Pat Barry Motion To Disqualify Harold LaFlamme

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 B. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A. B. IV. 2. A. III. I. II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS MOTION TO REMOVE LAFLAMME AS MINORS COUNSEL AND TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE HIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 REASONS FOR REMOVAL, INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE OF LAFLAMME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE DIRECTLY IMPACTING ON HANSONS AND R.M.S RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Litigation Events Preceding Hanson Bringing R.M. to Speak to Dr. Reardon, a Psychiatrist Who Testified that R.M. Disclosed to Him that her Father was Sexually Molesting Her . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. Fathers Repeated Attempts to Change Custody, Visitation, and Support. ..........................................................7 Fathers Attempt to Cover Up Sexual Molestation by Having R.M. Declared as Suffering from Williams Syndrome Thus Having no Credibility as a Reporter of Incest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Hearing on Hansons ExParte Application for Emergency Protection of Her Daughter in Which Dr. Reardon, a Psychiatrist, Testified that R. M. Disclosed to Him that Morgan Was Sexually Molesting Her, Shows That LaFlamme, the Court, and CPS Were Already on the Side of the Father. ................................................................9
THE COURT CONDUCTED STAR CHAMBER PROCEEDINGS ON THE TWO MOST CRITICAL JUNCTURES OF THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING, THE APPOINTMENT OF JULIE OLDROYD, M.D., AS R.M.S THERAPIST AND OF DUKE BUSSEY AS CUSTODY EVALUATOR AND THE RULING ON WHETHER MORGAN HAD SEXUALLY ABUSED R.M. WHICH LAFLAMME SUPPORTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The October 22, 2002, Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The January 2, 2003 Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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V.
LAFLAMME THREATENED HIS OWN CLIENT AND FOR THAT HE MUST BE DISCIPLINED AND REMOVED FROM THIS CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 ONCE HAVING OBTAINED AN ORDER WITH NO EVIDENCE AND NO HEARING, LAFLAMME THEN SUBVERTED THE PROCESS BY FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN OPEN COURT WHICH J. FIRMAT NOT ONLY PERMITTED, BUT ENCOURAGED, AND MADE RULINGS BASED ON THEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 LAFLAMME ENGAGED IN NUMEROUS EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH BUSSEY IN VIOLATION OF ORANGE SUPERIOR COURT L.R. 716(F) AND FAM. C. SEC.216, THUS HOPELESSLY TAINTING THE CUSTODY EVALUATION PROCESS AND THE RESULTING EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT LAFLAMMES UNETHICAL CONDUCT WAS CALLED INTO QUESTION, WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN RULING ON THIS MOTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 LAFLAMME HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS BIAS FOR MORGAN AND HIS PREJUDICE AGAINST HANSON IN OTHER WAYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
DECLARATION OF PATRICIA J. BARRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 DECLARATION OF KRISTIN HANSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
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M EM ORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS M OTION TO REM OVE LAFLAM M E AS M INORS COUNSEL AND TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE HIM ; ii DECLARATIONS OF BARRY AND HANSON.
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Humphries v. County of Los Angeles,05-56467 (9th Cir. 1-15-2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 In re Marriage of Hall (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 313 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 23 In re Marriage of Laurenti (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 395 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 IRMO Seagondollar (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1116 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 17, 18, 35 MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enter. Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 170 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Niko v. Foreman (2006) 11 Cal.App.4th 344 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 36-37, 38 Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Seneca Ins. Co. v. County of Orange (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 611 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 STATUTES, RULES: Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Code Civil Procedure 527.6(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Domestic Violence Prevention Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Evidence Code Section 730 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 16, 17 Family Code 3011(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Section 3110 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Section 3111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Section 3151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 39 Section 3151.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 iii
M EM ORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS M OTION TO REM OVE LAFLAM M E AS M INORS COUNSEL AND TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE HIM ; iii DECLARATIONS OF BARRY AND HANSON.
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6220 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 section 6320 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Penal Code 96.5 l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 11165.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 11165.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 11165.7(a)(19), (21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Section 11166(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 11167.5 (b)(11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 11167.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Section 11168 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Section 11170(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Section 11170( c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Welfare & Institution Code Section 827 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 California Rules of Court Rule 5.200(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Rule 5.220(c)(4) & (5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Rule 5.220(d)(1)( c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Rule 5.220(d)(1)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17 Rule 5.220(d)(1)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Rule 5.220(e)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Rule 5.242 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Court of Orange County, Local Rules Rule 716(F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 36
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M EM ORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS M OTION TO REM OVE LAFLAM M E AS M INORS COUNSEL AND TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE HIM ; iv DECLARATIONS OF BARRY AND HANSON.
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MISCELLANEOUS: (Jeffrey Turner, 1996). National Center for Victims of Crime, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentAction =ViewProperties&DocumentID=32360&UrlToReturn =http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncvc.org%2fncvc%2fmain. aspx%3fdbName%3dAdvancedSearch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Bette L. Bottoms, Kari L. Nysse-Carris, Twana Harris and Kimberly Tyda,, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 205-227 Published by: Springer, Jurors' Perceptions of Adolescent Sexual Assault Victims Who Have Intellectual Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Denise C. Valenti-Hein and Linda D. Schwartz: Witness competency in people with mental retardation: Implications for prosecution of sexual abuse, Institute for the Study of Developmental Disabilities (M/C 285), Mental Health Program, University of Illinois at Chicago, Box 4348, 60680-4348 Chicago, Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Farewell to All That: An Oral History of the Bush White House, Vanity Fair February 2009 issue, No.582, p.100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaslighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 McCollough, John, John Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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M EM ORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS M OTION TO REM OVE LAFLAM M E AS M INORS COUNSEL AND TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE HIM ; v DECLARATIONS OF BARRY AND HANSON.
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1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS MOTION TO REMOVE LAFLAMME AS MINORS COUNSEL AND TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE HIM. I INTRODUCTION IT WAS NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IT WAS THE DEPARTMENT OF LITIGATION RISK, AND THEY SAW EVERYTHING THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF WHETHER A DECISION MIGHT RESULT IN SOME KIND OF LIABILITY, WHETHER SOMEONE MIGHT GET SUED OR PROSECUTED. BUT THATS NOT THE ROLE OF A LAWYER. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IS TO EXERCISE GOOD JUDGMENT AND TO LOOK AT LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES, AND ULTIMATELY TO DO WHATS THE ETHICALLY AND MORALLY CORRECT THING TO DO. John Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser to the National Security Council and later to the Secretary of State in Bush Administration as quoted in Farewell to All That: An Oral History of the Bush White House, Vanity Fair, February 2009 issue, No.582, p.100, emphasis added. This is a dissolution action in which the couple, Petitioner KRISTIN HANSON (Hanson) and Respondent JEREMIAH MORGAN (Morgan) married on January 15, 1994, and had one daughter, born November 14, 1994, who shall be designated by her initials R.M. because she is still a minor. The judgment of dissolution was filed on August 20, 1996, a true and correct copy of which is marked and attached as Exh. 1. R.M. is now fourteen years old. J. Francisco Firmat (J. Firmat) has not allowed R.M. to see her mother for almost six years. Hanson Declar., p.41, parag. 2. Harold LaFlamme (LaFlamme) was appointed by Commissioner Gale Hickman (Comm.Hickman) on August 30, 2002, as counsel for R.M. Morgans key attorney is Victor de Witt (De Witt). On
October 22, 2002, J. Firmat appointed Julie Oldroyd, M. D., (Oldroyd) a child psychiatrist, as R.M.s therapist and Stewart Duke Bussey (Bussey) to perform the 7301 custody evaluation. A true and correct copy of the order filed October 22, 2002, is marked and attached as Exh. 2. Thus, the actors in this proceeding are R.M., Hanson, Oldroyd, Morgan, DeWitt, LaFlamme, and Bussey. As this travesty of due process unfolded in the courtroom, numerous
28
Evid. C. Section 730 which permits the Court to appoint an expert. 1
M EM ORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS M OTION TO REM OVE LAFLAM M E AS M INORS COUNSEL AND TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE HIM ; 1 DECLARATIONS OF BARRY AND HANSON.
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mandated reporters 2 made reports about R.M. to Orange County Social Services (Child Protective Services) (CPS), either about suspected sexual abuse or willful physical injury, including Oldroyd (three reports on sexual abuse, discussed infra); Dr. Reardon, a psychiatrist (one, on sexual abuse, discussed infra); Dr. Del Mundo, R.M.s pediatrician; a nurse at Dr. Del Mundos office; Dr. Shapiro, an emergency room physician; his nurse, Susan Pietro-Carol (or, her report was subsumed on willful injury as part of Dr. Shapiros report); and Mike Handfield, a Garden Grove police officer. Hanson Declar., p.41, parag. 3. Although Morgan has obtained records from CPS concerning R.M. on two occasions, Hanson has tried unsuccessfully on twice on her own to obtain them with no luck. Hanson Declar, p.41, parag. 4. . Barry served a 827 3 petition for the third time on December 21, 2008, on CPS, a true and correct copy of which along with its exhibits is marked and attached as Exh.3 asking for the records, but CPS refuses to produce the records. Barry Declar., p.38, parags. 3, 4. Hansons name is in the California Child Abuse Index as an abuser. A true and correct copy of the notice from Orange County Social Services dated January 4, 2004, and so stating is marked and attached as Exh. 4. Hanson is thus automatically entitled to the mandated reports themselves, subject to redaction to protect the identity of the reporter. 11167.5 (b)(11) Penal. On November 5, 2008, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Humphries v. County of Los Angeles,05-56467 (9th Cir. 1-15-2009) that those whose names are placed in the child abuse index are entitled to a due process hearing to have their names removed. Barry has requested a hearing from Orange County Social Services. A true and correct copy of the request dated December 26, 2008,and its exhibits is marked and attached as Exh. 5. There has been no The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act require certain professionals to make reports to Social Services based on a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or neglected. Pen.C. Sec.11166(a)(1). Among those responsible to make such reports are medical doctors, licensed nurses, and police officers. 11165.7(a)(19), (21) Penal. Based on what R.M. disclosed to Oldroyd and Reardon, Morgan was sexually abusing his daughter within the meaning of 11165.1 Penal, and when he hit her in the eye, he met the definition of willful injury of a child within the meaning of 11165.3 Penal.
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Welf.&Insti. C. Sec.827 entitles parents to have CPS records concerning their children. 2
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response from the department. Barr Declar., p.38, parag. 5. Bussey, LaFlamme, DeWitt, and J. Firmat have all worked together, with J. Firmat giving appointments repeatedly to Bussey and LaFlamme. Bussey testified that he had known LaFlamme for the four years prior to his engagement as the Hanson/Morgan evaluator, and he and LaFlamme had done ten cases together, with LaFlamme as minors counsel, as of October 7, 2003 (date of deposition), including the scandalous Niko case discussed infra at Part VIII. true and correct copy of portions of Busseys is marked and attached as Exh. 6. At 11:8-14. Bussey had also been on five to ten cases with DeWitt, Morgans counsel, and had known him also for about four years. Id., 11:15-21. J. Firmat had appointed him he was guessing at least twenty times. Id., 7:10-14. Thus, these men DeWitt, LaFlamme, Bussey, and J. Firmat were all familiar with one another and aligned themselves, one with the other, all against Hanson and R.M. LaFlamme probably advised Morgan to hire DeWitt. We also note that LaFlamme may well not meet the requirements of the recently-enacted California Rule of Court, Rule 5.242 Qualifications, Rights, and Responsibilities of Counsel Appointed to Represent a Child in Family Law Proceedings, which went into effect January 1, 2009. The Rule requires training in Recognizing, evaluating and understanding evidence of child abuse and neglect, family violence and substance abuse, cultural and ethnic diversity, and gender-specific issues; (D) The effects of domestic violence and child abuse and neglect on children;.... emphasis added. LaFlamme must have a declaration on file with the Court indicating he meets all the A
20 requirements of the Rule. 21 22 23 (a) 24 made false representations on the record to cover up his crime. The evidence is the letter/report 25 of Oldroyd, court-appointed child psychiatrist, which Oldroyd had written LaFlamme on January 26 2, 2003. LaFlamme suppressed the letter. However, at his deposition, Bussey provided a copy 27 28 of the letter to Rombro who read the letter into the record. Exh. 6, 51:1-6. 3
II REASONS FOR REMOVAL, INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE OF LAFLAMME. 1. LaFlamme has engaged in a pattern of criminal obstruction of justice. LaFlamme suppressed the most important evidence in this case, and then
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RACHEL HAS REPORTED THAT SHE HAD TO TOUCH HER FATHERS PRIVATE PARTS, THAT HE HAS THREATENED TO KILL HER MOTHER AND THAT HE HIT HER IN THE EYE WHEN HE WAS ANGRY. THIS HAS BEEN REPORTED TO ME AND HAS BEEN CONSISTENT..... emphasis added. (I) LaFlamme denied on the record that Oldroyd had reported that
4 R.M. had disclosed that Morgan was sexually molesting her. A true and correct copy of the 5 transcript of proceedings in the Hanson/Morgan on June 4, 2003, is marked and attached as 6 Exh.7. He also denied that Oldroyd had submitted a report. However, LaFlamme stated in a 7 letter dated January 16, 2003, to Hansons then attorney, Steve Hittlelman, a true and correct 8 copy of which is marked and attached as Exh 8, that Oldroyd had provided him a letter which he 9 was providing CPS. LaFlamme claimed privilege with no legal basis for doing so. 10 (ii) 11 is the letter from Oldroyd dated January 2, 2003, addressed to LaFlamme which was provided by 12 Bussey at the time of his deposition on October 7, 2003, and recited into the record. 13 (iii) 14 accepts everything LaFlamme says without further inquiry or documentation, and always looks to 15 him for validation of his rulings against R.M. and Hanson and who on January 2, 2003, entered 16 an order finding that based in part, on the report of Oldroyd, there was no sexual abuse, and 17 Hanson falsified the charges. A true and correct copy of the January 2, 2003, order is marked 18 and attached as Exh. 9. Oldroyds January 2, 2003, letter to LaFlamme states the opposite. 19 (b) 20 existence of the Oldroyd report/letter. On February 15, 2008, LaFlamme also stated that Oldroyd 21 had appeared in chambers and said there was no sexual abuse although there appears to be only 22 one instance of Oldroyd appearing in chambers, and that was when she was court appointed as 23 R.M.s therapist on October 22, 2002. A true and correct copy of the February 15, 2008, 24 proceedings is marked and attached as Exh.10. 25 2. 26 Firmats unconstitutional procedure of an unreported chambers conference with no sworn 27 28 witnesses, no reports, and without Hanson or R.M. being present to make the finding there was 4
Given the chronology, the letter from Oldroyd referenced in Exh. 8
LaFlamme failed to provide Oldroyds letter to J. Firmat who
In subsequent hearings, as already indicated, LaFlamme denied the
On January 2, 2003, LaFlamme as did Hansons own attorney -- supported J.
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no sexual abuse, and Hanson had falsified the charges. 3.
Exh. 9.
LaFlamme openly engaged in exparte discussions with Bussey in violation of his
code of professional conduct and in violation of L.R.716(f) which resulted not only in a tainted and unfair evaluation by Bussey but also an evaluation created in part by an unqualified individual against whom Hanson cannot lodge a complaint with the Board of Psychology as she has done with Bussey or subject him to cross examination as she could have, of Bussey, because Fam. C. Secs. 3151 and 3151.5 prohibit calling minors counsel as a witness; True and correct copy of portions of Busseys 730 evaluation dated February 12, 2003, reflecting only what is public knowledge or not confidential, is marked and attached as Exh.11. At p.13 of the evaluation, Bussey openly describes LaFlammes in depth participation in the evaluation and the parenting plan. A true and correct copy of Morgans December 26, 2002, declaration in support of a TRO he sought against Hanson is marked and attached as Exh. 12. He states that on December 18, 2002, LaFlamme had a telephone conference with Morgans and Hansons attorneys in which he described his lengthy conversation with Bussey in which Bussey told LaFlamme he had concluded there was no sexual abuse even before he had completed his evaluation probably because LaFlamme urged him to do so. Id., parag. 7, p.3. 4. LaFlamme violated his oath of office in that he told his client, Hansons daughter,
that when she disclosed to him that her father was hurting her and she did not want visitation with him, that he did not believe her and if she said anything, her father would go to jail, in the presence of Nancy Keyler, his assistant. Hanson Declar., p.41, parag. 5. 5. LaFlamme has consistently kept Dr. Oldroyd from testifying and recently, filed a
motion to quash the production of her records concerning R.M. in response to Hansons subpoenas although he knew that A) Dr. Oldroyd had been court appointed on October 22, 2002, as R.M.s
therapist and to report to the Court her opinions and findings about whether R.M. was being abused by her father, and there is a statutory waiver of confidentiality in that instance (Evid. C. Sec.917(a)); Alternatively, LaFlamme never sought a declaration from Dr. Oldroyd in which she 5
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could have stated that R.M. had disclosed a crime to her, that R. M. is a minor, and that it is in R.M.s best interests to disclose what R. M. had told her about her father sexually molesting her to the Court (Evid. C. Sec. 1027); LaFlamme never sought R.M.s input as to whether she waived the privilege after she turned 12 at which age through 18 she jointly holds the privilege with him, and if she waives it, he must honor it ( 317(f) Welf. & Inst); and in any event, Hanson has the right to call Oldroyd whose hearsay statements were relied on in part by Bussey for his opinions particularly since Oldroyd was court appointed. Barry Declar., pp. 38-39, parags. 6-7. 6. LaFlamme has actively litigated on behalf of the father, and not on behalf of R.M.,
and as evidence of his bias for the father and prejudice against the mother, besides the active suppression of the evidence of sexual molestation, his fraudulent statements made in court, his failure to object to all the due process violations, a. La Flamme has ignored for years the mothers written pleas to him to
obtain the medical and all other records of R.M. because the father refuses to provide her the names of the health care providers of R.M. and to ask Morgan to stop interfering with her telephone visitation. Hanson Declar., p.41, parag. 6. b. LaFlamme has for years spoken privately with the father and his second
wife in the hallways of the court purposely excluding Hanson and now, her current attorney, from the conversation and has always sat with the father rather than with the mother while waiting for the Hanson/Morgan case to be called. LaFlamme has failed to provide time and accounting records to Hanson. c. Hanson declar., pp.41-42, parag. 7; Barry declar., p.39, parags. 8, 9. LaFlamme has never filed a report nor represented to the Court whether
R.M. wishes to testify, although she is 14 years old, and where she wants to live, whether with her mother or with her father. Hanson declar., p.42, parag. 8. d. LaFlamme opposed Hansons recent exparte attempt to obtain visitation, a
true and correct copy of which exparte/OSC is marked and attached as Exh.13 and to proceed with an OSC re: custody on October 20, 2008. A true and correct copy of the transcript of 6
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proceedings on October 20, 2008, is marked and attached as Exh. 14. Hanson Declar., p.42, parag. 9; Barry declar., p.39, parag. 10. e. Hanson notified LaFlamme that R.M. is desperate to see and be with her
mother, as she cries on the phone when speaking to her mother, wanting to know when she will see her mother again. R.M. has an absolute right to be heard since she is 14 years old. Hanson Declar.p.42, parag. 10; Barry declar., p.39, parag. 10. III THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE DIRECTLY IMPACTING ON HANSONS AND R.M.S RIGHTS. A. Litigation Events Preceding Hanson Bringing R.M. to Speak to Dr. Reardon, a Psychiatrist Who Testified that R.M. Disclosed to Him that her Father was Sexually Molesting Her. 1. Fathers Repeated Attempts to Change Custody, Visitation, and Support.
As R.M. grew older and now was able to articulate what her father was doing to her, 13 Morgan began filing OSCs re: custody, visitation, and child support. Hanson retained custody . 14 A true and correct copy of portions of the case docket is marked and attached as Exh. 15 which 15 shows OSC filed by Morgan on February 8, 2000, on November 5, 2001, and on January 4, 2002. 16 2. 17 18 Perhaps one of the most obvious ruses Morgan pulled to hide his sexual molestation was 19 his attempt to have the Court declare that R.M. suffered from Williams Syndrome, of which one 20 of the characteristics is retardation. R.M. has developmental delays. One doctor, Dr. Rees, 21 suggested to the parents that R.M. might suffer from Williams Syndrome. Morgan rightfully 22 rejected the suggested diagnosis in no uncertain terms in a letter he wrote Dr. Rees. A true and 23 correct copy of Morgans letter to Dr. Rees dated November 18, 1997, is marked and attached as 24 Exh. 16. Hanson Declar. 25 Morgan was now armed with knowledge of the syndrome. As R.M. became older, 26 Morgan decided to preempt her disclosures by having the Court declare her a victim of the 27 28 Syndrome and therefore retarded. Morgan filed yet another OSC to obtain this result, on 7
Fathers Attempt to Cover Up Sexual Molestation by Having R.M. Declared as Suffering from Williams Syndrome Thus Having no Credibility as a Reporter of Incest.
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November 5, 2001. Hanson was flabbergasted, and disputed his claims. According to Hanson, her then attorney discredited Morgans expert on the stand. Hanson was willing to stipulate to seek medical treatment for R.M. indicated for children with the syndrome as long as R. M. did not have the label. A true and correct copy of a letter written by Mr. Morris then Hansons attorney to Farah Azar, then Morgans attorney dated April 11, 2002, offering this stipulation is marked and attached as Exh. 17. Hanson expressed concern to Mr. Morris that the stipulation included the label. Mr. Morris wrote and assured Hanson that [t]he order does not include a diagnosis or label. A true and correct copy of Mr.Morris letter to Hanson dated September 4, 2002, so stating is marked and attached as Exh. 18. A true and correct copy of the order on the medical treatment but with no label filed on July 19, 2002, is marked and attached as Exh. 19. Hanson declar., pp.42-43, parag. 12. Since truth was the first casualty in this lawsuit, Morgan, DeWitt, LaFlamme, Bussey, and J. Firmat repeatedly discredit both Hanson because she remained resistant to the label, and her helpless daughter by labeling her like a Scarlet Letter with Williams Syndrome, therefore, retarded and therefore, not a credible reporter of incest. 4 As one example, in his declaration executed on May 5, 2003,at p.3, parag. 10, a true and correct copy of which declaration is marked and attached as Exh.20, Morgan labeled R.M. as suffering from Williams Syndrome and being mentally retarded. As another example, at the June 4, 2003, proceedings, J. Firmat referred to R.M.s diagnosis of Williams Syndrome and that he expected the parents to treat R.M. as if she had the syndrome ...until some expert convinces this court otherwise that this child does not have Williams Syndrome. Exh. 7:11:13-16, 18-23. There was no diagnosis and J. Firmat gave R.M. the label that Hanson and her attorney thought had been avoided through the stipulated order.
That Morgan never believed R.M. suffers from Williams Syndrome can be demonstrated by R.M.s medical records which would show that Morgan does not have R.M. regularly examined by specialists as required by the stipulated order (Exh. 19). 8
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B.
The Hearing on Hansons ExParte Application for Emergency Protection of Her Daughter in Which Dr. Reardon, a Psychiatrist, Testified that R. M. Disclosed to Him that Morgan Was Sexually Molesting Her, Shows That LaFlamme, the Court, and CPS Were Already on the Side of the Father.
In August 2002 Hanson became very concerned about R.M. because of her behavior, 4 bursting into tears, expressing great fear in having to visit her father, telling her mother that her 5 father was telling her that he was going to kill her mother (and later, her grandmother and her 6 beloved dog), and showing other unusual signs of distress and anxiety. Thus, Hanson decided to 7 have R.M. see Dr. Reardon a psychiatrist with whom Hanson had treated in the past, and in 8 whom she had confidence and trust. Hanson Declar., p.43, parag.13. 9 Hanson reviewed the marital judgment, Exh. 1, p.2, parag.1-C, that if either parent wants 10 to take the child to see a counselor, the parent must notify the other parent before doing so. 11 Hanson called Morgan and let him know she was taking R. M. to see Dr. Reardon. Morgan 12 became very angry and made threats in two or three voice mails. Hanson Declar., p.43, parag.14. 13 Hanson took R.M. to see Dr. Reardon on August 28, 2002. After Dr. Reardon met with 14 R. M., he called Hanson in and told her that R.M. had disclosed to him that her father was 15 sexually molesting her. Hanson was in shock, began crying, and Dr. Reardon told her she had to 16 stop because he did not want R.M. upset. Hanson immediately contacted her attorney to file for 17 emergency protection of R.M. Hanson Declar., p.43, parag. 15. 18 Dr. Reardon was the sole witness at the hearing on Hansons exparte application, which 19 took place on August 30, 2008. Comm. Hickman was hostile from the get-go and made 20 Hansons attorney miserable in attempting to qualify Dr. Reardon as an expert and to have him 21 testify as to what R.M. told him. Commr Hickman engaged in hypertechnical objections, took 22 over the questioning, and made it clear that he was going to do everything to avoid issuing a 23 restraining order against Morgan which ultimately he did finding inexplicably that Dr. Reardon 24 was unqualified to render an opinion that based on what R.M. was telling him, she was being 25 molested by her father. A true and correct copy of the hearing transcript of August 30, 2002, is 26 marked and attached as Exh. 21 at 6, 7:1-12; 12; 13; 14:19-24; 15; 16:1-8. 27 28 Reardon testified as to his qualifications to interview a child to determine whether she 9
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was being sexually by her father, at Id., [BY FRITZ] 5; 7:15-26; 8:1-8, 18-25; 9:1-14; [BY LAFLAMME] 10:8-26; 11:1-19;[FRITZ RESUMES]16:13-26; 17; 18; 19; 21; [BY DE WITT, MORGANS COUNSEL] 22:16-26; 23; 24; 25; [FRITZ RESUMES] 26. In spite of exhaustive detail supplied about his qualifications in dealing with children who are suspected of being sexually abused, still Hickman went on for three pages (mockingly at 27:16-23; 28:10-18) that he was not qualified. [FRITZ RESUMES] 29:12-26; 30; 31; 32; 33:1-9, 21-26; 34; 35; 36; [BY DE WITT:] 36:9-26; 37:1-11. LaFlamme weighed in, not on R.M.s credibility, but on her supposed Williams Syndrome, which per the July 19, 2002, order was not a finding, (Exh. 19), clearly designed to reinforce the already apparent gender-biased doubt (woman parent, girl child, woman attorney on an indisputable girl cause of action: father-daughter incest, the highest reported incest in the United States 5) of an already unfriendly jurists head that the child was not to be believed, whatever she says. Id.,37:20-26; 38:1-1-19. Then, the Court took over questioning the doctor for two and a half pages, 38-40, asking, of course, about Williams Syndrome at Id.,40:11-14. He then lectured Fritz and finally ruled that Dr. Reardon could testify about his opinion the child was sexually abused based on history and symptoms. Id., 40-41, in particular, 41:18-26; 42:1-2. The court interrupted the questioning by Fritz mostly and by the other attorneys at 44:1924; 45:5-26; 46:21-26; 47:1-5, 10-19, 22-25; 48:8, 15, 17; 49:7-11; 50:2-14, 19-25; 51:5-12, 15; 58:25-26; 59; 61:26; 62:15-24; 66:1-11. He also chided Fritz because Fritz described Hansons demeanor when she came to Fritzs office at 74:14-26; because Fritz resumed her argument with my the concerns of the exparte was that the child -- at 75:7-9, interrupted her again at 76:2-9. LaFlamme and De Witt did not argue clearly they had a win. 76:21-24. Commr Hickman then began another lecture
Father-daughter and stepfather-daughter incest is most commonly reported,..... [S]ome estimates show 20 million Americans have been victimized by parent incest as children. (Jeffrey Turner, 1996). National Center for Victims of Crime, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx ?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentAction=ViewProperties&DocumentID=32360&UrlToR eturn=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncvc.org%2fncvc%2fmain.aspx%3fdbName%3dAdvancedSearch 10
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at 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, and then at 81:17-24 ruled that Dr. Reardon was NOT qualified (!) He of course brought up the Williams Syndrome at 82:21-26, betraying a tremendous ignorance of empirical data about mentally retarded individuals credibility in reporting sexual abuse. See, e.g., Witness competency in people with mental retardation: Implications for prosecution of sexual abuse Denise C. Valenti-Hein and Linda D. Schwartz, Institute for the Study of Developmental Disabilities (M/C 285), Mental Health Program, University of Illinois at Chicago, Box 4348, 60680-4348 Chicago, Illinois Abstract: Victims with mental retardation have been excluded from the legal system based on the belief that they are incompetent to provide accurate, reliable testimony. Such restrictions contribute to the increased risk that people with mental retardation will be victimized. This article examines the complexity surrounding definitions of competency, as well as the mythology which serves to de-emphasize the abilities of victims to testify against an alleged perpetrator. The implications of the presumption of incompetency are highlighted through the example of sexual abuse. Empirical evidence and recent court cases are used to argue that people with mental retardation deserve access to the same standards of competency as the rest of the population. 6
Hansons attorneys waived almost all of her due process rights including the well meaning ones. Hanson was thrust into a legal system which refuses to move away from its patriarchal origins. Thus, attorneys will easily abandon all the due process rights mothers have the same ones dads have. IRMO Seagondollar (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1116 WHICH IS AN ORANGE SUPERIOR COURT CASE, provides an excellent example of an attorney standing up every inch of the way for every bit of due process his client was entitled to. The Court of Appeal congratulated the attorney, acknowledging the attorney had irritated the Trial Court and then proceeded to excoriate the trial court. Notably, the attorney was a male and his client was the male parent. Hanson should have received the same dogged, ethical, zealous, competent representation Seagondollar received from his attorney. The complete cave in by Hansons attorneys especially Hittlemans on January 2, 2003 and Rombros fraudulent misconduct in the criminal matter is scandalous and something that the State Bar must look into. Rombro fraudulently induced Hanson to plead guilty. She should not have done so because the likelihood of obtaining an acquittal was very great. See Bette L. Bottoms, Kari L. Nysse-Carris, Twana Harris and Kimberly Tyda, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 205-227, Published by: Springer, Jurors' Perceptions of Adolescent Sexual Assault Victims Who Have Intellectual Disabilities, Abstract: Children and adolescents with intellectual disabilities are especially likely to be sexually abused. Even so, their claims are not likely to be heard in court, possibly because people assume that jurors will not believe them. We tested this assumption in a mock-trial study in which 160 men and women watched videotaped excerpts from an actual trial. As predicted, when the 16-year-old sexual assault victim was portrayed as mildly mentally retarded 11
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In addition, Comm. Hickman substituted his own expertise for that of Dr. Reardon who clearly did not see R.M.s developmental delays as an obstacle to credible reporting. The lack of proportionality was evident; that is to say, even if Dr. Reardon had no specialty in child psychiatry, all Hanson was asking for was a TRO which expires by its own terms within twenty days. J. Firmat did not tell the truth when he stated at one of the endless hearings where he denied Hanson an evidentiary hearing or access to her daughter that he and the other 17 jurists (in family law in Orange county?) always err on the side of the safety of the child. A true and correct copy of the February 13, 2007, hearing transcript is marked and attached as Exh.22. At 8:6-10. Commr Hickman clearly did not. As demonstrated infra, neither did J. Firmat who placed R.M. in a zone of danger, namely, in her fathers custody, based solely on unreported inadmissible and false hearsay in one secret chambers conference with no testimony, no court reporter, no written reports and without Hanson being present. Besides raising the Williams Syndrome, to attempt to impeach his client further, LaFlamme asked Reardon if he had the impression that R.M. was giving answers some adult wanted her to give, and Reardon answered No, at Exh. 21:71:10-13. He also asked Reardon if he asked R.M. if her grandma, for example, told her to say that she had been molested, and Reardon answered that the thought crossed his mind but he did not have any suspicion of that. 71:2326;72:1-2. The worst of it was not just the denial of the TRO, but also the unveiling by Morgans attorney, De Witt, that the dye was already cast, and Hanson and her daughter were doomed. That their gender played a substantial role is not a coincidence. It is all part of the dye.
instead of as having average intelligence, jurors were more likely to vote guilty and had more confidence in the defendant's guilt; considered the victim to be more credible and the defendant to be less credible as witnesses; and rated the victim as more honest, less capable of fabricating the sexual abuse accusation, and less likely to have fabricated the sexual abuse accusation..... Emphasis added.
12
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De Witt stated that Morgan the alleged perpetrator and not Hanson the protective parent received a call from CPS the day before (August 29, 2002) stating the case was closed. Id.,20:14-16. Thus, CPS had already determined there was NO credible evidence that R.M. was being sexually molested. Hanson never called CPS, not at this time in August 2002 nor at any subsequent time. Hanson Declar., p.43, parag. 16. LaFlamme was obviously happy with both outcomes, the commissioner refusing to enter a TRO against Morgan and CPS closing the case before it was even opened. When LaFlamme took Oldroyds letter/report, he knew that CPS would ignore it because as of August 30, 2002, CPS had already decided there was no merit to R.M.s disclosure of sexual and physical abuse at the hands of her father. To use John Adams words to the jury in closing argument in defending the British soldiers involved in The Boston Massacre, "Facts are stubborn things, and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictums of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence." McCollough, John, John Adams, p.. CPS, Bussey, LaFlamme, and J. Firmat all ignored those stubborn facts of Morgans acts of sexual molestation. The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DPVA) applies to the TRO , since the issue was Morgans sexual assault of R.M., which constitutes domestic violence. First, we note that The qualifications of an expert witness are for the trial court [citation (in original))] and any question as to the degree of his knowledge goes to the weight of his testimony rather than as to its admissibility." Citation. MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enter. Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 170, 179, emphasis added. Commr Hickman, like J. Firmat, LaFlamme, and Bussey placed the interests of the father
21 ahead of those of the minor child nullifying the public policy of this state found in 3020(a) Fam.: 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure that the health, safety, and welfare of children shall be the court's primary concern in determining the best interest of children when making any orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of children. The Legislature further finds and declares that the perpetration of child abuse or domestic violence in a household where a child resides is detrimental to the child. See also 3011(a) Fam. mandating consideration of The health, safety, and welfare of the child in determining her best interests. Thus, the fact that the doctor did not specialize in the 13
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treatment of sexually abused children should have been measured against what was at stake here: restraint of 20 days against the father versus the health, safety, and welfare of the child In addition, the DVPAs ...purpose is to prevent the recurrence of acts of such abuse and to provide for a separation of those involved in order to resolve its underlying causes. ( 6220.) To this end, the DVPA provides for the issuance of restraining or "protective" orders, either ex parte or after hearing, that enjoin specific acts of abuse. The act defines "abuse" as ...an act of sexual assault.... The behavior that may be enjoined under section 6320 includes "molesting, ...threatening, sexually assaulting,.... " ( 6320.) The foregoing provisions of the DVPA confer a discretion designed to be exercised liberally, at least more liberally than a trial court's discretion to restrain civil harassment generally. For example, the "abuse" that may be enjoined under sections 6203 and 6320 is much broader than that which is defined as civil harassment. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., 527.6, subd. (b).) Moreover, an order after hearing may enjoin civil harassment only on proof by clear and convincing evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6, subd. (d).) This stringent standard of proof does not apply to an order after hearing restraining abuse under the DVPA. (See 6340, subd. (a).) Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334, emphasis added. Orange Superior Court now has the unenviable position of explaining to the public who
13 want children protected against sexual abuse how for the almost last six years, Morgan has had 14 custody of R. M., and R.M. has been deprived of her mother, when the only record of testimony 15 from the witness stand in this entire case for the six-1/2 years since the sexual abuse 16 allegation surfaced is that of a psychiatrist testifying that R.M. disclosed to him that her 17 father is sexually abusing her. 18 LaFlamme early on demonstrated he was no friend of R.M., and certainly not of her 19 mother. 20 21 22 23 24 A. 25 With the complete acquiescence of LaFlamme and of Hansons then attorney, Judge Firmat 26 violated the due process rights of Hanson and her daughter by making the two most important 27 28 rulings in chambers without a court reporter, without sworn testimony, without any documentary 14
IV THE COURT CONDUCTED STAR CHAMBER PROCEEDINGS ON THE TWO MOST CRITICAL JUNCTURES OF THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING, THE APPOINTMENT OF JULIE OLDROYD, M.D., AS R.M.S THERAPIST AND OF DUKE BUSSEY AS CUSTODY EVALUATOR AND THE RULING ON WHETHER MORGAN HAD SEXUALLY ABUSED R.M. WHICH LAFLAMME SUPPORTED The October 22, 2002, Order.
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evidence, and in the second instance, even without Hanson present. Thus, it is anybodys guess, about what took place in chambers on the two most critical days of this lawsuit, namely, October 22, 2002, and January 2, 2003. The proceedings should not be graced by the term hearings because nobody absolutely nobody was heard. Hanson contacted the court reporter, Teresa Fletcher, to be sure that there was NO reporters transcript of what occurred on those two days. Ms. Fletcher confirmed by recorded voice mail there is not. Hanson Declar., p.44, parag.18. A true and correct copy of the transcript of Ms. Fletchers voice mail message prepared by Hanson is marked and attached as Exh. 23. On October 22, 2002, Julie Oldroyd, a child psychiatrist, was court-appointed by Judge Firmat to be R. M.s therapist. In a letter dated November 7, 2007, which Dr. Oldroyd sent to U. S. District Court, a true and correct copy of which is marked and attached as Exh. 24, Oldroyd indicates that she was court appointed as R.M.s therapist. Hanson also understood from speaking with Mr. Hittelman, her attorney, that Judge Firmat had appointed Dr. Oldroyd as R.M.s therapist. Hanson also understood from Dr. Oldroyd that the parties and the evaluator would look to Dr. Oldroyd as the final opinion-maker on whether Morgan was molesting R. M and that J. Firmat instructed Oldroyd to return to Court with a report and recommendations concerning R.M. Hanson Declar., pp. 45, parags. 19-21. According to what Mr. Hittelman told her, Oldroyd informed J. Firmat and the others in chambers that R.M. was at risk based on her preliminary findings, and that Morgan should be placed in supervision visitation, with no overnights. Judge Firmat disregarded Oldroyds request for supervised visitation, but did suspend overnights (so much for erring on the side of child safety). Id., p.45, parags. 19,20. Child sexual abuse psychology 101 or just plain common sense means that before a child will open up, she must be guaranteed protection from the abuser. In addition, R. M. repeatedly reported that her father told her repeatedly he was going to kill her, her mother, and her dog. LaFlamme failed to fight for his clients protection and insist on supervised visitation for Morgan. Hanson Declar., p.47, parag. 27. Also, on October 22, 2002, Judge Firmat appointed Stewart Duke Bussey, Ph.D. to 15
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perform a child custody investigation pursuant to Evidence Code Sec.730 and Family Code Sec.3111 See Exh.2. Judge Firmat attached standard conditions but he failed to define the scope of the evaluation in accordance with Rule 5.220 (d)(1)(B), CA Rules of Court: Give the evaluator, before the evaluation begins, a copy of the court order that specifies: (I) The appointment of the evaluator under Evidence Code section 730, Family Code section 3110, or Code of Civil Procedure 2032; and (ii) The purpose and scope of the evaluation. emphasis added. The definitions of a full and limited scope evaluation are set out in subsection ( c)(4) & (5)
7 of the rule: 8 9 10 11 It was also Judge Firmats responsibility to insure that Bussey followed this rule of court 12 which he failed to do. 13 Bussey himself was required to set out the scope and purpose of the evaluation in writing. 14 Rule 5.200(e) Scope of evaluations 15 16 17 All Bussey stated in the first sentence of his opening paragraph is the following: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I was appointed to conduct an E.C. 730 Evaluation in the above-referenced matter by the Honorable Judge Francisco Firmat on October 22, 2002. The evaluation began on November 21st and continues to the present time. A true and correct copy of portions of the February 11, 2003, evaluation is marked and attached as Exh. 11. In a family law due process case coming out of Orange Superior Court, IRMO Seagondollar (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1116, the Fourth DCA was merciless in its criticism of the trial court. One of its key points for reversing the order permitting the mother to move away was that both the Court and Dr. Adams, the 730 custody evaluator, failed to do what Judge Firmat and Bussey failed to do, which is for the court to include in the order and for the evaluator, to provide a letter in writing to the parents, describing the scope of the evaluation, and its purpose, and in the case of the evaluator what her procedure would be in gathering evidence for the evaluation. The 16
....(4) A "full evaluation, investigation, or assessment" is a comprehensive examination of the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child. (5) A "partial evaluation, investigation, or assessment" is an examination of the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child that is limited by court order in either time or scope.
Rule 5.220 (d)(1)( c)
All evaluations must include: (1) A written explanation of the process that clearly describes the: (A) Purpose of the evaluation.
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Fourth DCA emphasized at 1120: Virtually from start to finish, the trial court handling this matter failed to follow or evenly apply the rules and procedures governing family law matters and, by failing to do so, denied Timothy the opportunity to be meaningfully heard..... The rules of procedure are commands which ensure fairness by their enforcement. emphasis added. The Court recited the five points of argument of the father at 1127 which included :
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Later at 1132, the Court stated: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Accord, In re Marriage of Laurenti (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 395: 25 26 27 28 [fn12] See also In re Marriage of Seagondollar (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 575] (pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(e)(1)(A), the evaluator had an obligation to supply to the parties "a written protocol describing the purpose of the evaluation and explaining the procedures he intended to follow"). 17
....(5) failing to issue an order defining in detail the purpose and scope of the Evidence Code section 730 evaluation. We agree: The trial court erred in all of those ways. While some error may be excused as harmless, the cumulative effect was to deny Timothy a fair hearing. emphasis added. The Court described what happened in the Seagondollar underlying custody proceeding which uncannily tracks exactly what had happened to Hanson and her daughter. First, the Court noted and criticized the Court order after quoting from Rule 5.220(d)(1)(B): 5. Inadequate Order Defining Purpose and Scope of Evidence Code Section 730 Evaluation ....The minute order in this case stated, "[t]he court appointed Dr. Stephen Adams [sic] to conduct a limited [Evidence Code section] 730 evaluation. The cost of the evaluation shall be divided equally between the parties, subject to reallocation." That's it. The order specifies the evaluator's appointment, but fails to specify the purpose and scope of the evaluation.
In this case, the order was woefully inadequate because it failed to define the purpose and scope of the evaluation at all. The Court also agreed that Dr. Adams had a chance to clarify the record by sending a letter to the parents setting out the scope and purpose of the evaluation but only verbally explained it to the parents, (Bussey never even provided a verbal explanation of the scope and purpose - Hanson Declar., p.48, parag.31)): As Timothy points out, Dr. Adam had an opportunity to correct the trial court's error by supplying the parties with a written protocol describing the purpose of the evaluation and explaining the procedures he intended to follow, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.220(e)(1)(A). Dr. Adam did not prepare such a written protocol. He could not satisfy his obligation to supply a written protocol by discussing the evaluation orally with the parties at his initial meeting with them. Id, at 1133.
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Thus, the evaluation became a free fall and could get into matters that Bussey chose to investigate or not. This is further complicated by the fact that neither Bussey nor Judge Firmat defined what the standard would be: best interests of the child or changed circumstances. LaFlamme aided and abetted this scandalous state of affairs by not immediately demanding that both J. Firmat and Bussey follow the CA Rules of Court. He was part of it, participating in the preparation of the custody evaluation on an exparte basis with Bussey, thus tainting the entire process. LaFlamme should be removed from the case and should be disciplined by the supervising judge of Orange Superior Court for allowing this critical proceeding to take place in a secret chambers conference in violation of his clients right to due process. He should be disciplined for not opposing the order of NO supervised visitation to protect R.M. from threats and pressure by her father not to disclose the sexual molestation. B. The January 2, 2003 Order.
The January 2, 2003, order, Exh. 9, was a complete falsification of the facts and a suppression of the search for the truth. It was irrational because it put Gordons expedited investigation cart before Busseys 730 evaluation horse. And Hansons attorney, Mr. Hittelman, told her not to show up (!). Hanson declar., p.46, parag. 23. Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479 has never stood for the proposition that an unreported chambers proceeding involving third parties rendering opinions without their sworn testimony in open court, and reliance on inadmissible hearsay resulting in a final order could ever be substituted for an evidentiary hearing with all witnesses taking the stand when child sexual abuse, an issue, which directly implicates the public interest and public policy, is what is at stake. As our High Court pointed out in Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1355: Another statutory exception to the hearsay rule permits courts to rely upon affidavits in certain motion matters. (Code Civ. Proc., 2009.) [fn10 omitted.] Although affidavits or declarations are authorized in certain motion matters under Code of Civil Procedure section 2009, this statute does not authorize their admission at a contested trial leading to judgment The Court noted what the Court of Appeal made clear in Reifler, supra.
26 27 28 The same point was emphasized in Reifler, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 479. In that case the Court of Appeal considered a challenge to a Los Angeles Superior Court policy of adjudicating long-cause hearings on postjudgment motions in marital dissolution matters 18
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solely on the basis of affidavits. The reviewing court ...oncluded Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 provides a hearsay exception that grants a trial court discretion to decide motions on the basis of affidavits even when facts are controverted but only so long as the controverted facts do not require factfinding resulting in a judgment. (Reifler, supra, at pp. 484-485.) The court expressed no doubt that hearsay was inadmissible at a contested marital dissolution trial. Id.,at 1355-1356, emphasis added. In this case, Judge Firmat entered a permanent order which directly affected the health,
5 safety, and welfare of R.M. and then having done so, forever barred Hanson from an evidentiary 6 hearing. Citing Witkin, the Elkins Court emphasized the right of litigants to 7 8 9 10 11 Nor should this due process right be abrogated in family law proceedings: 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Of note was some empirical data the Supreme Court referred to, in Elkins which is of 19 immediate import here: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A recent statewide survey reflects a similar concern with court procedures that do not permit family law litigants to tell their story, a circumstance reported by litigants to diminish their confidence in the courts. (Judicial Council of Cal., Admin. Off. of Cts., Rep. on Trust and Confidence in the California Courts (2006) Phase II, pp. 31-36 [self-represented litigants "express [ed] frustration that they did not have a chance to fully explain their side of the story to the judge"; "public trust and confidence in the courts . . . will continue to be negatively affected [by] procedures [that] do not permit [litigants] to tell their story at some length and in their own words"].) Elkins, supra, 1368. That Hanson and R.M. should have had an evidentiary hearing is even more imperative because, as Hanson argued correctly and eloquently on June 29, 2005, there was not truly a final judgment on custody and visitation, because the couple had stipulated to custody and visitation in 19
...offer relevant and competent evidence on a material issue. Subject to such obvious qualifications as the court's power to restrict cumulative and rebuttal evidence . . ., and to exclude unduly prejudicial matter [citation], denial of this fundamental right is almost always considered reversible error. [Citations.]" [Citation] Ordinarily, parties have the right to testify in their own behalf [Citation] and a party's opportunity to call witnesses to testify and to proffer admissible evidence is central to having his or her day in court. [Citations] Elkins, supra, at 1357.
Matters of domestic relations are of the utmost importance to the parties involved and also to the people of the State of California. . . .To this end a trial judge should not determine any issue that is presented for his consideration until he has heard all competent, material, and relevant evidence the parties desire to introduce." [Citation]. Id., at 1358. In Elkins, supra, our High Court held that In sum, consistent with the traditional concept of a trial as reflected in provisions of the Evidence Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, we conclude that respondent's rule and order calling for the admission and use of declarations at trial conflict with the hearsay rule. Id., at 1360.
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such a way that J. Firmat who openly refused to examine the judgment should have ruled that the judgment was not final. Please see Part VI of this memorandum, for a full discussion on this point. What J. Firmat had Reiflerized were domestic violence TRO declarations both Morgan and Hanson had sought, and obtained, on December 26, 2002, one against the other. Morgans declaration in support of his TRO is marked and attached as Exh. 12. A true and correct copy of Hansons declaration in support of her TRO is marked and attached as Exh. 25. Both showed the high conflict between the parties, and J. Firmat could not determine credibility on the declarations. Hansons TRO prohibited Morgan from seeing his daughter, and for reasons unknown, the judge who issued the TRO stamped EXPEDITED INVESTIGATION on it. A true and correct copy of the December 26, 2002, order is marked and attached as Exh. 26. Brian Gordon, a courtconnected evaluator, was somehow retained by the Court to conduct the expedited investigation of what it is not known. Neither his report nor his declaration indicating his qualifications is attached to the order. Because its scope was not defined, in violation of court rules, and thus, due process, it too became a free fall, and it morphed into the issue of sexual abuse. To make matters worse, in January, 2003, Bussey had not yet completed his 730 evaluation, in fact, still interviewing witnesses. He did not produce the evaluation until February 12, 2003,
Exh. 11. Yet, in Morgans declaration dated December 26, 2002, Exh. 12, p.3, parag. 7, Morgan states that there was a conference call on December 18, 2002, with De Witt, Hansons attorney, and LaFlamme who informed the other two counsel that Bussey had told him in a lengthy conversation that Bussey had concluded that no sexual abuse had taken place and recommended extending Morgans Saturday visitation and giving him Christmas visitation (father never got it Hanson had obtained a TRO against him denying him all visitation, Exh.26). R.M. never stood a chance with her own attorney making sure she did not. CPS had decided as of August 30, 2002, that no sexual abuse had occurred with no investigation and closed the case; Bussey who worked with LaFlamme on the custody evaluation and the parenting plan, had concluded there was none as of December 18, 2002; and Gordon chimed in as well, but based on what we do not know. Bussey was affected by the unethical influence of LaFlamme whom 20
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Bussey would never dare to cross because J. Firmat from whom Bussey had received over 20 appointments has always looked to LaFlamme as the final arbiter in all the proceedings in this case. Bussey acknowledged right on page 1 of his report, that Oldroyd had informed Bussey of the childs disclosures: It is notable in this complicated case that during August of 2002 allegations of sexual molestation arose. The minor child disclosed this to the treating psychiatrist and to mother. Exh. 11, pp.1 of report, emphasis added. LaFlamme did nothing, not objecting on behalf of his client, to this outrageous procedure, in fact, supporting, and playing the major role in it. Once having determined there was no sexual abuse and Mom falsified all of it on what we will never know, it became much, much worse. As already well established in this memorandum, supra, LaFlamme failed to notify J. Firmat of Oldroyds letter and to seek reconsideration of the January 2, 2003, order based on it, in which she stated: Rachel has reported that she had to touch her fathers private parts, that he has threatened to kill her mother and that he hit her in the eye when he was angry. This has been reported to me and has been consistent..... emphasis added. Exh. 6, 51:1-6. Instead, LaFlamme provided the letter to CPS the very agency which had already determined that there was no sexual abuse as of August 30, 2002, and that Mom had falsified the charges (although she had never reported the abuse to CPS- Hanson declar., p.44, parags. 16, 17)) knowing that it would disregard Oldroyds letter and did so. In the order, J. Firmat writes that he relied on ...reports of Dr. Bussey, Dr. Oldroyd, and other professionals that the molestation allegation against Respondent is unfounded. As far as this writer and Hanson know, there is no report of Bussey in existence prior to the February 2003 report being filed, there is NO report whatsoever from Oldroyd stating there is no sexual abuse, and who the other professionals are is unknown because they are not named in the order. Orange Superior Court and in particular, J. Firmat continue this obnoxious practice of forcing chambers proceedings on family law litigants and their attorneys despite the Fourth DCAs repeated admonitions to stop with the chambers conferences. In re Marriage of Hall (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 313, 315, 316, 320, 321: 21
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That order [child support] was delivered to Robert's counsel, who then apparently in accordance with "the standard procedure as discussed in chambers" had ten days to object. ... This case appears to have followed the all-too-common pattern in family law of lawyers disappearing into a judge's chamber and emerging with the judge's order, independent of any hearing or settlement. Yet of all matters, child support orders ...must be seen by each parent as the result of a fair and reasonable process, not an arbitrary decision done in a corner. The Court went on to quote Justice King in another child support case: In this regard, Justice King's remarks in In re Marriage of Fini, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 1033, bear repeating,....: "We pride ourselves on a system of justice, especially in family law cases. In a just system, parents being ordered to pay or receive child support deserve to know how the amount of the support was arrived at and that the process used is one that is fair and reasonable to both the payor and the payee. ....." (Id. at p. 1041, emphasis added.) The Hall Court then made a statement of great importance to this case: Unfortunately, when lawyers and the judge disappear into chambers and emerge with an order to confer on the parents, the impression created is not one of a "fair and reasonable" process. Rather, the impression is one of a decision that has been predetermined without a hearing.[fn7 omitted]. Id., at 319-320. While child support is very important, it pales in comparison with the issue of incest. Yet,
13 even for child support issues, the Fourth DCA rightfully stated that 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Not only is it important to the judiciary's legitimacy that parents understand the basis for child support orders, an important issue of substantive family law is also involved. ....However, when orders are strictly the products of unreported chambers conferences, there is no opportunity for the court to exercise its discretion, because any discretion, under the current statutory scheme, requires either a statement on the record or some kind of writing. The Court also indicated that unreported chambers conferences leave the parties without a record to take to the Court of Appeal. The Fourth DCA stated in Hall, supra, at A logical corollary of this statute is that appellate courts must have enough information in the record to evaluate whether a court correctly followed the formula .... An adequate record on appeal is vital to the implementation of that policy. The Hall case was decided in 2000. Thus, J. Firmat and LaFlamme knew that its own Court of Appeal heartily disapproved of chambers conferences to resolve the ultimate issues, especially an issue like child sexual abuse, in chambers conferences. In Seneca Ins. Co. v. County of Orange (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 611, 619, the Fourth DCA once more expressed its disapproval of chambers conferences in other cases, again out of Orange County: We do not know what was said in chambers before Judge Prickett or why the judge did not follow the procedural requirements of section 1305.4 in conducting whatever occurred in 22
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chambers. There is no indication why the attorneys in the case were not notified of the chambers proceedings. We have in the past pointed out that numerous problems result when judges "disappear" into unreported chambers conferences. (See In re Marriage of Hall (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 313, 319-320 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 772]; Heenan v. Sobati (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 995, 1002 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 532]. V LAFLAMME THREATENED HIS OWN CLIENT AND FOR THAT HE MUST BE DISCIPLINED AND REMOVED FROM THIS CASE. Hanson became concerned that LaFlamme was not meeting with, nor speaking to, his client, and her daughter. She insisted that he interview her. Hanson brought R. M. to LaFlammes office to meet with her attorney. LaFlamme insisted on speaking to her alone but did have his assistant attend the meeting. After the meeting, R.M. reported to her mother that she told LaFlamme that her father was hurting her and she did not want to visit with him, and LaFlamme told her that he did not believe her and if she said this, her father would go to jail. R.M. was visibly upset. Hanson Declar. LaFlamme must be removed from this case. VI ONCE HAVING OBTAINED AN ORDER WITH NO EVIDENCE AND NO HEARING, LAFLAMME THEN SUBVERTED THE PROCESS BY FALSE REPRESENTATIONS IN OPEN COURT WHICH J. FIRMAT NOT ONLY PERMITTED, BUT ENCOURAGED, AND MADE RULINGS BASED ON THEM. June 4, 2003, Proceedings.
17 Hanson knew her daughter was being molested, something bad had happened in court, she 18 knew it happened without a hearing, and she knew that she and her daughter were entitled to one. 19 On June 4, 2003, the Court changed custody of R.M. from Hanson her primary caretaker since 20 birth to Morgan. See Exh. 7, the transcript of proceedings of that day. 21 Hanson knew instinctively her right to due process, i.e., a right to an evidentiary hearing. 22 She requested the opportunity ...to prove [her] case, Id., 3:24-26, that she was ...trying to be 23 heard, Id., 5:8, she stated over and over again of the need to have Oldroyd testify, Id.,4:6-8; 5:1024 15, 20-22; 6:24-26; 7:14; 7:22-25; 8:21-26; 9;1-3, all to no avail. Hanson told J. Firmat that she 25 was ...trying to get a fair trial and that 26 27 28 I want a fair trial. I live in America. Im entitled to that. And I owe it to my child to protect her and Im going to do just that. 22:16, 22-25. See also Id.,22:15-16, 22-25; 23:22-26; 24:14-16. 23
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Despite this reasonable demand, rather than provide Hanson due process and give her a hearing, J. Firmat changed custody and affirmed the bailiffs decision to handcuff Hanson with all the men observing. Id., 20:23-26; 21:1-11. Although LaFlamme knew that Oldroyd had informed him that R.M. had disclosed to her that Morgan was sexually molesting her in the January 2, 2003, letter Oldroyd had written LaFlamme, LaFlamme outright denied that in response to J. Firmats leading question: THE COURT: [quoting from Hansons declaration] ....I [Hanson] cannot express how fearful, frustrated and angry I am that the Court will not review the report of Dr. Oldroyd-MS. MORGAN [HANSON]: Yes.
9 10 11 As Hanson later clarified at Id., 4:10-13, 5:11-13, she had spoken to Oldroyd Hanson 12 Declar., p.46, parags. 24, 25, Hanson had seen the report in Busseys office, and Bussey had read 13 portions of the report to Hanson. Hanson was absolutely correct about what Oldroyd had written, 14 LaFlamme knew it, and lied about it. 15 J. Firmat then asked a rhetorical question of LaFlamme indicating by the form of the 16 question what answer he wanted from LaFlamme: 17 By the way, thats not what Dr. Oldroyd reports, is it, Mr. LaFlamme? 18 MR. LAFLAMME: NO, IT ISNT. 4:13-16, emphasis added. Frightening in view of 19 what LaFlamme was hiding: consistent reports of his own client then almost nine years old that 20 her father was molesting her, he had threatened to kill her mother, and he hit her. 21 Hanson even informed J. Firmat that she had taken Rachel with her and stayed at a 22 womans center, and J. Firmat expressed no concern. 23 Later when Hanson informed the Court that she had seen Oldroyds report, the 24 Court asked LaFlamme if there was a written report by Oldroyd, and LaFlamme repeated 25 the lie: 26 NO.. Id.,5:20-26; 6:1-7, emphasis added. 27 28 J. Firmat ruled that he ...has no evidence that Dr. Oldroyd would testify as Mom states. 24
THE COURT: [still reading from Hansons declaration] RACHELS PSYCHIATRIST, TO WHOM RACHEL HAS REPORTED THAT HER FATHER HAS SEXUALLY ABUSED HER. [exactly what Oldroyd had reported to LaFlamme in the January 2, 2003 letter]
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Id., 8:10-11 but he had no competent evidence that she would not and how come he did not want to hear from the expert he had directed on October 22, 2002, to return with her report and recommendations about whether sex abuse had occurred? Hanson declar., p.45, parag.21. J. Firmat also informed Hanson that if at some time in the future you find otherwise [that Dr. Oldroyd would testify that the child was consistently reporting that Morgan was molesting her] I would certainly like to hear from Dr. Oldroyd. Id., at 8:10-13, emphasis added. It was disingenuous for J. Firmat to make such a statement. He most certainly did NOT want to hear from Oldroyd. J. Firmat did order that ....that we can have a review hearing in 60 days and if theres any new information to be provided to this court by Dr. Oldroyd Id like to see it.... Id.,8:10-16 Hanson stepped in and informed the court that she had spoken to Oldroyd and represented
11 that Oldroyd wanted to speak to the judge, but that she was intimidated and LaFlamme would not 12 let Oldroyd speak. Id., 8;21-26; 9:1-3. 13 J. Firmat then asked those present whether there would be objection to Dr. Oldroyd ...in 60 14 days submitting some short written report, waiving whatever privileges are necessary to waive so 15 that we have a short report on the limited issue? Id., 9:4-7. LaFlamme stated he would be 16 willing for her to submit a short report ...provided that it doesnt constitute a waiver of privilege 17 except within the confines of the report whatever that means. Id.,9:8-11. See also 10:3-6. 18 LaFlamme also volunteered that Oldroyd had conferred twice with court and lawyers in 19 chambers ...at least twice that I can remember. Id., 9:17-10. This writer and Hanson are 20 unaware of any other chambers conference which Oldroyd attended except for the October 22, 21 2002, proceeding. Hanson Declar., p.47, parag. 28; Barry Declar., pp.39-40, parag. 11. 22 After giving Morgan custody with the only testimony in this court proceeding being from a 23 psychiatrist that R.M. reported to him that her father was molesting her, Rombro, then Hansons 24 attorney, asked for clarification as to what would be in Oldroyds report, and J. Firmat responded: 25 THE COURT: THE ALLEGATIONS, THE SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS, IS 26 THE ONLY THING THAT I WOULD LIKE ADDRESSED BY DR. OLDROYD. Id.,14:16-18, 27 emphasis added. 28 25
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As usual, Morgan knew what he needed to do, to protect himself and asked J. Firmat: MR. MORGAN: Just one request that the order include the provision that I take Rachel to all of Dr. Oldroyds appointments, that I be responsible for taking her there. [Can one have any doubt as to why he needed that order?] Id., 14:23-26. Without hesitating, J. Firmat said he would make that order. Id.,15:1, 5-6. LaFlamme did not object to Morgans request, having abandoned his client completely. Rombro asked the Court to have Dr. Oldroyd ... include in her report not only the issue of sexual abuse allegations but also an assessment as to how the child is progressing while in fathers care. Id., 15:13-17, emphasis added. J. Firmat and LaFlamme agreed. Id., 15:18-20. So, the report would cover two issues: sex abuse allegations and assessment of R.M. in Morgans custody. Oldroyd never produced a report addressing the issue of sexual abuse allegations, and the subsequent hearings were reduced to the gaslighting7 of Hanson with Bussey, LaFlamme, DeWitt, and J. Firmat engaging in the usual gender-based attacks that Hanson was mentally unhinged, needed drugs and to keep seeing a therapist to realize that her charges (which she never made to CPS - Hanson declar., p.44, parags. 16-17) were false. June 29, 2005 Proceedings. The June 29, 2005, hearing was particularly cruel if only because it was clear that once more, Hanson was right about both the law and the facts, and LaFlamme and J. Firmat were wrong (J. Firmat and LaFlamme having always been the advocates for Morgan, his lawyer said nothing.). A true and correct copy of the June 29, 2005, hearing transcript is marked and attached as Exh. 28.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaslighting: Gaslighting is a form of psychological abuse. It involves an increasing frequency of systematically withholding factual information from, and/or providing false information to the subject, having the gradual effect of making the victim anxious, confused, and less able to trust his or her own memory and perception....[Hanson remained strong and never wavered from her belief that her child was molested and that she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to prove that she was.] The term was coined from the 1940 film Gaslight and its 1944 remake in which changes in gas light levels are experienced several times by the main character.... The sinister interpretation of the change in light levels is part of a larger pattern of deception to which the character Paula [Ingrid Bergman] is subjected. 26
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Hanson filed an at issue memorandum and appears to have requested a release of the privilege (as to Oldroyd). Id.,2:13-24; 7:20-24. J. Firmat struck the at-issue memorandum, stating that because there was a judgment she could not have a trial. Id., 4. When Hanson correctly pointed out there had never been a trial or a hearing, J. Firmat stated that there would never be a trial in this case. Id., 5:6-9. Yet, J. Firmat told Barry at the hearing on July 10, 2008, on Morgans domestic violence petition Morgan filed against Hanson because she saw her daughter for a few minutes at her daughters school, a true and correct copy of portions of the July 10, 2008, transcript of proceedings of which is marked and attached as Exh. 28 that All she [Hanson] has to do is come into court, schedule a trial schedule a hearing. Id., 18:12-13. No, she cant. Barry requested exparte visitation orders pending ruling on OSC for change
12 of custody, J. Firmat denied them outright, writing no exigent circumstances on the denial. a 13 child who has not seen her mother in five years, is in the sole control and custody of a man 14 consistently reported by that child to professionals as molesting her, and is crying and begging to 15 be with her mother do not constitute, in J. Firmats opinion, exigent circumstances. A true and 16 correct copy of the order denying visitation is marked and attached as Exh. 13 at p.2. 17 Then, on October 20, 2008, J. Firmat refused to take evidence on Hansons OSC for change 18 of custody because Hanson alleged facts occurring in 2002, 2003. LaFlamme supported both 19 denials of his clients access to her mother. See Exh. 13, exparte order/OSC, and Exh. 14, 20 transcript of proceedings of October 20, 2008. 21 At the June 29, 2005, hearing, J. Firmat told Hanson that he would not read the judgment 22 although Hanson demanded a Montenegro finding that the judgment re: custody and visitation was 23 not final. Exh. 27, 3:23-26; 4-6. J. Firmat threatened Hanson with declaring her a vexatious 24 litigant. Id.,6:9-11. Hanson reminded J. Firmat several times correctly she had never had a trial 25 or hearing on the alleged false sexual abuse claims, never faced her accusers. Id., 8:22-25; 9:9-14, 26 21-22; 12:17-22; 14:1-9. Hansons judgment filed August 20, 1996, Exh. 1, which J. Firmat and 27 28 Bussey were duty bound to review for purposes of the evaluation, states in part under heading 27
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CUSTODY AND VISITATION: 1.B. In the event controversy arises regarding major decisions, both parties shall first consult together and if no resolution, meet and confer with an expert in the field related to the dispute, e.g., the childs doctor, teacher, counselor, etc. If the consultation does not resolve the dispute, the parties shall return together to mediation in an attempt to reach an agreement. Finally, if the dispute continues, it shall be submitted to the Court for a decision, and until then, the existing order shall remain in effect. Pp.1-2, Judgment. It happens that this language is virtually identical to the language of a judgment concerning
6 custody and visitation in In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941, 951-952 7 (2002) which caused the Court to conclude that the parties did NOT intend that the judgment re: 8 custody and visitation was a permanent order: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Therefore, 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Also, the hypertechnical distinction between trial and hearing means very little, since Hanson is entitled to put on evidence concerning the sexual abuse allegation with witnesses testifying in court whether one chooses to call the proceeding a trial or a hearing. And regardless, whether trial or hearing, either ones leads to final judgment on custody. 28
8
We conclude the trial court erred in finding there was a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended the stipulation and resulting March 14, 2001, judgment to be a final judicial determination of custody..... [T]he judgment further recites: "In the event the parties are unable to resolve their custody and visitation issues, they shall agree upon a therapist or counselor. . . to assist them in resolving their issues. . . . If after meeting with a therapist or counselor, the parties remain unable to resolve their differences, they shall make an appointment with the Conciliation Court . . . prior to either party filing a request with the Court for a hearing on the issue." The Court concluded that There is no "clear, affirmative indication," as that term is used in Montenegro, that the parents intended the custody determination to be final. ...We conclude, therefore, that the March 14, 2001, order was not intended by the parties to be a final judicial determination of custody.
.... the father was not required to show that a significant change of circumstances justified modifying the custody order. ...Moreover, the trial court was required, exercising its wide discretion, to make an initial custody and visitation determination after considering all the circumstances bearing on the best interest of the child. [Citation.] Thus, Hanson should have been able to schedule a trial, or at the very minimum, a fullblown evidentiary hearing8, on the custody/visitation issue, where Hanson would not required to prove changed circumstances, but rather the best interests of her daughter. Hansons motion to release the privilege was superfluous in view of J. Firmat ordering that
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Oldroyd produce a short report on the sexual abuse issue to which LaFlamme had agreed on June 4, 2003, and the Court should have acknowledged that. Instead, when Hanson asked that Oldroyd be allowed to testify and the privilege be revoked, J. Firmat, once more, as he does in all hearings, looked to LaFlamme who stated that he held the privilege, it was being asserted, it would not be revoked, and even J. Firmat asserted the privilege! Id., 10:26; 11:1-9. J. Firmat then made the clearly contradictory ruling that he would not reverse ...any previous orders based on your papers. 11:26; 12:1. He just did. Whatever privilege existed had been waived in the June 4, 2003, hearing (besides, there was none to begin with, in view of Oldroyds status as a courtappointed therapist). J. Firmat reversed that order. November 28, 2005, Proceedings. On November 28, 2005, J. Firmat continued with his hypertechnical interpretation of the rules when it was clear what Hanson was trying to do, and that is, get the court-ordered report of Oldroyd produced. A true and correct copy of the November 28, 2005, transcript of proceedings is marked and attached as Exh. 29. Hanson noted that when she tried to file her Request for Judicial Notice, it was refused (by the clerk). Hanson also stated that when she tried to file on the 23rd she could not do so. She was threatened three times that if she did not leave she would be escorted out with a deputy. Id., 6:22-26. Hanson correctly argued that to be denied the right to file a document was unconstitutional. J. Firmat denied the request although Hanson made it clear she wanted him to take judicial notice of the June 4, 2003, hearing transcript because J. Firmat had ordered that Oldroyd produce a report on the sexual abuse issue. Id., 3:11-14, 26; 4:1-9. When J. Firmat stated that the hearing was on Hansons OSC to cure federal violation, Hanson explained the federal violation would be cured by the court-ordered report of Oldroyd. Id., 4:13-18. Hanson correctly argued that the transcript (of June 4, 2003) shows that the Court is not following its own orders because there was no report of Oldroyd as the Court ordered on June 4, 2003. Id., 5:11-15. J. Firmats denial of Hansons motion to release the privilege is outrageous. LaFlammes use of that objection renders the concept of privilege meaningless. To deprive the Court and 29
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Hanson of hearing from a court-appointed therapist whose job was to assist the Court in making a determination of whether Morgan was molesting R.M. based on privilege is to turn law, due process, fairness, and justice all on their heads. There is NO privilege when the issue is a sexual crime against a child. February 15, 2008 Proceedings. The February 15, 2008, hearing was not just scandalous; J. Firmat and LaFlamme created a record out of whole cloth. Mr. Barth, Hansons attorney at the time, reminded J. Firmat that on June 4, 2003, he had ordered Oldroyd to produce a limited scope report, and that the waiver ...was clear so that Dr. Oldroid [sic] could address this issue of sexual abuse. Mr. Barth indicated that Oldroyd was present to testify. Exh. 10, February 15, 2008, transcript. See 3:1-22. Rather than review the transcript of June 4, 2003, J. Firmat, as is his practice, abdicated his fact finding duty to LaFlamme, stating that he did not ...have a recollection of Dr. Oldroid in 2003 in these three reports. Did we ever consider these three reports [it is impossible to know from the transcript what three reports J. Firmat is referring to] Id., 3:23-26; 4:1. LaFlamme claimed that Oldroyd was brought in on a limited waiver of confidentiality of the issue of sexual abuse, told the Court that ....she didnt think the child had been sexually abused, and left. This supposedly occurred in chambers with the consent of Rombro, then Hansons attorney. Id., 4:2-10. J. Firmat indicated that if Oldroyd was in chambers, there was no testimony, but if all agreed because of confidentiality, THAT HAPPENS ALL THE TIME. Id.,4:14-18. Hanson is unaware of any such chambers conference, and Rombro never informed her of one where Oldroyd was present and stated that no sexual abuse occurred. Hanson Declar., p.47, parag. 28. De Witt was of no help only vaguely recalling La Flamme filing a motion in which he objected to Oldroids testimony based on privilege and the Court honored it. He does refer to a chambers conference in which he, Rombro, LaFlamme, and the Court was present, but does not indicate that Oldroyd was also present. De Witt thought he recalled LaFlamme not willing to 30
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waive the privilege but willing to allow Dr. Oldroyd to indicate what would be in the best sexual abuse -- (?) Id.,16:20-26; 17:1-4. J. Firmat brought up Hansons and her mothers convictions for taking R.M. and hiding her from Morgan, the person who according to R.M. was molesting her. Id., 5:21-26. J. Firmat insisted there had to be yet another 730 evaluation before Hanson could have visitation, who by this time had not seen her daughter in over four years, because the Court wanted to know Hansons and Grandmothers state of mind. Id., 6:1-11. J. Firmat knew exactly what Hansons state of mind was, and remains, because she had been expressing her state of mind clearly, cogently, forcefully, as well as correctly stating the law each time she spoke over the years in court and as she did that day: Dr. Oldroid is here to give testimony as to what happened. The reason I fled with my child is because you have never listened to me. I have tried to get the doctor to you many times. There are child abuse reports she has filed. ...I have never made false reports. I have never made false allegations. I have been accused of that without a hearing. I have had a 730 evaluation. The 730 evaluation is not truthful. ....I tried to bring up issues. I tried to protect my child. You have never listened to me in this court, ever. Id., 6:19-26; 7:1-9, emphasis added. 9 J. Firmat has also received numerous evaluations of Hanson by at least three different mental health providers, Dr. Leslie Drozd, Dr. Higgins, and Dr. Reardon. Hanson Declar., p.47, parag. 30. LaFlamme then stated that they [assumedly Barth and Hanson] ...can look at every single social services investigation that has ever been done. He stated that De Witt, then Morgans attorney, has them and J. Firmat ordered that De Witt turn the reports over to Barth. Id., 10:24-26; 11:1. Of note is that Oldroyd was so intimidated by LaFlamme that she had hired an attorney, Mr. Stebens, who confirmed that Oldroyd had made three child abuse reports to CPS on behalf of R.M. Id., 10:10-17. Barth apparently reviewed whatever De Witt turned over to him. The problem with this proceeding is not that Barth is not a reliable reporter, but what he was stating to the Court was his J. Firmats hostility towards Hanson is ill-disguised. Morgan, the male parent, spoke out with no admonition from the Court. Id.,5:10-17; 8:18-19. When Hanson spoke, both LaFlamme and J. Firmat treated her rudely, and J. Firmat threatened to remove her from counsel table. Id., 9:12-13, 19-21. 31
9
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report of what was in the records in the short time he had to review them which means J. Firmat was willing to decide the issue on inadmissible hearsay on top of inadmissible hearsay on top of inadmissible hearsay which a full blown evidentiary hearing would have remedied. First, J. Firmat had no idea what was in the CPS records and they were unreliable, because they were not admitted into evidence, second, they were not properly authenticated, third, they were all based on inadmissible hearsay, and fourth, Barth could not cross examine the social workers who assumedly prepared the documents because J. Firmat would not allow a hearing, only unreported chambers conferences with no record of what happened or who attended and according to J. Firmat, THIS IS DONE ALL THE TIME. Hanson, to this day, does not have a copy of the CPS documents, including those Barth examined, although she herself requested them on two occasions, and Barry also made a formal request. Hanson declar.p,42, parag.4; Barry declar., p.38, parags. 3, 4. See Exh. 3. Barth reported to J. Firmat that The first report [of sexual abuse] was substantiated. Then nine months later was the change to unfounded. Id., 11:10-13, emphasis added. Barth notes that maybe three lines were devoted to a discussion one worker had with Dr.
16 Oldroyd on October 2, 2003. Id., 12:9-13. 17 Barth notes that there is an entry that a worker (?) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ....tried to contact Dr. Oldroid. But never a discussion of when which they actually did contact Dr. Oldroid. And a day later they unfounded, turned unfounded, the report from August which was unsubstantiated. [from context, it appears that Barth meant substantiated.] id., 12:21-26, emphasis added. Barth states that he did not see in the documents anything documenting ....a discussion with Dr. Oldroid as to what really is at the bottom of this. And the person that has spent as much as any time with her, is Dr. Oldroid. Thats the problem I have [sic] the CPS report. Id., 14:2-6. J. Firmat then noted that although Oldroyd had submitted three reports, CPS ...either unsubstantiated or unfounded the reports. Id., 14:12-16. CPS workers were not the courtappointed child psychiatrist; Oldroyd was. Further, Barth made it clear that the CPS documents showed a so-called investigation filled with holes. 32
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Mr. Stebens, Oldroyds attorney, indicated that Oldroyd was not waiving the privilege, LaFlamme had told him the child was not waiving, and he stood on Pen. C. Secs. 11167.5 and maybe 68 which makes privileged the contents of a child abuse report. As of February 15, 2008, Hansons name is in the child abuse index as a child abuser. See Exh. 4. 11167.5 Penal states in part: **Update Notice: This section has been amended by Chapter 699 of 2008, Chapter 701 of 2008 ..... (b) Reports of suspected child abuse or neglect and information contained therein may be disclosed only to the following:... (11) Persons who have been identified by the Department of Justice as listed in the Child Abuse Central Index pursuant to paragraph (6) of subdivision (b) of Section 11170 or subdivision of Section 11170, or persons who have verified with the Department of Justice that they are listed in the Child Abuse Central Index as provided in subdivision (e) of Section 11170. Disclosure under this paragraph is required notwithstanding the California Public Records Act, Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude a submitting agency prior to disclosure from redacting any information necessary to maintain confidentiality as required by law. Thus, Hanson had a right to have not just Oldroyds three reports but those of all the other
14 mandated reporters who made reports on behalf of R.M. Stebens misstated the law, including 15 even with respect to Pen. C. Sec. 11168 which refers only to forms which must be used by 16 mandated reporters when making reports. 17 Barth correctly pointed out that the privilege was waived when ...this was first initiated. 18 And correctly stated that the waiver was very clear in the transcript. Id., 14:16:9-12.Then began 19 arguments about what the June 4, 2003, transcript said and what the waiver really meant. Id., 17:520 8, 18-26; 18:1-15. LaFlamme actually claimed that the transcript says he did not waive the 21 privilege at 18:16-17 in spite of the June 4, 2003, transcript stating: THE COURT: THE 22 ALLEGATIONS, THE SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS, IS THE ONLY THING THAT I 23 WOULD LIKE ADDRESSED BY DR. OLDROYD. Exh. 7,14:16-18, emphasis added and in 24 spite of LaFlamme himself and J. Firmat at Id., 15:18-20 agreeing to expand the report at 25 Rombros request to have 26 27 28 Dr. Oldroyd ... include in her report not only the issue of sexual abuse allegations but also an assessment as to how the child is progressing while in fathers care. Id., 15:13-17, emphasis added. 33
1 After taking a quick look at the June 4, 2003, transcript, J. Firmat then ruled: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 One of the reasons for reversing the Seagondollar order (Orange Superior Court) allowing 25 the mother to move away was because the custody evaluator had exparte communications with 26 minors counsel. Here is what the Court of Appeal had to say about this: 27 28 We are also concerned that the children's counsel engaged in ex parte communications with 34
Its clear here that the privilege has not been waived. So they there hasnt been a waiver of the privilege. So. Dr. Oldroid will not be testifying. Exh. 10, 18:18-22. Barth also brought up the exception to confidentiality and privilege which is Evid. C. Sec.1027. Sec.1027 permits a therapist to testify when the patient is a minor, the therapist believes a crime has been committed against the minor, and that it is in her best interests to disclose the crime. Exh. 10, 24:6-18, 22-26. In a spectacular, blatant question-begging statement, LaFlamme boldly and falsely claimed that the child was not a victim of a crime, except that of abduction by her mother and grandmother, KNOWING WHAT OLDROYD HAD WRITTEN HIM ON JANUARY 2, 2003. Exh. 10, 25:6-11. J. Firmat concluded that there was no evidence of sexual abuse and it was unfounded and unsubstantiated. Id., 25:13-15. There is none because he and LaFlamme will not allow the evidence of sexual abuse to be presented through competent testimony. Thus, even the unambiguous and unequivocal rulings of J. Firmat that there shall be a report of Oldroyd addressing both the sexual abuse allegations and an assessment of how R.M. was doing in her fathers sole custody do not mean what they say, only what J. Firmat. LaFlamme, De Witt, and Morgan later decide they want the rulings to say. This is solipsism and obscurantism at its very worst, making it impossible for any litigant to obtain justice in J. Firmats courtroom. LaFlamme aided and abetted J. Firmats miscarriage of justice. LaFlamme should be immediately removed from the case and investigated. VII LAFLAMME ENGAGED IN NUMEROUS EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH BUSSEY IN VIOLATION OF ORANGE SUPERIOR COURT L.R. 716(F) AND FAM. C. SEC.216, THUS HOPELESSLY TAINTING THE CUSTODY EVALUATION PROCESS AND THE RESULTING EVALUATION.
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Dr. Adam, including several telephonic conferences and a personal meeting. The Superior Court of Orange County, Local Rules, rule 716(F) prohibits such ex parte communications:.... The Court was very clear about how serious it took this violation: The Superior Court of Orange County, Local Rules, rule 716(F) is unambiguous. It advances the sound policies of protecting the evaluator from unilateral influence and preserving the evaluator's neutrality. Those policies now are also advanced by Family Code section 216, enacted in 2005, which similarly prohibits, absent stipulation, ex parte communications between the attorneys for any party, including court-appointed minor's counsel, and any court-appointed evaluator, except for scheduling of appointments and as provided in subdivision (b) of section 216. ...We expect these prohibitions against ex parte communications with court-appointed evaluators to be obeyed. Id., at 1133, emphasis added. Bussey and LaFlamme were both surprisingly open about their disregard of due process and observance of rules: I have had a number of conversations with minors counsel, Harold LaFlamme, coordinating and exchanging information in order to develop a best interest plan for the minor child. Ive also conveyed my interim recommendations to him on December 17th. Further, on January 29, 2003, I discussed ongoing developments in the case and have conferred with him regarding an overall plan of follow-up with the common collateral sources. I will defer to Mr. LaFlamme to convey his opinion regarding his client to court and counsel. Exh. 6, p.13. emphasis added. Likewise, in Morgans declaration dated December 26, 2002, Exh.12, he states that there was a conference call on December 18, 2002, in which LaFlamme informed counsel for Morgan and Hanson that Bussey had told him in a lengthy conversation that he, Bussey, concluded that no sexual abuse had taken place and recommended extending Morgans Saturday visitation and giving him Christmas visitation (father never got it Hanson had obtained a TRO against him denying him all visitation, Exh.26) None of these lengthy conversations LaFlamme had with Bussey qualify as statutory exceptions to the rule of no exparte communications. Busseys report was not issued until February 12, 2003. Bussey continued doing his investigation and gathering evidence until January 30, 2003. Exh.11, p.3. Yet, he had already reached his conclusion forty-three days before he finished his investigation that no sex abuse had occurred, no doubt due to LaFlamme urging him to make such a finding. LaFlamme should be removed from the case, investigated, and disciplined for exparte communications with Bussey, for exercising undue influence over Bussey who knew better himself, and for participating in the 35
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preparation of the evaluation and parenting plan. VIII THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT LAFLAMMES UNETHICAL CONDUCT WAS CALLED INTO QUESTION, WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN RULING ON THIS MOTION. La Flamme worked with Bussey in another case, Niko v. Foreman (2006) 11 Cal.App.4th
5 344, about the same time or a little after they worked on Hansons case. La Flamme, who was also 6 Minors Counsel in that case as he is in the Hanson/Morgan custody proceeding, threatened the 7 fathers expert, Donald Smith, with filing a complaint against him with this Board if he testified 8 just as LaFlamme has threatened Oldroyd if she testified on behalf of R.M. in this case. 9 10 11 12 13 did La Flamme. Obviously, they were working in tandem just as they are in this case. In the 14 Niko case, the testimony of dads expert, Donald Smiths was critical because the court would not 15 allow the son to testify, and the proffer of Smiths testimony was that it contradicted what Bussey 16 had testified to as the sons preference about where he wanted to live. 17 While two of the three-member panel affirmed the judges decision to let the mother move 18 to Colorado, Acting Presiding Justice Bedsworth, the dissenting panel member, was incensed at 19 the intimidation of Smith: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I am further unconvinced this parent received a fair hearing below. The court refused to hear from the very mature 12-year-old child whose custody and state of residence were at issue because of a personal "policy" against listening to the children. It did so despite knowing that the father's only expert had been intimidated from testifying, an action my colleagues ratify with the explanation that, "[t]here is no evidence the court suppressed his testimony or otherwise precluded Niko from forcing Smith to testify by use of a proper subpoena." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 366, italics added.) To my mind, a trial court should at least inquire when there is evidence an attorney admittedly intimidated a witness who intended to testify for an opposing party; it is not enough for the court to just throw up its hands and say, "Not my problem." My colleagues are willing to accept that; I am not. After a long discussion of the facts and why he dissented to the majoritys ruling affirming the lower court, Justice Bedsworth went on to state: 36
[Niko] also filed a motion in limine to disqualify LaFlamme from continuing to represent Taylor, alleging he had engaged in tactics designed to intimidate Smith and prevent him from testifying in the action. The motion to disqualify LaFlamme was denied, and the next month the court appointed Duke Bussey, Ph.D., an associate of the first custody evaluator in the paternity action, to conduct a custody evaluation in connection with Foreman's OSC. Id., at 351. Bussey recommended to the Court to let the mother move away with the couples son, as
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Unfortunately, the court appeared to consider the evidence that Smith had been, in effect, "run off' to be irrelevant. I strongly disagree. Even if I assume... that Taylor's counsel, LaFlamme, had acted properly in taking Smith aside and suggesting that if he testified a complaint would be pursued (a far more doubtful proposition[fn7 omitted]), I could not conclude that the consequences of those actions are immaterial. Even justified conduct has consequences, and the court could not simply discount them on the basis that they were not the product of wrongdoing. It is undisputed that the pressure applied by Foreman and LaFlamme actually caused Smith to withdraw from the case. Niko himself did nothing to cause it. It is also undisputed that had Smith remained on the case, the court would have heard his testimony regarding Taylor's preferences. Consequently, as a direct result of Foreman's and LaFlamme's conduct, and through no fault of his own, Niko lost the ability to offer evidence from the only witness who could counter Bussey on the subject of Taylor's preferences. In a case in which the facts were in such dispute, that loss was significant. Id., at 384-385. Emphasis added. The Court and other authorities must look into the issue of LaFlammes intimidation of
10 Oldroyd to the point she felt she had to hire her own attorney. Niko, supra, demonstrates how far 11 LaFlamme is willing to go, including violating Rule 5-100 which prohibits attorneys from 12 threatening administrative, disciplinary, or criminal charges in order to gain a litigation advantage 13 in a civil matter. LaFlammes litigation advantage in this case, as in the Niko case, was not for the 14 benefit of his respective clients, but rather for the parent he had decided should win. The stakes, 15 however, are far higher in this case than they were in Niko, namely, placing R.M. with her abuser 16 and cutting her off completely from R.M.s only protector, her mother. 17 Finally, there was a blog of Attorney Paul Ashby, which accused LaFlamme of suppressing 18 evidence of child abuse in another case. A true and correct copy of the Ashbys blog is marked and 19 attached as Exh. 30. 20 21 22 Hanson had to force LaFlamme to perform his duties under Fam. C. Sec.3151, which 23 includes interviewing and communicating with his client. It turned out dreadfully because all he 24 did was threaten R.M. See Part V of this memorandum. 25 LaFlamme also opposed Hansons exparte request for visitation and OSC for custody and 26 would not even negotiate with Barry and Hanson so that his client could have some visitation. 27 Exhs. 13, 14; Barry Declar., p.39, parag. 10. 28 37
IX LAFLAMME HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS BIAS FOR MORGAN AND HIS PREJUDICE AGAINST HANSON IN OTHER WAYS.
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Hanson and Barry witnessed LaFlamme and Morgan conferring with each other in the hallway waiting for the case to be called and many times sitting next to each other when in the courtroom. When Hanson or Barry or both attempted to be part of the conversation, the men stopped speaking and moved away. LaFlammes time records for R.M. should be produced because they will show how many times LaFlamme has communicated with Morgan, DeWitt, and Bussey, while leaving his own client and her mother out of the loop. parag. 7; Barry Declar., p.39, parags.8, 9. Morgan will not provide the names and addresses of R.M.s health care providers, and Hanson has written LaFlamme numerous times over the past almost-six years asking him to assist Hanson in obtaining her daughters health care records. Hanson also wrote him numerous times about Morgans repeated interference with her telephone visitation with R.M.. Hanson has written him on these issues probably 30-40 times over the years. LaFlamme refuses to help Hanson which failure negatively impacts on the wellbeing of R.M.. Hanson Declar., p.42, parag. 6. LaFlamme has never fulfilled his duties per Fam. C. Sec.3151. He has never filed a report nor represented to the Court whether R.M. wishes to testify, although she is 14 years old, and where she wants to live, whether with her mother or with her father. Hanson declar., p.43, parag. 8. LaFlamme knows that R.M. is desperate to see and be with her mother, as she cries on the phone when speaking to her mother, wanting to know when she will see her mother again. R.M. has an absolute right to be heard since she is 14 years old. LaFlamme has not reported these facts to the Court. Hanson Declar., p.43, parag. 10. X CONCLUSION 96.5 Penal states: Hanson Declar., pp.42-43,
23 24 25 26 27 28 (b) Nothing in this section prohibits prosecution under paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 182 of the Penal Code or any other law. Something must be done about LaFlamme and his conduct in this case. Because he is court 38
(a) Every judicial officer, court commissioner, or referee who commits any act that he or she knows perverts or obstructs justice, is guilty of a public offense punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year.
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appointed, he has judicial immunity. If he has judicial immunity then he is a judicial officer and there should be an examination of his conduct from the point of view of Pen. C. Sec.96.5. He has obstructed justice, and J. Firmat supported him. There should never have been an unreported chambers conference in which J. Firmat spoke with someone, who we do not know, without that or individual(s) being sworn and without Hanson being present. LaFlamme pushed for it. Oldroyd should have testified. LaFlamme clearly intimidated her and hid behind the defense of privilege at the expense of the health, safety, and welfare of his own client. R.M. is in harms way. She has been deprived of her mother for almost six years. Hanson requests that the Court immediately remove LaFlamme from this case, and investigate and discipline him. DATED: March 19, 2013 PATRICIA J. BARRY
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DECLARATION OF PATRICIA J. BARRY I, PATRICIA J. BARRY , declare the following: 1. I am the attorney for Plaintiff. I testify to the following based on my own
knowledge. If called to testify in court, I could and would competently testify to the following as well. 2. Exhs. 1, 2, 4, 6-10, 12, 14, 16-22, 24-30 were documents which were in the files
which Petitioner Hanson received from her prior attorneys, and she in turn provided them to me. In addition, the court documents and letters from and to attorneys involved in the case have sufficient indicia of reliability, such as court date stamps and signatures of attorneys. I prepared Exh. 3 and 5 and mailed them to the respective addressees. Exh. 11, the Bussey evaluation, I obtained from J. Firmats clerk with J. Firmats permission. Exh. 13 is an exparte/OSC I prepared, filed, and served on behalf of Petr Hanson. Exh. 15, the docket of this case, I obtained from Orange Superior Court website. Exh. 23 is a transcript of a voice mail from Teresa Fletcher, court reporter, which Petitioner transcribed herself. 3. Although Morgan has obtained records from CPS concerning R.M. on two
occasions, (see exhibits attached to my 827 petition which is Exh. 3 attached to this motion,) Petitioner Hanson has tried unsuccessfully on twice on her own to obtain them with no luck. I personally reviewed her two petitions which she served in February 2008. 4. I served a 827 petition for the third time on December 21, 2008, on CPS, a true and
correct copy of which along with its exhibits is marked and attached as Exh.3 asking for the records, but CPS refuses to produce the records. 5. I requested a hearing from Orange County Social Services in early January of this
year. A true and correct copy of the request dated December 26, 2008,and its exhibits is marked and attached as Exh. 5. There has been no response from the department. 6. Mr. LaFlamme filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum I served on Dr.
Oldroyd with a hearing date continued at my request to November 19, 2008. On that date, I served a Statement of Disqualification on J. Firmat which he struck. Based on his Answer which he also 40
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filed and served, I am will be filing another Statement because he falsified his Answer. J. Firmat failed to reschedule the hearing on Mr. LaFlammes motion and I will be that the Court reschedule the hearing. 7. Mr. LaFlammes motion has no merit. As demonstrated in this memorandum, Dr.
Oldroyd had been court appointed on October 22, 2002, as R.M.s therapist and to report to the Court her opinions and findings about whether R.M. was being abused by her father, and there is a statutory waiver of confidentiality in that instance (Evid. C. Sec.917(a)); Alternatively, LaFlamme never sought a declaration from Dr. Oldroyd in which she could have stated that R.M. had disclosed a crime to her, that R. M. is a minor, and that it is in R.M.s best interests to disclose what R. M. had told her about her father sexually molesting her to the Court (Evid. C. Sec. 1027); LaFlamme never sought R.M.s input as to whether she waived the privilege after she turned 12 at which age through 18 she jointly holds the privilege with him, and if she waives it, he must honor it ( 317(f) Welf. & Inst); and in any event, Hanson has the right to call Oldroyd whose hearsay statements were relied on in part by Bussey for his opinions particularly since Oldroyd was court appointed. 8. Each time I have appeared in court which I recollect is four times, I have witnessed
Mr. LaFlamme speaking privately with Respondent, and sometimes, also with Respondents second wife in the hallways of the court purposely excluding Hanson and me from the conversation. He has always sat with Respondent rather than with Petitioner while waiting for the Hanson/Morgan case to be called. Mr. LaFlamme has failed to provide time and accounting records to Hanson. 9. On one occasion, Petitioner and I went out in the hallway to join in the conversation
between Mr. LaFlamme and Respondent. They stopped talking and walked away. Mr. LaFlamme is decidedly not neutral. 10. Mr. LaFlamme opposed Hansons recent exparte attempt to obtain visitation, a true
and correct copy of which exparte/OSC is marked and attached as Exh.13 and to proceed with an OSC re: custody on October 20, 2008. A true and correct copy of the transcript of proceedings on 41
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October 20, 2008, is marked and attached as Exh. 14. He never contacted me to negotiate visitation for his client with her mother, although Petitioner notified him in writing that her daughter continues to cry on the phone asking her repeatedly when will she be able to see her. 11. I have examined thousands of pages of court documents and correspondence among
the various attorneys. I have not located an order noting Dr. Oldroyds presence at a chambers conference. Despite everyone being in agreement that Dr. Oldroyd was present on October 22, 2002, oddly enough, the minute order does not reflect it, which is just one more example of the reckless disregard for proper documentation of court events in this case. I declare the foregoing to be true and correct under penalty of perjury. Executed this 26th day of January 2009 in Los Angeles, CA. PATRICIA J. BARRY
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DECLARATION OF KRISTIN HANSON I, KRISTIN HANSON, declare the following: 1. I am the attorney for Plaintiff. I testify to the following based on my own
knowledge. If called to testify in court, I could and would competently testify to the following as well. 2. R.M. is now fourteen years old. J. Francisco Firmat (J. Firmat) has not allowed
R.M. to see me for almost six years. 3. I am aware of numerous mandated reporters who made reports about R.M. to
Orange County Social Services (Child Protective Services) (CPS), either about suspected sexual abuse or willful physical injury, including Oldroyd (three reports on sexual abuse); Dr. Reardon, a psychiatrist (one, on sexual abuse); Dr. Del Mundo, R.M.s pediatrician; a nurse at Dr. Del Mundos office; Dr. Shapiro, an emergency room physician; his nurse, Susan Pietro-Carol (or, her report was subsumed on willful injury as part of Dr. Shapiros report); and Mike Handfield, a Garden Grove police officer. Officer Handfields report was on sexual abuse. 4. I tried unsuccessfully in February 2008 twice on my own to obtain CPS records by
serving a 827 petition on CPS with no luck. The department refused to respond. 5. Mr. LaFlamme never met with my daughter. I urged him to do so, and he agreed to
meet with her, I believe, it was around April 2003. He and his assistant Nancy Keyler met with her without me being present. When my daughter came out of the meeting, she was visibly upset. I asked her what was wrong and she told me, that when she disclosed to him that her father was hurting her and she did not want visitation with him, he told her that he did not believe her and if she said anything, her father would go to jail, in the presence of Nancy Keyler. 6. Mr. La Flamme has ignored for years my written pleas to him to obtain the medical
and all other records of R.M. because Respondent refuses to provide mr the names of the health care providers of R.M. and to ask Morgan to stop interfering with my telephone visitation. I probably have sent him forty letters over the years raising these two issues. 7. Mr. LaFlamme has for years spoken privately with Respondent and sometimes his 43
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second wife in the hallways of the court purposely excluding me and now, my current attorney, from the conversation, and he has always sat with Respondent rather than with me while waiting for the Hanson/Morgan case to be called. Mr. LaFlamme has failed to provide time and accounting records to me. 8. Mr. LaFlamme has never filed a report nor represented to the Court whether R.M.
wishes to testify, although she is 14 years old, and where she wants to live, whether with her mother or with her father. 9. Mr. LaFlamme opposed my recent exparte attempt to obtain visitation, a true and
correct copy of which exparte/OSC is marked and attached as Exh.13 and to proceed with an OSC re: custody on October 20, 2008. A true and correct copy of the transcript of proceedings on October 20, 2008, is marked and attached as Exh. 14. 10. I notified Mr. LaFlamme in writing that R.M. is desperate to see and be with me,
her mother, as she cries on the phone when speaking to me, wanting to know when she will see mr again. R.M. has an absolute right to be heard since she is 14 years old. Mr. LaFlamme has not notified the Court of my daughters distress. 11. My daughter does have developmental delays, although I do not believe she is
retarded. One doctor, Dr. Rees, suggested to my ex-husband and me around 1997 that R.M. might suffer from Williams Syndrome. Respondent and I rightfully rejected the suggested diagnosis, Respondent sent a letter to Dr. Rees making it clear why he believed R.M. did not have the syndrome. I was in complete agreement. A true and correct copy of Morgans letter to Dr. Rees dated November 18, 1997, is marked and attached as Exh. 16. 12. Nonetheless, Respondent filed an OSC to have the Court rule that R.M. suffered
from the syndrome, on November 5, 2001. I was flabbergasted, and disputed his claims. Mr then attorney, Mike Morris, discredited Respondents expert on the stand. I was willing to stipulate to seek medical treatment for R.M. indicated for children with the syndrome as long as R. M. did not have the label. A true and correct copy of a letter written by Mr. Morris to Farah Azar, then Morgans attorney dated April 11, 2002, offering this stipulation is marked and attached as Exh. 44
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17. I expressed concern to Mr. Morris that the stipulation included the label. Mr. Morris wrote and assured me that [t]he order does not include a diagnosis or label. A true and correct copy of Mr. Morris letter to me dated September 4, 2002, so stating is marked and attached as Exh. 18. A true and correct copy of the order on the medical treatment but with no label filed on July 19, 2002, is marked and attached as Exh. 19. The order states that we are to provide the medical treatment recommended for sufferers of the syndrome, but nowhere does it say that R.M. suffers from the syndrome. I have been attacked by Respondent, J. Firmat, Mr. Bussey, Mr. LaFlamme, and Mr. DeWitt because I refuse to give that label to my daughter. I believe that Respondent does not believe she suffers from the syndrome, which would be demonstrated by R.M.s medical records over the last six years, which will probably show that Respondent has NOT taken R.M. to the specialists listed on the order. 13. In August 2002 I became very concerned about R.M. because of her behavior,
bursting into tears, expressing great fear in having to visit her father, telling her mother that her father was telling her that he was going to kill her mother (and later, her grandmother and her beloved dog), and showing other unusual signs of distress and anxiety. I decided to have R.M. see Dr. Reardon a psychiatrist with whom I had treated in the past, and in whom I had confidence and trust. 14. I reviewed the marital judgment, Exh. 1, p.2, parag.1-C, that if either parent wants
to take the child to see a counselor, the parent must notify the other parent before doing so. I called Respondent and let him know I was taking R. M. to see Dr. Reardon. Respondent became very angry and made threats in two or three voice mails the night before I took her. 15. I took R.M. to see Dr. Reardon on August 28, 2002. After Dr. Reardon met with R.
M., he called me in and told me that R.M. had disclosed to him that her father was sexually molesting her. I was in shock, began crying, and Dr. Reardon told me I had to stop because he did not want R.M. upset. I immediately contacted an attorney to file for emergency protection of R.M. 16. I learned third hand that CPS said I falsified charges of sexual abuse. However, I
never made any reports or complaints to CPS, at any time. CPS contacted me only because of the 45
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numerous mandated reporters who made reports on behalf of my daughter. 17. I was never interviewed/questioned by CPS worker, Donna Doocey at any time. I
was interviewed by Julie Poulos who interviewed Rachel twice, since she strongly felt that abuse had occurred. However, I was informed by Ms. Poulos that she was unable to get enough information out of Rachel in order to stop the visitation. At least five CPS workers were on my case due to reports being made by mandated reporters, but yet I was accused of making false reports which is untrue. I never made one report to CPS. 18. I contacted the court reporter, Teresa Fletcher, to be sure that there was NO
reporters transcript of what occurred on October 22, 2002, and January 2, 2003. Ms. Fletcher confirmed by recorded voice mail there is not. mail which I transcribed myself. 19. On October 22, 2002, I was represented by Steven Hittelman from Minyard and Exh. 23 is the transcript of Ms. Fletchers voice
Morris Law Firm in the city of Orange, California. On this date, Dr. Julie Oldroyd, was present at the court. My mother was also present with me. There was no hearing in open court, since Judge Firmat and counsel met and conferred in chambers. Dr. Oldroyd was taken into chambers, along with counsel, to speak to Judge Firmat. My mother and I were told to wait out in the corridor. I was informed by Mr. Hittelman that Dr. Oldroyd made recommendations to Judge Firmat that Rachels father have no overnight visits and only monitored visits with Rachel. Judge Firmat ignored Dr. Oldroyds request for monitored visits but took away overnight visits and gave him visits for three times a week for only a few hours during the day from approximately 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 20. Later, I was informed by Dr. Oldroyd that she told Judge Firmat that even though
she was new on the case, she felt that Rachel was already at risk with her father. 21. Also, according to Dr. Oldroyd, on October 22, 2002, Judge Firmat appointed her
to be R.M.s therapist and that her purpose was to evaluate whether or not any sexual abuse had occurred. Judge Firmat had instructed her to come back to court to give him a final report regarding the sexual abuse allegations and to provide him with her findings and recommendations. 46
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22.
However, each time that Dr. Oldroyd was subpoened to court to testify and produce
her reports, minors counsel illegally invoked the privilege, stating patient-therapist privilege, and refusing to allow her testimony and three child abuse reports to be admitted into evidence. Judge Firmat has never allowed Dr. Oldroyds testimony and allows Mr. Harold LaFlamme, minors counsel, to control his courtroom. Judge Firmat has denied me a hearing for almost six years and will not allow any of my witnesses to testify in court. Except for Dr. Reardon, not one single witness has ever taken the stand and testified in my case due to Judge Firmats/court constant denial of my due process 23. On January 2, 2003, I was still represented by Steven Hittelman I was not present at
court on this day, as my attorney, Mr. Hittelman, told me that it was not necessary for me to come to court which I now realize was a huge mistake. After waiting several hours, my attorney called me at home and told me that I had kept physical custody of Rachel but that her father was given back his regular overnight weekend visits and once a week visit. This decision was made by the court, without the consent of Rachels court appointed therapist, Dr. Julie Oldroyd. 24. I later learned from Dr. Oldroyd that she was very upset about Respondent getting
back his regular visitation without the court first consulting her. She also informed me that she had written a letter to minors counsel, Harold LaFlamme, expressing her disappointment and concern that she was not consulted before giving back overnight visits to him. Dr. Oldroyd informed me that she never would have recommended that Mr. Morgans regular visitation be restored to him. I have not seen this letter from Dr. Oldroyd, but she did tell me that she sent it to Mr. LaFlamme. 25. Ms. Barry explained to me that my former attorney, Roger Rombro, read into the
record of Mr. Busseys deposition which he took on October 7,2003, a letter from Dr. Oldroyd dated January 2, 2003, to Mr. LaFlamme. She believes this is the letter that Dr. Oldroyd was referring to in her conversation with me. The letter as read into the Bussey deposition record does state what Dr. Oldroyd had learned from my daughter, which is that Respondent had been sexually abusing her, he threatened to kill me, and he hit her when he was angry. 26. On January 2, 2003, my daughter was forced once more to have regular 47
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unmonitored and overnight visits with her father. I was informed by my attorney, Steve Hittelman, on January 2, 2003, that the social workers informed Judge Firmat that there was no evidence of any abuse. However, Ms. Barry informs me that the minute order for January 2, 2003, indicates that only the attorneys for the parties and Brian Gordon, court-connected investigator, were in chambers. I have no idea who provided the information to J. Firmat because I was not even in the courtroom and there is no record of the proceedings, other than the minute order and the written order. 27. Because J. Firmat refused to place Respondent in monitored visitation as requested
by Dr. Julie Oldroyd, Rachel continued to be threatened by her father that he was going to kill me, herself, her grandmother and her beloved dog, Zoe. Each time she would come back from a visit with her father, R.M. would be crying and sometimes to the point of being hysterical from these death threats and other threats that her father was making to her. 28. R.M. had many of the signs and behaviors consistent with abuse, including blood in
her urine and her underwear, and contracting a yeast infection while in the custody of her father, of which she had no prior history. Respondent also kept several pairs of her underwear and never did return them. 29. I am not aware of Dr. Oldroyd attending a chambers conference except on October
22, 2002. Mr. Rombro never informed me that he was aware of, or attended, a chambers conference which Dr. Oldroyd attended in which she said there was no sexual abuse. 30. I have provided J. Firmat numerous evaluations of me by at least three different
mental health providers, Dr. Leslie Drozd, Dr. Higgins, and Dr. Reardon. 31. Dr. Bussey never provided me a verbal explanation of the scope and purpose of his
original 730 evaluation when I met with him. I declare the foregoing to be true and correct under penalty of perjury. Executed this 27th day of January 2009 in Costa Mesa, CA. KRISTIN HANSON
27 28 48

Pat Barry Motion To Disqualify Harold LaFlamme

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 B. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A. B. IV. 2. A. III. I. II.

DECLARATION OF PATRICIA J. BARRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 DECLARATION OF KRISTIN HANSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Evid. C. Section 730 which permits the Court to appoint an expert. 1

Given the chronology, the letter from Oldroyd referenced in Exh. 8

LaFlamme failed to provide Oldroyds letter to J. Firmat who

In subsequent hearings, as already indicated, LaFlamme denied the

On January 2, 2003, LaFlamme as did Hansons own attorney -- supported J.

no sexual abuse, and Hanson had falsified the charges. 3.

LaFlamme openly engaged in exparte discussions with Bussey in violation of his

Rule 5.220 (d)(1)( c)

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