for

that "common

the

first time

self"

mentions the notion of

the

general will as

that gives

life

to

the state as a moral

whole and provides

being, caring for the preservation and well-being of the of each part (P, in, 245). Conformity to the dictates of the general will
standard

the

for just

as opposed

to tyrannical statesmanship.
reflections on modern natural

The

general will relation

is derived from Rousseau's

alternative.

right in la
an

to the ancient

If we judge

by his

first

use of

volonte

generale, in the Political Economy, then it is

clear that

the term, he intends it as

ideal
the

standard

that is

meant

to correct the atomistic individualism of Hobbes

on

by
of

application of

the Platonic- Aristotelian emphasis

the unifying character

the passages

the idea of justice (cf.

P,

in, 244-45,

248-49).

Nonetheless,

first delineate Rousseau's understanding of the general will echo and have a family resemblance to Machiavelli's teaching on the popular will in Discourses
that
1,58.

Now, in clarifying
omy,

what

he
a

means

by

the general will

in the Political Econ Political society variety of interre

which mod will

Rousseau distinguishes

variety

of associations and wills.

composed of a

is

not

homogeneous, he
smaller societies ways

maintains.

Rather, it is

lated,

permanent or

temporary, formal
these

or tacit

ify
ted

in many

"the

will,"

appearances of the public

that

is,

of

the general

(P, in,

246).

United

by

their common

interests,

partial societies are anima

by

a will that

is

general

from the

perspective of

its members, but

particular

and

hence

pernicious
can

from the
a

perspective of
a

the whole society:

[A person]
citizen.

be

devout priest,
can

brave

soldier, or a zealous patrician, and a

bad

[Their]

deliberation

be

advantageous to the small community, and

particular societies

very
the

pernicious to the

large. It is true that them,

one should

being always subordinate

to the others, that

to those

which contain

obey the

latter in

preference

duties

of a citizen go

before those

of a

senator, and those of man before those of the

proportion

citizen; but unfortunately personal interest is found always in inverse

to

duty,
most

and

increases
less
and

to the extent that the association

becomes

more narrow and the en

gagement

sacred:

invincible

proof that the most general will

is

also always the

just,

the

voice of

the people

is in fact the

voice of

God (P, m,

246).

Rousseau
is the
seau

as much as

Machiavelli

claims that the universal opinion of a people

ultimate and most authoritative source of political morality. even more emphatic than

Indeed, Rous
instead
of a

is
is

Machiavelli, employing
of

an

identity

simile
seau

(the

voice of

the people "is in fact the voice of God").

Furthermore,

Rous

unambiguous

in affirming that the declarations

the general

will are

only

the universal opinion of that particular people as to what is

that such

just, for he
of of

contends

m,

245).

declarations may well be faulty from the perspective Though Rousseau raises the un-Machiavellian notion
earthly city
with

foreigners (P,
the possibility

of a unified caused

its

by

the general wills of the rest of his

universal general will overcoming the divisions different peoples, he quickly sets aside this notion
of

and conducts

inquiry on the assumption

the existence of distinct

popular wills

(P, in,

245).

The Armed Founder

versus the

Catonic Hero

269 language to describe

Third, like Machiavelli, Rousseau

the popular will.
ple's

appropriates religious

Pointing

with a sense of awe

to the sacred character of the peo

declarations, Rousseau stresses the same occult, popular excellence under lined by Machiavelli (cf. P, in, 248). Fourth, in the Political Economy Rousseau echoes Machiavelli's concern that
the people can

be

"seduced"

by
Machiavelli's incompetent
says

the eloquence of clever speakers to

make

bad

judgments Rousseau

about common affairs repeats

(P, in,

246).

And, later in

the Social

Contract,
less

key

contention

in Discourses 1,

58 that unlike

kings

who choose

or corrupt

magistrates, "the

people errs much

prince."

than the

For,

to head a

republican government

These

family

people elevates only those of true merit (Bk. Ill, Ch. 6; P, in, 410). resemblances, echoes, or parallels in Rousseau's teaching of

Rousseau the

Machiavelli's Rousseau's
tween

premise of popular

acceptance of and

leaders

statesmanship are accompanied, moreover, by Machiavelli's notion of a unity of interest and will be the people albeit a unity grounded on a division of political

labor. As Machiavelli had

that transcends the
"virtue"

done, Rousseau
"sublime,"

asserts

the need for a

divisions

of particular associations and classes.

the

that exceptional,

rare, heroic

virtue

unity And it is only of armed found

political

ers,

legislators, (cf. PE, P, in, 248; SC,

and senatorial statesmen which can accomplish

this unifying task

11, 7;

P,

in, 381).

III. THE ARMED FOUNDER

the armed founder while explicating a

Rousseau

adumbrates

his

notion of

maxim of popular

he

restates

laws"

with

the

which statesmanship, "Follow in everything the general "administration be in in the form that the government's conformity of the general will (PE, P, in, 251). The laws are the central con

cern; Rousseau

initially

seems to view the role of the

established

instrument

of

the laws

by

chef or head as passive, an leader must simply, it legislator. The the

amount of

seems, learn
and

not to

employ

disproportionate

force to

uphold

the

law

to

retain

his

However, in
Economy,
If it is
them
a

the

impartiality final, lengthy

under all circumstances. paragraph of

emerges:

this

first

section of the

Political

Machiavellian leitmotiv
to know how to

good

use men as

they

are, it

is

worth much more still

to make

what

there

is

a need that

they be;
and

the

most absolute

authority is that

which pene

trates to the very interior of man,

is

exercised no

less

on the will than on actions.

It

is

certain that

the

people are

in

the

long

run what

the government makes them

be. War
and

riors, citizens,
prince who

men when

it wants;

populace and canaille when

it

pleases

it;

despises his

subjects

dishonors himself in showing that he did

not

every know

how to

render

them worthy of

esteem

(P,

in, 251).

According to Rousseau "the great art of ancient imitated by modern leaders; they can mold the wills

(P, in, 252)

of

can

be

essentially

malleable men

270 into the

Interpretation
will

to generalize

the unified popular will

of citizens who will

desire

the common good and fight to defend their homeland. This

zen's psyche and

formation

of

the citi

body is

Above all, for the citizen "the first of the laws is to respect the dered riors

necessary because naturally men are not political. to become political, he must learn to respect the laws;
laws,"

but this disposition

cannot

be

engen

by

written

laws (P, in,

249).

What is

required to make men political

is

comprehensive

and citizens.

fashioning by morals and manners appropriate to republican war Addressing himself to every potentially heroic prince, Rous
break
with

seau advocates a

the mercenary

politics of

the age that gave

wish

rise to

disunited

canaille and masses:

"form men, then, if you

loved"

to command men; if

you want the

laws obeyed, make them (P, in, 251-52). Undoubtedly, in this call to the virtuous few to overcome the
albeit with some

corruption of the

age, Rousseau
active

heroic

virtue

he

analyzed

is calling for the exercise of that in his earlier Discourse on the Virtue Most Nec he
stresses

indirection

essary to the Hero. In this

wielder of

work

that the heroic founder is

an expert

force,

although

his

defining
P,

virtue of strength of soul cannot

properly
contends

be

reduced

to physical courage (cf.

n, 1263, 1268,

1272).

Rousseau

that

Men do

not govern

themselves thus

by

abstract views.

They

are

only

made

happy by

being

constrained to

be so,

and

they

must

be

made

to experience happiness for them to

often with

love it. Here lies the business

that he
puts

and talents of the

hero; it is

force in his hand

he first
con

himself in

a condition

to receive the
order

blessings

of men whom

strains to
reason

carry the
11,

yoke of the

laws, in

finally

to submit them to the authority of

(P,

1263-64).

According
mon good and

to this passage, the

law.4

heroic leader

must

to establish the rule of that results

Once the

people experience

employ force initially in the happiness or

will

order

com

from obeying the laws, then they

their reason.

learn to love them

justify
as

them

with

It is true that in the Political Economy Rousseau does

not emphasize

the use of

force

he had done in the Discourse

in the Political
warriors

on

the

Hero,

and

instead

stresses the use of

austere and peaceful morals and manners

Nonetheless,
citizens to

be

first

and

needs their arms

(cf.

section

about the need for Economy last, coming to the aid of their fatherland when it n, P, in, 261). To fashion warriors, however, the
and

in making the laws he is wholly explicit

obeyed and

loved.

leader

must

be

a warrior as

well,

know how to

wield

force expertly (such

as

Romulus,

who

is

referred to as a

founder in

section ni).

This heroic

virtue

Rousseau
of

calls

for in the Political

Economy

reminds us of
of

Machiavelli's advocacy
4.

heroic

leadership

to put an end to the corruption

Thought,"

his

See David R. Cameron, "The Hero in Rousseau's Political Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 45, no. 3 (July- September 1984), p. 401; and for an excellent study of the Discourse on the Hero that places it in its historical and contexts, see Diane Beelen Woody's unpub

literary

lished Ph.D. dissertation, Problematique du heros dans les

ecrits

de J.-J. Rousseau

Toronto,

(University

of

1981).

The Armed Founder

times

versus

the Catonic Hero

271

in The Prince. Let

mode

us read

the final chapter of The Prince according to the

interpretive

Rousseau
original
on

espouses.

In it (Chapter 26,

whose

heading
and

trans

lated from the Latin from the

is: "Exhortation to take hold

of

Italy

liberate her
de'

barbarians"),
says

the surface

level, Machiavelli
unite

exhorts

Lorenzo

Medici, ruling

prince of

What is needed,

Florence, to Machiavelli, is a

Italy

and regain

her

ancient glory. of

virtuous

leader

of

the greatness
as of

Moses,
in

Theseus (all viewed, along with Romulus, Chapter 6). Indeed, such virtue is present in the house

Cyrus,

and

armed prophets

the

de'

Medici, in

Lorenzo
ceded

himself,

and

he

him (Pr.,

102).

only follow the examples Then Machiavelli asserts

need

of greatness which pre

at present we

have

witnessed

by

God: the

sea

has opened;

a cloud

extraordinary happenings without example brought about has cleared your path; the rock has poured water;
you

it has
must

rained manna

do

yourself.

here; everything has run in favor of your greatness. The rest God does not want to do everything, so as not to take from us
that

our

free

will and a part of

glory that belongs to

us

(Pr.,

103).

If Lorenzo's

supposed

greatness,

however, depends

upon

the occurrence of these

extraordinary happenings without example, it is questionable. For these happen ings were preceded in sacred history, and are reported in the Bible as experi
enced

by Moses and the Jewish people on the way to their promised land. To be sure, moreover, Machiavelli is not reporting their occurrence a second time; in fact, in inventing a second occurrence he ridicules the first. Above all,
Machiavelli is making fun
virtue required of

Lorenzo,

to overcome the

corruption

petty autocrat who hardly possesses the in his native land. Indeed, this ridi only based on the fact that the par Lorenzo's is false. Furthermore, in

cule or satirical treatment of allel

Lorenzo is

not

between

Moses'

divine

destiny
an

and

likening

Lorenzo to Moses in saying to Lorenzo

such a ridiculous

fashion, Machiavelli may

that, just
as

none

theless be

in

ironic

manner

Moses did

not reach

the promised

land, neither would he attain the goal of a unified Italy. Machiavelli, then, is not seriously advising Lorenzo in The Prince. In
capable
satire:

the fol

lowing passage, addressing himself to men more enzo, he reveals what he really intends beyond his
it is
This
who no wonder

politically than Lor

if

during
it

the

numerous revolutions

in

Italy

and

during
is

the numer

ous manoeuvres of war, arises

always seemed that

her military

strength

extinguished.

from the fact that her

new

old orders were not good, and that there was no one
and

knew how to discover

ones;

ing

man, as

do the

new

laws

and the new orders

nothing brings as much honor to discovered by him (Pr.,

newly

ris

103).

What is required, according to Machiavelli, are leaders who will be political arti whole people (in sans and put form in the prime object of politics constituted by a this case, the Italian people). In alluding to Roman virtue, moreover, Machia
velli shows

his

preference

for

republican modes and orders agreement with

(Pr.,

105).

Rousseau, then, is in fundamental

Machiavelli's teaching that

272

Interpretation
is necessary to create the foundation for the life of citizens and life according to the rule of laws accepted by the popular will as a corrupt mercenary politics based on the collection and payment
concern was more

the art of the few warriors,

a civic of

just, instead
of money.

Though Machiavelli's

in the direction

of

foreign

policy (the mercenary soldiers in Italy that precluded the attainment of national independence), and Rousseau's in that of domestic policy (monetary corruption
associated with

the

system of

taxation

as

he

elaborates

in

section in of

the Po

litical Economy),

nevertheless

both

view

the problem of political corruption as

requiring an armed prophet to provide the initial solution. In the Social Contract Rousseau leaves a place for the Machiavellian founder in his
hints
own

armed

theory, but emphasizes the notion even less than he had in the Political Economy. At the periphery of his discussion of the legislator, Rousseau
at

the necessity of an

armed

founder

who would

be

leader

of

warriors, and

whose

activity
says,

would precede that of

remember

the legislator. To found a nation success

genius will not suffice.

fully, he
is "true

that

imitative

What is

required

genius,"

nothing

that "which creates and makes everything out of

(celui

de rien) (Book II, Chap. 8; P, in, 386). Unfortunately, he Peter the Great had only imitative genius, and thus failed to under concludes, stand that the Russians first had to be made into warriors, then civilized with the
qui cree et fait tout

appropriate

laws

and

institutions (cf. iv, 4, note; P, in,

444).

IV. THE SENATORIAL HERO

The
rather,

armed

founder is

not

Rousseau's

central model of popular

leadership;

it is the senatorial,

republican

hero

above all as exemplified

by Cato the
will con

Younger. Rousseau

considers

Catonic

virtue to

be the

epitome of political virtue

in the Political Economy. Political

virtue requires

that "the particular

of

form to the

will"

general

(P,

in, 252). At the level

heroism

such virtue

de

mands that one act as when

Cato did, giving up his life to affirm the general good, even Caesar had won the physical battle on behalf of a tyranny that negated the
clear

popular will.

It is
will

from the latter formulation that for Rousseau

"virtue"

to generalize one's concerns

of

in times

of peace and of

war; this

is simply the is the excel

politi

lence its

the citizen that alone the

will

interests him in the Political Economy. And

cal virtue or

to generalize, he contends, requires love of the fatherland as

passionate

fuel

or

zens,
and

however,

first

of all

energy (P, in, 254). For this love to develop among the citi the leaders must act in the manner of the most virtuous

talented Roman senators, like

Cato, protecting
not

the rights and liberties

politicians.

of

the

citizens against would-be

tyrants,

like modern, mercenary

Blinded

by

their ambition to acquire and maintain power, modern

politicians

confound their

glory

with

the misery of the people, says

of

Rousseau,

and resort quest

to

using

"dark

art"

consisting

force

and

fraud (P, m,

253).

This blind

for

The Armed Founder

power and methods

versus

the C atonic Hero

273

glory may result in the acquisition of power, but not of glory, for such produce a fragmented society of self-interested individuals unable to

glorify the leader. Thus

A herdsman
governs

his dogs

and

his herds,

and

is only the last

of men.

If it be

fine

thing
your

to command, it is when those who obey us can honor us:

show respect

then to

fellow citizens,

and you will make yourself

respectable; show respect to

liberty,
be

and your power will

increase daily:

never exceed your rights and

they

will soon

come unlimited

(P,

in, 258).
accepts the

Rousseau,

we

see,

fully
,

Machiavellian doctrine that be

political ambi

tion and the exercise of power are good things which can
competent way (e.g. the leaders of the Roman republic) ner (e.g., Louis XII of France) (Pr., Ch. 3).

satisfied either

in

or an

incompetent

man

All men,
to be
not

says

Machiavelli,
without

that political actor who

without

things and glory (Pr., Ch. 25), but "to kill fellow decides his citizens, to betray his friends,
seek material
religion"

faith,

pity,

without

can acquire

"imperium but

glory"

(Pr., Ch. 8;
we read

42).

If

one wants

to acquire immortal glory, The Prince

tells

us

(if

it

as

having

a republican

intention),

one must cultivate

that

greatness and nature with

nobility of mind prevalent in the Roman senate. Even Scipio 's easy "would have in time wronged [his] fame and glory, had he continued
. . .

it in the imperium, but

of

since

he lived

under

the

government of

the

Senate,
ch.

these harmful

qualities were not

only hidden, but brought him

glory"

(Pr.,

17;

pp.

102-3

the Alvarez trans.).

For,

when one's ambition

is

exercised

in

the context the unique

of a republican

senate, the distinct

strengths of each compensate

for

weaknesses of each:

For this

reason a republic
since

has

fuller life
able

and enjoys good adapt

fortune for

longer time owing

accus

than a principality, to the

it is better

to

itself to diverse

circumstances a man who

diversity
in
suit

found among its

one particular

citizens than a prince can

changes. ruined

do. For

is

tomed to act
no

way, never

Hence,

when

times change and

longer

his ways, he is

inevitably

(Discourses in, 9; Walker trans.). that political efficacy and

model of a

Rousseau,

as much as

Machiavelli, then, is arguing

if
one exercises power rights of citizens

glory can alone be attained Roman senate that respects the

according to the
the assemblies

in

(P, in,

257).

Citizens, then,
and,
most

will

be

virtuous

their homeland if the leaders

protect and enhance

if they love their homeland. They will love their interests in life, property,
this is
not enough.

importantly, individual liberty. But

citizen virtue requires

In addition,

love ally

as a

bond energizing

the concrete examples of

heroic

virtuous citizens who provide a model of emulation

for the

others:

everywhere where

the

lesson is

not upheld

by

authority, and the precept

by

example,
mouth of

the instruction

remains without

fruit,

and even virtue

loses its influence in the

under

him

who

does

not practice

it. But let illustrious warriors, bent

upright

the weight of their

laurels,

preach

courage;

let

magistrates, grown

gray in

purple and on

the

tribu-

274

Interpretation
justice;
age

nals, teach
transmit

the ones and the others

will

thus form the

virtuous

successors, and talents of the to

from

to age to the

following generations,
the citizens,
261).
and

experience and

leaders,
and

the courage and

virtue of

the

common emulation of all

live

die for the fatherland (P, m,

Only when there

ciety
one's own

is

such concrete public education

in the

context of a political so or compassion

that protects the rights of citizens, encourages

humanity

for
in,

(P, n,

254-55),
of the

ad satisfies the and

desire for

rooted

fraternity (P,

258-59),

will

love

fatherland

the consequent citizen virtue

develop.

seau contrasts

To clarify the conjunction of love of the fatherland and political virtue Rous Cato the Younger with Socrates, Cato who opposed the tyrannical
of

designs his

Caesar

and

Pompey
1 134).

and whose example pierced

Rousseau's heart to

dying day
Catonic
the

(cf. P, I,

virtue

is

put

into

relief

in the Political
255).
5

Economy by being
philosopher
went about

contrasted

with

pure virtue of

Socrates (P, in,

source

The he

Socrates'

father
the

land
truth.

was

the

whole

world, says

Rousseau,
in the

as

in

search of

His happiness had its

exercise of such pure

intellectual virtue,

in seeking after individual perfection, though he fought the sophists and taught a few individuals. Socrates proved his total dedication by dying for the philosophi
cal

way

of

life

and

the truth. In contrast, Cato

was

totally

committed

to his par

ticular fatherland

his

personal

Living completely for his homeland, Cato discovered happiness in the happiness of his fellow citizens. As long as he was
Rome.

able, he defended the republic, its

laws,

and

its liberty.
senate

Appearing like
of

"a

god

mortals,"

among Plutarch's account), uncorrupted, impervious to the blandishments and Caesar who sought to flatter and bribe the senators and people
sults of their
lites"

he

stood

his

ground

in the

(Rousseau implies from

Pompey
satel

with the re

foreign
in,

conquests.

In the end, though,

when

Caesar

and

"his

(cf.

sect,

P,

in, 269) triumphed and enslaved

Rome, Cato Plutarch)

would not

give

Caesar his

greatest victory: rather

than accept (as claims

the salva

tion of

his life through Caesar's customary clemency towards the virtuous, he chose instead to commit suicide after reading the Phaedo several times, a dia logue in which Plato's Socrates discusses death and the possible immortality of individual
After
souls.

developing
be the

this contrast between the

individualistic Socrates
worthy human

and the

communitarian
rates would

Cato, Rousseau
of

concludes that while a

student of

Soc

most virtuous or excellent

being

poraries,

worthy emulator ambivalent in his judgment

Cato

would

be "the

greatest."

among his contem Though somewhat led

about the relative value of these two models of vir

tue, hence claiming that we should be instructed ond, in the final analysis Rousseau avers that we
worthy
5.

by

the

first

and

by

the sec

should prefer and celebrate the

emulator of

Cato. "For

a people

[consisting

solely]

of wise men

has

never

See Claude Pichois

and

Rene Pintard, Jean-Jacques

entre

Socrate

et

Caton (Paris: Librairie

Jose Corti, 1972),

pp. 48-64.

The Armed Founder

been

versus the

Catonic Hero

275
happy,"

instituted, but it is
leaders
as

not

impossible

to make a people

when such re

publican

Cato Cato

are

guiding the political

Rousseau
of of

views

as the model of

the happiness of the people, but in so

community (P, in, 245). excellence, then, from the perspective doing Rousseau has introduced an aspect
of the

his

general

"myth
the

of

antiquity,"6

especially

Roman

republic as

truly

democratic

and

senatorial

leadership

as concerned with

the common people's

interests. For
about

even

from Plutarch's account, it is

clear that

Cato

cared

too much

his

character and

dignity

to court the people's votes, was the first to arrive

last to leave the Senate, and would never consent to economic measures that benefited the common people, if it was likely such measures would upset the
and
constitutional order centered

in the
928).

collective

leadership

of

the senate

under

the

law (Lives,

946-47, 936, Cato's perspective, according to Plutarch, was that of the conservative sena tors who, to be sure, showed humanity towards the common people, but were

pp.

fundamentally dedicated to senatorial ascendancy (Lives, p. 933). Rousseau's Cato takes his bearings by the happiness of the common people. The mediating
term

accounting for this mythical reinterpretation is Machiavelli's popular repub licanism based on the Roman model (although I do not want to discount other

influences,
seen,

above all

that of Bodin and Montesquieu).

and

Rousseau,
as

as we

have here de

reflected on

Machiavelli's Prince

Discourses

background

material

for

developing

his

own maxims of popular

leadership. And he

reiterates

in his
claim

reformed model of

Cato,
be

of senatorial

leadership, Machiavelli's
the great

general

that a civil

order can

firmly based on

the satisfaction of the people's

for life, property, and liberty from being oppressed by 9-10, 16-17). Such a popular foundation and perspective
sires

(Pr., Chs.
Mach

conforms to

iavelli's

general call

for

a politics

based

on

"the

effectual

truth of the

thing, than
this realism

to the imagination

thereof"

(Pr., Ch.
have

15).

Machiavelli
viewed as seen or

opposed with

all versions of political

idealism,

which never

he

publics and principates that

been

constructing "imagined re known to be in (Pr.,

truth"

Ch.

15):
wise

Plato's ideal
aristocrats,

of rule

by

wise philosopher-kings, of rule

Aristotle's ideal
Machiavelli

of rule

by

and

Augustine's ideal

ready

partook

in the

spiritual

community

of

the

by City of God.

Christian

princes who al

insists,
desire

however,
A

that

politicians assume

simply that

all men are self-centered and

material things and personal glory.

closer analysis of

Rousseau's ideal

of patriotic republicanism

that is to be

shared
we

by

leaders

and citizens will reveal

its

realistic or of

Machiavellian basis. As

have seen, according to Rousseau love

to
manifest political virtue:

the fatherland motivates

leaders

and citizens

It is

certain
[l'

that the greatest

prodigies of virtue mild and

have been

produced

by

love

of

the fa
of

therland

amour

de la patrie]: this

live

sentiment which

joins the force

6. Cf. Jean Cousin. "J. -J. Rousseau, interprete des institutions romaines dans le Contrat in Etudes sur le Contrat social (Paris, 1964), pp. 13-34; and Denise Leduc-Fayette, J. -J. Rousseau
et

social

le

mythe

de I'antiquite (Paris: Vrin, 1974),

pp.

103-16.

276

Interpretation
with

self-love out

[amour-propre] to all the beauty of virtue, gives to it an energy which disfiguring it, makes of it the most heroic of all the passions (P, m, 255).
see, the
essence of
even

But,

as we now

love

of

the homeland is self-love or

self-

regard

amour-propre

though

it is

experienced

by

the political actors

ardor,"

themselves as a

"burning

and sublime

as

the

emotion a religious person

feels in
istic

loving

God (P, in,

255).

the realistic

psychological

Rousseau does not, it seems, want to emphasize of all ideal foundation the self-regarding basis

republican

patriotism,

including
though the

the type he is advocating for the corrupt

modern world.

Nonetheless,
make

amour-propre

desire for

recognition on

part of the

is a self-regarding desire, it is leaders that can well result in social

as

conditions

that

the people

happy,

as

long

the leaders are persuaded that

when

their

desire for

glorious recognition can

only be fulfilled

there are united

citizens with a sense of

liberty
and

and
who

the common good to give

recognition.

That is to say,
sion

great

leaders

love their fatherland

of personal

always experience a

ten

between this love

their

love

glory; citizens experience this

tension to a lesser tuous is not as

exists

degree,

since as

their attempt at emulating the exceptionally vir that of

actual or potential

thoroughgoing
leaders

leaders. This tension

for

exceptional

as well as common

citizens, but Rousseau's Machi

avellian path prevents

tian solution
a struggle of

him from arguing for an essentially Aristotelian or Chris to the problem. From the perspective of the latter what is required is
our prudence and unrestrained passions or

between

between

our

love

God

and of ourselves.

If

we win

the struggle, we attain

moral or spiritual per our

fection

and

hence

care about

the common good more than for

at

individual in

terests; if
seau,
men

we

lose this internal battle, then,

rejects such a are

worst,

we

become tyrants. Rous

asks, he claims,
overcome their
most
self-

however,

"perfectionist"

approach that of

they regarding passions (P, in,

that

to do what

incapable
259).

doing
what

Rather,

effecitvely he advocates is

a public education

leads to
. .

an expansion of

the self to

identify
State,

with the state or popular will:

If

[children]
its

are accustomed

early
of

enough never and

to regard their

individuality
in
some

ex own

cept

by

relations with the

body

the

to perceive, so to speak, their

existence as a part of
with

the greater

it, they will be whole (P, in, 259).

able to arrive

finally

at

identifying

way

Later

son to the

same passage Rousseau asserts, albeit rather vaguely in compari Second Discourse (cf. P. in, 189, 219), that an expanded or patriotic love results from a form of habituation of man's amour-propre (P, in, 260).
on

in this

Returning
Cato

to Rousseau's central example of a model republican leader

we. will now see what,

put the
of

lowed Cato to
on the

glory Hero Rousseau remarks

according to Rousseau's realistic psychology, al Rome before his personal glory. In the Discourse
on

the strength of

soul of

Cato

required to give a

public celebration after grief

losing

the

consulship instead

(P, 11,

1274),
soul,

a generous act

Caesar,

who also

withdrawing into private possessed the heroic virtue of

11, 1264). All heroic leaders

strength of

would not

have

performed

(cf.

P,

The Armed Founder

must possess strength of

versus the

Catonic Hero

277
strength

soul, but those like Cato put that

to the service

of

the constitutional order

other countries

because

of

their pride in their country

conditions
side

being first
self-

among

in establishing the
the common good

for

civil

freedom. Patrio

tism, then, has this

Rousseau
of

thoroughly self-regarding

but it is

an expanded

regard consistent with

of a particular nation.

No

sooner

did

introductory Economy than he quickly laid it to rest, as we saw. For republican politics based on being spiritually superior to other states could not function in the absence of particular regimes. During the civil war, fleeing among strangers,
raise section

the possibility of a unified earthly city in the

the Political

Cato for

refused

to shave,

have his hair cut,

or

ner when at

table. Cato acted like one in mourning for a

any longer recline in the Roman man most beautiful beloved, essentially inferior
and

whom all other objects of possible affection are

hence

unworthy

of one's

love.

THE CATONIC LEGISLATOR

In Rousseau's

account

in the Political Economy,

In the end, though, he

we

have

seen

that

Cato

sought political recognition. recognition cial

in future

centuries

attaining for his total dedication to his fatherland. In the So

was satisfied with

Contract, Rousseau
and

tells us that the legislator also hopes to attain "distant

stature of a god

glory,"

like Cato has the

among

mortals

(P,

in, 381;

cf.

245)-

Furthermore,

the legislator relies

not on

force, but

on

his "great

soul"

to lead

the people to the condition where

they

adopt

good, and enlists the

support of myths about

laws embodying their common the will of the divine. Rousseau

the legislator, with such "pru clearly follows Machiavelli's account of the way civilizes a people (quoting from Discourses 1, 1 1 in a note dence and 384). to SC n, 7; P, in, However, unlike Machiavelli, Rousseau uses Lycurgus,
goodness,"

not

Numa

as

his

central example.
portrait of

In Rousseau's

him,

Lycurgus

made

the Spartans

happy,

even while

they

were unknown

to the

rest of

Greece.

Resigning
.

his
time

lawgiver

a wise advisor

he took

advantage of a

kingship following

to serve as a
revolutions

and civil war

course on

to

give

his

people a new code of

laws (cf SC, 11,

7-8 with

the Dis

Inequality; P, in, 381, 385,

portrait of

180).

But the

Lycurgus

given

in the Social Contract leaves

out

the Ca

tonic dimension Rousseau

underlines

in a "Fragment":
de
mauvais
ruse et

Quand Licurgue
traitemens

etabli ses part

lois, il

eut a soufTrir mille murmures et meme et

de la
ses

des Lacedemoniens

il fut

meme contraint

d'user de

d'aller finir
stitution qui

jours hors de
a rendu

sa patrie pour obliger ses concitoyens a conserver une

in la

les

le

peuple

le

plus

illustre

et

le

plus respecte qui ait existe sur

terre

(P,

in, 512).

278

Interpretation

readers

In the Social Contract's account, Rousseau simply assumed, one gathers, his knew Plutarch's portrait of Lycurgus and thus the requisite details of the
which

deception to Lycurgus any

of

he

alludes

in the preceding
to
given

quotation.

Plutarch

recounts

that

persuaded

his

countrymen

swear an oath

that

they

would not change

the customs

or

laws he had

them,

until

he

returned

oracle at

Delphi. After visiting the

sent
would never

oracle and

being

told that

from visiting the his institutions were

good, he
that

this oracular utterance back to the Spartans.

However,

to assure

his laws

stead, he starved

be changed, Lycurgus never himself to death (Lives, pp. 72-73).

returned to

Sparta. In

VI. VIOLENT CREATIVITY OR TRAGIC EQUANIMITY IN THE FACE OF FORTUNE

We have his

seen

that in Rousseau's doctrine the

popular

of political

leadership, Catonic

sen

atorial virtue

is

combined with

foundation Machiavelli

advocated

in

political education of new

leaders;

and

the armed founder has a necessary

senatorial

preliminary function to perform to clear the way for the der primitive or corrupt historical circumstances.

statesman,

un

Moreover, in Rousseau's teaching

concern with seau parts

there

is

a resemblance

to Machiavelli's

overcoming the power of fortune in political affairs, though Rous company with Machiavelli after an initial agreement.
a protest against the power of affairs a call to political men to

Now, Machiavelli's philosophy leadership is

fortune in human

be

self-reliant and

active,

not

tragic and passive instruments of a fate beyond their control. In

power of

describing

the

fortune, Machiavelli
future
25).

at

first

employs the

image

of

fortune

as a torrential

river. If one builds

sight

embankments and

dikes in

quiet

times

uses prudential

fore in

to plan for the

then one will not

be

subject to

fortune's

power

chaotic times

(Pr., Ch.
a

However, Machiavelli
fortune is like fickle
physical strength and

uses a second

image to depict
seduced

the power of

fortune:

mistress who

is effectively

by

forceful overtures,

daring;

or, politically speaking, arms

and

imaginative,

res

olute calculation and will. such as

The

armed prophets who establish republican senates

the Roman one, and the

legislators

and senatorial

heroes

who emerge

from

such

bodies

of advisors are

Machiavelli,
quered

one must

fortune's worthy foes (cf. Dis. 1, 1 1 ; 11, 1). grant, is not entirely certain fortune can be wholly con
calculation, though the unifying theme
of and

by

human fortune

daring

and adaptive

his

political education

in The Prince

Discourses is how

political virtue can

problem

overcome

more and more

to the point of totality. Machiavelli's

armed

is how to inspire his

readers to

imitate

founders

or prophets and senatorial

heroes completely For these admixtures

and acceptance of

without the admixture of would

Christian

compassion and

love.

debase

political virtue with

vulnerability, weakness,

defeat for the

sake of

affirming

the value of idealism and the

The Armed Founder

innocent in the face
of

versus the

Catonic Hero

279
and 25).

the struggles against

fortune (Pr., Chs. 15-17,

Indeed,
and

even

Machiavelli's
popular

passionate personal commitment to republicanism

symbiotic,

leadership

takes second place to his awe in the face

of

those tyrannical manifestations of creative competence that conquer

fortune.

Someone

of

"outstanding brain-power and

to monarchical rule
order a

authority,"

he asseverates,
or vice

could con
or will

vert a province suited

into

republic,
cf.

versa,

fully found
deed, he

tyrannical

(Dis. 1, 55; 257-58;

1, 16, 25-26). Rare in

to

says, are the leaders

who possess such mental and physical power

carry In his advocacy

racy, not the
on the

out enterprises of

this magnitude.

of such

activism, Machiavelli defends

the rich,

a new political aristoc

"pernicious"

old ones of of

lazy,

and

cowardly "who live

idly

income

their abundant possessions without

living"

being

concerned either with

cultivation or

(Dis. 1, 55; 266). This new senate Mach necessary toil in iavelli envisages is made up of leaders who are resolute in the face of fortune,
who

have that

greatness of soul manifested

by

Camillus
me"

who averred:

"The dicta

torship did
luteness in

not elate

me, nor did exile depress

(Dis. in, 31;

469).

Such

reso

mind and conduct results

in fortune

having

"no sway

them."

over

Still, Machiavelli
prepared one's

advocates resoluteness of mind combined with resoluteness of

will allow one

military conduct, and all that forces.

to triumph after one

has competently

In the Political Economy, Rousseau

where

claims

that "in public administration

fortune has less

of a part

than in the fate of

to

happiness

that these two objects are

intertwined"

individuals, wisdom is so close (P, in, 262). Going in a Ma

Catonic
statesman who em

chiavellian

direction, Rousseau

maintains

that the

ploys enlightened, calculating parsimony, future planning, and egali hence the power tarian tax measures can assure that public needs are satisfied
policies of

of

fortune

minimized.

In the

spirit of

Machiavelli's first image

of

fortune

as a tor

rential river, Rousseau, first of all, encourages the construction of public ware houses to prevent famine, just as Machiavelli had done in The Prince (P, in, 267;

Pr., Ch.
ies

10).

Second, like Machiavelli, Rousseau

instead for the

opposes the use of mercenar

and argues

establishment of a citizen

Pr., Chs.
"the

12-13).

Third, both

advocate

parsimony

army (P, in, 268-69; preventing the emergence

so as

of new governmental needs rather than

increasing
attacks

revenues

to prevent
16).

crushed"

[from] being Fourth, in the Political Economy

people mands egalitarian tax reforms

with excessive

taxes the

(P, in, 266; Pr., Ch.

of

Rousseau

tyranny

the rich and de

Machiavelli's
55; 266).

censure of

albeit less violently of entirely in the spirit the idle rich in the Discourses (P, in, 270-78; Dis. 1,

Machiavellian
volved

In the Social Contract, Rousseau even goes daring in the face of fortune. In in making
governmental

some

proportion as more people are

distance toward advocating in

decisions, he says, prudence is stressed "too much, insufficient emphasis is given to fortune, so that by dint of deliberating, (SC, in, 2; P, in, 402). A head or leader the fruits of deliberation are often
lost"

280

Interpretation
the
political art well must

who exercises

native,
with

swift strokes of political and not make not

employ prudence, but also those imagi judgment and action that will harmonize affairs

fortune,

the polity subject to

factors"

its

vagaries.

Thus, Rousseau

criticizes

Cicero for

himself to "a
spiracy. pated

combination of chance should

with

employing emergency measures and hence subjecting in dealing with the Catilinarian con have
appointed a

Rather, he

dictator

who could chance

easily have dissi

the conspiracy

vigor,

leaving

nothing to

(SC, iv, 6; P, m,
of

457)-

Rousseau, then,
velli's

thought of himself as
as

following

in the footsteps his

Machia

Prince

and

Discourses

he

elaborated upon

own political education

for

republican

statesmen

in the Political

Economy

and the

Social Contract.

Rousseau did

not conclude

that there is a fundamental difference between his

as we must

teaching
tion of

and

Machiavelli's

because in his
see

republican

interpreta

Machiavelli's thought he failed to

the priority Machiavelli gives to

creative violence.

It is true that
violence: violence goes on

at

times Machiavelli seems to

prefer

the arts of peace to those of

he

seems

to rank Numa's peaceful methods above Romulus's creative

(Dis. i,

ii).

However, he quickly
wanting.

reverses

to manifest little interest in that exemplary virtue

his judgment (Dis. i, 19) and of both Catos, which

the time
of

he

admired

but found

Rome

was so corrupt at

Cato the
was

Younger,
with

that the example of virtue

was

a republican politics of emulation

insufficient to turn the tide. What

that "terror and
fear"

a new armed

founder
with

or

needed, he implies, was instilling had known at the beginning of their regime they prophet like Romulus, but more sophisticated so
of

men

by
as to

be

able

to deal

the lavish corruption

the imperial republic (Dis. in, 1;

382).

Machiavelli's advocacy
of

of

the priority
who

of

the action
puts

of

the armed founder and

those creative commanders

imitate him in the

him

at odds with

Rousseau's

ultimate reliance on a politics grounded

emulation of strength of soul.

For

Rousseau

was convinced

that only the Catonic model of republican

leadership
other

assures that a republic will

regimes and not seek

be

oriented

to showing moral superiority over

imperialistic

mastery.

The

moral struggle

for republicanism
Rousseau

is

important than winning dedication is more potent in the

more

specific armed

battles; compelling by exemplary

force
of arms. subor

long run

than the

dinated
pure

mere success

through the competent wielding of the political art to his

truth"

subordinated this politics.

faith in the nobility and moral superiority of republicanism; Machiavelli faith to what he understood to be "the effectual of

Reason

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

William Mathie
Brock

University

I
How is the
of

student of

Thomas Hobbes to treat the

'

several systematic versions

his

political

teaching?

commonwealth

by

In every version Hobbes promotes the peace of the teaching the rights of sovereign power and obligation of sub laws
of nature.

jects to obey the

appeal

sovereign commands and

Always he does
In

so

by

to that condition of equality and radical

insecurity

that is the consequence

each statement

of man's nature and passions

in the

absence of sovereignty.

Hobbes
other

argues

the case

rivals

of civil

for monarchy and attacks the pretensions of priests and authority. At the same time, there are many and striking
account of the
of

differences in Hobbes's
nature; in his treatment

passions,

natural

condition,

and

laws

of

the generation of the commonwealth and of the forms

it may take; in his response to the challenge of religious to civil authority. To ig nore these differences and treat Hobbes's teaching as if it were definitively stated in any
one of

these versions
supply.2

is to forsake the invaluable

as

help

other versions seem

sometimes to

To

identify
but

Hobbes's

political science a composite of

arguments
sume

found in

some

not all statements of

it,

on

the other

hand, is

to as

that the interpreter's task must be to reassemble the elements of a

teaching

which

has

somehow

"come to

pieces."3

statements of
as

student can neither neglect nor exploit uncritically the several his teachings, might he not find in the fact of their existence a clue to the fundamental intention underlying Hobbes's political philosophy, if he

If Hobbes's

could

but

understand

how those

statements are related?

Do the succeeding
or even

ver

sions of

Hobbes's dubious

political science record a

movement,

progress,

of

his

thought? Do
upon
a

we see

here Hobbes's

progress

from

a political science

dependent

and unattractive

account

of

the human passions to one that

individuals,"

merely

analyzes

"the formal

structure of essential

the relations between

or a

movement that
I
parts

jeopardizes the

basis

of

Hobbes's teaching through the

in
1640 was published
published

The Elements of Law Natural in 1649

and 1650.

and

Politic

written and circulated

in two
was

Elementorum Philosophiae, Sectio

Tenia, De Cive
into English

in 1642,

republished

by

Hobbes

with added notes

in 1647,

and translated

and published again

by

Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society. In the same year he published Leviathan. Hobbes published the first and second parts of his Elementorum Philosophiae in

Hobbes in

1651 as

1655 and 1658 and a Latin version of Leviathan in 1668. References to these works will usually occur in parentheses in the text with abbreviations EL, De Cive, and Lev. as required. Page references are to Pogson-Smith's edition of Leviathan and Gert's Man and Citizen (New York: Doubleday, 1972).
2. other versions.

Those opting for this method can rarely resist the temptation to import arguments from the See, e.g., C. B. Macpherson in his Introduction to Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Pen
p. 42 and notes 3 and 4. F. S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 13.

guin, 1968),
3.

282
attempt

Interpretation
to express it as if a result of his
said of either
natural
philosophy?4

Whatever

must

finally
self

be

hypothesis,

we note that no one claims

that

Hobbes him
version of

has indicated

by word or deed the clear superiority of the

forms. Might the
his continuing effort to content of Leviathan could
purpose

latest

his

teaching

to its earlier

changed expression of make reflect

Hobbes's

political

science then rather reflect

that science effectual?

That the form

as well

and even

its

author's

rhetorical,
though

as philosophic,

is

suggestion

frequently

advanced

pursued,5

rarely
own political

Yet, recalling Hobbes's bold description (in Leviathan) of his science as a proper subject for public instruction and his repeated
in his
public

condemnation of eloquence

deliberations,

one must consider whether

Hobbes's understanding
the

of

own enterprise and of rhetoric

does

not exclude

possibility we mean to explore. That Hobbes always deplored the

we

role of rhetoric central

in the

commonwealth's

de

liberations,

democracy
lutions
as
. .

may Hobbes attributes to Thucydides, for it led to

and

not

doubt. Eloquence is

to the case against ancient

desperate
or

actions undertaken upon

the

"inconsistency of reso flattering advice of such

desired to attain,
the

amongst

people."6

power which can

to hold what they had attained, of authority and sway In the Elements of Law Hobbes argues that the misuse of result from the passions of the sovereign will be greatest where

sovereignty is in the hands of many assembled together because there every speaker will seek his own benefit or honour by "working on the passions of the
rest"

(2.5.4). I" T>e Cive, the it

allows more men

claim

that

democracy
wisdom,

is

superior

to monarchy be

cause

"to

show their

knowledge,

eloquence"

and

is

compared strained

to the objection to peace "that it

is

a grievance
it"

to valiant men to

be

re

from

tions of great
eloquence

because they delight in (2.10.9). The public delibera assemblies fail because success here depends upon eloquence and

fighting

the unjust appear just;

shaped

distorts the good, the profitable, the honest and their contraries; makes reasons from vulgar opinions rather than true principles; is
the
hearers'

by

passions;

and aims at

victory,

not truth

(2. 10.

11).

4.

While contemporary
now

readers no

longer

object

to Hobbes's

"wicked, blasphemous,

and atheis

tical
of of

views"

that

they

share

human

nature."

McNeilly

them, they still strain at the "unsavoury gnat which is Hobbes's view hopes to extrapolate from the progress he detects in successive versions

Hobbes's teaching to a statement freed of this objection. Ibid, 5. Compare Leo Strauss, The Politi cal Philosophy of Hobbes (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), 6-29, 169, and What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959), 170-96.
5. See, e.g., A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," in K. C. Brown, ed., Hobbes Studies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 35; Bernard Gert, ed., Man and Citizen (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 3; Sterling Lamprecht, ed., De Cive (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), xix. The suggestion is pursued in relation to the Clifford "on the Sovereign theory of authorization
Authorization"

by

Orwin,

suggestion

Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. I, 32. See that the theory constitutes a "rhetorical

also

Hanna Pitkin's

enthusiasm

for Orwin's
Leviathan

advance,"

Ibid.,

47.

On the

rhetoric ot

Gary Shapiro, "Reading and Writing in the Text of History of Philosophy (April 1980), and James Zappen, "Hobbes's Leviathan: Logos, International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Madison, Wisconsin, April,
as a whole see also
thos,"

Leviathan,"

Journal of the Ethos, and Pa

1981
.

6. English Works vm,

xvi-xvii.

Reason

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

283
that the advice

In Leviathan Hobbes
of

still argues against sovereign assemblies

members,

who participate

by
of

right not

knowledge, is

given

in

long
to

discourses injure than

the dan

which

commonly
the

excite rather than govern

the passions, and he

greater
most

adds that ora

tors,

who are

favourites

assemblies, have
144-45).

capacity

defend innocent
"apart"

subjects

(2.19,

For the

part,

however,

gers of eloquence are rather

treated now as reasons why a sovereign should seek advice

same

than

from the

individuals in

an

As Hobbes's
uous

comparison of of

the

kinds

of commonwealth so

assembly (2.25, 200-201). becomes a less conspic

feature
of

his

political

science,

he treats

rhetoric now within a general

discussion

the qualities of

"apt,

and

inept

counsellors"

(2.25,

198).

In his Elements of Law and Citizen Hobbes also views rhetoric as a necessary condition of the dissolution of the commonwealth through sedition. According to both
works

if there be

members of the commonwealth who are

discontent, dis
to
stir

posed

to

believe

sedition could

be rightful,
confusion of

and

hopeful

of

success, there is
one

"nothing
quicken

them"

wanting to sedition and (De Cive 2. 12. 1

the realm,

but

up

and

1).8

The leaders

or authors of sedition are neces

"wisdom."

sarily

at once eloquent and

lacking in both

"judgment"

and

According
such show

to the argument of the Elements the leaders of sedition as

that

they

lack prudence,
one who

or

the ability to conjecture what is to come

who

by

remembrance of

things past, since of those

have led
their

seditions
of

twenty have failed for every

or of

succeeded;

they display

lack

wisdom,
of

the knowledge

of re

people'

"what conduceth to the good and government

the

drawn from "a

themselves,"

membrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst can can

since

it

be demonstrated be
just"

by

such

knowledge

or science that

"no

pretense of sedition

right or

(2.8.13). The leaders

of sedition are

imprudent, then,

as

they
false

expect

to succeed, unwise as
seem

they

themselves believe one or another of

those false doctrines that

opinions adopted and eloquent

justify sedition (De Cive 2.12.12). In fact, the taught by such men were already "insinuated by
to
.

sophistry"

[the]
both

of

Aristotle

and others

(El.

2.9.8).

That the

authors of

sedition must

be

eloquent

is

shown

by

a consideration of their

create or augment must make men

the

sense of

injury

and provoke

task, for they must rage and indignation.

They
must

believe their
(El.

rebellion

just,
The

their discontents grievous, and

successful orators of sedition
.

their chance of

success great auditors out of

2.8.14).

"turn their
The

fools into

madmen

enlarge their

hopes, [and]
De Cive

7.

reorganization of

the argument

in Leviathan

seems to

follow the

suggestion of

democracy which result from the deliberation of great assemblies would disappear if everyone within the democracy would mind his own affairs and the people "would be stow the power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or some very few, being
that the inconveniences
of

content with the nomination of magistrates and public ministers,

"

i.e.,

with

the authority without the

ministration

(2.10.15;

see also

El.

2.5.8).

"formal"

8. The
right,
and

clearest statement of of success occurs

the

theory

of sedition

in terms

of

discontent,
of

pretense of

hope

in

the Elements of Law

(2.8.1) but
and the

the same

theory is implicit in
Regimes

the

account of De

Cive (2. 12. 1,2. 12.

11).

See Mathie, "Justice

Question

Canadian

Journal of Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sept. 1976),

452.

284

Interpretation
reason

lessen their dangers beyond

quence can create success as well as
as

(De Cive

2. 12. 12).

If, indeed,

great elo

in its hearers the

passionate sense of

discontent
or can

and

hope

of

the false opinion that their sedition

is,

be, just,

rhetoric

"the

metaphorical use of words

fitted to the

passions"

would seem not

only

necessary but a sufficient ical science intended to

therefore depend
upon

cause of sedition and civil war. preserve

The

success of a polit

the

commonwealth

against

dissolution

will

its ability to

render

the

potential auditors of such rhetoric

immune to its When

we

appeal.9

turn

in Leviathan
wealth can

we are struck
secured

from these to the corresponding account of political dissolution by two changes. Hobbes now holds that the common

be

indefinitely

against

internal dissolution if men

make use of

the reason

they

claim

to possess, and that what

is

at

fault

when commonwealths

do

perish of are

internal disorders lies "not in

and

men as

they

are

the matter; but as

orderers"

they

the makers,
now

of
rhetoric

the commonwealth (Lev. 2.29, 247). Nor

eloquence.10

does Hobbes

mention

or

Instead,

we observe

that

Hobbes's treatment
metaphorical;
man each

of each of the

internal

causes of or

is

compared to some

infirmity
mention

dissolution is itself partly disease of the individual hu

what

body. Could Hobbes's failure to

here

treated as a necessary if not sufficient condition of sedition

he had previously imply a new hope of

rendering common opinion safe against the danger of eloquence and thus a basis for Hobbes's hope that the commonwealth might become "immortal"? In any
case,
we

may

observe that

Hobbes does

not

here

much alter

his treatment

of

dis

content and

those opinions that can support a pretense to right of sedition.

In
of the

all versions of

his

political science

Hobbes

proceeds
of

from the

examination of

internal

causes of

dissolution to
a

discussion
at

the duties or

"office"

the

sovereign

representative,
examined.

dangers just

least partly directed to the political In Leviathan this discussion is much expanded and
subjects

discussion

grounds of

significantly modified. The duty of the sovereign to instruct his his own essential rights as sovereign is given much
nence within

in the

greater promi

that discussion. This

teaching
folly

of one's subjects

is

of

fundamental

9.

Hobbes illustrates the

combination of

and rhetoric and the result of this combination

through the
and place

story of the daughters of Pelias who were persuaded by Medea to dismember their father his members in a boiling cauldron in order to restore his youthful vigor in De Cive as in the
application of this
of

Elements, but his

for the
10.
divines"

folly

the orator's

hearers

story is altered in the later work so as to suggest a greater concern "the common Compare De Cive 2. 12. 13, El. 2.8.15.
people."

The false doctrines

and some of

which support a pretended right of sedition are attributed

to "unlearned
of

those

"making

profession of the

laws"

(2.29,

249-51).

Speaking

the

exam solicit

ple of

neighbouring
Hobbes

nations as a possible cause of

innovation Hobbes

speaks of

"those that

<men> to
wealth

change"

but

gives no account of

these.

Among the "not so

great"

diseases

of the common

speaks of

the popularity

of a potent subject whose

laws"

draw

others

from "their

flattery and

reputation

may

serve

to

obedience to the

but he does
of as

not mention rhetoric or eloquence

in dis

cussing the potency of such a subject; he speaks here against the Senate after he had won the army and not, Elsewhere, in discussing the passions that most
dom
of

Caesar

who proceeded to win the people and

in the Elements
crime not of

De Cive,

of

Catiline.

frequently cause
but

Hobbes discusses
their eloquence

the unwis
228).

"the first

movers

in the disturbance

of

commonwealth"

(2.27,

Reason

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

of

285

importance because the rights

maintained.

Neither already

civil

law

nor

sovereignty cannot otherwise be successfully fear of punishment can accomplish this. Those

who

do

not

recognize themselves as obliged

by

the laws of nature will

and will regard punish

not acknowledge ment or

that

they

are obliged to

obey

civil

law

the threat of it as nothing but "an act of

hostility"

(2.30,

259).

"

In

all

statements of

his

political science

Hobbes

speaks

both

of

the

who and

young in the universities be themselves fully demonstrated foundations of civil and of the truly capacity of the vulgar to entertain true doctrine through their public and private instruction by
teach the
doctrine"

necessity that those instructed in the "true

those educated
264-65).

in the

universities

In Leviathan Hobbes
"potent"

goes on

(De Cive 2.13.9; El- 2.9.8; Lev. 2.30, 260, to answer those who doubt the capacity

of the common people

posed

to receive this

instruction,

that the

difficulty

is

rather

by

the

who can

hardly digest "anything

the
"learned"

bridle their
eth

affections"

and

by

who reject

their errors and

vulgar

thereby lesseneth

their

authority"

to up discover"that anything (2.30, 260). The capacity

a power

that setteth

of

the

is

shown

by

their acquiescence

in the "great Mysteries

of

Christian
of

Religion";
true civil

on the

basis

of this evidence and/or can assert

the reasonable character

the to

doctrine Hobbes
hear"

that

an unprejudiced man

"needs

no more

leam,
must

than to

this doctrine. And indeed he now offers a statement of

of

what

be taught

on

the pattern

the decalogue.

Success in teaching the true civil doctrine depends upon the discovery of how "so many opinions, contrary to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false prin
ciples, have
ered nevertheless

been

so

deeply

rooted"

in the

people.

What is discov
of

thereby is that the

not

greatest part of mankind

is diverted

by

lack

leisure

or of

attachment to sensual pleasures

"from the

deep meditation,

which

the

learning

truth,

only in the
"

matter of natural

justice, but

also of other sciences necessar

(2.30, 264). Certainly Hobbes does not speak of this as a capac ily requires ity for scientific instruction as such "as for science, or certain rules of their ac
tions, [most men]
264;
are cf.
are so

far from it, that they know

90).

not what

it

is"

(1.5, 37; 2.30,

since

De Cive,

"Preface,"

Prudence,

and eloquence as

seeming prudence,

among the "human possessed by few and by these in but few things
their possessors (1
.

powers"

but the

sciences are

"small

power"

they

are

and understood at all

Conclusion"

10, 67). In Leviathan's "Review

and
all

only by Hobbes ac
men

knowledges
are

that though solid reasoning is necessary to

resolutions and unjust

deliberations if
effect will

to avoid rash

sentences, reason's

be

slight and

conse

"if there be

not powerful eloquence which procureth attention and

concludes that

"reason,

and eloquence,

(though
well

not perhaps

in the
548)-

natural sci

together"

ences,

yet

in the moral) may

may, or
says

If

moral science

very must, be so

stand

(547,

presented as

to combine reason and false doctrines "not

(2.
of

elo-

11.

In De Cive Hobbes

it is the

duty of the

sovereign

to

root out

by com
13.9).

manding, but

by teaching;
remarks

not

by

the terror of penalties,

the Elements he
made

habitual,

cannot

only that opinions which are be taken away by force, and upon

by the perspicuity of gotten by education, and in

the sudden
.

but

reason"

In

length

time,

are

(2.9.8).

286
quence,

Interpretation
what should

be the

nature of

this combination? The sciences although

power."

they

are

the

"way"

of reason are

"small

Geometry
use"

which

is the true Ge

mother of all sciences and

"arts

of public

is least

of all acknowledged.

ometry,

on

the

other

hand, has the

advantage over

"the doctrine

of right and

wrong"

that it is not like the latter

"perpetually
ignorance
of

disputed."

Geometry
79).

is

no matter of sci

of contention

for it "crosses
of

ambition"

no man's and

(Lev. i.ii,

Lack

ence, over,

or

ignorance

causes,

the signification of words, more

contribute much to
must

the power of seditious eloquence, for those who suffer

from this ignorance

on

rely

on

the opinions and advice of others

and even
.

take

trust the errors and nonsense of those

of

they have

come to

trust (1 1 1

78-79).
of

If lack

leisure

and concern

for
of

bodily

pleasures make most men while science qua science

incapable
is
alone

science,
of

including

the science the

justice,

free

disputation,

must not

successful rhetorical response

to the rhetoric of sedi

tion itself somehow resemble science?

In Hobbes's Behemoth
alter

one of

the speakers doubts whether anything can ever

of

the ignorance

of

the common people

their

duty

to the public "as never

meditating anything but their particular "the preachers, or the most

interest"

and

therefore

following

others

potent"

in

all other

things. In response to this

unjust might not
demonstration"

doubt the
taught

other

discussant

like

other sciences
...

asks why the science of just and from "true principles and evident

be

and

"more easily than the preachers and democratical gentlemen teach rebel to a further doubt as to the existence of this science and the safety of one who should try to teach it, he adds that one writer has already prepared a suf
lion;"

ficient demonstration
the meanest

of

the rules of just and unjust "from principles

evident to

capacity.12

What

are

those principles from

and

which

the rules of just

to those

and unjust can of

be sufficiently derived

how exactly

"evident"

are

they

the meanest capacity?

II
How
perhaps a successful moral science should combine reason and eloquence

may

be better

understood

if

we consider that

failure

of

Hobbes's

predecessors

to create such a science which

no older than and

led Hobbes to

proclaim that moral

of

philosophy is
successors,

his

own

De Cive (FWi, ix). The failure

much of

Socrates, his

especially Aristotle,
Than
more

to establish moral science as a science would seem to be

almost complete.
said
. .

ignorantly;"

the old moral philosophers do

Aristotle's Ethics, "scarce anything can be little more than de

.

scribe their own passions and

ture"

treat "attributes of

honour"

as

if "attributes

of na

(Lev. 4.46, 522, 531). Yet if

that those writings

what the moral philosophers

have

written

has
not

entertained men's affections rather

so clear

than

illuminated

their understandings, it is
noted

have had

no effect.

We have already

Hobbes's

12.

English Works vi,

212.

(Emphasis added.)

Reason
statement

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

287

that the false opinions successfully taught

"insinuated"

by

the orators
of

of sedition

were

previously In the "Preface to the

by the
of

"eloquent

sophistry"

Aristotle

and others.

Reader"

De Cive, Hobbes

goes so

far

as to suggest that attempt

the opinions of the moral philosophers which

prostitute

derived from their

and

"to

justice

...

to their own

judgments

apprehensions"

have been

the "causes of all contentions and

bloodsheds"

(98,

emphasis added).

Indeed,

Hobbes does
existed

not

hesitate to describe in this

justice"

passage a golden age of peace that

before "the

science of

was

"openly

exposed to

disputation"

by

the

first

philosophers who

took this science up. Until this event, subjects recog

nized

that their own

power and would not

security depended upon the preservation of the supreme "join themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits, to the

state."

utter ruin of

the

Now, apparently in

consequence of the prostitution of

vulgar"

justice

by

the moral philosophers, "even the

or

claim an equal share of

that

"prudence"

"civil

knowledge"

by

which

the government should be directed

and

its

conduct

judged (96). Hobbes's

own rhetoric

clue to the nature of

may be

furnished,

we

think,

by

reflection upon and

the considerable effect Hobbes here attributes to his predecessors

of

the ambiguous relation

this effect to the intention he also attributes to

them. The moral philosophers

mediate

have successfully
rule,

undermined

the natural or im
men's opinions as

authority "principles of
"practice

of all who

and even established

in

nature"

those "democratical

principles"

they derived from

the

popular"

of their own

commonwealths, which were

(Lev. 2.21, 165;

FW vi,
would

218).

The

success of
were

Aristotle

and other moral philosophers as orators

thus be great

the promotion of democratic principles an adequate de

scription of their

that this is so.

intention, but Hobbes does not, at least consistently, maintain Rather, Hobbes claims that Aristotle made natural inequality, or
politics

the naturally greater ability of some to rule, the foundation of his whole
and

intended thereby the

as

rule of

"the

wiser sort

(such

as

he thought himself to be

for his

philosophy)"

over those others

losophers

he

"that had strong bodies, but were not phi (Lev. 1.15, 118; De Cive 1.3.13; El. 1.17.1). Measured
their

against this achieved a

rule of

account

of

intention,
wise

the

rhetoric

of

the philosophers
or acquiesced

has
the

doubtful result; the foolish have

wise nor

seldom

sought,

in,

the

have the

always, often,

or almost ever mastered

by

force

those "who distrust their

own wisdom".

In

one passage ofDe might

Cive Hobbes

appears even to suggest that the philosophers

"who

have lived

under

the natural jurisdiction of

kings"

are

securely and quietly instead "tormented with

their own "in

dissensions"

perpetual cares, suspicions, and

vention"

in

consequence of

of

the

(false)

science.13

civil

cal science upon natural

inequality

In any case, Aristotle's founding of politi has "weakened the whole frame of his politics

and given men colour and pretences,

1

whereby to disturb

and

hinder the

peace of

This

seems

2.

10.3, note) especially when compared with that other fable of the ancients

to be the meaning of Hobbes's interpretation of the fable of Prometheus (De Cive "Preface" reported in the

(97).

288
one of

Interpretation
(El.
i.i.i).

another"

It

would seem

that the moral and political

philosophy

Socrates

and of

his

successors

has established,
opinion,

by the

success of

its rhetoric, the

the

dominance

individual
This

private

or rather

passion,

over public author claim at

ity,

a pretext

for the ambitious,

and much support

for this

level

of

common opinion.

result can

be

connected

to the assumption that wisdom the basis of a claim to rule,

should

rule, for the ambitious have

obtained

thereby

as wiser than

him

or them now ruling.

For the

proud at

least,
the

this is more than a to rule, or

pretext, for it has become

one's opinion prevail with supernatural wisdom wisdom of

an admission of

inferior

wisdom not

have
to the

him that does. When,

finally,

"ghostly"

claim

is

combined with

the belief that ruling is justified

by

those

who

rule, the way is

the

prepared

for the division is the true

of spiritual and not

temporal

authority

and

subordination of

the latter to the

former. What is
rule of

established or even unwise.

by

the old moral philosophy, in any event,

wisdom,

that of those philosophers who considered themselves the wise, over the

Indirectly,
"the

the actual result of that moral philosophy could better be de

scribed as

suppression of

philosophy

by

such

men, as neither
truth"

by

lawful

au

thority,

nor sufficient

study

are competent

judges

of

the

(Lev. 4.46, 536;

EWvi,
In
ation

283).

order

to determine the

character of

Hobbes's

proposed

remedy for this

situ

for

which

his

predecessors

are, at least partly, responsible

a situation

de
to

fective from the

point of view of

both philosophy

and commonwealth

and

identify the rhetorical dimension of this briefly the accuracy of Hobbes's account
phy.14

remedy it

will

be

useful

to consider

of the claims of

the old civil philoso

If

we

claim of

may doubt whether Hobbes has done justice to the reasons for the Socrates and his followers that philosophers should rule, we cannot

deny
ophy

that this claim was made. What

Hobbes does
political

not acknowledge

is that those
Hobbes

who claimed that the evils which

beset

life

would not cease until philos of

and political power coincided were

hardly

more confident than

the prospects for this coincidence. Although the argument for this coincidence
could

be

made within

the perspective

of political

life

perhaps

perspective

the political efficacy of this argument was

must also

only within that doubtful to those who

made

it; philosophy

practice,

or call

upon,

a rhetoric that can soothe

proposal.15

the indignation provoked

by

the very

hearing

of such a

If, in
ical

the second place, there

is

a partial

truth to the assertion that the old polit

or

science was

founded
nature

upon natural

inequality,

the possession

by

some of

greater wisdom
ers of

by whereby these ought to rule over the others, the teach that political science did not expect many, if any, actual regimes to reflect
very
this
exactly.
inequality"

this

inequality
upon

"founded

Nor did they apparently expect any regime to be if by this is meant the clear acknowledgement and
those who rule as their title to rule. Where
and

acceptance of the greater wisdom of

14.

For

a general

discussion

of

Modernity"

15.

in Cropsey, ed., Ancients Plato. Republic 498d.

its accuracy see Joseph Cropsey, "Hobbes and Moderns (New York: Basic Books,

the Transition to

1964). 225-28.

Reason
the

and

Rhetoric in

Hobbes'

Leviathan

289

claim of wisdom

to rule is accepted at all, this is

of several

likely to

wider accommodation

conflicting

claims to

only within a for rule; example, the

occur
recognition as

claim of wisdom or virtue ground

justed.16

may

sometimes obtain a

limited

on which

the

more potent claims rhetoric and

of wealth and number can

be

ad

The immense task for

reflects natural are

in the

creation of a regime that

sig

nificantly
could

inequality
be

the virtual

impossibility of a rhetoric that

suggestion that the all

fulfill this task

both illustrated

by

Socrates'

city in

speech of

the Republic might

established

by

ants of some

city to depart

the new order

cation

leaving their (541a), or by the "noble

By

children

persuading to be raised

the adult inhabit the founders of

by

lie"

he

proposes to secure

fraternal dedi
organization

to the common good and acceptance of the city's hierarchical

(4i4b-4i5d).
responds

the latter especially, Socrates implies that

an order which cor

and all

to natural

inequality,
at result of

even

though beneficial to the city

when

its

mem

bers,

will

be accepted, if

all, only

it is misrepresented,
Just
as

by

a powerful rule of

rhetoric, as the

direct

divine

agency.

in securing the

the

lovers

of

wisdom,

rhetoric must

apparently

overcome great resentment or

indig

nation.

We may begin to indicate Hobbes's point predecessors if we recall an image Socrates

and even served

of

departure from the teaching of his employs to account for the nonrule,

contempt,

of philosophers which
compares

Adeimantus, like Hobbes, had

city to a ship
represented whose navigation.

ob

(4870-489^. Socrates
neither

the

owner, the peo

ple, is

very
to

perceptive nor

knowledgeable concerning

Mem

bers

of

this

ship's

crew, the politicians, as

obtain control of and suppose

here,

contend with one

another

in

order

the

rudder.

They

doubt

whether

there is any
could never

true art of

navigation

that this art,

valuable

if it does exist,

be

combined with

what

is clearly

the art of obtaining the rudder,

the true art of navigation does

whether

by

persuasion or

force. The

possessor of

not rule

but is despised because his is

valued.

art

is
of

not

acknowledged, while the art

rule would

he does

not possess

The possibility
or

his

depend

upon

the combi
of

nation of those two

navigation.

arts,

the

persuasion of

the

shipowner

that there is an art

Hobbes

notes

the

somewhat similar

fact that

even

the vulgar suppose

as some

themselves to possess an equal share of prudence, or civil

knowledge,

thing
any
men

attained without

others wiser

to

admit

that there are any great care or study and therefore deny in this than themselves. In De Cive this unwillingness of most that others might have a better claim to the civil science is pre

accomplished sented as a consequence of that prostitution of justice

by

Socrates
that

and

his

successors.

In Leviathan the for concurring

same conviction of almost all men

they

are more prudent

whom

than the vulgar, "than

with

all men

but themselves

and a

few others,

approve

by fame,
not

or

themselves, they

has become
94-95)nor

an argument

for the equality

of prudence, albeit

facetiously
"Aristotle"

(Lev. 1.13,

Hobbes does
16.

deny

the disastrous
See

consequences of

the contention in Joseph

for rule,

Aristotle, Politics
eds.,

i283bio-35.

also

H. V. Jaffa,

Cropsey and

Leo

Strauss,

History

of Political

Philosophy

(Chicago: Rand

McNally,

1963), 113-14-

290

Interpretation
the existence of some

perhaps even

kind

of art of of

navigation, but neither

does he
that

seek

to

persuade

those who

contend

for rule,

the existence of that art.

Hobbes insists, in
there is a natural
over

all presentations of of wisdom of

his

political men

teaching, that the

claim

inequality
1.3.

others,

which was a

foundation

among Aristotle's
18).

justifying

the rule

by

some

doctrine,
Hobbes

must

be denied (El. here is The Aristotelian

1. 17.

i, De Cive

13, Lev. 1.15,

117-

What

we must consider

how far this denial has itself

claim must claim as we

a rhetorical character. against

says

the

be denied because it is

both

"reason"

"experience."

and

is

against

"experience",

or

denied

by

prudence, in the first place,

because,

fully
ence,

have seen, those supposing themselves wiser have seldom if ever success imposed their claim. Whatever the conclusion to be drawn from this experi
which we

have

observed was

also offers a

kind

of explanation

for this

familiar to Hobbes's predecessors, Hobbes experience: "there are very few so fool
governed

ish,
1.

that

had

not rather govern

themselves, than be

by

others"

(Lev.

15,

118).

Once the

experienced unwillingness of

accept

the rule of others as wiser than

supposedly less wise to themselves is understood in this way, it be

the

comes possible

to conclude that

natural

knowledged

as a

of government.

necessary condition The universal acknowledgement that

of

human equality must be universally ac for the securing of peace and establishing
no man

is

by

nature the su

perior,

or

ruler,

any

other and

the actual enjoyment

of an equal

liberty consis
claimed an supposed

tent with this acknowledgement

equal or even superior share of commonwealth

will perhaps content men who

have

that wisdom whereby

they have
claim

the

is

governed.
as

Of course, the Aristotelian

is

also

denied

"by

reason"

inasmuch

can

be killed

by

it has previously been demonstrated that even the strongest the weakest in the natural condition. We must observe, how

ever, that although this demonstration is said to show that "the

now

inequality

that

is has been introduced

by

the

laws
not

civil,"

Hobbes's
this

conclusion that

equality
reason

by
but

nature must
on

be

acknowledged

is

based

on

demonstration from
have

the argument developed from experience. Thus natural equality is to be

admitted

"if

nature

have

equal"

made men

or

"if

nature

made men un

equal."

Although the requirement that natural equality be acknowledged is deduced as necessary for peace in view of the unwillingness of most men to admit that any other is wiser than they are, it may be objected that what is required for peace corresponds with what teaches, in any case. In fact, all reason teaches
"reason"

in

all

three accounts of the natural condition is "how brittle the

which

frame

of our

hu

man

body is, isheth with it;

perishing,
a

and

strongest

how easy (De Cive 1 1

.

its strength, vigour, matter it is, even for the

all

and wisdom

itself

per-

weakest man to

kill the

.3).

istotelian
which

claim

that there is a

Does this teaching effectively contradict the Ar natural inequality among men in wisdom or virtue

justifies the

rule of some

by

others? names
of

When he

summarizes reason's teach

kindred,"

ing
but

in De Cive Hobbes specifically

not prudence or

"riches,

power, nobility
shown

of

wisdom,

as

forms

inequality

by

reason to

"come

Reason
from the

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

(i
.3.

291 simply that "the inequal

law"

civil
is"

13).

In Leviathan Hobbes

says

ity

that now

is introduced
in this
that is

by

the civil laws perhaps

because in the

account of

the state of nature

work a

equality
their
of

of prudence

he has specifically denied that there is a natural in basis for rule. Men are equal not only by reason of
at

vulnerability to violent death

the

hands

of others

but

also

in "the faculties

mind."

Men

are

indeed

even more equal

prudence, than
equal selves

in

bodily
1
.

strength since prudence

in the only relevant mental faculty, is only experience, "which

time equally bestows on all men, in those things

unto"

(Lev.

13,

94).

The

vain conceit of most

they equally apply them that they are more prudent

is equally distributed

than others
since equal

derives from partiality

and proves that prudence

the satisfaction of all with their share of some good is the best sign of an
distribution.17

If it be true that

prudence

is

experience and that all men will

what

obtain an

equal measure of

this over the same period of time in

we must note

"they

unto,"

equally apply themselves

edged selves

that Hobbes has already

acknowl

in the

eighth chapter of Leviathan that all causes of

do

not
.

by any means apply them

are

equally, that "the

this difference

in the

passions,"

and various

that prudence is in fact a natural virtue unequally possessed

even

by

men,
52-

if less

subject to

inequality
The

than

"judgment"

"fancy"

or

(Lev. 1.8,

57).

18

Hobbes's thematic but the

analysis of prudence analysis

does be

not

indicate the equality

confirm

of
of

prudence

converse.

does however

the wisdom

those who would rather govern themselves than

governed

by
not

the wise, for the

difference in
wit

men's passions which

is the do

cause of and

the difference

in their

natural

is

difference between those

over others. affairs of

who

those who

do

desire

power or more

dominion
prudent other

Hobbes does
own

assert

that a "plain

husband-man is

in

his

house,

than a

Privy

Counsellor in the
husband-man

affairs of an

man"

(Lev. 1.8.56) though

office

not that the plain

could perform

Privy justify a share of all or anyone in rule Privy Counsellors into the daily affairs
in any
only
case
event that what

the

Counsellor's

well; the equality

of prudence

is

not so great as

to
of

but

enough

to

restrict

the

intervention

is

added

husband-men. We may in Leviathan to the argument from

of plain

conclude
"reason"

against the

Aristotelian

claim of natural

inequality

refutes

that claim,

if

at

all,

by

appeal once more

to a

kind

of prudence, or even common opinion. on prudence, or common

others wiser

The

for equality

of prudence

is thus based
to admit any
that the

opinion, or

the passionate

refusal of men

than themselves.

If it is

pecular

to

rhetoric

principles out of which

have"

its

arguments are possi

drawn "are the

common opinions

that men

(EW vi, 426), it becomes

ble to

speak of

edged as a rhetorical

Hobbes's insistence that human equality by nature be acknowl claim, or even to say that the Hobbesian commonwealth, at
rhetorical

least in Leviathan, has itself a

17.

foundation. The fundamental

another version of

role of

the

See Descartes, Discourse, Part I (at the beginning) for

It may also be doubted fancy.
on the

the same "argu

ment."

18.

latter

account whether prudence

is entirely distinct from

judg

ment and

292

Interpretation
equality
within

acknowledgement of natural cated

Hobbes's

political science

is indi

by

the

fact that it is
that

whereby several laws

mance of natural

we see of

we are and

nature,

necessary bound to obey the a standard for the

and sufficient condition of sovereign sovereign

that

reasoning
perfor

representative, and the

in the ordinary
only

his

office.

If, further, the Hobbesian

also

commonwealth not

affirms

equality but
to

permits, or

even encourages a great

living"

things

"necessary

commodious result

inequality in the and obtained through the industry of in

Hobbes's
perception of can

dividuals this latter

common opinion: attributed

too

is

at

least

consistent with

"Want is less
of

disgrace than stupidity; for the former

the latter

be

to the
.8).

inequity

fortune;

is

alone"

attributable

to nature

(De

Homine

1 1

Ill
"At the
ture."19

centre of

Hobbes's

political

theory lies
examine

the concept of the state of na

role of rhetoric

Although

we cannot

hope to

here the
we

in the into

structure and content of

Leviathan

as a

whole,

do intend to illustrate in this it departs from

ccfncluding Hobbes's treatment

that

section of our

discussion how far human

rhetorical considerations enter

especially furnished in the Elements of Law and De Cive. We hope to show that the novel features of this account admit of such an explanation and, so understood,
indication
of

of the natural

condition

as

constitute a valuable rhetoric

the character and broader aim of Hobbes's

in Leviathan. This

analysis

pretation which of rational

finds in this

chapter

may also supply an alternative to that inter Hobbes's substitution of a formal analysis

deliberation for his

account of

earlier and

dubious

reliance upon an unattractive

of Leviathan arbitrary Hobbes's concern for, or with pride or the passionate desire for glory has vanished, or is vanishing, from his central political argument. If Hobbes remains a is now concerning human nature, his and
"obsession" "pessimist"
"pessimism"

human

nature.20

On the latter reading

to be seen as a merely private view and no part of

his

political science. of

Can

one

diminishing
ments
6?21

say that Hobbes "does not miss the importance of glory in his
of

an

opportunity [in Leviathan]

and political

psychological

argu

At least four

the six considerations Hobbes advances concerning

of the

mankind to
volve

distinguish human society from that

or reputation

irrational

creatures

in his

glory, comparison,

(Lev. 2.17,

130-31).22

Summarizing

argument

to the end of the twenty-eighth chapter, Hobbes says he has "set forth
159.

19.
20.

McNeilly, Anatomy,
Ibid.,
Ibid. Though there
146.

21. 22.

there are significant revisions

preserve

closely parallel treatments of this question in the Elements and De Cive in each version and especially in Leviathan Hobbes did not merely something from the earlier works. See notes 23 and 28.

are

Reason

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

(whose
.

293
compelled

the nature of man

pride and other passions

have

him to

submit

himself to government) and explains the title of the reference to God's words to Job: "he [Leviathan] by
dren
pride"

present work

Leviathan

...

is

king

of all the chil of

of

(Lev. 2.28,

246).

Vainglory is treated
passions

as

the most

important

the

passions which cause crime and

apparently
constitute
which

as

the more

especially important of the two

criminal sedition

(2.27, 228-29),

and

madness"

uance maketh

(1.8,

57).

Since

madness

"whose violence, or contin is understood by Hobbes to

the excess of passion itself we may almost conclude that

self-conceit"

"vainglory,
passion and espe

as

such.23

is commonly called If vanity is a less

pride and

characterizes

human

obvious and explicit concern

in Leviathan,

cially in the discussion of the state of nature, than previously, it has hardly disap peared from Hobbes's teaching. Nevertheless, we must consider whether it has

become
quently

superfluous of minor

to Hobbes's

discussion

of the state of nature and conse

importance to Hobbes's

argument as a whole.

Does Hobbes's
longer

account of

the principal reasons why the state of nature is a state

of war no

depend

upon the pursuit of glory?

The improved
rized

argument

Hobbes's Leviathan is

said

to contain

can

be

summa

thus:

while

self-glorifying leads to

violence can result

from the

pursuit of

glory,

competitive violence can result whenever men

have incompatible objectives; the

to anticipatory violence, and so
as to the specific

possibility
nature of

of either
war.

a general on this

diffidence,

to a state of

lations

of

nature of

nature generally, but only works out the calcu any individual who must act in relation to others "when the specific indeterminate."24 A man may reasonably initiate antici these others is

Hobbes, individuals, or human

account,

supposes

nothing

patory
general pects

violence when

he fears

violence violence

from

some other within a condition of other not

diffidence; he may fear

of

from that

that other

pursuing

an

incompatible

objective or

only when he sus glory but also when he

suspects that the other same reasons

may himself initiate anticipatory including fear of anticipatory violence.

within a

violence

for any
and

of

these

"Diffidence"

"anticipa

violence"

tory
pothetical"

formal

analysis of rational

deliberation

constitute a

"hy
In "be
were

argument

which

replaces

that of the Elements and De

Cive.25

those

works

Hobbes had

argued that man passions as an

is driven into
it

conflict with others

cause of the nature of

not caused

his

individual"

so that even

if violence

by

the

incompatibility

of objectives

would result

from the

universal

conflict.

and

The

"relentless drive for glory which is error in this interpretation begins to De Cive
which

the chief cause of

emerge when we consider

Hobbes's from

preface to

is

supposed

to constitute evidence of a transition

an earlier political science

based

upon a specific account of

human

nature

to the

23.

24. 25.

Strauss, Political Philosophy of Hobbes, McNeilly, 165.

Whether the
argument
violence;

1 1

12

anticipatory
there
should

it is

finally

is hypothetical may be doubted even on McNeilly's understanding of hypothetical only in the sense that it is deemed reasonable "only if
war"

be

an

opportunity

of

making precautionary

to do so (166).

294

Interpretation
version of

formalized

Leviathan. In reply to those

nature, Hobbes
yet

who object

that he has as
wicked were

sumed men wicked

by

observes that

"though the

fewer than the righteous,

and self-defense operates

because

we cannot

distinguish

them"

anticipation

is

required of even

the most honest (p. ioo). To say that what

nature of

here,
not

as

in Leviathan, is "not the

which of

human

motives

...

but the

deliberation"

bearing
man

of the unknown on rational

is

not exact.

Hobbes's

"honest"

does

know

the others is

"wicked"

"righteous"

or

but he

must

have

an account of

human

nature which encompasses

the more dangerous possi

bility. Similarly, though anticipatory violence may be caused by fear of anticipa tory violence the condition of diffidence within which this can occur presupposes
a certain

understanding

of

human nature,

or of

the

range of

its

possible

forms,

on

the part of the

of violence can also

diffident;

the diffident must be able to the fear

of

conceive of a possible cause

in human

nature other than

be

shown that

vanity,

or

self-glory, as a
of

anticipatory violence itself. It possible form of human nature in the treatment

of

remains essential to
of nature

the existence

diffidence

even

the state

in Leviathan.
account of

In his

the causes

of quarrel

in De Cive Hobbes
frequent"

calls

violence"

chief source of

yet admits

that "the most

source

glory "the is the incom

argument mo

patibility
as stated

of objectives.

This

would

indicate incoherence in Hobbes's

as a specific and we recognize

here, only if we understand glory tive. Hobbes's incoherence vanishes when

for glory "man
or comparison can enter
contribute

isolated human

that the human concern

to,

their

into the very choice of objectives and cause, or incompatibility. And indeed Hobbes says in De Cive that anything good, (2.5.5).
which

scarce esteems
. .

hath

not somewhat of eminence

in

the enjoyment

In Leviathan Hobbes introduces

ability"

"equality

hope"

of

as

the

result of

"equality

of

from this derives enmity and war out of competition (1.13, 95). Has Hobbes thus found a sufficient cause of violence in the mere incompatibility
and

of

objectives,

or

We

should observe rather that

in the scarcity of the Hobbes

means

whereby desires may be

satisfied?

new notion of

"equality
As

hope"

of

follows

his

expanded and revised treatment of

ability."

"equality

of

we

seen, Hobbes argues in Leviathan for the first time that men are their physical vulnerability but also in their
ter he notes that "such

equal not

have already only in

faculties
.

of

mind; in arguing this lat

is the

nature of men

they

will

hardly

believe there be

many
men's

so wise as

wisdom

ity

ability"

of

equality of but it is not, of course, an acknowledgement of equality as it exists in beliefs. One can say that Hobbes derives "equality of from "equal only when he expands his account of the latter to include the vain
hope"

themselves

For Hobbes this becomes

a proof of

conceit of most men as equal of

to their own wisdom. Not equal hope of obtaining but fear derives from equality of ability when this is confined to the recognition how brittle the frame of our body is.2* In Leviathan then, though diffidence
"Dans
cet

26.

etat, chacun se sent

inferieur;

a peine chacun se sent-il

egal."

Montesquieu, De

T esprit des lois

1.1.2.

Reason
may

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

"two
men

295

occur whenever

desire the

same

cannot

both

enjoy,"

we must recall again

that

thing which nevertheless they "man, whose joy consists in com

what

paring himself with other men, can 130). The probability and possibility
pends upon can

relish of a

nothing but

is

eminent"

(2.17,
objectives"

true

"incompatibility of

de

the fact that at least some men proceed in this way, or that all
some might.

men

imagine that

That vanity,

or

the concern for what is eminent, re

mains an essential element of

the argument which shows that the state of nature

is

a state of

war, is

finally

suggested

by the

fact that "the desire inclines

of such men

things as

are

is a necessary to commodious least when it is accompanied by the hope

living"

passion that of

to peace, at
their own

obtaining these things

by

industry (1.13,
If,
as we

98).
or

have argued, vanity,

the concern for reputation, remains

essential

to Hobbes's account of the generation of quarrel

must nevertheless acknowledge

in the

natural

condition, we

that

its

explicit role within

his

argument

is

re

duced. More exactly, glory

tioned after rather than
of

as a separate and specific cause of violence competition

is

men

before

for

"gain."

Nor is this the only

as a cause of

change

this

kind

within

Hobbes's
also

argument.

In the

earlier statements and

wits"

especially in
violence;
thing"

De Cive Hobbes had

identified the "combat

hurt"

of and

if glory is the chief cause of the "desire to its most frequent source, disagreement of
trines or politic
.

"appetite to the

same

opinion

prudence"

causes
.

"the

fiercest,

or

concerning religious "doc the greatest discords which are

their
own wisdom

(De Cive

.5).

In Leviathan
"

men's vain esteem of

is in

corporated

into the "proof

of equal

faculties

of

mind,

while

their differences of
seek

opinion are

(Lev.

1.

included among the 13, 96). We may doubt differences

an

"trifles"

for

which

those who

glory

contend

whether

this change indicates that Hobbes no

doctrine"

longer

supposes

of opinion

concerning "religious
strife; the

or

"civic

prudence"

important

cause of contention or civil

problem

greater part of

Le

viathan

is directed to the

for the

commonwealth posed

by

errors of reli

gious

doctrine. It is therefore

reasonable

to consider whether Hobbes's altered the priority of the pursuit of

solution of

treatment of these differences of

opinion as also of

glory

could

be intended to

contribute

to the

practical

the

problem

these create for the

commonwealth.

There

is,

we

believe,

a general

consistency

between the
revisions ports

changes

in Hobbes's

account of

the natural condition here and other the commonwealth which

in his teaching concerning the

suggestion.

nature of

sup

this

If the may be

pursuit

by

two or more of some objective

over

they

tains a kind of priority

considered

the

pursuit of reputation

cannot jointly enjoy ob in Leviathan, this change and

in

relation

to Hobbes's understanding of the possibility

manner of satisfying those pursuing these ends within civil society. In De Cive can be obtained through the society of others, even if Hobbes argues that
"gain"

it

could

be

sought yet more we

successfully through
of things

dominion,

were

this obtainable

(1. 1. 2). As

have seen, the desire hope

necessary for

commodious

living

coupled with the

of obtaining these through our own

industry

is

a passion

296
which

Interpretation
inclines
men

to peace (Lev. 1 13, 98).

.

Society

does
(1

not at all advance

"the
and
of

cause of

my glorying in

myself,"

on the other
can

hand, according
.1.2).

to

De Cive,

no great or

lasting
in

society

be based

on this pursuit

Those forms

commonwealth

which there

ferior to that in

which

is opportunity for this pursuit are to this extent in there is none (De Cive 2.10.9). Since, further, "ambition
men"

and greediness of

honour

cannot

be

rooted out of

the

minds of

those who

think themselves wiser than others and show

it

by harming
(2.

the commonwealth
obey"

if they cannot do so "constant application

Hobbes
to
still speaks of

otherwise must

be led to "an but

ambition

to

by

the

of rewards and punishments

13. 12).

In Leviathan

the

application of rewards

understands

the aim of these

extend

beyond the
end

mere restraint of ambition:

their use and

wealth,

is

then

done,

when

they

that

have

well served

the common
so well re

are with as

little

expense of

the

common

treasure, both to

as

is possible,
to do

compensed, as others
as

thereby may be

encouraged

serve the same as

faithfully

they

can, and to study the arts

by

which

they may be

enabled

it better (Lev.

2.30,

270)27

If the

proper use of rewards can encourage

could

something

other

than the mere

"ambi We

tion to obey",

the concern for comparisons or what

is

eminent

be trans

formed into the

pursuit of

those goods associated with commodious living?

have already noted Hobbes's observation that the peculiarly human pursuit is of what is eminent since man's joy consists in his comparison of himself with oth
ers.

than.

We may now observe that this thought obtains its most radical form in Levia In the Elements of Law Hobbes had said that while bees pursue a common
men seek such goods as are

good,

distinct

and therefore cause

contention; in Le

viathan

the bees are naturally inclined to their

man

private good and

thereby
its

procure

the common good while

comparison

determines

what

is

good

by
a

eminence

is

not a result

but

a cause of

the human pursuit of goods that are dis

tinct and eminent (El. 1.19.5; De Cive 2.5.5; Lev. 2.17, 130).

We have
which

seen that

in Leviathan

men's vain esteem of their own wisdom, of opinion

is

expressed

in their differences

concerning

civic prudence and

religious

doctrine in De Cive, becomes have

suggested

part of an argument

prudence and we

that this argument

for the equality of is dubious both on its face

and when compared

athan.

to what Hobbes has said about prudence previously in Levi

aim remains

So far

as

Hobbes's

that of persuading his readers that

of

they

[those readers'] blood to wade to their own (De Cive, 103) the rhetorical merit of his new argument is considerable and it is augmented by other changes in his teachshould not ambitious men

"suffer

through the streams

"Preface,"

power"

27.

Compare

also

the extent

and status of

Hobbes's treatment

of

the prevention

of

idleness in De

Cive (2. 13. 14)

28.

Leviathan (2.30, 267). The account in De Cive falls between those

and

of

The Elements
"has

and

Leviathan: the among

natural appe

tite of the

bees is "conformable
private"

and

they desire

the common good, which

what

them differs not

from their

while man

"scarce

esteems"

not somewhat of eminence

in the enjoy

ment, more than that which others

do

possess."

Reason
ing.29

and

Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

297

Though in the

men's vain esteem of

their own wisdom is not satisfied

by

partici need to

pation admit

governance of the commonwealth

it is

not violated

by

the

the greater wisdom of some other.

Equality of hope becomes

and

central to the

account of quarrel

in the

natural

condition,

equality
as

of

right fundamental to
of nat

Hobbes's treatment
ural

of the
men

laws

of nature.

Equity

the acknowledgement

equality among

has

moreover an

representative

in the

performance
of

increased role in guiding the sovereign of his office and a new role of great importance
of

in the judicial
Differences
all

interpretation
of opinion

the laws

the

commonwealth.30

among the causes of quarrel

concerning religious doctrine are no longer named at in Hobbes's treatment of the natural condition in
of religious

Leviathan though the basis

corded considerable

belief in ignorance

of natural causes

is

ac

importance in Hobbes's

examination of

the "qualities of

mankind work

that concern their

78-81).

living
If

together in peace and

unity"

earlier

in the

same

(Lev. i.ii,
suppose

such

differences
That

retain

their significance we can

only

that Hobbes

includes them among the

"trifles"

for

which men seek

ing
be

glory invade

one another

(1

96).

men's

differences

of opinion might obvious.

"trifles"

understood as a contention over

is

not

immediately

In the
the

Elements of Law Hobbes had supposed it a duty of sovereigns "to religion they hold for since "eternal is better than temporal
best"

establish

good"

(2.9.2)
who

though in De Cive he is less sure of this (2.13.5). Nor is the question of

should govern

ignored

by

the partisans
religious

ferences
"trifles,"

of opinion

concerning however if it be agreed

of opposing religious Dif doctrine may become a contention over that Jesus is the Christ and that "inward
faith"

doctrine.31

obedience of the sovereign

consistent with

is

all

that is

required

for

salvation and

that this

faith is

any

external

actions,

even of

worship,

required of subject

by sov

ereign,

and

these are the teachings of

Leviathan}1

In the Elements of Law Hobbes had deplored the lack of progress in moral and civil philosophy evidenced by the fact that the writers on this subject have not re
solved

but

exacerbated

controversy
much as

while

every He had

man continues

to think "that in thereonto no

of progress

this subject he knows as

study"

any other, supposing there

wit."

needs

but that

supplied

by

"natural
mankind

contrasted this
efforts of

lack

with

the several benefits to

resulting from the

motions and

those who com

proportions are men

pared

"magnitudes,

numbers, times, and

how their

to one

another;"

this difference Hobbes

attributes

to the fact that these latter

29.

To

eliminate

differences

of opinion or reduce these

attributed

to their passionate basis is consistent with

of

the aim

Harvey

C. Mansfield, Jr., has

99-100.

to Hobbes
of

avoiding

founding

politics or rule on

political opinion as such. "Hobbes and the

ence

Science

Indirect

Government,"

American Political Sci

Review, Vol. 65 (1971),

In Leviathan the
himself"

30.

requirement

to seek peace if

obtainable

is

immediately followed by
he

the

rule

that

a man content
.

himself "with
100).

so much

liberty

against other men, as

would allow other men

against

( 1 14,

In De Cive the

same rule

is

presented as

the ninth law of nature and a

sequel to the prohibition of pride

(1

3.14).

32.

See English Works vi, 243, 275. On Hobbes's authorization theology

see

Orwin,

"On Sovereign

Authorization,"

35-38.

298
have

Interpretation

proceeded

have taken

"evidently "vulgarly
benefits
the things

from humble

principles"

while

the civil philosophers

received"

opinions as

their principles (1.13.3).

Hobbes
these are

names these same

enumerated as natural

of scientific progress

in Leviathan but
condition of war

now

men must

lack in that
96-97)."

to which their

passions

carry them (1.13,

the common

Although,

or

because, Hobbes
in the study
effort to

continues

to

deny
is
the

opinion

that "there needs no method

geometry)"

of

the politics (as there does in the study of

politics

and even

to suppose that

"the

harder study
profess

two"

of

the
of

(2.30, 271), he
study
or

makes

little

persuade men of the need or

rule of

difficulty

that

that

they

should accept

the

those who
own

it. If Hobbes

attempts rather

to correct

men's

"vain

conceit"

of

their

wisdom, his correction tends

and

to the acknowledgement of nat

ural

equality

the acceptance of a politics

and

society based
of

on

right

than to the recognition of that

"harder

study"

the politics.

equality of Within classi On

cal political science rhetoric

is

called upon

to assuage the indignant popular reac

should rule.

tion to the claim that wisdom, or those

devoted to its pursuit,

conceit"

Hobbes's understanding

of men's

"vain

we could

say that this

reaction

is

at once

the acknowledgement that wisdom

is

a title

to rule and the angry denial

of most men ence so

that there are others the

wiser

than themselves. For ancient political sci

far

as

common opinion

recognizes, or can be represented as recogniz

ing,

the

claim of

wisdom, that

opinion

implies

basis

on which

the claims of the

political
which

many, the wealthy, and the

task becomes in

wise might

be harmonized. In principle, the

the spirited element,
result of

large

measure

the

subordination of

is

the basis of anger, to wisdom;

tion.34

political

justice is the

this subordina

For

Hobbes,

on

the other

hand, inequality

of wisdom as a possible

basis
de

of rule must nial

be denied. Hobbes

seeks rather to

derive from

men's passionate of right.

that others are wiser than themselves their

passion"

belief in equality

As

"getting opinion from

vain esteem of

is

form

of

rhetoric, Hobbes's

response

to

men's

their own prudence must be acknowledged as a new and

powerful

kind

of rhetoric

(El. 1.13.7,

2.8.14).

speaks only of the absence of "ornaments and comforts of life, which (1 .14.12) and in De Cive of the lack of usually invented and "pleasure and beauty of ( 1 1 1 3) The famous enumeration occurs only in Leviathan 34. See Plato, Republic 441-42. If the pursuit of wisdom is itself a form of the pursuit of glory or power, as it is for Hobbes, this subordination is ruled out. If the spirited element is to be civilized it

33.

In the Elements Hobbes

by

peace and

procured"

society

are

life"

must rather

be

subordinated to appetite so

far

as this

is

possible.

Rousseau

versus the
of

Savoyard Vicar:

The Profession

Faith Considered

Peter Emberley
Carleton

University

New

philosophic

truths and new

forms

of political power can cast

doubt

on

the existence of the gods to whom a people prays and can erode the traditional re
straints

by

which a

believe this problem to

ceived

community regulates men's passions. Rousseau appeared to be particularly acute in his day because of what he per
and

to be the social consequences of modern materialism teaching. Men confronted one another
now

the modern

natural-right

as

equals, liberated
of

from had

earlier obligations

to do another's bidding. The diffusion

individualism
the

made each man

the center of a self-contained universe thus

jeopardizing

social order

by dissolving

the self-evidentness of traditional restraints and en

couraging a ruthless calculation of interest and advantage. Contrary to the teach ing of Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau did not believe that calculative reason and juridical
power could moderate and

the newly liberated

appetites.

In fact, the

new

teaching

the

materialism upon which

it is based, had
the human

given rise

to a predatory
that stood

competitiveness and a cheerless

stark opposition men and

dependency on the whims of others,

facts
of condition:

in

to the most potent

the solidarity of

against

human freedom. Rousseau's teaching involves a sustained polemic what he perceived to be the public irresponsibility of the materialists and
innovations to
reconstitute moral

various philosophic and pedagogic

behaviour in

the

wake of

their disturbances.
more sensitive

Rousseau,
discourse
readers with ruption

than his contemporaries to the

fact that

philosophic

was a public act and therefore

had

political

effects, often presented his

salutary truths. He employed a powerful rhetoric to prevent the cor

to be the inevitable
also wrote
consequence of educators and upon

he

saw

the

modern

natural-right

teaching.

However, he

for

legislators

whose

future task

it

would

be to

construct new social power

bonds

the ruins of the political order and

within

the emerging

matrix

that pending revolutions would produce.

Thus, in interpreting
comes

Rousseau's

various pronouncements and

judgments, it be
or strategic case

necessary to

speculate

that some of them may

have dramatic

rather than philosophical significance and that this where religious and ethical matters are at
stake.1

may be particularly the

relation

Interpreters
References
are

of

Rousseau have

often

been insensitive to the

of

his

to Qiuvres

completes

Pleiade,
1
p.
.

1964), 4 vols.,

although

I have followed the translation les

de J. -J. Rousseau (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la of Allan Bloom, Emile or on Educa

sources,"

tion (New York: Basic

Books,

1979). sur

Cf. Jean Morel, "Recherches

Annales de la Societe J. -J. Rousseau,

(1909),

135.

300
novel

Interpretation
of
of

the

social and

doctrines to the Biblical tradition, a tradition that constitutes a large part One of the consequences intellectual fabric of Rouseau's
time.2

this is that

readers

have

difficulty

orthodoxy

with

the same

caution and alarm as

in understanding the philosophic dispute did the political authorities

with
not

to say ecclesiastics
ments might

in Rousseau's time.

Ignoring

the possibility that his state

or to

have been

a product of prudent understood

caution,

have

a strategic

value,

commentators of

Rousseau have

the materialist monists and their pernicious

him to be unequivocally challenging doctrines with a restatement of tradi

to a new moral autonomy.
of

tional dualistic

doctrines; pointing forward however

is
said

This

restatement

to

occur

in "The Profession

Faith

of the

Savoyard

Vicar"

in Book IV

of

the Emile. With this Rousseau was said to have attempted to have made explicit his self-appointed task of rais
ancients,"

to charm corrupted

hearts,

and to have contemporary man "to the pitch of the souls of the sponded to the doctrines of Helvetius, La Mettrie, and Diderot (in. 961). It is

ing

re as

serted that

Rouseau did

not

merely

restore

but instead identified the

structure of a

novel and rigorous moral experience.

prominent

interpretation, then, is
freedom

to see
self-

the Profession as Rouseau's

"proto-Kantian"

statement of moral on natural sentiment.

as

legislating autonomy grounded, however, Many of Rousseau's interpreters claim

presented

that in the "Profession of

Faith"

he

the only coherent and unified discussion of his metaphysics, episte

ethics.3

mology, and
with seminal

Much

of what

is

revealed

by

the vicar

is indeed

compatible

ideas Rousseau

expressed

explicitly in

such works as

the First Dis

course, and Letter to the epistle

d'Alembert,

the Moral

dedicatories to

other major

Letters, the Letter to Voltaire, and works. Moreover, immediately after the
wrote that

presentation of

the profession of the way one

faith, Rousseau
establish

he had

transcribed

it

"as

an example of

can reason with one's pupil

in

order not to

diverge

from the

method"

he had tried to he had

(iv.635). In his Confessions, Rous

religious

seau claimed

that he had resolved his own metaphysical and

of what written

doubts
re-

along the lines

2.

in the Emile: "the

result of

my

painful

thors,

cf.

Rousseau's broad grasp of both classical and Biblical Marguerite Reichenberg, "La Bibliotheque de J. -J. Rousseau
writes

material is attested to
Rousseau,"

by

various au

Annales,
was

xxi

(1932),

pp.

181-250.

in his Confessions:
way,"

"My

usual

evening reading

the Bible and I read it

through five or six times

3.

in

this

xi, 1,

580.

Grimsley, Rousseau and the Religious Quest (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), and The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); P. M. Masson, La Profession defoi du vicaire Savoyard (Fribourg: University of Fribourg Press, 1914);
examples of

As

this interpretation: R.

Romantic (London: Methuen, 1974); Ernest Cassirer, The Ques York: Columbia University Press, 1954); A. Levine, The Poli tics of Autonomy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976). The exceptions to the general opinion are A. Bloom, introduction to the Emile (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1979). C. Butterworth, inter
and

K. F. Roche, Rousseau, Stoic

tion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New

essay to The Reveries of the Solitary Walker (N.Y.: New York University Press, 1979), Yvon Belaval, "La Theorie du jugement dans Jean-Jacques Rousseau et son QZuvre (Paris: 1964), pp. 149-57, J. Cropsey, "The Human Vision of in Political Philosophy and the Is sues of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), and C. Orwin, "Humanity and Justice:
pretive
l'Emile," Rousseau"

The Problem
of the

of

Compassion in the Thought

explore

Rousseau,"

of

Harvard Ph.D. dissertation,

1976.

None

latter, however,

the disjunctions in detail.

Rousseau
search was

versus the

Savoyard Vicar
I have

301
in the
faith"

just

about what
what

since registered conveyed

profession of

(1.1018).
tended as

Apparently
his final

Rousseau

in the

vicar's profession was

in

word on religious and ethical matters and

few

commentators

have
A

questioned

his

openness or sincerity.
readers'

major reason

for

most

belief that these

are

Rousseau's

own views

is that the
with

profession

is

unorthodox and was the cause of

Rousseau's troubles
Rousseau
that

the ecclesiastical authorities. The vicar, who is commonly thought to be

regarded as a

Rousseau's mouthpiece, is
could air

literary

mask

through

which

his

own unorthodox views

in

less direct He

manner.

The

vicar claims

there

is

no

basis to revelation, to divine intervention in the form

of

miracles, or to

the truth of

holy

scriptures and prophecies.

also

denies that the Church has in

a

fallible

authority.

The

vicar's approach

to

theology is

type

of

"natural

religi

constituted

by

man's natural

grasp

of

the

world around

him

rather

than the truths

of revelation.

Since

some of the vicar's views are

by Rousseau,
I
shall

few have doubted that the

profession of

explicitly faith is Rousseau's

expressed elsewhere own

philosophical position.

argue,

however,

that this conspicuous section of the Emile

is in fact
and

Rousseau's

most orthodox and traditional

of

treatment

of philosophical

issues

thus does not contain the enduring core

sion clashes while

his teaching. I

suggest that the profes

only with the externalities of the theological teaching of the Church leaving its foundations intact. The character of the rest of Rousseau's
contrast,
much more subversive of

teaching is, by
ings in

Christian

and classical

teach

disputing

the ontological structure of that tradition. The

radical character

of the profession acts acter of

indeed

as a

mask, but to the

much more unorthodox char materialists.

Rousseau's fundamental
novel general

agreement with and

the

It

mediates

be

tween his

teaching

the traditional or conventional opinions of

his

contemporaries.

The

spectable than those of

I would suggest, are ultimately more re Rousseau himself before the judgment of orthodoxy. De
vicar's views profession embraces a metaphysical

spite
all

its heretical character, the

dualism

and

that this

commitment entails.

Insofar

as

Rousseau

appears

to adopt some of

the important doctrines of

sential vicar.

materialistic

monism, as will be shown, there

is

an es

incompatibility in
submit

the

physical and moral

theories of Rousseau and the

To

that the profession does not constitute Rousseau's own

teaching
factors
and

"dramatic"

will require a two-fold

demonstration:

(a)

that there are major

that suggest that the

profession

is

an unacceptable

teaching for Emile,

even

(b)

that there

are substantial philosophical claims made that are own views stated elsewhere. not seem

incompatible
proof

with

Rousseau's
cient.

However,

this

is

not suffi

Does it

extraordinary that

an author would offer a

text that

is

not

his

own philosophical position

but

one guaranteed

to

bring
is
a

about the severest

censure?

To

explore and

to

present

the

view

that there

disjunction between

Rousseau's
sion.

and aim

the

vicar's positions

does

not explain

the purpose of the profes

What

does it

serve

if it is

not

Rouseau's

own considered opinions about

302

Interpretation
Such
an explanation

moral matters?

is

a needed supplement
views.

to the

inquiry

and

follows my demonstration of It is necessary to make some preliminary remarks concerning the justification for engaging in interpretation of Rousseau's intention and the interpretive strat
egy I
shall employ.

the disjunction in

It is

not self-evident which of

Rousseau's

works are more

im

portant and which serve a

didactic

rather than a philosophic purpose. a certain order and

Rousseau

asserted that
read"

his books

would

have to be taken "in

that he
would

diligently

(1933). He

was concerned

fects he
and so

sought would not on

be produced,

and

be misrepresented, that the ef that he would be read superficially,

it is incumbent he
offers.

the reader to trust Rousseau's advice given in the

few

suggestions

It is

obvious that

Rousseau's

philosophic principles are not presented

in the

traditional mode of philosophical

discourse. Instead,
to

as exemplified most partic and conversa of

ularly in the Emile, he

tions.

provides a series of on readers

narratives, anecdotes,

Explaining his demand

decipher the meaning

these

frag

ments,

I have

often given myself a good a word cast as

deal

of trouble to
result of a

try

to

enclose

in

sentence, in a

line, in

if by chance, the
to

greater part of

my

readers ought

find my

long series of reflections. Often the speeches badly connected and almost en
the trunk
whose

tirely desultory, for having failed

shown

to

perceive

branches

alone and

I have I have

them. But

it

was enough

for those

who

know how to understand,

never wanted

to speak to the others (in.

of of

105-

106).

The terseness broader

many

Rousseau's images

encourages

reflection

on

the

significance of the example: you will

"Reader,

spare me words.

If

you are made

for understanding me,

examples."4

be

quite able to

follow my

rules

in my detailed
writes with

It is

nonetheless pertinent

to query the suggestion that Rousseau

with

caution and

indirectly.

Especially

Rousseau

who so

constantly

parades

his

sincerity

and who

explicitly subtlety

claimed

that he had dedicated his life to the interest

of truth and that the

and subterfuge of

many

authors was a sign of their

bad faith (iv.569),

cipher

a reader might

be

suspicious of an
and

interpreter's

attempt to

de
vir

his

tues that Rouseau extolls.

in that
even
. .

Openness, sincerity, all, "Yes, with some pride of soul, I declare and I feel that writing I have carried good faith, veracity, and frankness as far, further
statements. are after
.

"simple

naivete"

than any other man

has

done"

ever

(1

1035).

Nonetheless, in response, two factors

claimed

in

a work sixteen years

should be considered. First, Rousseau later, The Reveries of a Solitary Walker, that he of

had dedicated his life to the interest

er's opinions and reactions are

truth. In a public document

was

whose read of

diverse, it
way

necessary for the interest

truth

to present the
readers

inquiry

in

such a

as to promote

salutary teachings to those

re-

unwilling

or unable

to pursue the more subtle meaning. Rousseau

4.

iv, 802.

Rousseau
vealed

versus the

Savoyard Vicar

303
the

that his writing had been motivated

by

desire to

offer useful

teachings to

to mankind:
speak

"Love

of

the public

good

is the only

passion which causes me

and

to the

public."5

He had

recognized

that some truths were salutary

that

others were

socially harmful. The materialists had run roughshod over this dis tinction, but the diffusion of knowledge which they had effected had not pro duced human order. What would happen to the saluary effects of traditional re
straints on

the passions
notion of

the fear
the

of eternal

damnation,

or

the corruption of the

soul,

or

the

mined

that men have no

intrinsic nobility of just acts if science had deter that all human is souls, purposeless, and that the striving had
recognized

sole guide

to human action is self-calculation? Rousseau

were

that po

litical dangers
maxim,
vitam

being
of

posed

by

the new science.

wrote:

Interpreting
truth"

his life's
(1.1038).

impendere vero, Rousseau

"My

professed

truthfulness is

based

more on

feelings

integrity

and

justice than

on

factual

What he implies is that the

consideration of

obligation

to reveal the truth publicly is based on a

the public utility of that truth.

The truth is different

ument
men.

owed

but the

manner of

its

delivery

can reveal

different things to

suggest

that Rousseau's intention is two-fold: he provides a doc

nature of which

for his time, the

is to inspire in his fellow citizens,

at

the

very least, well be educators

in

the simulacrum of virtue; he also offers to his

and

future

readers who

may

legislators,

a science with which a novel transformation of

ethics and politics

which

he

uses

may be effected. That transformation is obscured by the way his terminology, sometimes in the more radical way. It is
the admonition Rousseau gave to Mme. d'Epinay: "Learn
good

worthwhile

heeding

my vocabulary better, my

friend, if you

want us

to understand each other.

Believe me, my terms rarely have their usual To turn now to the interpretive strategy I shall employ, it is well-known that there are significant tensions or disjunctions from one of Rousseau's works to an
meaning."6

other.

Yet he had

claimed

"I have

written on variouss

subjects, but always

with

the same principles; always the same morality, the

same

belief,

the same maxims

and, if

opinions"

you

like,

the same

(iv.928). Is there

a set of works that would

whereby all the differences can be understood? In a letter to M. de Malesherbes Rousseau identified his principal writings in a description
provide the principles of

his "suden inspiration": "All I

a quarter of an

could retain of

these crowds of great truths that

which, in

hour, illuminated

me under

distributed in my three

principal

writings, namely that

which

tree, has been weakly first discourse, the one on

inseparable
and

inequality,
form Rousseau's

and the

treatise on education,

three

works are

whole"

a single

(1.

1135-36).

This

suggests that the

on

decisive
Arts

principles of

thought are to
on the

be found in the Discourse

the

and

Sciences,
for

the Discourse

Of these, the Second Discourse

5.

Origin of Inequality Among Men, could be said to have the

to

and

the Emile.
most significance

J. -J.

Rousseau, Letter
p.

M. d'Alembert M. d'Alembert,

on the

Theatre,

transl.

by

Allan Bloom (N.Y.: Free

Press,

1968),

132.

6. J. -J. Rousseau, Letter

to

p. 28.

304
an

Interpretation
Rousseau's teaching because in this writing he elaborates the principles upon which the novelty of his thought is based. There is
of

interpretation

philosophic

considerable evidence piece of

to

support

his

claim.

That essay, he had

indicated,
not

was

"a

writing in which these audaciously (in. 783). Years later, writing in his Confessions about his texts, he in dicated that "everything daring in the Social Contract was already said in the
principles were most
revealed"

boldly, if

Second
tise.7

Discourse,"

and

in the Emile his

references

to that discourse

imply that it
against

was of crucial philosophical

significance
which

for

interpreting

the educational trea

In the Letter to Beaumont, in

the

Rousseau defended his treatise

the

the

accusations of

Archibishop, he
in

wrote

following
so

about

the Second Dis

course and

his

earlier works

relation

to the Emile.

if the force

subject of them
what

did

not admit of their

being

fully

explained,

they

gained
with

in

they lost in

extent and express

vicar.8

the author's profession of

faith

less

reserve

than that of the Savoyard

a passage of

Finally, in
locutor
which

Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, Rousseau has his inter

understood

suggest

that Rousseau's principles could be

to that of their

only in

an order

publication

"was

retrograde

suggesting
of

that the dis

courses

contain appears

the most elaborate expression of his philosophic

principles.9

Thus, it

that

an

interpretation

of

the resilient core

and

Rousseau's teaching
as

requires an emphasis upon the

arise

Second Discourse

in reading Rousseau's other works need may that discourse. Indeed, the most important theoretical insights
toricization of consciousness and the
crucial

any such disjunctions to be interpreted in favor

offered

of

the hisexpe

significance of the
condition

human

rience

of

time as duration

supplies an

the necessary

for Rousseau's
of the contra
faith.10

pedagogical

innovations. This is
exist

important

conclusion

because

dictions that
Although

between the Second Discourse

and the profession of

most modern commentators not gone

have ignored these contradictions, the

unnoticed.

discrepancies have

appears, perhaps not

seau's
which

completely surprisingly, in an is
a

suggestion of

disjunction Rous
of
Arch-

account

by

the

first

reviewer of

Emile,

the

Archbishop de
portion

Beaumont. In his

mandate against

the

Emile,
the

the significant

discussion

of the profession of

faith,

7.

8. T. Becket

J. -J. Rousseau, Confessions (London: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 379; iv. 556, and P. -A. de Honot, The Social Compact and the Mandate of the
p. 47.

796.

Archbishop

of

Paris (London: 1764),

9.

1, 932-33;

see

also, Roger

Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, N.J.:

a similar of

Princeton
10.
sur

University Press,

1986), for

interpretive

strategy.
or

I have

not addressed the

issue

why in the Moral Letters to Mme. d'Houdetot

of

the Lettre

la Providence Rousseau
often quoted

embraces certain metaphysical assumptions similar to those of the vicar.

Although dressee
have
and

to support the

interpretation

Rousseau
efforts.

as a proto-Kantian and metaphysi particular anxieties of each ad

cian, these letters too reveal Rousseau's pedagogical

receive

The

individual

attentioin and one cannot assume

cf.

a general

significance;

Rouseau's
of

portrait of

simply that the contents of each letter Mme. d'Houdetot in the Confessions (1.409)
1760

his

qualifications

for the initial letter

Providence to Voltaire, June 17,

(iv.

1070-71).

Rousseau

versus the

Savoyard Vicar

305
as

bishop
himself

also censures

Rousseau for presenting Emile

material and subject

as a

being

purely

to the the

brought up "to look laws of

basis
of

on

mechanism."11

Now this in the

statement could

hardly

have been
to

made on

the

presentation

profession of

faith,

which although

heretical is

sustained

by

a metaphysical

dualism

and not what often appears

be Rousseau's

own mechanical monism.

The

statement

therefore

attests

to,

or points

to,

an apparent

disjunction between
of the rest of

the profession of

faith

and

the

Archbishop's

own

interpretation

the

Emile.

I. DRAMATIC FACTORS

Throughout the
taken

Emile, Rousseau
minds

counsels that great stealth and care must

be

in presenting young to judge.

A

the

teaching from

which

they

are to

learn how

single object well chosen and shown

in

a suitable

light

will provide

him

emotion and
on what

reflection

for

a month.

It is

not so much what

he

sees as

his

looking

back

he

has he

seen that

determines the judgments he

object comes to

makes about

it;

and

the durable impression

point

receives

from the

him less from the

object

itself than from the

of view which one

induces him to take in recalling it (iv.516).

appears

Given this advice, it

judicious to
consider

"dramatic"

consider the

factors

of

the vicar's presentation. We

will

four

elements of that context:

(a)

Rousseau's preceding discussion vine, (b) his critique of Locke's

and

of

imagination

and

the source of ideas of the di

educational

method,

(c)

the significance of the

(d) accompanying frontispiece, The discussion of Book IV, in which the

the character of the profession's addressee.

profession

marily to the need to prevent the premature sire. The major dilemma confronted in that book is the tendency of Emile's imagination to arouse his desires through alluring and enticing images. Thus, the

is situated, is devoted pri development of Emile's sexual de

by various manipulations to mute and to channel the influence of by eliciting and maintaining desire, instrumentalizing it, and ex control over the body of the nascent moral subject. It is necessary to em tending
tutor seeks

imagination

phasize that this context offers us an sion of

indication
sufficient

of what

is

at stake

in the Profes
with

Faith. For the

moment

it is

to say that it is particularly

vicar's and

regard to the problematization of

desire that the

of

Rousseau's

views

differ. However, that the Profession

tation and instrumentation
of

Faith is

situated

in the

context of

the exci
a mere

desire in Book IV may suggest, beyond

cit. supra, p.
abominable

11.
about

T. Becket

and

P.

-A.

de Honot, op,

16.

The

Archbishop

wrote

the

following
could not

the Emile as a

whole:

"... containing

doctrines

calculated

to invalidate the princi

ples of natural

justice

and

to subvert the foundations of the Christian

of

(p.

34).

He

have

written this on the

basis

his reading

of

the profession alone.

306

Interpretation
positions,
as a strategic

conflict of

tactic on the tutor's part in the constitution of

"sexuality",
explore

the locus

of a positive

investment in life processes,

profession

which

shall

presently.12

The
men

section

immediately

preceding the

focuses

upon

the

difficulty

have in acquiring ideas of the divine, of substance, and of disembodied spir its. Rousseau reiterates a theme sustained throughout the first three books, that
men can

only know the things which can be

world

by

perception:

"we

are

limited

by

our

faculties to

sensed"

(111.551). As he has

maintained

throughout Book

II,

corporeal and sensible phenomena are and reliable

the only ones of which men have concrete

ideas. Rousseau

now suggests that men

have

animated

the world

with processes and characteristics which are projections of want of

their own

being. For

comprehending
their

natural

phic versions of
ativity"

own

forces, men created gods that were anthropomor fears, needs, and hopes. Rousseau relates this "cre
and to

to a certain primal

fear

the

rampant excursions of

the

imagination.

world

that is not understood

is

animated with

intention

and

will; an omnipotent
about sub of

will

is believed to direct the

Should

motions of

the universe.

Men's ideas

stance and spirit are conceived natural causes.

in

a similar

fashion,
the

generated

by

ignorance

one read the vicar's views mindful of of

this observation?

The

second

feature

Rousseau's

prelude to

profession

is his

criticism of

Locke's

suggestion

that a child should become acquainted

argues

first

with spirits and

then bodies.
procedure

Rousseau
against

that Locke's

method

is

the

order of

nature,

and

leads to materialism, that his that it proceeds from superstition.

with a

Rousseau proposes, as he has throughout Emile's education, to begin knowledge of bodies. An

examination of

the relevant section in Locke's writings on education is re

vealing because it shows the great divergence between the two thinkers regarding the foundation of virtue. Locke argues that virtue is the first and most necessary endowment for a gentleman and suggests that it is "absolutely requisite to make him
valued and

beloved
other's

by

others, acceptable or tolerable to

appears more

himself."13

In

Locke's teaching,
esteem.
next.

esteem

important to

men

than

self-

Virtue,
of

appears

here

as

the means to happiness in this

virtue

world and

the

Locke

continues

by arguing that the foundation of this

onto

is to be "a true

Notion

God,"

imprinted early

the mind and that He is to be acknowl

things, as well as the benefactor of all that is in men's lives. The esteem of God makes men esteem themselves; the rec ognition of God's benefaction encourages humility and the love of fellow men. It is in the imitation of Christ that men become Christ-like; it is in being valued by
edged as the author and maker of all
good

God,
12.

that men acquire value in their own eyes. Locke's gentleman is to acquire
concerning Vic (New York: Vintage Books, 1980). John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University
critique of the

For this distinction

see

M. Foucault's

"repressive

hypothesis"

torian mores,
13.

in The

History
135,

of Sexuality,

vol. I

Press,

1902);

section

p. 99.

Rousseau
the

versus the

Savoyard Vicar

307

idea

of an

omnipresent and omniscient

Deity,

whose greatness

is to be

praised and acknowledged

through prayer.
of

Locke then turns to

that
are

discussion

how to

accustom children

to the dark

so

they

avoid

the fearful

imagining
that He

of other spirits

which, in their

fears, they
made

liable to

produce.

He

advises

that children

should

know that God

the

dark for their

purpose and

is

ever

harm that forestalls

could come

to them.

Trusting

vigilant, protecting them against any in God, His goodness, and benefaction

primal fear, teaching men to endure patiently whatever His designs in store for them. Locke's precise argument for the study of spirits is have may that is serves "as an enlargement of our minds to which we are led both by Rea son and
Revelation."14

The knowledge
revelation.

children ought to

have

of

God

and their

own soul

is to be taken from

matter,

upon

reflection on

is necessary because which the senses are constantly engaged, does not itself encourage immaterial phenomena. Locke stipulates that "none of the great
of spirits

The study

phenomena of nature can

be

resolved"

by

recourse

to explanations

of mere mat

ter and motion; such

positive

forces

as

gravity
so

can

only be

explained

by

appealing to "the
of

Will

of a

Superior

Being

ordering

it."15

Now
tion

all of

this goes very

much against

the spirit and particulars the

the educa
the revela

proposed

by Rousseau

and casts some question on

purpose of

tion about to commence, if Rousseau is

implying

that there is a connection be

confined throughout

tween Locke's and the vicar's pedagogy. Emile

education

has been
solely

his

to understanding the

natural phenomena

by

grasping the in his

proper

ties of matter; he has

ences of reality.

required no recourse

to

spiritual explanations

experi

Moreover,
to

the

notion of an external

Will

with some manifest

intention towards
mitted.

man runs counter to the perspective to which

maintain within

Emile is

com

In

an attempt

Emile to

appraise all phenomena

his heart, Rousseau has taught the unity around him from the point of view of his own he has
experimented.

utility ble
the

and

the scientific knowledge with which

which

This

solip-

sistic self-contraction
core of material

is intended however to

guarantee some

indubita

facts

justifies Starobinski's

claim that

Rousseau banishes

divine, for "If the self interiorizes the last judge, it also interiorizes the cre ator: the self is his own origin, or better, he keeps the memory of his own ori it."16 Rousseau has insisted that gin and in his recollection he coincides with
Ibid., sec. 190, 156. Ibid., sec. 192, 157-58. 16. Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transperence et T obstacle suivi de sept essais surRouseau (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 329. The self-delusion of this Cartesian project on behalf of of material facts, and the danger of operationalizing doubt in experimentation and the indubitability
14. 15.

the mind's

enclosure within

its

own self-made entities, albeit

technologically successful, is
of

explored

in H. Arendt's The Human Condition (Chicago:

and

University
Making"

Chicago Press, 1958),

pp.

248-89,
copene-

in G. Grant's discussion
of

tration

knowing
12

and

ada, 4th

Series,

the meaning of the modem understanding of the truth as the Transactions of the Royal Society of Can in "Knowing and making (1974); its self-divinizing quality is captured by a remark of Merleau-Ponty that
of

Cartesian

consciousness assumes

the divine task of creating the world anew each morning.

308
Emile

Interpretation
not perceive

emanates

any intention beyond himself. No restraint is to appear that constraint is the natural necessity of an universe. purposeless Indeed, in Book II, in his discussion of the impersonal, source of the tyrannical will Rousseau had intimated that this turbulent state was from
a

will; Emile's only

precisely a product of the belief that there is an external will in the universe. Rousseau's comments on Locke's advice regarding revelation and trust in God's beneficient
Book II fear
the
of
where nature might remind

the reader of a

corresponding
imaginings"

section

in

Rousseau had

shown

that the "fantastic

arising from

the dark could be dispelled

world.

empirically examining the phenomena of The discussion in Book II involved an experience in a church and the

by

consequences of

imagining the existence of spirits.

concerns.

That

example alludes perhaps

to the broader question of religion and its psychological origin and so is relevant to
our

immediate

Rousseau's

project

in Books II

and

IV,

on

behalf
of

of

channelling
causes of a physical

fear, had been

to redirect it from an alliance

with

ignorance
of

the

the phenomena and the resultant superstitious

imaginging

spirits, to
relief

from

pain.

study The former

of natural phenomena

based

on need and the

desire for

obscures natural causes even

will

vealing them. As Rousseau

and

further; the latter aids in re of a need which is natural "The idea later, say
process"

known to the

child

turns

aside

that of a mysterious
upon some of and

(iv.499). Implic

itly, Rousseau

appears

to cast serious doubt

the truths

of religious

orthodoxy, reducing them to psychological responses,

ignorance,
about

thus plant

ing

in his

reader's mind some suspicion

concludes

Rousseau
method

his

comments on

regarding Locke with the judgment that Locke's

on

what

is

to transpire.

leads to

materialism.

Reflecting
Rousseau's

Emile's education,

however,
to

the
a

reader might wonder whether need of or age

education could

lead Emile to have

desire for any

notion of spirits.

What Locke's

method seeks

encour

the

contemplation of spirit are

Rousseau's

method appears

to exclude from

the beginning. Emile's inquiries and,

scientific, useful, for the

relief of

his estate,

literally,

close at

hand. No

authoritative

doctrine is

required

to shed light on

his doings. Locke's

seau's method

method prepares

is

meant

to pre-empt

for administering to future anxieties; Rous them. Rousseau's young student is educated
of

to question the
nations

world around

him in light

his

needs and

to seek natural

expla

for the
makes

effects

he

observes.

This

it

all the more strange

that

when

the vicar actually commences, he

proceeds not me

by a reasoned conversation but rather, by claiming:

it to
you"

"it is

enough

for
as

to

reveal all

(iv.566). Mindful that Emile's

good

principal question

in

sessing
what

knowledge is "what is that

for?",

and

his

utilitarian appropria one might wonder articles of

tion of the phenomena that may present themsselves to

him,

in the

vicar's revelation will

actually benefit Emile. Can

faith
ever

supplement

Emile's functional

observations of the natural world?

Is Emile

in

a condition such
direction?"

that "the progress of his enlightenment

leads his

researches

in

that

(iv.557)
consider

The third dramatic factor to

is the

complex relation

between the

vicar

Rousseau
and

versus

the

Savoyard Vicar
This

309
to

the addressee of the profession.

question appears never

be

raised

by

commentators

for it is simply

assumed that the profession

is directed to Emile.

But the
rupted

to whom the profession is actually addressed is described as cor "tyrants": rage, indignation, and a tempestuous vanity are his re by sponses to fate. Everywhere he sees only the viciousness of men and the ruses
youth men perpetrate under

the appearance of virtue. As a consequence of his observa

tions, the young

Emile

man experiences a

hatred

and contempt

for

mankind.

Can

therapeutic profession

for

a youth

like this be

applicable to

Emile?

by

contrast

has

none of

this youth's remorse nor

division; he is truly

"pre-Fall"

innocent:
as pure as

His heart,
ther

his body, is

no more
made

familiar
a

with

disguise than
never

with vice.

Nei

reproaches nor contempt

have

him

coward;
of

has

vile

fear taught him

to disguise
naive

himself. He has

all the

indiscretion

innocence. He is uncalculatingly

(iv.706).
and

The self-sufficiency
and

self-dependency
as a

of

Emile

contrasts with the slavishness

dependency
meant

of

the embittered addressee. It is not obvious then that the pro

fession is

for Emile

necessary

supplement

to his "natural

education

Rousseau has repeatedly

vance

cautioned

that the

pedagogical

techniques used to

ad

the

teaching

of virtue must

be

appropriate to

the

character of

the soul of the

student; here the difference between the two is too glaring to permit the immedi
ate conclusion

that the profession

can

benefit Emile. As

we shall examine more

carefully shortly, the pedagogies of Rousseau and the vicar differ substantially. The
addressee of the profession

is

such

that the vicar's words appear to

be

spe

cially tailored to his corrupted character. The vicar, too, is a special case. He, while
nal

sworn

to celibacy, submits to car to the vicar's weak

involvement

with married women.

which

The

youth well

is

witness

ness, temptations, "of

he

corrected

was not too

and

The

vicar's recur of

ring theme of anxiety is the guilt and what he problematizes is the

torment regarding the

disunity

his soul, his

"Flesh,"

as the site of moral prohibitions on

desire. To

alleviate this

he

embraces moral principles upon which

life."

"he founded
theories the

the uniformity of so

singular a

The

moral and metaphysical

vicar proposes appear necessitated are

by

the conditions he himself and his addressee

palliative

in. The
and, it

creed might

thus

appears

to provide a

for their

weaknesses and

guilt

be said, is

healing

response

to the dualism

they feel

within

themselves.

By

contrast, Emile is
ease.

free from the

worries and

the rage the vicar's

beliefs

are

designed to

Moreover,
propriety Emile's own
careful

the relation of tutor to student

counsels

Throughout the Emile, Rousseau

and sobriety.

significantly different. that the tutor must be the model of

is

also

Any

indication
to

of weakness,

division,

or

dissimilarity

to

condition will serve

undermine

and

ultimately to collapse the

the sort of

foundation he has

constructed.

Could the

vicar ever provide

model of education which

Emile

requires?

310

Interpretation
and

The fourth

final feature to

which

the reader's

attention

is drawn is Rous de
them and the

seau's choice of
picts

the frontispiece that

men

accompanies

the profession of faith. It

Orpheus teaching

the worship of the gods,

transforming
virtue of

beasts

by

the wonderful power

apparent

he

was said

to

have

lyre-playing. They, in
the

fright,

prostrate

his singing and by themselves before the terror of

divinity
as a

above.

Looking
of

up they

are given

the hope of to the

divine benefaction.
to occur,

The frontispiece both

the

seems

particularly
concerns.

well-suited

revelation about

hallmark

that

profession and as a signal

to the disjunction the religion

between Orpheus

vicar's and

Emile's

For

what

is

singular about

inspired,

of note

for

our

immediate death the

Death

sense of

disjunction,
the

was

its

attitude towards
sin committed

death. The

body was

seen as a prison wherein

soul paid

for the

by

the Titans. Through

soul escaped and was granted

was

the privilege of

beautitude in the
life
where men

afterlife.

thus a benefaction for it led to real

life,
of

became like

the gods. Beatitude was a reward

for the

sacramental

acts men were obliged to perform so as sins of

to atone for the human

inheritance
life

the

the Titans. The need for an

expiation of original sin and

the notion of life

as a means of

as a preparation

for the

delivering

the soul

life beyond, demanded from the bodily prison. Man's

real

an ascetic

nature was seen as

dualistic

and sex was problematized

by

techniques of power.

Chastity,
the

as an

seeing the flesh as the site of various prohibiting imitatioDei and as the deja-ld of death, was

a supreme expression of

longing

for

purity.

It is

theology in its

celestial and

eschatological elements of
sentation.

It is

highly questionable, however,

his earthly
engagement and

striking similarity to that underlying the vicar's pre what use Emile could have of such
attachments, his
shameless

opinions,

given

naivete,

the absence of sacramental ritual

But the Orpheus

myth also

in his life, and the lack of division in his soul. has a supplement, the character of which exposes

the ambiguity of Rousseau's intention and so takes us beyond our immediate

sense of a
ments a
disjunction.17

The

myth

brings forth in
images
of

addition to

its Apollonian

ele

host

of chthonian and tellurian

of generation expressed

the

fecundity
initiate's

of the earth and abandonment of

the mystery

in the

religious

himself to the

experience of

the full

fertilizing

power of the

Earth Mother. Or

pheus as a god-man of androgynous character was understood to attend to the re

demptive,
priated

rhythmic regeneration of

the rites of agriculture. While he was appro

of

later

by Christianity
innocence
symbol of

as

the prototype

Christ,

and

thus an

expression of

natural man's

and yet ultimate

hope

of union with a

transcendent god,
power while who

the

"orobouric"

androgyny
as a

within

the theme of the generative

of the

earth, is in fact the enduring core of the religion of

could

Orpheus. Thus
and

Orpheus

be depicted

Christ

who mediates

heaven

earth,

through divine insight into the meaning of natural events

17.

harmoniously

orders

The term

"supplement"

is Derrida's

and connotes

both the linguistic

attempt to reappropriate

presence and the cf.

Jacques

infringing substitute, that is an intervention or insinuation, adding only to replace, Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp.

I45-63-

Rousseau
them

versus the

Savoyard Vicar

-311

from

within and

bestows

heavenly

and eschatological significance upon power of the

them, he is more properly the fecundating While the Vicar affirms the Apollonian ble
of opposites places all

Earth

Mother.18

element which

in the Pythagorean ta

meaning, truth,

and plenitude on the side of

light

and
and ab

the celestial, and all absence on the side of what

is

dark, heavy,
of

cold, earthy,

female, Rousseau's
sence,

own

teaching

admits

the re-emergence
the

the suppressed

tery

of

conferring meaning birth and abundance. This contrast

plentiude of

now on of

sanctity

of

life

and

the mys

the sacrality

of

the sky and the fe

cundity of the earth, I suggest, betrays a subtle suggestion that the Profession of Faith lacks a univocal meaning, permitting instead a disclosure of the last Dio
nysian

trace of
we shall

Orpheus.
see, Rouseau's
social world

As

vicar's:

it is

one

in

which

the Emiles and

is radically distinct from that of the Sophies are submerged within the
and

rhythmic cycles of

birth,

growth,

fullness,

decay

of

the life

process.

Even

love's illusions do
able.

not

As

"biopower"

quanta of

break those cycles, making them instead only more endur the Emiles and Sophies participate in a recurrent
nature,
a cyclic

and endless metabolism with

becoming
social

and

biocosmic
health

unity.19

Here the sacrality

of

mortality is

replaced

by

the

ideal

of

and

fertil is
no

ity,

an object of calculation with no sense of

transcendence.

Philosophy

longer

learning how to die, because death does not continue to be ontologically significant. Instead, philosophy is transposed into technical modes of interven
tion that invest the
appropriation of

life

process with significance.

In Rousseau's Enlightenment longer

a

the

chthonian

Orpheus, death is

no

destiny or fate
shall

but

scandal and

extended examination of these

transgression, to be corrected by technical means. I issues in the following sections.

these four
elements of

turn to an

Having
may
views.

considered

Rousseau's presentation, the

reader

experience some

hesitation in simply equating the vicar's and Rousseau's The substantial philosophic position to which I have already alluded and

to whose fuller treatment I now turn,

vere

is, however,

even more

indicative

of a se

disjunction

with

Rousseau's

other avowed principles.

II. PHILOSOPHIC CLAIMS

There

are

two

sections

to the vicar's profession, one that elaborates a philo

sophic system and the other constituted orthodox

by

a polemic on

the historical effects of

Christianity. The first

section of

the vicar s profession outlines

his

epis
tun-

temology, his
18.

metaphysics, and

his

account of

the soul and its proper moral

For

discussion

of

the significance of these chthonian themes see Mircea

and

Eliade, Rites

and

Symbols of Initiation (New York: Harper

(London: Sheed
19.
and

Row, 1958)
into
a

and

Patterns in Comparative Religion

nature"

Ward,

1958).

For

an argument that

the

submergence see

"metabolism

with
cit.

leads to loss

of care

for "the

world", of meaning, and of reality,

Hannah Arendt, op

supra, pp. 79-'35-

312

Interpretation
is the
one with which we are

ing

and

whether

it is

compatible with

primarily concerned in order to discern Rousseau's philosophic principles.

mind"

his epistemological views by proposing to speak with (iv.560). From this he "the clarity of the original understanding in (his) upon which views are supported. In philosophical principles his major draws the
The
vicar commences

the

Second Discourse Rousseau tells

a

us

that man is not

by nature rational and that

understanding is

appear endowed with a ples

the young man does not or with innate ideas or princi for understanding capacity beyond those which he gradually grasps through trial and error, repetition,

derivative

capacity.

In the

Emile, too,

and

habituation. The
and natural

vicar appears

to grant human nature a

greater natural en

dowment
tion

direction than does Rousseau. As

tion,

by the recognition that his is an disparity need exist here, but it must be noted that without a further philosophy of history no ontological claim could be advanced by the vicar
is
qualified no serious which

the vicar's posi long historically contingent introspec

as

Rousseau

would accept.
light"

The

vicar now appeals

reader

to a guide in his
whether

delibera
the

tions, an "inner "original

Emile is

(iv.569). The
or

is

not

told

this

is

part of

understanding"

allowed no such

if it is his "conscience", but however that may appeal in any of his deliberations. His judgments
of

be,
are

based

on

his "natural

researches"

those things that

are of

Rousseau's

account of

the

manner

in

which

Emile's

consciousness

utility to him. From is shaped,

there appears to be
quired

neither a natural

by

experience nor

The

vicar's questions

understanding apart from the prudence ac any inherent intellectual or moral sense. are addressed to what he experiences as a "frame of

a condition that he finds a "disturbing and pain uncertainty and ful state": "Doubt about the things it is important for us to know is too violent a mind of

doubt,"

state

for the human

mind"

(iv.568). He

suggests that

his

inquiry

is intended to
account

overcome

this state. The vicar's revelation is thus a settling of

doubt; his
and

is

a satisfaction of the requirements of the situation of

might

perplexity
profession

doubt that

initiated the inquiry. One

merely quieting doubt. Such an inquiry ture of the inquirer himself rather than relating it to those facts by virtue of which the propositions are true or false. The vicar is more skeptical in some ways about knowledge than Rousseau:
We do

subjective account of truth

is potentially a for it is truth that is personally satisfying in limits truth to the effect of the inquiry and the na

be led to feel that his

not

have the know

measurements of neither

this

immense machine, its final

cause.
. . .

we cannot calculate

its

relations: we
we

its first laws

nor

We do

not

know ourselves;
mysteries sur

know

neither our nature nor our active principle.

Impenetrable

round us on all

sides;

they

are above the region accessible

to the senses (iv.568).

Emile's

education

has been

by

contrast more

narrowly empirical,
of

and

ultimately
at

offers a more restricted

but

"operational"

theory
knowledge

knowledge, for he has

tempted to gain certainty of his

cross-referencing his

various sensations.

by virtue of verifying, testing, Certain fundamental facts, albeit

and
con-

Rousseau
fined to
world.20

versus

the

Savoyard Vicar

-313

corporeal

utility, are at the

source of

his certainty

about the material

Rousseau himself

we

know

shares

the vicar's skepticism about

man's

grasp

of

the final end, of essences, or of substances.

argues much more

However,

throughout the Emile he

assertively than the vicar that the first laws of nature can be known, that general laws of science are derivable from empirical observations, that man's nature is governed by knowable psychological laws, and that the "ac
principle"

tive

is

controllable and

its working

ascertainable.

Indeed,

on

this last
nei

point, Rousseau clearly has given the impression that the active principle is
ther a spiritual nor a mysterious principle
physiopsychological
moreover

motion

of

but rather, nothing more than the the body. The sentiments it produces appear
account.21

to

be

explicable

by

a thermomechanistic

The

science of

the

passions used coherent

by

the tutor with precision throughout the Emile is based

upon a

understanding of human behaviour as subject to predictable modes of modification. In Book III Emile is taught the rudimentary principles of hydrostat

ics,

astronomy,

biology,

and

chemistry,
and

implying

that man's proper posture to

of control and willful

nature

is

not one of
upon

tion of
about

form

passivity matter in

resignation, but

imposi

motion.

Whatever doubt Rousseau may have had

more confident

the mind's ability to grasp certain ethereal truths, he is far

than the vicar about

immediate,
his
that

palpable certainty.

The
and

vicar continues
resolves

inquiry by
he is

from this

endowed with an active

recognizing that he is a sensing creature force a sense of his

existence

that acquiesces to sensations. For the vicar, men

sensation

have

a natural no
"I"

tion of their own existence;

implies the

presence of an

that

is

sensing (iv.570). Rousseau however does not believe that men naturally have a For Rousseau, as a reading of Books I sense of their own existence (1 v. 279
-80).

and

II reveals, the Emile

"I"

is

created

to,

other objects and selves of

suggests

relatively in the consciousness of, and resistance but the self is never immediately sensed. Rousseau's
"I"

training

that
"self."

develops from

a relation

between

a sensed

phenomenon and a

sensing human

The

awareness of modification

by

an external
re-

source and

the

realization reinforced over

time that the modification can be

experienced provides the

machine with an

identity. There is

no substan

tial self

prior

to this

experience

that can reflect on

its

own states and

.

that realizes

the continuity of its

son that

own existence

independent

of experience

It

was

for this

rea

various senses,
sense of a

Emile had to learn experientially to coordinate the effects he felt from his unable to rely on an inherent sense coordination or an innate
"I"

residing

that

experiences all

the sensations as a unity. The senti

ment of existence

is

acquired

rather

than sensed, the unity of consciousness

achieved through

the

equilibrium of power and

desire (iv.301).

20. 21
.

See

note 16.

Following La

Mettrie

and

Diderot, Rousseau
thought,

appears

to

identify

heat

as a stimulus

that gives

rise to
488.

sensibility, the passions, and

produced

and to give physiological explanations of the effects

hitherto believed to be
2,

by

a spiritual substance.

See iv.342, 502, 519, 547,

and

Bloom,

n.

Cf. J. Cropsey,

op. cit. supra

for

an account of

this thermomechanism.

314

Interpretation
suggests

What this

is

a radical appears

feature

of

Rousseau's teaching,

alien

to

his
a

contemporaries. unified

Rousseau

to have dispersed the subject understood as

totality,
to

depicting
traversing

instead
the

a subject constituted as a conjuncture of multi

ple trajectories accords possible

body,

thus

dissolving, too,

the primacy the vicar

of

consciousness and

identity. This disemination

reconstitution.

the subject makes

the success of technical

Constituted be

as a

body,

the

indi be

vidual can optimized:

be

represented as a

"machine", possessing
forces
must

capabilitites which must administered at

flaws

must

be

corrected and

the capil

lary level,
a task

beneath

consciousness and

identity. That Rousseau is

of experience.

engaged

in

such

is

suggested

by
do

his understanding
not

For Rousseau the

sensa

tions prior to touch

convey

what would alone

distinguish itself from its sensations, let

be necessary for the self realize that it has a distinct be

even to
and en

during

identity. The

vicar

infers from

certain effects

that he must have a substan

more

tial soul. Rousseau shows that these effects could

explaining the gradual construction of experience much lac's demonstration of the understanding of his statue-man. From Rousseau's
point of

simply understood by in the spirit of Condil

view, the vicar's claims are unscientific for the vicar believes that spiri

tual and metaphysical principles underlie the workings of

his

mind.

The

vicar

then

depicts his "active

force"

as one and

that is capable of judging. He

suggests that

distinguishes
tinctive

perceptions one

from judgment

hence is

he has

dis

faculty,

that is a sign of an "active and intelligent human

a

being"

(iv.571). He denies that

tions. Man's

merely

sensitive

being

capable of this sort of

judg

ment; comparison involves superadding a mental construction to received sensa

intelligent force is has

active rather than passive.

The

vicar's position
exper

implies that

man

an autonomous reason

to which the perceiving and

iencing
world.

individual

appeals to adjudicate

the appearances present in the

sensible

For Rousseau, this mode of judgment is not so obviously active, nor does he accept the idea that man has an autonomous reasoning capacity. He presents, at one point, the example of the appearance of a broken or bent stick in water.
Emile learns the true
character of

the stick

ceiving different types erably Emile would

more passive

of sensations.

employing various senses and re His deliberation consists in a succession of

principle.

by

sensations rather than appeal to an

intelligible

His judgment is

consid

than that

which

the vicar describes. Rousseau suggests that

perceive

the stick to be bent the first time he saw

various sensations resolution

it, but

through the

experience of original

comparing assumption. This

he

would soon

does

not require a

learn to rectify his distinct power or capacity

reason as to the

for judgment; the

proper relation.

copresence of various sensations

informs his

nate

For example, whereas the vicar is puzzled as to how the mind could coordi its five senses as if it were in fact passive and denies that without an active

and autonomous cation

judgment

the mind could

be

capable of

between the senses, Rousseau

suggests an alternative.

providing communi Reference to the

Rousseau
Molyneux

versus the

Savoyard Vicar
Cheseldon

-315

problem and the

experiment

in the Moral Letters

scientific

suggest
of an a

that Rousseau was well aware of

priori coordination. constitutes

his

contemporaries'

denial

He thus

suggests that

the copresence

of

different

sensations

comparison;

judging

is

a modified

form

of

sensing,

strengthened

by

exercise and coordinated

to the sensations of touch.

experience can

In sum, the
ters into
ence

vicar

denies that

be the

sole cause of all

ideas

and

sentiments, yet

Rousseau

states quite
comes

unambiguously that
there through the

"everything
and

which en

human understanding
means of

senses"

that experi

is the only

ideas
the

or principles prior

acquiring knowledge. For Rousseau there are no innate to experience. Faculties and sentiments are acquired by
perceptions of pain and

repetition of

sensations,

pleasure,

and

through habit.

Rousseau denies the autonomy of reason, for it "alone is not The fundamental activity of the mind resides not in itself but in

active"

(iv,645).

psychological

forces: "it is only

are

act"

passions which make us

(iv.453). The

senses correct

themselves and simple

ideas, by

which

the
no

illusions

of perception are

dispelled,
to
which one

only

compared sensations. epistemology.

There is

mysterious,

nonempirical principle

Rousseau's
must

The rationalists, Rousseau claims, among

not realized

include the vicar, had

rather

the extent to

which

the

mind relies on the

body

than on the promptings of a spiritual substance.

turns

The

vicar

subsequently to is to be

metaphysical

issues. He distinguishes the two

and suggests

types of

motion

communicated and spontaneous at rest.

that the natu

motion matter

ral state of phenomena

On the first

point

he

claims

that the

of animate

beings is
or

spontaneous and

denies the idea

(iv.575).

of

"unorganized

moving itself
that animals that their

action"

producing some are only "ingenious

machines"

Rousseau, however, claiming in the Second Discourse, suggests

that

matter

is

organized

in

such a manner

they

are capable of

motion,

sensitivity,

The
and

vicar

thought, thus extending far greater power to matter. doubts that intelligent life could possibly have emerged from "passive
and even some

dead
need

matter"

and

"blind

fatality,"

or

from

nonintelligent

life

and chance.

"I

not think.

only know that matter is extended and divisible in order to be sure that it can And for all that any philosopher who comes to tell me that trees sense and
suble

rocks

think, may entangle me in his speaking in bad faith who prefers to

man
.

arguments,

can see

in him only

a sophist

attribute sentiment

to rocks than to grant a soul to

It

seems to me that

discovered,
but

on the contrary, that men

far from saying that rocks think, modern philosophy has do not think. It no longer recognizes anything
(iv.580).

sensitive

beings in
reveals

nature"

his solidarity with his contemporaries on precisely this point: reason or thought is not natural to man and deliberation is a product of ex perience, senstion, and habit. Moreover, in addition to Rousseau saying that ani

Yet Rousseau

mals are

only

machines and yet capable of

thought, he He

also sees

ently
of

peculiar about

attributing vitality to
makes

matter.

suggests

nothing inher that only the lack have

sense

movement"

"progressive
(iv.584).

it unnecessary that

plants should

and thought

316

Interpretation
second point of natural perceives a motion and

On the
around

rest, the vicar, in observing the visible universe

him,

he

says

laws"

constant

draws from this

observation

is "regular, uniform, and subjected to his first article of faith: a will

an external
and or

moves cause

the universe and

animates nature

(iv.576). For him, there is

to the regular motions of the

vicar

universe.

From The

a perception of

design

der,

the

derives the

notion of a prime mover: moved matter

certain

laws is

evidence of an

intelligent

will.

vicar

according to illustrates this phenome

universe

non of order and and

harmony

with a

Newtonian image: the

all

is like

a watch
end"

it is God's design that keeps

sensible order

the parts working for a "common

intelligence"

(iv. 578). The

"proclaims
of order

a supreme

(iv.579). The

"goodness

of

God is the love

links

...

for it is

by

order

that He maintains

whole"

what exists and

each part of

the
notion of

(iv.593).

Rousseau, by
Although the

contrast, posits a

the universe that is more ambiguous.

perceived nature of

reality
social

as

flux

and

indeterminate

motion

is

often a product of man's

turbulent

life,

there is also a caprice to nature that

issues in disorder, chaos,

sitory"

and sudden upheaval:

"everything on earth is only tran

Lucretian
account of the

(iv.816). Rousseau intimates his

a

acceptance of a

universe,
matter,

reality

as a result of

the

accidental collisions of random particles of

denying thereby
force that

that there

personified

sustains

is any overall design, final end, or divine and and directs the world beyond the appearance of

disorder. He
because the

makes repeated reference to the

"body

in

motion,"

continuous

to

the affections of the bodies in "continual

world

flux,"

and suggests

that it is precisely

is in

constant motion

that men come to acquire knowledge

and

(iv.284,

303, 363). A

perception of

destructiveness

susceptibility to
nature,

painful

and violent alteration characterizes man's proper relation to

and

like
of

Lucretius, Rousseau
religion

appears concerned to

liberate the issue in

mind

from the terrors

by demystifying
and

death. Rousseau depicts the lot does

not

of man

to be one of

hardship

pain, but

one which

an excessive

desire for tran

scendence
particular

if his pedagogy is followed. There is no reason for habituation to a posture of the intellect, nor for security in love of glory, because all is
a mortal and perishable

flux
nal

and

transition, "As
this
which

being,

should

go and

form

eter

ties

on

and

from

to understand

away, everything changes, everything disappear (iv.820) Although men may come the first laws of observable motion sufficient for their earthly pur
where
passes

earth where

tomorrow?"

shall

poses, these do not suggest an ultimate unified order beyond.

The

vicar continues

the theme

of order and

regularity

by turning

to the doc

trine of evolution as proposed

by

the modern materialists. He suggests that it is

impossible to

conceive

that "nature

finally
for the

prescribed

laws to itself to

which

it

outset"

was not subjected at

the

(iv.579). He

flatly

refuses to accept the notion of

chance combination as responsible and

present configuration of the universe

that complex configurations could emerge

from the have

conjunction of simple el emerged

ements.

He denies too the

notion

that all life could

from

a common

prototype:

Rousseau

versus the

Savoyard Vicar
nature sets

-317

The insurmountable barrier that

would not

between the

various

species,

so

that

they

be confounded,

shows order.

its intentions
It took

with the utmost clarity.

It

was not

satisified with

establishing

certain measures so that

nothing

could

disturb

that order

(iv.580).
of

Rousseau's Second Discourse explicitly denies both

the vicar's claims.

or

Ap

pealing to
Moses,"

natural science rather

than to

a priori

reasoning

"the

writings of

that the

deferring more precisely to Buffon, the naturalist, Rousseau history of natural phenomena has been a product of "fortuitous
and
accidents"

argues

causes,"

"countless

and

the "chance combination of events which might never the passage of time

have

arisen"

(in.

162).

Describing

from

earliest man and

his

original

ignorance, Rousseau

and everyone always crudeness of

uselessly starting from the same point, centuries passed in all the the first (in. 160). There was no benevolent guide to man's
ages"

writes:

"... the

generations multiplied

present state of

organization,

and

thus Rousseau disavows the teleological and to sustain the vicar's position. There is noth
view

metaphysical assumptions required

ing

contradictory to Rousseau

in the

that the development of the organs and

the corporeal organization generally was haphazard and often

by

error.

Like the

atomists, Rousseau disavows any language concerning formal or final causation,

stating for example that it is an error to believe that the senses urally functional for the utility of life. There are no gods who
end

and organs are nat prescribe

design

or

to the universe.

His discussions in Note

emerged

"J"

strongly

suggest that

he believes

all natural gence was makes

life to have in
no

from

a common

prototype, but that such emer

way designed. Indeed, one may go further and suggest that what Discourse particularly interesting is that in his analysis of each Second the
situates the emergence of a new practical
within a synchronic rather

historical stage, he
guage,
and

consciousness, lan

script,

than diachronic structuration, thus

disrupting
the human

the

notion of

continuity, the

species.

Thus, in

identity, and development in the history of Second Discourse, Rousseau appears to sustain

an argument

of

for the materiality of discourse ordering human consciousness. The third and final section of the vicar's philosophical position is his account within himself and as a consequence the soul. He senses a "violent
condition"

invokes

a notion of metaphysical

dualism. He but

admits that

he

cannot understand
of

the interaction of his two tains nothing

repugant

substances
reason or

accepts that

the

idea

dualism "con
suggests

observation"

to

to

(iv.576-7). He

that

he has two distinct

principles:

one of which raised

him to the study

the
took

of eternal

truths, to the love

of

justice

and moral
wise

beauty, and to man's delight;

hindered

the regions of
while

the intellectual

world whose contemplation

is the

other

him

basely

into himself,

subjected

him to the
means of

em

pire of the senses and to the passions all that the sentiment of the

which are their ministers and

by

these

former inspired in him (iv.583).

these two
principles and

The

vicar experiences

the

conflict of

is torn

by

remorse
senti-

and guilt

for his

coarser

inclinations. He depicts his

shame as a

"tyrannical

318

Interpretation
that

ment"

brings him torment. Like Adam

of eternal

after

the

fall,

the vicar

is

ashamed

and

his fears

torment lead to his attempt to hide from himself. He

moralism of

does

so with

the self-righteous

hating

the

wicked

(iv.596). The

vicar's

shame and
side

feelings

of

torment and his intense and bitter

and passionate of admiration

hatred for the

beautiful,"

wicked re

together with an

intense

"love for the

which

is the

source of

"these transports
. .

for heroic actions, these

virtue."

raptures of

love for
and

great souls

this enthusiasm

for

Divided between his desires

vicar seeks

the

moral principles evoked

by

his

active

reason, the

the original

unity

of natural man.

By contrast, Emile who has never been given cause to choose between desire and duty because his desires have never been rampant, is described, as we have
seen,

by
has

as undeceiving and naive (iv.642). While subject to the alienation caused human temporality underlying also the vicar's self-division, he nonetheless retained much of the artifice

Much
of

self-identity and immediacy to nature of natural man. has been deployed to achieve this, but an artifice wholly unlike that
moderate sentiments not

the vicar's current animadversions. The vicar's violent vacillations of love and
are

hatred his

far from the

that Emile experiences.

By confining
be trans

existence within

himself, he has
would

been led to judge

of

others nor to

ported

by

raptures

that

What "divine
virtue":

permits the vicar

within

injure the stability to sustain his project

an

his

mind.

of restoration

to self-unity is a

essence"

himself that issues in

"innate

principle of

justice

and

Conscience,
a

conscience!

Divine instinct, immortal limited but intelligent

unto

and celestial voice, certain guide of

being

that

is ignorant

and

and

free; infallible

guide of good and

bad

which makes man

like

God

(iv.600- 1).

He

also speaks of man's

capacity for
and

contemplation and

links to it

a natural per

ception of

"order, beauty,

virtue."22

We discover that the

achieved

vicar's project

for overcoming hiss

grounds social

self-division

is to be he

by

a moral

freedom

which

man's active reason and will

what

in the

natural

sentiment of con
actions to na

science,

thereby reconciling
or

sees as

his freely-determined

ture, he
his

and so

the Emile

restoring the original unity of his being. Rousseau never appeals in in the Second Discourse to these faculties or this resolution nor does
sense of

mention

any inherent

order,

beauty,

or virtue.

Instead, Emile's
experimental

sense

of order

is

restricted

to the predictable consequences of

his

science,

sense of beauty is fabricated and nurtured by the judicious manipulation of his imagination, and his virtue develops in the regulation of his heart by ideals that the tutor instills. The vicar ascribes to the natural character of the soul, a metaphysical structure that

Rousseau both
emplaced

reveals to

be

false hypostatization

of

structurally

and

historically

behaviours,

and

ignores in his

own peda

gogical techniques.

22.

iv. 582.

Rousseau
The bad

versus the

Savoyard Vicar

-319

vicar claims

that these sentiments of

love

of

the good and

hatred

of

the

are as natural as

the love of self and suggests that

it is these

relative senti
men are

ments able

that make men sociable

by

nature.

By dint
regime.

of moral

sentiment,

to reflect upon and make actual a

voice"

just

The

vicar expresses

the view

that the "inner

acts as a natural

law governing

men's affairs:

All the duties

tice

of the natural

law

which were almost erased name of the eternal

of men are recalled

to

it in the

justice

from my heart by the injus which imposes them on

me and sees me to

fulfill them (iv.603).

Where the
seau on

vicar expresses writes

his

admiration

for

man's natural

sociability, Rous
to

the other hand

"from the little

care taken

by

nature

bring

men

together through mutual need and to

sees

facilitate
and
bonds"

their use of speech, one at

least

how little it
men

prepared their

sociability

how little it
(in.
151).

contributed to

every

thing
not

have done to
argument

establish social

Rousseau's

that

man's nature

is

a product of

history,

and that man

is

by

nature a

being endowed
undermines

with certain predetermined capabilities and expe vicar's natural

riences, in
sense.

fact

the possibility of the

of natural

law in the

strict

If

we

take the doctrine

who

law to

mean

(a)

that man

is

by

nature a

rational

is inclined toward acting according to reason and hence acting and that the principles of natural law are universally valid and eter (b) virtuously nal because they accord with an unchanging human nature, then Rousseau's po

being

sition

in the Second Discourse

law doctrine.
man's

renders

him incapable

of

consistently maintaining
asocial and

a natural and

By claiming that man

informs Man
man as

is

by nature

nonrational,

by finding

distinctiveness in his malleability, Rousseau denies that hu

or

man nature points

to

to certain moral principles whereby

he is
to

completed or perfected. which

makes

himself because there is

as

no natural order

he

must adapt.

For Rousseau,
and

Book V
will.

appears

to suggest, morality

is

an artifice of

imagination, ideals
the

human

The is

consequence of

vicar's

belief that his is

a privileged position

in

nature

for understanding the difference between Rousseau and the vicar. For Rousseau, nature has assigned no ranks; man does not represent the apex of the
crucial natural world.

The vicar,
the

by

contrast, claims, "I

find

myself

by

my

species in-

contestably in

first

rank"

(iv. 552-3). Rousseau's

analysis of the passion

amour propre appears to shed

light

on

the

vicar's

condition, his self-interpreta

vicar

tion,
of

and

his

need

for the

palliative of
passion.

his faith. The

He
claims

himself makes

mention

the distraught state of this

that raising
of

questions of meta

physics
pear to

has "agitated (his) be both

products vicar

amour propre

Many
the

and also causes of

his sentiments, indeed, ap increasing turbulence of his

pride.

amour propre. myself thus

The

is imperious in his self-congratulatory

without

"Can I

see

distinguished

congratulating

myself on

filling
it", he

this honour
asks

able post and without

blessing

the

hand

which placed me

in

himself

(iv.583). On
servitude:

the other side of

this imperiousness

can

be found

an obsequious

320

Interpretation
I
am

Being of beings,
you
.
.

because You are; it is to lift

worthiest use of

on you ceaselessly.

The

it is the

charm of

my

weakness

myself up to my source, to meditate my reason is for it to annihilate itself before to feel myself overwhelmed by your Greatness

(i v. 594).

This diverges remarkably from the

status

Emile is to
as

envisage of

for himself.
the soul for

Pride, they

vanity,

and

servility

are seen

by

Rousseau

distortions

are

based

on corrupt comparisons.

Comparisons

with others

and resentment

propre,

which

especially is enflamed

when others are perceived as

being

superior.

lead to envy Amour in turn

all

by comparisons
It is
and this

of

those superior, produces

the "hateful and irascible

passions."

amour propre
up"

that "always wants to that is

carry
of a and

man above

his

sphere,"

"looking
upon others.

produces a slavishness

the source of misery and

dependency

For Rouseau, the

more prone to

constraints

transcendent morality make men more

turbulent,
ability
or

deception,
within

ultimately

more unjust.

It is the lack

of

desire to

cull

from

those resources to comprehend and use nature, that leads a

propre

frustrated

amour

to animate the universe

with will and produces

propre's

link

with

imagination that

intention. It is precisely amour the very idea of a sphere that tran Emile's
education

scends

human life.
reason

It is for this
attempt

that a

significant portion of

has been

an

to arrest the

emergence of amour

propre, the

source of

these attempts to
care

aspire

to supreme heights and beyond the human that the

seeds of

condition.

The tutor has

fully

contrived situations so

imperious

passions

sown.

Efforts to

surpass

the human condition

unrequitable

by
and

acts of supreme and

may Godlike
passions

never

be

vir

tue, lead to unhappiness,

cause men

hope,
not

unruly

vanity.

The

that to to

to emulate others, to become dependent on other's recognition,

and

become

resentful

if that

recognition

is

forthcoming
will

are not

however

natural

man; careful nurture

sure that

can prevent

their emergence. A proper education must en

the child
nor

not perceive a

domineering

insisting

that its precepts be

respond

followed
mands.

believe that

an external will can concerned not

be beseeched to

to its de

Emile's tutor has been

man

to manipulate the environment in such

way that the young

may

develop the character which would require the

of

myths of eternal salvation and

hope
The

divine intervention. Rousseau's

that the profession succors

analysis

of the source of

the tyrannical

will reveals

that the cause of such a temperament

are

is

faulty

perception of reality.

passions

thus

a symptom of

defective

education.

Emile is

one who

lives for himself; the

vicar

corrupted soul

lives in the

eyes of oth of the

ers or another.

The
and

finds his

source of

happiness in "contemplation
is the
source
...

Supreme
the

Being

the eternal truths of which He

the

beauty of
for

order will strike all

the powers of our

soul"

(iv.591). The transcendence to

contemplation of

the

eternal order

is, for

the vicar, the

height

of perfection

human beings. For Rousseau, this transcendence simply betrays a demand for recognition of others. The vicar does indeed seek recognition from others, be

traying his

slavishness

to their opinions: "I wanted supernatural understanding in

Rousseau
order

versus the

Savoyard Vicar

321
fellows"

that I myself would be privileged among my

(iv.608). His virtue,

moreover,

is calculating and hypocritical: "If I do a good deed without a witness, I know that it is seen and I make a record for the other life of my conduct in this
(iv. 308).
virtue of

one"

Rousseau transforms the

preme virtue of

humility
of

to that of

humanity,

and

the su
redirect a

domestic fidelity, in seeking to glory attention to the man's earthly things. Belief in a transcendent realm and who is the author of commands regarding human virtue, or attempts to
and

honor to that

Deity
In the

surpass

the

human

condition

in heroic feats,

"vain-glory."

produces

misery

and

Letter to

Beaumont, Rousseau

revealed

precisely that
may have disturbed, in ideas. A too longer
seen

continual meditations on the

Deity or the enthusiasm for virtue

mean and regular order of
.

the

sublime

imaginations,

the

common
are no

great elevation of mind sometimes

turns the brain and things

in their

ordinary

light23

The teaching Rousseau wishes to convey is that by focusing upon the divine, men have lost the capacity to achieve justice and happiness in this world. As
well, this heroic striving has corrupted the regularity of their souls. Men therefore restrict their
allegiance and energies must

to the human estate; an

and neglectful of

imaginary
his
weak

elevation of man's existence makes ness and

him imprudent

true duties.
one precept to give you and

I have only
strain your

it

comprehends all

the others.
and

Be

a man.

Re

heart

within

the

limits

of your condition.

ever narrow

they may be,

a man
when

is
he

not

unhappy
to

as

Study long as he

know the limits. How

closes

them. He
when

is unhappy only he forgets his human he

always

wants order own.

to go out beyond them.

himself up within He is unhappy

estates

estate

in

forge for himself

goods

imaginary

from

which
are

falls back into his

one
.

The only

those one
no

believes
a man

has

a right to

...

man wants

it is costly to be deprived of to be God when he believes

ills. But
.

he is
the

longer

The illusions

of pride are

the

source of our greatest

contemplation of

human misery

makes

the

wise man always moderate eternal

As

mortal and perishable

being

should

go and

form

ties

on

this earth where ev

erything changes,
morrow?

where

everything

passes

away, and

from

which

shall

disappear to

(iv.820)
between the
vicar's and

This

disparity
the

Rousseau's

views underscores

too the

divergent

pedagogies

they
"he

employ.

The

vicar attempts

to

instill it

love

of virtue

by depicting by portraying
count of

beauty
noble

of virtue

in

such a

way

as to make

alluring.

He does

so

others:

reanimated a generous ardour

. .

in his heart
deeds"

by

the ac
per

others'

deeds

formed them, the priest gave For reasons we have already Emile because it
would

in making the boy admire him the desire to perform like his

those who

had

(iv.653).

examined, this would not

amour propre.

be

appropriate

for
hu-

exacerbate

He has been taught to

question the motives and

23.

intentions

of those who attempt to surpass

supra, p. 37.

ordinary

T. Becket

and

P. -A. de Honot,

op. cit.

322
man

Interpretation
and

bounds

to strive for immortality.

Imitation,

and

the heroic or the

divine, is

the source of the corruption of an honest

especially imitation of love of vir

tue. In Rousseau's understanding the discourse of the classical

made appeal

pedagogy that

to

"imaginary

estates",

supreme

virtue, duties in opposition to na

of

ture, and the need for patient had taken men outside of the
Rousseau's
part.

endurance

in hope

future

"natural"

order and caused

salvation necessary, disruption in their souls.

choice of preceptors

indicates the worldly he

offers

concerns

he intends to im
the

Rather than choosing a teacher of divine Socrates, Christ, or the heroes

model.24

virtue who was said to partake of

Chiron

as the most popular not seek a

Emile's

concerns are at

tant

happiness for him

one

completely this-worldly: "I shall the expense of the (iv.654).

present"

dis

In sum,
constituted.
vicar

may discern from the god to whom a man prays how a man is The vicar's regard is for a god who exercises divine judgment; the
and torn

is corrupt, rebellious,
as a prison and sees
after

between desire

and guilt.

The

vicar sees

the the

body

life

as a period of atonement:

"... I my

aspire to

moment

when,

being

delivered from the

shackles of

body,
in

shall

be

me without contradiction or
happy"

division

and shall need

only

myself

order

to be

(iv.604). He bases his hopes

on

the

immortality of the
for justice

soul and

the belief

that the afterlife justifies the the

soul survives

pains endured

and virtue:

"I believe that

the

body long
and

enough

for the
The

order"

maintenance of

(iv.590).

Torn between inclination

tion"

duty,

the vicar is tormented

vicar's

by

the "violent condi

of
quire a

the

union of

his

body

and soul.

hopes

and sufferings

thus re

belief in

eternal salvation.

Do

all of these opinions and

beliefs

sound

like the

sort of

teaching Emile

re

quires?

Emile is completely free from the worries, calculations, and recrimina tions the vicar's beliefs are intended to ease. The vicar's "virtue", like Locke's
which we examined

earlier,

depends

on a

transcendent,

punitive

God ("without

faith

no

true virtue exists"); virtue depends on suppressing nature and tran

mortal

scending

regulatory
ambitions.
men

prudence.

life (iv.632). Emile's virtue, by contrast, is constituted by a selfIt is based on knowing how to judge and circumscribe his
eternal salvation are
of

Hopes for

folly in Rousseau's eyes

for they

cause

to forget "the art

living":

In the uncertainty of human life, let us avoid above all the false prudence of sacrificing the present for the future; this is often to sacrifice what is for what will not be (iv.781).

Despite the
place

vicar's expectations man occupies an whole.

in the

Compared to the

heavenly

bodies

insignificant, if guaranteed, or divine intelligence, man

is

at an outer periphery:

The

good man orders

himself in

relation to makes

the whole, the wicked one orders the

center of all

whole
mea-

in
24.

relation to

himself. The latter

was

himself the

things; the former

heroes, he partook of the dual nature of beast and man and it is this that Rousseau emphasizes, reasons for which I explored in "Rousseau and the Domestication of Canadian Journal of Political Science, xvn:4 (December 1984), pp. 731-53.
Virtue,"

While Chiron

the teacher of

Rousseau
sures

versus the

Savoyard Vicar

323
Then he is
circles,
ordered

his

radius and

keeps to the in

circumference.

in

relation

to the

common

center,

and

relation to all the concentric

which are the creatures

(iv. 292).

For the vicar, mony

within

man

is the

measure of

the cosmos; he

reflects

its

order and at

har

and remains within a pre-established relation.

By looking

the order
a micro

himself,

man can understand

the order in

nature

because he is

cosm of

the universe. The vicar simply remains committed to a classical cosmol

materialists'

ogy and ethic as a For Rousseau,

verse; he
tions.
creates

response

to the
man

claims.

however,
or

is the

master and measure of the chaotic uni

the order and his understanding is

based

on

his

own construc

All

intelligibility
of accounts

meaning has its poignantly

root

in human

needs and artifice.

The
of

difference

is

most

revealed

in Rousseau's description

man's relation

to the world around him:

Let

us measure the radius of our sphere and

stay in the

center

like the insect in

the

middle of

his web;

we shall always

be

sufficient unto ourselves and we shall not

have

to

complain of our

weakness,

for

we shall never

feel it (iv.305).
metaphor

Rousseau's
metaphor

choice of the spider as a

the dominant

has

pedigree, the best known

the
Books"

being

the use made of

is insightful, for the it in Swift's bitbee

ingly

satiric contrast of

ancients and moderns.

He had in his "The Battle be

ancient

tween the Ancient and Modern

whose wings produce music and

described

philosophy

as a

flight

and who

thus "visits all the blossoms of

enriches

the field and

garden

and

in collecting from them

their smell, or their
spider which

himself without the

ancient

least

injury

to their

beauty,

taste."25

The

bee is

con

trasted to the
own world

modern

house-building
itself

feels that it

can produce

its

from

within

and perceives

itself

as self-sufficient.

Whatever the ambiguity of Rousseau's agreement with Swift's critique of the moderns, he nonetheless adopts this modern perspective. Rousseau rejects the
vicar's teleological conception of the universe, and
and

its transcendent morality,

Rousseau's
criticism

the

account of power

that sustains that

classical project.

of previous philosophers, who

have

mistaken a particular

historical

configuration

of nature and of the soul as nature

herself,

applies as much and

modern

to the vicar's posi

tion.

Rousseau's

acceptance

of mechanism

historicization

of consciousness requires

leaving

ancient

psychology and his ideas behind. The pro

faith is, therefore, the most conservative part of Rouseau's work and should be taken as distinct from the radical teaching he propounds as the endur basis of his philosophy. However, we must now account for the reason Rous

fession

of

ing

seau might

Emile,
25.

an explanation

have had in writing the text and situating it to which I promised to

return.2*

within

Book IV

of the

Books,"

Jonathan Swift, "The Battle Between the Ancient Satires (London: Dent, 1975),
objection could

and

Modern

in A Tale of a Tub Rousseau

and other

p. 151-

26.

An

be

made

to this reading

by

pointing

out that

in his dual

own name

embraces

some of

the vicar's

doctrines, particularly

of conscience and of

substances.

However,

324

Interpretation

III. DRAMATIC AND STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

If the
seau's

profession of

faith is

not compatible with

the theoretical
the

core of

Rous

teaching,
the

what purpose

does it

serve?

offer

following

possibilities.

First,
pil, but
gineer a

education which

is

offered

to Emile is not only an impractical politi the tutor gives to his pu

cal proposal

because

of

the rare and

privileged attention

also

because Rousseau himself

soul

was not persuaded of

its

efficacy.

To

en

human

is

wager,

not

because Rousseau
of

appears

to believe that the truths

of

student will suffer

which

intimations

of

deprival

natural,

experiential

from

he has been excluded, but because because

of

of the essential

artifice and cial

trajectories

traversing

the

fragility body in a given

human
so

the

threatening the univocal script with which it has been outfitted. Like Styx-dipped Achilles, Emile's pedagogy is not invulnerable. After all, the se
reality,

quel to the

Emile is

tragic aftermath,

where

Rousseau

reveals that

the couple's

daughter dies in infancy, that they move to Paris, where following Sophie's se duction and impregnation by another man, Emile abandons her for a misan
thropic existence as a solitary. One might hypothesize that the juristic constitu tion of sovereign association
cases the civil profession of

in the Social Contract is faith

as

vulnerable,

and

in both
en

serves as a palliative of

to the degeneration

suing from the rupture while injurious to those

solution where

of the
whose

unity

the moral experience. The

Profession,

self-unity is uncontaminated, might be the only the technical penetration has failed or been overwhelmed by other
to the second suggestion. In a corrupt, bourgeois

forces.
This leads
me

society the away from less de

vicar's profession of

faith

can

inspire

virtue

by

portraying

a simulacrum of vir
men

tue,
vice.

dazzling
and

in its

charm and

beauty

and capable of provides a

For his contemporaries, Rouseau

alluring "natural

religion,"

manding

less inclined to

promote

hypocrisy

than revealed religion, that as

misery.

sures some moral response

to the commercial society and its

In this way,

the vicar's profession conveys a salutary

teaching, one that is intended as a tract for the times. Indeed, Rousseau intimates that the profession has primarily a po litical task. At the beginning of the profession he announces that he is about to
speak to

his "dear fellow

"suitable for

citizen."

The

reader should recall that

in the

general

preface to the education

Emile Rousseau

addresses

his

work to

those educators
heart."

who seek an
universal

man and well adapted

to the human

This

since

this occurs conspicuously around the profession, these

what would otherwise

declarations
views.

seem to

have the

role of

softening
work

be too

severe a

disjunction in

Although

one could muster

sufficient evidence

for this thesis

for example,

by contrasting

earlier editions with the published

will adduce or

der,

of

God,

only one argument. After the profession where one might expect that love of or of the inherent virtue and justice might regulate Emile's heart, Rousseau resumes his
a

biotechnology: "One has

pire that their
ments

hold

on the possessions

only

by

means of the passions.

It is

by

their em

tyranny

must

to regulate nature

be combatted; and it is must be (iv.654).

drawn"

always

from

nature

itself that the

proper

instru

Rousseau
address

versus

the

Savoyard Vicar
the

325

to mankind is in
where

contrast to

particular addresses of other more rhetor

ical works,

he

speaks as a citizen of

Geneva to

other citizens.

In those

works where

he

speaks as a

citizen, Rousseau is less

open and more

didactic,

seeking to impart salutary truths and concerning himself with civic virtue and justice. In the Emile, generally, no such political fervor is expressed. Only in the introduction to the
otic or partisan

profession of

faith does Rousseau

express

any

similar patri

sentiment,

and so one might assume

that it serves the same end as

Rousseau's

other rhetorical works.

In the Letter to Beaumont, Rousseau had in

a religion

dicated that "Let

us

his

sole concern

had been to devise

it."27

"useful to

mankind":

take this utility therefore as our guide;

and proceed

to establish those doc

trines which are most conducive to

The truth

of revelation

is

subordinated

wholly to the utility

aim

presenting As well, in Book XI of the Confessions, Rousseau in fact indicates that his

of

certain views to

his

contemporaries.

hearts

in writing had been to display the beauty of virtue so that he might move the of the Parisians. Although he believed that they were corrupt and had
to know virtue and morality,
could entrance with

ceased seau veals

they had

"delicate

sensitivity"

that Rous

felt he

his

accounts.

Rousseau

never

the objections he might have made to the

profession of effect

systematically re faith and its pro

posed model of virtue.

An

explicit statement

to the

that the vicar's position

only

provided

the simulacrum of virtue would have

rhetoric

undermined

its intended
views un

effect.

Hence, his
and

is beautiful
as

and noble and

he

presents

his

ambiguously
nected with

his

solutions reserve. of

unproblematic.

Only implicitly
not

does Rous

seau speak with

less

There is

a reason

for Rousseau's

reticence con possi

the

difficulty

presenting his teaching. He did

believe it

ble in his
man who

age

simply to

praise

temperance and exhort men to moderation. To the restraints, whose action is governed

has

abandoned all traditional

by
the

the principle of

pleasure and calculative

reasoning alone, Rousseau's His teaching in the Emile

prerequisite

teaching

would appear anachronistic and tyrannical. need to accept some evils

reveals

degree

of

suffering

as the

to a moral outlook; the

to be endured are
a

emphasized more

than the goods to

be

happily

enjoyed.

There is

im complexity to the relationship between happiness and virtue not of admin efficient means most calculates the mediately apparent to the man who to his desires, who has been exposed to modern materialism and the

istering

natural-right

teaching

and whose prejudices would render often presents

Rousseau's

concerns

comical.

For this reason, Rousseau

the

simulacrum of

virtue, that

teach alluring image for men already corrupted by ings. They are charmed by his text and are sent away with a surface view better which by dint of persuasion might than their old prejudices. In "corrupted
can serve as an

the

modern

hearts"

again

become disposed to

love

of virtue, the simulacrum of virtue must

virtuous:

be

compounded with what

is

not

precisely

"the

sacrifices made
hearts."

to

duty

and

virtue always
not

have

a secret charm even

for

corrupted

be
27.

sufficient

for the

more comprehensive
op. cit.

theory

of

Although this may "exvirtue, the image of

T. Becket

and

P. A. de Honot,

supra, p. 37.

326
alted

Interpretation
plays a crucial pedagogical role.
win agreement neither of

virtue"

Beautiful images

charm even as

they help However,

Profession

to the

more substantial arguments.

these

suggestions

does justice to the

question of

why the
strat

of

Faith is

where

it is in the Emile. For this

I
suggest

another

interpretive
his

egy

must

be

advanced and pedagogical

that in

looking

at the connection

between
political

Rousseau's

techniques and a distinctive element of

comes

teaching
crucial
agenda plains
jects.28

a provocative

possibility

to light. It is unorthodox but I

on

believe
and ex

to make the case that the Discourse

Political

Economy
of

establishes an

for Rousseau's thoughts

on the political

technology

desire

the mode of power

deployed in constituting the Emiles

as moral sub

As the Discourse
reason and power

and

the Emile make evident, men are not

are constituted as particular moral

simply

morality;

they

subjects,

by by the way
guided

traverses their bodies within a political culture, or a political economy.

What
of

makes

Rousseau
and

interesting

is his

problem:

how to

constitute an

economy
ar

desire,

power,

truth. That

desire,

power,

and

knowledge

are posed as sites

of problematization

ticle

already early in his writings emerges, for example, in his for Diderot's Encyclopedic which offers us his agenda:
good

If it is

to know how to use

men as

they

are,

it is better

still to make them what one

needs them to and

be. The

most absolute on

is

exerted no

less

his

will

authority is that which penetrates to the inner man than on his actions. It is certain that people are in the Train men, therefore, if
you want

long

run what

the government makes them

to

command men.

Rousseau is alluding here to

organization of an

very

specific
which

historical

and political

reality

and

economy

of

bodies,

Foucault has

suggested was consti

"governmentality."

tuted within a specific art of political rule, namely

This

art

has

as

its datum the is that

new

"population"

as a unique

field

of

intervention. What this

of

means
proper

tactics and techniques as

men

well as

formations

knowledge

to governing

in their

multiple relations

in the

conjuncture of popu and make possible

lation, territory,
him to be

and wealth

emerge as the concern of

state,

the "penetration of inner

man,"

the

desiring

man who wills and

acts, enabling

governed efficiently. relates that

Thus, in

the Discourse on Political

Economy,
the en
wealth and

Rousseau behaviour

to govern a state is to set up an economy toward its citizens

of

involving

tire state that

is to

exercise a

that

is,

toward the

of each

form

surveillance,

or

dressage

involving

questions of and the of a per

sexuality, mortality, health

and

hygiene,
Such

wealth,

fertility, birthrates,
dream
eighteenth

safety

of urban and

domestic

spaces.

a project conveys the

fectly

transparent
so to

and efficient society.

Foucault writes, "The

century

invented,
28.

speak,

a synoptic regime of power, a regime of

its

exercise within

am

here pursuing
and

and

enlarging

upon an argument made

by

Michel Foucault in "Govern

and

mentality,"

Ideology
uality,
op. cit. supra.

Consciousness,

vi

(Autumn 1979),

pp.

5-21,

his histories

on sex

Rousseau
the social
ercises

versus the

Savoyard Vicar
from
it."

327 Unlike Hobbes's

sovereign who ex

body,

rather than power a

above

juridicial

distillation

of power

into

a single will

the art of

government

deploys

a power

that circulates in a

dispersed
or

network of appara

tuses without a single,

organizing system, center,

power,

focus. Individuals

simulta

neously

exercise and undergo

they

are vehicles of power and not

with

its

point

of application.
pectations

Moreover,

the individual

is the

prime effect of power.

his desires, knowledges, and ex Rousseau is precisely novel in this regard bodies
as effects of

because he
power, that
at

examines

how the

relations of power constitute

is, how they are constituted in the deployment of power, especially the level of desire. Here power is polyvalent; power has a productive character
it
produces

since

the effects of truth

population management.

within the many governmental discourses of Commentators have hinted at this political technology

its accompanying exercise of power by referring to the refashioning con ducted by the soulcraft of the legislator and by suggesting that the reproduction
and

of the structure of

the natural equilibrium the

of power and

desire is

a technical ques
government

tion. But the

of men and

constitution of

new subject goes

beyond this. The

their

constitution as quanta of
"Man"

labour

power or

biopower in

a popula

tion,

suggests

that this is not

as an ontological given who

is

being made to
freedom
to
a appeal

be free. Commentators
that allow this

acknowledge

that it is the external

conditions of

"making"

"denaturing"

or

to be possible, but here

they

juridicial

conception of

power,

exercised

by

a superior wisdom.

I have

suggested

that Rousseau's position

is

more refined:

this is a power dispersed and

diffuse;
the Dis

there are no
of social

central nodal points of

power, only

the trajectories of a multiplicity

forces. Indeed,
Political
moral

a substantial portion of and most of the

the Social

Contract,

course on

Economy

Emile,

are given over

to a discus

sion of

this

discipline. One is right to

"self-mastery"

identify

the genre of the moral

code

free
and

dom

constituted

to be

but in Rousseau this

is

at

one,

indeed dependent upon, the

the ritual of examination,

politics of

surveillance, of the confessional, and of

and

thus must be differentiated from the divergent po

litical
Italian
"the

technologies of self-mastery of the citizen

of the courtesan

in the Greek polis,

or of

of

the Stoic

in the cosmopolis,

in feudal Europe,

the

condottieri

in the

city-republic

because the

measure

is drawn from

a new scientific

object,

population."

Let

me elaborate

this further:

one might see

that Rousseau's politics of truth is

inextricable from
subject

the dynamics of a
produce a

confessional

discursive

regime.

That

is,

the

is incited to

discourse

of truth about
and

his desires, his sexuality,

so as to

to examine his thoughts, memories,

images,

dreams,

decipher them
that

for the first

which not

stirrings of

desire

which animate

the flesh. Desire

until

is

construed as

is hidden. It

must

be

extracted, and

the subject,

he has done so, does

know his

own truth.

Pedagogical discipline incites

renders

his truth in the

verbalization of

confessing subject who his desires. The hermeneutic relation in

a

which the

moral subject

is

engaged

to achieve self-mastery,

in

which power/

knowledge

elicits and maintains

desire, instrumentalizing it

and

extending

con-

328
trol
over

Interpretation
the

body of the subject,

an omniscient gaze

is

actualized and an

in

society devoted to
of

a new polit

ical

optics

economy

orderly,

contented

bod

ies. It is

not a

morality

of repression and self-abnegation an

but

rather one of and

desire instru
eco

as a pervasive
mentation.

visibility in
we

economy
out

of

excitation, proliferation,

Sex, for
prohibitive

example,

find

in the Emile

now

becomes
as

political,

nomic, and technical problem; it is no longer "the

techniques of power
assumes a

flesh"

the site of various

death), but instead it

constituted on

(the Church teaching or the sovereign's power of new form as "sexuality": sex has become a locus
of

the basis of new techniques vengeance,

or the

power; not on the negative exercise to the world

of the sovereign's
upon a positive

denial

of access

hereafter, but
Constituted

investment in
can

practices which

direct life

processes.

as a

body,
and

the individual

be

represented as a

"machine",

as a quantum of

"biopower"

rected,
with

possessing capabilities which must be optimized; flaws must be cor forces must be administered at the capillary level in this "metabolism Emile's
education

nature."

is

not a

pedagogy
of

of

precept,

of

knowledge

as

juridical

authority.

Instead,

the tutor engages the technique of constant surveil

lance,
occurs

a gaze coupled with the

incitement

desire. The innovation is that

what

is

not

the

repression of power.

free desire but its incorporation, its government,

of

through

disciplinary

Throughout the Emile, Rousseau deploys tactics

incitement. The teaching of moral, juridical force, ruse, habit, and duties are deprecated rights, continually by Rousseau as ineffective and inap propriate for producing the new "natural who is to be integrated into soci
suppression and
man"

ety's grid of surveillance. subject

The

same mechanic

in the

constitution of

this

unique

is found too in La Nouvelle Heloise

where

Julie claims,

If

a mother

plete control.

is in the least watchful, she has the passions of her children under her com She has means of arousing and sustaining the desire to learn or any other far
as

desire;
do

and, so

they

are compatible with the complete

freedom

of the child and

not sow

the seeds of vice,

I readily employ them.

a prelude

and

This scrutiny is however only the administration of desire it

"the inner

to the

interiorization

of surveillance next tactic

makes possible.

In the Emile, the

in

this administration is illustrated

sures that

by

the Profession of Faith whereby the tutor

en

sentiment"

obliges

Emile "to

keep

an attentive watch over

himself before

listening

to his nascent

desires."

At this

point where

the tutor has

contrived the situation so

immediately consummate his desire for Sophie, his temporary self-division is monitored by the policing of an inter nalized gaze. The procedure finally culminates in again shifting the surveillance,
in

that Emile cannot

fixing

desire to

a particular object:

the

imaginary

woman, who

will

eventually
solu

become the tangible Sophie. Rousseau has here

tion of

resorted to the

disciplinary

intensified

surveillance

serves,

and exercises

from without, a woman who governs, judges, ob the powers of desire over him. What this implicitly shows
"inner
sentiment"

is distrust for the

effective

as

the

final,

conclusive moral

regu-

Rousseau
lator
and

versus

the Savoyard Vicar

on a new

329
relation,
guaranteed

the

dependence
desire.

tutelary

by

a prudent

management of

The Profession then has

program of a control of

served as a

perfectly transparent society

momentary bridge in Rousseau's overall which guarantees itself the complete

will require

the drawstrings of moral behavior. The transparent society

no gods and no sovereign.

Power dispersed

and

diffused to the

capillaries of this

society will ensure an efficient circulation of moral effects. The Profession is but a tool drawn from Rousseau's kit to this end, tactically contrived within a moral
project of

constituting disciplined
"biopower"

subjects.

Submerged
not

within

the recurrent and

endless metabolism with nature and

identifiable
to

by

their

the quanta of

they

contribute

Mankind,

as a

singularity but by biological species, the

technical interven

Emiles

and

Sophies have been

constituted within an object of

"population."

tion, the

healthy

and productive argued

To conclude, I have

that the profession of faith cannot be

read as con

taining Rousseau's
trix and thus

philosophic principles.

The

vicar's system

is

open

to insur

mountable objections on

the basis of the new philosophic truths and

political ma

ineffective in regulating the social effects individualism fostered by materialism. The traditional restraints of
rendered can

is

of the new a transcen

dent morality
selfish

only be
the

seen as

arbitrary

or quaint

from the

point of view of

the

man who embraces

materialist

teaching

on

human

nature and realizes realized

that his that the

designs

now

have

philosophic sanction.

Rousseau had

consequences of

this new

teaching
simply

on social
revert

life

were calamitous.

However, he
presented

could not

to a classical cosmology and impose a

refutable system of

morality may

upon men.

Although

such

depictions
and

of virtue as

by

the

vicar

charm corrupted men's

hearts

dispose them to

virtue, the ancient ideas could not be sustained in the

ments.

new commercial govern

Nor did Rousseau believe it

possible to

findings
exempts

and postulate that man nonetheless

has

simply ignore the materialist distinct realm of freedom that

one of the mechanically-regu

him from

mechanical necessity.

Man is
nature

lated

phenomena of nature.

It is from his

that the

nature must

be taken. Rousseau's moralizing

multiple modes of power and

of

regulating his the human machine is found

means of account sustains.

elsewhere

in the

knowledge his
who

It

was of

Nietzsche,
"Man"

of

course,

and not

Rousseau

taught us that with the to recognize that

death

God,

was gone too.

But Rousseau
to

also seemed

"Man"

had become

problematic and

have

ventured on

the

path

implying

that

"Man"

is technically

constituted

through various modes of power, and that mo the public responsibility and caution
and political and willful

rality is but an armature of that power. It is Rousseau adapts in constituting the moral distinguishes him from many
of

subject,

however,

that

his inspired

followers.

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Alexander Hamilton
Mackubin Thomas

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

Owens, Jr.

Office of Congressional Affairs, Department of Energy

In Number
observed men are

I of

The Federalist, Alexander

Hamilton,

"Publius,"

that America would

decide the

great question

writing as "whether societies

of

really

capable or not of

and

choice,

or whether

they

are

establishing forever destined to depend for their The

unique claim of

good government

from

reflection

political con

stitutions

on accident or

force."1

America, according

to

Hamilton in this passage,

tem imposed
man choice upon

was

that this nation, rather than

having

its

political sys

it

by

tradition or necessity, would establish a regime

by

hu

in

accordance with

reason,

a reason

that is ordered toward a truth that

lies in

an objective order of reality. nation would

The American
rather

therefore be the first regime based upon

"principle"

principle
princip-

than accident.

The English
of

word

comes
cxgxr).

from the Latin

ium,

which

is the translation meaning

the Greek

governs the

or action of a

thing; it is

also

dgxtf is a rule, which a beginning or origin. Insofar

present

An

as the rule which governs

the development of a

thing is

in its origin, the

rules

thing
does
This

will

become

what a

it is intended to become. The

human

beginning
will

the end,

by

determining what
not

become

thing, when human being,

it has fulfilled its nature,

and a
embryo

become. An become

acorn

does

not

an oak.

applies as well to politics.

The
as

principles
well.2

informing

the American

founding

would shape

the nation's

destiny

There
gime

are various statements of

the principles
the

upon which

the American re

is

supposed

to be

founded, but

best known

expression of

those

princi

ples understood as

both the

the Declaration of Independence.

of government

beginning According
the

and end of

government, is to be found in to this document the purpose or end

is to

protect

unalienable natural rights of

individuals to

life,

liberty,
of

and

the pursuit of happiness. Thomas Jefferson

and

of course was

the author

the

Declaration,

it is his

name

that is invoked as the

advocate of what most

Americans take to be While

the principles of the American regime.

most people profess

to know Jefferson's

principles and

their

impor

tance to the foundation of the United

States,

the

same cannot

be

said of

Alexan
polit

der Hamilton. As John Marshall remarked, "[wjith

respect to

[Hamilton's]

ical

principles and

designs,

the most contradictory opinions were

entertained."3

i. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 3.

ed.

Jacob E. Cooke

2.

Jeffery Wallin,
1980,
p. 3.

"Locke

and

the American

Founding,"

paper and

delivered

at

the APSA Annual

of

Meeting,

Cf. Leo Strauss, National Right

History

(Chicago:

University

Chicago

Press,
3.

1950),

pp.

122-27. p. 202.

John Marshall, The Life of George Washington (New York, 1925), Vol. V,

332
The

Interpretation
reputation of

Alexander Hamilton has been

supposed

subject

to wide vicissitudes of

opinion.

Talleyrand is
as

to have said, "I

consider

Napoleon, Pitt,
choose

and

Hamilton

the three

greatest men of our

age,

and

if I had to

among the known the

three, I

would without

hesitation

give

the first place to

Hamilton."4

According to

Guizot, "Hamilton
vital principles and
.

must

be

classed

among the men who have best

strength and contribute

fundamental

conditions of a government

there

is

not an element of not

order,

worthy of its name duration in the Constitution

there."5

which

[Hamilton] did
ambitious

powerfully
restricted

to place

Nor

was

this

high

regard

for Hamilton
I

to foreigners. Washington wrote of him:

of

"That he is

shall

readily grant, but it is he takes in

that laudable

kind,

which

prompts a man
name of

to

excel

in

whatever

hand."6

And Fisher Ames: "The

of
Aristides."7

Hamilton

would not

have dishonored Greece in the Age

Of course, contemporary approbation of Hamilton was by no means univer His erstwhile Federalist ally, John Adams, called him "the bastard brat of a The ambition for which Washington had praised Hamilton was Scots
sal.
peddler."

the source of Adams's disdain:

"[Hamilton]

was

in

delirium

of ambition:

he

had been blown up with vanity by the Tories, had fixed his eye on the highest sta tion in America, and he hated every man young or old who stood in his Your "ambition, pride and overbearing wrote Noah Webster, "have des
temper"

way."8

tined you to be the evil genius of this

country."9

But it

was

Hamilton's

perceived principles rather than

his

ambition that most

troubled his greatest

political

enemy,

who

branded him

as

the conservative

or,

indeed, reactionary
most

opponent of

the principles of the American revolution:

reputation

Thomas Jefferson
a

firmly

fixed Hamilton's

by branding

him "not
and

monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed on only his allies characterized Hamilton as a proto-Caesar,
plan as an attempt to establish
America.11

corruption."10

Jefferson

and attacked

his financial

monarchy, aristocracy, plutocracy,

and corruption

in

To the

charge of added

being

opposed

to the principles

of

the revolution,
with

modern

historians have

the charge that Hamilton was at odds

contradicted the

himself,

that the late

"conservative"

Hamilton

"radical."

early
revolution

In

fact, Hamilton's

principles were

the principles of the American

and, to a remarkable extent, the principles of

servative"

Thomas Jefferson. The later "con

"radical"

Hamilton was, moreover, perfectly consistent with the early Hamilton in the principles by which he took his bearings. The great debate
4.

be-

and Journals of George Ticknor (Boston, 1876), Vol. I, p. 261. Quoted in Melvin G. Dodge, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Putnam, 1896), pp. 7-8, 48. 6. To John Adams, September 25, 1798. The Writings of George Washington, John C. Fitzpat-

Life, Letters,

5.

rick, ed.
7.

(Washington, D.C., 1931-44), Vol. XXXVI,

pp. 460-61.

Quoted in William Coleman, ed., A Collection of the Facts and Documents Relative Death of Major General Alexander Hamilton (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1904), p. 249.
9.

to the

8. Quoted in Page Smith, John Adams (New York, 1962), Vol. II, Smith, John Adams, Vol. II, p. 1045.

p. 1085.

10. Jefferson, The Anas, in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds. The Life ings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library, 1944), p. 126. 11. Cf. e.g., National Gazette: "Brutus No. March 15 and subsequent Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Norton, 1979), p. 241.
,
I,"

and

Selected Writ Cited in

numbers.

Alexander Hamilton
tween

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

333

and Jefferson, and the apparent conflict between the early and had late Hamilton, largely to do with means rather than ends. This is not to say that these differences were not considerable, even funda
mental

Hamilton

from

a political point of view.

To "establish

government"

good

it is

not

sufficient

merely to espouse true principles. These principles must be applied in

practice, and the mode of application can make all the

difference in the

world.

Hamilton's

vision of

America in his Report

tent with the natural rights

Manufactures is perfectly consis doctrine found in his Full Vindication of the Measures
on

of Congress

(1774)

and

end of government was

the

The Farmer Refuted (1775). His understanding of the same in 1800 as in 1776. But what he perceived as

the proper means to those ends

Specifically, Americans

were no

had changed, as circumstances had changed. longer fighting a revolutionary war. They were

instead establishing institutions of government and learning to live together un der them. The public measures (and the public disposition) required for founding
were

different from those

the same ends.

required

for revolution, though

revolution and

found

ing

served

As

a statesman

instrumental in the

founding

of

the American regime, Hamil

ton faced a major obstacle. The American people were a revolutionary people,

passionately attached to liberty. This passionate attachment to liberty led them to the belief that their will should rule in all things. Even established law was an
unacceptable constraint.

Hamilton

saw that such a character

in the

people would

lead to anarchy and hence to tyranny, both destructive of true liberty. A major aspect of Hamilton's statesmanship consisted of attaching the American people
to the law and Constitution
of

the new nation, and in making them virtuous

by

making them law-abiding. Hamilton believed that liberty meant the citizens ought to be free to follow their natural inclinations, but that it was necessary for
there to be
what some

is

right

relationship between what the people are inclined to do and for them to do. Hamilton sought to teach moderation and justice to a
people through attachment to good

revolutionary
them to

respect

the property of minorities, pay their

laws, particularly in urging debts, and abide by the stric

tures

of

international law.
great challenge was

In short, Hamilton's

to transform a revolutionary people

into
cure

self-governing people, to moderate their passion

for

liberty in

order to se

to them the

blessings
at

of

liberty,
a

to infuse the spirit of independence with the

spirit of

the law. Even

the height of revolutionary

fervor, Hamilton

showed

his

awareness of this challenge

in

letter to John Jay.

fits
the
multitude
.

The

same state of passions which

for

opposition to
of all

tyranny
.

and

oppression, very naturally leads

them to contempt and

disregard

authority into

When the

minds of

those are loosened to

grow

from

their

attachment

to ancient establishments

and courses,

they

seem

giddy

and are apt more-or-less

to turn

anarchy.12

[Emphasis added]
12.
ette and

To John

Jay

Jacob E. Cooke,

(November 26, 1775), The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syr 26 Volumes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-79), 1. 176-77;

Papers hereafter.

334 He

Interpretation
to this
central

returned

theme at the New York

.

Ratifying Convention in
jealousy

1788.

In the

commencement of a revolution

nothing

was more natural than that the pub

.

lic

mind should

be influenced

by

an extreme spirit of

and to nourish

this

spirit, was the great object of all our public and private
came predominant and excessive. seemed

institutions. Zeal for

liberty be

In

forming

our

confederation, this passion alone

to

actuate

us,

and we appear
object

to have had

no other view than to secure ourselves

from despotism. The

ing. I

certainly

was a valuable one.

But, Sir,

there

is

another ob

ject, equally important,

and of vigor

and which our enthusiasm rendered us

little

capable of regard

mean a principle of strength and

stability in the organizing

of our

government,

in its

operation."

It

was

in attempting to

moderate

America's revolutionary passion, the better

to fulfill America's revolutionary purpose, that Hamilton incurred the wrath of

Thomas Jefferson
nent of great

and won

the revolution and

from posterity the reputation as a reactionary oppo of his earlier (radical, and therefore better) self. In this
choice of means

test of his statesmanship Hamilton displayed that quintessential virtue of

the statesman

prudence, the

to unchanging ends,

given

by

na

ture and not subject

to deliberation.

Hamilton

seems to attach great

importance to

principles and to

consistency in

holding

them. Thus in Federalist 31 he writes:

of

In disquisitions

every kind, there

are certain

which all subsequent reasonings must

depend

primary truths, or first principles, upon Though it can not be pretended that

the principles of moral and political

certainty

with

those of the mathematics;

knowledge have, in general, the same degree of yet they have much better claims in this re
men."1

spect, than to judge from the

conduct of

And in commenting on Jefferson's first although "a wise and good may,
man"

annual message under certain

to Congress he says that

circumstances, change his

opinions,
must

such

changes, especially in

matters of great

importance to the public,

be

rare.

The contrary is
and or

always a mark either of a weak and versatile mind, or of an artificial

designing

character, which, accommodating its creed, to circumstances, takes up

lays down

an article of

faith, just
not

as

may

suit a present

convenience.15

The statesmen,
as

of

course, is
as

necessarily

a philosopher.

But to dismiss him is

simply

a man of

action,

merely

an advocate of a particular political plan

to miss the important point that political decision and advocacy, while certainly
not

identical

with political

theory,

nonetheless

may be

grounded

in thoughtfully

articulated principles.

Our first
13.

problem

is to discover

what

Hamilton's

political principles were. Al-

at the New York Ratifying Convention (24 June, 1788). Papers, v. 68. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison. John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Jacob Cooke town, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), pp. 193-95. 15. The Examination, Number XVI. Papers, xxv.564. Cf. Second Letter from 14.

Remarks

(Middle-

Phocion, Papers,

m.542-43-

Alexander Hamilton
though there
treatise.16

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

335

is

evidence

His

principles must

ters which, now

phlets

he intended to do so, Hamilton never wrote a political be gleaned from his pamphlets, reports, and let run to 26 thick volumes. There are however two pam collected,
Hamilton devotes to the dictates that
we

in

particular which

articulation of political princi

our

ples,

and common sense

begin here. In fact,

beginning
a

is is

Hamilton's

as

well,

since

these are his earliest political

natural

writings.

In them is

full

discussion
good

of

human nature,

ends, and therefore

an articulation of what

for

man as man.

A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress, written in December 1774, and The Farmer Refuted, which followed in March 1775, provide the clearest
statement

of

Hamilton's

political

principles.17

In

view of

Hamilton's
voices

alleged a thor

"conservatism,"

these early pamphlets are

truly
of

shocking.

He

here

oughgoing for themselves,

ural

radicalism.

He defends the right his

the American colonies to legislate

basing

argument on natural rights and natural

law. From

nat

rights, he derives

a radical

justification for the right to

revolution.

Hamilton's first pamphlet, A Full Vindication,

the Continental

was a response

to

an attack on

Congress

by

Samuel Seabury, the Anglican

the name of "A. W.
response

rector of

Westches

ter, New York.

"Coercive"

Seabury,

Farmer"

under

had ridiculed the

"Intolerable"

measures enacted

by

the

Congress in

to the so-called

or

Acts

passed

by

Parliament in

1774.

Hamilton, invoking

the law

of

nature, the genius of the British constitution, and the Colonial charters as justifi
cation

for the security of the individual in his life and property, set out to show that "the inhabitants of Great Britain [had no] right to dispose of the lives and
the inhabitants of America
"18
. .

properties of

lic

Seabury, in his reply, requested that Hamilton "explicitly [declare] to the pub Hamilton obliged him in The [his] idea of the natural rights of
which

mankind."

Farmer Refuted, to
of

he

added a

justification

colonists'

of the

cause

in terms

the British

constitution and

the

colonial charters.

Hamilton's two
of

pamphlets

provide one

of

the most

comprehensive

defenses

American

liberty

to

be

found,
cal

one

that is at least
author of

as radical as the document

written

by

his future

politi

enemy, the

the Declaration of Independence.

Seabury 's
onies
16.

position was

that Parliament had every

a

right

to legislate for the col

motherland.

because, by definition,
"Mr. Hopkins
related relates: when

colony is

subordinate
consent

to the
to

Thus,

Hamilton hesitated his

given

republication

[of The Feder

alist], that he
meat;'

to

him,

'Heretofore I have
purpose

the people milk: hereafter I will give them treatise on

ciii.

governm

words

indicating

his formed

to

write a

John C. Hamilton,
a

ed., The Federalist (New

vestigation of the

York,

1864), Vol.

I.,

pp.

xcii,

"[Hamilton intended to write]

full in
the

history

and science of civil government and the various modifications of

.

it

upon

[He desired] to have the subject treated in reference to past Bacon's inductive philosophy, and to engage the assis of Lord experience and upon the principles William Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent (Boston: Little, tance of others in the

freedom

and

happiness

of mankind

enterprise."

Brown,
17.

1898),

pp. 327-28.

A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress. &c. Papers,

1.81-165.

1.45-78.

The Farmer Re

futed, &c, Papers,

18.

Papers,

1.46.

336
there

Interpretation
be
no

could

lawful

resistance

to the taxes imposed on the colonies

not whether
tea."

Parliament. For

Hamilton,

the issue was

there should be a
was rather

by the "petty
taxes

duty
they

of

pence per pound on of

East India

The dispute

"whether

the Parliament

Great Britain
or not
. .

shall make what

laws,

and

impose

what

please upon

us,

It is true,

we are

denying to pay the duty

we cannot submit and

upon

tea, but it is
without

not

for the

value of

the

thing

itself. It is because
upon which
ever.'9

to

that,

acknowledging the principle in

all cases whatso

it is founded,

that principle

is

a right to tax us

But Hamilton denies this

cause to admit such a power

principle.

There is

no unlimited power

is

a contradiction of

the law of

tax, be nature, the British

to
not

constitution, and the

colonial

charters.20

Seabury 's problem,

source of all

says

Hamilton, is

one of

ignorance. He does
these rights is the
requires

know the Hamilton

natural rights of mankind.

His total ignorance

of

fundamental

his

errors and

sophisms, and his ignorance

that

spell out a

doctrine

of political

obligation,

beginning

with

the law

of nature.

Good

and wise

men, in all ages

each

have supposed, that the deity, from the relations,

other, has constituted an
on all eternal and

we stand

in,

to himself and to

immutable institution

law,

which

is, indispensibly, obligatory

mankind,

prior

to any human

whatever.21

Quoting Blackstone,
This is
tated
what

he

continues:

is

called the

law
of

of nature, 'which

being

coeval with mankind, and

other.

dic

by

God himself,
the globe,

is,

course, superior in obligation to any

and at all

It is

binding

over all

in

all

countries,
of

times.

No human laws
all their

are of

any validity,

or

if contrary to this; and such immediately, from this

them as are valid,

derive

authority, mediately,

original.'22

The

content of the natural suggests

law

as

it

applies

to man is
of

"twofold."

Hamilton's strong

formulation

that there are two commands

the law of

nature: a

one and a weak one.

It is

.a

dictate

of

humanity

to contribute to the support and

happiness

of our

fellow

creatures and more

and

and

especially those who are allied to us by the lines of blood, interest, mutual protection; but humanity does not require us to sacrifice our own security welfare to the convenience, or advantage of others. Self-preservation is the first
When
our

principle of our nature. and unnatural to refrain

would 19. 20. 21.

lives

and properties are at stake,

it

would

be foolish

from

such measures as might preserve

them, because they

be detrimental to
1. 67.
1.43.

others.23

Papers,

Papers,

Papers, 1.87. 22. Papers, 1.87; Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1979 [First published, London, 1765-69], Vol. I, p. 41. 23. Papers, 1. 51.

of

Alexander Hamilton
The strong
command

on

Natural Rights
law
of nature

and

Prudence

337
The
weak

command of the
or at

is: "preserve
The

yourself."

is "help,

least,

do

not

harm,

others."

end of

the strong com

mand

is to

preserve one's

life. The

means

to that end are within the choice of the

individual, but
The "natural

are constrained rights of

by

the

weak command. upon

mankind"

depend
and

the natural

law,

and

include the

inviolable right to "personal

right

liberty"

"personal

safety,"

as well as the natural

to

freedom,
These

or

"which is the

same

thing security for

all

life in

and

prop
natu

erty."24

with

rights to life, liberty, and property are the dictates of the law of nature. The relationship between
natural and self-preservation can

accordance

natural

law,

ral

rights,

be

understood

because the

supreme

being

"endowed
sue such able

[man]

with rational

faculties, by

the

things, as were consistent with his him to understand and employ "the means
reason

help of which, duty and interest

of

to discern and pur

.

and which en

preserving

and

beatifying [his]
speak

existence."25

It is
est

that indicates these "luminous

principles."

"They

the plain

language to every man of common sense; and must carry conviction where the mental eye is not bedimmed, by the mist of prejudice, partiality, ambition, or
avarice."26

Reason

and

the law of nature operate even when there

is

no civil

society, but

the sanctions against those who violate the law of nature are very weak
sence of civil society. no man

in the

ab

The best Hamilton

had any
nor

moral power

say is that "in a state of nature, to deprive another of his life, limbs, property or
can
him."

liberty;

the least authority to command, or exact obedience from

emphasis on moral power

Hamilton's

indicates that there is

yourself,"

a problem
man

here. If has the

the law of nature commands "preserve

right to self-preservation,
vation.

if,

that

is, every

he

must also

have the

right

to the means of self-preser

In the

state of

nature, the

right of self-preservation of one man necessar

ily
his

comes

into

conflict with that of

means

another,

and since

every

man

is the judge

of

own

cause, this
war.27

that the state of nature is either actually or potentially a

state of

The natural, inviolable rights which Hamilton in the state of nature, "since a right implies a law
of nature will always

proclaims are

thus not complete

The

weaker

dictate

of

the

be

"moral"

overwhelmed

by
to

the stronger, and that

power one

has in the

state of nature

turns

out

be

no power at all. all will

Because the

equal right of self-preservation unendurable and

actual

for

lead to

universal con of natural moral

flict,
This
24. 25. 26.

the state of nature is

must

thwarts the

intention

law. force

be

corrected
1.66. 1.87-88. 1.97.

by placing

force behind the ineffectual

Papers, Papers, Papers,

27.

1952).
ed.

1.88. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Nelle Fuller (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 23 of The Great Books. Chapter XIII, pp. 84-86. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (New York: New American Library, i960), Second Treatise, Chapter III; Sections

Papers,

45.48-5I.

338

Interpretation
law
which says

of that part of natural

do

not

harm

others.

In

other

words, for the

law

of nature to effect even

its

minimal

purpose,

i.e.,
A

to secure self-preservation,
real sanction must

men must

be

prevented

from

harming

each other.

be

pro

vided where nature

does

not provide one.

Civil society is the necessary

correc

tion of the state of nature.

The

purpose of civil

society is to

protect

those absolute rights which, though

ordained

by

the law of nature, are not secure in the state of nature. "Civil
sanctions

liberty

is only natural liberty, modified and secured by the Again quoting Blackstone, Hamilton says:
The
principle aim of

society."

of civil

rights,
not

which were vested

society is to protect individuals in the in them by the immutable laws

without

enjoyment of those absolute of

nature; but

which could

be preserved, in peace,

that

mutual assistance and

gained

by

the institution of friendly and

end of

social communities.

intercourse, which is Hence, it follows, that the

the
absolute rights of

first

and

primary

human laws is to

maintain and regulate

individuals.28

For
sent of

civil

society to be just, it

must

be

voluntary compact, based

on the con

the

governed.

No

reason can

be

assigned

why

one man should exercise

over

his fellow
it.29

creatures more

than another; unless

any power, or pre-eminence have they voluntarily vested him

with

the

origin of all civil

government,

justly established
be liable to
the
of

must

be

voluntary compact,
as are neces

between the

rulers and
of

the ruled;

and must

such

limitations,
consent?30

sary for the security

man or set of men

the absolute rights to

govern

latter; for

what original

title can

any

have,

others, except their own

Thus does Hamilton derive the

purpose and

foundation

of civil government

from

first

principles or the

law

of nature.

Governments that
quotes
of

violate

these principles
are of

are

illegitimate. As Hamilton

Blackstone: "[N]o human laws

and such of

nature];

them as are

any validity if contrary to [the law from this valid, derive all their authority
. . .

original."

To usurp dominion
power than

over a

people,

in their

own

despite,

or to

grasp
of

at a more extensive
which gives

they

are

every

man a right

willing to entrust, is to violate that law to his personal liberty; and can therefore,
added)31

nature,

confer no obligation to

obedience.

(Emphasis
not

Hamilton does

hesitate to

proclaim the right

to revolt against such illegiti

mate governments.

28.

Papers, Papers, Papers, Papers,

1.

104,

88; Blackstone,

1. 120.

The

editors of the

Papers mistakenly

give the page ref

erence of this passage as 124. 29. 1.47.

30.
31.

1.88. 1.88.

Alexander Hamilton
The
nations of an

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

339

Turkey, Russia, France, Spain

and all other

despotic kingdoms in the

world, have

inherent right, whenever they please to shake off the yoke of servitude (though sanctified by the immemorial usage of their ancestors;) and to model their gov
upon

ernment,

the principle of civil

liberty.

are

When the first principles of civil society are violated, and the rights of a whole people invaded, the common forms of municipal law are not to be regarded. Men may then betake themselves to the law of nature; and if they but conform their actions, to
that standard, all cavils against
some events

them,

betray

either

ignorance

or

dishonesty. There
when applied

are

in society, to force

which

human laws In short,

cannot

extend; but

to them

lose

all their

and efficacy.
which are

when

human laws

contradict or

discounte

nance

the means,

necessary to

preserve the essential rights of

any society,

they defeat the

proper end of all

laws,

and so

become

null and

void.32

similar

Hamilton clearly advocates a natural rights position expressed in language to that of Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. Hamilton's prin

ciples understood as

beginnings

are rooted

in human

nature which requires a

on consent.

free

government, a government of political equality based

understood as ends are

His

principles

the perfection of virtue,

or

human

excellence through the

expansion of

liberty.
what

Guided
practice

by

he took to be the

natural ends of

men, Hamilton

varied

his

to meet the exigencies of the time

and place.

What

was

best simply,
Thus

might not
while

be best

under

the

circumstances.

This is the

essence of prudence.

in

private

Hamilton

criticized

the

various state

constitutions, in public he

attempted

to attach the people to law-abidingness

tutions;
asserted

while

document,"

worthless

he privately characterized he mounted a major

praising those same consti the Federal Constitution as a "frail and

effort

by

to

see

it ratified;

and while

he

that Jay's
as

Treaty

had been

woman,

negotiated

by

"an old

he publicly

defended it ditions
of

the best

means of affairs.

preserving the

regime under

the prevailing con

international

Hamilton's fullest

account of prudence

ing
icy,

System

written after

his

resignation as

is found in The Defence of the Fund Secretary of the Treasury. But even in
of

his first

pamphlets there

is

brief discussion A
good

the relationship among good pol

principles,

and prudence.

policy
require

must meet these practical criteria:

First,

the necessity

of

the times

[must]

it, secondly
to

it

probable source of greater evils than those

it

pretends

remedy: and

[must] not be lastly,

the
.

it

[must]

have

success.33

probability

of

In the Defence, Hamilton

wrote

that

his

duty

as

Secretary

of

the

Treasury,

and

by

implication the
.

duty

of

any statesman, had been "to

unite

[in his policy] two

success."

probability of could not in good conscience, he wrote, "have submitted the best financial simply because it was too remote from the prevailing opinions
. .

ingredients

intrinsic

goodness

[and]

a reasonable

He

plan

"

32.

Papers, Papers,

1.

125, 136 (Emphasis

added).

33.

1. 52.

340

Interpretation

unaccomodated to In pursuing too far the idea of absolute perfection in the plan circumstances. The chance of an absolutely bad issue was infinitely enhanced, and the
evils connected with

it.
collapse of

Such

evils

included the

credit, the

subversion of union

(and hence

effective

government), and "a severe

prudence

blow to the security

mean

of

property."34

Hamilton's

did not, however,

the subordination of principle to

simple expediency.

Although

we should act

dence,

we must

keep

our eye upon an objective standard of

according to the dictates of pru human behavior.

it any
essential prin

accommodation was not

to

be

carried so
with

far

as to sacrifice to

ciple.
was

This is

never

justifiable. But

the

restriction of not

it

not right and adviseable to shape the course as to secure the

sacrificing principle best prospect of

path of

effecting the greatest possible good? To me this appeared the 3S and I acted under the influence of that impression.

policy

and

duty

But it
appeal

was also a

dictate

of

Hamilton's
of

prudence

to

recognize

that the constant

to first principles those

is destructive

the stability necessary to the very pres

ervation of

principles.

This, it

seems

is the

source of

the

real

debate be

tween Hamilton and Jefferson. While Jefferson advocated a constant appeal to

first principles, Hamilton believed that positive law that appeal. Revolutionary fervor is inappropriate to
society,
even one

must of

necessity

replace

living

in

a stable political

individual rights. Prudence teaches that ultimately individual rights can only be preserved when there exists in the regime a strong sense of law-abidingness.
that protects

Thus,
attempt

as suggested

before,

much of

Hamilton's

enterprise was the prudential

to make a revolutionary people law-abiding. Before he could hope to see

a regime of

liberty fully
make a

established

in America,
who

necessary to
their wills

revolutionary people,
see the on

its benefits enjoyed, it was desired only to acquire whatever

and an

directed,

necessity

of

paying their debts. In

will of great

infant

nation

whose survival

depended

the restraint and good

powers,

a revo
other

lutionary people had to be

countries and attachment

shown

the necessity of subordinating gratitude to

to revolutionary principles, to the dictates of interna

requirement of prudence was attach the people

tional law.

Perhaps the foremost

in

to make an

an

cient establishment of a new

government, to

to the laws of the that

stable gov

new government ernment might

order

that their rights

might

be protected,

and

be

preserved.

In

order to understand

the importance of prudence to the implementation of a

examine

regime of

principles, it is helpful to

Hamilton's justification for

revolu

tion and the source of that justification. As Gerald Stourzh has

brilliantly

demon
was

strated, the
the

source of

both Hamilton's

"radicalism"

and

his

"conservatism"

"eminently
"Defense

respectable"

Blackstone.36

Much has been

made of

Blackstone's

34. 35. 36.

of the

Funding

System,"

Papers,

xix. 3-6.

Papers,

xix. 7.
and the

Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton

Idea of Republican Government (Stanford,

Calif.: Stanford

University Press,

1970),

pp. 9-37.

Alexander Hamilton
conservative

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

341

influence
to

on

the

Revolution. But he

also provided a

justification

for "the
olution.

resort

first

principles"

that characterized the radical aspect of the Rev

whom

The jurist
of all

Jefferson
and of

accused

(along

with

Hume)
. . .

of

having
sophist

"made Tories
whose native

England,"

doing

the same to "those young Americans them above

feelings

of

independence do

not place

wily

ries

could nonetheless write about:

recourses to

those

extraordinary

first principles,

which are

necessary

when

the con

tracts of
against

society

are

in danger

of

dissolution,

and the

law

proves

too weak a defense

the violence of

fraud

or

oppression.38

The historian Claude Van Tyne

a

writes that:

South Carolinian
no

spoke of

those

latent,
such

though inherent rights of society,

ever

which no
...

climate,
mind

time,

no

constitution, no contract, can

destroy

or

diminish

To

that venerated the

Constitution

ideas

were

poisonous,

and pointed

plainly

to

anarchy.39

But the

source of those sentiments was

precisely

one who venerated the

British

constitution.

Indeed, it is found by
even of

experience, that whenever the unconstitutional oppressions,

with gigantic strides and

the sovereign power, advance

will not

threaten

desolation to

state, mankind

be

reasoned out of

their

feelings

of

humanity;
laws
are

nor sacrifice their

liberty by
will

a scrupulous adherence to those political maxims, which were

originally

es

tablished to preserve

it. And therefore, though the

positive

silent, experience
. . .

furnish

us with a of

[Abdication

very remarkable case, wherein nature and reason prevailed James II]. In these, therefore, or other circumstances, which a fertile

imagination may furnish, since both law and history are silent, it becomes us to be si lent too; leaving to future generations, whenever necessity and the safety of the whole
shall require no
37.

it,

the

exertion of

those inherent (though

climate,

no

time,

no constitution, no contract, can ever

latent) powers of society, destroy or

which

diminish.40

To Horatio G. Spafford (March 17, 1814) in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (Washington, 1903), Vol. 6, p. 335.
38. 39.

ed.

A. A.

Blackstone,

1.243.

Claude Van Tyne, The Causes of

p. 13.

the

War of Independence (Boston, 1922),

pp. 236-37.

Cited in Stourzh,
40.

Blackstone,

1.238.

Stourzh

maintains

that Blackstone had a major

impact

on

Hamilton,

espe

cially in terms of his understanding of natural law. Stourzh. pp. 9-36. McDonald minimizes the influence of Blackstone on Hamilton, suggesting that "he may have merely skimmed through [the

Commentaries] during
refer

the six

or eight weeks

to them in his

earlier pamphlet.

since he did between his writing of the two McDonald, p. 51 McDonald also claims that Hamilton did
.

tracts,"

not
not

"derive his understanding

of natural

law from Blackstone: that

came

Donald,

p. 57.

Concerning
p.

Stourzh's opinion, McDonald study

.

writes

Mc principally from "I believe that Stourzh, in his not

Blackstone's influence
upon

Vattel."

unflawed

but generally

excellent

misinterprets and overstates

Hamilton."

McDonald,

378,

Stourzh's work will recognize was transmitted in the British tra Blackstone demonstrates the unique way in which the "natural dition. For instance, it is interesting to note at this point that Hamilton's use of Blackstone may point
law'

I follow Stourzh in this debate. Indeed, anyone familiar with how much my discussion here depends upon his view. I believe that
note 17.

the way to reconciling two apparently irreconcilable views of the Revolution: the
"legalistic"

"conservative"

or

view

of, e.g., Daniel

Boorstin,
principles.

"ideological"

and the

view of

Bernard Bailyn. Boorstin

explanation of the role

neglects the role of resort to

first

Taking

issue

with

Carl Becker's

342

Interpretation

For Blackstone (and Hamilton writing in 1775) the English law and the British constitution were coeval with the natural law. Thus the first Resolve of the Mas
sachusetts

House

of

Representatives

proclaimed

"that there
which are

are certain essential

rights
of

of

the British Constitution of

Government,
Rights
of

founded in the Law

and

Mankind,"

God

and

Nature,
. .

and are

the

common

the Massachu
unalterable own

setts

Circular Letter
.

of 1768 expressed

the view that the

acquired

"essential,

right, in nature [was] engrafted

of natural

is absolutely his What a man honestly law."" into the British Constitution, as a fundamental
has
Revolution, Boorstin
the
common writes:

law in the

"According
to

to this view, the colonists began their

within

arguments on a

low legalistic level,

finding

it

convenient

debate first

the

framework

of

the
of

imperial

constitution and

abstraction

until,

by

mid-1776,
a

law; but they gradually and inevitably climbed the ladder were thinking and talking in the arid heights of natural law they
of

[Becker's account] supposes the Americans to shift their

could as

kind

intellectual mobility
suit

near

disingenuousness
granted
.

which enable

grounds

to

their needs.

It takes for

that the colonists

ter

his

plea PP-

readily abandon the legal for the philosophical level of argument as a hired counsel could al Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago, from guilty to not
guilty."

1953).

77-78,

79.

on the other hand stresses the ubiquity of natural rights thinking, and goes far toward suggesting that there was no conservative element to the Revolution. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

Bailyn's interpretation

1967).
ral

Both

of

those views, it seems, can

be

reconciled

law in English thought,

represented most of all

by recognizing the special status of the natu by Blackstone, and the prudence of the colonists in
law
as

adapting their arguments to their needs. First of all, the absolute distinction between
and other species of
exist

positive

the pure command of the sovereign

via

law

such as natural

law,

which we

inherit from Hobbes

such as

for the Founders. Writers, particularly Christian writers preted the common law and the British Constitution in terms
was a

Fortescue

John Austin, did not and Hooker, inter

"natural"

of medieval

Natural Law. Thus there

and

merging

of common

law rights,

such as of

the right to trial

by a jury of one's peers,

in the
words of of

sacred

by

virtue of the

very antiquity law

their tradition, and the rules of moral conduct ordained

"LexAeterna,"

by

God

and revealed

by scripture

and reason: of nature

the
written with of

moral

law,

called also the

the

finger

Sir Edward Coke, "the God in the heart of law

was engrafted

man."

Quoted

by

Hamilton in Papers,

1.91

Onto this tradition

as

English

natural

the

fun

damental law
ticulated

of self-preservation.

Perhaps,
a

by Hobbes and Locke are Revolutionary period, who embraced incompatibility was not important.
Boorstin is
correct conservative
radical

later thinkers have argued, modern natural rights as ar incompatible with the older tradition, but for the statesmen of the lawyer's understanding
of

law

and the constitution, such an

fact that the

nists
tion"

in their

in recognizing the importance of Blackstone to the founders, but he misses the Blackstone provided the means of constitutional reasoning used by the colo enterprise. The concern with the "true nature of the British Constitu
colonists'

must not obscure

the

inseparable from
Englishmen"

natural

fact that, as transmitted by Blackstone's Commentaries, that concern was law and natural rights. And further it is not disingenuousness but prudence,
mankind."

that led the Americans to change their arguments from a defense of the colonies in terms of the "rights
of

to the "rights of

At the beginning, they

were

in fact the same, but

as

Par

supremacy gained ground, the colonists suited their arguments to their changing needs. Thus John Adams recollected that during the drafting of the Declaration of Rights in 1774, it was dis
cussed

liamentary

"whether

we should recur

to the Law of

Nature,

as well as to

the British Constitution and

our

Galloway and Mr. Duane were for excluding the Law of Nature. I was very strenuous for retaining and insisting on it, as a Resource to which we might be driven, by Parliament much sooner than we were John Adams, The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, ed. L. H. Butterfield (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), Vol. Ill, p. 309. 41. Edmund S. Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 56. The Massachusetts Circular
and
aware."

American Charters

Grants. Mr.

Alexander Hamilton

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence
fervor
on

343
three levels that

Hamilton, in his early

the

pamphlets argued with equal

"security
of the

to our lives and property [is afforded

by]

the law of nature, the gen

ius

with equal

British constitution, and our [colonial] charters facility argue his position from natural law or from
"legiance."

Hamilton

could

a pre-Lockean un

derstanding
British

of such a concept as

Thus, "[t]he law

of nature and the

constitution

both

confine allegiance

to the person of the

King;

and

found

it

upon

the principle of
role

protection."42

Blackstone's

in unifying, in the

minds of

Englishmen

and colonists

alike,

the law of nature and the British constitution is most this little noticed passage.

forcefully

demonstrated in

The

absolute rights of
are

every Englishman (which, taken in

a political and extensive on nature and reason, so

sense,

usually

called their

liberties)

as

they

are

founded

they

are coeval with our form

of government
written:

Immediately
The idea
these

above

this passage, Blackstone had

this political or civil
short of

and practice of
where

liberty

flourish in their highest

and can

vigour

in

kingdoms,

it falls little

perfection,

only be lost

or

de

by the folly or demerits of its owner: the legislature, and of course the laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to the preservation of this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject. Very different from the modern constitutions of other states, on
stroyed

the continent of

Europe,

and

from the
and

genius of the

imperial

law;

which

in

general are

arbitrary ject in the prince, or in a few

calculated to vest an

despotic

power of

controlling the

actions of the sub

grandees.43

Blackstone

argues

that all

men

have

certain natural

rights "such every

liberty"

as would

be

long

to their persons merely in a state

of

nature,

and which

man

is

entitled

to enjoy whether out of society or in

it."

The "natural
fit"

of man which or so

must be modified in "consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks der to receive the advantage of civil society. "Every man when he enters into

ciety gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a Civil rights, the absolute rights of individuals, are a number of "private immuni and consist in "that residuum of natural lib defined by "several
ties"
statutes"

purchase

erty,

which

is

not required
natural

by the

laws

of

society to be

sacrificed

to public conve

nience."44

The

rights,
"the

now

the civil rights of the people of

England,
lib

consist

in three

articles:

right of personal

security, the

right of personal

property."

erty;

and

the right of private

The

preservation of

our civil

immunities in

these, inviolate, may justly be said to include the their largest and most extensive
sense.45

preservation of

Letter is

cited

in Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher

p. 79.

Law"

Background of American Constitutional Law

(Ithaca,
42. 43.
44.

1955),

Papers,

1. 91.
1. 1 23, 1.125. 1. 125.

45

Blackstone, Blackstone, Blackstone,

122-123 (Emphasis

added).

344 The

Interpretation
sum of

Blackstone's

argument seems

to be that the British constitution

men are entitled systems

is

coeval with

the

natural rights of mankind. constitution

All

to these
world

rights, but
has in fact

only the British

secured them.

among

all

the legal

in the

The fact that Hamilton

pamphlets,
and advocated

relied on natural rights

to a greater extent

in his early

them more strongly than Jefferson

did in his

Summary

View of the Rights of British America, can be explained by a circumstance to which prudence must adapt itself. As Hamilton himself tells us, New York,
where

he

was

writing, had no

royal

charter,

and

his

careful argument

for the

charter rights of other colonies

did

not

apply to New York.

It is true, that New York has

no other way,

it might,

with

no Charter, But, if it could support its claim to liberty in justice, plead the common principles of colonization: for enjoyment of

it

would

be

unreasonable

to seclude one colony, from the

the most im
sacred rights

portant privileges of the rest.

of mankind are not

There is

no

need,

however,

of this plea:

The

to be

rummaged

They
hand

are

written, as

with a sun

for, among old parchments, or musty records. beam, in the whole Volume of human nature, by the
be
erased or obscured

of the

divinity itself;

and can never

by

mortal

power.46

Hamilton's principles, understanding

with of

as given

in his early pamphlets,

reflect a

Blackstonian

the British constitution. Hamilton's radicalism

is thus traceable jurist. But

to a view of the constitution advanced

by

the eminently respectable

Blackstone,

and unlike

Jefferson, Hamilton believed

that the "resort to first

principles"

should

be

a rare

occurrence, undertaken only under the direst circum

times."

"Legiti absolutely required by the "prudence of the revolution, which may involve illegal acts, is to be undertaken only when the absolute safety of the people is at stake or, as quoted above, "when the first
stances, only
mate"

when

principles of civil vaded

.

society are violated, and the rights of a whole people are in Resistance to Parliament is justified by that body's usurpation of the
people. and

rights of

the

Since the

end and

intention

of

government, is to

preserve

the

life, property liberty and tyranny justify a resort

of the

subjects, only the encroachments

used

of oppression

to first principles. When power is

illegitimately

by

their rules, the people may resort to

so with a clear conscience.
of rule

legitimate,
extralegal

may do

Such

illegal measures, and but legitimate measures serve

though
guarantee the purpose of

to restore the conditions

government.

originally designed to in
contrast

Hamilton's favored bookish in

a

sober radicalism stands resort

to that of Jefferson. Jefferson

frequent

reaction

first principles, which explains his complacent and to Shays's Rebellion and the bloodshed of the French Revolu
to

tion. In a

America,"

letter to Edward Carrington, Jefferson spoke favorably of the "tumults i.e., Shays's Rebellion, "as a means to the firmness of our [state]
which,
even when

government,"

in error,

"keep

principles of their

institutions. To Madison he

wrote

[their governors] to the true "I hold it that a little

rebel-

46.

Papers,

1. 121-22.

Alexander Hamilton lion

now and

on

Natural Rights
thing,
and as

and

Prudence

345
political world as

then

is

a good

necessary in the
of

storms

in the

physical."47

Gerald Stourzh has

Article IV
ernment,
of

shown

that the source

of

Jefferson's ideas
which states

can

be found in free
gov

the Virginia

Declaration

Rights,

that "no

or

the

blessing
to

of

liberty

can

be

preserved to

any
to

people

but

by

firm
fre

adherence

to

justice,
to

moderation, temperance,

frugality,

and

virtue,

and

by

quent recurrence sis on a resort

fundamental

principles."

According

Stourzh,

this empha

first

principles can and

James

Burgh, Thomas Gordon

be traced back through George Mason, to John Trenchard, the authors of the influential

Cato's Letters, thence to Algernon

writes

Burgh in his Political Disquisitions that "Machiavelli says, that to render a com monwealth long lived, it is necessary to correct it often, and reduce it towards its
and

Sydney

finally

to

Machiavelli.48

first principles, Sydney:

which

is

likely

to

be done

by

punishments and

examples."49

And

its first

[Machiavelli proposed] reducing every state, once in an age or two, to the integrity of principle. All human constitutions are subject to corruption, and must per
unless

ish,

they

are

timely

renewed, and reduced to their

first

principles.50

Indeed,
original plished
which

the title of The Discourses III, I is "To insure a

long

existence to reli

gious sects or

principles."

republics, it is necessary frequently to bring them back to their The purification of the corrupt body politic could be accom
accidents"

by

"extrinsic

such as the

led to the

rebirth of

Rome,

or

sacking of Rome by the internal devices such as "a law that

to render an account of their

"Franks"

obliges

the citizens of the association

often

conduct."51

Many

saw

this as the source of the ideas of rotation in office, frequent elections,

and other republican

lar tumults,
to

and

institutions. Sydney, for one, saw it Jefferson followed him in this regard.
and

also as a call

for

popu

While Hamilton first be

Blackstone

agreed with

Jefferson that
maintained

an extralegal resort

principles was sometimes

rare.

should

Hamilton's

great

necessary they fear was that the

that such recurrences

end of government would

be

overturned and that mobs,

mine

driven

by

their short-sighted passions would under

were

the whole basis of civil government. His Phocion Letters

directed had

against mob rule.

47.

And indeed these bookish

admirers of

"little

rebellions,"

uary 30, 1787), Koch and Peden, p. 413; can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are
spirit of resistance?

To Edward Carrington (January 16, 1787), Koch and Peden, p. 411; To James Madison (Jan cf. to Col. Smith (November 13, 1787). "And what country
not warned

from time to time, that this

set them right as

people preserve
pardon and

the

Let them take

arms.

The remedy is to

to

facts,
must
"

them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty time to time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
P- 436.

pacify be refreshed from Koch

and

Peden,

48. 49. 50.

Stourzh,

pp. 34-37.

James Burgh, Political Disquisitions (London, 1774-75), Vol. Ill, p. 298. Algernon Sydney, Discourses Concerning Government, in The Works of Algernon
1772),
pp.

Sydney
p. 386.

(London,
51.

405,

124. ed.

Machiavelli, Discourses,

Bernard Crick (Baltimore: Pensuin Books, 1970), m.i,

346

Interpretation
the whole of Machiavelli's the
essential correctness of of republics chapter on resort

they
have

read seen

to first principles would

return

Hamilton's fear. For Machiavelli's

and

to the

to the terrible

beginning beginning
writes

involved terrible

striking

deaths, i.e.,
arose.

a return

out of which civil

society necessarily

return to

beginnings is the
Machiavelli

renewal of

the fear that characterizes the state of nature. As

in this
to

section:

[Some men]

used

say that it

was

necessary to
maintain

reconstitute

the government every five

the govern

years, otherwise it was difficult to

ment"

it;

where

by "reconstituting
with which

they
ior
and

them when

instilling they had instilled of it Provision has to be made against [misbehav instituting necessity corruption] by restoring that government to what it was at its
meant men with

that terror and

fear

origins.52

For Blackstone
rants undermine
ervation of against with

or

Hamilton, frequent

rebellions or rules

for overthrowing ty

the stability of government which is necessary for the very pres

admitted

liberty. While Blackstone

might

that extrajudicial, extralegal acts

authority Locke's position,

be legitimate
expressed

under certain of

circumstance, he took issue

in Sect. 149

The Second Treatise, that the

people

have the inherent

power to remove or alter the

legislature,

when

they find

the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.

But however just this conclusion may be in theory, we cannot adopt it, nor argue from it, under any dispensation of government at present actually existing. For this devolution of power to the people at large, includes in it a dissolution of the whole

form

of government established

by

that people; reduces all the members to their origi

nal state of

equality; and,

by

whatsoever once must

will

before

enacted. all

annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all positive law No human laws will therefore suppose a case, which at

destroy

law

and compel men to

build

afresh upon a new render all

foundation;
legal

nor

they

make provision

for

so

desperate

an

event, as must

provisions

ineffectual. The
ment supposition of law therefore is, that neither the king nor either house of parlia (collectively taken) is capable of doing any wrong; since in such cases the law itself incapable of furnishing any adequate remedy. For which reason all oppres
which

feels

sions,

may happen to spring from any branch any

stated

of

the sovereign power, must

nec

essarily be
new

out of the reach of

rule, or express

legal

provision:

but if

ever
upon

they unfortunately happen,

emergencies.53

the prudence of the times must provide new remedies

It

was

the "prudence of the

times"

which required
Revolution."

"new

remedies upon new

emergencies

during

the period of the

According
and

to Hamilton
a whole people

When the first

are

principles of civil

society
of

are

violated,

the rights of

invaded,

the common

forms

of municipal

law

are not to

be

regarded.

Men may
are

then

betake themselves to the law

nature; and, if

they but

conform their actions to

or

that standard, all cavils against

them,

betray

either

ignorance

dishonesty. There

52.
53.

Discourses

ill.

I,

p. 388.

Blackstone

1. 157, 237-38.

Alexander Hamilton
some events

on

Natural Rights
human laws

and

Prudence

347

in society, to force
and

which

cannot

extend; but when applied to them

lose

all

their

efficacy.54

But the

prudence of

the times also recognizes that extralegal but legitimate revo

what pretence

lution is

not

to be confused with mere violence, no matter under

erupt.

that violence

may The young

mature

Revolution is

not anarchy.

"radical"

Hamilton

was as much concerned about rash violence as as

"conservative"

the

Hamilton,

his

reaction to

the attack

on

the press

of

Tory

James Rivington in the previously

am

cited

letter to John

Jay

indicates:
press

Though I
and

fully
and

sensible

how dangerous

and pernicious

Rivington's
yet

has been,

how destestable the

character of the man

step.

is in every respect,

cannot

help

disapproving
In times up to
edge

condemning this is

of such commotion as the

present, while the passions of

men are worked

an uncommon pitch there

great who

danger

of

fatal

extremes.

The

same state of

passions which

fits the multitude, for disregard in the

I

have

not a sufficient stock of reason and and oppression,

knowl

to quiet them,

opposition to
of all

tyranny

to

contempt and

authority

In

such

very naturally leads them tempestuous times, it requires

and within proper

the greatest skill

political pilots to

keep

men

steady

bounds,
of

on which account
mere will and

am always more or without

less

alarmed at
authority.55

every thing

which

is done

pleasure,

any

proper

It is the

prudence of the time that teaches that authority and government are nec essary to the protection of those rights for which the revolution was fought. And here, Hamilton faces a particular problem, a problem that, as his letter to Jay

demonstrates,
cern

concerned

him

even

in his

"radical"

youth,

and which will con

him to the very end of his life. Reason teaches men the rights of
knowledge."

mankind.

But

everyone

has

not

the same
a pas

"stock

of reason and
"liberty."

Short-sighted,
passion can curbed

self-interested men

have

sionate attachment to

Such

be

made use of

in

opposition

to

tyranny

and

oppression, but if not

through the actions of true statesmen,

very principles of the Revolution, the principles of true lib erty. The passionate devotion to freedom, understood as merely the emancipa tion of desires is opposed to the reason and knowledge necessary to establish true
can undermine the

liberty. Reason

and

thority
and

and rules of

knowledge teach that it is necessary to establish a proper au law and government in order to protect the absolute rights of

individuals. But

men, driven
guide

by

passion and without a

"sufficient

stock of reason

knowledge to

them"

will recognize no principle passions are

to limit their

desires,

will recognize no
54. 55.

authority because the

in

principle

unlimited.56

Papers, Papers,

1.136.

1. 176-77.
1802):

56. produce
men.

To James A. Bayard (April [16-21],

results,

"Nothing is
projects,

more

fallacious than to
on

expect

to

any valuable or permanent Men are rather reasoning than

For
at

in

political

by

relying merely

the reason of

reasonable animals

for the
are

most part governed

by the

impulse

of

passion

the very

moment

[the Republicans]
are

eulogizing the

reason of men and pro

fessing

the appeal only to that

faculty, they
xxv.605.

courting the

strongest and most active passion of

the

human heart

Papers,

348
What

Interpretation
prudence

dictates is the
of

moderation of

the passionate
which

love

of

liberty,
call

without which

the love

liberty

will turn

into anarchy,

in turn may

forth tyranny as a necessary corrective. Prudence dictates that revolutionary pas since the minds of men sion be replaced by new "establishments and
courses,"

have been loosened from their

people,"

ancient ones.

What this

means

is that the "pilots

of

the
ward

those who do have reason and

knowledge,

must guide

the people to

the

establishment of proper which

rights for
Peace
a

the revolution

authority and government, in order that those was fought are protected and maintained.
The
object then will

made

a new scene opens.

be to

make our
a

independence
herculean task

blessing. To do this

we must secure our union on solid

foundations;

and to effect which mountains of prejudice must

be

levelled.57

We have
mains to
proves

now

happily
of

concluded the great work of

independence, but
flattering.
common

much re

be done to

reach the

fruits

of

it. Our

prospects are not

the

inefficacy

the present confederation, yet the

danger

Every day being re

.

we are receding instead of advancing in a disposition to amend its defects It is to be hoped that when prejudice and folly have run themselves out of breath we

moved,

may

return

to reason and correct our

was concerned

errors.58

Hamilton

that in the aftermath of the

Revolution, hostility

to

authority in

general

had emerged, arising from

and that

a passionate and not a reasoned

attachment to

liberty;

there

was a

tendency for

the new government to

succumb to the passions of citizens

the people, causing those governments to oppress the

government oppressed was

just

problem

as surely as the British for the "pilots of the on and

the Americans. The

of

people"

to attach citizens to a government

rights and

law, based
account

informed in

by

a concern

for

principle, but
of

taking into
people. gov

human

nature

such a

way

as

to moderate the passions

the

"It is

an axiom

that governments form manners, as

well as manners

form

ernments."59

According

to Hamilton the American governments were formed

of

by

the

democratic temper

the people passionately attached to liberty. Hamilton

wished

to have government form manners

rule of

passions, prejudices,

and

providing an antidote to the chaotic interests. This was to be done both by proper be the
was

by

force

and

by example.

This

example would

government's adherence to the

government which al

very principles upon which the Revolution lows its actions to be swayed by passion

based. A for its

provides no example to the people.

citizens.

Good

government

forms

a model of good conduct

Good
object of

government requires attachment to

authority,

which

in turn

attains

the

independence. That authority

and not

honorably
57.
58.

arbitrarily

or

be worthy of respect. It must act tyranically. "It will be shocking and indeed an
must

To John Laurens (August 15, 1782), Papers, in. 145. To John Jay (July 25, 1783), Papers, in. 416- 17. Second Letter from Phocion, Papers, m.553. Cf. Montesquieu, Sur les romains et de leur decadence. "Dans la naissance des societes, ce
qui causes sont

59.

de la

gran

deur des

les

chefs

des

font l'institution; et c'est ensuite l'institution CEuvres Completes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964), p. 436.
republiques qui

forme les

chefs

des

Alexander Hamilton
eternal reproach pendence

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

349 inde
ad re

to this country, if we

begin the

peaceable enjoyment of our

by

a violation of all

the principles of

honesty

policy."

and

true

By
just,
signals

hering
doom

to the rule of principle, a government

is

rendered moderate and

spectable and exemplary.

The failure

of good government

in America

the

of

the cause of

freedom

everywhere.

The

world

has its

eye upon

America. The

noble struggle we

have

made

in the

cause of of our

liberty, has
example

occasioned a penetrated

kind

of revolution

in human

sentiment. and

The influence
pointed the

has

the

inquiries,
But in
to

which

may

shake

gloomy it to its deepest foundation

regions of

despotism,
. .

has

way to

order

to provide an example to the rest of the world, "it remains for

us

justify

the revolution

by

its

fruits."

If the

outcome of

the experiment

in

self-

government proves such an

imitate."

that "we really have asserted the cause of human

example will

happiness,"

illustrious

be something that "the

world will

bless

and

But if experience, in this instance,

verified

the lesson
govern

long

taught

by

the enemies of

liberty;

that the bulk

of mankind are not

fit to

master, and were

despotism

over

only made for the rein and spur: liberty. The advocates of the latter With the

themselves, that they must have a we shall then see the final triumph of
must acknowledge

it to be

an

ignis

fatuus,

and abandon the pursuit.

greatest advantages

for promoting it,

nature.61

that

ever a people

had,

we shall

have betrayed the

nature not

cause of

human

That the
uated

cause of

human

be betrayed, human

nature must

be habit

to

certain

behavior

ernment or popular eration. must

away from certain tendencies. Otherwise self-gov government is not possible. Self-government requires mod
and

The

statesman needs to

do

more than

merely

establish

institutions. He
to
principle

teach
who

moderation.

By teaching

moderation and adherence

affairs,"

to

"those

have the direction

of public

the statesman establishes the

manners

necessary for

self-government.

'Tis

with governments as with

individuals, first impressions

Our
governments not of

lasting

bias to the

temper and character.

and early habits give a hitherto have no habits. of mankind, that

How important to the happiness

should acquire good ones.

America alone, but

they

If

we set out with

justice,

moderation,

liberality,

and a scrupulous regard to the

constitution, the

government will acquire a spirit and

tone,

productive and permanent

blessings to the

community.

If

on the contrary, the public councils are guided

by

humour, passion and prejudice; if from resentment to individuals, or a dread of partial inconveniences, the constitution is slighted or explained away upon every frivolous pretext, the future spirit of government will be feeble, distracted and arbitrary.
The
rights of the subject will

be the

sport of

settled rule of conduct,

but every thing

will

every party vicissitude. There will be fluctuate with the alternate prevelancy

no
of

contending

factions.62

60. To George Clinton 62. Papers,

(May

14, 1783).

Papers,
ni.557-

ill. 355.

61. Second Letter from Phocion, Papers,

in. 556-57.

350
There

Interpretation

is,

"paternalism"

of

course,

a certain
responsibilities

in Hamilton's

attempt

to educate

the Americans to their

cognizance of
knowledge"

in

self-government.

the fact that everyone does not

order

But this merely takes have the same "stock of reason and
the

in

to seek "the real

upon

commun

welfare of

The

welfare of

the community depends

of

the

establishment of good

law

and

the attachment
and

the citizens to the

law,

and

those motivated the law.

by

passion,

humour,

interest

alone cannot

be properly

attached to

Men passionately attached to liberty must be est lies in developing habits of law-abidingness.
act on

made

to see that their true inter

must

They
in

be

shown

that if

they

the basis
of

of

"political

expedience,"

which

practice amounts

to acting on
law."

the basis

passion,

manifested

in

good

humour, and interest, rather than on the basis of principle as law, they put themselves "out of protection of They
scepter

in

effect
.

"transfer the

from the hands

of government

to those
.

of

individu

als

[T]hey

arm one part of

the community
all

against another

[and thereby]

war."

enact a civil

They

"undermine

those rules,
convent

by

which

individuals

can

know their duties

The

and

their rights, and

laws."63

the government into a gov

ernment of will not of gratification of

momentary
to

passions through whimsical and

tions which

ignores principles,
well return

while

arbitrary ac it may be in the immediate interests of the

people, may

haunt them.

Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to grat ify momentary passions, by letting into the government, principles and precedents
which afterwards prove

fatal to

themselves.64

By teaching
which made

people that their

true self-interest

lay

in

developing
for

a character good

them

law-abiding

and which engendered an affection

laws,

Hamilton tried to

make self-government possible.

The

passionate attachment to

liberty which

characterized the

Revolution

was appropriate

to the struggle/or lib

erty but was not appropriate to the establishment and maintenance of true liberty. The role of the statesman and the policy dictated by the "prudence of the
was

times"

to moderate the passionate

love

of

liberty

so

that the

blessings

of

liberty

may

be

obtained.

If

such moderation should not

take place, if violent government as

of

the arbitrary means to

the norm, the
ment

fulfilling
would

the passions
great

unreasoning

men should

become

danger

be

that such "a the

may disgust the best citizens,

and make

disorderly body of the people tired of their

or violent govern
what shall we

independence."65

Were the
our

people of

America,
either

with one

voice, to ask,

do to

perpetuate and you

not

liberties

and secure our

happiness? The

answer would

be "govern

well"

have nothing to fear

from internal disaffection

or external

hostility. Abuse
or

the power you possess, and

you need never apprehend

its diminution

loss. But if

63. Papers, m.556, 551. 64. Papers, in. 485-86. 65. Papers,
111.494.

Alexander Hamilton

on

Natural Rights

and

Prudence

35 1

you make a wanton use of

it, if you furnish

many
as well as

another

example, that despotism may de

you

base the
the

government of the

the

few,

like

all others that

have

acted

same

part,

will experience

that licentiousness is the fore-runner to

slavery.66

It
the

should now

be

clear

that Hamilton in no way abandoned his principles. But

mere assertion of when

those principles does not secure them.

They
must

must

be fought

for

threatened

by tyranny

and

oppression,

and

they

be

protected

by

civil authority.

The

passions released

in the fight for

one's rights can

in the

end

destroy those rights, because of passionate hostility to authority on the one hand, and the use of authority by mobs to destroy rights on the other. Passionate men must be attached to good laws. They must be taught that their true interest lies in law-abidingness, that the constitution is the implementation
of

those principles
political

for

which men

fought the Revolution, that the

precedents that will

recourse to vio render all

lent

expedience, introduces

eventually

men unsafe

in their liberty.
political career

Hamilton's
havior. His
the

was, for the most part,

a model of prudential

be
of

aim was

to establish a government that implemented the principles

make use of

Revolution, but he had to That character was not always

same stock of reason and ernment could ensure acter of

the

character of

the people to do it.

suited to the times, because not everyone had the knowledge. Hamilton realized that only a central gov

the

enjoyment of

the fruits of the

Revolution, but

the char

hostile to authority, particularly centralized au thority. Hamilton had to do what he could to make all authority as decent and
people was

the American

effective as

he could,

while at

the same time working to establish the necessary above,

central government. and

Thus,

as shown

during

the period of the Revolution

state governments or the

its aftermath, Hamilton publicly praised extant political authority, either the Congress and Articles of Confederation, in order to en
in the people, i.e.
private
,

courage a certain character

affection

for

a rule of

conduct,

and
of

law-abidingness;
the

while

in

he
the

expressed concern over people

the

inadequacy
authority

Articles

and

the

attachment of

to state rather than the national gov

ernment.

This is

not

hypocrisy, but

prudence.

His

praise of extant

was

done for the But

The

purpose of

establishing the conditions necessary for the ultimate

constitution.

adoption of the

improved

even the establishment of constitution

the the

national government and requirement

the adoption of the

statesmanship.

Federal

did

not end

for Hamilton's Those

character of

the

new government was still unformed. and who remembered

who could make

use of the

institutions available,
men

that governments, once

formed

by

then

form the

character of

their citizens, would now those principles

be

able

to

ensure the

implementation
was

and perpetuation of

for

which

the

Revolution

fought.

66. Papers,

in. 495.

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Autonomous

Morality

and

the Idea of the Noble

Peter Simpson
Catholic University

INTRODUCTION

refer

to autonomous morality in my title, and

of moral

what

I principally

mean

by

the

term

is that tradition

theorizing

that

wants

to separate off

moral values

thinking from other forms of thinking, such as thinking about natural and to set it in a realm of its own where it operates according to its own objects, internal logic without having any foundation in anything outside itself. In this
and moral sense

morality is

autonomous

because it has its

reference
'is'

own

independent

sphere.

This

autonomy is

often expressed
'ought'

by
the

to the is/ought distinction.

'ought'

Morality is
is not, for
'ought'

the realm of the

not

and

this

is

sui generis and

instance, like
rests

the prudential or hypothetical 'ought'. For the prudential

on

for its force

and
'ought'

the facts about the contingent desires and interests people to do if one is to satisfy
and

have,
moral

just tells has

a

one what one ought

them; but the

force

peculiar

to

itself,

is

somehow uncontaminated

by

calculations of selfish advantage.

cal'

Unless

one recognizes

this

peculiar

'categori
of moral

character of

morality, it is said, one has failed to grasp the idea

thinking
or

at

all.1

Another way
that

of

stating the

same

thinking

about what one ought

idea is to say that morality is nonnaturalist, to do and what counts as morally good is

different from thinking about how things are or about the true and false. In this sense it is said that moral thinking is volitional rather than cognitive, for it is
quite not constituted acts of

by knowing certain facts,

The
existence of

but

rather

will,

or acts of choice

that are spontaneous and not elicited

by the performance of certain by any prior

sphere

acts of thought.

morality

as an

independent

is thus

un

derstood

as

ous acts of senses of

arising from the fact that it is constituted by independent, spontane will. As both senses of independence used here are to be counted as
autonomous

autonomy, the

morality

of

my title

must

be taken to

em

brace both.
An
earlier version of this article was read

to the Irish Philosophical

Society

at

its

conference

in

Cork, March
that followed.
1.

1984.

am grateful

to the

other participants

for the stimulating

and

helpful discussion

Having a Point", in Hudson, The Is/Ought Ques Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Macmillan, London, 1970), pp. 274-75 (though see also pp. 276-81); the very interesting article of Duff, "Desire, Duty in Philosophy, 55, 1980, pp. 223-38; Foot, Virtues and Vices (Blackwell, and Moral
E.g. Phillips
and

Mounce. "On Morality's

p.

tion

(Macmillan, London, 1969),

Absolutes,"

233;

Oxford,
1948),

1878),

essays 11 and

12;

p. 22;

Crombie, An

Examination of Plato's Doctrines

1981), p. 131.

Paton, The Moral Law (Hutchinson University Library, London, (RKP, London, 1962), vol. I, p. 275;

Maclntyre, After Virtue (Duckworth, London

354 The
of

Interpretation
claim

that morality is autonomous is

often

looked

upon as

the guarantee

its

peculiar and

collapsed

distinctive character, without which it into something quite different. But one may also

would get reduced or

and

equally look
realm of

upon

it

as

the claim that there is a

divorce,

or a

severing, between the

knowl
the

edge and nature on other.

the one hand and the

exponent of

realm of will and moral values on

At least the finest

the autonomy of morality,

it like this, as he made starkly evident It is, in fact, this theme of the autonomy
or split

Kant, looked on in the introduction to his Third Critique.

of

morality

as

constituting

divorce

in human
of

existence

that I want to examine in this

article.

Considering the

influence fluence
serves

the ideas of autonomous morality today, and even more so the in Kant in contemporary moral philosophy, it is a theme that perhaps de more attention than it is usually If I choose to approach it from the
of
given.2

vantage of

history, it is

not

because I think
of

a philosophical position can

be

ex

its origins, but because in many cases, and espe in this the internal logic of a philosophical position can become case, cially clearer if seen in its process of growth. The precise bearing and significance of
plained or refuted

in terms

different
be better

elements seen

in

a united

if observed

turns to the whole, one

one's notice.

they still have in that whole, may it in their beginnings. In this way, when one re may be able to discern in it what before had escaped
whole, and which
outside

My
deal first

principal object of concern

in

what

follows
not

will

be Kant (though I

will

with several others as well).

regard

him

just

as the

finest but
day.3

also the

exponent of

the idea

of autonomous

morality, and as the one who is respon

sible, if anyone

is, for

the persistence of that idea in our own

My

remarks

be exhaustive, either with respect to history or with respect to the philosophy of Kant. I hope, nevertheless, that they will be pertinent and
will of course not

provocative.

THE

REALISM'

OF MACHIAVELLI

In tracing any historical development one is always faced with the problem of how far back to go. Wherever one stops it will always be possible to continue

further, for no historical beginning is absolutely

beginning
as

Big

Bang).
in

pose.

Obviously My purpose can suitably begin

advance

one needs to go

back

as

far

is

required

(except possibly the for one's pur

choice

where the

with Machiavelli. I cannot really justify this because the justification is precisely the ensuing argument importance of Machiavelli for my theme will become clear. I can,

2. E.g. Hare, Freedom and Reason (O UP, Oxford, 1963), pp. 34, 219; Moral Thinking (Claren don, Oxford, 1981), pp. 4, 9-11; Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, Oxford 1972), pp. viii, 256; Foot, op. cit, pp. I57flf. 3. Cf. Von Wright, Varieties of Goodness (RKP, London, 1963), p. 1.

Autonomous

Morality
as

and the

Idea of the Noble

355

nevertheless, appeal to the

fact

that Machiavelli
one of the chief

ing

something original;

being

is widely regarded as initiat founders of modern forms of

thought.4

Since

autonomous

doctrine

(nothing

like it

exists

morality as I have described it is a typically modern in ancient moral thought which is far more holistic
would not

and naturalist
velli.5

in character), it
of

be surprising if it has
about

roots

in Machia

There

has,

course, been
of

much

debate

the novelty

of

Machiavelli,

and

I have jection
man

no

intention here

entering this

debate.6

will note one particular ele purposes.

ment of

his thinking

which

is especially
which

relevant

for my

This is his
good

re

of

the ancient idea that there is

by

nature a supreme or

highest

for

(namely human

perfection),

is discoverable

by

reason and which

de

life. This, one may say, was the and in chapter 15 of The thought, very Prince Machiavelli gives what is effectively his dismissal of it. Declaring his in of tention to write something "useful", and separating himself from the
termines the character and structure of the good
substance of ancient moral and political
"orders"

others, he
tion of

matter,"

was

going to

go to the

"effectual truth

of

the

not the
of

"imagina

it."

dition,
seen,
velli's

He accordingly mounted an attack those who "imagined republics and known to be in

or
truth."

on

the thinkers

the previous tra

never

princedoms that
what

have

been

or

It is in this that is found

to indulge in

shall call

Machia

'realism', instead

his

refusal

speculations

about, and

construc

tions of, the

sistence

best regime,
on

such as were usual

about on

in the

classical

writers, and

his in

speaking

the world of actual realities, and to men

world.

whose concern was with

getting

in that

The effort,

by

the imaginative

construction of

the best regime, to

see as

far

as possible what political order will

best

realize man's

highest good,

and

the attempt to
as

live

by

the virtues relative to

that good,

is

rejected

by

Machiavelli
a

both

useless and ruinous.

Machiavelli's
orientation

work

may have
to

for he

wants not

speculate

confessedly practical rather than theoretical yet his practical but to get results
"Nature,"

teaching is
that

given a theoretical can

basis.

he writes, "has from

created men

in

way they "human appetites

to

desire everything but are insatiable, because

and

everything";7

cannot obtain

and again:

having
power

nature the power and wish

desire everything,
4.

from fortune the

to obtain

few

of

them, there

re-

Machiavelli"; Skinner, The

vol.

E.g. Berlin, Against the Current (Hogarth Press, London 1979), essay on "The Originality of Foundations of Modern Political Thought (CUP, Cambridge, 1978),
pp.

1,

180-86;

Procacci,

Machiavelli: II Principe
"ought'

Discorsi (Feltrinelli,

Milan,

1979),

Intro.,

p. xcii.
was argued in a famous article by Anscombe, The novelty of the modern autonomous "Modem Moral Philosophy", in Hudson, The Is/Ought Question, pp. I75~95 (it originally appeared in Philosophy. 33. 1958). The thesis has been recently and more elaborately re-argued by Maclntyre,

5.

op. cit.

While 1
1953).

agree with some of the and owe more

things especially that Maclntyre says, my own views are

somewhat

different

to the writings of Leo Strauss (e.g. Natural Right and

History,

Chicago,
7.

6. For

a summary of the varying views, see the essay by Berlin, note Discourses: Bk. I ch. 37; all translations, whether of Machiavelli
,

4.
or

others, are my own.

356
suits are

Interpretation
in human minds, and For Machiavelli men's desires turn
an

continually

ill

content

disgust
to

with

the things that

and

possessed".8

out

be both insatiable

self-interested.

Men's
sees

good

is their

private

good, their

private pleasure and ad

vantage.

As he

it,

men are

directed

by nature only to the objects of their con

of a

tingent and self-regarding passions, and to all of them equally, not to one more than another. There can
one that

be

no sense

in speaking
possessor.

highest among these, lot is

such

or of

will complete and

satisfy the

Moreover because these

never and

passions are

infinite but

man's

that he can

satisfy them,

the natural human condition

world

is

understood as one of

misery

frustration. The

is hostile to
'realist'

man and opposed

to his natural urges.

cruel and

Machiavelli, in fact,
vicious

speaks almost as

if

nature

had been

deliberately

to

man.

passions set greater or

vision is of man as a creature of selfish At any rate his in a hostile world where he is forever condemned to frustration in

lesser degree. between this

vision of man and

The

contrast

the ancient

vision could

hardly be

greater.

It

is, therefore,
aspects to

of some

importance to fix the

precise sense and character

of

the difference. The traditional idea of a

supreme end

for

have two
nothing

desirable;9

it: (i) it is the fully satisfying object of (ii) it is an ordered hierarchy responding to the
Man is
a

may be said to desire that excludes

man

objective

hier

archy

of

human

nature.

being

made
of

up

of parts and

these parts are

rightly

ordered when subject to

the discipline

reason, and

when

they

preserve

and assist

the activity of reason (in art, science, philosophy, etc.). It is not the
whatever one

case, therefore, that

desire
sires

will

be

satisfied

by

may subjectively and contingently happen to the supreme good, for it may be that some of these de

lack the necessary subordination to reason. Attaining the supreme good in volves not just the satisfaction of desire, but also the disciplining and control of

desire,
be the
with

so

that it does not

exceed

the

rational state

measure; but this in fact

proves

to

most

desirable

and

fully

satisfying
nature.10

because it is the

state that accords

the objective condition of

good

The

most noble

life may thus be the or excellent life. The

context of

objectively satisfying life; but it is also the noble is understood as the highest and most ele
most

vated,

and

in the

human life, high

of

and elevated mean

the most

com

plete and advanced

development
of

soul,

where

life is lived to its fullest

and most

intense. As this development

oneself of
must

soul, or perfection, is precisely the realizing in

the
at

hierarchy

of one's

being, it follows
case, be the
what man

that the good and satisfied life

also,

least in the
of nature

ultimate

noble and

beautiful life. Such

life

is the intention

itself: this is

is naturally directed towards. In

8. Ibid.: Bk. 2, Preface. E.g. Boethius. De Consolatione Philosophiae, ill, I2l5bi8; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q. 1, a. 5.
9. 10.

prose

2;

Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics,

and of

ticles

on

This is certainly the thrust of Plato's and Aristotle's happiness, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, qq. 1-5.

ethical

thought,

Aquinas in his

ar

Autonomous

Morality

and the

Idea of the Noble

rational rather

357
self-control,
one

becoming good
not oppose or

and

noble, in achieving virtue and

does

thwart one's natural

inclinations but
is the

follows them.
no natural

For Machiavelli,

however,

the

reverse

case.

Man has

inclina

tion to virtue or nobility;

ruled

he is just

by

whatever

desires he happens to have in the

by nature a creature of multitudinous passions, and moved by nothing but the

rather

restless urge

to satisfy them. There might still be here a notion (implicit

sense of complete satisfaction of not

than explicit) of a supreme good

desire

(though this

satisfaction remains out of no

reach), but

in the

sense of an ordered

hierarchy. There is

longer any

natural and unnatural restraint on ral.

the

desires, or latter; instead all desires

in Machiavelli to distinguish among to impose, in the name of nature, discipline and

attempt
whatever are regarded as

equally

natu
of

By

thus retaining the idea of complete satisfaction and rejecting the idea the idea of complete satisfaction of one's

order and

yearning for it
and a
cruel.11

hierarchy, being and one's become, instead of something ennobling and elevating, a curse burden; and man's world, instead of friendly and beneficent, hostile and
cease

Man's desires thus

to be a guide to follow and become

rather a problem

to overcome. These desires are the cause both of happiness

and

misery; happi

if they ble but one

ness

satisfied, misery if they are not. Complete happiness is impossi can at least contrive to get what one can. In Machiavelli's case this
are of the

takes the

form

devious

and unscrupulous techniques of able

his

political science

whereby the himself the

artful prince

is

to conquer and subdue

other men and win

for

pleasures of
of

lasting

rule and glory.

There were, however,

other an

swers, notably that

Hobbes.
man

Hobbes

presents

the Machiavellian picture of

in his

some ways more effec more

tively

even

than Machiavelli himself. To

no such finis ultimus

quote one of
nor summum

striking

passages:
as

There is

(utmost aim)

bonum (greatest good)

can a man

is

spoken of whose

in the books

of the old moral philosophers.

Nor

any

more

live

desires is

are at an end

than

he

whose senses and

imaginations

are at a stand.

Felicity
the
man's

a continual progress of the

desire from
the

one object to another, the

cause whereof of

former

being

still

but the way to

once
desire.12

later. The for

one

attaining of is that the object of

assure

desire is

not

to enjoy

only

and

instant

time, but to

forever

the way of

his future
quest

This insatiable
that in

for is
a

satisfactions

has the inevitable result, in

desire just

Hobbes'

view,

all men there

"perpetual

and restless

of power after power that

ceaseth

only in

death;"

for

what men want

future.13

is

not

satisfaction now

but

an abil
con-

ity
his

to secure satisfaction for the

1 1
.

This necessarily brings

infinite
character of

men

into

Aristotle

was as aware as

Machiavelli
unlike most

of the

the passions; but because

of a measure on

of

notion of

hierarchy, he holds,
ch. 1

passions 12.

is

natural and

Leviathan,
Ibid.

ultimately 1; I have

Machiavelli, that reason's imposition satisfying, cf. Politics, I257b24-8ai4.

spelling
and punctuation

the

changed

to

bring them more

into line

with

current conventions.

13.

358

Interpretation

flict,

since

they

of each other.

competing for limited goods and so striving to From this results the "war of everyman against
are
satisfied or

get

the

better

everyman"

where,

far from

being

secure, each is in

continual

fear

of violent

death.
the

This

picture

is

quite parallel

to Machiavelli's, but Hobbes has

and

not acquired

same reputation seek. and

for

'wickedness'

'evil arts'. The reason, I

think, is

not

far to

While Machiavelli leaves the

counsels

unredeemed condition of man unredeemed

merely ingenious way

how to

exploit

it to

one's own

advantage, Hobbes in

a quite

endeavours

by finding
stitute

a substitute

to refound morality on its basis. He does this in for the traditional idea of a highest end; only
condition

effect
sub

Hobbes'

is

rather a

necessary assuring

than a supreme

end.

In the

state of war of

everyman against at

everyman, since no one

satisfactions

all, let

alone of

pensable

thing for everyone is

to replace

can be sure of getting any satisfaction for the future, the one absolutely indis it with a state of peace. Peace is the uni

versal and and

necessary condition for the attainment of any satisfaction whatever, hence for the attainment and safe enjoyment of anything that the individual

can call good. sort of

Whatever, therefore, is necessary for

and satisfied
whose sole

decent

"natural

laws",

peace is necessary for any life. Hobbes accordingly constructs a set of rules or purpose is to secure peace; they are, as he calls them,

"convenient
rules of

articles of

peace".14

They

are also at

the same time the normative this universal condition of

Hobbes'

moral

theory. That

is why I

call

peace a substitute understood so

for the

ancient vision of a supreme end. reference

moral

For

as the ancients

the moral

by

to the highest

good of

human perfection,
condition of

Hobbes
Hobbes'

understands

the

by

reference to the

necessary

peace.15

theory may be ingenious but the morality that results has a certain feature that, for my present theme, deserves particular notice. It creates a two fold split or divorce. First of all there is a divorce that it creates between the
moral

life

and the satisfied

life.

Morality consists
sake of

in the

rules of

peace,

and these

rules consist

in giving up, for the

satisfying

some of one's

passions, the

pursuit of the satisfaction of all of

try to satisfy all is to achieve but the war of everyman against nothing everyman, and that in turn is to achieve nothing but the frustration of all one's passions. One has, therefore, a choice be
tween

them. For to

satisfying some passions or none; one certainly cannot satisfy all. But just as there is this divorce between the moral life and the fully satisfied life, so there is a divorce beween the moral life and the natural life. nature
man pursues

the satisfaction of
as a

all passions whatever, without

By distinction,

and

restraint, back in short along frustrate it; for even if the frustration is partial and is justified in the name of satisfaction, it is still frustration and a frustration that one cannot entirely avoid. This is implicitly admitted by Hobbes, but it has taken a modern Hobbesian, G. J.

morality

comes

check,

on

nature, to hold it

to

Warnock,
14. 15.

who
ch.

consciously

constructs

his morality

on

the

Hobbesian model,

to

Ibid.,

13.

Ibid.,

ch. I5,adfinem.

Autonomous
point out

Morality

and

the Idea of the Noble

since

359
re

that such a morality

it involves the frustration indeed the involves

also the

pression, not the

continuous

fulfillment, of nature psychological damage, or

requirements of

likelihood

a general psychic

malaise.16

rate quite clear

that Hobbesian morality generates a split or

causing It is at any divorce in the struc

of

ture of

human life: the

morality

and those of satisfaction and na

ture are

in insoluble

conflict.

If in elaborating ers one divorce it

elaborating
a

one of the strands of

creates within strand of

Machiavellian

'realism'

Hobbes

uncov

human existence, Bacon

and

Descartes, by
pic

further

it,

uncover another.

Along with

Machiavelli's

ture of man as a collection of unordered passions went also, as

has already been

personal

briefly
and

mentioned, a picture of

knowledge

as a

technique of mastery for

advantage.

To

control

the insatiable beast that is man one needs skill and

force,
of the

his understanding passions of men, and much more on his understanding of how to control The Machiavellian prince is a man who knows how to manipulate men,
Machiavelli
prided on on
exploit

himself

his knowledge,

them.17

and

to

their passions to his own advantage; he is a man endowed

with a superior

technique.
quer

The

man of

knowledge in this
is known.

sense

is

a man who

knows how to is

con

human

nature and

human affairs; knowledge, in

other words,

power and

for the

conquest of what confined

Machiavelli
picked

his knowledge to

control

of

man, but

Bacon,

who

up Machiavelli's idea of knowledge as conquest, thought it could and should be applied to the conquest of nonhuman things as well, so that they could be exploited for human advantage. It seemed to Bacon, who at least for this life
accepted

Machiavelli's

picture of

man,18

that even

if

one could not secure entire one

satisfaction,

one could achieve a

lot

more of

it than Machiavelli thought, for

could overcome

the

hostility
the

of external nature

by

the conquest of technological

advantage and satisfac

science,
tion.

and so exploit

nonhuman

things for

human
of

Bacon, in fact,

seeing but

the advantage of

implicitly having

accused

Machiavelli

being

one-sided, of

not

knowledge in both areas,

and of thus

failing

to

see that one could control man not

also

just

by

the direct use of

force

and

trickery,19

by

the invention of "new arts, endowments, and commodities towards

20

life"

man's vellian

If Hobbesian morality was one alternative answer to the Machia problem of how to deal with man's insatiable passions, Baconian science What Machiavelli thought to
secure

was another.

by

ruthless

politics, Bacon

hoped to fictional

secure

by

technological science.

His

vision of

the New Atlantis

is

representation of

just that hope.

science, which was invented precisely
cf. also

Bacon's
16.

new method of

for this

pur-

Right

and

17.
18.

The Object of Morality (Methuen, London, 1971), pp. 161-62; 10719. Wrong (Penguin, 1977). pp. See the dedicatory epistles of The Prince and Discourses.

Mackie, Inventing

in. pp. 301-302, 4l9ff.; Great

19. 20.

Advancement, in Works, ed. Spedding, Ellis and Heath (Longman, London, 1857-74), Instauration, Preface, Works, vol. I, pp. 125-33.
Advancement, bk. 1; in Works: Advancement, bk. 1, in Works:
vol.

vol.

m, m,

pp. 244-45. pp. 301-302.

vol.

360
pose21

Interpretation
purpose which still

predominately animates the pursuit of technologi cal science to this day), has however precisely the same consequence for human new morality had for human acting namely a split or di knowing as
Hobbes'

(a

vorce of man

from

nature.

Previous

or traditional science set

had, in Bacon's

view,
and

failed to find the

proper method.

It had
and

too much store

use

by the

"immediate

senses,"

natural perceptions of

the
a

had tried to

these to get to the realities

senses are

of things.

But this is

hopeless
can

procedure

because the

too gross to

judge

nature

directly; they
nature.

they
port

can report

the truth about experiments

only judge it by means of artificial aids; that is, but it is the experiments that must re
science

the truth about

For Bacon's

is

a mechanical and materialist

science; the world is just bodies and efficient causes, operating without reference to ends, that is without any inherent teleology. The world is just a collection of
goalless
facts.22

It

is, indeed, only

reduced

on

the basis of such a vision of things that a

technological science seems best able to operate, for such a science that the natural be
to calculable rules, so that artificial

first

requires
can

devices

be

built

with

the necessary

mathematical and mechanical precision

to embody and

exploit

them;

and second

it

requires that

things be understood as no more di

rected to one
wills.

thing

than another, so that man

is free to

use

them exactly as he

Now Bacon took this

real,
and

picture of nature postulated

by

science as

objectively

hence he thought that

and not

by

the

knowledge

revealed

by

artificial experi

ments

alone,

by

the knowledge of the unaided senses, could a legitimate

mind and
things.23

familiarity
nature

be

restored

between the

But it is

at once evident

that this restoration

by

means of an artificial method

is only
as

required no

because
access

by
to

the mind and things are divorced. Man

has,

such,

direct

the nature of

things,

and though mechanical aids enable

him in

part

to overcome

this, he only
remains nature.

ever gets

indirect access; the

original

divorce is

never abolished.

It

the case that the mind and the senses are not

by

nature

fitted to know

This divorce is
great

even more evident

in the
also,

founders

of modern

science,

who

Descartes, like Bacon, saw in it

case of
of

another of the a means of the

use of

conquest of nature

for human

advantage.24

His famous 'doubt', his

skep

ticism to reject the natural and ordinary operations

the mind and the senses,

has,

as

yond

its result, and indeed intended result, the setting of the world of things be human access behind a screen of or inner mental entities, which are
'ideas'

always the

direct

and proper object of

knowledge. In his view,

and external

one

only

ever

knows the
21.

contents of one's own

consciousness,

things only to the

Distri

bution
22.

of the

Advancement, bk. i, in Works, vol. Ill, pp. Work, in Works, vol. 1, pp. 125-45.
Novum Works:

294-95; Great

Instauration, Preface

and

Organum,
and vol.

11,

sect.

2,

stauration,
23. 24.

Preface

Distribution
121, 138;

of the

1,

pp.

Advancement, bk. 2, in Works, vol. ill, pp. 357-59; Great In Work, in Works, vol. I, pp. 121, 138. Novum Organum: Preface, and I sect. 50.

Discourse: Part VI.

Autonomous
extent world

Morality
ends

and

the Idea of the

Noble

361
picture of the real
of

that

God

guarantees one's

ideas

are

like them. The

Descartes

up

with

is

one of pure mathematical

extensions, devoid

all sensible

properties; something, in other words, both

typically

scientific and at

the same time quite

senses.

foreign to

what we are

familiar

with

through the unaided

This

new vision of science and of

the world and man's place in it two

is

marked al

ready in Bacon and despair. The

and

Descartes is

by
more

opposing

characteristics
what

confidence

confidence

noticeable, for it is

they both
passions.

stress,

namely their belief in the almost unlimited power

of man

to conquer nature

for

his

own

advantage, that is for the

goes

increasing

satisfaction of

his

But the

despair

hand in hand

with

this, for it is nothing

other than the

divorce be

tween mind and things on which the new method of science was

founded. Man

may be
of

able to conquer

the world for his own use, but the real nature or essence
cut off

that world

is forever

screen of more or

less delusive
For the

from the direct grasp sensible images.

of

the human mind behind a

We have

long

grown accustomed to call this epistemological

despair

by

another

name, the

name of epistemology. modern

task,

as this exists

in its typically

confining the human mind within nar rower bounds than had traditionally been allowed by laying down for it its legiti mate sphere of competence. It seemed very clear at the time, indeed, that if this
was outset that of
was not

form,

from the

done the
no

mind would

fly

off

in

all

directions into

areas where

it had

and

could

have

knowledge,

ignorance
gerly

and useless

and consequently where it disputing. The condition of the evidence of

could produce

nothing but

schools of the

day

was ea

seized upon as

furnishing just the

for this fact. Not surprisingly it

pretended to

soon came to

be believed that the first task

any philosophy that

precisely to determine the scope and competence of the hu man mind, and so to impose on it the necessary ascetic discipline and restraint that the previous scholastic tradition of philosophy had signally ignored. This be
systematic rigor, was

comes quite explicit

and

in

Locke,25

and

from him it

passes over

into Hume, Kant,

with

latterly, A. J.
this

Ayer.26

Taking

divorce from in the

nature

in the

sphere of

knowledge together

the

divorce from

nature

sphere of morals

traced earlier, one evidently

what

has in
gen

the tradition of
eral

realism

descended from Machiavelli

may be

called

in

the philosophy of divorce. In

fact,

such a

Kantian critique, for it is,

as was suggested

is exactly applicable to the in the introduction and as I shall now

title

try

to

show more at

length, in Kant's

critical

most

ingenious

and systematic elaboration of

philosophy that one gets perhaps the just this theme. One also gets in
significant answer

this philosophy another, and for my purposes, quite

chiavellian problem that
25. 26.

to the

Ma

had

exercised

Bacon
ch.

and

Hobbes.

Essay
One
is

on

Human Understanding, bk. I,

I,

sect. 7.

tempted to suggest, in the light of this, that whereas the ancient tradition was severe as

regards the passions

but indulgent

as regards speculative

thought, the

modem

Machiavellian tradition
passions.

is the

reverse

severe as regards speculative

thought and indulgent as regards the

362

Interpretation

KANTIAN AUTONOMOUS MORALITY

Following Bacon
ject
of our

and

Descartes, Kant holds

is
not real

that the direct and

immediate

ob

knowledge

and experience

tities in our own minds. He goes

with

further, however,

externally existing things but en than Descartes in asserting, is

always

the British empiricists, that the content of our experience

purely

sensible and that we never

sensible properties.

know anything

except what

is in

some

way

a matter of

He denies, however, that the

patterns of

tion that give this sensible content coherence and meaning

unity or combina derive from experi

ence; on the contrary

they

are

imposed

on sensible experience

by

the mind itself

in the

act of

patterns of

unity,

knowing. For the mind, according to Kant, is endowed with these or categories as he calls them, a priori, that is, it possesses its
structure.

them already as part of

perience

Consequently,

whenever

the mind thinks ex

it

must of

necessity think it according to these

categories.

Knowledge is

thus, for Kant,

dures

a matter of

patterns given prior

subsuming sensible or empirical data under laws or to that data. He expressly models himself here on the proce

Newton,27

the

by people like Copernicus, Galileo and for, like many in his own day and since, he was deeply impressed by success of modern science and became convinced that it had the key to
of modern science as practiced
general.28

knowledge in
were part of

But if the

actual procedures of

contemporary
confined

science
empir

his inspiration

here,
and

the major

influence
on

was

undoubtedly the

icism
edge

of

Hume.

Following

to

ideas

and

elaborating impressions (immediate level

of

Locke, Hume had

and

knowl in

sense experiences and their copies

imagination)

grasped at the

sensation;

he showed,

with

fair success,

that in such a gutted experience there is nothing universal or necessary. Kant ac cepted that Hume was right about what experience in itself is like but because he
recognized that

there was

no science without of

the universal and the necessary,

was

and

because he
source of

accepted

the reality

science, he

driven to look for

another

these properties, and

found it in the

mind.

One

of the

immediate

consequences of
of

we can never

have knowledge

Kant's epistemology is the claim that anything but what can be given in sensible

form,

purely quantitative, in mathematics, or sensuous as well, in the nat There is no such thing as genuine metaphysical knowledge, that is knowledge of the being as being of things. In complete consistency with the tra
either
ural sciences.

dition

of epistemological

despair that he

was

consciously following, Kant wholly

rejected

the speculative metaphysics that is so marked in the older thinkers. In

his

view we can

selves

only know appearances; the real being that things have in them is forever hidden from us. This leads him to distinguish two worlds: the

phenomenal world, the world of appearances that we

know,

and

the

noumenal

world, the
27. 28.

world of realities

that we do not know.

First

Critique,

b,

pp. xiv-xxii. p.

First Critique, B,

xvi; and also the conclusion to the Second Critique.

Autonomous
The

Morality

and

the Idea of the Noble

natural world as

363

phenomenal world

is the

ence, and
erned more

it has the features

attributed to
and

it

by

contemporary sci Bacon, for it is materialist, gov

described

by

lacks any objective teleology. But, and this is necessity by important for present purposes, the description Kant gives of man insofar
mechanical part of

as

he too is

the

natural or phenomenal

world, proves to be
and

no other

than

the description given

previously

by

Machiavelli purely

Hobbes;

man

is just

a crea

ture of passions, and these passions are

selfish and

lack any

natural order

ing

themselves.29

among If Kant had been forced

and

by

reflection on

the character of science, namely its

empirical

universality
world of

necessity, to add something from the mind to the

so

Hume,

he

was

forced
to the

by reflection on the character of morality to add

Machiavelli
and

something from the

mind

selfish world of

Hobbes. In the

first

case

this addition took the form of the a priori categories or patterns of unity;

in the

second case

it took the form

at

of

autonomy

and the categorical

particular seem

imperative.

When Kant looked

morality, three things in

to have struck

him

as characteristic of

it. First,

moral

judgements have

a special claim or au

thority
wants

that applies

that,

independently following Machiavelli

made

of one's actual and contingent wants and

(the only

Hobbes, Kant felt

satisfy

one

had

as

natural).

If morality is

to depend on such wants, one ought only to

something behave
and

as

the
one

moral

judgement

requires

if

one will
wants

some want
no

in the process;
longer

if

has

no such

want, or one's
'ought'

change, then one

ought to

do

it. But the

not

sense of

used one's

vary

with

the state of

in morality is not hypothetical like this. It does inclinations, but rather stands independently of

even in opposition to them; it is, as he says, in some sense 'categorical'. Second, morality is something elevated and sublime, but if one subordinates it to particular inclinations, which are all selfish, one will make of it something low and base, and destroy all its peculiar worth. Third, morality is bound up with freedom. Men, in judging and acting morally, do so without external constraint

them,

or compulsion nal
will.30

from

natural

causes;

they

are

exercising free

choice or their ratio

All three
the

of

these

elements were

lacking

in the morality devised

could not,

by Hobbes
accept

on

basis

of

Machiavelli's

view of man.

Kant

therefore,

the
a

correctness of that account.

Now in

doing this,

Kant was, in effect, reverting to

Second Critique, in Gesammelte Schriften (Konigliche Preussiche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, i9ioff.; hereafter referred to as AA [Akademieausgabe]), vol. v, pp. 21-25, 3529.

(Also in

Abbott, Kant's Theory of Ethics. Longmans, London,

conception of a supreme and

1898,

pp.

107-12, 125.) One ought

to say here that the ancient

with their

far

more confident conception of

them, confined to empiricist, braces the whole, substantial

nature) that
one

'being'

up is not, for sensible data, nor to such data plus Kantian categories, rather it em of man (or his of things, and it is by discernment of the
the scope of human knowledge. Knowledge
'being'

hierarchical

end

for human life

was tied

discerns the

supreme end.

The

rejection of ancient

epistemology is thus

of a piece,

logically
above. 30.

and conceptually, with

the rejection of the ancient idea of a supreme end; cf. also note 26

Groundwork, AA,

vol.

iv,

pp. 428. 442-44.

364

Interpretation
morality, the vision that
as

more ancient and pre-Machiavellian vision of

moral goodness as

did
the

see

something fine
of

and

splendid,

something objectively

valid

for

all men

independently
choice.

their particular passions, and as

were present

involving

free

assent of

human

For these
or

in the

ancient vision of

the su

preme good and

pathetic

the noble,

the natural perfection

of soul.

But if Kant

was sym

to the ancient claim that the

truly

good

life

must

was not sympathetic to cause

of

their understanding

of what

be something noble, he the noble was. This was be

he

rejected

their claim that the noble was part of nature and was an object

knowledge. The
reason

for this is

of course not

difficult to grasp; it lies in his theory

of

knowledge,
alism'

or

his

acceptance of

the tradition of epistemological despair that

was, as has been argued, just another (though

of

distinguishable) element of the 're Machiavelli. Kant firmly believed that in the world of knowledge, the
world, none of the aspects of morality

phenomenal

he had

noted could

be found. Baco

The
nian

phenomenal world

is in fact the beast

of

world of

Machiavellian

realism and

science,

of man as a

insatiable

passions and of nature as a collection

facts. Kant was, therefore, forced to find the origin of what was moral in the noumenal world. This had some important results. properly To take first the questions of the moral good, or of the noble, and of freedom.
of valueless

The
as

moral good can

manifestly
and

no

longer be

regarded as an object of

knowledge in

it had been

by

the ancients (for the

only knowable

goods are the object of par

a moral

ticular selfish

desires),

consequently,

when one wills and acts or moved

way, it ceases to be the case that one is determined

prior cognitive recognition of good. mine

to do so

by

some

the will to moral

On the contrary nothing knowable can deter choice; if the will is determined it cannot be by anything

accessible to

understanding, but only

own

directly by

the

will

itself. The will,

says

Kant accordingly, has its

spontaneity, its

own

from the determinist causality nation with which the will is

and

of scientific nature.

free causality, quite distinct This causality or self-determi

endowed must

evidently

belong

to the

noumenal

hence

nonknowable sphere.

If the

impossibility
prior acts of

of

the will's

being

deter

mined

by any prior grasp of good, by

directly,
the

any

thinking,

means

that it has

to determine itself
sphere makes

of this self-determination in the noumenal freedom something entirely unknowable. Kant thus only secures the nobility and freedom associated with morality at the cost of shifting both into a sphere that lies completely beyond human grasp. The free acts of the will that

setting

constitute moral goodness and moral choice are

comprehension.31

beyond human

explanation and

This does

not

mean,

however,
on

that one cannot say anything about the form

that these choices take the form

about

take;

the

of categorical

contrary one can say quite specifically that they imperatives or categorical 'oughts'. Morality is
about

action,

or about

how to behave. Judgments

how to behave

are

typi-

31.

Groundwork,

ch. 3.

Autonomous
cally
these
one ought
ruled out expressed
'oughts'

Morality
of

and

the

Idea of the Noble

or

365

in terms

'should'

'ought'. In the
of

ancient scheme of things

of

are relative

to the good

the supreme end of,

or

to

do
is

so and so

because it is

part

leads to, the

good.

human perfection; But Kant has

in the

this way of
other

'ought'

understanding
than contingent,

by denying
and selfish.

that any good accessible

to knowledge
of moral
ative

low,

Consequently
'ought'

case
rel

judgements

about

how to behave he is left

with an

that is not

to any good, or that

is,

in his

own

words, 'categorical'. This categorical

'ought'

is just the

pure

idea

of prescription or

command, for that is

all that

is left

to

it

when

the reference to a good is removed.

a matter of pure categorical self

'oughts',
or

and

Kant's morality therefore becomes the will's free self-determination of it Freedom is

self'ought'

takes the form of the that is

imposition
the

of a moral command. of an

legislation,

autonomy

commanding

that has no ground

or source other with nature or cognitive. receives

it certainly has nothing to do anything that can be known; and it is essentially volitional, not It is thus in Kantian categorical morality that the distinction
own mysterious will
'is/ought'

than one's

its first

and

certainly its

classic

expression.32

This is one, and perhaps the most important, but there is a further one that deserves mention,
'ought'

aspect of
and

that

separation of stood

from

good means that the moral

'ought'

Kant's moral thought, follows from it; for the has to be under
and removes
'ought'

in

purely formal

way.

If one takes

'ought'

an

judgment

from
rela pre

it, in

the manner

described,
as

any

reference to a good to which the

is

tive or which is to be attained

by following

what

the

'ought'

judgment

scribes,
'ought'
'ought'

one as a

is left,

has been said, merely with the formal character of the prescription or a command. Now this purely formal character of

was understood

by

Kant

as not

just prescription, but

also

universal

tion (the
'ought'

reason given

is that

what

is formal is

necessarily

universal).

prescrip The be

in

which

the will expresses

itself,

the so-called categorical

imperative,
if it
can

requires that

any

proposed course of action must

be

examined to see

made a universal

law for

everyone and still

stand,

and

ble

with right and

duty. This

separates the action

only if it can is it compati from dependence on merely

to each

subjective and selfish

and so allows

interests that

are private and contingent

individual,
This
also

it the
at

categorical character

that

is necessary for

morality.

enables

Kant,

the same time,

as

to give a moral

dignity

to the purely selfish char

realism.

acter of man's

desires

these

were pictured

in Machiavellian
one can

For

while men

it

remains true that the

only desires

or

interests that

know to be

exist

in

are

their

particular

felt

and self-interested

preferences, it is

nevertheless possible
can

to put these desires on a higher

moral plane provided

they

subsumed un

der the
32.

categorical

imperative,

the

principle of

morality,

and

be

made

into

uni-

Some people,
it
plain

e.g.

Anscombe (see

Hume. But Hume has

makes

no sense of or

that

duty

note 5 above), have argued that this begins with disinterested duty, or unfounded r itonomous 'oughts', since he obligation is tied to, and follows, some interest one has and cannot be

'ought'

wished nor can

it

arise on

its

own

(Treatise,

ed.

Selby Bigge, Oxford,

1888,

pp.

484, 498, 517-19,

523)-

366

Interpretation
laws. Morality, in begins as
'ought'

versalized prescriptions or

other

words, becomes a

kind

of

universalizing of what The categorical autonomous

weight of

self-interest.33

of

universalizing

carries

the

whole

Kant's

moral system and

stand

its

significance.

If one
not

it is, therefore, of some importance to under looks at how Kant expressly regards the principle in
one will
peace.

his

ethical writings

(and

izing
of

is little

more than an elaboration of establishes

just The Groundwork), Hobbesian

right,
and right

find that

universal

The formal

principle

universalizing pursuing those of

ers'

is that

one should refrain

from

one's self-interested

desires

which are

incompatible
one

with oth

others.

pursuing their self-interested desires, or which Or, to put it differently, one is free, and has

bring

into

conflict with

a right

to pursue

happiness,
in

or one's self-interested so one

desires, in
upon

whatever

way

one

wishes, so

long as

does
or

not

infringe

the right and

freedom

of another

to pursue his

doing hap
the

piness,

his

self-interested

desires, in

whatever

way he

wishes.34

Right is the
and

restraining

and

checking
result

of one's

desires sufficiently to
were

avoid

conflict;

way to ensure this is precisely the device of universalizing one's desire. One asks
what would

be the

if everyone

to do the same, and if the result would

be

conflict or

something like the

principle, then,
of peace

war of all with

all, then it is

not

right.35

Kant's
than

moral

which establishes the

idea

of right

is

no more

Hobbes'

idea

it is its logical

as well as

historical

heir.36

In this

sense

Kant
on

never gets

beyond Hobbesian

morality.

He

does, however,

manage to

bestow

this morality something of that ancient sense of the noble that Hobbes

(along
33.

with

Machiavelli) had lost. But he does

and

not

do this

by changing the formal

Cf. Hare, Freedom

Reason,

104-105.

Theory and Practice, AA, vol. vm, pp. 290-91 (also in Riess, Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 748;.); compare with Metaphysic of Morals, AA, vol. vi, pp. 380-81, 396
34.

(Abbott,
35.

pp.

291, 307);

also

AA,

vol.

vi,

pp.

The

contradiction

that shows

a given maxim cannot p.

230-33 (Riess, be
423),
and

pp. 133-35).

universalized

is

rather one of will

than

of thought

tion to

Groundwork, AA, vol. iv, Kant (in Utilitarianism, Everyman,

is just

(e.g.

this

will perhaps

help

to

meet

Mill's

objec

1910,

ch.

1,

pp. 3-4). with

The

contradiction that rules out

prepared

certain maxims or courses of action

conflict of

desire

desire. That is why Kant is

to appeal to the undesirability of consequences, for it is precisely the repugnance to one's desire of the consequences of an action when this action is universalized or conceived as done by everyone that
shows one cannot

desire it

as

universalized,

even

though

one could

desire it

when conceived as of

done

only

by

oneself.

This does

not mean that utilitarianism

lies

at

the

bottom

Kant's

principle of

universalizing (at least

sion, especially
creased the

not utilitarianism

in Mill's sense, though there

remarks on

are similarities with action

Hare's

ver

when one considers

his

'fanaticism'), for an
happiness for
a

done

happiness

of

the many at the expense of

few

would means

many that in not be a case of

by

universalizing, though it
consider whether

would or could

be

a case of utilitarianism.

What it
worth

is that
or not

one

has to
to

the consequences of a given maxim amount to conflict of

maxim

desire

in

order

know

whether

the

is

universalizable

in the

relevant sense.

It is

gument against war and

in favor of peace has exactly the

same structure as

ar noting that this. Everyone finds he has

Hobbes'

to desire peace because what he

pleasure

instinctively
cannot

leads to consequences he

the unfettered pursuit of private ordinarily desires desire (namely the misery of war) if everyone does the
and

same.

36.
sect.

11,

This becomes especially clear in such of Kant's political pamphlets as Theory and Idea for a Universal History, especially 4th and 5th propositions;

and vol.

Practice.
vm,
pp.

AA,

289-306, 20-22.

Autonomous
character of

Morality

and the

Idea of the Noble

367

tion.

For

by

Hobbesian morality; rather he changes its motive and its justifica making his expression of this formal character, namely the principle into the
categorical

of universalizing,

imperative (in
into

which

is

contained the pure

idea in

of oughtness or command

that the will imposes on itself without reference to

an object of respect and awe sake

good or

desire), he

aims

to

make this principle

and

for itself,

quite regardless of the selfish

of which men would more or

system.

interests it serves, and for the less necessarily be moved towards it in

endowed with

Hobbes'

(which it

In this way the principle is separated from never was for Hobbes), and so has been

selfish and contingent motives

three qualities which

now

Kant,

with

his

sense of of

precisely those the noble, felt it lacked. For it is

categorical, that

is independent
is low
and

actual, contingent
and

desires;

sublime, that
will

is independent
spontaneously
passions.

of what

selfish; the

free,
less

that is imposed on the

by

itself

and not

by

more or

mechanical workings of the

It is thus in the idea

universalizing
sense of as

'oughts'

of

autonomy,

of categorical natural and

and respect

for

such,

all

divorced from anything

knowable,

that the

the noble comes to rest in Kant's thought. As one can see from the
that thought traced above, this
a

movement of

happens because the

context of selfish

sense of

the no
and

ble has had to be forced into

epistemological

Machiavellian
of

inclinations

despair. The truth

this

conclusion

is

no

better illustrated than

by

Kant himself:
Duty! thou sublime, mighty
of your noble name
. . .

what

is

your

origin,

and where
with

is found the
. .

root
.

descent,

which

proudly

strikes out all

kinship

inclinations?

It

can

self.
of

be nothing less than It can be nothing

mechanism of which

what exalts man

(as

part of

the sensible world)

above

him

other

than personality, that nature, yet

is freedom

and

independence

the

the whole

of

viewed at

the same time as a power of a

given

being

is

subject

to special

laws,

pure practical

laws

by

its

own

reason.37

from

Kant may thus have succeeded in restoring something of the noble to morality within a Machiavellian context (which Hobbes failed to do), but because of
context

the way that

forces him to

alter that

idea into the idea

of categorical

'oughts', the noble is reduced to a sort of universalizing that differs from Hob besian peace only because it is conceived as an unfounded and awesome com
mand.

For this

reason

Kant's

noble

has

an altogether peculiar character.

By

Kant's

own admission

'higher'

morality

Hobbesian morality is too low for morality, yet his own appears to be no more than Hobbes backed up by the un

founded

'ought'

of noumenal, that

that can be
and

noble

here is

the sheer

unfounded and

is to say incomprehensible, freedom. As incomprehensible is just

Hobbes'

all

'oughtness'

nothing else, it

would seem

that Kant's noble

ignoble

made

mysteriously imperious.

Perhaps, however,
Hobbes is
37.

this

is

little

extreme.

What Kant

regards as

ignoble

about

not

the

peace

he

commends

but the

grounds on which

he

commends

it,

Second Critique, AA,

vol.

v,

pp.

86-87; Abbott,

p.

180.

368

Interpretation

namely selfish interest. So in removing this but keeping the idea of peace, Kant ignoble imperious as removing something noble is not so much making But this is to forget the logical origin of the idea of from an ignoble context.
Hobbes'

peace.

of the natural man. sires are

This is only devised in the first place on the basis of a Machiavellian view For it is because men are conceived as creatures whose de just
particular passions

that the problem becomes one of coping with

of

these

passions.

The Hobbesian way

of passion answer

how the satisfying passion by all. The say that man has a not just in view of

is,

making this problem a moral one is to ask be harmonized with the satisfying of by in the end, to universalize. All that Kant adds is to
one can

mysterious what

he

gets out of

capacity to it.

respect

this universalizing as such and

By
which

contrast

the

ancient vision of

the noble is tied to a

particular

view of

the natural

man

denies any independent validity to

pursuit of

passions,

and a

right

to the

them,

whether universalized or not.

What

needs

fortiori any to be dis

with

cerned

instead is how to

subordinate

the

passions so as

to make them accord

and promote

the natural perfection and elevation of soul (which means,

in the

end, a

certain perfection of reason

in thought

and action).

Kant, however, is bit

their vision of the

terly

opposed

to ancient

moral

thought. When

he

speaks of

man, he calls it seeing beyond the boundaries cally in the case of "moral
perfection of

"fanaticism,"

by

which

he

means

"the delusion
or,

of

of

sensibility (sense
'ought'

perception)";38

specifi

fanaticism,"

the attempt to base morality on some

of

thing

other

than the stern categorical

duty,

and

in

particular
noble.39

the at

tempt to base it on some presumed knowledge and love of the

Kant

condemns all such

ideas fiercely. To

exhort men

to action

by
be

appeal

to

the noble, sublime and magnanimous, is necessarily, whatever may

protested
self-

to the contrary, both to appeal to a

motive

that

is "pathological", to

some

love
kind

or sentimental
thinking"

romanticism,

and

to induce an
a

"airy,

superficial, fantastical
goodness of
of
duty.40

of

that
are

flatters

men

they have
for

"voluntary
to the

when, in

fact, they

"yoke"

necessary to repeat
about

only that Kant's

of

moral when subject reasons

It is

not

such remarks are of course

his beliefs
the
natural

the

limitations

human knowledge

and about the selfishness of

man.41

This

opposition

to the ancient

idea that the

of

noble

is

perfection of soul and re

placement of

it

'ought'

by

the pure

duty

has

meant

that in Kant's thought one

has, besides
the
of
real

the separations already mentioned of the moral

from the

natural and

from the knowable, also the separation the moral from the beneficial and expedient,
38.

(deriving directly
or

from Hobbes)
the
most de-

from the idea

of

Third Critique:
presupposed a

sect.

29,

AA,

vol.

v,

p. 275.

Kant

was aware that

the ancient

vision of per

fection

capacity of the mind to penetrate beyond sensible being of things; that is the main reason why he rejected it. 39. Second Critique AA, vol. v, pp. 84-86; Abbott, pp. 178-79.
,

properties to the

intelligible

40. 41.
pp.

Ibid.

Groundwork, AA,

vol.

iv,

pp.

441-44; Second

Critique, AA,

vol.

v,

pp.

35-41;

Abbott,

124-30.

Autonomous
sirable and

Morality

and

the

Idea of the Noble

369

satisfying life. Since, for Kant, to speak of how something benefits one or makes one better off or fully satisfied is, if it is to have any graspable content and not be merely empty ideas, to speak of something empirical and

fully

pleasant,42

selfishly
the low and selfish
now

he necessarily associates the beneficial and satisfying with and so dissociates them from It has duty and the
moral.43

become

fairly

standard,

at

least in

some

quarters, to repeat the

same separa

tion and to equate the selfish with the prudent and to tion between the moral and what
sometimes put what

deny

benefits the

individual.44

any essential connec This separation is

a good x and

in terms
good

of x.

the distinction

between

what

it is to be

it is to be

for

Such

distinction

would

not, for instance, have been

what makes

tolerated

by

Plato's

Socrates,
first

who

thought it absurd to suppose that

good or

something
as

good might not also

be

beneficial for it,

and who went so

far

to

curse

the

man who

separated the useful and the

since.45

just. There

are others

who

have

made

the same protest

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this
veloped of

article

I have tried to
roots
and

show

how the idea

of

of autonomous

morality

as

de
in

by

Kant has its his

in the morality ultimately the

Hobbes,
of

the science of conquest

Bacon

and

Descartes,

'realism'

Machiavelli.

Having

herited despair
42. 43.

and made of

own a

bestial,

selfish view of natural

real

human inclinations,
and a
mechanis-

the human capacity to grasp the

references

being

of

things,

See the
It is

in the is

previous note. asserts as much

worth

noting that
of man

Kant

as, if not

more

than, Machiavelli

and

Hobbes that
prais

the natural condition

wretched and miserable.

He

goes

further, however, in actually

ing nature for being cruel and vicious for it is misery that is nature's engine to compel men to develop towards morality by forcing them to universalize their particular passions; Third Critique, sect. 83,
AA,
tics
vol.

v,

pp.

429-34, Universal History, 4th proposition,

references

AA,

vol.

vm,

p. 21. of Aristotle's

44.

See the

in

Saunders'

note I

and also

remarks

in the translation

Poli
1,

(Penguin,
45.

198

1),

p.

390,

which one should compare with

Aristotle's

own remarks

in bk. 7,

ch.

to which

Saunders is
kind

referring.
and of course

Plato, Gorgias, 474c-479e,

a
of

there

is the

general

teaching

of

the Republic that

justice is

health
and

of soul and a

benefit to the just

man

precisely

as such without addition

(e.g.

443c-445b).

Foot

Warnock

and others also wish to reunite the prudential and the moral

by

relating the moral to human benefit and harm, but they do, or were inclined to do this, by giving up the idea of the noble and returning to the selfishness of Hobbes (e.g. Foot, op. cit., p. xiii). For a
ent to violate the

Socratic position, one may compare Whately : "If anyone really holds that it can ever be expedi that he who does so is not sacrificing a greater good to a less injunctions of duty that it can be really advantageous to do what is morally (which all would admit to be inexpedient),
more
will come

wrong, and

forward

and acknowledge

that to be his

belief, I have only

to be
so profligate a

to protest, for my

own part, with the

deepest abhorrence,

against what

princip

conceive

Rheto

ric,

in Longmans, London, 1877, p. 316. Also Veatch. 'Telos and Teleology in Aristotelian D. J. O'Meara. Studies in Aristotle (Catholic University of American Press. Washington, 1981). One

Ethics,'

should also not

forget Nietzsche. Like the Evil, especially

part 9).

ancient authors,

he

wanted

fection

and elevation of
and

soul, and so in terms of what enhances and

to see nobility in terms of per benefits the noble individual (so

Beyond Good

370 tic,

Interpretation
nature, Kant devises
an autonomous noble.

nonteleological science of
'oughts'

self-willed categorical
consequence of

to cope with the sense of the

morality of This has the

man existence.

making more absolute fundamental splits in hu reaffirming The moral is divorced from the natural and knowable and also
and

from the
One

prudential and

the

fully
splits

satisfying, and mind is divorced from the real.

cannot

say that these

course of the
not.

have been

overcome or

the root causes aban

doned in the

historical development
cardinal

of autonomous

morality

since

The Kant, for they have distinction, remains today as much dependent on empiricist notions of the 'is', or of 'facts', and a selfish understanding of human desires as it was for Kant; and
thesis
of autonomous

morality, the

is/ought

there

is

still

the same insistence that the the

moral

has

not

been

understood

properly

if it is
from

at all equated with

suggestions

prudential and satisfying.

These

about the structure of autonomous

morality,

as

derived
is lot

an examination of

historical origins, do

not

in themselves For
one

amount

to a refu
a

tation,
of

either of

the

origins or of what rests on

them.

thing

there

back up the Machiavellian account of the natural man very (the appeal to facts of history is one of the strong points of Machiavelli's work). Yet one must not forget that there are other ways of coping with this evidence
good evidence to
without

ther.46

going the way of Machiavelli, and so have, in fact, throughout this paper,
are with the more ancient one.

without

contrasted

going the way the Kantian holistic

of

Kant

ei

account of

how things

This has doubtless

a

revealed

my

own

preferences. of man and

Certainly

for

one who

is drawn towards

and unified vision

his world, that does

not posit nor require radical splits and yet gives a

place

to the noble, the ancient vision is far more promising. Still it has not been
to settle this

my

aim

issue here; merely to

help

make clearer what the

issue is.

46.

Aristotle, Politics,

1253*29-39.

Review Essays

Faith

and

Reason in

Contemporary

Perspective

Apropos

of a

Recent Book

Ernest L. Fortin
Boston College

After

centuries of

heated

and often

futile debate, any

For these
of

attempt

to

reopen

the

question of

faith

and reason

is bound to
challenge.

strike the modern reader as a quaint ancient

anachronism or at convenient

best

daring

terms,

once used as

labels to designate the two types

said,
constitutes

knowledge

whose problematic re
western

lationship, it has been

contemporaries

the highest theme of

and

thought,

our

have

"religion"

"experience,"

substituted

both

of which are

supposedly less
that
"reason"

controversial and more

"experience,"

to quarrel with the word

can no

readily accessible to us. No one is likely which has a certain prima facie evidence

longer claim,
"varieties"

and we

have

all

learned from William James

with which of

and others
sible

that there are

of religious

experience,

it is

pos

to

become

acquainted even a remarkable

if

we

have

no

firsthand knowledge has

come

them our

selves.

Indeed,

degree

of openness

to

prevail regard

ing

these matters. Experiences can be

described but
entitled

require no

justification. It

suffices that

to account

they be for them

"authentic."

Everyone is

to his own without

having
be

or answer

any

questions about them.

Since their

objects are

presumed to

lie beyond the

or at

pale of rational

discourse,

all such questions are to

judged irrelevant is

the very least

unanswerable.

The trouble is that it is

one that
not.

not always

easy to tell

an authentic experience

from

There is

no

mistaking the pain that I

feel

when

I have

toothache,

and,

having
is

had

a number of them are

in the past, I know roughly

what others go

through
ence

when

they

similarly

afflicted.

If, however,
if it has to do

the content of the experi

with

not an object of sense perception,

issues

as subtle and

elusive as those

associated with religious

belief,

a greater measure of caution

often prove

may be in
more than

order.

Seemingly

profound experiences

to be nothing

passing fancies, delusions, or momentary infatua deeper have tions. Others obviously roots, but even they are not wholly unam biguous in so far as they are apt to be mediated if not actually induced by the larger context of opinion to which they belong. For all practical purposes the world is what we see in it, and what we see in it is, with rare exceptions, what we

fits

of enthusiasm,

have been

taught to see

in it. Our

thoughts and

feelings

are

rarely

ours alone.

They

tend to be those of our time or of our society and are generally shared

by

other members of that society.

They

thus assume a public character to which

they

372
owe

Interpretation

cows are sacred

both their plausibility and their authority. The Hindu who is persuaded that is not indulging in a private fantasy or expressing a purely per sonal view. His is noticeably different from that of the party-goer
"knowledge"

who

has had too

much

to drink and swears that the cow in his

backyard has

wings.

Still, it is

not

the kind of knowledge that someone brought up in

different

tradition would take

for

granted.

This

simple observation

is

enough to remind us religious or other

that we are confronted with a multiplicity of such wise, and that

of

traditions,

they

often

"religions"

speaking

of

differ widely from one another. Hence the modern habit in the plural rather than of in the singular, as
"religion"

was

the custom prior to the sixteenth century. It these religions has

character of

been

called

them will have to

one of

include

some reference

follows that, once the normative into question, any effort to evaluate to criteria that are not indigenous to any

them.
great

The

theologians of the past were not wholly unaware of the problem and
preferred a more objective approach
accustomed.

that is why
we

they

to it than the one to which

have

lately
was

become

They knew

that what went under the name

"faith"

of

ultimately

grounded

in

an experience of some

sort, whether it be

that of the prophet to whom

God had

spoken or of the recipient of

his message,

but they denied that it was a simple matter of subjective experience and insisted that the formulation of its content be submitted to the external control of reason. The
assumption

mind's natural
ous

that, although the divinely revealed truth exceeded the capacity, it did not run counter to it and was not totally impervi
was who reveals

to it.

Since the God faith

himself in the Scriptures

was also

the author

of

nature, and since he cannot contradict

himself,

no real antagonism of reason could

between
antici

the

dogmas
It

of

the

and the

independent findings

be

pated.1

Christianity
was not

was

in

principle and could

become in fact

a universal reli
people and

gion.2

the preserve of any particular nation or group of

its

teachings contained nothing

incongruent

or

demonstrably
were

false. The

assent that

they

commanded was a reasonable one

rationabile obsequium

(cf. Romans,
capable.

12:1).

It

was an assent of which all

human beings

theoretically
of

There

was of

danger

nothing to fear from a its being damaged by it

one to

philosophic as

investigation

its

roots and no

anything, the opposite was true.

principle

allowing

long as the investigator was competent. If Philosophy could be employed, not indeed as a pass judgment on the truth or falsity of Revelation, but
its meaning
and counter

as a tool with which to probe

any

attack that might

be

leveled
It is

against quite

it in the

name of reason.

possible,

however,

that in its eagerness to emphasize the

reason

ableness of existential modern

of

Christian faith, medieval theology downplayed its component, just as, in its eagerness to react against
the
prone to overlook

experiential or

this tendency,
singular merit

theology is
example,

its

rational component.
and

The

Robert Sokolowski's book, The God of Faith

1
.

Reason: The Foundations of

ch. 7.

See, for

2.

Cf. Augustine,

City

Thomas Aquinas, Summa of God, x.32.

contra

Gentiles, I,

Faith

and

Reason in

Contemporary Perspective
a

373

Christian

Theology,1

is that it looks for

happy

proaches and

that it does so, not merely

by

balance between these two ap restating the problem as it posed itself phenomenology
to
subtitle

in the Middle Ages, but

essay is
aim an exercise

by

using the is

contributions of modern

arrive at a more adequate articulation of

it. As its

suggests, Sokolowski's

in
to

what

now called

"fundamental
of

theology."

Its immediate
that of
rea

is

not so much

defend the compatibility

the life of

faith

with

son as

to

lay bare the theoretical presuppositions that enable one to

Christianity. Such
a

make sense of

the dogmas and practices of

theology is
or

said

to proceed

by

way

of clarification rather

than

by

way

of

inference from

premises to conclu
space"

sions.

It

seeks above all to elaborate the

horizon
(cf.

within which

the

"meaning"

of

these teachings

can

"open up the logical be unfolded for the benefit

of

believers
most

and

interested

nonbelievers alike
of not

pp. xiv and 37).

Accordingly, it is
of manifesta a

tion,"

aptly described as a "theology as distinguished from, though

disclosure"

or a

"theology

necessarily in

opposition

to,

"theology

for the theology of the Middle Ages. Its thesis is that there is imbedded in the structures of the Christian faith a coherent pattern of
of

things,"

Sokolowski's becomes

term

thought that
culiar

fully

manifest

only

when we reflect

thematically
it
with

on

the pe

understanding
to

of

God that

underlies

it

and contrast

the one that per

vades

the whole of pagan philosophic

and religious

thought.

According
terms
of

Sokolowski,

this novel understanding

and

is best formulated in distinction

the fundamental distinction between God

the world, a

that has no exact equivalent outside of Christian theology. Neither in Greek

philosophic thought nor conceived as a

being

that

in any religious tradition other than Christianity is God is not in any way affected by the existence or nonexis
not

tence of the
responsible

world.

God is

himself a

part of the world,

and, even though he is

both for its coming into being and its continued existence, he gains nothing from its presence, just as he would lose nothing from its absence. Take God away and nothing is left of the world, but the converse does not obtain, for
even

if there

were no

world, God

would still

be "all that he is in in him alone,

'more'

undiminished

greatness"

goodness and

(p.

107).

In him

and

essence and exis

'greater'

tence
or

coincide.

'better' "

but there is no When he creates, "there may be (p. 19). This insight, as we learn from the first chapter of the book, is
celebrated

already implicit in Anselm's

being
is
all of

than

whom none greater can of

be

conceived.

formula according to which God is the The distinction that it presumes from
common experience.

unlike

any

the ones with which we are familiar

In

these the two terms of the distinction

imply

each other and a son or a

have

no mean

ing
no

one without the other

(cf.

pp. 32-33).

Without

daughter,

there

is

father

or mother and vice versa.

The

present case

is different in that the in

one

rela

tionship
3.

of

dependence between God

and

and the world works

direction
+ 172.
ad

only.4

Notre Dame
For

London:

University

of

Notre Dame Press, God is

1982.

Pp.

xiv

4.

a similar argument, cf.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoi, I, q.45, a.3,

"relation"

lum,

where

Aquinas

explains that the relation of the creature to

of

a real
of

(relatio realis), whereas

secundum rationem).

the relation

God to the

creature

is

no more than a

"relation

(relatio

374 God is
perfect

Interpretation
no more perfect

for

having

created

the

world and would not

for

not

having

created

it. Such

a view constitutes a radical

which

be any less departure from

all of pagan or pre-Christian

thought, for
and

being in

the

universe.

"In Greek

God is merely the most perfect Roman religion, and in Greek and Roman
the
most

philosophies, god or the gods are appreciated as

pendent and

powerful,

most

inde

self-sufficient,

most

being."

cepted within even

the context of

unchanging beings in the world, but they are ac Hence "the possibility that they could be

though

anyone"

to
god of

(p.

everything that is not divine were not, is not a possibility that occurs 12). This is true of the Olympian gods, but it is also true of the
matter

Aristotelian metaphysics, for "no

as

how Aristotle's

god

is to be de

thought, he is part of the world, and it is obviously necessary that there be other beings besides him, whether he (pp. 15-16). Within this framework, the whole of na is aware of them or
scribed,
the prime
mover or

the self-thinking

not"

ture

is looked

upon as a rational

necessity

and

is treated

as such.

The thought that

same view emphasis

the world might never

have

equally
stantial one

characteristic of

of

simply does not arise. The the later Platonic tradition, despite its
existed principle of all

is
on

the transcendence

the divine

things, for
of what

even

here the
itself"

transsub-

One

or

the Good

is

still

"taken

'part'

as

is: it is the One

by being
18).

over,

for,

and

in many, book

never

As the

rest of the

so well

by being One only alone by shows, the basic distinction to

of

(p.

which attention

has just been drawn

undergirds the entire structure of a proper

Christian life
the

and thought.

It is indispensable to
vine
ner

grace, and the role

which

Trinity, understanding of the sacraments in human life, and it

the
read

Incarnation, di
the man

governs

in

Christians

the

Scriptures,

experience the world around

them,

and relate

to one another and to the divinity. This

is

not to

say that once the

"mysteries"

im

portance of that

distinction is

fully

appreciated, the Christian

cease

to

be

mysteries

mysterious

but only that one then begins to see more clearly wherein their character lies (cf. pp. 37-39). Such an approach has the great advan

tage of preserving the

21-23).

integrity of the faith as

well as that of the natural order

(pp.

Contrary
there

thinkers,

is

tem of symbols

finds among contemporary religious Christian reducing theology to a complex sys designed to convey a purely human meaning. On this score,
to what one so often
no question of

Sokolowski

can also claim to

be

on more solid ground

Thomism"

than either Rahner

or

Lonergan,
of

whose

"transcendental
and

arrives at

God through

an analysis

human thought

its

alleged

demand for

complete or unrestricted

knowl

edge.
world

Unlike Sokolowski, Rahner and Lonergan take the createdness of the for granted, for only on that assumption can it be regarded as transparent

to God and

hence

"completely
fails to

intelligible."

As

consequence,

neither of them

sees the need to contrast the

Christian
give

and pagan senses of the whole.

recognition"

Their tran
mind.

scendental method thus

"due

to the pagan state of

and works

It

refuses to accept

it

as a real

that is biblical or Christian

possibility from the outset (cf.

entirely

within a perspective

pp. 108-109).

saying so, Sokolowski

seems to

detect in their

approach a

Without explicitly latent tendency to blur

Faith
or

and

Reason in

Contemporary
with

Perspective
natural and

375
the supernatural
orders.5

deemphasize the distinction between the

own method of

His

dealing

this

issue likewise differs markedly from that

clarity"

of

Karl

Barth,
but

who goes

to the opposite extreme and repudiates metaphysics alto

gether

makes us us

by leaving

pay for the "religious (p. in "philosophical

darkness"

that this
112).

repudiation generates

One further

point

to be stressed is that the distinction between God and the

Christian theology itself. Since that dis tinction is not entirely beyond the scope of reason, it does not strictly speaking belong to the realm of faith, but since it has not in fact been discovered without
world occupies a unique position within

the aid of divine revelation, one

hesitates to describe it
stands at

Therein lies its

mains,

advantage.

Because it

purely philosophical. the intersection of the two do

p. 39).

as

it

can serve as a with

bridge between them (cf.

Nonbelievers

will

have

fewer difficulties
accepted

it

or at

it than they do with the dogmas of the faith, and, having least been made to see that it is not manifestly contrary to rea
reluctant to concede that the
reason

son,

they
pp.

will

be less

not accessible

to human

alone, do

not require

Christian mysteries, though that one turn one's back on

it (cf

xii, 39,

and 113).
parallels

Sokolowski's essay has few ished literature of our time. As

which

was mentioned

in the theologically lean and impover earlier, its topic and the level on

it is taken up are more typical of former ages than of ours and the thesis that it lays before us is argued with a cogency that one admires all the more as it
rarely found elsewhere today. One can only hope that, by raising once again the thorny issue of the rapport between faith and reason, and by raising it in a

is

so

manner

that is both

respectful of

the past and sympathetic to recent

develop

ments, the book

will set a new

trend

in

religious

sophical theology. what

There does

not appear

philosophy as well as in philo to be much doubt that it accomplishes Christian faith

can command

it

sets out

to

do,

namely, to show that the

the

respect of thoughtful persons regardless of what their religious convictions

be

and even

if they it

profess no religious convictions at all. which

As such, it
prized

stands

may in

the best tradition of Catholic theology,

has

always

reason and who starts

looked

upon

as an

ally

rather than an

enemy

of

the Faith. Anyone

from the

same

premises, and

they

are the ones that the medieval tradition took as

its point of departure, is bound to arrive at similar conclusions and will agree that the Christian faith cannot be dismissed as meaningless, that its main tenets are
neither patent absurdities nor

logical inconsistencies, into

and

hence that

one can sub

scribe to them

without

lapsing

obvious contradictions.

This said,
more

one wonders whether, apart

from its

more modern

(and

sometimes

disclosure"

obscure) terminology, Sokolowski's

"theology

of
medieval

is really

as

new as

it

claims

to be. In view of the extreme care that the

sciences and

theologians

brought to
5.

the distinction between the

89-90
and
100-

their various

formalities, they
the same terms

See

esp. pp.

101
or

where

the problem is taken

up in

much

but

without

any

mention of either

Rahner

Lonergan.

376
can

Interpretation
concerned than we are with or manifest of

scarcely be thought to have been less

things come to

the manner

in

which

light,
no

"presenced,"

are

themselves to us. To

be sure, Sokolowski has says, must be kept "in Whereas the

and

intention
things"

tandem"

separating the two theologies, which, he (p. 93); but he nevertheless sees them as different.
takes the Christian distinction between

"theology
in
on

of

God dis

the world for granted and concentrates on its two terms, the
zeroes

"theology

of

closure"

the distinction itself (cf. pp. 90-92). To speak of such a to

distinction, however, is

imply

that one

termined as accurately as possible

wherein

has already analyzed its terms and de they differ. The medievals may pos

sibly have taken the distinction between God and the world for granted, but there is reason to think that Sokolowski, who highlights that distinction, tends to take

its

terms

for
in

granted. point

A
elian

case

is his insistence
or

on

the intramundane character of the

Aristot

God,

which

may

thought on this matter.

do full justice to the complexity of Aristotle's Unfortunately, the texts in which the problem is taken up
may
not

in the Metaphysics

and elsewhere are

relatively few in

number

and, as the

long

history of Aristotelian scholarship demonstrates, notoriously pret. Ascertaining what exactly Aristotle may have meant by
task, especially
and

difficult to inter is
no small
mover"

"God"

since the word

is

applied not

only to the "first unmoved

the

other separate substances

but, in

accordance with earlier

to the outermost

heaven,

all of

the

heavenly bodies,

and on occasion reason

Greek tradition, it

self. The ambiguity is noted by Cicero, who observes apropos of Aristotle's lost dialogue On Philosophy: "At one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the

mind; at another he calls the

over

world

itself a god;

elsewhere

he

puts some other god

the world, assigning to this god the task of regulating and sustaining the movement of the world by means of a revolution of some sort; then he calls the
celestial

world which

heat (or ether) a god, not realizing that the heaven is he himself had previously designated by the name of

a part of
god"

that

(De Nat.
to the

Deor.,

1. xiii. 33).

Clearly,
a

some of

Aristotle's

"divine"

beings

belong

whole with which the metaphysician prime mover

is concerned, but it is
that whole. The

not at all clear that the

is himself

"part"

of

Metaphysics describes him

xa&'

variously
cf.

as

"self-subsisting
an

actuality"

I07ib20),

"eternal

and

(ivegyeia r) immovable (didiov

being" depend"

atixr\v,
odoiav

ioj2b2-j;

dxivr)xov,

I07ib5), the

good at which

principle on which the

everything in the heaven and all of nature

on

universe aims

(I072b3), or the (I272bi4), even though

the
ev

he himself does

not

depend

them or receive

subject of sacred

theology,

which

anything from them. God is appropriately begins with him and studies

him.6 He is not as such the subject of metaphysics or erything else in relation to being,7 first philosophy, which takes as its theme knows nothing of being qua God as he is in himself, and would not speak of him at all were it not for the fact

that the world as we know it

becomes

unintelligible without

him. Significantly,

6. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., I, q.l, a. 7. 7. Cf. Metaphysics, I003a2i, I004bi5, I025b2,

etc.

Faith

and

Reason in

Contemporary

Perspective

311

God is discussed only toward the end of the Physics and the Metaphysics, where he is introduced as the extrinsic final cause of the world, as distinct for its intrin
sic

final

cause or the order of contention

its

parts

As for the
(cf.

that Aristotle could not conceive of a divine

being
it

whose existence was not so

linked to the

world as to

be

unthinkable without

pp.

ments

16-18), it too may have to be re-examined in the light of other state that bear on this subject. The problem comes up at least once in the Meta

physics,
stances.

in

connection with

the discussion

of

the number of the separate sub

True enough, Aristotle thought it

"reasonable"

(evXoyov)

to suppose
set at ei

that this number ther fifty-five or that there might

related

is identical to that be

of

the spheres,

which

is tentatively
is
not

forty-seven. Yet he

was not prepared

to rule out the possibility

other separate substances whose existence

in any way
no means

to the

realm of celestial or sublunar phenomena

(cf. Met.,

I074ai4-3i).

Even if these

remarks should prove general

accurate,

however, they

are

by

fatal to Sokolowski's
him from the God
sight

thesis; for

regardless of whether one regards

Aris

totle's prime mover as part of the world or not, a vast

of

difference

still separates

Christian theology. That difference

of the radical

comes most

in Sokolowski's discussion

than
view

God. The

pages

devoted to this topic

the
opposition analysis on

bring
issue

contingency us back to the

religious and

of all

clearly to beings other

more

familiar

according to

which

between the
the

the philosophic

traditions turns
tence.8

in the final

of creation or

divine

omnipo

Between a God who is defined exclusively as the thought that thinks it self, is ignorant of what goes on in this world, and has nothing to do with its
all-powerful cre
no middle

coming into being or its governance on the one hand, and the ator of the biblical tradition on the other, there is obviously

term.

From this

point of view at

least it is certainly

possible

to argue for the greater

transcendence of the Christian

perfection

God,

who not

only

surpasses all other

self-subsistent

beings in

but,

as the
within

ipsum

esse subsistens or

ready contains Sokolowski

the case for

would appear

himself the totality of to have reason on his

uniquely being.

being,

al

side when

creation

has been presented, the

to

philosopher owes

he insists that, once it to himself to

take it seriously (cf. p. 115). That it

great thinkers of which

was taken with attested

the utmost seriousness

by the

the past is amply

by

the numerous disquisitions to

it

gave rise and

in

all three of the great religious communities of the

not

West, Is

lam, Judaism,
ined that
one still
son case

Christianity. It does

thoroughly, the philosopher hard to see how God could produce beings other than himself and it is thing, be said to be infinite or to exhaust the totality of being. As far as human rea

follow necessarily that, having exam will be more inclined to accept it. For

knows, nothing
"more"

can

be

added

to infinity. To say that that creation gives us

"better"

"greater"

something

but nothing
the
problem

or

provides elucidate

us

with a good

shorthand statement of

but does little to

it. It is equally

8. See inter multa alia Averroes, Decisive Treatise, in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (N.Y., 1963), I73"75; Maimonides, Guide, 11. 13.

378 hard to

Interpretation
see

how

ate without of change.

who is defined as pure and changeless actuality could cre from potency to act and hence without undergoing some kind passing Finally, if God can create, he also has the power to intervene in the a

God

processes of nature and alter

them as

he

sees

fit.

Anything

that is not

inherently

contradictory becomes essary

turned at any time
world order

possible.

In that case,
the

science

character and must

live

with

realization

loses something of its nec that its results could be over

may
not render

by

divine decree. Divine

omnipotence

the

vain, but it does inject

an unknown

factor

or an element of unpre

dictability into
Much
tled with these

the philosopher's quest for unchanging causes. the

zeal with which

as one can admire

the medieval theologians wres themselves

issues, it is fair
goes on

to say that the

problems

have

always

been

clearer

than the proposed solutions to them. Sokolowski seems to grant as

much when

he

to

explain

that the Christian distinction between

God

and

the

world

is

not on a par with other philosophical and

doctrines in
be

so

far

as

it "en
and the

affections"

gages our will.

demands the

collaboration of

both the intellect

"lived"

To that extent, it is inseparable from

action and must

before it truth, be

can even

be

stated

(pp. 123,

142).

While

not

itself

properly

supernatural

it

at

least has that It

much

in

common with noted

the truths that

belong

exclusively to the
not claim to

order of grace. able to prove admits that

should

be

that

Aristotle, for his

part, did

apodictically that the

and

world was eternal.

In Topics I04b6-i7, he

the magnitude of the problem is such as to

factory
his "fewest

solution,

he

also makes

it

clear

defy any completely satis in the Metaphysics that he preferred

own alternative to
difficulties"

the others only because it was the one that offered the (cf. Met., iojsa2-j) and shed the greatest amount of light on

the famous issue of the one and the many or of

being
Since

and so

becoming

that had

dominated the

whole of pre-Socratic

philosophy.9

tional certitude awaits us on either side of this vexed question,

advantage cue

little in the way of ra it may be to our

and,

to leave the study of nature aside for the time

turn to

being

taking

our

from

Socrates,10

Sokolowski's

account of

human

or moral things.

The discussion in this

virtue

particular

instance begins

with an analysis of natural

(pp. 53-68) that takes its bearings from the Nicomachean Ethics
the nature of moral agency as
categories or and
well as on

and

fo

cuses on

Aristotle's division

of

human

types

into four basic

formal

possibilities: the virtuous, the conti

much of

nent, the

incontinent,
who

the vicious. The stage for

the argument is set

attributed

by Kant,
character

is

used as a

foil to illustrate the importance

to

moral

in

classical

thought. For

Kant,

the ethical
and

life is

conceived

solely in

terms of the struggle

nal obligation.
notion of

between inclination

duty

or

between

passion and ratio

The

virtues and

human

wholeness

habits have practically no role to play in it and the all but disappears. Kant had the right idea when he
of

9.

See Aristotle's summary discussion

this

frequently

debated topic in Metaphysics,

I075a25-I076a5. 10.

Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, i.i. 10-15.

Faith
"related

and

Reason in

Contemporary

Perspective
divine"

379

(p. 56), but that is about responsibility to the issue of the as much as Sokolowski is willing to say in his behalf. For an adequate assess ment of natural moral phenomena "we must get out from under and this is
moral
Kant,"

where

Aristotle

can

be

most

helpful to

us

(p.

55). contrasted with the

The Aristotelian
tian view,

view of

morality is subsequently
some extent

Chris

which modifies

it to

and,

by

virtues and

the theological virtues, provides a new

adding to it the infused moral setting for human existence.

natural

None

of

these

tinue to serve as a
taken to mean
are

properly Christian kind of that,

when

virtues

destroys the

virtues,

which con must not

"ballast"

for Christian

action

(p. 83). This

be

the two contexts, i.e. the natural and the theological,

introduced,

the individual moral agent is "split into two performers"; it

concrete

means rather

that "in the

situation,

what

the Christian is primarily to

do"

supposed more

to do is what the good

man would

be

expected

(p. 82). To be

specific,
perspective

The Christian
ought

does

not

bring

in

obligations that are at odds with what we

do according to the nature of things; the Christian illumination of what is to be done consists first of all in confirming what is good by nature, and in appreciating
to that
what

is

good

according to
therefore

nature

is

not

cause created and

willed

by God.

simply good in itself but also good be What is good by nature is not set over what
what

is

good

by

grace

but is integrated into it. And

is

good

by

grace

is

not

matter of convention and reasonableness

arbitrary decision; rather it builds associated with nature (p. 83).

much

on nature and shares

simply a in the

While there is

to applaud

in

all of

this,

one cannot ethics

weight

help thinking
even the

that

Sokolowski's determination to
suspicion of

absolve

Christian
him to

from

faintest his fa
later

irrationality

has

again caused

the evidence in

vor. Among other things, his interpretation of the Ethics stresses only ments as may be thought to be neutral in regard to the distinction that made

such ele
was

between
the kind

pagan and

Christian

virtue. of

spirit that

informs Aristotle's treatment

of reader

Little if anything is said these matters, his method

about the
of proce resolve

dure,

to whom his book

is typically addressed, his

or as

to

present moral phenomena on their own philosopher as to

level

they

appear not so much

to the

morally

good or

decent human beings, and,

moral virtue

most

important,
The

the cognitive status that

attaches

to

in the Aristotelian

scheme.

for the assertion that Christian morality does not contradict pa but merely redirects or refines it by privileging "certain aspects of morality " (p. 83). Generally speaking, it exhibits a livelier concern natural moral
way is thus
gan
paved
goods"

11.

Sokolowski's

remarks

set within the context of a comparison

concerning the difference between natural and Christian morality are between the Augustinian and Thomistic views of natural virtue
"false"

virtue; 78-79 and 88). In simple terms, for Augustine natural virtue without faith is for Aquinas, it is virtue, albeit only relative virtue. This apparent discrepancy is rightly said to find its explanation in the fact that Aquinas distinguishes more sharply between the order of nature

(cf.

pp.

"true"

It is not unimportant to note, however, that Augustine, who generally works Platonic framework, tends to study all things in the light of their highest principles. Just as Plato denies that virtue without true knowledge is genuine virtue, so Augustine denies that virtue
and the order of grace.
within a

without

faith is true

virtue.

380

Interpretation
human beings have in
common

with what

"as

created and

loved

and redeemed

by

God"; it
and of all

pays greater attention

to the

needs and

dignity

of

the weak, the unborn,

the poor; and

it is

more emphatic

in its

proclamation of

"the

natural

equality

men,"

later to be
not even

reasserted

None

of

this,

Rousseau (pp. 83, 96). by Hobbes, Locke, the addition of humility to Aristotle's list of virtues, con
and
natural goodness.

stitutes an obstacle

to the pursuit of

Humility
as a

may

affect one's

appraisal of one's own pride or make example of

worth, but it does not enter into the believer any less secure in his actions
humility"

competition with noble

human being. The

those who manage to combine in their own persons "natural pride

and supernatural

is

proof enough

that the two virtues can live comfort

ably together (p. 85). All well and good, different types
he
of

save

for the fact that

we are still confronted with

two vastly
compelled

human beings between

which one

is

sooner or

later

to choose. Luther may have exaggerated but he was not entirely wide of the mark
when

pronounced

Aristotle's Ethics "the Christian

books,"

worst of all

one that

"flatly
the

opposes

divine

grace and all

virtues."12

Even if the Christian

and

pagan should mates

happen to

agree on

many

of

the same things, the spirit that ani

and

them and dictates their actions is not the same,

that is surely some

thing

to be considered in any analysis of moral character. Sokolowski's argument

proves

only that Christian belief

perspective,

promotes one

type of morality and,

depending

on one's

perhaps not the

highest

one at that.

the effect that

tory"

in Aquinas "the deal

noble seems almost about

The passing remark to to be changed into the obliga

elevate

(p.

81)

says a good

Christianity's inherent propensity to

the moral life of some of its

justice

above

nobility,
once

thereby stripping
required of
of

splendor.13

Magnanimity,
achievement

it is

everyone,

inevitably
albeit

ceases to as

be the

rare

described in Book IV

the Ethics. It

becomes,

Aquinas

would

have it,
moral

the most necessary of the (Summa Theol., 11-11, qu.129, a. 5). This alone does not make Christian morality any less but to anyone who is not inclined to
virtues
"reasonable,"

a part of

courage, arguably the lowest

measure

human

perfection

by

could make

it look
and

somewhat

it in the New Testament, it less lofty. For better or for worse, there are not
what said about

is

"ladies"

"gentlemen"

many
tried
12. 93-9413.

anywhere

in the Bible,
and

and

the few people who

come

to

behave

as

if they

were

Saul

Michal

immediately

to
pp.

Luther, An Open Letter to

On
p.

the German

Nobility, in Three Treatises (Philadelphia,

i960),

77, Sokolowski
use of

notes

by
and

example, moderates our

food

way of comparison that, whereas "natural temperance, for drink in view of health and the exercise of reason, in
.

fused

virtue will urge us

toward

asceticism."

No

one

denies,

of

course, that Christian virtue is

more

ascetical than
reflects a

purely

natural

virtue, but the

interesting

point

in Sokolowski's

statement

is that it

purely instrumental conception of natural virtue, which is regarded as a means to a further end, whether it be bodily health or the healthy condition of the mind. No mention is made of the Aris
totelian notion of moderation and moral virtue generally as something (xaXov) or desirable for its own sake; cf. Nic. Ethics, ni5bi3 and 24: rn6i 2 and b2o; H17JI7; 1 1 igai8 and bi7;
"noble"

120a23,

et passim.

Faith
mind

and

Reason in

Contemporary
their

Perspective

381

soon

learned to

rue

mistake.14

Along
as

similar

lines, it is

significant
and

that the Christian tradition

has
the

often seen a parallel of sorts

between Christ

Socrates (who
and

was not a

gentleman) but never,

Achaeans."

far

as

I know, between Christ

Achilles, "the best

so much more

of

"goods"

highly

than others,

Simply put, by valuing some moral Christianity risks inhibiting the devel

opment of certain parts of essential

the soul the cultivation of which may not be any less

to the attainment of

human

excellence.
evident

The from
and

problem

has larger ramifications, however, for it is far from

that

purely philosophical standpoint moral virtue is fully supported by nature that its normal requirements are always consonant with the good of society
a

as a whole.

To

cite

only

one of

the examples adduced

by Sokolowski,
can

Christian
on ratio

ity's

traditional stand against abortion and

infanticide

be defended

Christian grounds, but the reasons that purport to justify it may have to be pondered in the light of other reasons that militate against it in certain
nal as well as on
circumstances.

Aristotle, Sokolowski's
to

spokesman

for

natural

morality, did after

all propose that the number of children not

be limited One

and that can

be

allowed

live (cf. Pol.,

in

I i35b20-26).

deformed offspring likewise think of numer

ordinarily un city. A soci

ous other cases where

strict observance of

the

rules of justice as

derstood

would

be detrimental to the for the

preservation and welfare of

the

ety that has

chances of went so

no regard

observance of these rules could

survival, but
as

neither

Aristotle

nor

any

of

easily jeopardize its his classical followers ever is

always and

far

to

maintain

that an unswerving commitment to them

everywhere possible.

Confronted Ages

with

that problem, some Christian Aristotelians

of

the Middle

questioned the universal

applicability

of all

ples of justice and right.

As

one of

them expressed it

universally recognized princi in equivalent terms, what is

ted.15

universally admitted is not rational and what is rational is not universally admit The question with which we ultimately come face to face is whether, in

the absence of a

legislating God,

the moral order is

point and enjoys the cosmic support that most

internally consistent at every decent human beings demand for

observes

it. Sokolowski
separable

puts us on

the right track when

he

that "the

divine is in

obligatory

from

a sense of

the good

and

the
natural

(p.

55).

The

moral man as

such,

one

is tempted to say, is the

candidate

for belief in divine

revelation.

straightaway to the comparatively brief but incisive appendix that is devoted an examination of the relationship between Christian belief and This brings
us

the political life (pp. 157-64). Sokolowski notes perceptively that the privatiza tion of
religion necessitated or

brought

about

by

the triumph of modern

liberal
poli-

ism has led to the

14.
15.

neglect of religion on the part of political thinkers and of

Cf. I Samuel, 15:1-9; II Samuel, 6:16-23. Cf. Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace,

11. 12.7-8.

382

Interpretation
part of

tics on the

theology. Such
phers and

was not

theologians, to the detriment of both the situation in premodern times,

political

theory

and

when most philoso

theologians were wont to take a

lively

interest in

all questions per

taining

to the place of religion

in

society.

One

notable exception and

to the

present-

day
but

rule

is to be found in the
gives

works of

Leo Strauss

his disciples, to

whom

Sokolowski

full

credit

for

having

refocused our attention on

this problem

with whom

he

nevertheless

feels

compelled

to take issue on a number of cru

cial points.
gion

Specifically, he sees no warrant for the allegation that revealed reli renders "the political life, or at least the preservation of natural right impos
in
so

sible"

far

as

it

singles out some members of the

wealth or strength or virtue or

body

politic

"as

superior

to

others, not because of

ity,"

intelligence

or natural abil

else

but because they are the repositories of certain higher truths to which no one is privy. His answer to that charge is that Christianity leaves the realm of na
political

ture intact and hence does not advance any

teachings that are not

equally

available to non-Christian or nonbelievers or establish are supposed to govern others

"a group

of people who

by

possess."

virtue of of all

the unusual opinions

they
of

None

of

its

central

doctrines, least
human
158).

the belief in creation, interferes with the

the "natural

necessities"

normal operations of

reason or contravenes

the

political order

(p.

Although Sokolowski readily

acknowledges that

Strauss'

position on

these

and related matters remains somewhat

elusive, he questions what appears to be

his understanding of revealed religion whose necessity is not obvious to

Isaac suggests,
eign

as the

"communication

of commandments

reason"

and

that,

as the

story

of

Abraham

and

"may

even appear to

be

irrational."

Such its

an

understanding is for

to

Christianity,
more whose

which,

we are again

told,

accentuates certain parts of natural requirements with greater

law"

morality clarity, but

than others and expresses some of

teachings never "work against the natural

(p.

159).

Equally
of the

objectionable

in Sokolowski's

eyes

is the Straussian tendency to in

Strauss'

terpret the distinction

between the

natural and the supernatural as a simple variant

distinction between

nature and

convention, the pivot of

political virtues

theory. On this telling, the mysteries of the

and

faith, along

with

the Christian

the obligations

they

entail, become another form of conventionalism, at the

risk of

losing

much of their credibility.

Yet Strauss himself

acknowledges the

threat that the weakening of the sense of the sacred poses to civil society. For the
same

odds with

reason, Sokolowski cannot accept the view that Athens is permanently at Jerusalem or that philosophic reason and religious belief can coexist
an

only in

uneasy

and

finally

unresolvable

tension
of

with each other.

According

to

Strauss,

this tension is

what prompted

many

the philosophers of the past to

conceal their

them openly they should un dermine the salutary opinions by which most people live and on which society depends for its well being. This peculiar mode of writing may have been preva lent among philosophers in the past, but Sokolowski denies its relevance to

innermost thoughts lest

by disclosing

Christianity

on

the ground that the

Christian faith "does

not enter

into

competi-

Faith
tion with

and

Reason in
and

Contemporary Perspective
other writer can

383

reason"

that "its scope is

than the whole within which reason

with

finds its
or

home."

The Christian

dispense

this

form

of concealment oth

deliberate

dissimulation,

not

because he is
known"

more

honest

or

forthright than is

ers, but because the things he believes in "do not what is believed and what is (p. 162).

necessitate a conflict

between

Christianity

not a conven

tion,

formulating for

the uneducated

in

way that is

persuasive to them certain

thoughts about the ultimate, the sacred, the necessary, the obligatory, or the
whole

that philosophy then scrutinizes and reveals as mere opinion. Unlike the

God

of whom

unlike

Strauss speaks, the Christian God is not "unfathomable the God of the philosophers, he is not intellect alone. As the ipsum he is both Will
the
and

will,"

and
esse

subsistens,

Intellect

and neither more one than

the other.

Moreover,
telligibility
exercise of

fact that he

creates and redeems

does

not

deprive

nature of

its in
the

or prevent

human beings from he

discerning

that

intelligibility by

their unimpeded reason. Hence the Christian need not prescind from
speculates about the world.
what

the notion of creation when

What he does

as a phi

losopher is
world

no

different from

he

would

do if he

were convinced

that the

is

eternal and uncreated. acute comments are all the more welcome as

Sokolowski's
unusual

they

reveal with experience

clarity the uneasiness that Christian theologians

Strauss'

frequently

when confronted with

analysis of

the so-called theologicopolitical prob

lem. Though Sokolowski is

critical of not

Strauss

on the points that

have just been mentioned,

entirely

unsympathetic

to him and he

fully

appreciates the

difficulty ing in his

posed

by

the fact that one cannot always tell whether Strauss is speak

own name or said or

Strauss certainly
religion as a

merely paraphrasing the authors about whom he writes. implied that many of these authors looked upon revealed

politically useful myth, however cautious they may have been in stating that view. What is more, he never expressly disagrees with them. But nei ther does he profess to agree with them; for only a completed philosophy, as dis
tinct from a philosophy that
quest
understands

itself

as an unfinished and unfinishable

for

wisdom, could demonstrate the

possibility.

falsity
was

of revealed

religion, let alone

rule out

its

Strauss denied that he

in

possession of such a philos of

ophy.

He knew that,

within certain with

limits,

"teachings"

the

the classical philos

ophers could

be harmonized
of

those of revealed religion, and he pointed to

and

the achievements
of

Averroes, Maimonides,
in
which

Thomas Aquinas

as examples

the various

ways

this harmonization could be effected. But this

leaves
a

untouched of

the

question of whether

the

way

life

rather

than as a set of teachings

wholehearted assent

fiiog dewgnxixbg or philosophy as or a body of doctrines is compatible by

it. One may
wish

with the

believer's human

to certain truths that either exceed the ca

pacity

of

reason or cannot

be

nailed

down

to quarrel

with that definition of philosophy, but to be convincing to everyone, the argu

ment against

it

would

have to be based

on premises

that bear no trace of the

influence
Rahner

of

divine

revelation.

Sokolowski has

a good point when

he

reproaches
possi-

and

Lonergan

with not

accepting the

pagan state of mind as a real

384

Interpretation
to

bility, but he himself appears

possibility.

be

reluctant

to go all the way in recognizing that

Using

Strauss

against

himself,

so

to speak, Sokolowski
of

quotes a statement

to

the effect that

ground of

the

"By becoming dignity dignity of man and therewith of the goodness of the world,
aware of the

the mind, we realize the true

whether

we understand

it

as created or

uncreated,

which

is the home

of man

because it is

the home

of

the human

mind."16

From that
not

statement

he infers that
as

by

Strauss'

own admission and

Christian belief need

be interpreted

just

another convention

that the Christian thinker is not required to choose between nature on the one
and creation and grace on

hand

the other (p. 161). The argument may be

beside
to the
of

the point,

however, inasmuch
convention; but

as

Sokolowski has
general and

not proved

but merely
in
the full

asserted

that Strauss relegated religion

realm of
Strauss'

in

Christianity

particular

even

if it is not, in it

we should miss

import
the

statement

if

we were

to see

a simple acknowledgment of of

fact

that there is a

large

area of agreement

between the domains

vealed religion.

lel

passage

plexed,"

The total picture comes into view only when in the essay entitled "How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Per where Strauss explains that the same conclusion in the instance under

philosophy and re we look at a paral

immateriality of God may occa be drawn from two different and opposed premises, to wit, the eternity sionally of the world or its creation in time. But he is careful to add that the results in each
consideration, the existence, oneness, and
case are not

simply identical:
someone might

For instance,
would

have

said prior to the

Second World War that lost the war; if

would

Germany
her

be

prosperous regardless of whether she won or would

she won,

follow immediately; if prosperity the United States of America who would

the
predictor would

she

lost, her prosperity

her
as an

be

assured

by

have

abstracted

ally against Soviet Russia; but from the difference between Germany as the
need

greatest power which ruled second-rank power ruled sumption of creation

tyrannically

and was ruled

democratically. The God

who

whose

tryannically, and Germany as being is proved on the as

is the biblical God

name

is

characterized

by

Will

and whose

knowledge has only the

in

common with our

knowledge."

Granted, in
his

the vast

majority

of cases

the

human

being who takes

reason alone as

ultimate guide and

the one who seeks to please God above all else are

likely

to come to the same conclusion

circumstances.

regarding

what

is to be done in

a particular set of

But there is also something of importance to be learned from the few remaining cases in which their actions could conceivably differ. As a Christian theologian, Sokolowski can hardly be blamed for taking excep tion to the Maimonidean and Straussian view according to which God is essen tially Will rather than Intellect and for countering it with the Thomistic view, for
16.

1968),
17.

p.

L. Strauss, "What Is Liberal 8. L. Strauss, ibid.,

p.

Education?"

in Liberalism, Ancient

and

Modern (New York

180.

Faith
which

and

Reason in
as much

Contemporary Perspective
as

385
Thomas'

God is

position

is

he is Will. The fact is, however, that theological interpretation of the biblical datum that draws heavily
Intellect
philosophy.

on

Aristotelian

If

one sticks to what

is
a

said about

God in the Hebrew

As is

Scriptures,

which

is

what

Strauss has in mind,

different

vision emerges.

obvious not

numerable other

only from the paradigmatic story of Abraham and Isaac but from in biblical passages as well, the biblical God does not give any rea he does
or what

sons

for

what

he demands

of

his followers. That

outlook

is only

slightly modified in the New Testament, which replaces what is now called the Old Law with the new and in some fashion perhaps even more paradoxical "com
mand"

of

love. It is

no accident

that

within

the Christian tradition itself the

vol-

untaristic emphasis on

the

divine

works of such well-known

will again comes massively to the fore in the late-medieval theologians as Scotus and Ockham.

Closely

related

to this problem

is the

whole

issue

of esoteric

writing,

which

figures prominently in Straussian hermeneutics but which is supposedly out of place in the Christian world. In his treatment of this matter, Sokolowski laments
the fact that more
and alludes

is

not

known

about

the way

Strauss interpreted
according to

Aquinas'

works

to a "Straussian oral

tradition"

which

Strauss
in

would

have
161).

considered

Aquinas to be "more truly is

capable

believer"

a philosopher than a

(p.

Strauss did say

more than once that there

is

no

way

of

knowing

advance

what a

truly

great mind

of, but to my knowledge he

never questioned
whenever

Aquinas'

the sincerity of

religious

beliefs. It did

not surprise

him that,

possible, Aquinas consciously and deliberately interpreted Aristotle's text in the manner that best accords with the Christian faith. Strauss was also intrigued by
Aquinas'

habit

of

muting his disagreements

"reverently"

with some of

his Christian

predeces

sors of

by

exposing their thought

and

(reverenter)

a practice reminiscent

the reserve that marks the works of the ancient

philosophers and some of

their

Islamic Aquinas
was

Jewish followers. This is

not

to suggest, the
matter

however,
is that

that

he

regarded

as an esoteric writer.
upon

The truth

of

genuine esotericism

less frowned

than ignored

in the Christian West,

device to

where

for

long
who

time

it

survived

mainly in the form

called
upon

of a pedagogical

which

the learned could

was

resort

when

to address the simple faithful.

through the works of the

Aquinas,

vaguely
at

acquainted with

it

Pseudo-Dionysius, leaves it

uses at other moments in his saying that, while it may have had its legitimate apud modernos est inconsuetus tory, it was now largely abandoned

Be that

as

it may, Sokolowski
home"

traces Christianity's greater openness to philos

God,"

ophy

to

its "special understanding

Strauss

of

which calls

for

a world of

in

which

"the

mind and reason are at contradictions that

and so well

does away

with

"many

the

paradoxes and

philo

describes between

religion and

(p.

163).

The

same point could

be

made more
rather

simply

by
not

stating that,

as a charis not

matic religion or a religion of

love

than of the
and

Law, Christianity is
ed.

linked to any
18.

particular political

community

does

lay down any particular

(Turin, 1950),

Thomas Aquinas, In Librum B. Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, C. Pera,

11,
p.

Prooemium,

1.

386
code of

Interpretation
laws

by

which such a

any rate, it
that its

was

community might be immune to the kind of philosophic

governed.19

On that level

at

criticism still a

that could be di

rected against moral

the Jewish or the Islamic Law. This

are always

is

far cry from saying

imperatives

in full

accord with

the needs of the political

life. As
reason

we

have had

occasion

to observe, there are times when, in the name of

may feel compelled to embark upon courses of action that Christian morality reproves. One does not solve that problem by ar guing that none of the teachings of the Faith violates the "natural law"; for, the

itself,

wise and

decent

rulers

law properly so-called is itself a product of the Christian world and a What Christian theol reflection of its own understanding of natural though not always, what it has already chosen calls is sometimes, ogy to define as reason.
natural
morality.20

"reason"

It is easy, too easy perhaps, to say that "Christian Revelation leaves the
ral necessities and natural

natu

truths

intact, including

all those that are at work

in

po

litical

life,"

and that a commitment

to its beliefs does not of itself qualify one for

positions of
much of

its

leadership history the

civil society (p. 158). Everyone knows that throughout Chruch did arrogate to itself the right to exercise political

in

authority and to impose its ethical demands on society as a whole. Sokolowski, who does not dwell on the subject, would probably reply that this is a simple his torical accident based on a misunderstanding of Christian principles on the part
of

Church leaders. Even so, the

perpetrated across

frequency
Strauss'

been
to

the centuries

inspire in the
19.

minds of others.

with which that misunderstanding has does little to allay the fears that it continues criticisms are not proper to him and to

ception of

On that basis, Sokolowski argues for the greater transcendence of the New Testament con God over against that of the Old Testament (cf. pp. 1 24-29). The God of the Old Testa
"interventionist"

ment, we are told, is an

natures.

God

who

does

not allow

things to be according to their own

set

His

creative power and when

dominion

over

the world no

doubt

him

apart

from everything else,

that the gentiles

but for

all

that,

the Jewish writers speak of him,

"they

speak of

'the

thing'

same

speak of with their god and

gods, except that the Jews consider themselves to be speaking

125).

truly

while

As Sokolowski himself eventually recognizes, however, this super eminently transcendent character of the Christian God is often obscured in ordinary Christian piety. The whole argument, which is as subtle as it is profound, would require a much more detailed exami
nation than any that can be accorded to it here. One Testament's highly original notion of the

the others are in

error"

(p.

regrets

only that

more

is

not said about the

Old
of

"holiness"

(in

modern parlance, the

"transcendence")
riddle that

God,
one

which could cast

the problem in a

slightly different light.

origin of

20.

As
yet

recent studies

have shown, the

the natural law

theory

presents a
which

no

has

been

able

to crack.

Cicero,

the author of the oldest known works in

the expression

is

used in a clearly moral sense, identifies the natural law with right reason, thereby depriving it of its strictly legal status (cf. Republ., in. 22). The Church Fathers refer to it only sparingly and more as a

fully developed doctrine. The first theological treatises devoted expressly to it date only from the thirteenth century and are proper to the Christian West, where the natural law proved especially helpful as a means of bridging the gulf between the ecclesiastical and the temporal
commonplace than as a
powers.

Since the

end of the nineteenth

century, the claim has

frequently

been

made that the

Church

itself is the

authentic

interpreter
natural

of
is

the natural

likewise asserted, the

law

fact that may seem somewhat strange if, as is accessible to the unassisted human reason. On this point, see the

law,

puzzling remarks by T. E. Wassmer, "Natural Law: Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 10, p. 262.

Contemporary Theology

Philosophy,"

and

New

Faith
his

and

Reason in

Contemporary Perspective
and

387
as

"school."

They were first voiced by thoughtful

occasionally
neglect of political

dedicated Christians

far

back

as

the Middle Ages. One

regrets that

Sokolowski,

who

blames
it
more
us"

Christian theologians for their

theory, has

not taken

seriously himself. What he regards as the not the political life but the Lebenswelt of

primum quoad nos or

"first for
which

is

modern

phenomenology,

is

not

particularly

noted

for its interest in

politics and shows

of the extent to which our perception of the world around us

relatively little awareness is shaped by the real

what

ities

of our political situation.

This,

more than

anything else, is

lends to his
life"

analysis a

slightly

abstract

quality and, despite its claim to be "closer to

vital concerns of

(p.

97),

an air of remoteness

from the

everyday Christian living.

of

It is not necessary to add that the foregoing remarks barely touch the surface Sokolowski's essay and are in no way meant to detract from its outstanding merits. They will have achieved their purpose if they encourage others to read
the book for themselves and to read it say, there are
same
with all

the attention it deserves. Sad to

can

few

recent

books

of

its kind that

be

recommended with

the

degree

of confidence and enthusiasm.

We live in

a peculiar

age,

one whose

leading
soon

thinkers are

frequently
and,

embarrassed

by

the continued presence of faith to do

with

and reason

in

our midst

not

knowing

what

them,

would

just

as

ignore them
wants

altogether.

Et le

combat cessa,

faute de

combattants

Sokolowski
no

them

both, but he knows

and

that their harmonious relationship is

medieval

longer

as evident
which

to us as it was to our

forebears. His is

a coura

geous

book,

ignores the fads

fashions

of the

day

and refuses

to be in

timidated
ment.

by

the pomp and ceremony of the contemporary theological establish

It is

also a serene and

dispassionate book,
of so much of

as remarkable

for its defense

of
of

the faith against the latent or

reason against the

vestigial rationalism of our

time as for its defense

religious

irrationalism
a

present-day

thought.

Theologians Rahner
ogy,
and

will

find in it

challenging

alternative most

to the approaches favored

names

by

Lonergan,
will also

the two currently

influential be

in Catholic theol

and

it

teach political theorists to

more moderate
never

in their

criti

cisms of a tradition that

for the its

most part

they have

taken the pains to

investigate. A

sure sign of

success

is

that one need not agree with

every

thing

that

is it.

said

in it in

order

to

be

enlightened and perhaps even

profoundly

edified

by

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On Eco's The Name of the Rose

Joseph J. Carpino
St. Francis College, Brooklyn

The Name

of

the Rose.

vich, 1983. 502 pp.:

By Umberto cloth, $15.95.)

detective

Eco. (New York: Harcourt Brace

Jovano-

This is
tration of

no mere medieval

story.

It is

a paean a

to the particular, a lus

of

laughter,

a celebration of

cerebration,

laudation
of

Levellerism,

and

an epistemological a religious tract

epiphany

in the

guise of a

ending in a holocaust literary feast.

all

booksl It is, in sum,

The story by now is well known, so little can be lost by it. Adso of Melk, the Ishmael-Watson of this adventure, is
novice assigned as amanuensis

briefly
a

summarizing young Benedictine

to William

of

Baskerville,
of

in 1327,

by

Emperor Louis the Bavarian to

arrange a

Franciscan friar sent, meeting between the Fran

a

ciscans and

the representatives of Pope John XXII

Avignon ("Heaven

grant

that no pontiff take again a name now so

an

distasteful to the

righteous"

abbey in

northern

Italy.

They

arrive on a

Sunday
of

in

November
die

and

[p. 12]) at remain for

week,

has

during a brief fling

night), the

which

time about a half dozen

the

monks

violent

deaths, Adso

with a peasant girl on

floor

the refectory kitchen (Wednes

day
of

convocation of clerics erupts

Jesus"

[p. 335])

in

("a fraternal debate regarding the poverty hilarious brawl (Thursday morning), and a mad
mouth a

monk commits suicide with glee

by

(Friday
of the

night).

stuffing the pages of a forbidden book into his The week ends (Saturday, the seventh day) with
and

total

"ecpyrosis"

abbey, starting in

taking

with

it the
of

Library

around which

revolved.1

everything
smashed, pounded,

And

all

throughout, the Rule

Silence is shattered,

and

pulverized and

by
an

endless

conversations, rememberings,
not

debates, discussions, gossip, glances. This is, we must remember,

The Name of the Rose
presents man with a name we cannot

whisperings

to speak of meaningful

Italian
as a

monastery.

itself

detective

story: a or

tall thin English

disengage from the Hound

the

typeface, traveling
after

with a sidekick whose name an

(Adso) lacks only

as a

"W"

the

(which is not,

all,

Italian
and

letter)

and who

is

as

guid,

apparently

drug-taking

young stuffy Franciscan (p. 213) deduces, in the first few

.

man could

be

this

lanky, lan

pages, in

theatrically Holmesean fashion,

last

the name, the appearance, and the

never

probable whereabouts of a
1.

runaway horse he has

paragraph of

seen; then in a

conversa-

Echoing, in

the process, the

Hume's Inquiry: "When If we take in

our

we run over

libraries,
of

persuaded of these principles , what

havoc

we must make?

hand any

volume

di

vinity

or school metaphysics,

for instance

let

us ask.

Does it

contain

any

abstract

reasoning

con

cerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion."

390
tion
with

Interpretation
the abbot he is presented
with an unsolved murder

(it turns

out

to be a

suicide of

sorts)

which soon

becomes the first

"order"

of an apparent series of

homicides.
essen

And therein lies the reality and the mystery: there is no series! in which they are located, is of the deaths, the The
"seriality"

tially fictive, residing initially in

tive"

the investigative

intentionality

of the

"detec

(and

of

the reader, the first time around) and, at the end, in the retrospective
the main villain of the piece (Jorge of
convinced

rationalizations of

Burgos),
the

who permits
deaths"

himself to become (p. 470),

tern first

"that

divine

plan was

directing

these

and who makes use of suggested

the "Seven

Trumpets"

of old

Apocalypse,

a pat

by

a somewhat

dotty

monk,

Alinardo,2

(p. 159), the

Trumpets,"3

toothless Tiresias of this tragicomedy. The deaths do fit the "Seven

but they
491),

are not the

pattern; "There

plot,"

was no

says

William
*

at the end

(p.

and

the

whole of

mystery is
of

a triumph of

Nominalism!

The fabric

this often gorgeous

a

tapestry is

woven of a woof of

detective

story crisscrossing
terstices

warp

crammed with a

philosophy (epistemological and political), the in nap of details about things medieval. There is some bits
of citron scattered all

thing here for

this

everyone,

nuts and raisins and

through

literary

panettone to provide nuggets of recognition

jected to

a course
with

in "Western Civ.": the bull

etNon

of

for any reader ever sub Phalaris (p. 486), "the castrate
(p. 188),

Abelard,"

his Sic

(p. 132), "the idea

mounta

of a golden

the

figure Darii (p. 261), Occam's razor (p. 91), Buridan's ass (or horse, p. 24), and finally Wittgenstein's ladder (p. 492), making it a sort of intel lectual coffee table book. There is even comic relief, especially the convocation
syllogistic

of

friars

and prelates which ends

in

a melee of

boasting

and

namecalling,5

scene whose theatrical or even cinematic potential cannot

be ignored.
list"

The list
with

"accidental"

of such

delights

could go

on, but

not everyone will agree

Adso that "there is nothing

more wonderful than a

(p.

73).

We

must

His gumming of the chick-peas (p. 159) is pure Italian, a kind which is not Consider, for example, the Seventh Trumpet Jorge's cramming of the "forbidden into his mouth:
2. 3.
book"

of peninsular mentioned

family-joke.
connection with

in

And I took the little book

out of

the angel's

honey;

and as soon as

I had

eaten

hand, and ate it up; and it was in my it, my belly was bitter. Rev. 10; 10.

mouth sweet as

Jorge enjoys eating the Second Book of Aristotle's Poetics it's the only time he laughs in the entire book (p. 481) but of course it kills him. 4. The final clue, p. 457, entails taking words as things and not even as signs. 5. A personal note. At one point in the interchange, "The Dominican Bishop
"martyr-dropping"

of

here can only be to Piano Carpini (no relation), a Franciscan friar sent with two others of that order by Innocent IV on a mission to the Mongols in 1245. The comedic intention here may well be to point up the igno rance of the bishop's Franciscan opponent, who does not challenge his facts. But insofar as Adam Smith makes his own mistake about poor Piano (conflating him with another Franciscan, sent by
sent reference

Alborea, red in the face, were in Tartary, Pope Innocent

.

stood up.

'I

can prove

that before any Minorites

there.'"

[i.e., Franciscans]

three Dominicans

(p. 343) The

Louis IX in 1253 [as per the Modern Library Wealth of Nations, pp. 389-99]), that there is some plot afoot to obscure the efforts of old Carpini.

we can

only

suspect

On Eco's The Name

of

the Rose

391
form"

turn rather to essentials, to the particular

content, and must

ter."

of the novel, its philosophical forego completely any indulgence in the detective-story "mat Echoing, therefore, the wonderful list of fundamental philosophical ques

tions offered

by Kant,

we shall approach

The Name of the Rose in terms

of

the

following I Deciphering
.

concerns: of puzzles

2.

The

political program vision of

3. 4.

The

the simple

Laughter7

1. DECIPHERING OF PUZZLES

The very first thing that William of Baskerville does, his "act the abbey, is to discover the location of a horse he has never William's
mysteries

address"

of

to

seen

(p.

23).
of

Seinsverhaltung
(p. 304),
a
am

in

other

words, is that

of an

decipherer
. .

of codes

(p. 166),

investigator, a solver indeed, an inquisitor:

Gui,8

as

inquisitor I

[even] better

than Bernard the guilty,

God forgive

me.

Because

Bernard is
on

interested,

not

in

discovering
at a

but in

burning

the accused.

[But] I,
knot.9

the contrary,
must also

find the

most

joyful delight in unravelling

time
not an order, at

a nice complicated

And it

be because,
to

when as a philosopher

I doubt the

world

has

an

order, I

am consoled

discover, if
(p.

least

a series of connections

in

small areas of the world's affairs

394).

epistemology is made to flow, a notion of truth modeled on the solving of puzzles. The procedure is packed into a peculiar ity of translation (there are several such) in a passage occurring just after William
consolation a whole

And from that

has

explained

to Adso the

principles of

solving

mystery (pp.
was not at all

304-305):

I had the impression [muses

Adso]

that William

interested in

the

truth,

which

is nothing but

the adjustment

[V adequazione] between the thing

and the

can be particular, that individuation can be formal, is a characteristic theme among Scholastics, and it is no accident that the protagonist and his favorites (Roger Bacon and William of Occam) are all Franciscans although Duns Scotus, whose is haecceitas, never appears in person. Scotus, however, had little or nothing to say politically. 7. Laughter, of course, is the classical of man and the central concern of the book.

6. That forms

the Franciscan

"specialty"

"property'

For surely it
gether'

cannot

be

an accident

that the

Eskimo

expression

for the

conjugal act

is "to laugh to "geographi

and
cal"

that such the

laughing together,

between Adso

and

his

peasant girl, occurs at the

midpoint of

novel

pp. 245-50 of a 500-page

book!
and a

8. One

of the

many historical figures appearing in the book,

an

really

grand

inquisitor, if ever

there was one!

activity"

9.
was
with

William had in fact been

inquisitor, but "abandoned

("I don't
want

that noble
with

(p. 31) because he

prisoner and not

interested only in

causes"

the "simple chains of

30).

diabolical intervention (p.

connecting a victim to know who is good

a

his

or who

is

wicked. and

[p. 207]) Reasoning about such the only judge of that can be

ultimate

causalities, he says, "is

very difficult thing,

I believe

God"

(p.

30).

392

Interpretation
amused

intellect. On the contrary, he

were possible

himself

by imagining

how many

possibilities

(p. 306;

p. 309.

Emphasis

added.)10

is precisely what William was doing, and it is what the investigator into puzzles must do, but the formula being echoed by Adso is you should bite your tongue the rendered as the adequation of (even
"Adjustment"

of course

usually

"correspondence"

between) thing
and truth

and

intellect. Needless to say,

of

when

puzzle-

solving is
the

made

the model of

learning (i.e.,
becomes

appropriate

term,

success.

coming to know), But only men make

of

"adjustment"

is

puzzles.

There

are

two elements, one might say,

in the solving
the

puzzles, and

they

are

inevitably
ders,"

problematic

for

a science

built

on

paradigm of puzzle-solving: par and

"sets,"

ticulars, clusters,
or concepts

even manifolds of

particulars;

the patterns, "or

"understood."

according to

which

they

are

to be arranged or

The relationship is suggested in a couple of lines omitted from the translation. William is speaking of "the science [Roger] Bacon spoke of (p. 207):

Observe, I

speak of propositions about

things,

not of

things.

Science has to do
things."

with propositions and

their

terms,

and the terms

indicate

singular

First the particulars, then their

ordering.

Early in the tale, when he was expatiating to Adso on the epistemology of his discovery of the missing horse (pp. 27-28), William describes the process by which a vague and general idea is gradually replaced by more specific ones as we
come closer

to the object of inquiry.

you come

When
still

closer,

you will

then

define it

as an animal.
.

And finally,

when

it is

closer,

you will

be

able to

proper

distance

will you see

say it is a horse. that it is Brunellus.

.

And only when you are at the And that will be full knowledge,
an

the

learning [l'intuizione]
horses,
not

of the singular
of

[pace Aristotle!]. So

hour

ago

could ex

pect all of

paucity saw the when I intellect's hunger was sated [intuizione]. And deduction only my my me brought know that previous had then did I single horse. reasoning my Only close to the truth. And so the ideas, which I was using earlier to imagine a horse I had
. .

because

the

vastness of

my intellect, but because

of the

not yet

seen,

were pure

signs, as the hoofprints in the snow

signs of signs are used

were signs of

the

idea

of

'horse';
(p. 28;

and signs and

the

only

when we are

lacking

things

p. 36).

Brunellus
.

appears

again, in

disquisition

on

hypothesis testing:
.
.

I line up so solving a mystery is not the same as deducing from first principles. many disjointed elements [tanti elementi sconnessi] and I venture some hypotheses. I didn't know which hypothesis was right until I saw the cellarer [looking for a

horse]

Then I

understood

that the
. .

Brunellus hypothesis
(p. 305;
p. 308).

was

the

only

right one.

I won, but I

might also

have lost

10. That is, p. Bompiani, Milano,

"

306 of the
1980).

English translation

and p.

Subsequent dual

references will

309 of the Italian (// nome della be arranged in this manner.

che

rosa,

n.

proposizione e

Bada. parlo di i suoi termini,

proposizione sulle e

cose, non di cose. La scienza ha a

singolari."

fare

con

le

i termini indicano

cose

//

nome

della rosa,

p. 210.

On Eco's The Name

At this
derstood
point

of

the Rose

393
procedure with the
"usual"

Adso

contrasts

William's

one:

"I

un

at

that moment my master's method of reasoning, and to that of the philosopher, who reasons the ways of the
intellect"

it

seemed to me
so

quite alien

by first principles,
(pp. 305;
who

that his
12

intellect

almost assumes

divine

p. 308).

William's

rejection of

this "method of the

philosopher,"

"reasons

by first
in

and

"almost

assumes

the ways of the

divine

intellect"

is

grounded

his tender

concern

for the

prerogatives of

the divine

will:

must believe that my proposition works, because I believe it I must assume there are universal laws. Yet I but to by experience; cannot speak of them, because the very concept that universal laws and an established order [un ordine dato delle cose] exist would imply that God is their prisoner, whereas

You understand, Adso, I

learned it

God is something absolutely free, so that if He wanted, could make the world different (p. 207; p.
210)13

with a single act of

His

will

He

Adso

sympathizes:
a

"Yours is

difficult

life,"

said.

"But I found before.

Brunellus,"

William cried, recalling the horse

world

episode of

two days

"Then there is

an order a

in the

[un

ordine

del

mondo]!"

I cried, triumphant.
answered

"Then there is
p. 211).

bit

of order

in this

poor

head

mine,"

of

William

(p. 208;

Order, in short, is a function of the individual mind; and the way of discover of inquiry, is the process of deci ing it, the type and paradigm, the very
"form"

phering.

The

page or are

two devoted specifically to cryptography and code solving

revealing.

(pp. 165-67)
systems

particularly

William

offers some examples of code

(p. 166)

and then turns

rule

to the

ways of

breaking
is to

them:

But the first

in

deciphering

a message

guess what

it

means.

But then it's unnecessary to decipher it! I

12.

laughed.14

Earlier Adso had

remarked on

the ways of "divine reason,

282),"

which

has built
of

[costruito]
master:

the

world as a perfect syllogism other occasions spect about

(p. 279;

p.

and on the

contrasting temperament

his

"On

I had heard him

Franciscan"

speak with great skepticism about universal

ideas

and with great re

individual things;
and a
laws,"

and

afterward, too,
p. 36).

I thought this tendency

came

to him

from his

being

both

Briton

(p. 28;

13.

"Universal
all

of course,

is

quite equivocal.

derstands does
not

act and they would be understood even if, per impossibile, [the divine will] William Ockham. Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contin Appleton-Centurygents. Trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann. New York: intentions of the creative original). But the Crofts, Meredith Corporation, 1969, p. 84 (brackets in the
willing)."

necessary depend upon that

principles naturally, as

if before the

As Occam says, "[The divine intellect] un act of the divine will (since their truth

were not

divine rally

will are no more

bound

by

their effects than ours are.

Again, Occam: "For

our will, as natu

prior to

its act,
same

elicits

posite.

In the

way

that act in such a way that it could at one and the same instant elicit its op the divine will, insofar as volition itself alone is naturally prior to such an in
object p.

tention (tendentia), intends the

contingently in

such a

intend
14.

object."

the

opposite

(Ibid.,

83) In

other words,

way that at the same instant it could God's freedom to make another world is

not compromised

by the
here,

laws
of

of this one.

The problem,

we must assume, can

is

not science

but

miracles.

The

echo,

Meno's conundrum, Meno 8od, possibility

and nature of

hardly be accidental,
of

less is involved, here,

than the

learning,

because nothing coming to know.

394
Not
sage,
of

Interpretation
exactly.

Some hypotheses
[He

can

be formed

on the possible

first

words of

the mes

and

then you can see

.

whether

the rule you infer

the text.

gives some examples,

Perhaps this is the

of correspondence

right tack.

But it

could

apply concerning the cipher before them.] also be just a series of coincidences. A
.

from

them can

to the rest
.

rule

[una [asks

regola

di corrispondenza] has to be found.

Found
In
this
our

where?

Adso.]
see whether

heads. Invent it. And then

it is the

right one.

remember

there

is

no secret

writing that
added).

cannot

be deciphered

with a

bit

of patience

(p. 166;

p. 171.

Emphasis

Lest

we

be lulled his

by

the Holmesean flavor of this apostrophe

the

detective

into thinking that the showing topic here is the deciphering of codes, William's very next sentence is: "But we (p. 167). It is the library which risk losing time, and want to visit the
off expertise

in the techniques

of

his trade

library"

must of

the

be deciphered, the library which is "a great labyrinth, sign of the labyrinth as old Alinardo says (p. 158); and the library is the heart of the
world,"15
world"16

abbey (p. 36), which is itself a "mirror of the quence of infoliated symbols of symbols. Upon their from their first frightful
Adso
remarks night-visit to

(p. 120), be

all

in

a se

emergence
not

(by

accident!)

the

library

(it may

entered

by day)

to

William,

"How beautiful the

world

is,

and

how ugly labyrinths

are,"

to which William replies:

world would

How beautiful the

through

be if there

were a procedure

[una regola] for moving

labyrinths (p. 178;

p.

182).

Again

we must not

dally

with

the obvious: the world, for Adso the cloistered

young monk, is
puzzle

a place

to get out of; for

what will

William,

the worldly old

"regola"

friar, it is

to enjoy.

Rather, by

be

a somewhat

tortuous winding and turn

among the pages, let be found in the world.

ing

us now

try

to discover the

by

which order

is to

While they are wandering around the library in the darkness of that first night, William recites, "from an ancient text I once a complicated scheme for
read,"

one's way out of a labyrinth, involving making a mark with charcoal or something like that. every juncture unless it already has three marks

finding

at

...

And

by observing this rule [questa regola] you get out? [Adso asks.] Almost never, as far as I know, [William replies] (p. 176; p. 180).
15.

Its

wings and

branches

are arranged and stacked

in terms

of the areas of the world

from

which the

books

or authors

ancient and medieval

around

not unlike supposedly came, so it is quite literally a "sign of the maps, with the Mediterranean Sea in the center and all places located in a circle
world"

it. Thus the

With

anthropomorphism of all cosmic representations!

16.

a condition:

If this abbey were a speculum mundi, But is it? [Adso asks.] In

order

you would

already have the

answer,

[says William] have

a

for there to be

a mirror of

the world, it is necessary that the

world

form,

con

cluded

William,

who was too much of a philosopher

for my

adolescent mind

(p.

120).

On Eco's The Name

So
zle

of

the Rose

395 But how do

our

much

for the "We

rules of and

"ancient

texts."

heroes

solve the puz

of the

Library,

from

what standpoint?

From outside, "But

and

by

means of

must,"

mathematics.

says

William the

next
.

day, "find, from

how?"
.

the outside, a
asks

way

of

describing
me

the Aedificium as
shouldn't

it is inside.
.

Adso.

Let

think, it

be

so

difficult.

And the

method of which you spoke yesterday?

You don't less I

want to walk through the

labyrinth making signs with charcoal? No, he [William] said, the more I think

about

it,

the

am convinced.

Perhaps I

didn't
needs

in recollecting the rule well, or perhaps to get around in a labyrinth one to have a good Ariadne who awaits you at the door holding the end of a thread.
succeed so

But threads
ten

long

don't

exist.

And

also

if they

fables

speak the

truth) that

one can get out of a

tance. The

laws

of the outside must

be

equal

to exist, that would signify (of labyrinth only with outside assis inside.17 to the laws of the
were

How then in the

with

will we

figure it

out? as

"We

will use

the mathematical sciences.

are

Only

mathematical

sciences,

Averroes says,

things known to us identified

219)."

known absolutely [in modo assoluto] (p. 215; p. the obvious conclusion: "Then you do admit universal notions.
those

Adso jumps to
(cf.
p. 208).

Not

quite.

Mathematical
that

notions are propositions constructed

by

our

intellect in
or

such a

way

they function always as truths, either because they matics was invented before the other sciences. And the
mind

are

innate

because

mathe

library

was

built

by

human

fashion, because without mathematics you cannot build labyrinths. And therefore we must compare [confrontare] our mathematical propositions with the propositions of the builder, and from this comparison science can
that thought

in

a mathematical

be

produced

[e di

questo confronto si pud su

dare scienza], because it is

a science of

terms

upon

terms [di termini

termini].

And, in any case, stop

dragging

me

into discus

sions of metaphysics

(p. 215;

p. 219).

There is
constructed

one more piece to the puzzle.

A few days later,

after

William has

re

the floor plan

and

layout
that

of

the library, Adso

asks

him admiringly,

But how does it happen

you were able

to solve the mystery of the

library
inside?

looking
outside,

at

it from

the outside, and you were unable to solve

conceived and we

it

when you were

Thus God knows the world, because He before it

we was created

it in His
not

mind, as

if from the
[la regola],

[pace Hegel!],

do

know its

rule

because So

live inside it,

one can

having found it already made. know things by looking at them from the
deve
essere cosi

outside!

[exclaims

Adso.]

17.

Lasciami
metodo

pensare, non
cui

difficile.

E il

di

dicevate ieri? Non

volevate percorrere

il labirinto facendo

segni col carbone?

No, disse,
per girare
un

piu ci penso, meno mi convince.

Forse

non riesco a ricordare che

bene la regola,

forse
di

in

un

labirinto bisogna

avere una

bona Arianna

ti attende alia porta tenendo

il

capo

filo. Ma

non esistono

fili

cosi

lunghi. E

anche se esistessero, cio significherebbe

(spesso le favole

dicono la verita) che si esce da un labirinto solo con un aiuto esterno. Dove le leggi deU'esterno siano reason this passage is omitted uguali alle legge dell'interno (pp. 218-19 of the Italian). For some from where it belongs on p. 215 of the English translation.

396

Interpretation
creations of art

The

[Le

cose

deH'arte], because
[le

we retrace

in

our minds
,

the opera
are

tions of the artificer.

not the work

Not the

creations of nature of our minds

cose

della natura] because they

18

[non

sono

opera]

(p. 218;

p. 222).

And there
"Ancient

we

have

it,

the Charter of Modern Science.

texts"

are of no use
whose

in solving the
"equal"

puzzles of

this

world.

Only

some
some

"outside

assistance,"

laws

are

to the internal

laws, only

point of view

like God's, Who

to

such a rule will permit us

that

"regola,"

"as if from the only in labyrinth of this world. the And way that Ariadne's thread, that equivalent to God, is "the mathematical
conceives

outside,"

the

world

make our

sciences."

We
of

must

be forgiven this
at a

serpentine

sorites, this shuttling through the fabric

and

text, pulling doctrine, but this, as

Nominalism
was

the

thread from here

there to

weave a swatch of simple

must

be

said

again, is

no mere

detective

story.

the inevitable consequence of a

creational

cosmology, where

the Measure and the things It

made were all particular.

The

ancient problem was

the problem of individuation: how can particular beings be

proper mode of
wise man

intelligible,
a

when

the

intelligibility

as such

is timeless

and

unchanging, permitting the

(who sees)

and even the philosopher

(who seeks)

kind

of

divinity?

The

ancient

solutions, generally speaking,

particular as at

made some accommodations with

chaos, regarding the

lem

and

it

emerges

early in the is

middle ages

least partly meaningless. The modern prob (the Franciscans did not discover

the particular,
world where

they merely

popularized

it)

is the

problem of universals: else an

what
universals?"

In

"Divinity"

a proper noun and

everything

intelligible

par

ticular (God

being unable to make anything meaningless), intelligibility as such? Where and what, one asks, are the
in short, do God's
18.

"mode"

is left to

To what,
and

common nouns refer?

There is
their

"world"

no separate and

of
mutual

Forms,

absolute

simplicity

excludes

multiplicity
it?"

exclusivity

"Yes.

Adso then asks, "But for the library this suffices, doesn't (p. 218), and William replies But only for the (p. 219). The implication for the story-line is that mathematics
library"
.

will not solve power of

the

homicides, but the larger application

the ending of Chapter III of

would

be to

exclude

free

acts

from the

analytic

"mathematical

science."

19.

See, for example,

can

Aquinas'

On

Being

and

Essence: "Human
. . .

na

ture, then,
nature

have the

character of a species

only

as

it

exists

in the intellect.

And

although

the

existing in the intellect has the character of a universal from its relation to things outside the in tellect, since it is one likeness of them all, nevertheless as it exists in this or that intellect, it is a cer
tain particular species apprehended
exposition on the third
men

by

the

intellect. The Commentator

was thus

clearly in

error

in his

book

of

the De

Anima, for he

wanted to conclude that

the intellect is one in all

from the universality

existence which

of the

form in the intellect. For the universality

of that

form does

not come

from the

it has in the intellect, but from its

relation to things whose

likeness it is. In

the same way, if a material statue represented a great number of men, it is agreed that the statue's im
age or

likeness

would

ter, but it
(On 1949,

would and

Being

have an individual and proper act of existing as it existed in this particular mat have community inasmuch as it would be the common representative of many Essence. Trans. A. A. Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, St. Thomas tends to be
Agent Intellect
on

men.'

pp. 41 -42.)

circumspect about these

things, but insofar as he bases this

meant

Averroes'

rejection of

the

particularity

of

the universal, he must have

it to be

taken seriously.

On Eco's The Name

as

of

the Rose

397
"concepts"

though,
sought

as was so

Plato
way?

first suggested, his what can words be but

with all

could
an

be the

"Ideas"

which

intention to

use

them in a general

In

fine, Nominalism,
must

its

pomps and virtualities.

have floundered aimlessly for years until a flexible number-system appeared, to provide an armature for scientific inquiry. (Imagine Galileo trying to work with Roman numerals!) And the verities of "mathematical
science"

But Nominalism

are so self-assured
or

that their provenance ("either

because they
p.

are

innate
can

because

mathematics was

invented before the

me

sciences"

other
of

215)

be

bracketed
with no

stop detriment to the

. .

off

(".

dragging

into discussions
be

metaphysics"

p.

215)

success of experimental

inquiry

("I

won

"p.

305).

There is involuted pletely

science

perhaps one more metaphor that can

squeezed

for meaning, in this

com

attempt to show

the medieval roots of modern thought. Can it be

accidental

that the protagonist had been

of

by

trade an

inquisitor? Ancient
scientific experi

did

not

inquire

being

or put

it to the torture (as in

and

ments); it accused,

imputed
were

"categories,"

then

awaiting

results

that

"largely

and

for the

part"

most

followed their histories, true. But to inquire of

its veracity, to be

being is

to expect an

answer

from it and,

unable to check

satisfied with

anything that

"works."

Thus,

technological science. The categoriz

ing mode, on the other hand, confronted with the sullen silence of the accused (being doesn't speak; we speak, and maybe God speaks), too often retired to its
chambers and the somber consolations of skepticism.
"misology"

Modern

nihilism

is

dif

ferent thing; it is a resulting not from a disappointment with argu ment (as Socrates would have it in the Phaedo) but from a bitterness over the

loneliness

of a reason which
of

finds itself
suggests

so often unrewarded

by the

now-Godless

Nature it inquires But that is

other
all

(as Kant

in the Fundamental Principles).

words, and not even books speaking of
when

metaphor,
396).

words about

books (pp. 286,

the

Suffice it to say that

inquisition is taken languages 20

of

as

the

model of phers

judiciary

mode, when heretical conspiracies and labyrinths

of

and ci

(as in "the book

nature")

and puzzles and even

are taken as

the paradigm for

being itself,
even

then

inevitably
is
all.

the methodologies

investigative knowl

reporting
edge,
and

and of

decipherment become the

"winning,"

rules

for the

achievement of

success,

The labyrinth is not,

phy.

could not

be,

a model of the universe

for

pagan philoso

Labyrinths (and

puzzles and conspiracies and

languages)
or a

are made

by

peo

ple, but for

a non-Creational consciousness the as what

Measure does
A Jew

not make

anything;

it simply is

it is; indeed, it is
within

"what."

Christian

might well

regard the world as a cosmic puzzle

the puzzlement occurs

Socrates'

the context

it certainly presents itself that way but of belief in an ultimately benevolent if

of the syllable and

20.

example, in the Theaetetus

(202-206),

ing

to do with languages

in

their

variety

and complexity.

But the

hilarity

of

its elements, has noth his etymologies in the

Cratylus indicate precisely the impossibility, in ancient thought, of using language as the model for being. The Name of the Rose also has some very amusing derivations (e.g., pp. 282, 283, 288), but a little fun-poking and not epistemological. their intention is only historical

398
not

Interpretation
benign Puzzler. Our
the
author

immediately
A
wish?

reportedly

no

longer

shares

that

faith;21

we must wonder what

context of

his

puzzlement could

be? A

mem
at

ory?

cruel

hoax? A

cosmic

joke,

perhaps.

For,

as

Adso writes,

the

very end, "stat

rosa pristina

nomine,

nomina nuda

tenemus."22

2. THE POLITICAL PROGRAM

The
and

political

thrust
of

of

this "medieval

detective

story"

is

deep

and

passionate,

the

"moments"

its dialectic

are present

from the
(p.

start.

Adso

of

Melk is

of

the

nobility (p. 13)

not

and was even

born in

a castle

335).

William

of Basker-

ville, if
p.

15)
after

clearly of peasant stock is basically British (apparently which is almost as good. And we soon realize that the "bad
a

Scottish,
(this

guys"

is,

abbot,23

detective story) all come from aristocratic backgrounds (Abo the all, and Jorge of Burgos, the blind old keeper of the secrets, to name the
while

main

ones),

the victims

not

the

suicidal

monks, but the cellarer and the

are all peasants and

girl caught

in the inquisitorial

web of

Bernard Gui

from "i

semplici,"

the simple folk. And it

absence of

Duns Scotus in

all

the

finally dawns on us, after reflection, that the laudatory references to Franciscan doctors can

only be due to his virtual silence on political matters, whereas all the others Roger Bacon, Occam, Grosseteste (a semi-Franciscan) were outspoken, and
sometimes quite

active,

politically.

The
action

ostensive topic of the convocation which provides the raison

"debate"

d'etre

of the

is

on

the poverty of Christ. If Christ can be shown to have been

poor,

or to

have

advocated

poverty, then the Pope

as

at

condemnation and

prosecution,

heretical,

of all

the groups

Avignon is wrong in his of Fraticelli and

Poverelli that had

course,
.

preached and pillaged

throughout

Italy

in the

recent past.

Of

the question is
"poor"

not whether

Christ

was poor:

it is

whether the church must

be

poor.

And
or

does

not so much mean right to

owning

a palace or not; matters

it means, rather,
p. 349).

keeping

renouncing the
and

legislate

on

earthly

(p. 345;

Heresy
as

poverty, in other words, are not a matter of theory and

and

fact, but
it
were

of

practice and

principle,

the

"heresy"

at

issue

the

illegitimacy

of wealth as

particularly dangerous to the

social order.

The abbot, speaking

for

the

Establishment,
.

makes

the connection:

gism: P-

The Fraticelli derive from that doctrine [of the poverty of Christ] a practical syllo they infer a right to revolution, to looting, to the perversion of behavior (p. 150;

155)-

21. 22.

Cf. Current Biography, April 1985, Vol. 46, No. 4, Which has been translated as: "the
"approximately"

p.

14b.

rose of an earlier time stands

name,
23.

we

hold

alone."

only

as a

names

Ibid.,

p.

15b.

Abbone, in

the original, which might

be

rendered as

"Big

Daddy,"

if

we mix

languages

little.

On Eco's The Name

. .

of

the Rose

399
order of the civilized world
...

[all

heretics]

jeopardize the very

(p. 151;

p-

155)-

I know that heretics

P-

are

those who endanger the order that sustains the people of

God (p. 153;

158).

This is
logical"

a very function

political of

book,

and

it

presents

in

no uncertain

terms the "ideo

ven, in

our own

theology in the Middle Ages (a thing unknown, thank hea time), when the poor and downtrodden made use of the faith to theology
to support their dominion.

justify

their rebellion and the powerful used

says:

As William

Every battle
guish

against

heresy

wants

only this: to

keep

the

leper [i.e., the outcasts, the

Eucharist how That they distin much is correct

lower classes] how

as

he is. As for the

or

lepers,

what can you ask of them? of the

in the Trinitarian dogma

much

in the definition

and

is

wrong?

Come, Adso,

these games are for us men

simple

of learning [questi (p. 203;

p.

sono giochi per noi uomini

di dottrina]. The

have

problems"

other

206.

Emphasis
of

added).

William
simple

Baskerville is very

concerned

for

what

he

calls

"i

semplici,"24

the

folk.
cellarer was right

"So the
those their

[says Adso]: the

even

simple

folk

always

pay for all,

even

for
I did
was

who speak

in their favor,

for

those

like Ubertino
!"

and

Michael,
as a

who with

words of penance

have driven the

simple

to

rebel soon

was

in

such

despair

that

not consider

that the girl [Adso's brief encounter,

seduced

to be burned

witch]

not even a

Fraticello,
did

by

Ubertino's

mystical

vision, but a peasant, paying

for

something that

not concern

her.

"So it

is,"

William

answered me sadly,

(p. 406;

p.

409)

What is to be done?

The
of

solution

is

not

to

be

a matter of

Christian charity, benevolence

dismissed from the

on

the

part

the ruling

class.

After he has been

imperiously
at

case

by

the

abbot,
"
. .

William, in his frustration, blows up

Proud,
proud, all
of you

Adso:
more

Cluniacs,
hurt.

worse

than princes,

baronial than

barons!"

"Master

"
.

ventured,

[Adso is the
same stuff

son of a

baron].

"You be quiet,

you are made of or sons of

the

[della

stessa pasta].

Your band
you

[Voi]

are not simple men,

the simple.

If

a peasant comes

along

him [as the hand him

Have

abbot received the cellarer],

but

as

saw

yesterday, you

do

not

may hesitate to be
shielded.

receive

over

to the

secular arm.

But

not one of your

own, no; he

must

Franciscan,
and

a plebeian

Minorite [i.e., William], discover the

rat's nest of

24.
plici

His interest in

knowledge

of medicinal

herbs (pp. 66-67, is killed

et

passim), also called sem

with no apparent

(simples) in Italian,
other eats

must

be just

one of those accidents of

villain

language,
the

ideolog

ical

significance

than the

fact that the

by

poison

he himself

spread on the

pages

he

finally

400
this
.
.

Interpretation

holy
But
the

now

house? Ah no, this is something Abo [the abbot] cannot allow at any price. the challenge is not just a matter between me and Abo, it is between me
business [tutta la
of
"

and

whole

vicenda].

(p. 450;

pp. 453-54).

"The between

business,"

whole
"Cluniacs"

course, is

not

just the homicides

or even rather

the conflict

(wealthy

monastics)

and mendicant of

friars;

it is

a mat

ter of social systems, of

"orders."

Earlier, in speaking

Roger Bacon, scientist,

theologian, politician, William

enlarges:

Bacon believed in the strength, the needs, the He

wouldn't

spiritual

inventions
Lord.25
. .

of

the simple.
out

have been

a good

Franciscan if he hadn't thought that the poor, the

the
mouth of our

cast, idiots and

illiterate,

often speak with

What
p.

must

be

done? Give

learning to the

simple?

Too easy,

or

too

difficult.

(p. 205;

208) [Ba
the

con] thought that the

new natural science should

be the

great new enterprise of of natural

.

learned [dei dotti]: to coordinate,

the elementary
needs

through a

different knowledge

processes,

that

represented also

the

heap

of expectations

of the simple.

So I think that, since I and my friends today believe that for the management of human affairs it is not the church that should legislate but the assembly of the people, then in the future the community of the learned [comunita dei dotti] will have to pro
pose p.

this

new and
*

humane theology

which

is

natural

philosophy

and positive magic

206; 209).

Not

yet a political

program, but at least a preamble, and one

cognoscenti:21

which makes

manifest

the role of i
voice of

"Those learned in divine things (p. 297;

p. 300).

are

in their
ex

way the

the

Christian
(pp.

people"

The program, to the

tent that there is one, is presented mainly in William's speech to the friars and
prelates on

Thursday
(p.

352-56).

Pope

and

Emperor

stand on opposite sides

in

the matter of Christ's

"poverty,"

with

the
we

Emperor [Marsilius

backing
of

the

Franciscans
William
of

for his

purposes

13).

"But

...

Padua

and

Baskerville]
man

would

like the

empire to support our view and serve our

idea

of

hu

rule"

(p.

346).

The

plan was that as advisors to

the

Emperor,
the

the two

Williams (the

one of

Occam,

the

other

fictional)

and

Marsilius

would exchange theological ammuni

tion (for the

conditions of
25.

Emperor in his
/
semplici.

struggle with

Pope) for improvements in

quite work out
on

the

Unfortunately

it didn't
God."

that

way.

For

"The

voice of

the people is as the Voice of

Midrash Samuel
p. 346.

Leo Rosten's
cious reader, 26.

Treasury of Jewish
truly
catholic

Quotations. Bantam, 1980; in his interests.

spoken of earlier

William

must

Pirke Abot, quoted in have been a vora

This is the
its

magic"

"holy

in

connection with

the spectacles,

"where

God's
and

knowledge is
one of

made manifest

through the knowledge of man, and it serves to transform nature,

life"

is to prolong man's very (p. 87; p. 95). 27. Professor Eco may share some of William's views on the role of the learned. Cf. the refer ence, in Current Biography, April 1985 (p. 14a), to his association with a "Gruppo "a group of writers concerned with social in the 1950s and 1960s. In that same brief biography our au thor's analysis of popular diversionary culture is spoken of: "He objected not to occasional escapist amusement but to an exclusive diet of the kind of entertainment that neither provokes social criticism
ends
63,"
change"

nor points to the possibilities

for

reform.'

needed

(ibid.)

On Eco's The Name

of

the Rose

401
the whole medieval order of

waiting in the wings, ready to

destroy

things,

was

the emerging mercantile, manufacturing, and civic tidal wave which later
came, in Italy, the Renaissance. (Cf. Aymaro's complaint, new force is money.
pp.

be

124-27.) The

Money, in Italy [says William], has

try,
or

different function from is

still

what

it has in

your coun

in

mine.

much of
.

life

elsewhere
on

dominated

and regulated

by the bar
have

tering

of goods.

In the Italian city,

the contrary; you must have noticed that

goods serve

to procure money. And even priests,

bishops,
from

even religious orders

to take money

into

account.
.

That is why, naturally,

.

rebellion against power takes the

form

of a call to poverty.

and the whole city,

bishop to
(pp.

magistrate, considers
126-27).

a personal

enemy the

one who preaches

poverty too

much

Money
tinctions,

will

be the

nexus of

the
on

future, sweeping away in its

the

path all prior

dis

and

the specter of

it

horizon
even

makes

William's mildly Marsilian

a

parliamentarianism seem more

naive,

passe, than

tion of things to come.

at the meeting.

Adso

provides

only

a paraphrase of

revolutionary William's

adumbra proposals

He

cleared

his throat, be

and suggested that the

press

its

will might

an elective general assembly.

way in which the people could ex He said that to him it seemed sen

sible for such an assembly to be empowered to interpret, change, or suspend the law, because if the law is made by one man alone, he could do harm through ignorance or

malice

(p. 352;

p. 357).

Even Aristotle

could

Aristotle
state,

could not

live with that; but there is also the church, a problem have foreseen. William proposes a separation of church and
power, in this world, in the hands
of

with all coercive

the prince.
and therefore

[Christ] did
worldly
that

not want

the apostles to

have

command and

dominion,
be do

it

seemed a wise

thing

that the successors of the apostles

.

should

relieved of

any
. . .

or coercive power.

But

what should

the

prince

with a

heretic?

The
at

prince can and must condemn the

point

heretic if his
. .

action

harms the

community.

But

the

power of

the

prince ends

(p. 354;

pp. 358-59).

In

other

words, some of the

can

elemental principles of

Enlightenment

political

philosophy
of

"mainstream,"

already be found in medieval thinkers who, if not precisely were no less real. (William mentions Marsilius of Padua and John
startle read

Jandun

at

this point [p. 355], but there were others.28) This may
the period,

ers

totally
for have

unacquainted with

but

as there

acedia
not

anyone who

has

read the words of

is nothing new in William's Carmina Burana, so also one does

good or

to

be

a medievalist to realize

that, for

ill,

not all of the roots of

of work was put

the eighteenth century go back to classical the unearthing of

what

antiquity.

A lot

into

later became

self-evident principles.

28.

See, for

example, the off-handed remark of

Aquinas,

that "Hence the making of a

law be

longs

either

to the whole people or to a public personage who

has

care of

the whole people.

5.7., la Ilae, Q.

90,

art.

3,

corpus.

402 What

Interpretation
we ought

world and

the

do, then, is to strive for the elimination of injustice in this i.e., "demo institution, again in this world, of more equitable
to

cratic"

political systems.

What is

somewhat

new, in William's presentation, is

the

metaphysical and epistemological

grounding for this

by

now rather standard

secular ethic.

3. THE VISION OF THE SIMPLE

William's abiding
respects:

concern

is for "the

folk,"

simple

i semplici,
earth

and

this in two
pp.
201-

their status as outcasts, as the despised of the their role as

epistemological
"lens,"29

(e.g.,

203);

and real

really his Christianity, there

(pp. 205, 206,

et passim).

The first

concern

providing insight into the is doubtless grounded in

to compassion

being

no classical philosophical counterpart

for the

downtrodden.30

or as mere political

It may therefore be set aside as religious sentimentality and of no import for a purely rational and natural sentimentality More

program.31

important,

and

fairly

unique, is the

"gnoseological"

function
Bacon's
The

of

semplici.

Following
simple

the lens experiment (p. 205) and

his brief

presentation of

Roger

sociological

proposals, William

expands upon

the role of "the simple":

in their

search

have something more than do the learned doctors, who often become lost for broad general laws. The simple have a sense of the individual
sense

[l'intuizione dell'individuale], but this

[intuizione], by itself, is

not enough.

The

29.

Right

(p. 205), William

cussion of

showing Adso how a lens can magnify without changing what is seen through it "I'm saying more than I seem to and immediately launches into his dis Roger Bacon's political program (pp. 205-206) and Occam's epistemology (pp. 206after

says

be,"

207). 30.

Aristotle, for
of

example, will concede the

"
.

possibility

of a

kind

of collective wisdom

in

an as some

sembly
of

the freeborn:

for

where

there are many, each

individual, it may be

argued, has

portion of virtue and wisdom.

course,

they

are not

(Politics in, vi, 4; Loeb translation, p. 233.) Taken individually, to be trusted with the highest offices (vi, 6; p. 225), but "for them not to partic
a number of persons without political

ipate [at all] is an alarming situation, for when there are ours and in poverty, the city then is bound to be full of
must

hon

enemies"

(ibid.). The many, in

other words,

be handled,

even

manipulated,

but surely

not

loved.

31.

No

sentimentalist

charming
mate

of medieval

himself, however, William offers an intriguing explanation of that most images, St. Francis preaching to the birds. After speaking of lepers as the ulti

outcasts, he

says:

are a sign of exclusion in general. St. Francis understood that. his preaching to the [says Adso,] "I've heard that beautiful story, and I admired the saint "Oh, the company of those tender creatures of God.

The lepers
about

Have

you

been told

birds?"

yes,"

who enjoyed

"Well, him, he

what

they

told you was mistaken, or, rather,

When Francis

spoke to the people of the

went out on

to the

cemetery
I

and

it's a story the order has revised today. city and its magistrates and saw they didn't understand began preaching to ravens and magpies, to hawks, to raptors

feeding

corpses."

"What

horrible

thing!"

said.

(p. 202)

On Eco's The Name

simple
. .

of

the Rose

403

grasp (p. 205;

truth of their own, perhaps truer than that of the doctors of the church

p. 208).

The
are

lens,

we

remember,

made

things more
of

visible,32

and now the simple

folk in

"bearers

of a truth

different from that

William

wise"

the

(p. 285), their

natural

sight

into "the
How

individual."

continues:
so

are we to remain close to the experience of the simple,

maintaining,

to speak, their operative virtue [la virtii operativa], the the transformation and

capacity
was

betterment

of their world?

This

working toward the problem for Bacon

of

(pp. 205-206;

p. 208).

And Bacon's

solution

legislation

by

the people under the

direction

of

those

learned in the "new

p.

Magic"

is

"splendid

enterprise"

(Adso's expression,

206)

which

Bacon

and

William both think is

possible.

the

we must be sure that the simple are right in possessing the sense of individual [l'intuizione dell'individuale], which is the only good kind [l'unica buona]. However, if the sense of the individual [l'intuizione dell'individuale] is the good

But to believe in it

only

[l'unica

buona], how
which

will science succeed

in recomposing

[ricomporre]
will

the

universal

laws through

and,
p.

interpreting
209)

which, the good magic

become

functional [operativa]? (p. 206;

Adso

asks

how it

can

be done. William
Occam."

says

he "no longer

know[s],"

and re

fers to

"my

friend William
doubts in my
How
without

of

He has

sown
=

mind.

[giusta,
cannot

correct], the
prove. a

proposition can

Because if only the sense of the individual is just that identical causes have identical effects is
universal

difficult to lift

I discover the
an

bond that

orders all things

if I
The

finger

ment all relations

the relations

of position

creating infinity between my finger

ways

of new entities?

For

with such a move

and all other objects change.

[relazioni]

are

the

[il rapporto] between the

modo] is

single

[modi] in which my mind perceives the connections entities, but what is the guarantee that this [questo
PP-

universal and stable?

(pp. 206-207;

209-10)

"Intuition

singular,"

of

the

he had said,
But

when now

talking

about

his

discovery
other

of

the horse (p. 28), is "full

knowledge."

the

individual breeds

indi

viduals, like frost

upon a windowpane, and

the mind, in its effort to discover the

laws
from

of

their

interconnections, is
not

overwhelmed

by

ceptions.

This is

Nominalism

at

its

simplest

the multiplicity of its own per (where it cannot be distinguished

an outgrowth of

what

Engels
not at

will call

"metaphysics"33), but it is surely

it.

Practice is
32.

issue:

and epistemological function of William's spectacles is only one of the many which shimmer through the text. For example, like mirrors, and even light itself William says, "perhaps my poor p. 208: "And when this fork [the spectacles] is on my poor (Order a function of vision, and vision a function of technology?) head will be even more

The dramatic

leitmotive

nose,"

orderly."

But how the

even

abbey's glazier can grind and polish a new set of

lenses for William in

but coming

a matter of

days,

hours, is itself something of a mystery! 33. Or, for that matter, from what Kant calls

"dogmatism,"

at

it from

another angle.

404

Interpretation
worked out

In fact, I have

this

proposition: equal

thickness

[of

lens]

corresponds nec

essarily [deve corrispondere] to equal power of vision. I have posited it because on other occasions I have had individual insights [intuizione individuali] of the same type. To be sure,
herbs
of
therefore34

anyone who

tests the curative property of

effects of

herbs knows that individual

nature on

the same species have equal

the same

the patient, and

the investigator [lo sperimentatore] formulates the proposition that

every
the

herb

of a given type

helps the feverish,

or that

every lens

of such a type magnifies

eye's vision to the same

degree (p. 207;

with

p. 210).

But
sion?

what

has this to do
everything.

the insights of the simple and their political vi

what remains untouched
"laws"

In

way,

For

by

all

this perplexity

is

the status of names;

put

interconnecting

are

it), but
return

all

agree, both

simple and

learned,

up for grabs (as the simple might that individuals may be named.

We He

to William's political statement at the meeting of

friars

and prelates.

mentions

Adam,

"encouraged"

by

God "to

names."

give

things

though some in our times say that nomina sunt consequentia rerum, the book Genesis is actually quite explicit on this point: God brought all the animals unto Adam to see what he would call them: the whatsoever Adam called every living crea

In

fact,

of

ture, that

was

enough to call,
nevertheless

name thereof. And though surely the first man had been clever in his Adamic language, every thing and animal according to its nature, he was exercising a kind of soverign right in imagining the name that in

the

his

opinion

best

corresponded to that nature.

names

Because, in fact, it is

now

known that

men

impose different
are the same

things,

for

all.

designate concepts, though only the concepts, signs of [How would we know that?] So that surely the word "no
to that

men"

comes

from

"nomos,"

is to say

"law,"

since nomina are given

by

men ad

placitum, in

other words

by

free

and collective accord

(p. 353;

p. 357).

The derivation (nomen from nomos) is much too wild to have been without historical justification; but it's backwards! For surely naming
accord"

offered

comes

(like money, in first, generalized imposition "by free and collective legislative and impositions on then, Locke) decree, behavior, or positive law. by

And only the

simple

simple

have

no

illusions

about this.

With their

native

insight into

the singular, their

unconcern

for

word games or

for dalliance

with

universals, the

folk know that laws too

the
pot.

are

imposed,

and when all

the bets are in

they

want their cut of

The faith [i.e., the theology which] is the hope it offers (p. 203).

a movement proclaims

doesn't

count: what counts

The hope that is

offered

by

this "new science, the new natural

(p. 206)

is nothing less than

needs that
. . .

unlimited creature comforts also

for the many, "the elementary

simple"

[are]

the

heap of expectations

of

the

(ibid.),
not

or,

as

34.

The

"therefore"

which connects antecedent and which the experimenter generalizes

consequent,

here, is
"law"

the same as the

"therefore"

by
a

his

experiences.

There

are rewards

for

"correct"

inductions; but
completely,

the

step from the

manifold of experience to the

kind

of compulsion

specifying

the

unity of human being. But that is

is

of a

different

order

a side

issue.

On Eco's The Name

Jorge
the
puts

of

the Rose

405
man can wish

it, in

another

context, "the idea that

Cockaigne"

to have on earth

abundance of

the land of

(p.

475).
as

For if

all words are

imputed
the ma

names, all

laws imposed connections, then

(or
should

Protagoras implied
"leadership,"

jority
and

rules

rule, because

given the

right kind

of

it can);

Nominalism (l'intuizione

dell'individuale)
it

emerges as the epistemological

foundation for Populism!

Hope

by

nature overrides
was

the given, but

cannot

be

grounded

in itself. The
expecta

genius of

Hobbes

to ground his hopes in human selfishness, in the

counters,"

tion that though "words are wise men's

rock of certitude
compassion anticlerical

their fears will provide a

bed

beneath the swamp of vanities. William's hopes are grounded in for "the simple and his universe is a kind of polenta with an
folk,"

(i.e., Italian)

seasoning.

The distinctions in it

are all

spoon-made,
of

ul

timately
lem
of

quantitative and

subjective; there is nothing for the fork

reason, the

either/or of moral

ducing
For
latent

for chewing That's the prob a cosmologically disengaged Nominalism, its inherent relativism, re moral judgment to sentimental indignation.
condemnation, to

dig

out

on.35

all

grounds

its weaknesses, Christianity provided the many with ontological for hope for a millenium or so, along with and perhaps at the cost of its for Nominalism. Now only the hope remains, politically, and with merely naming as the mode of science. William reflects, towards
has

support

it the

residue of

the end:

I have

never

doubted the truth himself in the

of

signs,

Adso; they
the

are the

only things

man

with

which to orient signs.

. .

world.

What I did

not understand was

the relation

among

there was no plan

[connecting

deaths, but
another,
plan.

only]

a sequence of causes

and concauses, and of causes

contradicting

one

which proceeded on

their

own,

creating relations that did not stem from any I behaved stubbornly [da ostinato] pursuing a ordine], when I should have known well that there is
then?
,

Where is

all

semblance of order

my wisdom, [parvenza di
(p. 492;

no order

in the

universe

P- 495)-

And then he
order our mind

quotes

"a

mystic"

from Adso's homeland,

you

who

had

said

that "the
after

imagines"

is like "a ladder, built to

ladder away, because
(p.
492)."

attain something.

But

wards you must throw the

discover that,

even of

if it

was

"meaning"

useful, it

was meaningless

Use is

of course the

ladders,

but there's
It's hard God is

larger issue. William

goes on:
cannot

to accept the

idea that there

will of

be

an order

in the

universe

because it
the

would offend the

our

free

God

and

His

omnipotence

[cf.

p. 207].

So

freedom

of

condemnation, or at

least the

condemnation of our pride

(pp. 492-93;

P- 495)-

We

must not

be

put off

by

this

lightning

shift

from Wittgenstein to Sartre;

communicated

William's
who

tender regard

for God's

prerogatives

has

itself to Adso,

finally
This
all

begins to think:
be forgiven these lapses into
on
gastronomical

35.

reviewer must

metaphor,

but that too is Ital

ian. (Cf.

the delightful digressions

food,

e.g.,

pp.

94, 220, 288, 307).

406

Interpretation
and

I dared, for the first

how

last time in my life, to

express a

theological conclusion:
with

"But

can a necessary being exist totally difference is there, then, between God and

polluted

[intessuto]

the possible?

What

Isn't affirming God's absolute omnipotence and His absolute freedom [disponibilita] with regard to His own (p. 493; choices [miracles?] tantamount to demonstating that God does not
primigenial chaos?

exist?"

p.

496)
and

William's response,
ences

Adso's

"unpacking"

of

it

remind us of all

the refer

to secrecy that bestrew the

text:36

William looked
"How
could a

at me without
man

betraying

any

feeling

in his features,

and

he said,

learned

[un sapiente]
to
your

go on

sapere] if he
words.

question?"

answered yes

communicating his learning [il suo I did not understand the meaning of his

"Do

mean,"

you

I asked, "that there

would

be

no possible and communicable

you mean allow you

learning [sapere]
you could no
to?"

any more if the very criterion of truth were lacking, or do longer communicate what you know because others would not
p.

(p. 493;

496)
that point the roof caves in
here,"

And
answer: a

of course at

(literally!)

and

William

cannot

"There is too

much confusion a

final double-entendre,
Dominus."

commotione assertion!

he says, and the mystery ends with joke: "Non in commotione, non in (ibid.) It looks like the echo of a prayer, but it's an little
grammatical

4. LAUGHTER

This is

very

funny book,
"But
often

in places, It
must

and

laughter

ripples through

The Name
and
seri-

of the Rose
36.

as a recurrent theme.

therefore

finally
p. 96).

be dealt with,
against

For

example:

the treasures of
men

learning
"

must

but,
. . .

rather,

against other

learned

[sapienti],

(p.

88;

be defended, not And then,

to

the simple
that;

little below

"You

see?"

William
says

said.

"Sometimes it is better for

of secrets that

certain secrets

remain veiled

by

arcane words.

Aristotle

in the book many

a celestial seal and

evils can ensue. must

communicating too many arcana of nature and art breaks Which does not mean that secrets must not be revealed, but
how"

that the learned

[sapienti]

decide

when and

(p. 88;

p. 96).

He

explains

further: "I
fellows"

meant

that, since these are arcana from which both good and evil can derive, the learned man [il sapiente] has the right and the duty to use an obscure language, comprehensible only to his (p. 89;
P- 97)-

There is later a brief recapitulation of much the same thing, but it is omitted from the translation. After saying (p. 97) that learning (scienza) consists "also of knowing what we could do and perhaps William explains: "Look, that is why I said to the master glazier today that the should not learned man must in some manner conceal the secrets that he discovers, in order that others not make
do,"

wicked use of

them, but [he]

needs

to

reveal

hidden."

rather a place where secrets remain

them, and this [Ecco perche

library
oggi

[like the world?]

appears

to me

dicevo

al maestro vetraio che

il

sapiente ma

deve in

qualche modo celare

e questa

segreti che

scopre, perche

altri non ne

facciano

cattivo

uso,

bisogna scoprirli, On
132, Jorge

biblioteca

mi pare piuttosto un

luogo dove i had

segreti rimangono coperti

(p. 105, Bompiani edition).]

p.

reminds

his listeners that "the fathers

considered that such things should

have been

subdued rather

than raised

[piuttosto

sciolte]"

sopite che

(p. 132;

p.

139).

And finally, putting God above God creates; it does not conceal

all

this exoteric-esoteric

interplay, William

tells us: "The hand of

[nasconde]"

(478;

p. 482).

On Eco's The Name

ously, because as the

of

the Rose

407
an

blind

old

Jorge says, in

early interchange

"With his laughter [Cosi ridendo] the fool says in his heart
est'"

William, [implicitamente],
with all

'Deus

non

(p. 132;

p.

139).

This is
a

book

about a

book,37

book, "A forbidden

book!"

"a story of theft and (p. 394) The book in question,

second

vengeance"

because be

of

as must

well-

known

by

now, is the supposed long-lost

book

Comedy,
Jorge
piece,
cause

the only extant copy of which

of

is

somewhere
and

Aristotle's Poetics, on in the monastery's library.

of
whole

Burgos,

one-time

Librarian

the gray eminence of the

will not allow anyone access

to it. Jorge

is

against

laughter,

not

just be

he's

a puritanical

sourpuss, but for

apologetical and political reasons, as

we shall see.

The theoretical
and

climax of

the book (as opposed to the final monastic holocaust

the

central orgasm on

the kitchen
and and

floor) is
William
of

the last
of

debate, in

the hidden

room pp.

of the

Library, between Jorge

The topic is
of

Baskerville (pp. 467-48;

reads

471-82).
"text"

Comedy
with

the role

laughter. First William

from

the

Aristotle:
we

In the first book

comedy (as

dealt

tragedy

and saw

how, by arousing pity

we see

and

fear, it

pro

duces catharsis, the

with

purification of

those feelings. As

promised, we

will now

deal

well as with satire and

mime) and

of

the ridiculous,

it

arrives at the purification of that passion.

how, in inspiring the pleasure [And so forth, to include

listing

of what the ridiculous

includes.]

(p. 468;

pp.

471-72)

And then,

few

pages

later, William

spells out what

he thinks

will

be impor

tant about the book:

. .

Comedy
of of

is born from the Komai

feast.

that

is, from

the peasant villages

not

as a

joy

ous celebration after a meal or a

Comedy

does

tell of

famous

and powerful not end with

men, but the death

base
the

and ridiculous

creatures, though not wicked; and

it does

showing the defects and vices of ordinary men. Here Aristotle sees the tendency to laughter as a force for good, which can also have an instructive value [un valore cognoscitivo];
protagonists.

It

achieves the effect of the ridiculous

by

through witty

riddles and unexpected

metaphors, though

it tells

us things

differently

from the way they are, as if it were lying, it actually obliges us to examine them more closely, and it makes us say: Ah, this is just how things are, and I didn't know it. Truth reached by depicting men and the world as worse than they are or than we believe them
to

be,

worse

in any

case

than the epics, the tragedies, [and

asks

the] lives

of

the saints

have

shown them to us.

Is that it? [he

Jorge.]
p. 475).
Philosopher,"

Fairly
But
says

close,

[replies

Jorge]

(p. 472;

what can

be

so terrible about

that? "Because it was

by

the

Jorge:
book"

37.

Needless to say, "the

"
. .

is

also a cosmic metaphor

universe

here, like

mirrors and

the rose

itself.

is surely like a book written by the finger of God in which every creature is description and mirror of life and death, in which the humblest rose be (p. 297; p. 282. Emphasis added). comes a gloss of our terrestrial progress [cammino terreno] Adso
...

muses at one point:

the whole

"

Of

course

these are all

meaningless

images in

a pagan context, where there

is

no one

to write and

nothing to

mirror; and the

rose, even
up.

the compass rose, for all the

egalitarianism

among its petals,

goes nowhere;

it only looks

408

Interpretation
book

Every
look

by

that man

has destroyed
. .

a part of

the

learning

that

Christianity
;

had

ac

cumulated over at

the
.

centuries.

Before,

we used to

look to heaven

now we

the earth.
what

But

frightened

you

in

all

this discussion of laughter? [William asks.]

ant's

laughter is weakness, corruption, the foolishness of our flesh. It is the peas Still, laughter remains base, a defense entertainment, the drunkard's license;
.

for the

simple

[i.e.,

relaxation
. .

Aristotle's
the doors

Poetics], here

But here, [in the Second Book of for the mob] the function of laughter is reversed, it is elevated to art,
.

of

the world of the

of perfidious

learned

[dotti]
.

are opened

to

it, it becomes

the object of

philosophy, and

theology
sermon on

(p. 474;
the last

p. 477)-

Jorge is

a preacher

(see his

days,

pp.

398-405),

and

this,

his

argument against

laughter, is
be

the book's final sermon, albeit, of course, in

modo negativo.

It

cannot

escaped.

Laughter frees the

villein

[villano] from fear of the Devil

But this book [osten Devil is

wisdom.

sibly Aristotle's] When he laughs,

cause

could teach that

freeing

oneself of the

fear

of the

as the wine gurgles

in his throat, the

he has

overturned

his

position with respect

men

feels he is master, be to his lord [i rapporti di signoria]; but

villein

this book could teach learned

artifices

[dotti]

the clever and,

from that moment, illustrious

in the
villein

that could

legitimatize the
the

reversal.

Then

what

is still, fortu brain

but

nately,

an operation of

belly

would

be transformed into
at that moment,
again

an operation of the

[intelletta]
then,
when

To the
the

villein who

laughs,

dying

does

not matter: after

license is past,
to the

the

liturgy

imposes

on

him [i.e.,

Mardi
could

Gras], according
be born the This book
of new

divine plan, the fear

aim

of

death. And from this book there

redemption
earth
.

destructive
the

to

destroy

death through

from fear.
.

could prompt of

idea that
this

man can wish

to have on

the abundance
. . .

the

land

Cockaigne. But
the

is

what we cannot and must not

have.

if one

day

somebody,

brandishing

words of

the Philosopher and therefore speaking

as a phi

losopher,

were

to raise the

weapon of

laughter to the
the rhetoric

condition of subtle weapon,

if the

rhetoric of conviction were replaced

by
of

of

mockery, if the topics

of

the pa

tient construction of the

images

of redemption were

to be replaced

by

the topics of the oh, that

impatient
even
pp.

dismantling and
William,

upsetting

every

holy

and venerable

image

day

you,

and all of your

knowledge,

would

be

swept away!

(pp. 474-76;

478-79)
would manage.

William feels he
of the

Jorge

goes on to

blasphemy,
(p.

violence, and destruction of

say that "we are not heretics; "their impiety makes

afraid

our

shine"

piety
But if
one

476).
and no

day

longer

as a plebeian exception

but

as ascesis of the

learned
of

[ascesi del dotto], devoted to the indestructible mockery

were to

testimony

of

Scripture
liberal

the art

be

made

acceptable,

and to seem noble and

and no

longer
at the

mechanical

[meccanica]; if one day

then we would

someone could

say (and be heard), 'I laugh

Incarnation,'

have

no weapons

to combat that

blasphemy.

(pp. 476-77;

P-

480)
of course quite

And there
gets that

we

have it. Jorge is

mad, and in his madness he for

the art of mockery, the use of ridicule in

debate, had already been

spo-

On Eco's The Name

of

the Rose

409

ken of, variously and at some length, by ancient works on rhetoric. The differ ence, to be sure, is that the ancients used ridicule to defeat an opponent, a
particular

individual,

where

Jorge fears the

the

use of

ridicule to

destroy

an

idea

unless,

by

some stretch of

imagination, "the Comedy,

a

Incarnation"

is to be taken to

signify some Particular. Two things are involved here:

property
rational

(pp. 131, 197, 78, 95) differentia and not from "the dark
of man animals

which

and Laughter, the flows, traditionally, from the powers of corporal (Jorge,
matter"

dramatic form;

p.

477);

don't laugh. First, Comedy.

well

Aristotle may in verse)

"later,"

have dealt

with

Comedy (and,
Poetics
v.

as

he says,

with

hexameter
a

a second

book (as

per

1),

and

it is indeed kinds

pity that
poetry,

no

copy distinguished
"fine doings
resented

of

his treatment

remains.

Comedy

is for him

one of two

of

nature,"

"according
the

to the poet's
of

the "more

serious"

representing
exalted nature

and

doings

fine men,

while

those of a

less

rep

the actions of inferior

men"

(Poetics

iv.

7, 8). And in the only

real para

graph we

have, he

summarizes:

Comedy,
full
base
or ugly.

as we

have said, is

a representation of

inferior people,

not

indeed in the

sense of the word

bad, but the laughable [i.e., the ludicrous] is a species of the It consists in some blunder or ugliness that does not cause pain or disas

ter,

an obvious example

being

the comic

mask which

is ugly

and

distorted but

not

painful

(Poetics

v. 1-2).

And that's
ously"

about

it, for Comedy in Aristotle. It "was

because it
was

not at

first treated

seri

(v. 3),

perhaps

not

to be taken seriously; but even if

Aristotle did treat seriously of Comedy in some subsequent book of the Poetics, we can hardly expect, from what we do have, that his treatment would have
given much comfort

to Levellers

of

any time

or

type.

Laughter is

another matter.
pleasure,"

our reaction to the ridiculous For Socrates, laughter is a "mixed posturing of our friends (Philebus 49e-50a). The paradigm is a mild derision,

tinged

perhaps with

pity, a

looking

down

on

the foolishness

of mortals.

There

in Plato, and they must have been hilarious to very amusing his contemporaries; but at no point does laughter provide insight into anything deeper than human ignorance (cf., perhaps, Gorgias 509b). For Aristotle, laugh
are some
passages

ter

is

a polemical technique:

As for jests,
good

since

they may
Poetics36

sometimes

be

useful

in debates, the

advice of

Gorgias

was

opponents'

to confound the
stated

earnest with

jest

and

their jest

with earnest.

We

have
38.

in

the

how many kinds

of

jests there

becomare, some of them

Not in

what we

have. He

also

speaks, at Rhetoric I, xi, 29, of

having

discussed the

ridiculous

in the Poetics, but

that too

Cicero,
some such as

the

presentation

is lost. On the offchance, however, that his discussion was still through the mouth of Julius Caesar of the role of wit in oratory
chs. lviii-lxxiii).

available might

to
of

be

interest (On the Orator, Bk. II, is

united with

Caesar begins for ridicule

with:

"for

neither great

vice,

laughter"

crime, nor great misery

all scurrilous

is

a subject

and

(ch. lviii);

little

later he

cautions:

"so in this,

lx). And

he

refers

repeatedly to kinds

(ch. buffoonery is to be studiously avoided by the and are "far from beof jesting which are "not suited to
us,"

orator"

410

Interpretation
gentleman, others not.
employed on one's own

ing

Irony

is

more

gentlemanly than

buffoonery; for

the

first is

account, the second on that of

another

(Rhetoric hi,

xviii, 7; Loeb p. 467).

Laughter is
being"

a rhetorical a

device, for

ancient

(to employ has

no

laughing
In his

at oneself always a

barbarism) or even a sign (that's buffoonery) and the jesting

hard
edge
of

thought, and never "revealing of of the human condition. There is

that is permitted "a gen

tleman"

to it.
who

reaction

to Jorge

Burgos

hates laughter
of

and

insists that Christ

never

laughed (pp. 95, 132, 133)

mission of those who

William
mankind

Baskerville

suggests that

Perhaps the
make truth

love

is to

make people

laugh

at

the truth, to

laugh, because
passion

the only truth

lies in

learning

to

free

ourselves

from [the;

dalla] insane
That is "love

for

truth (p. 491; p. 492).

perhaps

going too
with

far, contrasting
quoted

as

passion" mankind"

[of]

the "insane

it does, a presumably rational for truth. And we would not want

to go along with "an African

ation of the world

alchemist"

by Jorge,

who attributes

"the

cre

to divine

laughter"

(p. 467). But it

remains

true that

laughter,

the

"property"

of

man, has been treated in step-sisterly fashion

by

philosophy,

which

has

always preferred to

deal

with

the species-differentiating

"rationality."

Laughter

should

be taken

more seriously.

Science

presumes to report on

being

in

a systematic manner.

Philosophy,
being,"

second-level theoretical a

endeavor,
a

attempts

to analyze "reports

on

also

in

disciplined
and

way.

But humor is

third and perhaps

more primal

"theoretical

mo

dality,"

laughter

a visceral response

to some "report on the set

being."39

Laughter
that

flows from the have

but

sudden and

fortunate

cancellation of

of expectations

permeated

the

neurons

(i.e.,

theoria). Animals may giggle

(they

seem

to)
ex

not

at the antics of

clowns; for that thought is required,

foreseeing,

pecting, and then a sudden seeing, with relief.

But
lar.40

unlike

This

pompous
. .

philosophy (and science) the object of laughter is very particu twit does not achieve the essence of great-souledness to
.

which

he

aspires

and

his its it

actions prove concept and rejoices.

it. Reason

notices the

discrepancy be
not compro

tween the particular and

mise

that the

discrepancy

does

the universal
what what

and

(Wickedness does

compromise the univer

sal; that's

is

"evil"

about

it!)
the theoretical posture of humor: it

That is

is different

about

is

not sys

tematic. Like poetry, humor reveals and then moves on; there

is

no

analysis, no
of

demonstration,

and

indeed

unlike

poetry, there is
Cicero

seldom even a

rereading

it.

education"

coming to a man of York: Harper & Brothers,

and about

(ch.

lxii).

on

i860.

Pp. 151, 153, 156.

Oratory and Orators, trans. J. S. Watson. New Throughout, jesting is what the superior do at
that its object cannot be

the

inferior.
alludes to the reflective character of

39.

Kant

laughter,

directly a cause of
Critique of

gratification; the enjoyment must result therefore from the

"play

representations."

of

Judgment, Book II,

40.

54.
at particular groups of

We may laugh

people, but never at logical classes.

On Eco's The Name

The
ter
gentle

of

the Rose

-411

lightning flashes,

something is seen,

and

the moment is gone. Laugh

is theoretical, but it is

not contemplative. and their

Consider, for
opponents

example, the near-fist-fight between the Franciscans

at

the meeting (pp. 346-47), a

an

bit

of comic relief

"made for the

except

movies"

although, to be sure,

Italian

movie.

What does it say

one might

that

piety is
not

not an objective structure of

being about which

error about

boast,

and that

those who would

boast

of

it

are

fools, in

something important

but

in

error as

the wicked are in error (we note that Bernard Gui remains aloof
as such

throughout)?

Piety

is

untouched

by

the squabble.

Of course there may be a larger intention in the incident. The friars may be in error not merely because piety cannot be an objective possession but because
there

is nothing to be

pious about
are

The

battling
.

brothers

are

fools
no

either

because
either

they have forgotten they

case,

human

or

because there is
purport.

God. In

however,

the humor has a metaphysical

But that is laughter the

tematic,"

what

humor is\ Humor is

it

"comportement,"

a metaphysical

and

visceral response

to its revelations. The problem is that it is not "sys

eludes

and

that

by

nature

the nets of analysis. (Can it be accidental

that the great anti-Systemists of

also

thought, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, are its only humorists?) Laughter is a living thing and dies under the knife. There is another reason for the virtual absence of laughter in the history of
modern

philosophy (aside from the natural gravitas of philosophical "types"). Philoso phy is the examination of the utterances of a putative wisdom. This means not
proverbs,
whose context
,

is life

that's why
measure

they

often contradict each other

but formulas like "Man is the ready

whose context

reflective mode, systematic

if

not a complete system.

is theory, an al But the context of

laughter, like
with all

that of proverbs,

its

sounds and smells

resists

is life itself, the whole fabric of lived experience and hopes and fears and trying once again, a con
generalizing instrumentalities of philoso because the deal with "Virtue is
knowledge"

text which
phy.

the

abstractive and

In

other

words, philosophy can

utterance
vino

is already in the Veritas, or with "You

life"

same reflective
wanna

ball park; but

what can

it do

with

In

duck?"

buy

a
classical

"The fabric

of

was not a

system, for

philosophy, not
was

even a

proper theoretical

context,

and

it

could not

have been; there

was

too

much chaos

in it, too
and

much of the particular.

And besides, there

must

too

much raw

hope in it,

there can be no hope (or

despair, it
of

be added) in

a philosophical uni

verse.

The thin
sive

and
at

bitter laughter
the foibles of

the gods and their human counterparts, the deri

laughter

mortals

(that's us,

folks!) is

not real

laughter
the

aside

the biting wit, mainly because it's no fun\ That kind of humor is quite possible in the most hope-less theoretical
41.
sea

ironic

empyrean,41

but from

As in Lucretius, De
winds trouble would

rerum

natura, Bk.

II,

the beginning: "pleasant it

is,

when over a great

"

the

the waters, to gaze

from

shore upon another's great tribulation. remove pain and anxiety.

He

goes

on

to say how easy it

universe,

be, by

right

thinking, to

In

fundamentally

hopeless

knowledge is technique, the

oil upon the sea of

dread.

412

Interpretation
great wit

Aristippus to Oscar Wilde, the

who

a hope-less universe humor reveals only par ticulars, this foolishness, this ignorance, this discrepancy with the universal. For laughter to have a metaphysical function the individual must have a cosmic sig because that's what hope is, in the long run, the conviction that we nificance
particulars are not mere

teeth, Real laughter requires hope. In

with

laugh

their

not with their

is feared, bellies.

not

loved,

even

by

his

friends,

instances,

more or

less defective,
or

of some universal.
which

thing is not accessible to classical science universal is the object, and the particular is barely
Such
a

philosophy, for

the

thinkable.
philosophy,"

Of

course

for those William

with

"no tincture

of natural always

for the

simple

folk

of whom

of

Baskerville speaks, there has

been laughter (and

tears as well, it must be

what ward

Of these it may be asked: If humor is theoretical, is their "theory"? And if laughter needs hope, what have they to look for
said).
life"

to but suffering and death? A distinction can be made between "rational

as such

and

"the life

reason."

of

Ra

tionality

is theoretical; it

puts particulars

into

a context.

And life

as such

overrides the

given, does

not accept what

enough and

is but

pitches
hope"

it into the future. Be

of pro

tween the two there is

vide

theory
is

the "raw

between them
a

basis for laughter

when

the work
real

vitality itself to is done.

of wealth

But
mism

"life

reason"

of

another thing.

As the

luxury

is

pessi

(the

Sadducees,
so too

we

remember,

were not poor

folk

and could afford

their

materialism),

the special privilege of the learned

of the

that
of the

is,

of academics

generally
need not

is their transcendence

hopes in

and

fears

many, their "im

partiality."

Living
mic significance.

as

they do in

the timeless generalities of their

which

disciplines, they
no cos

fear death

and can afford a universe

the particular has

But for Jews

and

Christians,
on

whether

by

circumcision or

in the

spirit

(or from

forgetfulness, living

borrowed cosmology, as it were), and for both learned and simple among them, the particular is of absolute significance; they are mea sured by a Particular and their particularities will be attended to by the Measure.
question
not42

The

is

not whether or not whether or not

Christ

ever

laughed

William

also

believes

he did

but

the sparrow's fall will be broken.

a system a

Only
imum

when

the universe

itself is

labyrinth,

to be sure ("The

max

of confusion achieved with

the maximum of

order"

[p. 217]), but

a system

nonetheless

and whole,

the production of a cosmogenic Will giving significance to parts then can the individual have universal significance and laughter only

an epistemological

function.
course,
was unknown

Such

thing,

of

to pagan consciousness
well aware of

especially
perhaps

the more philosophical

"...

and

Professor Eco is

it (although

42.
have"

(p.

161).

because, omniscient as the son of God had to be, he knew how we Christians would be Again, aside from the implicit Monophysitism, the sweet pessimism of the learned,
God's
omnipotence to make

who

have

no need of

it

all

turn out all right,

observing

as

from

they do, already

an upper tier.

On Eco's The Name

not

of

the Rose

-413

William, in his dour

enthusiasms). an enormous

We

must

assume, therefore, that The

Name of the Rose is itself

evangelical

hoax,

theological

deadpan, in

which an

enterprise masquerades under

the appearance of apocalyptic excoria

tion.

One
dence

of

the few Latin passages translated in the English edition (it is

not

trans

lated in the

Italian)

appears

in the

course of

Adso's

reflections upon the coinci

metaphors:

of opposites

(a characteristically

medieval

theme) in

Is it

possible

that things so equivocal can be said in

such a univocal way?

And this, it
more not

is the teaching left us by Saint Thomas, the greatest of all doctors: the it remains a figure of speech, the more it is a dissimilar similitude and openly 43 the more a metaphor reveals its truth (p. 248). eral,
seems,

lit

The
girl

passage occurs

in the
the

midst of

Adso's

ecstatic union with the peasant and

the

center piece of

book,

one might

say

its

most obvious

func

tion

is to

call

into

question the

in the
must

raptures of some

(as possibility of any other kind of "igneous Saint Hildegard, p. 239; cf. also Ubertino, on p. 231), but it
significance.

ardor"

have is

larger
of

Irony
witty

one

form if it

saying

what

is

not
.

the case; but so too is humor: "through

.

riddles and unexpected metaphors

lying"

it tells

us

things

differently from

the

way they are,

metaphor scientific

as

by

which

Could there be any more implausible to convey the essential dependence of modern political and
were

(p.

472).

thought on Medieval
and vengeance

theology

than this vast and

virtue!"

"of theft

among

monks of scant

(p.

394)?

rollicking panorama For as William

says near the end:

"There
P-

was no plot

and

I discovered it

by

mistake

[per sbaglio]."[!] (p. 491;

492)

43.

The Italian: Possibile

che cose tanto equivoche possan che

dirsi in

modo cosi univoco?

Epurre

questo, pare, l'insegnamento

of

hanno lasciato i

massimi

tra i dottori [N.B.: plural, and no mention

Saint Thomas]:

omnis ergo

figura tanto

evidentius veritatem

demonstrat
nome

quanto apertius per disp. 251.

similem

similitudinem

figuram

se esse et non veritatem probat.

//

della rosa,

Annals
Metastudies
of the

of

Scholarship
and

Humanities

Social Sciences

announces a special

issue:

Science
Edited
A
collection of essays

and the

Imagination,
Volume 4, number 1: available October 1986. Issue price: $7.00. Annual subscriptions:

by

G.S. ROUSSEAU.

from

the

1985

Berkeley Conference, sponsored by the Society for Literature and Science. Themes include: the history of the con cept of energy, the "two debate,
French Blake's
science

cultures"

fiction today, William

institutions, $35.00; individuals, $20.00;

foreign
per air

relation to science and to

mail,

$1.00

technology, Kandinsky's conception of space, the image of science in Margaret

issue.

Atwood's fiction, and the Literature and Science.

prospects

for

Annals of Scholarship, 1841 Broadway, NY 10023-7699 USA.

Contributors: Stuart Peterfreund, Lance Schachterle, George Slusser, Nelson Hilton, Mark L. Greenberg, Donald R. Benson, John Woodcock, G.S. Rousseau.

Affirmative

Action, Liberalism,

and

Teleology

On Nicholas Capaldi's Out of Order

Nino Langiulli
Saint Francis

College, Brooklyn, New York

Out

of

Order: Affirmative Action

and

the Crisis

of

Doctrinaire Liberalism.
1985. 201
pp.:

By Nicholas Capaldi. (Buffalo, $17-95-)

I

N.Y.: Prometheus Books,

contemporary political affair, namely, the policy of affirmative action, the federally-dictated preferential treatment of cer tain groups in American society. The title of the book, Out of Order, adumbrates
a philosophical about a

This is

book

its themes

which

are,

bluntly

speaking, that the policy

of affirmative action

is le

gally out of order, morally pernicious, and logically incoherent and that the ideo logical environment of the policy, i.e., doctrinaire liberalism, is a swamp.

The book is

philosophical rather

than political, and this in many respects.

It is

first, theoretical, addressing itself

and

primarily to the understanding of the reader

only

incidentally
wrought

to any action to be taken. With its many distinctions and

carefully

conveys the importance of offering and main belief. for Indeed, it displays the arguments for affirmative taining any action in clear ordinary English as well as in the now unfashionable symbolic no

arguments, it

reasons

tation (pp. 188-91). But it is philosophical, most

of

all, because it is an

inquiry
of

into the

principles and suppositions of the

doctrine

which

houses the
the

policy.

[B]eneath the
affirmative

maelstrom of statistics and court

,

decisions

[concerning
(p.
1).

policy

action]

we shall

discover

fundamental debate

about the structure of the

social world, the nature of man, and a conflict of values

The task,

as

see

it, is

to

unearth our present as

dominant
the

social

liberalism],
ments and our

to recognize

it

such, to

recognize

extent

to

which

philosophy [doctrinaire it colors our judg development in

(p.
4).
subject

evaluations, to understand
and

its history, to

note

its

peculiar

society,

gradually

to unfold the

distortions to

which

it is

Because the book is

the
reader

concerned with so controversial a

addressed

topic,

a comment about

to

whom

it is

is in

order. on

Such

a reader

must, of course, be
these the

someone who

is

still open to

discussion

the

issue, but among

book

has in mind,
out of

more specifically, those

liberals

who would not

dismiss its

author

simply for raising doubts and offering objec tions concerning a policy which has taken on the cast, among its advocates, of a sacred action (p. 101). Indeed, it is one of the themes of the book that through hand
as a racist and a sexist

416
the

Interpretation
and practice of affirmative

theory

action, liberalism betrays its very own

entitlement,"

principle

that of

liberty

itself

by

by believing in power as the sole ing in manipulative activism with

advocates of affirmative action conflict with representative

employing a concept of "group and central fact of political life, and

a

by

engag
the

patently

elitist posture.

In

all

these

ways

think and act

in

ways which are

fundamentally

in

democracy unmistakably fascism. Professor Capaldi consciously and unhesitatingly draws the comparison between liberalism and fascism (Chapter 7), yet interprets the crisis of liberalism
which are

but

evocative of

not

in terms

of

elitist,

and egalitarian

its affinity to fascism but rather liberals (pp. 21-25).

as a

debate among meritocratic,

and

There is
the term

a terminological

demon

which

haunts the book

that is the use of

which we

"teleology"

to

name

the theoretical position of

definition."

liberalism for

have the

following "working
consists of a

Liberalism

basic

psychological

theory

and

derivative theories
general and

of social

its basic psy theory chological component can be defined as teleological. A theory is teleological if it seeks to explain any act, event or process as the outcome of goal-directed behavior (p. 19).
structure, politics, and history. The
of

liberalism in

Capaldi
terms
tion for the

seems to

comply

with a

fairly

recent convention
not

in the

use of

the

"teleology"

"teleological,"

and

but it is

the correct name and

and

theory

of

liberal doctrine. Failure to locate the demon only

make

to call it

descrip by
become

its

proper name can

its

exorcism more

difficult. This

will

clearer

in the

course of

the review. For now we will continue with the author's

criticism of affirmative action

in terms

of

his

own usage.

When Professor Capaldi

attacks the proponents of affirmative action

view

for hav
ob

ing

"teleological"

view, it is because he finds that

fundamental to their
affirmative action).

jections to discrimination (itself the

crimination,

universal excuse

for

Dis

they

say, does

not permit

the oppressed groups to achieve their "full

natures"

potential"

(p. 120), to "fulfill

ends"

[their]

true

(p. 90),

or to accomplish their

"innate built-in

(p. 90). Affirmative action, they

insist, is

the remedy for

such blockages, especially when the discrimination has been covert. It is the remedy that will permit (if not ensure) the oppressed to "achieve their The proponents use the same sort of language in response to those who will

poten

inevitably
viously

be disadvantaged

oppressed.

policy which gives hyperadvantages to the pre But the terminology is curiously inverted in the arguments
a

by

which are offered

to

mollify the

victims of affirmative action.

The

following

are

examples:

1.

Nobody
and

qualifications.

deserves anything anyway, even by virtue of their Professor Capaldi quotes two affirmative action

abilities or

"theorists,"

John

Rawls

Richard Wasserstrom.
one

[Rawls] No

deserves his
191).

greater natural

capacity

nor merits a more

favorable

start

ing

place

in society (p.

Affirmative Action,

Liberalism,

and

Teleology

417
any
of these

[Wasserstrom] Since individuals do

not

deserve

having had
not

things [home
most

environment, class, schooling] vis-a-vis other part, deserve their qualifications, and since
not

individuals, they do
because
of

not, for the

they do

deserve their abilities, they do

their abilities (p. 191).

in any strong

sense

deserve to be

admitted

(Reflection
the high

upon

the

foregoing quotations can only make the reader dizzy with

these theorists

level

of abstraction with which

discuss

questions of ethics
of

and politics.

They

might remind

him

of
p.

Tom Wolfe's description

27, whereby

Le

Cour-

busier in From Bauhaus to Our House,

to
the

they

too might be

likened

logician

who

flies higher

and

higher in ever-decreasing

concentric circles until,

own

with one

last, utterly inevitable induction he disappears up his

in the fourth dimension

fundamental

aper

ture and emerges

2.
as

as a needle-thin umber

bird).

Affirmative

action

is truly for the benefit

of

the whole of society, inasmuch

it really
3.

redresses past

injustices

and

only

appears to treat

unjustly those
of

who

are

temporarily inconvenienced by it (pp.

In the

134-35).

long

run

the xekog (reviewer's word, not

Capaldi's)

history

will

guarantee the equilibrium of an organic

dividual

can

be fulfilled

and secure

society in which it is realized that "no in in that fulfillment as long as others are
"teleological"

not"

(pp.21, 135). Thus, briefly,

"social
benefit."

we

have

what

Capaldi

calls

the

character of the

apologetics of affirmative action, a notion of

"reAog"

built into

"fulfillment"

and

He

seems not to question this usage as when

he

asserts unam

biguously
needs,

that the apologists of affirmative action are saddled

and

with an untenable

combination of
and

determinism (pp. 2, 127) and speaks teleology desires having to be fulfilled (pp. 20, 125). In fact he uses

of

drives,
1

"teleology"

as an umbrella term to cover certain

features

of

the thought

of

Hobbes (p.

82,

n.

10), Bentham (p. 170), Mill (indirectly; pp. 179, 190), and even Hegel (pp. 170-71). Even when he explains, without taking exception to it, that what liber als mean by (as in "rational animal") is the calculating and maximizing
"rational"

of self-interest

views of

(p. 83), he is clearly echoing Hobbes, Bentham, and Mill whose humanity and society could hardly be called teleological. But more of
now an

this

later; for

exposition, not a criticism.

II
The book is
composed of three parts,

though this is not

page

evident either

visually

or typographically.

The

author

tells us so on

four. The

eight-chapter struc

ture, however, is evident both from the table of contents and the format. There is an introduction and a section of endnotes, both of which are important for an ap
preciation of the

book

as a whole.

The index is
as

useful

and

the dedication to
ac-

Sidney

Hook is significant, inasmuch

Hook is

an opponent of affirmative

418

Interpretation

tion, yet a devotee of liberty. Epigrams mark the ing its message mythically and cryptically.
The first chapter,
tion,"

beginning

of each chapter

bear

which

is

entitled

"From Jim Crow to Reverse Discrimina

treatment of the events which pre

contains a ceded
upon

historical

and sociological

the institution of the policy of affirmative action. The

discussion

centers

Blacks

and

the schools. Professor Capaldi chose Blacks as the paradigm groups,

rather

case of oppressed

than

women or

liberals declare that the

to the

most evident case of oppression

Hispanics, for example, because is that of Blacks. Also,

ordinary person or average reader, the case of Blacks is the most apparent. Finally, liberal intellectuals regard Blacks as having a superior moral stature (p.
3).

Thus Capaldi

wishes

to examine the arguments

for

affirmative action as

they

apply to the strongest and most evident case. Schools

are

discussed because in the

minds of

the advocates of affirmative ac

control

tion, "the

school"

is the

most

important institution to integrated

of

in

order to combat

racism and

to promote and achieve an

of

society.
and

Capaldi alludes,
sions, to
acts of

course, to the fact

slavery,

to

Supreme Court deci

Congress

familiar

episodes

does

so

in

order to

illustrate the

shifts that took place

in the story of discrimination. He between 1964 and 1968 in

words were

the rhetoric about the oppression of Blacks. The

were

changing

and so

too to
so

the actions of liberals. But the hidden agenda, according to

power of government and

Capaldi,

was

increase the
as to alter

carry

out projects of social

engineering

appointed elitists

permanently in America the (p. 23). shifting

power structure

to the advantage of

self-

An
would

(shuckin'

jivin'

example of such

and

in Black

street

vernacular)

fully
was

eliminating integrated schools, nay, nay, ideally integrated schools. A new hypothesis formulated that of covert oppression. The hypothesis was then tested by
student performance.

be that

of

segregated schools

to

implementing integrated, nay

studying

The hypothesis

was reformulated to

say that
to

such

performance

is

a result of conditions

beyond

student control.

An

appeal

statis

tics concerning results

same set of statistics which are

was considered enough

to establish the hypothesis. The

of

establishes,

of

course, the existence

hidden

variables

then taken to be the causes of the

appeal

differences in

results. an

Further
employed

is

made

to the metaphor of "the shackled

a

runner,"

image

by

President Lyndon Johnson in

tended to persuade the hearer

that, in the
and

race

1964 speech. The metaphor is in for life, liberty, and the pursuit of
oppression,
need

happiness Blacks,
certain

having
Such
are

shed the chains of overt

in

order
race

to

overcome the effects of advantages.

bondage
duties

in

order

to participate

fairly

in the

advantages and realignments which are

of

intended to
spe

close the unfair cial

gap

the government. The

Supreme Court is the

agency to

carry

out

the realignments needed to correct past

government

alignments which were unfair

(p.

19).

In this
ganized

context

Capaldi

examines the case of

Jackie Robinson's entry into

policy) through the

or

baseball (where discrimination

was official

action of

Affirmative
Branch
the

Action, Liberalism,

and

Teleology
that
of

-419

Rickey,

the owner of the Brooklyn Dodgers. He does

case and

so

in

order to prove

essential

differences between this

the second

the government's policy of

Law,"

affirmative action.

The

aim of

chapter called

"Twisting

the

is to

show

how

whole set of governmental

laws, executive orders, the words and actions of the federal bureaucracy (especially, the Department of Health, Educa tion, and Welfare and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), and the
decisions
and opinions of

happenings

the

federal

judiciary

all contributed

to the drama of

affirmative action.

Capaldi
He

concludes

that the entire drama is produced

by an
of

his

torical

hallucination

wherein affirmative action

is imagined

as

the remedy for the

results of slavery.

and arguments which

places before the reader a compelling assemblage leave little doubt that the law has been
"twisted."

facts

For example, the Civil Rights Act does

not order

of 1968

forbids

actual

discrimination. It

the termination of the

equal

effects of past

discrimination. The law is Rather it

meant sion

to foster

opportunity, not preference or racial balance. The expres

action"

"affirmative

is

not

found in the Civil Rights Act

of 1964.

occurs

in the

usage of

the executive branch of government,

i.e., in Executive Or

der #1
1967.

1246 of

1965

and

it is

extended
who

But it

was not

the President

in Executive Order #1 1375 of defined the expression. This was done by

to
women who

the bureaucrats in the Department of Labor

guidelines
"needs,"

issued Order

#4

in 1968,
of

and

in

1970 and
and

1971

The

expression

is defined in terms

minority
"quotas"

of

"goals

timetables"

"underutilization."

and of
concept and

The term

is

not used

by

these

bureaucrats, but its

intention becomes
and

parasitic

"underutilization"

on the term

which, in turn,
are

is defined
"the

determined

by

sta

tistical survey.

Quotas, declares Capaldi,

the policy
regarded

ultimate

logic

of affirmative

action"

(p.

30).

The

proponents of

it

as the proper evolution of equal em

requires those tasks

ployment

law. Genuine equality

close order

of

opportunity

that are nec

and

essary to Whites in
"genuine"

the

economic

and the professional

gaps

between Blacks
sense of

to achieve an

ideally integrated

society.

The

the terms

"ideally"

and
ages.

is

established and confirmed

in

statistics and percent

Capaldi
evolution

assures

the reader that he

is

not resistant to the change the notion of

implies. He denies, however, that the change must be in that direction contention that in which is defined by liberal ideology. He does not challenge the should be un he evolves. The law evolution, says, Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence,

derstood from
ervoir of

a conservative point of view

not on a

whereby law is based

on

"a

vast res

"logical

or metaphysical system of

first

principles

nature"

about universal

human
view

from

which applications are

deduced (p.

32).

He

believes that liberals

dom
pian

judicial discretion but

as

not as

applying the inherited wis

a Uto
intent,"

of the past to the present

future. When they choose to interpret it as

acknowledge

adjusting the past and present toward the importance of "legislative

of their view

they

tool for the future. A corollary

is that the

420

Interpretation

law is truly and properly formed in the courts and in the bureaucracy, not in the legislature. The relevant cases that Capaldi adduces both for the theoretical issue
of the

policy of affirmative action are Swann (1971), Griggs (1971), De Funis (1974), Bakke (1978), and Weber
of practical

formation

law itself and for the

(1979)-

When the

reader reflects on

Capaldi's

account of

both the larger

problem of re

the formation of law and the

minded of whatever

more specific problem of affirmative

of

action, he is

the even

deeper problem

the courts and

meaning itself. If the meaning of the law is the bureaucracy say it is, then it is not unreasonable to

infer that the meaning

and

of

any

word

is

what whoever

is in

charge says

it is. The

reflection ends with a vision of

Wonderland in the

presence of

the

King of Hearts
Professor

"the

oldest rule

in the

book."

In

chapters

three,
the

four,

and

five

the second part of the book

Capaldi

considers

paradox of

the contemporary university as perpetrator and

victim of

its demise

by

virtue of
seem.

the policy of affirmative action, a paradox which

is

not so curious as will.

it may

Free-floating

ideas have

they

Taking

academic

responsibility for the consequences of folk believe to be part of the game or the job.

way of landing where ideas is not a thing some

a
"Philosophers"

among

them will even

justify

not

doing

so with the sophistic argument about actions not

following
cal

necessarily from

ideas, slipping into

the discussion a question of logi

necessity where it is not at issue. At any event Capaldi offers the reader a valuable analysis of four competing conceptions of the university. Each conception has its advocates who then create

factions. Without
how two
as the
adox.

listing
(1)

all of

the conceptions, it is not difficult to understand

of

them
of

the university as social instrument and

research

(2)

the university
and

agency Capaldi

disinterested

could generate the

factions

the par

appears

to favor the

research

model,

as

he

calls

it, but

conceives

of

it in

a contrast which relies on pursuit of

...

his debatable

version of

teleology. He says that

"[t]he disinterested
...

knowledge is
It is

unintelligible to

doctrinaire liberals The

problem

It is

anti-deterministic"

anti-teleological

(p.

54).

here

is that the disinterested

pursuit of

knowledge is
the

contraposed to

teleology

and tele

ology is apposed to determinism. But the thrust of these chapters

American university has abjectly

university is that the contemporary submitted itself to the federal government (p.
on

65)

and

that social scientists,

in their

conversion

from
a

edge to

being

solvers of social

problems, have had

being pursuers of knowl key role in that submission.

while the social sci

The university has chosen to yield its freedom for ences, in their bid for the prestige and fundability in the direction
of manipulative

funding,

of the natural

sciences,

move

rhetoric,

of social

engineering,

and of an aca

demic
The

priesthood.
modern

American university, in short, has been

enthusiasts of

subverted

by

empire

builders in

the administration who confuse their national ambition with the existence of a national

purpose,

by

liberal-culture,

and

by

teleological social science (p. 69).

Affirmative Action, Liberalism,

We hasten to
The
us, that
add

and

Teleology
not

421
subjection

that

natural scientists

have

been innocent in the

and subversion.

history

of

the

federal
seems

funding

of

the university shows, Capaldi

reminds control.

even when

it

right, as in the G.I.

Bill, it invites federal

what

That
the

history

describes the courtship

a

and marriage of professional educators and

federal bureaucracy,

union,

which gave

birth to

Capaldi calls, "the

complex"

academic-bureaucratic

a complex which without much

fuss

or ob

jection became "comparable in (p. 60). The

this
path

scope and

importance to the
and

military-industrial was made ever so

complex"

to

federal intrusion
the

tinkering

smooth

by

dubious

marriage of convenience. view

The

reader

is invited to

tragedy
the

of

monster

(affirmative action) that

savages

liberal Frankensteins creating the laboratory wherein it is created. The

pathos of

this spectacle, which Capaldi prefers to call a

tragedy

part of which

is the
of

unspoken

tragedy

of affirmative action

is that too many Blacks

by

virtue

liberal

paternalism

fail to

develop

the necessary skills for the politics of parlia

mentary democracy (p. 153). The liberal Frankensteins, Kerr and Derek Bok, seem to escape the destruction they (pp. 79, 82). In their
stract

however,

such as

Clark

either create or enhance with

speech and

intellectuals

who

in their deeds they can be collated resemble Tom Wolfe's umber bird.

those ab

The policy

advocates of affirmative action entail

deny,

of

course, that the doctrine and the

the transformation of the

the radical

equalization of persons and

structure and content of

the

university. of

When faced

with

the incoherence of the

redefine

doctrine

and

the

impractability

the policy,

they simply

the terms of

the doctrine and the

rules of action

(p.

106).

cerns of their opponents as

belonging

to the

They regard the objections and con fallacy of the slippery slope, confus

turn, the logic of the speculative order with the way things happen in the practical order. The objections and concerns are not fallacious because the practical order is not one of ideas following necessarily from each other but one

ing, in

their

of events

following probably
p.

from

each other.

The

slope

is slippery in the

practi

cal order and almost action

everybody knows it,

especially the advocates of affirmative The

(cf.

102).

The fifth
vited

chapter ends with a

libertarian
of

recommendation.

reader

is in

to imagine the possibility

quality

control

of the

medical

profession

through a

truly free

market system rather than through

the profession itself or,

heaven forbid, the government. Anyone who wishes to practice medicine should be permitted to do so. The mode of preparation would be by means of a sort of medieval guild apprenticeship. For the patient or consumer, it would be a matter
of caveat emptor.

Capaldi

expects

his

recommendation

to be greeted

with scorn

medical by liberal power-brokers. Their interest, he insists, is not Blacks. It lies tion, nor in increasing medical service by and for

skill or with

innova

an

idealh integrated society

so that no statistical or

invidious

comparisons can

achieving be
an

made.

They

want,

in short, to

rearrange and manipulate people

according to

abstract model, which

they

regard as a sacrament.

422 The
Illogic

Interpretation
sixth chapter which opens of

the third part of the book and is entitled "The

Affirmative

Action"

is

regarded

by

Professor Capaldi himself

as

"the

philosophic

heart

of

the

book"

(p. 5). His intention is to deflect the

rhetoric of

affirmative action
which contains

so as to expose the structure and purpose of the argument

"key"

four

concepts:

(1) discrimination, (2)

The isolation
arguments.

potential,

(3)

the

dis

tribution of

talent,

and

(4)

compensation.

and analysis of

these con

cepts constitute

the structure of his

counter-

Discrimination is distinguished from

prejudice

in that the former is

a social

policy of exclusion against individuals who belong to certain groups whereas the latter is a psychological tendency of some people to regard other people accord

ing

to a

preconceived model.

Prejudice, in turn, is distinguished from

and

prudential

judgments, hasty
sion.

generalization,

from the fallacies

of composition or

divi

The

existence of
neither a

prejudice, Capaldi assures us, is

not evidence of

discrimi do

nation.

It is

necessary

nor a sufficient condition

for discrimination. He
not

adds,

however,

that those who oppose the policy of affirmative action

deny

the existence of prejudice.

as

Discrimination,
which prevented

far

as

United States

history

Blacks from voting

and which segregated

is concerned, issues from laws them from Whites in

schools, restaurants,

hotels, lavatories,
begin

theaters and modes of transportation. The

with

proponents of affirmative action

the fact

of actual

discrimination

and

then construct a concept of discrimination so abstract that it takes on the look of a

myth which

is then

used as a rhetorical

society

as a whole.

Redressing
human

device for promoting the realignment of injustices is merely the occasion for the more
The transition from
actual

mystical

delights

of

reconstruction.

discrimi

nation to mythic

discrimination is
impact."

accomplished

by

conceptual shifts

from "dis

crimination"

to "discrimination and its

effects"

to the more expansive

concept

"percep

tion of a negative

Once the last have the

is let loose high

and

accepted, the

proponents of affirmative action

rhetorical

ground. sole or

But the policy of affirmative action requires discrimination to be the major cause of impairment of the capacity to compete and that
means all practices

"discrimination"

private or

public, past,

present or

future,

actual or per

ceived to

be

actual

that hinder "full

not

participation."

ing

to

Capaldi, is
second

demonstrable,

since

This requirement, accord many other causes can be cited for

assumes

such

impairment.
"key"

The

concept shows
of

that the affirmative action argument

and

that someone is a victim

discrimination if
Capaldi
"potential"

merely if he has

not

been

al

lowed to

develop
to

his full

potential. and

urges

the reader that such a

correla appli

tion between
cable not

"discrimination"

is

so

all-embracing
or group. of

that it is

Blacks but to nearly every individual only correlation is that its entails the total
"logic"

The

point of the

reordering
as

Capaldi doubts the

ment. at

coherence of the notion of

an

"potential"

society (p. it is used in the

an
"potentials"

124).
argu and

He

can

imagine

indefinite

"potentials"

number of

for

individual

the same time eliminate a host of others. There might be

which

conflict with one another such that the

development

of some preclude the devel-

Affirmative Action, Liberalism,

opment of others.

and

Teleology

423
such an untenable re

The

concept of
of

"potential"

is forced into

lationship
tions of
evaporate

with

the doctrine
liberty"

"causal

determinism"

that whatever residual no

"individual
(pp.
"key"

"responsibility"

and

remain

in the

argument tend to

125-28).
concept

The third
tribution of
"potential"

in the

argument

for

affirmative action
use of

is that

of

"dis
the

talent."

Two

assumptions reside

in the

this concept,

(1)

of

Blacks is

equivalent

to that of Whites and

(2)

the distribution of

talent
whole

is proportionately equal to the percentage of Blacks and Whites in the population. The reader is warned, however, about a shift in the use of the
talent.
argument

notion of

The
those

begins

with an acknowledgment

that the talents in question are

ends with

which are relevant

in

competitive

technological society and

the

promotion of

talents that are relevant to another kind of society which is noncom

petitive and nontechnological.

The

shift

is

performed through a sermon to change

the

fundamental

views and modes of conduct that are characteristic of

not give examples of seem

Western

society.
action

Although Capaldi does

the fundamental

views and

he is thinking about, he does

a

to have in mind the sort of things that

ethic"

the sermonizers have called snidely "the work

or

"Western

manners."

The

shift, he stresses, entails

different

conception of affirmative action. game

It is

not a

policy intended to game (p. 129).

allow

Blacks into the

but

one

intended to

change

the

If, however,
bution
of

"talent"

means what

is generally

understood and agreed

upon,

then there can be no empirical evidence, Capaldi asserts, for the presumed distri
notions of racial intelligence and of group superi intelligence and other talents are properties of individuals, not ority, arguing that of groups. The demand for evidence of a correlation between discrimination and

talent. He rejects the

distribution
unequal

of

talent

is
of

met with a response which

distribution is

talent is due to discrimination but the

is transparently circular, i.e., evidence of dis fact is, he says, that

no one

crimination

unequal

distribution

of

talent. The

knows,

short of actual

achievement, how talent is distributed. The advocates of

affirmative action

do

not offer

independent

measurement of
"talent"

talent prior to
so that

dis

it may be crimination. They do not even clarify the grasped independently of the notion of discrimination. But they do fall back on the rhetorical tactic of charging their critics with racism. They insist either on the
notion of

belief that
upon the vinced ment

objective criteria are not prognosticators of professional success or

are no objective criteria. They remain supremely con been no discrimination, distribution of talent and achieve had there that, balanced a conviction which is a matter of blind faith. would be racially

belief that there

Other explanations, if they

torily.

occur

to these

advocates at

all, are dismissed peremp

"compensation"

The be
as

concept of

as employed as that of made to victims of and

by

them is shown

by

Capaldi to

"discrimination."

hazy

and

inapplicable

order that compensation

person or persons at

be

What they must do, in discrimination, is (1) name the

that

fault,

(2) demonstrate

it

was

discrimination that

424

Interpretation
led to the

caused or

inability

to compete. (Although Capaldi does not mention

it

at

this point, he

the persons to

crimination"

would surely add a third condition, viz., (3) they must identify be compensated.) Because these advocates use the notion of "dis as a theoretical term rather than as the description of an actual state

of

affairs,

tional social

i.e., because they use it forces, they disqualify

(p.
134).

to denominate an
themselves

infinite

series of uninten

from four

a coherent use of

the term

"compensation"

Since the
validity
since

coherent and proper use of

these

concepts

is

essential

for the

and soundness of advocates of

the argument

for the policy

of affirmative

action, and

the

this policy do not use these concepts coherently and prop

erly, then the

soundness

argument

is devoid

of

the

essential components

for validity

and

(pp.

188-91).

The

penultimate chapter which

is

concerned with

the politics

of affirmative

action contains several controversial claims.

They

are not so

because they

are ar

bitrary

or

merely

polemical.

Every

claim

is the

result of a

tightly

reasoned and

The controversy stems from the fact that the claims are contrary to the predominant opinions in the predominantly liberal intellectual es tablishments. Among these claims are (1) liberal state activism which created the
reasonable argument.

policy of affirmative action erodes the democratic process, a frequently ism in the name of eliminating oppression
sion

(2) liberal

state activ

prefabricated oppres pro

(pp. 144-48),

which

is then

used as a pretext

for further bureaucratic

and

liferation
cism

and more state activism

is fascist in theory

practice, and
not

(3) fas
is

is essentially and historically a movement of the left 156-57). A not so incidental feature of Capaldi's discussion

the right (pp.

of state activism

the conception of the nature and role of law used to

names

justify

the activism. He

the two schools of thought which dominate the law schools and prevail in
of

the interpretation

law, i.e.,

positivism and minor

the so-called American realism.

schools proceed

Capaldi
same

says

that despite their

differences, both

from the
the

principles, namely, the denial that law is based on

moral grounds and

affirmation of a more restricted notion of

tifically"

law whereby it is conceived of "scien and from a presumably value-free perspective. Although he chose not to, Capaldi might have added an ironic touch to his argument by quoting a locus
classicus

for

such a view of

law, Hans Kelsen's General Theory

it glibly
and confidently:

of Law

and

State, for example,

As
used

which states

in these

investigations,

the concept of law

has

no moral connotation whatso

ever.

It designates

a specific technique of social organization.

a problem of social

The

problem of

law,
.

as a scientific

problem, is

To free the stantly

concept of

technique, not a problem of morals law from the idea of justice is difficult because both are con
in
general speech

confused
p. 5).

in

nonscientific political thought as well as

(Kelsen,

Not only can such a conception of law but it is hardly scientific. For it would be

not

say anything important

about

law,
that

committed to such a view of

facts

Affirmative Action, Liberalism,

the proponent of this view would
book"

and

Teleology

425
"He
stole

have to hold that

such statements as

the
expressed
"stole"

is

not a

fact

or a

description. He
plus a

in the

"stole,"

word

signifies someone's
"fact"

(or

would say that it is a value judgment, The word fact, i.e., "He took the disapproval superimposed upon the "society's")
book."

of

taking
use

the book.
proposition

Not to
affairs

the

"He

stole the

book"

for

such an event or state of

is

not

to

describe that
not

event.

Not to

understand the proposition as a state

proposition

ment of

fact is
the

to understand the proposition. To claim that the

cannot

"He
that

book"

stole

be

used

to assert a fact

is

so

anyone who says so cannot

be trusted to law

recognize

perversely ideological facts nor to be scientific

(Law is

about

anything, let

alone

law.
which stresses will

It is this
whatsover

positivistic view of

and sanction

the sovereign wills or commands) coupled with the so-called legal re

alist's view

(that law is

not what

the

legislators frame but

Welfare

what

the judges

decide)

that causes

Capaldi to declare that it

of

comes as no surprise that the and

lawyers in the

department

Health, Education

and

in the Equal Employment

Op

portunity Commission did what they did with affirmative action (i.e., push peo ple around) (p. 150). The corridors of the law are not insulated against the echoes
of

barbarism. The

overall

federal judges is

who subscribed

strategy did depend, of course, on there to liberal social doctrine. Since the

being
view

enough

that law

an extension of social science

ciples on which

has become prevalent, Capaldi asks for the prin the judges decide. He answers that they do in fact anticipate the decisions in the form
required

consequences of their

by

social scientists.

Law be

comes, he sadly concludes, "an instrument of social engineering for achieving (p. 150). It is communal ends insofar as they are elicited by the social
scientists"

court activism and the pretext of

the tell-tale

signs of

performing scientific social activity doctrinaire liberalism's affair with fascism.

which are

In his final

chapter

Capaldi distinguishes the kinds

of

liberalism

differently

from the way he does in his first chapter. The later distinction is historical as one between classical liberalism and modern liberalism. He means by "classical lib no reference to ancient views of freedom but rather the views found in
eralism"

the

Whig party in England after 1832 and as expressed in the thought of Jeremy Bentham. In order to achieve the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest
people,
certain conditions must

number of

be

met.

For the

classical

liberal,

these

conditions are called rights. concept ern

The

modern

liberal

calls

them needs. The shift in

as the mod

has

rhetorical advantages,

according to Capaldi, inasmuch

liberal

appears

to

assert a scientific or empirical claim rather

"need,"

than a value

judgment. The

concept of
polemical power.

moreover,

has, therefore,
called

Anyone

who

designates something basic and questions or denies a need can be

insensitive

or malicious.
proponent of

If the
the

satisfaction of a need

does

not

lead to

antic a

ipated results, the

necessary
ever,

need cannot

be blamed,

since a need

is but

condition not a sufficient condition of anticipated results.

Need, how

need not

be

recognized

by

those who have them. Thus the occasion for

426

Interpretation
is
contrived

"consciousness-raising"

in

order

that the populace

be

educated as

to

its
(p.

"true"

needs.

cation and

is ready with relish to assume the task of edu thereby increases its bureaucratic growth in a geometric progression The
activist state
conceptual shift

172).

Capaldi locates the

alism through

from

classical

liberalism to

modern

liber

a concomitant geographical
root

shift

from England to the United Woodrow Wilson

might

States

where

it took

in the thought
of
Society"

and policies of

and

flowered in the "New

that

Deal"

Franklin Roosevelt. Capaldi

of

have

added

it bore fruit in the "Great

Lyndon Johnson
and

and was

brought to
in those

harvest

during the

"regimes"

of

Richard Nixon

Jimmy

Carter. It

was

last two

"regimes"

that the millennialist

character of modern

liberalism betrayed

itself,

since

the policy of affirmative

action confirmed

the transformation of the

concept of

security

through

freedom through equality of opportunity into a collectivist notion of equality of result. Inspired by their purity of heart and their pity, liberals
wish

the modern

to "realign

society,"

as

Capaldi

puts

it, i.e.,

to trans

form human beings into something they have never been, by means of the cre ative power of the state. Since the church could not bring about the kingdom of
heaven
the
on

time and in temple

of

time, its missionary

the state
with

spirit will achieve greater success

in

realistic

the university as its sanctuary. the reader, cannot resist or oppose the
within

Classical liberalism, Capaldi

cause so

reminds

preferential policies of the modern

liberals, especially

the universities, be

it

shares

their basic premises and their basic philosophical orientation. And

Capaldi

eases

his book toward

dream"

a conclusion with a variation on one of

his
al

liberalism. His final words, ternative to the "impossible of liberalism.

themes the crisis of

although

brief,

proffer

the

Our tradition is
precedents

epitomized

in Anglo-Saxon
set of

jurisprudence,
It is
a

a tradition of multiple

not a

deductive

first

principles.

tradition that evolves out of

a

the past, not one that progresses to a mythical

not collectivism.
utilitarian

future. It is

tradition of

individualism,
human

We

must not confuse

this individualism
of

with

the classical liberalmeans that

interpretation [reviewer's emphasis]

it. Individualism

beings

are autonomous moral agents

choices and

living

older and stronger

well as

[reviewer's emphasis] responsible for their according to self-imposed rules. This individualism is the result currents of thought. It existed as an ideal in the Renaissance as
even
an

of

in the Reformation. It

has

medieval roots

in the dispute But

about whether

the active

intellect

was

found in

individual

soul or a group.

most relevant

for

our

purposes, it has

deep

roots

in the Anglo-Saxon tradition judge

of common

law.

The

great

danger to this tradition is

some Utopian metaphysical vision that

of what

fosters

paternalism

by

making the

state the

the individual is (p. 179).

Ill
If it be
so

that

doctrinaire liberalism is

the

dominant
and

ideology

both in the

uni

versities and

in the communications

industry,

there is

no counter-evidence

for this

not

being

so, then Professor Capaldi has

written not

only

soundly

ar-

Affirmative Action, Liberalism,

gued and

and

Teleology

421
which

book but

a courageous one.
are

For the domains in

he lives

and moves

has his

being

the domains of the university

and of

publishing
The

domains
For in
at
"priests,"

which

have their
a

own

holy

ikons
acted

and

naturally their

own priesthood.

tacking holy ikon, he has not the gods, are sure to be

meantime some

angry.

heretically May his own

and sacrilegiously.

guardians protect
nor

him! In the

friendly

criticism will neither

wrong him

harm him.

doctrine of human nature and of morality as a species doctrine is, at least, misleading and, at most, false. Throughout the book, Capaldi calls the theory which is used to justify affirmative action
To
regard

the utilitarian

of teleological

policy

teleology. Yet on the last page of the text and in an endnote, he calls the
"liberal-utilitarianism,"

theory
mon.

the
on

more precise and accurate name

for his de
might

Why,

then does he insist

predilections.

the name, teleology? The answer

answer

lie in

his Humean
among
which

But the better

lies in the
of ethics. and

recent convention

analytic philosophers

in their discussions
of ethics which

It is the

convention
moral

is found in textbooks

distinguish Such
Plato is

classify

doc

trines as either teleological or deontological.

"Whiggish"

anachronistic or a rationalist and

labels

are not much more

instructive than to
Our

call

idealist

or

Aristotle
such

an empiricist and realist. with

complaint

not with

the use of labels as

ex

but

the use of unnecessary,

inappropriate,
29.

or

imprecise labels. An

ample of a

textbook which classifies utilitarian ethics as teleological

pp.

is William

Frankena's Ethics (1963),

13,

Another is Jacques Thiroux's Ethics

with

(1977),

p.

28,

where

the distinction is used alternatively

that between

consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories of ethics.

consequentialist

theory is
is
vention

equivalent

to a teleological theory,

while a nonconsequentialist

theory
con

equivalent

to a deontological theory. Still another textbook to accept the

p.

is Tom Beauchamp's Philosophical Ethics (1982),

result of

73.

The

use of

these classifications has the

regarding
also

not

only the

modern positions of

Hobbes, Hume, Bentham

teleological

and

Mill but

the

ancient position of

Epicurus

as

hedonism

as well as egoism are taken as

and

kinds

of

teleologism.
as

Thus Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, Mill

ethics

Epicurus
and

share

the same

bed,

far

as

is concerned,
of

with

Plato, Aristotle,
this

Aquinas.

One

the

problems with

convention

is the

confusion

between is

a conse a cause.
and ends

quence and an end.

A is

consequence

is

an effect of an action, an end

Furthermore,
"purpose"

an end

not a purpose,

despite the fact that the All

sorts of

"end"

words

are

frequently
computers.

used synonymously.

things

have

knives, trees,
which

Purposes, however belong

Purposes
are motives which

to intelligent agents

by

they

perform actions.

direct

and move agents.

The

end of a

tree

is to grow, take

nourishment and reproduce.

The tree Ends

executes

no purpose poses

in reproducing

whereas make

human

agents

may

use a tree
etc.

for landscaping, to
of
"purpose,"

furniture,

to hide

behind,

for many pur exist inde

pendently The term

human beings willing them; purposes stem from their however, is synonymous with the term
"end"
"purpose"

being

willed.

"intention."

Many
ac-

"intention."

authors, Capaldi included,

use

the term

to

mean

or

Another

problem with

the

convention comes

from the intention to classify

428

Interpretation
the
presumption

counts of ethics on

that the fact-value distinction is griindlich,

theories at the presumably
whether or not
"ought"

i.e.,

radically true. As

"deepest"

a result ethical

level is

are supposed connected

to be distinguished on the basis of

natural order

the moral order

to the

(or

whether or not

the

is divorced from the

"is"). Those
nature are

moral accounts which are related

to the rest of nature or some part of

deemed teleological; those is

or

which are not are

deemed deontological.

The

convention

either somewhat careless about

the distinction or makes it too

exclusively

dualistically.
contrast,
another recent

By

way

of

textbook, Great Traditions in Ethics

(1980) by Ethel Albert, Theodore Denise, and Sheldon Peterfreund, restricts to Plato and Aristotle alone (pp. 10, 30). Very the description
"teleological"

shrewdly these using it for the

saves

authors

do

not even

positions of

Hobbes, Hume, Bentham,

explain of

apply it to Aquinas. And they certainly avoid and Mill. Such avoidance how
a teleological ethics can

them

from in

having

to

be

accommo

dated to the human The

mechanistic

beliefs

those thinkers as regards nature in general and

nature

particular.

this exercise in textbook canvassing is to suggest that ( 1 ) Capaldi in regarding utilitarianism as a teleological doctrine, (2) to do so is a mistake, (3) his demon is utilitarianism not teleology, and (4) utilitarianism through its teaching that morality consists in the moral agent's maximizing plea
point of

is

not alone

sure

for the

maximum number of people and

teaching whereby it is
of

the agent's
and

duty to do so

especially Mill's version of that is the proper philosophical base

to Bentham or

doctrinaire liberalism
Edmund Burke's has it dawned

its policy

of affirmative action.

caution about such a

on

doctrine did

not occur

Mill

nor

contemporary

utilitarians.

It is

a caution worth

noting

as regards the matter of affirmative action.

The

great

inlet

by

which a colour

for

oppression

has

entered the world,

is

by one man's
the

pretending to determine concerning the happiness of another, and by claiming a right to use what means he thinks proper in order to bring him a sense of it. It is
ordinary
and

trite sophism of oppression.

It may very well be Mill's effort to transform individual ism into a universal ethical hedonism by means of the

psychological

hedon

"deontological"

concept of

duty

("the

pure

idea

of

duty")

that is the fulcrum

also

which sits upon

the

utilitarian

base. In America that fulcrum has

ethics and ethic

been

supplied

by

the Puritan tradition on

worldly
time

success.

Louis

Auchincloss'

in

our

the subject of his latest novel

wry comment on the Puritan is appropriate.

certain

In American culture, the Puritan tradition is to desire

moral

standard, but to see to it that everyone

else

not only to do right by a does (Daily News. 1/5/86).

In this respect, it is

interesting

and

instructive

to compare Capaldi's

account

Michael Sandel's in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982). What is instructive in the comparison is that while both are in agreement about liberalism and its product the policy of affirmative
of affirmative action and with

liberalism

Affirmative Action, Liberalism,

action

and

Teleology
a criticism of

429

Sandel's treatment is devoted to

sophisticated arguments of

liberalism, especially
Capaldi
gives

as

found in the

John Rawls

whereas

his

at

tention to the arguments terest

in the

comparison

for but mostly against affirmative action. What is of in is that they disagree profoundly about the philosophical

ground of while

liberalism

Sandel

finding it to be

more

deeply rooted

in deontology,

Capaldi locates it in teleology.

Sandel distinguishes two

opposed

to consequentialism and
p. 3).

to

teleology (Sandel,

deontology: (i) a moral sense wherein it is (2) foundational sense wherein it is opposed For Sandel, utilitarians are liberals but not liberals in
senses of
a
"truest"

the foundational sense. The

liberal is
and

deontologist liberals in

kind

of

Kantian.
calls the

For Capaldi,

utilitarians are

liberals

they

are

what

Sandel

foundational sense;
tion for

i.e., for Capaldi

would

utilitarians are

teleologists.

Their disagreement
what

extend,

at

this deeper

level,

to Sandel's prescrip
view of

will which

he takes to be liberalism's unruly voluntarism (a holds it to be so free as not to be subject to reason)

ground of

the human

the

limiting

the teleological

order

(Sandel,

pp.

175-

rediscovery of 177). Such a pre

of

scription and corrective would reason which acts as a

involve,

naturally, a rediscovery of a concept

limit to

and a guide

for the will,

and prior
will.

not

to

speak of a concept

of nature as of

having

an order

distinct from
and

to

but

not

independent

human reason, human passions, In this

vein we must attend

human

to an

assertion made

twice at the

center of

Profes

sor

Capaldi's powerfully

reasoned

text

an assertion which can place

only be discon
puts

certing to the
same

sympathetic reader.

In the first

it may

offer

to the advocates

of affirmative action a weapon against

him. In the
the liberals

second place whom

it

him in the

boat

at engine room place

level

with

he

otherwise opposes.

And in the third

tions.

it may

count against another of

his

deeply

held

convic

That

assertion

is that "human beings do

a

not

have natures;
(p.

rather each and

desires"

every

one of us

has

multiplicity

of

conflicting

91).

Yet

on

the last

page of the

text, he
(p.

asserts with equal conviction

responsible

".

human beings

are autono
self-

mous moral

agents,

for their

choices and

living

according to

imposed

rules"

179).
no

If it be true that human beings have

natures, but only a multiplicity of

or the conflict, then nothing to sort out the multiplicity Capaldi can have no Professor that claim the advocates of affirmative action will or courts people manipulated either by the by the social firm objection to

conflicting desires

with

having

engineers.

Human beings,

by

not

having
Here

natures, are as

infinitely

malleable as when

they

are

unlimitedly

autonomous.

we should remember

that

John

Dewey

(whose

notion of

human

nature

impulses"

is primordially "a formless void of become 125), he also said that "any impulse may position according to the way it interacts with

is strikingly like Capaldi's) said that man (Human Nature and Conduct, p.
organized

into

almost

any dis
and

(Human Nature

Conduct,

p. 95).

as much as

For Capaldi, Dewey, and liberals, human beings can be done to do. And if this is so, then the human world has to take the they
can

430 form

Interpretation
another, one bundle of conflicting

of one autonomous will against

desires
advo

against

another,

and one

batch

of self-imposed rules against another.

The

cates of affirmative action will call or even an

Professor Capaldi's

appeal

to reason a sham

instrument

of

privilege and to

keep

others

his will, impulse, or desire to hold on to his position of from achieving the objects of their desires, their im
wills, and

pulses or their autonomous

rules.

living

according to their

own self-imposed

If human beings have

of

no

nature, and if Sandel is right about the

deepest level

Capaldi wrong about it, then the sympathetic reader will worry that Capaldi has placed himself in the same deontological boat with the liberals,

liberalism

and

especially the doctrinaire liberals he so deeply opposes in the political matters. To say that human beings have no nature, no natural ends, only a multiplicity of conflicting desires, is to remain silent about what the principle of construction or
selection might

be

either of ends or

desires

and whether or not that principle an

is

distinct from
seem

choice

itself. The deontological boat has

engine, but it does

not

to have a rudder or a port. Deontological

liberal-utilitarianism may
as are

not col

lapse automatically into nihilism, but it is surely congenial,

of affirmative

the advocates the

action, to creating and shifting meanings, to

twisting

affirming relativism, to scorning the

disinterested

pursuit of

law, to knowledge, to re
con

jecting
ism),

the

notion and

fact

of merit on

(and thereby accepting

radical egalitarian

to recognizing no
or

limits

the power of the individual or the state to

struct, reconstruct,

worrying about acts of behalf of the duty and pleasure

deconstruct the world, and to remaining silent or not destruction committed by a tyrannical pursuit of duty in
of others.
will wonder and

Finally
phasis]

the sympathetic reader

worry

about whether or not

are

Professor Capaldi's strong

autonomous moral

conviction

that "human beings

[reviewer's

em ac

agents,

responsible

for their

choices and

living

cording to self-imposed tion that human beings have

rules"

is too

heavily

taxed

by
a

his equally strong

of

convic

no natures

but do have

desires. It is difficult to
Even if he

understand what

multiplicity that autonomy might be. he

seems to make

conflicting

should escape

the

charge that

autonomy (or free

dom) into
but
which

the nature of human

is theirs
"to

by

virtue

beings, an autonomy which they do not choose of being human, he might be persuaded to accept the
policy and its liberalistic idea that human beings have a nature to be
fulfilled"

suggestion roots

that the way to confront affirmative action

challenge the

is

not

(p. 90). He

might then challenge even more

forcefully

than

he does

the

idea that be
per

human beings have desires,

suaded, moreover, to
accept

all of which must

be fulfilled. He

might

the suggestion that if human beings have

a multi

plicity of conflicting desires, then it must be reason which enables them to judge and determine the multiplicity and the conflict and that it is freedom which en
ables them

just be

what

to make a selection. Such a combination of reason and freedom may the nature or end of human beings is.

The Most Recent

Thinking

of

Jurgen Habermas

Robert R. Sullivan
John

Jay College

of Criminal Justice

Der

philosophische

Diskurs der Moderne.

By

Jurgen Habermas. (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp Verlag,
Die
neue

1985.)

Uniibersichtlichkeit. By Jurgen Habermas. (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp

Verlag, 1985.)
I
The New Left's

distinguishing
other

claim

is that

cultural

formations

can

determine
seri

the forms that industrialization takes and hence are themselves worth
as

taking

ously determines culture, the New Left holds that culture, including politics, can deter mine economics. This being the case, the New Left addresses itself to intellec
tuals
rather

determinants. In

words,

where

the Old Left

held that

economics

than

flesh

and

blood workers,

and

in
an

keeping

with

this

shift
neo-

in addressee, it
class.

also perceives

its

opponent to

be

intellectual

class of

conservatives rather

than the flesh and blood

all a matter of

old conservatives of on

the business (or

gives us

capitalist)
the

This is

standing Marx

his head, but it

key

we need

to understand the most recent

thinking

of

the prolific spokesman

of the

Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas.

contained

That thinking is

in two

volumes published

in German in be

1985.

At

first

glance neither of them seems

to fit the model

sketched prove

above, but

upon

reflection

that is to say,
of the

with

interpretation

both

to

understandable

in terms

dominant

cultural

thread of Habermas 's

thinking.

The first
as one of

book,

Der

philosophische

Diskurs der Moderne, is bound to be taken

Habermas 's

major works.

It

consists of a well-integrated set of

lectures, for
for

the

most part given

in the United States, in late

on the

now

being

translated and prepared

rendered as

pub

lication

by

the MIT Press

1986.

The title is best

The Philo

sophical

Discourse

Modern,
of the

and the

body
and

of

the book is best understood

criticism

as

philosophical

defense

modern

of

thinkers

who

might

be

called postmodern called

because they try to break

cage"

out of what

Max Weber

ambivalently The second

sichtlichkeit

the "iron title

of modernism's rationality.

book's

and

Die neue Uniiber ungainly in German it is best to put it into equally ungainly English as The New

is

Shortsightedness. It is

made

up

of newspaper

features, introductions

to other words,

books,

and otherwise unpublished papers

purer

from Habermas's files. In

other

it is a collage in which Habermas's thinking is applied. It will most likely for it very nicely not be translated in accessible book form, which is too bad,
complements

the first book.

432

Interpretation

The two books, taken together, strongly suggest that there is a coherent cut ting edge to Habermas's latest thinking. On the one hand, he is going back to the

drawing board to construct a powerful philosophical defense of enlightenment as being essential to the modern. On the other hand, he is testing his philosophical vision against counterenlightenment reality, and although he may be pleased by
the test results, the fact that he feels a need to defend the
postmodern modern and criticize

the

(read: counterenlightenment)
opposition

suggests upper

that Habermas feels that the

intellectual

may be gaining the

hand.

II
In the Philosophical Discourse
period as an ated.
on the

Modern, Habermas defends

in
a

the modern

Age

of

Reason,
are

and

this

is

meant

literal

sense not

to be depreci

All

previous ages are taken

reason.

by

Habermas to be

ages of unreason or ages of

emerging different In

They

dominated

by

one or another

form

of

mythos,

but

the

modern age

is dominated

by logos, by

reason

itself,

and this makes

and

other

absolutely superior to every other age of words, Habermas is a Hegelian who holds the
Absolute Mind. What this
means can

it absolutely European history.

modern

to be the

embodiment of
way: whereas

be

put

in the

following
modern

age,

as the

every past mythological age can be refuted Age of Reason, cannot be refuted by another
reason cannot

by

reason, the

reason.

It is Catch 22,

Hegelian

style:

be

refuted

by

another reason without simulta

neously confirming the

absolute.

absolute

primacy

of reason.

Hence the

modern age

is

Any

attempt

to

step

out of

it, any

attempt

to

initiate

a postmodern

age,

is

deception,
and

an effort at

counterenlightenment,
on the

a regression

to myth.

In the Philosophical Discourse Habermas

absolute

Modern, Hegel is
thinker

considered

first

by

taken to be the ultimate

modern

because he

understood the

quality of reason in the modern age. Absolute here means, if I read Habermas correctly, that dialectic is not simply a matter of talking-thingsthrough (the literal, classical meaning of the term), but is also a term that ade quately describes the underlying structure of historical reality. In other words, dialectical thinking is a reflex of real historical relationships. The recognition of
this absolute quality of reason is what

distinguishes the

modern as an age of

history. Over
against

this

Hegelianism, Habermas
be
called postmodern

thinkers who

might

ment about absolute reason.

In

one

these thinkers to be less than rational

variety of more recent because they do not accept the argu way or another, Habermas then takes all or, even, irrational. Nietzsche, Heidegger,
taken to be thinkers who understood that

considers a

Bataille, Derrida,
they
son.

and

Foucault

are all
of

could not

break

out of

the Age

Reason

by

means of yet another act of rea

They

therefore resorted to acts of w/zreason to escape Weber's iron cage of

modernism.

Nietzsche,

so

this argument goes, sought to clear the way for the coming of

The Most Recent

Thinking

of Jurgen Habermas

433
Heidegger
sought the
of

Dionysius,

a god of wine and passion rather than reason.

of

Destruktion

the European

metaphysical

tradition that had led to the Age

Reason,
today
as a

and

Heidegger's
iron

irrationality

inspired the book

written

burning

of 1933.

Derrida
word

seeks

the deconstruction of the

text and

a return

to the spoken
research

way

out of the

cage of rationality, and could

Foucault did his

in in
In

sane asylums

because only there

speak,
and

he find Europeans

who were

out-of-their-

minds,

so to

thereby

catch a glimpse of a world

beyond

reason.

short, Habermas's book is

losophy,"

an extended argument

documenting

the "end of phi

of

the absolute triumph of the modern, and the

which

hopelessness

anything

called

postmodern,

here

means post-Hegelian.

Habermas's Diskurs is in my opinion a brilliant but deeply biased book. In the currently fashionable debate over the meaning of the postmodern, Habermas nar rowly
concentrates

the Modern in the absolute

rationalism of

Hegel. The

result

is

that many of the most

appear

interesting

thinkers since Hegel are necessarily made to

repeat:

irrational simply because they disagree. I closely

assigned

as an absolute and
matter of

to

Hegel,

then

if rationality is defined irrationality is no more than a

Therefore the

disagreeing with the absolute rationality of the modern. postmodern, which by definition disagrees, can be characterized
counterenlightenment movement rather

narrowly

as a

than as a movement that says something

point of view of

new

(nothing really
a

new can

be

said

from the

Absolute Reason).
Habermas's
and pre

In
vious

fashion,

this manifest bias

so

has its

clear value.

In

none of

books has he been

obviously the Hegelian rationalist,

this book:

this
on

finally
all of

is the local

significance of

it

sheds a retrospective

light

Habermas's previous books and helps to throw into sharp relief just how rational ist they really were. But the greater significance of Habermas's Hegelianism lies

in

what

it

allows

him to do

with

the

postmodern.

This term is

accorded an ex

treme definition

synonymous with

irrational,

reactionary, counterenlightenment,

and, yes,

counterrevolutionary.

It is

not within the purview of

Habermas's

ur

bane

style to go all

the way down this

are

list, but he does

not

stop too far

short of

its

Marxian Endstation. The dice

clearly loaded

against

the postmodern.

Ill
In the New Shortsightedness, Habermas continues his critique of any effort to refute the absolute reason embodied in the modern age. The second book
makes up for this by applying As Habermas's thinking to the contemporary already noted, it is a collec tion of newspaper articles, interviews, introductions to other books, and other

lacks the

philosophical argument of

the first

but

world.

wise unpublished papers written of unrelated

recently

by

pieces, but

with

the

help
be

of the

Habermas. It is seemingly a jumble sharp Hegelian focus of the first

book, it
The

finally

comes together nicely.

used

argument of one piece can

to illustrate the structure of

modern architecture against

Haber
the
re-

mas's applied thinking.

Habermas defends

434

Interpretation
I believe this
argument

cent phenomenon of postmodern architecture.

nificant

because it is
with

a political argument.
actual

That is to say,

architecture

is sig really does

have to do

the

help

but have do

political
well

making of the city, the polis, and it cannot significance. It shapes the public space, and for better or

worse, we

to be conscious of it. I am thus

looking

at

Habermas's

com

ments on architecture as an

indirect

political argument.

The

conventional modernist an

formula that form-follows-function is taken

classical examples of modernism or

by

Habermas to be buildings
of

absolute, and the

van

in the

Wright, Mies

der Rohe,

Corbusier
was a

are

taken to be buildings
post-

that cannot
modernist

be improved

upon.

Granted there

decline in

World War II
that

architecture, but this is

no reason to abandon the

functionalism

determines it. Here, in the

to determine
modernism. quote

modernist claim

that form ought to follow

function, I

take Habermas to be restating the basic Marxist proposition that economics ought
politics.

Habermas's latent Marxism

also

dictates his is its

view of post

The

signature of the postmodernist movement

willingness

to

its reactionary quality. Ar freely chaic values are resurrected and put into place, the public place, in the form of stone. The details are literally tablets handed down to us from on high. They thus
the past, and this suggests to Habermas
represent

for Habermas

an attempt

to give an outdated definition to essentially

public spaces.

However

intriguing

it is to

tectural critic, an even more

politically conscious Habermas as archi interesting section in the second book is his lengthy
read the

piece on political neo-conservatism.

who are not aware and so

This topic may

come as a surprise

for those

that there

is

such a

thing

as neu-Konservatismus
an

therefore it has the potential to provoke

after

intense

response.

The

in Germany, reader is

initially inclined,
into different

the piece on architecture, to equate neoconservatism with

postmodernism and assume containers.

that Habermas

But this

prejudgment

is is

pulled

up short by one of the more Habermas does a comparison of American

simply pour the same arguments is quickly overcome as the reader unexpected moves of this book.
will

and

German

neo-conservatism that
phenomenon

remarkable

for its

generous treatment of the

as

distant American

and

is helpful insofar is its

it

allows

the American reader to

become
its

oriented

in

re

spect

to German neoconservatism. What

commitment to

impresses Habermas
values and

about

American

neoconservatism pretive

democratic

reliance on

inter

sociology to make its case. Habermas is careful not to lay too much praise on American neoconservatism, but considering the source, this is a most remarkable treatment. Partly, however, Habermas is generous toward American
neoconservatism so

is taken

by

that he can set it off against German neoconservatism, which Habermas to be undemocratic and basically unsociological (read:
presentation of

unrealistic) in its
servatism
not

itself. But then this

sketch of

German
this

neocon

turns out to be
make

startlingly incomplete

that
and

is to say, Habermas does

of

really

the neoconservative argument

because

incomplete

ness,

which could

be

called

one-sidedness, it is clearly

wrong.

Where Habermas

The Most Recent

can

Thinking
be

of Jurgen Habermas

435
critic, the
same cav

be let

off

lightly

for his

shortcomings as an architectural

alier

generosity The German

of

cannot

accorded

his

view on

German here I

neoconservatism. am

neoconservative argument
and

and

following the
begins

think

ing
that

Carl

Schmitt, Arnold Gehlen

neo

Joachim Ritter in

with a move

distinguishes

from

old conservativism

vatives

hold that there is

still

Where old conser life in traditional institutions like the family or the
out

Germany.1

church,

neoconservatives and accept

draw
the

the

logic

of

Nietzsche's
of

claim

about the

death-of-god based

on religious sanction.

corresponding demise Therefore, because of this Habermas.

way.

traditional institutions skepticism, Ger

religious

man neoconservatives are

themselves enlightenment thinkers,

and

it is precisely

this that makes them so menacing to

Let

me put

this

key

point

in

different

By definition,

the

institutions

of

any traditional society

no sense

depend

upon a

divine

sanction.

Indeed,

tradition makes

if it is

not the

passing down from

generation to generation of the sanc

tion that was

originally

revealed at creation.

Correspondingly,

and also

by

def

inition, any believe in a divine

but the

and all modern societies are modern

sanction
put

deity

is

at

least

precisely because they cease to for worldly institutions. God is not necessarily dead, on hold in respect to societal institutions. Therefore, a
societal

new sanction reason

is

needed

for

institutions,

and philosophy's claim

modern

is that

(logos)

provides

this sanction. The definition of

therefore has to

do

philosophy that understands itself as the new authorizing agent, fully operating under the dictates of logos. Habermas, as a modernist in the above sense, has no problem if he is dealing
with

the reasoned sanction provided

by

with

some

traditionalists, but he has a real problem if he is dealing with someone or group that claims to be providing a better reason than he and can back up
what

the claim with persuasive argument. This is

claim and as someone who

the German neoconservatives

and understood

has, I

presume, read his Plato

the en

lightened

desirability

of

putting
short of

an opponent's argument

in the best

possible not

light, Habermas falls far

admit

his

own enlightenment standard.

He does

that German

neoconservatives are also modern enlightenment

thinkers. He

treats them as reactionaries and

thereby
follows:

avoids their argument.

while

That
and

argument continues as

accepting the liberation from

god

the corresponding release from the restrictions of tradition, German neocon that
relativization of

servatives also claim

traditional structures without a corre

sponding coming in the basic

order

provision of a new reasoned sanction articulation of enlightenment.

for worldly institutions is a short Freedom mandates a legitimate freedom

of

constitutional order.

This

sounds

like

a contradiction
a

mandates

but for German

not

neoconservatives

it is

dialectical truth
such

the first water.

Freedom is
I

the

elimination of all order.

Under

conditions, as Dostoev-

There is
are

thers

no adequate study of German neoconservatism, but by consensus the founding fa Carl Schmitt. Arnold Gehlen, and Joachim Ritter. More recent neoconservatives are Ernst

Forsthoff, H. Schelsky,
thinkers.

and

Giinter Rohrmoser. Habermas is familiar

with

the writings of all of these

436
ski's

Interpretation
would

Grand Inquisitor
of

have it, everything

or

lowance

something, rather than everything or

nothing is permitted. The al nothing, is premised on the ex

mandates

istence
and

of some

legitimate

order.

Hence the dictum that freedom insistence

on

order,

hence the German

and

neoconservative

the provision of
of some

legiti

mate

that means constitutionally restricted

authority

type.

The
ment

needed concept of order

is to be found in limited,

constitutional govern

(the Rechtsstaat),

and

German

neoconservatives are committed

in

principle

to supporting this

embodied principle of order.

This argument,

now was

political,

may be

put

slightly differently. The European Enlightenment

originally

characterized

by

premises acceptable

to reason, namely, that traditional forms of

community were unreasonable because they unnecessarily repressed human freedom. These premises were also restated as political goals, and with their
achievement

that

is to say,

with

the

political relativization of

the traditional au

thority

of

family,

church,

and

principality

the goals of the European Enlight

made academic.

enment were reached and enlightenment

more

the premises
more or

thereby
it
was

But

absolutist

continued,

less like

a rebel without a traditional

cause,

or

accurately, like the

rational

a rebel whose cause

to eliminate all

forms

of author

ity,

even

authority

of

the Rechtsstaat that

guarantees the

freedoms

achieved

by

the Enlightenment. The contemporary revolutionary Left thus tends

and

to be absolutely
neoconservatism

this means mindlessly

antiauthoritarian, and German

draws the line because this

position

is irrational.

German neoconservatives, in the

application of

this political

thinking,
that a
red

see an
of

integral

connection
and

between the

student movement of
1980s.2

the 1960s, the terrorism

argue

the 1970s,

the peace movement of the

They

thread
move

of absolutist antiauthoritarianism runs ments. man

through these so-called

liberation

This

antiauthoritarian attitude constitutes the unreason of and pits them against

dissident Ger

intellectuals
Rechtsstaat.

the legitimate authority

under

of

the Federal Re
nonetheless a

public

which, however

faulty

and

clumsy

Helmut Kohl, is
to be found

real

Specifically,
German

the German Federal Republic is a representative

neoconservatives are

democracy,
classical

and the

defending

this

Enlightenment

political

form.
seeks to arrive at a

In opposition, the German New Left

phenomenon which

direct democracy,

has its

charms at the

local level

of

Green

Party

meetings

(al

though even
nation-state

here the
has

charm

proven

is wearing thin) but which at the level of the German to be dangerous illusion. The reason is not hard to find.
neoconservatives the equivalent of

Direct

democracy

is for German

Habermas's
speech sit

famed ideal

speech situation.

Writ small, direct

models of

democracy

and

ideal

uations are perhaps

desirable

decision-making. But
problems of a

writ

large

that is arise,
call

to say, projected onto the nation-state

and

different

magnitude writ

Habermas has

never recognized

these. Direct

democracy
interest

large,

it

plebiscitary democracy, rather an invitation to the tyranny

not a
2.

is

liberation from

all extraneous authority.

It is

of powerful private

groups

or, if

they

See Giinter Rohrmoser,

Revolution

Unser Schicksal? (Stuttgart:

Seewald,

1974).

The Most Recent

are

Thinking
tyranny

of Jurgen Habermas
of a

437

extinguished, to the

single, absolute authority, like the

veil of

bodily

needs of

the people. Like Rawls's

famed

ignorance, Habermas's ideal

speech situation

determining
tain kind of
sion-makers

is only apparently a device for excluding outside interests from political decisions. In reality it is a device for ensuring that a cer decision will always be made, and this is one that compels deci
to

decide in favor

of equality.

Coercionless

coercion
of

(zwangsloser
speech

Zwang), Habermas
situation, and this

once called

this essential characteristic

neoconservatives

the ideal

is for German

hardly

a reasonable

basis for

political constitution.

Habermas's
cause

second

book, The New Shortsightedness, is

disappointment be

it continually refers back to contemporary German neoconservatism as the intellectual opponent of the New Left but never once adequately confronts the
pages.
course

philosophical-political argument made above and

This is too bad, for

on

coupled with the

most

the

Modern, Habermas's

suggestively referred to in his first book, The Philosophical Dis recent thinking is liable to have a

strong influence in the next few years on the American academic debate over postmodernism. It would have been ideal if Habermas had actually locked horns
with

his

chosen

opponent, but these books

pull

up just

short of

that

confronta

tion.

IV
Cultural formations,
relativization,
shorn

of their

divine sanction,
that

are

ripe

material

for

and relativization means

they

will

be

understood as

the ex

human interest in domination. In this respect, the only difference between Habermas and Karl Marx is that Habermas believes that freepression of one or another

floating
world.

cultural

formations

still

have influence,

even a

decisive influence, in the disagree

Marx,
now

perhaps mistakenly, wrote off

culture, the residue of the departed

gods, as
with

being fully

determined

by

economics.

Habermas does

not

this as a basic Enlightenment goal, but his

of

claim

deeply

informed

by

his

of

reading the dead

Freud

is that

archaic cultural

forms

are nonetheless still possessed even economic action.

power of

tradition that can

determine action,

Culture,
Marx's

shorn of

tion why anyone should obey

opinions on

its divine sanction, becomes mere convention, and the ques convention is a legitimate one, with or without is to say, in
is
a mode of a

the issue. In a traditional society, that

society

still more or

less

centered on

infallible authority,

culture

ensuring

temporal

from one generation to continuity by passing divinely sanctioned values religion and becomes a to be a ceases or Judaism another. But when Christianity are not and ask why going to be satisfied -life, the children are going to
way -of
with

the answer that this is the-way-it-has-al ways-been. In the absence of god,

will want good reason.

they

The issue then is

whether mere convention can

be

reformulated as reasoned argument.

Habermas has

never persuaded

himself that

an autonomous political

commu-

438 nity

Interpretation
to exist, but I believe the reasoning here
presented makes

ought

the argu

ment

that is missing from his thinking. In the presence of an established and

culture

functioning deity,

does

not need

reason, but in the absence

need reasoned political

of such an

otherworldly establishment, human beings

the private

discourse to
even

provide agreed-upon norms and prevent this or that private

human interest,

interest

of

painstakingly
cultural

created

bodily needs, from overwhelming and privatizing the public forum. This sounds at first glance like a formula for
and

authoritarianism,

in

fashion it is just that. It is

similar

in

motivation
with guar

to the enlightenment reason that

antees against

loaded the United States Constitution

rule.

Indeed, if one is to believe Madison majority in Federalist # io, the United States Constitution is a conspiracy of enlighten ment reason against the dictates of the populist body.
the excesses
of

Put differently, authority in a desacralized world must be a reasoned thing, and this implies that mind find it within its scope to erect limitations to even its
own

activities, especially
of

when

these are

determined

by

the

ments"

the body. Such reasoning leads state, or in

logically
I

to the

idea

compelling "argu of the limited con

never

stitutional

German,
of

the Rechtsstaat. Habermas

would argue on the

has

been

clear

that this

is the direction
to do

his

reasoning.

that in

Habermas's latest
what

books, especially
culture

the Philosophical Discourse

secure

Modern,

he is really

attempting in the

is

the condition of the possibility of absolutist intellectual

modern

world, what one German commentator once called the

Diktatur des Sitzfleisches (the

Dictatorship
of

of the

Sitting Class,

namely, intellec

tuals). This involves convincing us

son as an

inescapable

consequence of

inescapable necessity of rea the death-of-god. But it also involves the

the absolute

substitution of a new

termine the mind's

the bodily functions that should de worldly absolutism form for the otherworldly absolutism that has passed away.
and

The

suspicion

here

fully
we

credit

German

neoconservatives

like Arnold
absolutism

Gehlen for arousing this for otherworldly absolutism, from

and absolute to

suspicion3

is that in substituting worldly

made no change at all.
we

have

Only by
the

shifting

limited authority do Habermas does none of this.

postmodernism

meaningfully

record

death-of-god,

Like

perience.

wish

could

in architecture, German neoconservatism is a mixed ex say it was humorous, but it is hardly this. More often in the way it is
expressed and received.

than not, it is

heavily Germanic
be

But inso issued

far

as

its

argument can

construed

lightheartedly

and not as a manifesto

from

tower, it is not putting forth a program of consistent tra ditional values, designed to do combat with the dragons of a godless modern world. It is rather arguing for a Rechtsstaat that will secure the open society or, the same thing put differently, will secure a space in which all values may be set
a crenelated castle

to play.

Play
3.

suggests

games, and the chief character of any genuine game is that it is

und

Arnold Gehlen, Moral

referred to on pp.

1979),

45-47, 55

Hypermoral (Bonn: Atheneum, 1969) of Die neue Unubersichtlichkeit.

and

Einblicke (Frankfurt,

The Most Recent

not serious.

Thinking
with

of Jurgen Habermas
that there is

439
the playing of depends upon it

Above all, this

means

no end outside of

the game.

Similarly

the

Rechtsstaat, its
Just
as so

own

legitimacy

having
to the

no ulterior motives or goals.

functionalism is
the

a goal that

is

ulterior

forms

of an authentic

architecture,

too the social functions that form

Habermas's thinking
are ulterior motives

and cause

him to

question

legitimacy of the Rechtsstaat

to

legitimate
modern

barrassing
German German

claim

in the

This primacy of politics is a rather em world, but it is still the claim that is central to
politics.

neoconservatism. neoconservatism

does

not

take it to be an

actually does take politics seriously because it expression of some forces or purposes outside itself.

Habermas, in contrast, questions the legitimacy of the Rechtsstaat because he does not, finally, take politics seriously. Somewhere in his soul Habermas be
lieves that economics, His New Left
claim
which

is morbidly serious,
of

ought to

determine

politics.

that politics, as an aspect

culture, can determine econom

ics is only a claim about what is in fact the case in a less than Utopian reality. What Habermas wants is the banishment of the city itself, at least the city that still controls its destiny, and this is, after all, the only kind of city worth keeping.

If

you are

and

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Book Reviews

Jerusalem Eidelberg.
cloth,

vs.

Athens: In Quest
Md.:

of a

General
of

Theory

of

Existence. By Paul
393
pp.:

(Lanham, University $27.50; paper, $18.50.)

Press

America,

1983. xviii +

Will Morrisey "In the

souls:

history

of

mankind, two
Athens."

cities stand above all others and vie

all participants

for

men's

Jerusalem

salem stands stands

Jeru for religion, revelation, and traditional authority whereas Athens for philosophy, reason, and freedom of thought. Eidelberg dissents.
are not

and

To "almost

in this

conflict,"

These dichotomies
shall present evidence

only superficial; they

are a

distortion

of the

truth. We

freedom in the city Aristotle. We shall show that the Tree

not survive without

indicating that there is far greater rationality and intellectual of King David and King Solomon than in the city of Plato and
of

Knowledge,

which

bore fruit in Athens,

can

the Tree of Life whose roots are in

of

how the Athenian tree death.

knowledge,

without

Jerusalem. Indeed, we shall see the Tree of Life, yields madness and

Eidelberg's
sor

claim should not

be unthinkingly dismissed. As
many
of

a student of

Profes Torah
on

Leo Strauss he had

guidance through

the

most obscure yet

important

"Athens."

neighborhoods of
master

Rabbi Dr. Chaim

by the teachings of logician Zimmerman, Eidelberg boldly challenges

not penetrate the esoterics of the quarrel

Fortified

and

Strauss

Straussian territory: Unfortunately, Prof. Strauss did

Talmud. Had he done
modems of which so

Torah

or of

the

he

would

have transcended the

the master.

between

ancients and

he

was otherwise

Eidelberg
noire, tice
can

makes

the still bolder claim that modern

historicism, Strauss's bete

theory
and prac

glimpses a truth

denied

by

the best Greek philosophers:

ultimately harmonize,
and modern

and

humanity

is

perfectible.

He

makes perhaps

the boldest claim of all in calling true

revelation

entirely rational,
means

superior to phi

losophy
fection
tence"

science; the Torah contains the

by

which

human

per

can

be

achieved.1

Eidelberg

intends to

provide a

"general

theory

of exis

based
that

upon a rational

understanding

of the

Torah. In

doing

so, he intends

to

show

modern mathematical physics

is

not

the paradigm of true

knowl

'scientists'

edge; the

attempt of modern social

to use this physics as a model must

fail.

Eidelberg
1
.

writes ten chapters.

The first

and most complex of these contains

By

"true

revelation,"

I do

not refer to

the subjective experience of the prophet, which may or

may

not

be rational, but

rather

to what the prophet says.

442

Interpretation
principles"

the "basic man,

of

the "Torah

Theory

Existence."

of

Following

Zimmer

Eidelberg

mechanics and

the general
so

discusses twentieth-century physics, arguing that both quantum theory of relativity disprove the physics of classical

Athens but do
confirm

by

pointing beyond

physical existence

itself.2

This tends to

the Torah

principle that an epistemology based upon "the postulation of

self-sustaining"

and unified, any physical or mental existent, process, or law as is a form of idolatry, the worship of a created thing. Thus the Torah stands against any form of monism, as distinguished from monotheism. Although many scholars contend

that there is no Hebrew equivalent of the word the names of

'nature,'

Eidel
the

berg

observes that one of of cyclical

God, 'Elohim,
in
creation.

appears

in

relation to

multiplicity
man

forces

manifested

However,

these forces do

not constitute

the self-sustaining nature of the philosophers, the nature of which

universe owes

is

part; rather, "the

its

existence

to the ceaseless Will of the

Creator."

Another

ly

but to

"natural'

cyclical

God's names, HaShem, appears in relation not to cyclical than the linear, providential, teleological laws "more laws. This exemplifies the principle of "asymmetric comple
of
fundamental"

mentarity"

whereby
ement of each
own'

nature and

history

are ordered

by

means of

dualities,
world

one el

duality being
are

the stronger. In this case, the physical

has 'its

laws but these

task"

governed,

finally, by

nonphysical

laws. "Judaism's dis

tinctive

is "to sanctify the

the nonphysical

physical world so

that the latter is brought into

a

harmony

world."

with

Far from
"the

being

handbook for mystics,

creation, about the
with

the Kabala "embodies

knowledge"

about and

structure of

re

lationship
tion"

between

existence,"

nonphysical

physical

scientific

and

mathematical rigor. of

Judaism thus

avoids the

"self-gratification

and self-glorifica of the

the Cainites and the "one-sided asceticism or

systems of

spiritualism"

Sem

ites. Two
ate

law

daily
and

activities, and

Finite Halacha (DineiAdam), governing immedi the Infinite Halacha (Dinei Shamayim), governing "the
the

conduct of

individuals

and nations

throughout

history"

combine

law,

rational

ity,

skepticism.

morality in a manner Plato and Aristotle would regard with considerable But the philosophers are the descendents of Esau, "the or despite their best
efforts

nations"

goyim,

who

inhabit
of

and exploit

the physical

world and

serve egalitarianism.

The descendents

Jacob,
in

the

Israelites, inhabit
Torah
of

the spiri

tual domain that will master the physical

accordance with

principles of

hierarchy. Both the descendents

that conduce to the
of the

of

Esau

and the

descendents

Jacob

serve

laws

descendents

whereas

might say, however, that the best Esau know that they do not know what they are doing, the best of the descendents of Jacob do know something of what they are
perfection of mankind.

One

of

doing. In the
second chapter as

Eidelberg contrasts philosophic

He
observes that

pride with

Torah anava,
'forgets'

usually translated

'humility.'

Plato's Socrates

jus
(The

tice and gentleness in

2.

his final

enumerations of the philosopher's virtues.

and

See Chaim Zimmerman: Torah

Reason: Insiders

and

"H

ED"

Outsiders of Torah, Jerusalem:

Publications,

1979.

Book Reviews
word

443
"gentle"

Eidelberg
far have

translates
as

as

is translated

"tame"

as

by

Allan

Bloom.)
read

He

goes so

to argue

(citing

the Republic 501a and 541a) that Socrates

would

all citizens over

the age of ten exterminated, a somewhat harsh

ing

that allows him to call the ancient/modern that

dichotomy
living,
life"

exaggerated. would not

He

also

contends eliminate

if the

unexamined

life is it

not worth

"it

be

unjust

to

those unfit to pursue the philosophic

republic.

the very ones eliminated

serious

from Plato's justice is

and

But this

as

were

deadly

reading

of

Plato fails if
that Plato

not

the philosopher's virtue or the philosophers

purpose.3

Eidelberg

charges

indeed

all

deify

the intellect and attempt to

murder

God.

This

manifests

their pride. "Pride of intellect

who

is the human
for the

excellence

vice par

The Torah man,

serving any
were given as

is anav, "does
wisdom or

not even regard

himself

as

credit

for his

greatness,"

means of

to

him."

"Judaism is based
cyclical

gratitude,"

on

gratitude

ultimately de achieving these not only to God

that

the giver of nature's

of

laws,

apprehensible

by

the human mind, but the

laws

HaShem, inaccessible

to the

unaided

human

mind.

(Eidelberg denies
and can

this veers into mysticism; Torah

laws,

once

given, "must

be tested like
to eluci

any scientific theory: by its internal logical consistency date nature and history.
. .

and

by its

power

.")

The

man of Torah of

does

not want

to make a name

for himself; he

wants

only to

sanc

tify
the

the name

HaShem. To sanctify
much as

the name of HaShem requires not the union of

wisdom and

power, so

the

union of wisdom and anava

from

which power

in

form

of

just

rule and

dominion follows.

In this way the judges of the Sanhedrin excel Plato's philosopher-kings. In the third chapter Eidelberg writes that "Machiavelli only vulgarized Plato Plato's "city in or made public what Plato preferred to remain

speec private."

is "founded

force"

on
truth."

and

"preserved
must

by

force

mitigated

by

fraud

yet all

the quest for

(One

ask, Does Machiavelli's city

serve the quest

contrasts or

serving for
the

truth? If so, is Machiavelli's

'truth'

identical to Plato's?)

Eidelberg

inhumane Platonic
scribed
of

founding
with

(whether that described in the Republic

that

de

in the Laws)

the

founding

of

Israel,

and

earth,"

"the

most anav man on

removed

the face of the

the

particularly Moses.
and

with

the efforts

Infinitely
only God,

from

idolatry of nationalism
be, like Moses,
perfect

imperialism, Israel, serving

at tne same

would

be

proud as a nation
nation would

(Deut. 33:29). yet>

time-

each 'di

vidual member of

this

humbleness
ual and

and pride corresponds which

to a

This complementarity of complementarity between the individ

anav.

society

is to be found only in the Torah

of

Israel.

3.

Put

another

way, Socrates can

be

said to argue,

in effect, that those

'Do lover

who want

justice

more

than anything else

must commit acts of

injustice to

obtain their end.

you want

justice

that muchT
not

he may be said to ask. Socrates, want justice that much.

4.

lover

of wisdom and not so much a

of

justice, clearly does

wisest of

This does

not prevent a man of anava no

is the fact. There is

merely

conventional view of

from recognizing himself as the humility, here.

mortals, if this

444

Interpretation
overcomes

Thus Judaism
munity
makes

the tension between the wise individual and the com

by Plato. Eidelberg argues that philosophy inevitable because philosophy understands cyclical nature only; anava would be irrational in a meaningless, ever-wheeling cosmos. In "is a fit and alldeed, what has lately come to be called
a tension

best described

this tension

'self-actualization'

consuming imperative in such a taught. Instead of the tension between the

poses a

universe,"

as

Spinoza

more-or-less

openly

philosopher and

the polis, Judaism

problem, if not necessarily a

permanent

the created. "How can the

Absolutely

Transcendent be

tension, between the Creator and The problem

Immanent?"

is

"insoluble"

by

the

posed unio mystico a

finite human mind; "mysticism, insofar as it involves with HaShem, is utterly foreign and abhorrent to the
actions'

sup

Torah,"

God's transcendency or holiness. We can only know God "indirectly : through nature, history, and especially through through His works or
denial
of

His

most

illuminating

work, the

Torah,

which

"harbors orally

a pure system of sym

bolic
ple,

logic"

whose rules of exposition are given and then

"only

to the Jewish peo

only to those who, through

Talmud."

long

and rigorous

discipline, have

mastered ordered

the logical system and esoteric wisdom underlying the

deliberately

dis

teachings of the

The
what

following chapters include two on history, two on science, and two on might very loosely be called psychology. In the chapters on history, Eidel
six

berg

writes

that "the primary historical

function

of

stroy the Greek pantheon, that identifies

is,

idolatry."

primitive

Greek philosophy Platonic

was

to de

"rationalism"

Being

with

being

known,"

thus

deifying

intellect. "In the denial

and a

of

creation ex nihilo

is the fundamental
also

conflict

between Athens

Jerusalem."

Aristotle's
Mover,"

"empiricism"

deifies intellect
about

by

defined

as

"thought thinking
an offense of mind

itself."

working its way to "A Creator-God

intellect."

"Prime

would

be

absolutely
serves

inscrutable,
and

to the philosopher's

Eidelberg

ob

that this deification

power

lectual

creativity"

achieving a radical power This power "presupposes knowledge

derived."

paradoxically "imposes limits to man's intel because it "denies the possibility of man ever over the power to natural laws.
nature,"

"modulate"

of nonphysical

laws from

which

the laws of

nature are conquer nature.

The moderns,
image'

one might

say, absurdly

try

to use nature to

But the only way to truly conquer nature is to employ nonnatural 'in God's rather than the ersatz laws; creativity creativity of self-deifying philosophers, is the promise of Judaism. In

destroying

the

Greek pantheon, the

classical philosophers weakened the

man."

polis and encouraged universalism

the conception of "man qua

Despite

their attempts to conceal this apolitical thus served the

teaching, the

classical

Greek

philosophers
regarded as

idea
As

of

equality in the
this nature

sense that all nations could

'nature'

be

equally
good needed

artificial.

Eidelberg

asks, "How is it that

fails

to produce one

regime?"

Further,
of

fails

to produce the sense of obligation

sees that such

to sustain a just

hierarchy.
son

Eidelberg

Torah incidents

as

Abraham's

binding

his

Isaac

and the severe methods employed

during

the

Book Reviews
conquest of

445

Canaan might easily be cited if one wished to raise questions con cerning the justice of God and the Israelites. Accordingly, he argues that "Abra ham's sacrifice teaches us that although man is nothing in relation to God, he
. . .

is the

acme of

God's

creation."

As for the destruction

of

the

Canaanites, it

was

done "to stamp out the pagan practice of sacrificing the innocent for the sake of the Jewish practice contrasts with the perhaps proto-Machiavellian acts
guilty.'"

of

Plato's founders. It

also contrasts with

'pagan'

Christianity,
"The hence

which

Eidelberg

blames

for sanctioning just such a the innocent for the guilty is

sacrifice.
a

pagan practice of

form

of aristocide

egalitarian.

sacrificing In practice,

by eliminating the coherent and comprehensive system of laws of the Torah, Christianity was forced to adopt the patchwork laws of pagan nations, laws which
could not

but

conflict with and eviscerate the unguarded teachings of the

Nazarene Caesar

or

his disciples. Hence

things that are

Christianity
and to

was and still

is

compelled to render unto

are

the

Caesar's

God the things that

God's,

when

in truth, nothing in

a monotheistic universe

belongs to Caesar.

The

church/state separation

leaves

Christianity

vulnerable

to the separation of

morality and politics effected by its enemy, Machiavelli. intellect" "sacrifice of required by the Christian doctrine "The Book
of

Eidelberg
faith"; it

decries the

of salvation

by

faith.

Truth

requires

infinitely
the

more than

belief
"The

or

requires acts
...

in the form Modern

of observance of

commandments.
deification."

suicide of

the mind

is

the final consequence of the mind's

science provides a
'classical'

different way to this

Plato's
esteem of

suicide.

Chapters

six and phys

seven concern

(i.e., Galilean/Newtonian)
preserves
of

and

twentieth-century
mental

ics,

respectively.

Galileo

for

mathematics

but discards brings

the Platonic eidos; "the loss

this

upper

rung

Plato's

hierarchy

Galileo

closer to epistemological
universe

democracy."

For in

contrast

to Plato Galileo

believes the

infinite

and

irrational,

with no natural warrant

for distin
or egalitar

guishing ianism "entered

atomism, advance, in
ments

curved

from straight,
the

circumference

from

center.

Relativity

cosmology."

Add Galileo's antiteleology, subjectivism,

and
an

and we see one

grounds

for

an atheist positivism.

Eidelberg calls this

Greco-Christian

sense, because it destroyed "a farrago

of

ele

which,

having

fulfilled their historical function

of

destroying

paganism or

primitive
God."

idolatry,

were now

Newton

added an empiricist

preventing mankind from recognizing the only true determinism to this modern brew. Twentiethsubstitutes a objects

century

physics

nonmaterialist

early modern physics. Einstein mechanics. Eidelberg for Newtonian determinism

in turn
counteracted no room

that

Einstein's laws "leave

Creator."

sumes that the universe exists

will of a

for contingency or uncertainty"; Einstein "as by immanent necessity and not as a result of the
not

Relativity theory

only deifies human intellect but

over

a necessity looks the necessary incompleteness of any mathematical system demonstrated by Godel. It also contradicts the microphysical indeterminacy pos

ited

by

another

branch

and other reasons,

contemporary physics, quantum mechanics. For these Eidelberg can insist that physics now suffers from theoretical
of

446

Interpretation
spectacular practical
successes.

disarray, despite
Whitehead
"apart from

He

points

to the concept of

creatio ex nihilo as

the only remaining solution to the many problems.

the existence of one such problem when

"admits"

he

writes of

that

some notion of

'imposed

law,'

statistical

law

or

'the doctrine

im

absolutely Eidelberg relapsing into lawless and asserts that statistical laws "are not
tropy."

manence provides

no reason

why the
goes

universe should not

be steadily

chaos.'"

self-sustaini

further, following Zimmerman, because, if they were the

en

only laws in operation, "the universe would now be in a state of complete Contra Einstein, "God does play dice with the world, only the dice
'loaded.'"

are

This

assertion allows which concern

Eidelberg

to introduce the claims

of chapters

eight and

nine,

the human soul as seen in Jews and in non-Jews. the decline into entropy is human ac
will should serve

Aside from God Himself,

what prevents

tion, insofar

as those actions serve

most

God. The human

people of the

the

divine

"stiff-necked"

Will,

and

the

willful,

the ones best fitted to serve

sui generis and so par

that Will

are

Jews. "The creativity

Jew is

abundantly
The

elaboration." excellence."

manifest as to require no
non-Torah

The Jew is "man

world,

by

contrast, has
will.

sunk

mind, then the human

a suicide of

In its

'pluralism,'

into deification of, first, the human it now deifies even baser emotions,
which

the

intellect

comparable

to that

Eidelberg imputes
of

to Chris

tianity.

Eidelberg
means

returns

to

Plato for
of

an

explanation

this.

He

advances

Nietzschean interpretation
that

Socrates'

last

words:

"I

owe a cock

to

Asclepius"

life is

disease,
of

an absurdity.

When Socrates "told the Athenians that

was, in principle, condemning

the unexamined

life

was not worth

living, he

Athens (and the bulk

absurd, then Socrates
philosopher as

mankind) to death.
condemned

(One

might

reply that if life is

in fact

the bulk of mankind to

life, leaving
his

the

the one who learns to

'die.') "Socrates

conquered all

emotions

all save

one, the desire for

truth."

Having

"emotion"

severed this

from the

others, Socrates effectually unleashes them. The artificial constraints he recom

provides the nec eventually fail. Only the "discipline of the essary restraints on these innocent but indeterminate forces of the soul. The stan dards for discipline "cannot be determined by categories of reason nor by logical
mends must
Torah"

inference from the facts any

of experience

if only because life is legal

infinitely richer than

an argument

set of mental concepts or accumulation of empirical

philosophers'

data"

op

posed

to the
range of

contention that no

system can respond suffi

ciently to the "the Torah

ple."

ther suppresses nor

program

human circumstance. In setting standards, the Torah nei indulges the emotions; it guides them to assist men to fulfill for overcoming the cyclically of nature and the death princi

Obviously,
this

unaided

human

reason cannot

know the "Infinite

other

Halacha"

on
eros of

which

overcoming depends. As for

restates

"emotions"

than the

intel
and

lect, Eidelberg
others.

the

difficulty

noticed

by

Leo Strauss,

Stanley Rosen,

Book Reviews
It is
or always

447 theory
of

the case that the adherent of any reductionist or emotive

ideas

mentality

runs

into the

clusions

an exercise

exempting his thought from its own con in self-deification, a sort of parody of the Biblical verse,
paradox of

'My

thoughts are not your

thoughts.'

Unfortunately,
HaShem.

these

'gods'

characteristically lack the

and

gracious

restraint

of

Eidelberg
course of some

titles his tenth

final

chapter

"The Conquest

Death."

of

In the

advancing a non-Kabalistic interpretation of the Eden story, he offers hints on how to interpret the Torah. By eating from the Tree of Knowl

edge, Adam asserted that

nated

he,

not

God,

'owned'

the Garden. He

thereby

subordi

his

higher, God-perceiving faculties

to his senses or sensuous desires

in

the very act of

tence,
one

man

searching for knowledge. In descending to a lower level of exis caused tension between his mind and his body, yielding death on the
the other. Had Adam and Eve then
eaten

hand

and shame on

from the Tree

right; to

of

Life their misery "anthropocentric himself by

effort.

would

have been

eternal. unto

As it

is, Socrates
God

was

life, for
redeem

man,"

is "sickness
go

death."

allowed man

But "to

reason, the Kabala of

of measurement

beyond the finite, but without It can yield the Torah is

and principle

leaving

the

domain of "create

necessary."

a science whose units

"synthesize quantity

quality"

and enable man to

matter,"

overcoming the merely

natural

of conservation-of-energy.

Qedusha,

the "nonphysical

energy"

that nonetheless can govern the physical

nations."

world, "distinguishes and separates Israel from the

Thought's enemy, complacency,

makes good

will

find

no refuge

in this book.

Eidelberg
and and ex

his

promise

to

challenge

"many
eros

cherished

convictions, skeptical
more

dogmatic

alike."

In

doing

so, he leaves one wanting to see

detailed
easily

tensive treatment of his theme. This

for

completion could

reach an

impasse, however.* In order to fully understand Judaism as Eidelberg represents it, one needs instruction in the esoterics of the Torah and the Talmud. To receive that is, one must decide the issue in advance, at this, one must become Jewish
least is to
provisionally.

(Else

one must

become the for

greatest

The Torah

master can

thus argue that

all practical

dissembler in the world.) purposes the Torah master

nonphilosopher:

the philosopher what the

philosopher says

he is to the

man who

knows both the

true

life

of

the mind and the

false life, thus enjoying the

'know'

advantage over men who

only the false.

Does God

smile?

*Part
much

of

the problem arises

from the

scope of the

book. Although he discusses large

areas with

depth, Eidelberg
(if they
are

must seize come

the main points, not the nuances. This means that the book's weak
and were unavoidable once

nesses

that)

from its strength,

Eidelberg

chose to give

it

that

strength.

448

Interpretation

How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? Edited

William A. Schambra. (Washington
and

by

Robert A. Goldwin

and

London: American Enterprise Institute

cloth,

for Public

Policy Research,

1985.

125

pp.:

$13.95;

paper,

$5.95.)

Will Morrisey

The
eous

discrepancy

between

political speeches

deeds

of political men

has

not gone unremarked.

extolling rights and the unright Some of this discrepancy

simply from the difference between theory and practice. But much of it does not. Most regimes today fail to defend rights. Their rulers give every sign of
results unwillingness or

inability

to

do

so.

Their

citizens

and

that is
abuses.

term

have

almost no civil recourse against tyrannical not

scarcely the Because the

United States Constitution does

secure

them, understanding it

can

merely mention rights but actually helps to make "a valuable contribution to the safety and The
editors

happiness
tives.'

world."

of the people of the

have

selected six essays

in

tended to strengthen that understanding

three

by

'liberals,'

three

by

'conserva

The first two

rights,
of

essayists

present

historical interpretations

of

Constitutional father

focusing
of

on

Madison's

campaign to add
writes

the first ten amendments, the Bill

that Madison "became the
reject

Rights. Historian Robert A. Rutland

the Bill
original of
Rights"

of

when

hostile

voters

threatened to

the Constitution in

its

form. Rutland
are

argues

that public opinion and the "national and state

bills

reciprocally influential. He goes so far as to call the Constitu tion "a living, breathing for this reason, although his one example of this (that we no longer have slaves) required nothing less than a civil war and an
document"

rights"

amendment to

be effected,

as we

lived

and

breathed.

Rutland evidently regards the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment (as interpreted by twentieth-century Supreme Court justices) the principal Con
rights. Public opinion alone rarely protects he contends. adequately, Abolitionists, religious zealots, suspected Confederate sympathizers, IWWs, pacifists, conscientious objectors, "support stitutional guardians of
our rights
Americans'

ers of the newborn

Soviet
until

Union,"

labor

leaders,

"denied"

and suffragettes were of the

their civil

liberties

the

Supreme Court "spread [the] broad

umbre

Fourteenth Amendment to

do not immedi in ately threaten the peace. To this day, public opinion "can never be our republic, but public opinion continues to favor abridgement of accord rights;
cover all public speech and action that
ignored"

ingly, "the Supreme Court

of our

and an executive

branch dedicated
informed"

to the preservation

individual
which

rights must

be strong
not

enough to withstand the vagaries of public

so well and as

opinion,"

"today

is

nearly

in

previous eras.
re

Rutland deplores apathy,

marks a

indifference,

the Reagan Administration. He

"wide difference between

of certain civil

public opinion and the more advanced although the

judicial

interpretations becomes

rights,"

'advancement'

meaning

of

obscure when

the

'liberal'

faith in

progressive enlightenment

dims.

Book Reviews
The late
sumption

449
Herbert J. In his

political scientist

Storing

contradicts of

Rutland's

prime as

by denying
seal

"the

common view that

the heart

American
of

liberty

is to

be found in the Bill

intended to
the

Rights."

of

campaign

for the Bill

Rights, Madison

Antifederalists'

defeat

group

of common people whose opposition

separating them from "the large did rest, not on fundamental hostility

by

to the basic

design

of the

Constitution, but
more secure.

on

the broad fear that individual

protected."

liberties
makes

were not

sufficiently
rights a

Storing

doubts that the Bill

of

Rights

Americans'

bly have
limit To
risk

developed

any kind of common

Without it, "our courts would proba law of individual rights to help to test and
rally"

power."

governmental use

the Bill of Rights as a "set of maxims to which people might

government."

is to

"undermin[ing]
main

stable and effective

The Federalists identified

not as
self-protection

"the

political

business

of

the American

people"

against political power

but

as self-government.

"Even

rational and well-consti

tuted governments need and deserve a

nence,"

presumption of

legitimacy
can

and perma

Storing
if it

suggests, echoing Madison. Persistent recurrence to the Bill of

Rights

as

were a statement of maxims or and

'first

principles'

interfere

with

this presumption,
ment.

thus

with

the practical

business "at the

of republican self-govern of

Accordingly,

the Bill of Rights comes

tail"

the

Constitution,

not

the beginning.

The Bill

of

Rights

provides a opens.

fitting

close

to the

parenthesis around

the Constitution

that the Preamble to

But the

substance

is

design

of government with powers

act and a structure arranged

design,
cal

not

its

preamble or

to make it act wisely and responsibly. It is in that its epilogue, that the security of American civil and politi

liberty

lies.

One

might even

infer that
as

Storing

suspects some enthusiasts of amend

the First Amend

ment go so

far

to use it to further

the Constitution without popular

consent.

The

second two essayists

discuss contemporary

ways of

interpreting

the Con

stitution.

Law

scholar

Owen M. Fiss contends, first, that "rights

emerging "through
to values
a process of

are not prem

ises, but
meaning

conclusions"

trying

to give concrete

and expression
new

embodied

in

an authoritative

legal

text,"

and

second, that "a

form

of constitutional adjudication

has

emerge

reform,"

with a newly-emerged set of rights.

Called "structural
large-scale

this

coinciding form of adju

organi

dication

assumes

that "the

operations of

threaten "our
assumes

values"

constitutional

more

formidably

than individuals do. It further

an
assumption

that these

organizations

must

be restructured,

"reflect[ing]
privilege
quo."

healthy

skepticism

about

the existing distribution

of power

and

in
en

society."

American
terprise "requires a
with the
bors."

The

reformers

intend to "create
on

a new status

Their

measure of

activity

the part of the judge that

is

at odds neigh

picture of

him

as a passive umpire,

simply choosing between two

enterprise."

The judge

now

"becomes the

manager of a reconstructive

Fiss

450
charges
with

Interpretation
that the older "dispute
resolution"

model of

judicial

conduct

"begin[s]
not sub

indifference toward
this charge.
objection

public values or

ignorance

them."

of

He does

stantiate

A familiar

to

such vigorous

activity

by judges is

the rhetorical ques

tion, 'Who

elected themT which

Fiss

replies

that judges and courts form part of our po

Judges'

litical system,

is based

upon consent.

personal moral

expertise,

of which

authority rests not on "some have but on the process that limits none, they
method

their exercise of power and constitutes the

must

by

which a public

be

construed."

This

process

involves dialogue, responsibility,

and

morality indepen
also

dence. One

might

note

that although the power

bringing independence
meant

brings responsibility obviously, the more powerful you are the responsible for it does not of course bring the responsibility
phrase yield

more you are

by

the
can

'a

responsibility.'

sense of even

Further,

keen

sense of

responsibility

different,

opposite,

results

derives from his

authoritative

depending upon the public morality a judge legal text. Fiss himself suggests some of this by
itself becomes
so
much

conceding that the

of

judiciary

itself becomes bureaucratized

organizations when

one

those

dangerous, large-scale
justice

given

to do.

Worse, "the danger is

their commitment to

ever present

that judges will temper their idealism and

by

what

is

realistic."

Fiss

colors the picture

darkly:

[he warns]; they will bargain; they will become That is to say, having become politicized, judges get political.

"They

adap

will negotiate

Political

scientist

Walter Berns
framers'

considers current notions of

judicial

conduct

to be unusual, even irregular and

their

eccentric.

Under the

Constitution, judges "owe

independence to the
exercise

tively today
vide

the

power who

that

by

judgment that only with it could they effec natural right belongs to someone else, the

people"

constituting
nonetheless

ordain, establish, and amend the Constitution. Judges

rights,"

"create
as

doing
if it

avowedly,"

so

"openly

and
of

Fourteenth Amendment
New

empowered

the courts instead

using the Congress to pro

v.

the substance of privileges and immunities. Until the 1925 case Gitlow

York,

the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth

Amendment had

not

been

con

joined. But

subsequent justices have made up for lost time. Far from commending the American founders sought "to devise a system in which moral differences would not become political The
'idealism,'

issues."

founders, Berns
discovered in

argues, conceived of rights in the modern way, as natural rights

a nature with no telos except self-preservation and with such sub

sidiary rights (notably liberty) as self-preservation entails. Without spurning dec larations of rights, the founders never supposed mere declarations sufficient. The defense
of natural rights requires an artificial structure
will

"designed to but

ensure that

the country

be

governed

not

by

simple majorities

by

constitutional are

majorities,
private civil
none

majorities

that respect constitutional

limitations that
kind

defined

by

rights."

This defense

also requires another

of artificial

structure, a

society sufficiently strong or fanatical

extensive and commercial to contain enough to

diverse interests,
not

dominate the

others.

While

noble, this

Book Reviews
"great modern

451

project"

Berns

cautions

is "not ignoble"; it encourages liberty, prevents tyranny. that "while rights, properly understood, can be secured, not all These
wants

wants can

be

satisfied."

include the ignoble

wants of

criminals, but
us

they
the

also

include
at

some of the noble wants of moralists. as

Berns tempts

to think

latter

least

dangerous
'low*

as

the

former.
right

The
be fed

assertion combines

that human beings have not only the

the
concern

to

eat

but the

right of

to

for

survival with

the

'high'

language

'ide
now

alism'

in

a manner that

may be

peculiar

to our time. Few

moralists

before

could regard governmental alleviation of

hunger

as a superior moral undertaking.

Charity has
based
upon

earned praise

for centuries, but

appears
praises a

enforced

charity, charity

as a

demand

"subsistence

rights,"

Political
Rights."

scientist

Henry

Shue
set

mostly document

on recent called

lists

of moral goods.

the "International Bill of

The "core Shue

rights"

forth

therein are rights to "minimum economic se

rather

curity."

emphasizes

the obligatory

than the libertarian character of

rights; "the

whole point of

imposing
sistence

duties,"

justifiable demands,
the
right

example, means you

liberty of other people by Having the right to life, for refrain can justifiably demand that I from killing you. "Sub having
rights upon

is to limit the
them.

rights"

extend

to life to contemporary circumstances,

ever

wherein

human beings

control nature

to a larger degree than

before. Famine is
of

no

longer

so much an act of nature as an act of principles

men; "specification

sensible,

well-

informed

for the

allocation of political

responsibility is, I think,

one of the cen

philosophy

tral tasks of contemporary

Shue
with

criticizes the

Reagan Administration's
that foster "cold war

replacement of

"human

rights

"political

rights"

goals."

He

charges the

Administra

tion with
allies as

hypocrisy because, he
Marcos'

claims, it overlooks human

while

rights abuses

by

such

Turkey

and

Philippines

condemning

abuses

in the Soviet

bloc. "Genuine logical

subsistence rights

[are] betrayed in
see our aside

the pursuit of

gains"

illusory
their

because the Soviets

tune.

illusory ideo hypocrisy and therefore will

whether

not change

own unjust

Leaving

the question of

the

Reagan Administration actually has

and

overlooked

human

rights abuses

by

allies,

leaving

aside

the pretty claim that the Soviets

must

might repent

if only they

thought us sincere, it

be

said

that Shue here fails to

conquered

argue consistently.

If,

given the extent to which men

have

litical
ical"

crime

Stalin in the

1930s and

nature, famine now ranks as the Marxist rulers of Ethiopia today

political or

a po serve

as obvious examples of this

reasons
rights"

then one cannot ignore the

"ideolog

for

the decision to cause famine.

rights"

Attempting

to separate "human
are political ani

from "political

makes no sense regard

if human beings
when

rights"

mals who act of

differently in
and

to "subsistence

their conceptions

"political

differ. If if other

commercial republics

rarely

or never

deliberately
is
an

cause of

famine,

regimes

do,

then the

issue

of political rights

issue

human

rights.

If,

moreover, certain
communist

kinds

of regimes that spurn commercial

republicanism

(e.g.,

regimes)

wield

considerably

more power

than

certain other

kinds

of regimes

that also

spurn commercial republicanism

(e.g.,

452

Interpretation

right-wing

dictatorships)

then there is no

hypocrisy or even inconsistency

in

con

centrating one's public attention on the former and not on the latter. The decision to do so involves prudential deliberation and may be called into question by pru dential deliberation. But to make that decision primarily a matter of rights under
mines

the exercise of the practical judgment that defends rights.

might associate

John Locke
patriarchalism.

"subsistence

rights"

as

Shue

conceives them with

emperor

For example, Confucius tells the Chinese

to

feed the

people,

who are as

his

'children.'

The

absence of state-guaranteed

"subsistence

rights,"

distinguished from the

Locke's

natural right

to consume the fruits of one's la the ruler-as-father, reservations

bor,

perhaps reflects

reservations about

originating in the philosopher's dislike of tyranny and his esteem for human in dustry. In the volume's most substantial essay, Nathan Tarcov examines the con
ception of rights seen

in the Declaration

of

Independence

and

the

Constitution.

He finds it

individualistic than Shue does, but not simply individualistic. Tarcov observes that the Declaration of Independence speaks of both individ
more

ual and collective rights.

But the latter

exist

to secure the former. A

"people,"

in

the

Declaration, does not sentiment helps constitute

itself
and

mean an organic a

entity,

a race or nationality.

Shared labor

people, but that is

to a new

not enough.

people constitutes

by its acts: emigration by the risk of

acts of

land,

the acquisition of that land

by

individuals'

lives

and

fortunes.

The

naturally free

individuals, in
to
each of

particular the expenditure of

life, liberty,

and

property that laration

signed

by

nature

belong

them,

are what constitute a people.

The Dec

recapitulates and reconfirms that ultra-Lockean origin

by

its final

pledge of

individuals'

lives, fortunes,
right

and sacred

honor.
"people"

Although Tarcov is surely

ean,

to call this

definition

of a

ultra-Lock

one should also notice

that the

fortunes, and sacred honor tion life, liberty, and the pursuit
pursuit of

Declaration's closing formulation lives, differs significantly from its opening formula
of

happiness. Go

so

far

as

to concede that the

concession

happiness

means

the attempt to acquire

property (a

that de

cisively
honor"

confirms

the Declaration's Lockean character, although it is not a con

cession that need

makes sense

be made), and you still cannot accurately contend that "sacred in Lockean terms. The sanctity of honor sounds far more
needed

aristocratic than

anything Locke endorses, and more careful research is fix the meaning of this evocative phrase. This notwithstanding, Tarcov clearly shows the relation of

to

individuality

to

collectivity in the Declaration. The Constitution, he argues, embodies an analo gous relation between the country and humanity. Universalist but humanitarian, Constitutional rights inhere in human nature itself "but their security is primarily Locke teaches that "civil so something each people must accomplish for has the right to secure the rights of those who have consented to it"; ciety only accordingly, "we have believed that American patriotism is the most effective
form
the
philanthropy."

itself."

of

individuals

who consent

American nationhood, then, directly serves the rights to participate in it while indirectly serving (by

of

exam-

Book Reviews
pie) the

453 human beings

Fourteenth
who cannot participate

vast numbers of

in it. Against

those who contend that the

alter

and

Fifteenth

amendments

fundamentally
that "the the

the

Constitution's
Constitution

moderate

individualism,

Tarcov

observes

amended

protects

the rights of individuals against

violation on

basis

of their

race, not rights of racial or ethnic groups as units"; "the interests of

more

classes

derive from the

stitutional

majorities rule not

fundamental property rights of as classes (as the Athenian demos

individuals."

Con

did) but

as shift

ing by their elected

effect

coalitions of

individuals

and

interests
Extensive

whose views are refined and enlarged use of

representatives.

the power

of judicial review upon

to

policy thus

undermines

the very constitutionalism it depends

their proper

by

stripping Tarcov distinguishes the

tution

constitutional majorities of

function.
protected

natural rights of

individuals

by

the Consti

from

natural right as propounded

by

classical political philosophers.

Clas

sic natural right

involves the distribution

of political

of

goods, the direct

cultivation of vir

tues,

the

fostering

unity,

and

the

teaching

of truth.

The

classical

politeia

...

is

the

form taken

by a political community,
the ruling
part

determined

by

who rules

it. The domi

the whole the

nant characteristic of regime and view

determines both the

political goal of

the

personal goals of

the individuals in

it. This
in

conception reflects

that

political rule of a

is

natural.

The American

conception of a a single

constitution,

in

con

trast, is that
stood as

fundamental law, preferably

the
will of

written

document,

under

the

expression of

the

whole people.

The Constitution
not so

grants

powers of government
rule others or

from the

natural right of

individuals,

that some can

form their goals, but

so that the

remaining

rights of all can

be

more

secure.

The Constitution does

not constitute a classical

timocracy (Federalist #8

explic

itly
erty

contrasts

the

agricultural

and commercial pursuits of

the American states

with

the

ancient

republic, a "nation of soldiers"), an oligarchy

("Securing prop
who would

rights

is

of special advantage not

acquire wealth"), or a classical

only to the wealthy but to those democracy. Constitution

recommends

Tarcov does
the question
of

not mean that the

blinding ourselves
desires."

to

the

desirability

of our several desires. While securing rights, the

Constitution is "compelled to distinguish lawful from lawless

Exclusive
public good
reliance on rights generates

irritable litigiousness only invoke

to
pursue our

and

empty

yearning.

Our

discourse is impoverished if we
us,

rights

and never

debate

what what

is

for

if

we

would make us

only happy.

assert our right

happiness

and never

discuss

In protecting the right to speak by means that reward civility and rationality, the Constitution subtly orients some American souls toward distinctively human happiness and away from either the irritable self-righteousness of men who mis
take themselves for
selves
gods or

the

appetitive yearnings of men who mistake

them

for beasts. Both these

mistakes

incline

men

to tyranny.

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Short Notices

Freedom

of

Expression: Purpose

as

Limit.

By Francis
and

Canavan. (Durham,
The Claremont Insti
1984. xv + 181

N.C.,
pp.:

tute for the

Claremont, Study of Statesmanship cloth, $19.75; paper, $9.95.)

and

Calif.: Carolina Academic Press

and

Political Philosophy,

Will Morrisey

"One

of

the most curious

developments in
in

recent

intellectual
if not in

history
practice

is the

metamorphosis of
court."

freedom

of speech and press reason

into freedom
principle

of expression tout and

Words

are

inseparable from

the substitution of expression tion of

for speech,

oral and

written, betokens the redefini this understanding of

ideas

as tastes and tastes as urges.

rational

"Expression, in
Canavan

it, becomes detached from

purpose."

writes

"to disturb

[this]
dis

opinion."

insufficiently
cussion of minds

reflective public
and

The book's first

finest

chapter contains an

uncommonly
purpose,

reasonable

the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Canavan re

readers

his

that any freedom

the

must

have

some

and this purpose as the

defines,

that

is, limits,

freedom

served

by

it. For example, if,

Supreme

Court has consistently recognized, the First Amendment's primary purpose "is to produce a government controlled by a public opinion that has been formed
through free and rational debate
issues,"

on public

then reasoned speech and por

some of

nography

are not created equal. while

Amusingly
no

enough,

the more libertarian

Justices,
ences

professing tween The Federalist Papers between

political

to

discover

Constitutionally

valid

distinction be

and Fanny Hill, easily discern important differ speech and commercial advertising, the latter deemed

legitimately pressions by
conduct

ruled

by

strict

laws

Canavan

would end such

arbitrary judicial

ex

redirecting but between irrational

attention

to the distinction "not between speech and

and more or

less

speech."

rational

In
nine man

six of

the remaining seven chapters, Canavan examines the teachings of

Wortnoteworthy writers on freedom of speech: Milton, Locke, Spinoza, (a Jeffersonian democrat and author of A Treatise Concerning Political En
and the

quiry,
and

two

of the Press, published in 1800), Mill, Bagehot, Laski, twentieth-century American legal scholars, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and

Liberty

Alexander Meiklejohn.
pression, Canavan does

Having
not

insisted

upon

distinctions among kinds

men.

of ex

fail to

acknowledge the sometimes

considerable

differences in intellect reading

ment of of

and

learning

among these

(Almost necessarily, his

than his treat

Locke's

complex writings will

be

more controversial

Laski). Be that

as

it may, Canavan convincingly

an

shows that

liberty's

great and near-great

defenders in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

not passion.

de

fended freedom

of speech as

inducement to reason,

Indeed,

456
Bagehot

Interpretation
went so

far

as

to argue that "government

energy.

by

discussion"

would

rechan-

nel sexual

into intellectual
shows

Canavan

that this defense of free speech first weakened

when

Mill

and

his followers optimistically presumed that moral progress must result from lib erty, and then began to collapse when such writers as Laski and Meiklejohn ut

terly
stant

abandoned

the "appeal to Nature and Nature's

God"

as progressivism 's

optimism receded.

"[T]o

assert that

truth is beyond the reach of reason is the con

temptation of contemporary

liberals."

Canavan's final

chapter

eloquently

summarizes

the

argument:

Freedom to
to
reason

speak and publish was pursuit of

in the

originally advocated for the services it would render truth. Now it is defended on the ground that, not only is

there no
standard

definitive

standard

by

which we

by

which we can

distinguish in

reason

may judge what is true, there is not even any in the pursuit of truth from passion in
gain, or the libido dominandi in its drive

the pursuit of pleasure,

or greed

quest of

for

power.

But to take this its

position

is to

undermine the whole case

for the freedom

of the mind and

expression

in

speech and publication.

Nihilism
,

makes a poor shield

for

right.

philosophy bears nihilism within itself from the beginning, in contending that reason is a scout for the passions. Modernity's may attempt more to make reality than to apprehend it. This ques
might ask

One

if modern

political

'rationalism'

tion takes

one

viding

a cogent

beyond Canavan's study, which carefully leads us to it, thus pro introduction to the issues raised by the modern right to freedom

of speech.

Philosophical Apprenticeships.

Sullivan. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Joan Stambaugh The title

By Hans-Georg Gadamer. Trans. Robert Press, 1985. 205 pp.: $17.50.)

R.

of

this intellectual autobiography should remind us of

not an

Goethe's
sense,

Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeships. It is

autobiography in the
effects of

usual

but primarily

makes accessible

to the reader the entire the

twentieth century

Germany, including
hermeneutical
of

devastating
nobis

university Nazism
on

atmosphere of
and

the

recovery therefrom. The book's motto, de

author's characteristic
reflective

ipsis silemus, incorporates the

stance of not

focusing

himself in for the

self-

Cartesian fashion, but

providing
in

the sensitive optic

person

ages and situations with which

he

came

contact.

ger, Rudolf

Paul Natorp, Max Scheler, Martin Heideg Bultmann, Gerhard Kriiger, Richard Kroner, Hans Lipps, Karl Reinhardt, Karl Jaspers, and Karl Lowith; but many other figures, some perhaps
are separate chapters on

There

less known to English

readers

in

an

ingenuous

and

revealing

but equally important for Gadamer, are discussed way. Gadamer leads us through the

university

Short Notices
communities of

457
and

Marburg, Leipzig, Frankfurt

later
on and work

Heidelberg, discussing
colleagues and

at

first
are

his fellow

students and professors and

his

friends. We

made aware of

in Greek philosophy, particularly Plato, and in the poets, most notably Holderlin, Rilke and Paul Celan. It is, of course, not possible to discuss all of this rich material in a brief re
view.

his interest

We hear

about the neo-Kantianism that was a predominant

youth

influence dur
with

ing
ger,

Gadamer's

in Marburg. We hear

about

his Habilitation

Heideg

about whose

thought he makes many insightful remarks, two of which might

be

mentioned

here.
refers

The term

'turn'

to a bend

hairpin

or switchback

in the

path

that goes

up

mountain.

One does

not turn around

here;
is

rather, the way

one that cannot

itself turns in be easily

order to con

tinue going up.

Where to? The

question

answered.

Heidegger
would

was then

find

expression

orienting himself to an intensive interpretation of Nietzsche that in a two-volume work, the real counterpart of Being and Time

(p.

50-

There is

substantial

discussion

of

Nazism, highlighted by

the

following

piv

otal sentences:

That I had failed to

see

a widespread conviction

any danger in this pale instrument is easy to understand. It was in intellectual circles that Hitler in coming to power would he had
used

deconstruct the

nonsense

to drum up the movement,

and we counted

the

anti-Semitism as part of this nonsense.

We

were to

leam

differently

(p.

75).

The descriptions
vision of the

of

trying

to maintain

Nazi party border on Gadamer's tales are not without humor.

his university activities under the super the surreal. It was not an easy time for anyone.

Among Marburg

students, it
come

was

then

said of with

Kriiger

and me:

With Kriiger

one

leams

how everything has

to

be exact;

Gadamer

one

leams how little

we

know

about what exactness

is (p. 64).
what

One

gleans

insight into

Gadamer thought familiar to

to

of the

contemporary

educational methods as

us now as to

growing influence of him then. Thus, only

genu

anthologies and

xeroxing

are anathema

him;

verbal exams are the

ine kind;

introductory

courses should

be taught

by

full professors,

not

by

begin

ning teachers;

one cannot

versity level; by Of the most condensed

marks on

normally then it is too late.

speak of

"educational

influence"

at

the uni

philosophical

interest,
of

of

course,

are

Gadamer's

re

hermeneutics,
appended

scattered

throughout the book and systematically put

forth in

an

essay "On the Origin

Philosophical

Hermeneutics."

Early

on we are told:
a

Meanwhile, hermeneutics has become

mostly
used as a new

fashionable term, but this

means

that

it is
that

hat for for

a

not at all

new,

or even

things, especially for a "hermeneutic nonmethod of divination and enthusiasm,

old

method

is

which

is

as old

as the unrequited

love for philosophy itself (p.

147).

458
We

Interpretation
are told that

hermeneutics has less to learn from the theory

traditions that
are worth remembering. and

of modern sci

ence than

from

old

There

interesting remarks on remembrance ing from that of Heidegger.

Whenever the
this
way.

history

that indicate a

are some very direction differ

attempt

is

made to

philosophize, the

remembrance of

being

happens in

But
no

nonetheless

it

seems to me that there

a

is

no

history

of

being. Remem

brance has
is
no such

history. There is
as a

growing

forgetfulness, but in
.

the same manner there

Philosophy has no history. The first person to write a history of philosophy that really was a history was also the last: Hegel
thing
growing
remembrance.

(p.

187).

Finally, Gadamer calls for a return

perience of

to the primordial dialogic of the

human

ex

the world, to the unending dialogue of the soul with itself (and oth

ers),

which

is

what

thinking is. Hermeneutic philosophy is

mood and charm of

not an absolute posi

tion, but a way of experience. To appreciate the inimitable

read

this

book,

one must

simply

it. It

recaptures an era now

forever lost to

us.

Forthcoming
Harry V.
John C. Jaffa

Articles

Equality, Liberty, Wisdom, Morality,

the Idea of Political Freedom

and

Consent in

Koritansky

Socratic Rhetoric Phaedrus

and

Socratic Wisdom in Plato's

James C. Leake

Tacitus'

Teaching
(first part)

and

the Decline

of

Liberty

at

Rome

Discussion
Pamela Jensen

The American Constitution

Character

and the

American

Will

Morrisey

Delimiting Philosophy

Reviews

Philip

J. Kain

on

Gisela N. Berns; Will

and

Morrisey

on

Forrest McDonald Krason

on

Walter Berns; Stephen M.

John J. Schrems

ISSN 0020-9635