Interpretation

A JOURNAL

A OF

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Spring
227

1993

Volume 20

Number 3

Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn

Zakariyya
al-RazI

The Book

of

the Philosophic Life

Translated

by

Charles E. Butterworth 237 Charles E. Butterworth The Origins

Political

of al-RazI's

Philosophy
259 275
Grant B. Mindle
Morton J

Shakespeare's Demonic Prince

Frisch

Shakespeare's Richard III

the Tyrant

and

the Soul of

285

Richard Sherlock

The Problem

of

Religion in Liberalism

& Roger Barms 309

Kenneth C. Blanchard, Jr.

Ethnicity

and

the Problem

of

Equality

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept.
of

Philosophy, Queens College

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Interpretation
Sprine Spring 1993
Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn
Zakariyya Translated
al-RazI

JL JL

Volume 20
of

Number 3

The Book

the Philosophic Life

227

by
The Origins
of al-Razi's

Charles E. Butterworth Charles E. Butterworth Political 237

Philosophy
Grant B. Mindle Morton J. Frisch Shakespeare's Demonic Prince Shakespeare's Richard III
the Tyrant
and

259
the Soul of

275
of

Richard Sherlock

The Problem

Religion in Liberalism 285

& Roger Barrus

Kenneth C. Blanchard, Jr.

Ethnicity

and

the Problem

of

Equality

309

Copyright 1993

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

The Book

of

the Philosophic Life

ibn

Abu Bakr Muhammad

Translated
by

Zakariyya

al-RazI

Charles E. Butterworth

University

of Maryland

[I.

INTRODUCTION]
Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-RazI, may God join gladness and to his spirit, said: When people of speculation, discernment, and attain
that
we were

repose

ment saw means of

engaging

with people and

becoming

involved

with

the

living, they criticized us and found fault with us claiming making that we were turning away from the life of philosophers, especially the life led by our leader, Socrates. Of him it is related that he did not call upon kings but made light of them when they called upon him, did not eat pleasant food, did not wear fine clothing, did not build, did not acquire, did not beget, did not eat flesh, did not drink wine, and did not attend festivities. Instead, he confined
a

himself to eating vegetables, wrapping himself in ing in a cask in the desert. Moreover, he did not
with

a ragged practice

garment,

and

lodg
either

dissimulation

the

common people

or with

those in authority.

Instead, he

confronted

them

with what was

truth according to him in the most explicit and clearest

are

utterances.

We, however,

the opposite
evils of

of

that.
our

2. Then they said, among the that it goes against the course of

this life that

leader Socrates led is

cultivation and

nature and provision

for

beget
their

ting

and

leads to the

ruination of

the

world and

the

perdition of people and

destruction. 3. We
willing. shall respond

to them concerning

whatever of

that is in us, God

[n. THE PHILOSOPHIC LIFE]

[A. The Reasons for

Socrates'

Earlier

Life]

4. Thus, we say that they speak the truth in what they relate and mention about Socrates. That was part of him. However, they ignore other things and
This translation is based
on

al-RazI, Kitab

al-Sirah

al-Falsafiyyah, in Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn

Zakariyya al-Razl, Rasail Falsafiyyah, ed. Paul Kraus; (reprint; Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadldah, 1973), pp. 98-1 1 1 The paragraphs and textual divisions are mine. The numbers in square brackets
.

Kraus'

within

the text

refer

to the pages of

edition

in Rasail Falsafiyyah.

interpretation,

Spring 1993,

Vol. 20, No. 3

228

Interpretation

refrain

from mentioning them so intent are they on forcing a proof against us. That is, these matters they relate about Socrates did pertain to him at the very outset and for a long period of his life. Then he turned away from many of
them
of so

that he died

having

had

festivities,

eaten good

things except for

and related

daughters, fought the enemy, flesh, and drunk a

among those
was at who man.

attended sessions

little

intoxicating

beverage. That is known

are concerned about

inquiring

into the

reports about was

this

5. Indeed, he
time
otherwise

the way

[100] he

the very outset

because

of

his

great amazement over

philosophy, his love for

passions and

it, his desire

to

devote to it the
inclined to
those who
was one
and

dedicated to

pleasures, his
of and

nature

being
on

it

rather

than to

that,

and

his making light

looking

down

philosophy in the way it deserves and who preferred what baser than it. Without a doubt, at the start of stirring and ardent matters, prefers turning to them, being excessive in loving them and pursuing them,
not view

did

hating
and

those opposed to them until,

when

he

penetrates them

deeply

and the

matters

become
returns

firmly

settled

in

him,

the excessiveness about them declines

he

to

moderation.

As it is

said

in the
of

adage:

"there is

a pleasure to

thing."

every new his life. And

So this

was

the condition

Socrates

during

that period of

what was related of

him

with respect are more

to these matters is more

and re

widespread and numerous mote

because they

curious, astonishing,

than the conditions of people. People are enamored about spreading the
unusual report and are

curious,

shunning the familiar

and

habitual.
Socrates'

therefore, opposed to the praiseworthy aspect of even though we fall short of him greatly and acknowledge our deficiency life, in practicing the just life, suppressing desires, loving knowledge, and aspiring
not, to it. Our difference
quantity. with

6. We

Socrates, then, is

not about

quality

of

life but

about

We

are not

inferior if

we acknowledge our

failing

with respect

to

him,
So

for that is the truth; this is what we say

and

acknowledging the truth is

this topic.

more noble and virtuous.

about

[B.

Austerity

Versus

Profligacy]
they
in [the first of] there also is the quantity,
criticize
Socrates'

1 With
.

respect

to what

two

lives,

we

is truly blameworthy is clear, as we have explained in

say: what

not

the

quality.

For it

doning
noble.

oneself to passions and

book On Spiritual Medicine, that aban preferring them is not most virtuous and most
our

Rather, it is taking
that does not

each need

to the extent that is

indispensable

or

to the
ob

extent

bring

about a pain that surpasses

the pleasure

thereby

tained.

8. And Socrates did turn back from

what was excessive

in

it,

that

which

is

truly blameworthy
people, for he did

and

leads to the back

and

ruination of

the world and the perdition of

come

beget,

war against

[101]

the enemy, and

The Book of the Philosophic Life

attend sessions of

229

festivities. Anyone
mired

who

does that leaves It is And we,

off

rushing into the

ruination of this world and perdition of the people.

not

to

be like that is to be

in the

passions.

even

necessary that not if we do not deserve

name

the name of philosophy in comparison to

comparison to nonphilosophic people.

Socrates, surely deserve its

in

[C. Principles of the Philosophic

Life]
to the

9. Since this has it may

come

forth

with respect

issue, let

us complete

the

argument about the philosophic who prefer

profit

life

so

that the lovers of knowledge and those

we say:

from it. So

we need

to support the matter

concerning the goal we are intent upon in this treatise on fundamentals whose explanation has been set forth in other books that are to be consulted to make
easier what our

is in this treatise.

Among

them are our book On Divine

Science,

book On Spiritual Medicine, our book On Blaming Those Characterized as Philosophers Who Occupy Themselves with What Is Superfluous in Geometry,
and our our

book

characterized as

book

characterized as

of the Art of Alchemy, but above all Medicine. The Spiritual Indeed, it is indispensable The

Glory

for

bringing
forth in i. We life

to

completion

the goal of this treatise and the

of

fundamentals

upon

which we

build the branches

an abridged

the philosophic
are:

life

which we

take here and

set

form.

They
or

will

have

praiseworthy

blameworthy

state after

death according to
towards which

our

during

the time our souls are in our bodies.

ii. The

most virtuous matter

for

which we were created and

we are moved

is

not

getting

bodily

pleasures, but the

acquisition of

knowledge

and the practice of

justice;
desire

through these two comes about our deliverance from

this

world of ours and

to the world in which there

call us

is

neither

death

nor pain.

iii. Nature

to prefer present pleasure, whereas

intellect

frequently
preferred.

calls us to

leave

present pleasures aside

for

matters

that are to be

iv. Our Master, from

whom we

hope for

reward and

fear punishment, look

ing over detesting

able and

us and having compassion for us, does not want us to cause pain; injustice and ignorance on our part, He loves for us to be knowledge

just; indeed,
ought not surpasses

this

[102] Master
pained

punishes

the one among us who causes

what of

pain and who v. pain

deserves to be

according to

he deserves.
a pleasure

We
itself

to endure a pain in the

and quality.

hope

getting

that the

vi.

in quantity The Creator, may He be

things the
of which

magnified and

glorified, has bestowed

upon us

the

particular

of which we

have need, like tilling, weaving,

accorded

and similar

things

world and subsistence are constituted.

10. Let them [i.e., these principles] be build

upon them.

us, then,

so

that we may

230

Interpretation

[D. About

Pleasure]
if the
pleasures and pains of

11. So

we say:

this world are interrupted

when

life is interrupted

whereas

the

pleasures of

the

world

in

which

there is no

death

are always uninterrupted and unlimited,

he is deceived

who would purchase a

transitory, interrupted, limited pleasure for one that is eternal, lasting, uninter rupted, and unlimited. Since the matter is such, it follows necessarily that we
ought not

to seek a pleasure

which

to acquire we

will

undoubtedly

perpetrate

something that prevents us from deliverance to the forces

and
upon us

world of

the soul or that

in this

world a pain pleasure

that

is

greater and more severe

quality than the

to us.

we prefer.

Any

pleasures

apart

in quantity from that are

permitted

12. The

philosophic man

may,

however, leave

aside

many

of

these permit
as we

ted pleasures in order to

mentioned and easier

condition and

habituate his

soul so

that

have

it will be more comfortable in the Book of the Spiritual Medicine for him in case of necessity. For habit, as the ancients mention, is
making the hard easy
of

second nature

and

the strange familiar

either with re

spect to

matters

the soul

or

bodily

matters.

As

we

see

that couriers are

stronger at about

walking, soldiers bolder at war, and so on, there is no obscurity

habits

facilitating

matters

that were difficult and hard before habituation.

13. Even though this

extent

argument

I mean,

what we and

have

mentioned about

the

of restricted pleasure

is

abbreviated

summary, many

particular

matters are subsumed under

it

as we

have

explained we

tual

Medicine.

[103]

For if the fundamental he

have

set

in the Book of the Spiri down namely, that

will entail a

the intelligent
pain

man ought not

to yield to a pleasure when he fears it

surpassing the is stifling passion

pain

acquires

sound and

in putting up with forsaking pleasure and true in itself or is so postulated, then it neces
condition as

sarily follows that: even if we were in such a earth for the length of our life by perpetrating

to possess the whole

upon people what

does

not please

God,
sure

such

that we would be prevented

we ought not

abiding grace,
that

to do or

by Him from acquiring eternal prefer it. Again, if we were sure

good and
or almost

by

opthalmia

eating something like a plate of fresh dates we would get an for ten days, we ought not to prefer eating them. This is the case
to the particular instances

with respect

falling

between the two

examples we

have mentioned, despite the one being great and the other petty in relation. Each of the particular instances is petty in relation to the greater and big in
relation

to the

more

petty.

Because

of

the multitude

of particular

instances

falling
tive.

under

this

general

rule, it is

not possible

to make the argument exhaus

14. Since

what we wanted

to

explain

has been

explained with respect

to this
upon

topic,
this

we are

intent

upon

explaining

another one of our goals

that

follows

goal.

The Book of the Philosophic Life

[E. About 15. So

23 1

Pain]
from the fundamental
concerned about
we

we say:

have

set

down to the
and

effect

that

our

Lord
us

and

Master is
also

us, looks

over
us.

us,

has

compassion

for

it follows

that He

detests

pain

befalling

Any

pain

befalling
a

us that

is
to

not

by

our enterprise or choices

but

pertains to nature

is thus due to

necessity
pain

and occurred

inevitably. It

results therefrom

that

we ought not

to cause

any

sensible

being

unless

it deserves

such pain or unless

one.

by

means of that pain

we spare

the creature

a more

intense

[104] Under

this maxim, as well,

there

fall many details:

use

all the sorts of

wrongs, the

pleasure

kings take in hunt

ing

animals,

and the excess to which people go

they

them. Now all of that must

and

in exerting tame animals when be according to an intelligent and just is

not exceeded nor a greater one

intent,
as

rule, method,

doctrine

one that
push

deviated from.
means of

16. Pain
when

occurs when one

surgeon

hopes to

away

by

it,

the

makes

[the

sick

lances [an abcess]; cauterizes a gangrenous limb; and person] drink bitter, repugnant medication and forego pleasant
of

food from fear

exerted
when with

great,

painful

sicknesses. and

Again,

tame animals are to be

except

[considerate]

intent

without

violence,

in instances

ring

as in spur necessity calls for violence and reason and justice requires it horse in seeking to save oneself from the enemy. For justice then re

quires

spurring and injuring if it is hoped thereby to save a human being, especially if he is a good, learned man or one of great value in a way that confers well-being on most people. For the value of such a man and his remain

ing
two

in this
men

world

is better for his

people

than the horse remaining.

and one of

Again,
has

when

happen to be in

a waterless

desert

the men

enough

water

that he is able to save himself but not his companion, in such a case the

one of

the two

who confers more

this is the analogy for these

and similar

well-being to the people is to be kinds of cases.

and

preferred.

So

17.

Hunting,

pursuing, exterminating,
to animals that

in

with respect

lead

a complete

annihilating ought to be engaged life only by means of flesh

those which cause

such as major

lions, tigers,
without

wolves, and the like

as well as with

harm

there

being

any hope

of

them

like vipers, scorpions,

permissible

and so on.

profiting from them or need to use So this is the analogy for these kinds

of cases.

18. It is One is that is

a

to

destroy

these animals only from two perspectives.

when they are not destroyed, they destroy many animals. [105] This feature particularly characteristic of these animals, I mean those that live only by flesh. The other [perspective] is that souls are delivered from the

bodies

of no animals except

for the

body

of

human beings. Since this is the bodies is like

a

case, the
and

delivering of souls like these from facilitating to [ultimate] deliverance.

perspectives

their

bringing

along
must

19. Since both

apply to those that live only

by flesh, they

232
be

Interpretation
far
as possible.

exterminated so

Indeed,

that brings about a

lessening
they

of

animals

being

pained and a

hope that their

souls will enter

into

more suitable cause

bodies. Vipers, scorpions, wasps,

pain

and so on

have in

common

that

to animals and are not suitable to to work. Therefore

be

used

by

man

the way tame animals

are used and put nate

it is

permissible to annihilate and extermi

them.
are put

20. Animals that

minated and

to work and that live from grass

are

must not

be
we

exter

annihilated.

Rather, they
possible,

mentioned

and,

as much as

lest they become

numbers.

so numerous

to be worked gently have sparingly for food and bred sparingly that it is necessary to slaughter them in great
as used
with

That, however, is
is
no

to

be done

intent
a

it

not

that there

hope

of a soul

in any but

according to need. Were human body being delivered,

and

the judgment

of reason would not give rein

to their

being

slaughtered at all.

Now those
of

who engage

them are of

in philosophy have disagreed about this matter. Some the opinion that man is to nourish himself by means of flesh, and
that opinion. Socrates was among those
of
who

others are not of

did
not

not permit

it.

21

The judgment

intellect

and

justice

being

that man

is

to cause pain

to others, it

follows that he is

not

to cause pain to himself either.

Many

matters

forbidden
what

by

the judgment of intellect also come under this maxim, such as

the Hindus do in approaching God

by burning

their bodies and

throwing

them upon sharp pieces of iron

and such as

the Manicheans cutting off their

testicles

hunger
urine what

they desire sexual intercourse, emaciating themselves through thirst, and soiling themselves by abstaining from water or using in place of it. Also entering into this classification, though far inferior, is Christians do [106] in pursuing monastic life and withdrawing to her
when

and

mitages as well as

earnings,

and

irritating

and

many Muslims staying permanently in mosques, renouncing restricting themselves to a modicum of repugnant food and to coarse clothing. Indeed, all of that is an iniquity towards them
them
pain

selves and causes

that does not push away a preponderant

a

pain.

22. And Socrates had led it in later

people years as we

life like this in his early years, but he renounced mentioned before. There is a great diversity among
not

with respect

to this classification

to

be

gone

into here. Yet it is

of

unavoidable that we

say something approximating it

by

way

illustration.

[F. Upper

and

Lower

Limits]
differ
with respect

23. Thus
raised

we say: people

to their conditions.
make a greater

Some

are

in

comfort and others

of some matters

in

misery.

Desires

demand

upon
of

the souls rule,

and

as with
such as

those who that

with

are enamored of

women, wine, love

respect to which great

diversity

occurs

among people. Thus the pain that befalls them in suppressing their desires differs greatly in accordance with the difference in their conditions. The skin of

The Book of the Philosophic Life

one

233

born

of

kings
his

and

brought up in

their comfort will not endure coarse

clothing

nor will

stomach

tolerate repugnant food in the way the one born of

common people will.

those accustomed to
prevented

Rather, he will be severely pained from that. Similarly, having a certain kind of pleasure will be pained when from having it; and the inconvenience will be multiplied for them and be
for
one not accustomed to

more extensive and sharper than

that

pleasure.

24. Because
the the

of

that it is

not possible

to charge everyone in the same way;

conditions.

rather, it is to differ in

accordance with

the difference in their

Thus,

philosophically

minded children of

kings

are not charged with children of

adhering to

food, drink,

and other staples of

life that the

the common people

it is done gradually when necessity calls for it. 25. However, the limit it is not possible to go beyond is that they abstain from anything pleasant that can be attained only [107] by perpetrating iniquity
are charged with unless

and, in general, from everything that antagonizes God and must not be done according to the judgment of intellect and justice. What is apart from
and murder

that is

allowed

them.

So this is the
I mean,

upper

limit, I
to

mean,

with respect

to giving

oneself over to enjoyment.

26. The lower limit

oneself

with respect

being

ascetic and

restricting

is for

human

being

to eat what does not harm him or make him sick

and not to reach

beyond to

what

that he becomes intent

upon pleasure and wear

hunger. And for him to have

what a

excessively pleases him or what he desires so desire rather than upon satisfying his what his skin endures without suffering and not to

propensity for sumptuous, colorful clothing. And for him to dwell in shelters him from excessive heat and cold and not to reach beyond to
and

magnificent, splendid, colorfully adorned,

highly

decorated dwellings in

un

less he have

such an abundance of wealth

that it is possible for him to extend it

or self-exertion

to such matters without

iniquity, transgression,
fathers
and

acquisition.

Therefore those born

excel

of poor

brought up in shabby

circumstances

in this instance. For restricting oneself and being ascetic is easier for those like this, just as it was easier for Socrates than for Plato to restrict himself
and

be

ascetic. allowed.

27. What falls between these two limits is

that does
not go outside of

The

one who practices

the title of philosopher; rather,

it is

permissible

for

him to be

so entitled.
more

lower limit
companions

Nonetheless, it is preferable to have a propensity for the than for the higher limit. Virtuous souls, even if they are
in comfort, gradually

to bodies raised

bring

their

bodies towards

the lower limit.

28. Yet to
what

go

beyond the lower limit is to

we

go outside of respect to

philosophy, some

in the way

have

mentioned

with

the conditions of the

Hindus, Manicheans,
antagonize warrants

monks, and hermits. It is to go outside the

just life

and to

God, may He be exalted,

placed outside

by

causing

pain

to souls

[108] being

the title

of philosophy.

needlessly and The situation is

the

similar with respect

to going beyond the higher limit. We

beseech God

234

Interpretation
of

Endower
give us and

intellect,

the Dispeller

of

grief,

and

the Remover

success, direct us,

us closest

and assist us

in

doing

what

is

most

to of anxiety favorable to Him

in

bringing

to Him.

[G. The Philosophic Life in

Sum]
glorified and
who

knower

29. In sum, I say: Since the Creator, may He be who is not ignorant and a doer of justice He is
unqualified

magnified, is

does

no

injustice;

and a

since

knowledge, justice,

and

compassion;

and since

He is

creator and master

to us, whereas we are slaves and vassals to

Him;

and since

the slaves most beloved of their owners are those who

ways of

most adhere

to their

life

and are most

in

accordance with

their

traditions;

the slaves closest

to

God, may He be magnified and glorified, are those who are most learned, most just, most compassionate, and most kindly. This whole speech is what is
meant

by

the

statement of all philosophers:

"Philosophy

is making

oneself simi

human
of

lar to God, may He be glorified and magnified, to the extent possible for a And this is the sum of the philosophic life. A detailed statement
being."

is in the Book of the Spiritual Medicine. For there we have men tioned how to rid the soul of bad moral habits and the extent to which someone it is
what

aspiring to be

philosophic ought and

to concern himself

with

gaining

livelihood,

acquisition, expenditure,

seeking

ranks of rulership.

[III.

SELF-JUSTIFICATION]
we

30. Since

have

explained what we wanted

to explain with respect to this to

us.

topic,
lived
we

we will return and explain what pertains

And

we will mention

those who
a

defame

us and will mention

that even until this

day

we

have

not

life

due to

success granted

deserve to be

excluded

from

by being

God

and

to His assistance
"philosopher."

such that

designated
of

That is be

cause the one who

deserves to have the title

short

the

one who

falls

in both is

parts of

philosophy stripped from him is I mean, knowledge and philosophy

to lead. Yet
are we

practice

through
a

ignorance

of what

the philosopher is supposed to know or

leading

life the

philosopher

not supposed

due to God's

praise, grace,

granted

success,

and guidance

31. Now
power of

with respect

to the classification of

free from any of that. knowledge, if we had only the

us

to

compose a

philosophy

stripped away.

book like this, that would prevent In addition, there are our

from

having

the title

books1

like On Demon

Science, [109] On Spiritual Medicine, and our book On an Introduction to Physical Science, which is designated as Lecture on Nature. And there are our like On Time, Place, Matter, Eternity, and Vac uum, On the Form of the World, On the Reason for the Earth Arising in the Middle of the [Heavenly] Sphere, On the Reason the [Heavenly] Sphere Has
treatises2

stration, On Divine

The Book of the Philosophic Life

Circular Movement,
Own Motion
and and our
treatises3

235

On Composition

and

On

Body Having Its

books
pertain
medicine not

This Motion

Being

Known. And there

are our

books pertaining to matter, and our books about ing like The Mansurl Book, our Book to Those Whom the Physician Does
to the soul, our
our

Visit,
the

Book

about

Existing Drugs,
as

the

one

designated

as

Royal Medicine,

and

book designated
of

The Summary. With

me nor are our

respect to the

latter,

none of

the people

the kingdom has surpassed

has

anyone yet
about

steps or copied me.

And there

books

followed along in my the art of wisdom, which is

moment of my alchemy according doing this treatise, nearly two hundred books, treatises, and pamphlets have issued forth from me in the physical and metaphysical branches of philosophy.

to the common people. In sum, up to the

32. With
them

respect

to mathematics, I acknowledge that I have looked into

sumed
an

only to the extent that was indispensable for me. That I have not con my time in trying to master them is deliberate on my part and not due to for them. For those
do
who so

incapacity

wish, I have set forth my excuses to

the effect that what I have done is correct and not what those designated as
philosophers geometry.
who consume their

lives

busying

themselves

with

the details of

33 If
.

what

I have

reached with respect to

knowledge is

not what

is

reached

by

the one

deserving

to be

called a

philosopher, then I

would

like to know

who

such a one would

be in this

epoch of ours.

34. Now God's

with respect

to the practical part, I have not in my life

due to

assistance and granting of success reached beyond the two limits that I defined. Nor has there appeared anything from my actions such that it deserves to be said that my life is not a philosophic life. For I have not kept company with the ruler as a bearer of arms or as one entrusted with his affairs. Rather, I

have kept company with him as one engaged in medicine free rein over two matters: when he was sick, to cure him
the condition to
advise of

and a convive

having

[110]

and

to

improve be

his body;
and

and when

his

body

was

healthy,

to entertain him and

would

him

God knows that

of me

about

everything I hoped

of

sound

benefit for him

not

for his flock.

I have
an

35. It has

appeared that

avidity for amassing money

with

and

spending it
an aversion

nor

for

disputing

with

people, quarreling
am

them,

or

being

ini

quitous to them.

Rather it is known that I

of

the opposite of all that and have

my rights. I 36. With respect to the way eat, drink, and engage in festivities, those who have frequently observed me in such activities surely know that I do not reach

to claiming many

any

point of excess.

It is the

same with

the rest of

what can

be

observed of

my

conduct with respect

to clothing, mounts,

and male and

female

servants.

respect to my love of knowledge, my avid desire for it, and my it is known among those who have been my companions and for it, striving that from the time of my youth until this moment I have me observed have never ceased being eagerly devoted to it. It is such that should I chance upon a

37. With

book I have

not read or a man

I have

not sounded

out, I do

not

pay

attention

to

236
any

Interpretation
concern whatever
even

if that is

of major man

harm to

me

until

I have

gone

through the book and learned what the

are such

is

about.

My

patience and

striving

that in a
more

amulets,
spent

I have written, in a script like that used on than twenty thousand pages. In working on the large Summary, I
single year

fifteen

years

working

night and

day

so

ing

the muscles in my hand that at this

moment

weakening my eyesight and ruin I am prevented from reading

and writing.
abandon

Though my

situation

is thus, I
to

exert myself as much as someone

can not

to

them and always

have

recourse

to read and write

for

me.

[IV.

CONCLUSION]

38. Thus if according to these people the extent of my practice with respect matters brings me down from the rank of philosophy and the goal of following the philosophic life according to them is other than what we have
to these

described,
Thus
we we

then let them set it before us either

accept

in

clear speech or

in

writing.

may

may refute 39. Let me,

it from them, if they bring forth a superior knowledge; or them if we establish that there is a mistake or deficiency in it.
out of

indulgence towards them,

grant

that I fall short with

Still, what can they possibly say with respect to the If they have [111] found me to be deficient with respect to it, let them tell me what they have to say about that so that we may look into it and afterwards concede that they are right or refute their error. And if they have
respect to

the practical part.

part?

theoretical

not

found

me

to be deficient

with

respect

to the theoretical part, the most

not

appropriate attention

thing is for them to take advantage of my knowledge and to my life. Then they will be doing something like what the
practice

to pay

poet says:

Put into To

For if I fall And

short

my learning, in my doing, is my learning, short falling.

your advantage
of no

harm my

40. This is

what

wanted

to set down in this treatise. To the Endower of

as

intellect,
His

praises without end

He deserves
good

and merits. servants.

And may God bless

chosen male servants and

His

female

41. The Book of the Philosophic Life is completed. To God, may He be exalted, praise in every circumstance, always, perpetually, and eternally.

NOTES

The text has the

singular: mithl singular: wa

kitabind.

2. The text has the

<mithl> maqdlatind.

3. See preceding

note.

The Origins

of al-RazI's

Political

Philosophy

Charles E. Butterworth

University

of Maryland

I. INTRODUCTION

We begin our inquiry into the origins of al-Razi's political philosophy with his Book of the Philosophic Life (Kitdb al-Slrah al-Falsafiyyah) not because it provides the fullest statement or is in any sense his earliest writing, but because it is most readily accessible. The questions raised in this treatise are central to his fuller teaching and are more clearly stated in this work than in his other writings. Here he seeks to justify the way he has led his life by showing how closely it parallels that of his acknowledged master, Socrates. For al-Razi, as for Socrates, the problem is to what extent the philosophically inclined individ
ual must engage opposed to

in,

and

be

concerned

with, the

world of

human beings

as

the

world of

ideas.
the whole question. In

That,
cion

of

course, is
to that of

not

defending

his

own conduct

by

comparison

Socrates,

al-Razi must also counter

the unspoken suspi

that the pursuit

at

success

fully

philosophy threatens the faith of the community. His exculpating himself from this silent charge without ever ad
of

dressing it explicitly is a clear sign of how adroitly al-RazT has crafted the treatise. As will become clear in what follows, he accomplishes this feat by
enlarging the
sphere of

philosophy,
as a

by taking

it beyond the way it is

conven

tionally

viewed

that

is,

quasi-ethical,

quasi-metaphysical pursuit.

And his

this, again, is part of the appeal the treatise has for us. Whereas Socrates had to contend with the ridicule heaped
endeavors

upon

him

and

by

so gifted a comic poet as

slanders of nameless contemporaries.

Aristophanes, al-Razi has to answer the For Socrates, the charges of Aristophanes
in the breasts
of

awakened and then nurtured suspicions

his fellow Athenians.

Apparently never quite able to lay those suspicions to rest, he even contributed to them by the dismal account he gave of himself at his trial, at least if we are
to

believe Plato's
Socrates'

and

Xenophon's

accounts.

But both

of

these thinkers

de

fended
One
to

memory in

other writings:

can easily receive the impression that Plato Socrates in conscious contradiction to

and

Xenophon

presented their

Aristophanes'

presentation.

It is

difficult
and

say

whether

the

profound

differences between the Aristophanean Socrates

interpretation,

Spring 1993,

Vol. 20, No. 3

238

Interpretation
Socrates
must not

the Platonic-Xenophontic

be traced to

a profound change

in

Socrates himself: to his

moral

conversion

from
or

a youthful contempt

for the

political or

things, for the human things The

human beings, to
al-Razi 's

a mature concern with

them.

clearest and most thoughtful exposition of this

is to be found in Muhammad b. Zakariyya

possibility known to me Life.' The Philosophic Way of

Because
speaks of

of

the impassioned manner in which al-Razi

and

defending himself
asceticism

Socrates
with

his

change

from something like solitary

matters,
we

to

involvement

human beings

and political

turn to his exposition

with enthusiasm.

In this writing,

al-Razi pleads

philosophy dain such

and

does

so without ever
answer

losing

sight of

eloquently for the pursuit of how fellow Muslims dis To

activity.2

The

he

gives

to their charges leads us to the thresh

concerns.
would

old of political

philosophy

and

to its basic

make

these observa the basic

tions

clearer and somewhat more

persuasive, I

like to

analyze

argument of

the Book of the Philosophic Life and examine the way it adum

brates

al-RazI's

broader

political teaching.

II. THE ARGUMENT OF THE TEXT

The Book of the Philosophic Life may be divided into four major parts: introduction, a digression in which al-Razi sets forth the basic characteristics
the
philosophic

an of

life,

an attempt at work

self-justification, the introduction

and a conclusion. and

By

far

the shortest parts of the

are

the conclusion,

each

amounting to less than a page of printed text (paras. 1-3, 99:3-13 3 38-40, 110:16-111:7). Even his attempt at justifying himself is
and amounts to

and paras. quite short

little

more

than two pages (paras.

30-37, 108:13-110:15). So
presented explic

by itly

far the
as a

most extensive and

detailed

part of

the book is that

digression,

namely, the account al-Razi gives of the philosophic life.

A. The Introduction (paras. 1-3,

99:2-13)

The

work opens with al-Razi

and attainment phers

have

criticized

noting that people of speculation, discernment, him for turning away from the life of philoso

especially the life led by his blamed for engaging with people and

leader,

master,

or

imam, Socrates. He is
with

involving

himself

the

means of mak

ing

living,

whereas

the philosophical life as lived

by Socrates

consists

in

refraining from
and powerful

activities and

that lead to contact with others

99:3-5
from

and see para.

in showing little concern 34, 109:19-110:2). Central to the list

said

especially the rich for his personal comfort (para. 1

,

of nine activities refusal to acquire

which

Socrates is

to have refrained

(99:5-7) is his

anything,

a refusal

that finds a symbolic parallel in the central place his

wrap

ping himself in

a ragged garment occupies

among the

enumeration of activities

Origins of al-Razi's Political

in
which

Philosophy

239

he did

engage
of

apposite
of

linking

Socrates'

(99:7-9). This pairing takes precedence over the more refusal to wear fine clothing the third example his
recourse to a ragged garment.
and ends with references refers

things he shunned
that the negative
whereas

and

It

should also

be

noted cial

list begins

to

Socrates'

antiso

behavior,
how he

the positive list

to such conduct only at the end.

acquire"

Surrounding
ples of

the mention in the negative list that he "did

shunned acquisition

not and not often.

are exam

that
and

is, by

not

building
equally

begetting. in

Only
two

his lack

of concern with

food

drink is

cited

From these

lists, then, it

appears

that

Socrates'

disinterest in

acquisition and

bodily

comforts attracted most attention.

his clothing
tite

habits,
to

various

Indeed, in contrast to the nine references to instances of his failure to acquire, and lack of appe

with respect

food

and

drink,

there are only three indications of his disin

terest in

contact with other

humans.
these negative
and positive activities

Now the
what

enumeration of all

is based

on

Socrates (al-mathur <"anhu> annahu, [99:5]),4 that is, on what is generally believed about him. Breaking its fine rhetorical balance is the additional claim al-Razi sets forth about Socrates one so worded intriguing

is

related of

that it
what

can

is

related

only be understood as referring back to the earlier enumeration of (see 99:5) to the effect that he never practiced dissimulation
the common people
or with

(taqiyyah)
"he

either with

those

in

authority.

Instead,

him"

confronted them with what was truth

and

bi-md huwa al-haqq 'indahu) (bi-ashrah al-alfdz

utterances"

according to did so "in the most

(bal

yajbahuhum

explicit

and clearest

wa abyanihd

[see 99:9-10]). It

is,

nonetheless,
reluctance

a claim

developed
pass

nowhere

in the treatise. Al-RazI lets

Socrates'

to

dissimulate Socrates
else
or

in

silence either

because,

unlike

us, he does
was

not

know that
above all

anything but nondissimulatory because he is overly impressed by

was

that he

ironic have

Socrates'

death

and

thinks that had

survived.5

he
A

not

been

more

forthcoming interesting line of

so
and

with

the people of Athens he

might

thought is that al-Razi does know about Socratic

of

dissimulation

is thus practicing something

either

the same here

by
or

repeating the characterization without ing it as an inappropriate practice. Not

on content

defending

Socrates for it

merely depict

to blame

al-Razi

to insist that the life led

by

for his worldly pursuits, these same critics go Socrates is evil insofar as it (a) goes against the
as to the

course of nature as well as against

ruination of presented puted

the

world

as

well

cultivating and begetting and (b) leads to the destruction of the human race. As
whether

here, then,
a
needs

the

issue is

the philosophic life

Socrates is

re

to have led

solitary,

austere

life that ignores his

own as well as other

people's means

is

good.

Al-Razi,
And
even

who claims

to follow

Socrates, is by
for

no

solitary isolation and abstemiousness

such a

or austere.

though the critics blame the self-imposed

al-Razi

of

Socrates, they fault

failing

to

lead

life. At the very least, the

permits us

critics are not consistent.

Nothing

to explain the

inconsistency

as

arising from two

sets of

240

Interpretation
The text
presents

critics.

the two critiques

uals.

Al-Razi merely

adds

tion, discernment,
criticized and

attainment"

and

as coming from the same individ clearly referring back to the "people of specula whom he had first mentioned as having

"then they (thumma qalii). What is more, this characterization of them as "people of speculation, discernment, and is not particularly flattering. Apart from acknowledging that they
said"

found fault

with

him

attainment"

have discernment, it is purely descriptive: it tells us what they do and what they have achieved, nothing more. Even the gracious inclination to their ability to
distinguish becomes
sented. an

empty

gesture once

the full set of recrimations

is

pre

At any rate, He
concentrates

al-Razi says

nothing

about

this

inconsistency

in

what

follows.

instead

on

defending

Socrates'

zealous excess of youth.

need

Since Socrates

abandoned

solitary austerity merely a it early on, al-Razi sees no

as

to investigate whether a life so devoted to the pursuit of wisdom that

all other concerns

it

ignores
good

is laudable, nay, is the good life, or whether the life is the balanced one he describes as his own at the end of the treatise.
cannot
of

Still the issue

whether

the pursuit

be ignored, for it points to the broader question philosophy must be so single-minded that it takes
or,

of no
of

account of the needs of men

differently

stated,

whether

the

proper

focus

philosophy is

nature and

the universe or

human things.

B. The Philosophic Life, A Digression of Sorts (Paras. 4-29, 99:14-108:12)

This RazI

long
just

part or section consists of seven subsections.

In the first two,

al-

seeks

to

justify

Socrates'

life

by

showing that the solitary

and austere

portrait

presented

those practices later in

austerity or 101:4). In the three intermediate subsections,

the complete argument taken from
means
other works about

insofar as Socrates turned away from life (paras. 4-6, 99:14-100:14) and by arguing that abstemiousness is better than profligacy (paras. 7-8, 100:15
not accurate al-Razi provides what

is

he terms he

the philosophic

life

grounded

in

six principles what

(paras.

9-10, 101:5-102:5),

then illustrates

by

explaining two of the principles in detail

pleasure

namely, the fifth one

concerning

(paras. 11-14,
"digression,"

effect that we should not cause pain

(paras.

102:6-103:13) and the fourth one to the 15-22, 103:14-106:6). In the last
al-Razi notes

two subsections of this

that

even

though the diver

sity among the conditions of human

beings

necessitates the relative character of

his discussion thus far, a general rule of upper and lower limits can still be stated (paras. 23-28, 106:7-108:3); and he provides a summary definition of the philosophic life (para. 29, 108:4-12).

4-6) It was dat 'ajabih bi-al-falsafah)

1. (Paras.

Socrates'

"great

philosophy"

amazement over
earlier

(shid-

that occasioned his

solitary austerity,

accord-

Origins of al-Razi's Political Philosophy

241

to al-RazI (para. 5, 100:1). Other reasons for these practices of Socrates derive from his love for philosophy, "desire to devote to it the time otherwise dedicated to passions and being inclined to it by nature, and "mak ing light of and looking down on those who did not view philosophy in the

ing

pleasures,"

way"

he thought it deserved

and

"who

preferred what was

baser than

it."

All

of

these led him to the kind

when

of excessive attitude

that

frequently

befalls

people

they first become desirous of something; they come back to a balanced approach once they have penetrated it deeply. In sum, Socrates was infatuated
philosophy
as a

with

youth, but

returned

to a more conventional way of

al-Razi

life

as

he

came

to understand

philosophy better. Though

wish,
all of

does

not emphasize

it

as much as we might
Socrates'

these causes seem to come back to a single

one

uncompromising

pursuit of

philosophy,

a pursuit so

intently

focused that it

he does make to passing is sufficient reminder. After all, Socrates is known "stirring and ardent for characterizing himself as erotic about his pursuit of
seems almost erotic.

The

one

reference

matters"

wisdom.6

More

attention

is

paid

to this earlier conduct of

his

that

is, it is
so

more a part

of common opinion and rumor

because

such conduct

is

unfamiliar and

astonishing to most people. Indeed, observes al-Razi, people like to talk about the unusual. This settled, al-Razi now denies that his own conduct differs from
that
our of

Socrates, "even
it"

though we

fall

short of

him greatly

and acknowledge

deficiency
and

edge,

in practicing the just life, suppressing desires, loving knowl (para. 6, 100:10-12). Thus, al-Razi's first defense of aspiring to
with

himself is that "our difference

quantity"

Socrates

...

is

not about

quality

of

life but

about

(100:12-13).
al-Razi
Socrates'

The wording permits what is praiseworthy in

this praiseworthy

to compare

himself,

albeit

unfavorably,

with

life

and

to avoid

being

precise about whether of

element

is

related

to the first or second period

his life.

Ostensibly, he
away from it in

need not

order

to follow a more balanced life.

blame that solitary austerity because Socrates turned Thus, however blamewor

thy

such conduct might enough

intensely

be in itself, Socrates pursued it neither long enough nor to deserve blame. Al-RazI refrains from blaming Socrates for

his solitary austere practices, then, because they did not lead to dire conse quences. He sees no reason to blame such withdrawal or such austerity simply. We, however, must focus our attention on what al-Razi deems characteristic
of

the

pursuit of

philosophy
excuses

and

praiseworthy in
not

Socrates'

life

namely,

prac

ticing justice, controlling

the passions, and seeking knowledge.

It is for this
how Soc in

deficiency
We
must rates

that

he

himself,

for his solitary

or abstemious practices. acknowledged

note, in addition, that despite

as a soldier

having
(para.

already

distinguished himself
virtues of

4, 99:17-18),
of

al-Razi now cites

only the
silence.

justice,

moderation, and wisdom; courage

is

passed over

There is

no place

in his understanding
short of

philosophy for the simply

not

political virtue.

Though he

admits

to

falling

Socrates in these matters, he does

242
think

Interpretation
he therefore deserves blame: "We
with respect

are not

inferior if
and

we acknowledge our

failing
Razl's

to

him, for
(para.

that is the truth

acknowledging the truth is

not

virtuous"

more noble and own

6, 100:13-14). Such honesty, surely

avoid

in

al-

interest,

allows

him to

determining
of most

Socrates'

whether

stan

dard is too high

too far beyond the reach

Socrates'

human beings. Moreover,

was

given the notion that

excessive advised

earlier

devotion to philosophy

excessive,

so

that he himself later turned away from

it,

al-Razi would

be better

to show that he directs himself according to the standard of the

cannot

later

Socrates. He
tes'

do so, however, for he has

pursuit of point also needs

deftly

avoided

solitary austerity, or the 2. (Paras. 7-8) Another

philosophy
to

connected

making Socra with it, an issue.

contention that

his

critics can

blame

Socrates'

neither of

be made, namely, al-Razi's ways of life. Noting

that

what

is

at

issue is the

extent

to which one practices solitary austerity, that to give oneself up to pas his famous book The Spiritual Medicine

no one would contend sions and

it is

either virtuous or noble refers

to

prefer

them, he

to

what

(al-Tibb al-Ruhdnt) for the first time (para. 7, 100:15-17). On the basis of is set forth there, he insists that what is virtuous and noble is "taking each

need to the extent that

is

indispensable"

or

that does not entail a pain

Socrates*

the pleasure attached to it.

blameworthy"

Consequently,

early way
al-Razi

of

exceeding life is "truly

insofar

as

it "leads to the

ruination of

the world and the perdition

people."

of

That

point

conceded,

however,

immediately

counters with

the observation made earlier, namely, that Socrates did turn back from

it in

time to

"beget,

war against

the enemy,

festivities"

and attend sessions of

(para.

8, 100:19-101:1

and see para.

4, 99:17-18).
Socrates'

Explicitly and implicitly, then, the argument is based on the idea that there is nothing inherently wrong with early pursuit of solitary abstemious it did not harm and he abandoned it in time to participate in activ ness; him,
ities
conducive to

human

well-being.

Differently

stated,

whatever the critics

may claim, such conduct is not wrong per se nor against nature. It is to be judged in terms of its results in quantitative terms, rather than in qualitative
ones

and

it becomes wrong only

of

when

followed to the

point of

the well-being

the abstemious solitary or of the human race (see para.

threatening 7,

100:15-16).
Nor he does
can

his

critics

impugn

al-Razi as

being

sated with

desires just because

not

imitate

Socrates'

solitary

austerity.

The

point

is eminently sensible,
that although

but
is

al-Razi

then seeks to summarize the argument

Socrates'

by contending
now made

he falls
do

short of

earlier conduct

(one he has

defensible), he

still philosophical
not

if

compared name of

to nonphilosophic people: "And we, even if

comparison to
people"

we

deserve the
name

philosophy in

deserve its
see also

in

comparison

to non-philosophic

101:1-3). A

more persuasive argument would

Socrates, surely (para. 8, 101:3-4; begin by insisting that

and then praise

solitary austerity is

always a

threat to the world we

of

live in

the

salubrious consequences of

the life

the reformed

Socrates.

Origins of al-Razi
That
and argument

Political
Socrates'

Philosophy

243

is

not

appropriate,

however, for

merrymaking in

are not at

issue for

al-Razi's critics.

begetting, Rather, it is
That

warring,
whether

doing
gaged

those things prevents

one

from

being

philosophic.

al-Razi

has

en

activities similar to
pass over

these is why

chooses

to

the

question

they blame him, after all. But he in silence. By phrasing his defense in quan
Socrates'

titative terms, he fails to give an adequate account of the balanced life. What
al-Razi needs to

do here is

show

worldly activities, he
even more

continued

later involvement in that, despite to be as interested in philosophy as before. Or,

Socrates'

earlier solitary kept him from insofar as it prevented him austerity pursuing philosophy fully from paying attention to the questions related to human conduct.

to the point, al-Razi needs to argue that

3. (Paras.
would ment

9-10) He takes up neither line of argument because either one him away from his next stated goal, namely, setting forth the argu that completes his depiction of the philosophic life. Such a claim notwith
take
what

standing,
ples,
all

follows is less

an argument

than an enumeration of six princi

taken from other to support

...

works.

The

reason given

for setting them forth is that

treatise"

"we
of

need

the goal we are intent upon in this

by

means

them (see para.

9, 101:7-8). Then,

after mentioning the

of

four

works

from

which

they

are

taken and

insisting

on

the importance

The Spiritual Medicine,

he lists the
a.

principles occurs

(101:13-102:5):
after

What

to us

death depends
created

on

the way we to
attain

live

now.

b. The

reason

for

our

being

is

not

bodily

pleasure, but to
to the
world

acquire without

knowledge death

and practice

justice

they lead to

release

or pain.

c.

Nature

and passion

favor

pleasure

now, but intellect

urges

putting it
or

aside

for

what

is better.
not want us to cause

d. Our Lord does

and e.

pain,

commit

injustice,

be ignorant;

He

punishes

those

who cause suffering.

We

should not endure a pain given us

hoping

to get a pleasure that

is inferior to it.
the means to

f. The Creator has

them.

the things we need to

subsist and

Three
solved and

of these principles

(a, d,

and

f)

are

based

on premises

that

can

be

re

only if the

soundness of what

has been

revealed about

God is granted,
of revelation
all

the other three demand extensive discussion.

more than
except

Here,

no

defense

is offered, nor does al-Razi do discussed elsewhere. Moreover, immediate sequel, he

consider are the one

say that these principles have

principles others

been

for the two

the

developed in the

passes over all of

in

silence.

The two he does

concerning pleasure (e), phrased almost as an imperative, and that concerning divine providence (d), with its concomitant obligation. Though the fourth principle does shed some light on the second and the fifth on
the third,
Socrates'

neither clarifies

the first or the last

principle.

4. (Paras. 11-14) The explanation of the fifth wisdom in his earlier period of solitary

principle serves abstinence.

to confirm
argu-

Al-Razi's

244
ment

Interpretation
is that if the
pleasures

in the life to
are

come are neither

intermittent
place

nor

limited,
in

whereas pleasures

in this life

both,

it is foolish to

the former

jeopardy by

pleasures

pursuing the latter. He does concede, however, that all other would be permitted. Nonetheless, the philosopher will train himself
permitted

to resist even these

resist.

pleasures, because

such

training
as

makes

it

easier

to

The

principle

is

sound and

eminently reasonable,

long

as

the basic prem

ise is true. Clearly, no one normally thoughtful citizen no more than philoso pher would forego such restraint in order to pursue a pleasure likely to jeop
ardize greater pleasure

in the

next

life.

Still,
al-Razi

we

do

not

know

whether

the

premise cient

is

sound.

Nor is

al-Razi

willing to

argue

to posit the

principle.

Nonetheless,
the premise.

it here. For him, it is does drop two hints here

suffi about

the the

problematic character of world of

the

soul some

vouch

for

at

least

First, he denotes the world to come as (para. 11, 102:10) and then brings in the ancients to of what he sets forth here (para. 12, 102:15), leaving us
might more

to

wonder

how

much

they

have to say

about

the broader

points. con

5. (Paras. 15-22) Even

cerning the
premise
sion pain

interesting
and

is the fourth principle, that

pain.

obligation we are under not our

to cause

Again, assuming
pain.

that the

to the effect that

Lord

Master

watches over us with compas

is true, it follows that He does

sometimes arises

not want us

to cause others
reason

But

since

by

nonhuman

cause, the

must

be that it is

necessary and inevitable. Al-RazI does not say why it is necessary and inevita ble, but it would seem to follow that it fits into a divine plan in some way
unknown

to us. The basic point

assuming the
to any

soundness of

the

original prem

ise

is that

we should cause no pain

living

creature not

deserving it,

unless the pain caused wards off a greater pain principle

wise

(para. 15, 103:14-104:4). This

helps us understand what warrants many practices that would other be deemed wrong, especially those related to hunting wild animals and to exerting or even mistreating those that have been domesticated. The first dis

i.e., killing wild animals and exerting tame ones is couched in terms of what kings do, as opposed to what ordinary people do. But it is pursued no further. Indeed, in attempting to explain how such
tinction,

that between

hunting

actions might

be

carried out

according to
cause a

an

intelligent

and

just

rule

and

thus

be justified

even

though

they

living

creature pain

al-Razi momen

tarily

neglects

the

question of

hunting

wild animals.

He begins
sibility
of

by noting that certain medical practices presuppose the permis inflicting a lesser pain so as to obtain a greater good: physicians
about

treatment for the sake of reducing healing. Sometimes suffering bringing they even insist upon the pa tient ingesting foul substances or sacrificing a limb or organ in order to save the body (para. 16, 104:4-6). On another level, this line of reasoning permits inflicting pain on one species of being in order, thereby, to benefit a higher species. Thus al-Razi explains that a horse may be ridden hard even to the
sometimes cause patients to undergo painful
or

Origins of al-Razi's Political

point of

Philosophy

245

death

if that leads to the saving

to the

learned

man or one valuable

human life, especially the life of a community (104:6-11). And on yet another
of pain even

level,
are

the reasoning justifies

inflicting
one can

death

on one member of when

the same species in order to preserve another member.

Hence,
other

two

men

in danger
to

of

perishing but
al-Razi

be

saved

if the

is

abandoned or

allowed

die,

thinks it reasonable that the

one most useful

for the

well-being of people survive (104:11-14). The reasoning here tacitly assumes a hierarchy in
other species of animals

nature.

Insofar
abide

as we use

for

our

nourishment,
we

we

unreflectively

by

such a appli some

hierarchy
cation

hesitate about, or even resist, its to fellow human beings. Yet al-Razi is merely making explicit

in

daily

life.

Nonetheless,

thing
man

we all seem

to acknowledge

implicitly,

namely, that however

equal

hu

beings may be in principle, they

are not all equal

in fact

they

are not all

equally valuable to the community. Indeed, we follow such reasoning in vot ing, in exempting some individuals from military service, and in assigning military tasks. The only viable counters to the principle would be radical egali
tarianism
or

insisting

that,

as

the measure of all

things,

man

is

inviolate.7

Though It

easier to

must also

live with, neither is a priori any sounder than al-Razi's. be noted that the reasoning here goes back to the original
of

ac

knowledgement
order to

necessity

bringing

about pain and

suffering (see

para.

15,

103:15-17). Yet only the second example, inflicting pain upon one species in benefit another, explicitly corresponds to the original formulation of
problem

the

(i.e., 104:1-4):
all]
sorts of

[There

are

wrongs, the pleasure kings take in

hunting

animals, and the

all

in exerting tame animals when they use them. Now of that must be according to an intelligent and just intent, rule, method, and doctrine one that is not exceeded nor deviated from.
excess to which people go

The first
reminds

example us

depends

upon an extension of pain

the necessity argument

persuaded

and

that

greater good.

we willingly submit to Introduction of this greater

when

it

will

bring
two,

good principle underlies

the second

example and also the third.

More

attention

is

paid

in

each of

the latter

however, to necessity. Though both it and pursuit of the greater good some times bring us to inflict pain upon ourselves, necessity as well as attention to the dictates of intellect and justice are needed to justify inflicting pain upon inferior species of being or in extreme cases upon one of our own (see para. 16, 104:7 and 8).
Al-RazI turns from this line
of

reasoning to the topic he

passed over

earlier,
we

hunting. In

keeping

with

the principle guiding the

discussion,

he holds that

may hunt and pursue only carnivorous animals and those that are dangerous but useless. Two considerations are adduced to justify their destruction. The first is
that

they

will exterminate or

harm

other animals

if left to themselves
no

and

the

second

is that in

killing them,

their

future life is in

way harmed. This is

246

Interpretation
soul

because the
human

is

fully

released para.

17-18, 104:15-105:4,
soul

esp.

only from human bodies after death (paras. 18, 104:18-105:3). That is, none but the

lives

on apart

from the

body

after

death.
presented as

Though the two

groups of

considerations are

originally

applying to both

animals, that
al-Razi

is,

the

carnivorous as well as

those that are

grounds

dangerous
the

but useless,
rous animals

later

modifies

his judgment. On the

existence of other
obligation

that carnivo
restricts

necessarily threaten the first consideration so as to infer an

animals, he

to exterminate them.
rather

Because
than the

dangerous but
only the
right of

useless animals cause

harm

incidentally
to them.

than necessarily,

second consideration

fully

applies

Thus,
pales

no more

destroying

them can

be inferred. Even the be

added

distinction in

namely,
to

that

they may be

annihilated as well as exterminated

comparison

his

conclusion

that the former "must

exterminated so

far

possible"

as

(para.

19, 105:4-9). Perhaps

al-Razi
bodies"

as a way of softening the harshness of this imperative, invokes the hope that the passage of their souls "into more suitable
will

thereby be

facilitated.8

Finally,
after

the same line of reasoning about the nonhuman soul not

comes

living

on

death

to sanction

killing
only

tame and herbivorous animals. But the

fact

that the latter are useful in addition to

being

harmless dictates that they be That the

usefulness of

treated gently tame or

and sacrificed

as

needed.9

animals,

dangerous, is judged solely from

the human perspective is perfectly in

keeping with al-Razi's focus here on the best human of being only insofar as it relates to human beings.
Apart from the is
not permitted.
pain
medical treatment already The difference between the upon oneself

life. He looks

at

the chain

discussed, causing
actions

pain

to oneself
permissi

first

examined

ble

inflicted

for the

sake of

health

and upon other

beings in

order to achieve a greater good

stated

and nonpermissible pain caused

to oneself

is

in

justice
second and

and

preliminary manner here as what is regulated by the judgment of intellect for the first actions and by the judgment of intellect for the
para.

(see

21, 105:15-17). Later, however,

the distinction is

abandoned goes

nonmedical

inflicting

of pain

on

oneself called

wrong because it

against the

larger

principle: no greater good

greater pain avoided

is

attained

by inflicting
seems

pain upon

ourselves nor

is any

(106:2-3).

Though it

remains

implicit,
Lord
and

al-Razi's

thinking here

to be that we
we stifle

come no closer to our

Creator
a

by

such practices nor

do

any
the

desires (see 105:17-19). There is kinds The less

of pain

definite

hierarchy
upon

in his

enumeration of

different

religious groups

inflict

themselves in this

quest.

self-immolation and

torture practiced

reason as are

the acts of abuse engaged in

by Hindus are simply repugnant by Manicheans. Explicitly stated

Christians
in
and

to
as

serious are the

seclusionary
as

practices of

Muslims

and even
all of

the instances

of self-neglect sometimes engaged

by

the latter.

Still,

these are wrong insofar

they inflict

pain

but

avoid no greater pain.

The discussion

calls to mind

Socrates'

earlier phase of

solitary abstinence,

Origins of al-Razi's Political

and

Philosophy
those
who

247

he is

mentioned

here

as

having

leaned
a

somewhat to
or

neglect

themselves

that

is, he

was more

like

Muslim

Christian than

Hindu

or

Manichean (see
elaborate, but
or

para.

22, 106:3-5
that
even

and para.

20, 105:13-14). Al-Razi does

not

we are aware

abstemious
upon

perhaps
or

harm

himself

Socrates only inclined to them, that his austere ascetic practices did not lead him to inflict to discipline his body in any way. Rather, they were the
his neglecting immediate
than
needs

natural consequences of self more

in

order

to

devote him
be
called

fully

to the pursuit of philosophy. His asceticism, if

of commission.

it

can

that,

was one of omission rather

Above all, it

must

be
to

asked whether

the discussion sheds

new

light

on al-Razi's earlier attempt

distinguish himself quantitatively from Socrates: precisely because such prac tices of inflicting pain upon oneself are unjust and lead to no new knowledge,
we must wonder about

the

extent

to which

Socrates actually

achieved

justice

and

knowledge in his first way of life. 6. (Paras. 23-28) The discussion of these two
a general rule of conduct. wealth and rule

principles permits al-Razi to

account

formulate
sioned

Taking

into

the

diversity
to the

occa

by

upbringing,

yet not

wanting to do away
the upper limit

with

these roots,
maxi

he

states

his

in terms

of upper and

lower limits

with respect and

mum amount of pleasure one

may

seek

the

minimum

amount of pleasure one ment

may
on

seek

the

lower limit. The

maximum

for enjoy
para.

is phrased,

drawing
paras.

the preceding

discussion, in
or

terms of seeking no

pleasure that causes

hurt to

another

being

leads to its death (see

25,

106:18-107:2
terms of
not

with

23-24,

106:7-18). The lower limit is defined in

limiting oneself in the pursuit of pleasures in such a way as to body to danger or weaken it, while at the same time making the preservation of the body and not seeking pleasure one's primary goal (see
expose the
para.

26, 107:3-12).

Guidelines restricting the pursuit of pleasure are set forth in the discussion of both the upper and lower limits, the two differing with respect to the way
pleasure

is

acquired and

its

object.

For the

upper

limit,

the examples focus on

whereas

pleasure sought

by

means of another or at another's

expense,

for the

lower limit they have to do

clothing,
and shelter.

with pleasure

that is

more personal:

nourishment,

Thus,

though constraining the quest for

pleasure

is

urged upon

in

both,

the discussion

of permissible pleasure

in the lower limit insists

giving
mum:

a minimal amount of attention to the

the principle, first

stated

in terms
needed

of

body. It is, however, a strict mini not being too lenient with the body

or

pursuing

more than what

is

things because

they

are enjoyable

merely to preserve it, that is, seeking (para. 26, 107:3-9), is then expanded to

include
para. about

exhortation

to

27,

107:13-15).

training in doing without (para. 26, 107:9-12 and also Later, it becomes evident that al-Razi is also concerned
oneself

the least one can permit

and similar
subsection

anything less than that least

10

being
in

overly harsh

to the

blameworthy
28,

self-inflicted pains enumerated

the preceding

(para.

107:15-108:1).

248

Interpretation
standard used of

The

to explain how one

or

understands

the

upper

limit is the

judgment

intellect

justice

or

and, though
what

mentioned

here for the first

time, tial hesitations

based
on

presented as an equivalent and

displeases God. Moreover, despite ini

false allusions, al-Razi eventually formulates a standard the judgment of intellect and justice in order to determine the lower
says

limit. First he
unjust

that

infringing

the second understanding

against

of

the lower

limit is
that

(107:17),

then that it is
the

philosophy (107:17-108:1)
says

against reason

or

intellect. But he
references to

nothing

about

is, displeasing God,

and

content perhaps

to let the

Hindus, Manicheans,

Christians
habit

carry the implication. With

must

respect to the
respected.

be
to

Shelter

lower limit, the diversity of human suitable for a man of modest

character and means will

not

be be

adequate able
gle

for

one used to elegant

dwellings,
an elegant

nor will a man of modest means

accommodate

himself to

dwelling

without

the kind of strug

that will hinder

parities caused

by
to

him from his primary goal (para. 26, 107:3-9). The dis such differences in fortune provoke al-Razi to no suggestions
for
a more equitable

about the need

strive

distribution

of wealth or

to regu
politics an

late the way it is

and political
easier

passed on.

Completely
notes

eschewing

such excursions

into

economy, he

merely that the less wealthy may

have

time of abiding

by

the lower limit and that, all things considered, it is

preferable to para.

lean

more

towards that limit (para.

26, 107:9-12

and

especially
which
al-

7.
all of

27, 107:13-15). (Para. 29) The summary

statement of

the philosophic

life,

that to

the preceding contributes, consists of four basic parts. It

begins

with

Razi asserting certain qualities of the Creator. He then seeks a rule of conduct based on an analogy between the way servants seek to please their sovereigns or owners and the way we should please our Sovereign Master. Next he draws
a conclusion with

from that analogy about the character of philosophy. And he ends the declaration that the fuller explanation of this summary statement is to
al-Razi moves

be found in The Spiritual Medicine.

The way
possible

from the
goal of

assertion about

the qualities

of

the Creator

to the conclusion that the

is extraordinarily

subtle and

philosophy is to be as much like God as inventive. It consists of a conditional syl

logism along with an explanation of what the syllogism is intended to mean. The first premise of the conditional syllogism is that the Creator is a knower ignorant of nothing and so just as to commit no injustice. Then, setting forth
the second premise as an explanation of the
appropriate

kind
and

of

knowledge
compassion

and

justice

to the

tion,

al-Razi

Creator, namely, knowledge adds without further argument

this character

justice

without qualifica
or

that

(rahmah) is
added so

also of

(108:5). It is

not clear whether compassion

mercy is

that the
and

reader not conceive of

justice in

the present context as neces

sarily harsh the Creator

unyielding been

or

because

one cannot speak of

justice

as related to

without not

thinking

also of compassion.

has certainly

prepared

by

At any rate, its introduction the preceding discussion. The third premise

Origins of al-Razi's Political

states

Philosophy 249

the

relationship between
abuts

us and

the Creator: He is to

us as a creator and a

master

(mdlik),

whereas we are

So stated, it
master, then

in

we should

Cabld mamlukin). logical discrepancy. If God is to us as a creator and be to Him as creatures and vassals or as creatures and
and vassals

to Him as slaves

slaves; but God's

being

our

Creator does

not make us

His

slaves.

Al-RazI drops

the logical parallelism between the creator and created in order to introduce one

less obvious, namely, that between the Creator as Master and us as indebted to this Master. Politics enters into consideration given the relationship between us and the Creator, but it is a politics based on a hierarchy that can never be
collapsed.

is that the
most

slaves most

The final premise, posed solely from the perspective of subjection, loved by their owners (mawdlihim) are those who adhere
ways of

closely to their (108:5-6).

On the basis
of

life

and are most observant of

their traditions

these premises,

al-RazI concludes

that "the slaves

closest

to

God, may He be magnified and glorified, just, most compassionate, and most
be to
and our

are

those

who are most

learned,

most

kindly"

(108:7)."

The idea is that

we must

Master

as slaves are

to their owners;

traditions.
and

Perhaps,

since

knowledge

and

follow His way of life justice do not fully encompass

we must compassion

God's life
second

finds it necessary to add traditions, premise and kindliness in the conclusion. But both
al-Razi

in the

are added without

explanation.

In

each

instance,

the

language

al-Razi

chooses so as

permits

one

to

think that he is merely

attempt to restrict

drawing

on other qualities of

God

to ward off any

is tempered

with

justice. To be sure, mercy and kindliness

the

revelation apprises us

that God's

justice
even

the justice of

divine punishment,
In the end, mercy
with

the punishment
refusal ness

of

day

of

judgment,

notwithstanding.

al-Razi's

here to
us

explain

why he

so mingles

God's justice
an

and

kindli
to his

leaves

to

wonder whether

it is merely

indirect

suggestion

detractors that they about him.

It is Al-Razi has

should so

temper their sense of justice

in reaching judgment
of

not possible to answer such questions on made

the basis

the text

before

us.

it impossible to

pursue

the

inquiry by

the way he has

struc

tured the syllogism. This syllogism, he further asserts, embodies what all phi

losophers

mean when

they say "philosophy is making

oneself similar

to

God,
life."

may He be magnified and glorified, to the extent possible for a human (108:8-9). Even more importantly, "this is the sum of the philosophic

being"

This summary description

odoras

Socrates'

recalls

playful attempt

to persuade The

that those

who

truly deserve
in
order

to be called philosophers
greater or

have

no need of

the knowledge
them to

most men world an

praise, that their to become

deeper knowledge leads

flee the

as much

like the

deity
no

as

they

can.

It
to

is,

nonetheless,

incident
it is

relating to

Socrates'

life that is in

way

alluded

here.12

Nor,
count

replete as

with

implications, does

al-Razi present

this summary

statement as

his full

account of what constitutes

another

the philosophic

life. That

ac

is to be found in

work, The Spiritual Medicine. We must turn to

250

Interpretation
al-RazI, because there he
habits"

it,

says

mentions

(a) how

we can rid ourselves of

"bad

moral

and

(b)

"the

extent with

to which someone aspiring to be philo

sophic ought

to

concern

himself

rulership"

diture,
tion
of

and

seeking

ranks of

gaining a livelihood, acquisition, expen (108:10-12). In other words, the defini

raises questions

the philosophic life set forth

as

here

that al-Razi elsewhere

and

identifies
affairs

relating to

moral

virtue, especially
that this fuller or

moral

purification,

human

economics as well as political rule.

At

no point

does he
at odds

suggest with

more

philosophy is

complete account of what

the summary is involved in seeking knowledge, struggling to

statement.

detailed understanding of It seems, rather, that a

act

justly,

and

being

compassionate as well as

kindly

encompasses matters

that fall

under a

discussion
and

of moral virtue or rule.

ethics, household
must

management or eco

nomics, texts

political

These

activities
of

be

seen

in
of

particular con

that relating to the improvement

of

the individual first

all, then to the

betterment
munity. pursuits. of

household, finally Moreover, some hierarchy must be established among the different In the Book of the Philosophic Life, however, we find no reflections
the
and

to the well-being of the political com

this kind.

They

are

absent

precisely because the

and

work

is

so

devoid

of a

political perspective.

As Yet

presented

here, for

example, compassion

kindliness

appear almost as and

afterthoughts and

compassion and

surely kindliness fit in be

called

as qualities

less important than knowledge

more

justice.

readily

with

the emphasis in the

treatise

on what might

the personal part of the definition of philoso

phy, that relating to

pain

moral virtue.

Even justice, thus far defined primarily

personal manner.

as not

causing what He desires for us, is thereby presented in a it is possible to extract the skeleton of a political
about a

to others and explicitly linked with our understanding of God and

argument

To be sure, from the discussion

of

hierarchy
of

among human beings that

six principles

was

introduced in the discussion is his

the fourth

comprising life especially insofar as the superiority of one man over another is stated in terms of his being more useful for the well-being of the people (see para. 16, 104:11-13). It is difficult to take that argument
statement of the philosophic

the

"complete"

what al-Razi says

very far, however, because al-Razi says so little about it anywhere in this work. An attempt to extract more of a political teaching from the Book of the Philo sophic Life is likewise frustrated by his reluctance to speak here of the Creator as the Governor of the or of our relationship to Him in terms of His
universe13

being

like

Governor to

us rather

than

as

being

like

Lord

or

Master to

us.

C. Self-Justification (Paras. 30-37, The

tual
claim that a

108:13-110:15)
these

fuller

statement of
us

issues is

to

be found in The Spiri

Medicine

must not

lead

to

disparage

the present work.

Indeed, in his

Origins of
attempt to

al-Razi'

Political

Philosophy
al-RazI

251

justify

his

right to

be

considered a
more

philosopher,

insists that

had he been
sophic

capable of
would

nothing
enough

than composing the Book of the Philo

Life, it

be

to prevent anyone

daring

to deprive

him

of

the

name philosopher explanation of

(para. 31, 108:18-20). This praise of the book is part of his what he has accomplished with respect to the scientific part of

philosophy,

science or

knowledge
the

(Urn) being
other.

one of the two parts of philoso

al-Razi seeks

phy himself

and practice

Carnal) being

Accordingly,

to

justify

elaborating on what he has done in each of these domains and his detractors to show that they have accomplished as much espe challenging in the realm of science. cially

by

explanation constitutes

In turning to this exculpatory argument, al-Razi something of a digression:

Since
we

notes

that the preceding

have

explained what we wanted to explain with respect to this

will return and explain what pertains

to us. And we
this

will mention

those
a

who

topic, we de due
ex

fame

us and will mention

that

even until

day

we

have

not

lived

life

to success granted
cluded

by

God

and to

His

assistance

such that we

deserve to be

from

being

designated

"philosopher."

(Para.

30, 108:13-15, my

emphasis)

Now it is

not clear where

this digression

first begins. As I
after

order

it in the

division
the

of the

text followed

here, it

starts

immediately

the introduction to

whole treatise.
Socrates'

In this sense, the way

of of

whole second part

comprising the justifica

tion of
and

life,
it

the complete statement of the philosophic the digression (that

the final summary

are all part of

is,

paras.

life, 4-29,

99:14-108:12). One could, however,

the two
attempts

make a plausible argument

for

including
B)
as a

to

justify

Socrates'

early, solitary, and abstemious life (paras.

as

4-8, 99:14-101:4
part of

identified here
prior

the first two subsections of Part

the argument

to what al-Razi speaks of now as

having

been

digression. Still,
statement of

under no circumstances philosophic

is it

possible

to

interpret the

complete

the

life,

the explanations of the fourth and fifth princi

what

ples,

and

the last two accounts of

what

that statement and explanations mean as

digression.14

anything but
of

he

refers to here as a

Differently
the

stated, the

core

this treatise is

external

to the

occasion

for its writing

core of

al-Razi's

need

to

justify
that,

his life to contemporary detractors. The

of

book,

the full under

standing

the

philosophic

life,

obliges us to confront

his larger teaching. For

or so

it

would

seem, we need no

forensic impetus.

Contending that is, knowing tice

a philosopher

that philosophy consists of two

what a philosopher

is

supposed

things, knowledge and prac to know and doing what

on

is

supposed

to do

al-Razi

insists that

both

counts

he has

done

what

is

needed.

His

proof

tion of books he has written,

concerning knowledge consists in an enumera including this one (para. 31, 108:18-109:9); a
compositions

summary
of

statement

that these

amount

to about two

hundred branches
more

books, treatises,

and pamphlets about

the

physical and metaphysical

philosophy (109:10-11);

an explanation of

why he has

not

delved

252

Interpretation
into
mathematics coupled with a

summary dismissal of those who that pursuit deserves more attention (para. 32, 109:11-14); and an assertion that if these activities do not qualify him for the title of philosopher then he can

deeply

think

imagine

no one of

his

age so

deserving

Al-Razi's

enumeration of at

(para. 33, 109:14-16). least fifteen books and treatises here

with particular subjects

plus a

mention of several

books

dealing

follows

no particu

lar order, but it does fall into some general categories. After lauding the present book as sufficient grounds for his being considered a philosopher, he adduces
the titles of four books. The

first

concerns

third is the

enigmatic

The Spiritual

logic, Medicine; and

treatises,

the second metaphysics; the

the

fourth is

about

physics.15

There follows
science or

an enumeration of six

each

having
about

to do with physical
written

astronomy.16

He then

returns

to speaking

books he has

and mentions
about

some

having

to do with physical science, specifically,

books
rather

the soul and about

continues.

matter

(al-hayiila). The
al-Razi

enumeration of

books,

than

treatises,

Now, however,
the
subject.17

explicitly lists

a series of

five

books

having
about

to do

with medicine and speaks of

them as merely an
speaks of

indication
al-

of what written

he has

written on

Finally, he

books he has
call

the
,

art

of
.

wisdom,

something the

common

people

Kimiyyd back to
move

alchemy

Thus the list

one of a

proceeds

from

an enumeration of

books to

one of

treatises and
writings

books. As

presented

from

defense of,

or

here, apology for, philosophy (forensic

high for the
soul

the subjects treated

in these

philosophy); pass

to logic and metaphysics; rise to a

point with a subject

physics, physics,
physics

and medicine

combining meta (The Spiritual Medicine); move to

physics,
the
on

in

general

and,

after particular aspects of as we might

to medicine; to
works

and on

end with

alchemy. at

Intrigued

be

by

reference

alchemy

the

end of

the enumeration, it is not those

writings

to

which al-Razi

importance in the sequel, but to his the large Summary (see para. 37, 110:12-15). 18
attaches great

medical work

that he terms

In

defending
and

himself

with respect

to practice, al-Razi draws the

reader's

attention

to the two limits set forth

as a

fourth

fifth

principles above and claims

summary that he has

of

his

explanation of the

never

infringed them.

Yet he has frequented the mighty and certainly enjoys more wealth than Socra tes, so he turns to an account of his worldly activities. It is al-Razi's contention
that in

being

a companion

to the ruler

(sultan), he has merely

well-being
this

acted as a physi

cian and advisor community.

ruler

for the

ruler's personal

as well as

for that
relation

of

the

(What

al-Razi

thinks

of

the

community
or

of citizens

in

to the the

is aptly indicated

by

his

choice of words at

juncture: he

speaks of

citizens or subjects as

the sultan's herd

flock [ra'iyyatuh]). Though

al-Razi

insists that he has

diately

obvious

as a warrior

administrator, it is not imme he seeks to emphasize the point. After all, Socrates served why when he turned away from his ascetic ways.
never served as a warrior or al-Razi turns next to an account of

At any rate,

how he handles

money.

He

Origins of al-Razi
claims

Political

Philosophy

253

that he neither accumulates it

nor spends

it loosely.

Moreover, thinking
not seek quar

still of

the acquisition and use of money, he insists that he does

rels,

attack

others,

or

harm them. Another

to money

count on which

he

seeks to excuse
with respect

himself is likewise
clothing, mounts,

related

namely, his conduct

to

and male as well as

female

servants

but

al-Razi

brings his

denial
tivities

of excess with respect

to these

matters under another

heading. In these

matters

as well as with expenditures al-Razi asserts

having
from

to do with

that he refrains

excess.

food, drink, and fes Thus, having insisted that

nothing in his
the philosophic
who

private or public

life

treats others or disposes of his

wealth

life,

al-Razi closes

nothing with respect to the way he is blameworthy, much less unbecoming his self-justification by noting that those
and pursuit of of

frequent

or observe
can

him know how dedicated he is to the

cited

knowl for him

edge.

Two things

be

in

evidence of

the

intensity

his

quest with

knowledge. The first is something of a since youth, namely, his inability to let
even

character trait that a

has been

book

go unread or a man unsounded or

if

doing

so

leads to

major

inconvenience

detriment. The

second con

the way he has weakened his sight and paralyzed his hand through the hours spent writing his Summary for the last fifteen years. Both, however, point to excess that goes beyond the lower of the two limits: One is not sup
cerns

long

posed to

harm

oneself

in the

pursuit of wisdom.

D. The Conclusion (Paras. 38-40, In closing,

of al-Razi poses a

110:16-111:7)
to those who disparage his way

double

challenge

life

and would

deny

him the title

of philosopher.
was

The defiance has to do

with

the two parts into

which

knowledge

and practice.

philosophy His final words

wants

divided in the preceding section, are not contentious, however, but

that his writings are given the

conciliatory. attention

In the end, he they deserve.

practice, he
the
philosophic

only to

ensure

As

concerns

asks

them for a clear statement of what

personal conduct or

they

think

constitutes

life. If they deem his

superior or refute

his defini

tion of the

philosophic

life to fall short, they

should explain

their view so that

he

can accept

it if it is truly he

it if it is

not.

Even conceding, for

al-Razi

the sake of argument, a shortcoming

with respect

to practice,

demands

they

also state wherein

errs with respect

to knowledge. In both instances his

are correct or

reasoning is that he may profit from such a statement if they refute it if they are wrong. He does not think they can fault him

on

this count,

however,
than the

and

invokes doggerel to

says than to what

practice.

urge that they pay more attention to what he he does. In the end, it is the teaching that counts far more

The

work

ends, then,

on what

is

almost an admission

that his practical life

and

does fall only

short.

by

implication

But the only error to which he has admitted thus far is to being excessive in his pursuit of learning.

that

254

Interpretation

III. AL-RAZI'S POLITICAL TEACHING

Clearly,
own

the political

teaching

of

this work is set forth only

by

implication.
gives of

Neither in the does

Socrates'

exposition of

life

nor

in the indications he

his

al-Razi

address

the goal for which Socrates turned

from solitary, for three inad

see

abstemious practices

to concern with human things.

And,

except

vertent

suggestions, it is difficult to discern how he

ruled.

would

like to

the com
as a pur

munity

For the

most

part, in

fact,

al-Razi portrays

philosophy

suit carried out apart

from

politics.

Questions
sues.

of rule arise

primarily

with respect

to personal,

i.e.,

ethical

is

The

crucial question concerns

the greater or lesser usefulness one citizen

or another

lead to

an

may have for the community. Reflection upon the Creator does not awareness of divine order or diverse levels of governance within the
an

universe, but to

image

of a

ownership

has

over slaves.

There is

hierarchy,

rulership much like that a master to be sure, but it is a very rigid and
and of rule as

stratified

kind in

of

hierarchy. And this image passing

to his
"flock."

ownership finds further

expression

al-Razi's

remark about

the way he occasionally advises

the

ruler with respect

The
the
of

considerations

that prompted Socrates to turn away from

inquiring

into

heavens

and natural

phenomena, to turn from a solitary and austere pursuit

concern

philosophy that paid little attention to human affairs, in order to himself with human needs and the things humans seek in daily life
made explicit

are not

here. Nor does

solitary,

al-Razi

pay

attention

to the content of

Socrates'

teaching during his

ment with

abstemious period or

during

his

period of

involve
and

humans. He

pays no more attention

to what

Socrates thought

taught than to what he himself thinks and teaches. In part, this that this book on the philosophic
other

is due to the fact

upon al-Razi's

life is

presented as

dependent

work completes
of

writings, especially this one is

on

The Spiritual Medicine. The

extent

to which that

set

forth very tellingly in the final

a

explanation of

his

summary The Spiritual Medicine

the philosophic

life,

summary

that points to the manner in which

about

provides

the fuller

teaching

the two parts of phi

losophy

household management or economics and politics. missing here Yet it must be noted that al-Razi has indirectly enlarged the sphere of philos

ophy in this treatise. He has indicated how philosophy must go beyond inquiry into individual ethics and natural phenomena in order to explore the relation ship between individuals of the same species. Nature does inform that inquiry,
to be sure, but the implications
of

the

information it

provides are the subject of

further investigation. It is human in

by

no means

being
which

can exploit another on even

clear, for example, to what extent one the basis of an acknowledged inequality
a

between them. And

rule

though convention provides for

form

of political

the ruler tends to look upon subjects as a

herd

rather

than as

autonomous

individuals,

al-RazI makes no attempt to argue with nature or with what

that such conven

tional rule accords

in any way

is best for human

Origins of al-Razi's Political Philosophy

255

beings. Finally, though he has adroitly referred to the Creator and His provision for us here, thereby indicating that we must reflect upon the Creator and His
providence

in

order

to understand some

of our

how for

we can

live

as

humanly

as

possible,

al-Razi

customary practices as well as has not indicated to what

extent

the

Creator's instructions
accord with what

to us

His

revelation
us

by

means of a

lawgiver,
human

example

philosophy leads
not

to understand about

well-being and political order. These issues all raised, though

sophic

fully

resolved

Life
not

are said to

be treated

at greater

in The Book of the Philo length in The Spiritual Medicine.

This is

to

The Spiritual Medicine.

ethical gation

say that The Book of the Philosophic Life is less important than Precisely because the latter work is presented as an

treatise and consequently as

of
us

having

little to do

with

politics, this investi

the

philosophic refocus

life
its

provides

the necessary introduction to it and

teaches

how to

apparent emphasis on ethics.

From this

smaller

treatise we

learn

lesson
go

not addressed

in the larger one,

namely, that the

philosophic

life

must

stemious withdrawal

however

much such conduct

beyond solitary austerity or ab furthers deep reflection

set

to concern with fellow human beings.

Everything
as

forth in the digression

leading
clusion:

up to the summary definition

the

of

the philosophic life points to this con

blame

Socrates'

of pain

early life
or

due to

youthful

excess; the em

phasis on not

causing

to oneself

to others, even to
above

irrational animals,

except under special

circumstances; and,

all, the

constant reminder

that,

however elusive, we even directed toward

cannot escape the notion of the universe

our own well-being.

being

orderly,

Al-Razi's two

portraits of

Socrates,

taken together with his not so irrelevant

digression,

reveal

the deeper strata of

willing involvement in household matters as well as in the pleasures and the toils of citizenship. Even the unusual insistence on Socrates remaining faithful to his early vegetarian habits begins to make sense given this larger perspec
tive.

This,
of

perhaps, is

what

lies behind the

enigmatic claim cited at

the begin
we

ning

this analysis, namely, that in al-Razi's Book of the Philosophic Life

clearest and most thoughtful
Socrates'

find "the
from
or

exposition

of

"conversion

a youthful contempt

for the

political or moral
them."

things, for the human things

human beings, to

a mature concern with

NOTES

I have benefitted greatly from,

this essay ("Vegetarians
Philosophy,'

and

thus am grateful

for, both Hillel Fradkin's formal

on

critique of

with

Bloody

Hands: Some Comments

presented at

'The Origins

of al-Razi's

Politi

cal panel of

by

Charles E.

Butterworth,'

the

Society

for Greek Political Thought

and the

the 1991 American Political Science Meetings in

Washington, D.C.)

insightful

comments of

Hilail Gildin.
Strauss'

passage must

1. Leo Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 314. This be read not only in context but also with an eye to starting point, namely, the

256

Interpretation
thread between
pp.
Aristophanes'

suggestion of a common

attack on esp.

Socrates

and the

later, equally
I,"

harsh,

attack

by

Nietzsche (see
p.

3-8,

6-8). basic appeal,

of

2. For

a characterization of the work's passion and

see

Paul Kraus, "Raziana is

not

Orientalia 4 (1935), might make it seem,

personal character

303: "The 'Book

of

the Conduct

Philosopher'

the
principal

only,

as

its title
in the

a simple exposition of
sets

Razi's

ethical

ideal. Its

interest

resides

forth: In it, Razi presents an apology for his life. Having reached a somewhat advanced age, he sees himself attacked by adversaries who deny him the title of 'philos and denigrate the high moral ideal he has set for himself. Perfectly aware of his worth, Razi
opher'

it

replies

to his adversaries. He declares that he has been faithful to his philosophic ideal and

has
a

rendered

human beings

great

service

by

his

scientific activity.
with

Let

us not

forget that this is

physician who speaks to

us,

a physician

impregnated

the best Greek

any

ascetic

masters

tendency, whose great care is to attain the perfect equilibrium from antiquity. Rarely in Arabic literature do we have the opportunity to hear
and
cause."

traditions, distant from that had characterized his

so

strong

voice,
such a

one

expressing itself with such an accent of personality and warmth (The translation is mine, as is the emphasis.) legitimate

in the

service of

saflyyah

3. Here, and in what follows, page and line references are to al-Razi, Kitdb al-Sirah al-Falin Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Zakariyya al-Rdzi, Rasail Falsafiyyah, ed. Paul Kraus (re

print; Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadldah, 1973), pp. 98-111 (with an introduction 98). Paragraph references are to my English translation, which is based on

by Kraus
Kraus'

on pp. 97-

edition.

The

division

of

the text is my own. For another, quite

free, English
in the

Arberry, Aspects of Islamic Civilization, As Depicted of Michigan Press, 1971), pp. 120-30.
4. Kraus inserts

text, see A. J. Original Texts (Ann Arbor: University

translation of the

'anhu, apparently on the basis of sense. 5. Note the way this suggestion is developed by al-Farabi in his Philosophy of Plato, para. 36; in Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle trans, with an intro., Muhsin Mahdi (Glencoe: The
,

Free

Press, 1962). Though both

sometime

in Baghdad

(257/870-339/950) and al-Razi (251/865-313/925) were between 282/895 and 293/905, they seem to have had no contact; we know
al-Farabi al-Razi's metaphysical

only that al-Farabi is said to have written a treatise against 6. See Plato Theages 128b; also Apology 23a-b.

teaching.

7. For 8. See
mal souls

contemporary
pp.

illustration,
and

see

Books, 1984),
may

148-49
from

149-50. See
and

Amos Oz, In the Land of Israel (New York: Vintage also Plato, Theaetetus 165e-172c.
I,"

para.

19, 105:5-6

pass

body

to

p. 328, n. 1. Still, by denying that ani Kraus, "Raziana body until they finally reach the stage of humanity, al-Razi es souls

capes the problem of animals.

explaining why human

who engage on or not and

do

not regress

to enter the bodies of irrational

9. Razi

Noting
adds

here that those live

the souls of such animals

in philosophy (al-mutafalsifuri) disagree about whether that some therefore did not approve of eating meat, al-

that Socrates did to

not approve of

it;

see para.

20, 105:13-14
sometimes used

and para.

4, 99:18. This

aside obliges us

wonder whether

Socrates held

the same opinion as

they did
in
not seem

about the souls of

animals surviving.
mean

(Though the term

themselves
on

al-mutafalsifun

is

a pejorative sense to

those who

pride

engaging in philosophy, it does

to be used in that

sense

here.)

10. He explicitly mentions Hindus and Manicheans in this section, then monks (al-ruhbdn) and (al-nussdk). When speaking earlier of pains Christians inflict upon themselves through neglect, he cited monasticism (al-tarahhub) and withdrawal into hermitages (al-takhalll
recluses

fi

al-sawami')

as examples of such practices.

The juxtaposition

of

the two passages suggests that

of

al-

RazI
(see

wishes para.

to

exempt

Islam from any

of

these criticisms, for nothing he said

Muslims

earlier

21, 105:20-106:2) corresponds to anything mentioned here. 11. Schematically, the steps of the syllogism are as follows: (a) Since the Creator is a knower ignorant of nothing and so just as to commit no injustice; (b) and since His knowledge and justice are without qualification, as is His compassion; (c) and since He is a Creator and Master to us, whereas we are slaves and vassals to Him;

Origins
(d) (e)
and since

ofal-Razi's

Political

Philosophy

257
of

the slaves most loved

by

their owners adhere most

clearly to their way

life

and are most observant of slaves closest most

their

traditions;
kindly."

to God, may He be magnified and glorified, are those just, most compassionate, and most 12. See Plato Theaetetus 176a-c. Socrates, however, associates the deity with justice and practical wisdom or prudence as well as with piety or holiness, thereby suggesting that even the
who are most

therefore "the

learned,

deity

prizes

the kind of

knowledge
as

needed

for

political

life. See
wise virtue

also

Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics

10.8.1179a22-32. Though he
passage,

speaks

only

of the

intellectual

virtue of

intelligence (nous) in this

a person

identifying
Aristotle's

it

the

context of

attempt

quality distinctive of the to determine which human

man, the discussion occurs in the

is best for

to pursue so as

to achieve happiness. His analysis leads to the conclusion that

person

intelligence

and wisdom allow the

is

most

possessing them to understand how best to lead an excellent human loved by the gods, and that this constitutes happiness.
equivalent term
al-Millah

life,

that such a person

13. The

in Arabic

would

be

mudabbir al-'dlam or al-mudabbir

li-al-'alam;

see

(Book of Religion), in al-Farabi, Kitdb al-Millah wa Nusiis Ukhrd, ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1968), para. 27; an English translation of this treatise by
al-Farabi, Kitdb

Charles Butterworth is
eval

forthcoming

in the

new edition of

Ralph Lerner

and

Muhsin Mahdi, Medi

Political Philosophy, A Sourcebook.

14. That

is,

paras.

108:12 or, respectively, 15. These books

(FT

9-10, 101:5-102:5; paras. 11-22, 102:6-106:6; subsections 3, 4-5, and 6-7 of Part B above.
al-Tibb

and paras.

23-29,

106:7-

are:

On Demonstration (FT al-Burhdn), On Divine Science (FI

al-Ruhdnl),
and

al-'Ilm

al-

llahi), On Spiritual Medicine (FT

al-Madkhal

On

an

Introduction to Physical Science

ild

al-'Ilm

al-TabiT).

The last, he says, is

also

known

as

Lecture

on

Nature

(Sam'al-Kiyydn). 16. These

al-Maddah

are:

wa al-Dahr wa

On Time, Place, Matter, Eternity, and Vacuum (FT al-Zamdn wa al-Makdn al-Khila), On the Form of the World (FT Shakl al-'Alam), On

wa

the

Reason for

the

Earth

Arising

Wust al-Falak), On the Reason the

al-Falak

in the Middle of the [Heavenly] Sphere (FT Sabab Qiyyam al-Ardfi [Heavenly] Sphere Has Circular Movement (FT Sabab Taharruk
and

'aid Istidarah), On Composition (FT al-Tarklb),

On

Body Having

Its Own Motion

and

This Motion

Being

Known (FT

anna

li-al-Jism Harakah

min

Dhdtih

wa anna

al-Harakah Ma-

'lumah).
17. The books he
mentions

here

are as

to Those Whom the Physician Does not Visit (Kitdb ild man

follows: The Mansurl Book (al-Kitab al-Mansurl), Book la yahdaruh Tablb), and Book about
.

Existing
other

Drugs (Kitdb fi
another

al-Adawiyyah

al-Mawjudah)

The two books he

mentions

than their proper titles are: Royal Medicine (al-Tibb al-Mulukl), The

by something Summary (al-Jdmi').

There is

book

on medicine attributed
Sind'

work, Kitdb

al-Madkhal

ild

at

al-Tibb, wa

Spanish,
Benito

with

an

introduction

and

which he says nothing here. This huwa IsaghujT, has been edited and translated into technical glossary, by Maria de la Conception Vazquez de

to al-Razi about

under

the title Libro de la introduction

al

Arte de la Medicina

"Isagoge"

(Salamanca:

Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1979). 18. Of the works enumerated here, only two FT al-'Ilm al-llahl (On Divine Science) and FT are among the four listed as the sources for the six al-Tibb al-RuhdnT (On Spiritual Medicine) principles enumerated in subsection 3 of Part B above (see p. 243 above with para. 9, 101:9-11).

They
in

are

the

first two
here

of that

Alchemy"

(Kitdbund
says

al-mawsum

listing. The fourth, "our book characterized as The Glory of the Art of bi-Sharaf Sind'at al-KTmiyyd), seems to find an indirect reference
written about

what

he

of

books that he has

"the

wisdom."

art of

But

of

the

third,

Kitdbund fi Adhl Man Ishtaghal bi-Fudul

al-Handasah min al-MawsumTn

bi-al-Falsafah ("our book

On Blaming Those Characterized as Philosophers Who Occupy Themselves with What Is Super fluous in Geometry"), nothing whatever is said. Apart from the Book of the Spiritual Medicine, none of these books has come down to us. However, Paul Kraus has presented fragments of On Divine Science 165-70
and
culled

from the

critique other authors made of al-Razi's

teaching;

see

Rasd'il,

pp.

191-94

with

170-90

and

195-216.

Shakespeare's Demonic Prince

Grant B. Mindle University
of North Texas

Richard.

Why Buckingham, I say I would be king. Buckingham. Why, so you are, my thrice-renowned lord. Richard. Ha! Am I king? (IV. ii. 12-14)'
Shakespeare's Richard III is the story of a man icle of a tyrant who tries to "clothe [his] naked derous Machiavel to
without a
school"

who would

villainy"

"touch

pity,"

of

erous"

villain, Richard

by Henry VI, III. ii. 193). A murderer a consummate a "subtle, false and treach is perfectly, splendidly, and delightfully wicked (cf.
(I. iii. 335; 3
"liar,"

be king, a chron setting "the mur

Disc, 1.27). His best conspiracies are conceived Machiavelli, exploiting the vanity of his victims.
Machiavelli."2

and executed

in the

spirit of

Richard III is "the only one of Shakespeare's kings explicitly associated with There are other Shakespearean kings whose ascent and reign are

marred

by injustice,

but

their wickedness

is imperfect

and

half-hearted

and

their

demeanor too
never

solemn

to classify them as Machiavellian. Bolingbroke

cousin

would

have deposed his

death. Macbeth, despite his "vaulting hand against Duncan but for the
wife

but for Richard II's complicity in their uncle's would never have raised his
ambition" witches'

prophecy

and

the intercession of his

(Macbeth, I. vii. 27). Their

they
usurped.

royal ambitions were

kindled

by

their pride in

their own virtue, and their consciousness of their superiority to the monarchs
whose thrones stain

Bolingbroke hoped to "purge the throne

committed

of

the

left

on

it

by

Richard's

having

the

Cain,"

sin of sin

but

when

to

his
re

consternation

he is forced to

commit

the same
shattered.3

"he is

stricken

with

superiority Thinking in manliness, Macbeth embarks upon the murder of Duncan prepared to "jump the life to but the weight of his actions is more than even he can bear,
sense of moral
come,"

morse,"

his

himself

preeminent

his

"guilty

conscience

betray[ing] him
and

turn"

Unlike Richard, Bolingbroke

every Macbeth have

and

at

" (Macbeth, I. vii. 7).

some regard

for morality,

host (Richard II, V.iii; vi. 24-52; for their obligations as kinsman, subject, Macbeth, I.vii.1-28; but cf. Richard III, m.i. 108-9; IV.ii.59-64). To Richard,

This interpretation

of

Richard III

was

inspired

by

a conversation

I had

with

Harry

V. Jaffa

many

years ago. and

My

debt to him is immeasurable. I

also wish to thank

Morton J. Frisch, Steven

Forde,

Leo Paul S. DeAlvarez for their

advice and criticism.

interpretation,

Spring 1993,

Vol. 20, No. 3

260

Interpretation
a word that cowards use,/ arms

"Conscience is but
in
awe;/

Devised

at

first to
law!"

keep

the

strong

Our strong
more

be

our

conscience,

swords our

(V.iii.310-12).5

He is

neither

surprised nor

unduly
and

perturbed

by

the harm he does. No one

murders

deliberately
murder of

(V. iii. 198). The

and

Lady

serenely than Richard III seemingly Anne is anticipated prior to their marriage,
more

then announced to the audience in a soliloquy with a

lightheartedness
6

which

is surprisingly

and

frightfully

amusing (I.ii. 227-29).

Richard's

nu

merous professions of remorse are comical performances

by

a skilled actor who

knows how to "quake

(III.v.l;

see

also

whenever the occasion requires [his] I.iii. 305-18, 323-37; ffl.vii.210; IV.ii.64; 3 Henry VI, and change of a

color"

Ill.ii. 182-92). The downfall

tion brought
mourn on

tragic hero is

inevitably

an act of self-destruc

the

he 4).

would

His

pride or hubris; his suffering elicits our pity, because we his virtues, and our terror, because were it not for his virtues, not have suffered so. But we feel no pity for Richard III ( V. iii. 202final words "A horse! A horse! My kingdom for a

by

loss

of

horse!"

(V.iv.

13)

are more

victims,
Hath

and

he knows it (3

befitting a comedy than a tragedy. Henry VI, III. ii. 165-67).

He is inferior to his

she forgot already that brave prince, Edward her lord, whom I, some three months since, Stabbed in my angry mood at Tewkesbury?

sweeter and a

lovelier

gentleman of nature no

Framed in the prodigality

Young,
The

valiant, wise, and,

doubt,

right royal

spacious world cannot again afford.

(I.ii. 239-45)

Not

pride or even

hubris, but

what we shall call

for

want of a of

better

word "self-

contempt"

is the

key

to Richard's

being. "Cheated

feature

by dissembling

Nature,"

imagine himself worthy of anyone's love (Li. 19). His ugli though he endeavors to conceal it from others, he readily and eloquently ness, concedes to himself in his No one, not even his most ardent ene
cannot
soliloquies.7

he

mies, ridicules Richard half so well as Richard

ridicules himself.
plays

Richard III begins

with a

soliloquy, the only one of Shakespeare's

actions,"

to

begin in this
speare ard's

way.

As

[is]

not

just

Tracy Strong astutely observed, what "interests Shake but "what is going on Rich [Richard's]
inside"

head (p. 204). Not "made to

nymph,"

court an amorous

looking

glass,"

or

"strut

before

a wanton

ambling
pleasures of

Richard is "determined to
days"

prove a villain/

(Li. 15, 17, 30-31; see also 3 Henry VI, Ill.ii. 153-71; V.vi. 68-91. Cf. the reference to "ambitious in Disc. I. preface). Unlike Bolingbroke and Macbeth, his rebellion is kindled by his
these
leisure"

And hate the idle

sense of
right.8

inferiority. Richard has

plot of

no

The

Richard III is
is
. .

not a
.

right to rule, but also no regard for natural revolution "The first and most funda

mental cause of revolution

tice"

the

different

conceptions men

have

of

jus

but

conspiracy,

boldly

conceived and executed

motive

is surprisingly

private and

trivial: its author's

by one alone whose lover.9 inadequacy as a

Shakespeare'

Demonic Prince

261

Everything
meditated.

libels,

and

Richard does, every lie, every betrayal, every murder, is pre "Plots have I laid, inductions dangerous/ By drunken prophecies, dreams/ To set my brother Clarence and the King/ In deadly hate the
other"

one against the

accompanied

(I.i.32-34). Seven lines

is

by

an armed guard appointed

later, Clarence appears on stage by the king to convey him to the

Richard
on

Tower. Throughout the play, this

tells us what needs to

pattern

repeated again and again.

be done, does it, humor

and then pauses to pat conceits so

himself

the

back. His

successes are so

astonishing, his "I

clever, his

victims so

foolish,
to

and

his

sense of

and self-contempt so wonderful that we are apt

am possessed with admiration of

hate him less than

we should. and

the genu

ine Richard, his genius,

cruelties can
depress."10

his mounting spirit,

of

which no consideration of

his

The England
peace

portrayed

in the opening lines

steeds,"

(Li. 1-2). After

arms"

years of civil

war, the time

and

Richard's first soliloquy is at has come to put away our

our

"bruised
romance.

and

"barbed
order of

dedicate

lives to

dancing

and

Love is the
of

the

day. And yet, the

passions which seem

to stir

the

hearts

Edward IV s

subjects most

fervently
"to

are ambition and revenge

(II. iii. 27-28). Buckingham

ables

covets title to the earldom of

eager

Hereford

and

its

mov

(IV. ii. 87-90); Lord Hastings is

give them thanks/ great

That

were

the

cause of

[his]

imprisonment"

(Li. 127-28). So
most

and

injustice in Edward's England that the

hearing: "This
that

is the suspicion, ill-will frivolous of accusations com

up/
be"

mands a sympathetic

day
of

About

prophecy (Li. 38-40; Il.i. 133-34) (Stubbs, quoted in Furness, p. 1). Surrounded by fools less proficient in the use of arms than
no

which says

shall Clarence closely be mewed Edward's heirs the murderer shall

he, Richard has

Like his

difficulty

sowing dissension

within

the ranks of the nobility.

teacher, the notorious Machiavel, he wages war by force and especially fraud. Richard is truly an "artist in and yet, the righteous have no cause to criticize Richard's handiwork (Rossiter, quoted in the Signet edition, p. 248).
evil,"

the young princes, Edward V and Richard, 198his York, tyranny are justly punished (but see I. iii. 208; Il.i. 133-34; ii. 33-35; IV. iv. 61-66). Lady Anne is the butt of her own curse: "If ever he has wife, let her be made/ More miserable by the life of him/

With the Duke

of

possible exception of

the victims of

Than I

am

made

IV.i. 58-62, Clarence, is guilty of perjury and mur der (I.iii.134-38, 312-14; iv.46-68, 204-18, 223-26; 3 Henry VI, V.v.3440). Rivers, Grey, Vaughan, and Hastings stood by while Edward Prince of

my young lord 65-86). George, Duke of

thee!"

by

and

(I.ii. 26-28, 113, 131-32;

Wales

was

"stabbed

by bloody
love"

daggers"

(Li. 127-28;

iii. 89-91,

209-13;

Il.i. 7-27; ffl.ii. 99-103; iv. 14-16; IV. iv. 68-70). Hastings, contrary to his to the Queen's brethren, was overjoyed by their oath "sweating] perfect arrest and sentencing: "This day those enemies are put to death,/ And I in better
state that e'er

was"

(II.i.9-28; IILi. 181-85; ii.49-103; iv.87-92). Buck

his
own punishment: respite of

ingham is the fearful

soul/

author of

"This,

this All

Souls'

day

to my
which

Is the determined

my

wrongs./

That high All-seer

262

Interpretation
with/ Hath turned my feigned prayer on my head/ And given in earnest I begged in jest./ Thus doth he force the swords of wicked men/ To turn
masters'

I dallied
what

their own points in their

bosoms"

(V.i. 13-29; Il.i. 29-40).

and of

Anne,

Clarence, Rivers, Grey, Vaughan, Hastings,

themselves for their fate (cf. I. iii. 3 18). Robbed
no tragedy.

Buckingham die cursing

their

dignity,
and then

their

death is
corpses"

"Richard's
of of

victims are and

first
in

made

into fools,
of

into

to the delight

his audience,

accord with everyone's sense of

Tragedy,"

justice,
God,"

including
Some
an

that

his

victims called

(Jaffa, "The Unity

Richard
an

p. a

287).
of

critics
with

have

angel,"

"avenging
no angel.

"scourge

"angel

horns."11

But Richard is

He has

no regard

for

justice,

and unlike everyone else

anger, he feigns

moral

in the play, no desire for vengeance. Incapable of indignation whenever it suits his purpose (I.iii.42-81;
conduct

Il.i. 79-82; IV. ii. 27-31). His

is dictated

by

cold, calculating reason,

by

king (I.ii. 229;II.i. 140; 11.148-50; III.i.94, 158-93; vi; IV. ii. 5-23, 49-61; iv.294-496; 3 Henry VI, 12 V.vi.84; vii. 31-34). Hastings and Buckingham are unjust, but it is not their injustice (their injustice was useful to Richard), but their scruples which cost by
them his favor. Hastings is executed because he will not countenance the de

the necessities imposed upon him

his desire to be

thronement
shoulders/

of

Edward IV 's
see

children:

"I'll have this

crown of mine cut

Before I'll

the

crown so when

foul

misplaced"

from my (Ill.ii. 38-55). Buck

murder of

ingham's fall from

Richard's 31). Richard only
nephews:

grace

begins

he balks

at

arranging the

"High-reaching
in

Buckingham

circumspect"

grows

(IV.ii.5-

never curses anyone

earnest

(I. iii. 58),

perhaps

because he is the
or so

one who

blames
no

nature

for his

misfortunes.

He is too ugly,
cf. no

he
all"

assumes, to be worthy

of anyone's no

love (e.g., IV. iii. 47-57;

p.

Richard "loves (E. B.

one, trusts

one, strange to say, hates

King Lear, Li). one, but uses

amazed

Warner,

quoted

in Furness,

15,

emphasis added).

He is

that

Lady

Anne

should

find

him,
of

though he himself cannot, "a

marv'lous proper applauds

man"

(I.ii. 254). The target

wit:

his

nephew's

barbs, he magnanimously

the young man's

Buckingham.

Think you, my

lord,

this prating York

Was
Richard.

not

incensed

by

his

subtle mother

To taunt

and scorn you

thus opprobriously?

No doubt,

no

Bold,
He is

quick,
all

doubt. O, 'tis a parlous boy, ingenious, forward, capable:

the mother's, from the

top

to toe.

(ffl.i. 151-56)

Richard is
(A. W.

a devil, albeit one more apt to arouse our admiration than our hatred Schlegel, quoted in Furness, p. 15; Richardson, quoted in Furness, p. 555; Bewley, quoted in Furness, p. 568). He is unbelievably ugly, but his physical deformity, the root of his worldly wisdom, candor, and good humor, is mitigated by his virtii (cf. Disc., 1.55). Originally by virtue of the defects of

Shakespeare'

Demonic Prince

263

his

body,

and

thereafter

by

virtue of the operation of

of

stand outside

the natural order

word

the

universe.

"I have

no

his mind, he seems to brother, I am like no divine,/ Be (3

resident

brother;/ And this

men

"love,"

which graybeards call

in

like

one

another/

And

not

in

me:

alone"

am

myself

Henry VI,

V.vi. 80-83). He loves Bolingbroke

political

no one.

His

family

and

Macbeth he has
no

no

nothing to him, and unlike desire to be a father and founder of a

means

dynasty. He has
could
confide."13

friends;

there is

"absolutely
everything,

no

soul

in

whom

Richard

He treats

everyone and

including himself,
and not

"without any

respect"

therefore shameless.

(cf. Disc., I. preface). He is incapable of reverence, Nothing is holy to him. There is no principle he will
violate,
no

betray,

no

trust

he

will not

human

being

he

will not sacrifice should would

the necessity to do so arise. The lines nature and piety

have

us

draw

between

public and

private, friend

and

foe, kinsman

and stranger are

blurred

by

Richard's Machiavellianism. Its

unit of

communities and associations to which

currency is the individual, while the he belongs are derivative and of second

ary importance. One cannot speak

Richard's nature, because he has none. His being is art, and art alone (Strong, pp. 205, 213-14). As an actor, he is, so to speak, always on stage, and strangely, never more so than in his soliloquies (H.N.
of

four asides, constituting nearly five per cent of the play, testify to his isolation as a human being. "Richard is the quintessential (Jaffa, "The Unity of Trag

Hudson,

quoted

in Furness,

p.

565). His twelve

soliloquies and

individualist"

edy,"

p.

287;

see also

Strong,

pp.

213-14). He is truly

uno

solo, but

an uno

solo who by virtue of his isolation dominates every scene whether or not he is physically present (the phrase is Machiavelli's, see Disc, 1.9). As it is, Rich lines.14 ard appears in 14 of the play's 25 scenes, delivering 32 per cent of its

His birth is unnatural,

and

his

misshapen

body

the

original provocation

for

his

war

against

nature

(I.i.20-27; Il.iv. 127-28; IV.iv.49; 3 Henry VI,

Ill.ii. 153-62) (Strong, pp. 194-95; cf. Disc, 1.1-3 on the insufficiency of nature). In Richard's case, nature dissembled by providing him with a body incommensurate with his spirit. Sent into the world "scarce half made (Soulless? Cf. Strauss, p. 31), Richard finds himself surrounded by men or more generally, appearances especially women for whom the body everything. "Men in general judge more by their eyes than by their hands. Everyone
taken in
one
sees and

up"

are
.
. .

how

you

appear, few touch

what you

are;

For the

vulgar are

by

the

appearance and outcome of a

but the
own

vulgar"

(Prince,

ch.

thing, and in the world there is no 18). Everyone in Richard's world is vulgar. In
are even uglier

their

way, the

victims

of

his deceits

than he.

They

are

shallow and

vain, their

souls

too

simple and plain

to sustain his admiration

for

(Li. 1 18; iii. 327-28). "He entertains at bottom a contempt for all mankind, for he is confident of his ability to deceive them whether as his adversaries or his (Schlegel, quoted in Furness, p. 584).

long

instruments"

We

cannot

help laughing

when

Clarence

chastises

his

murderers
kind"

for

speak

ing

ill

of

his brother: "O do

not slander

him, for he is

(I.iv. 226-46).

264
"With
by"

Interpretation
curses

(I.ii. 233-34; IV.i. 65-80),

and penitence. exclaims on

in her mouth, tears in her eyes/ The bleeding witness of my hatred Lady Anne succumbs to Richard's profession of

love

Hastings, despite mounting

the
eve of

evidence of

Richard's duplic

ity, absurdly
man

his

own execution or

that "there's never a

in Christendom/ Can lesser hide his love know his

heart"

hate than he,/ For

by

his face

straight shall you

(Ill.iv. 48-53). To
can

Richard,

the

world

is

stage and the actor

'Content'

is king.

"Why

smile,

and murder whiles

smile,/

And

my heart,/ And wet my cheeks with artifi cry (3 Henry VI, Ill.ii. 182-85; cial tears,/ And frame my face to all to mask his "deep in Richard III, I.iii. 47-53). Armed with "honey
to that
which grieves
words"

occasions"

tent,"

Richard knows how to

seem

saint

when

most

he

plays

the devil
which

(I. iii. 3 37; IV.i. 79). His

were able

ugliness and reputation

for villainy

handicaps

it

not

for Richard's (and Machiavelli's?)

example might seem

insuper

nothing to him because he knows it is not virtue, but virtii, the appearance of virtue, that matters (II. ii. 27-28; III.v.29; cf. Prince, ch. 15).
are

George, Edward Clarence, is arrested because his name begins with (Prince of Wales), Henry VI, Clarence, Edward V, and Richard (Duke of York) are murdered, and Anne and the younger Elizabeth are courted and mar
and are
action of

"Names"

"name-calling"

integral to the

the

play.

Duke

"G."

of

ried

because their

surname might give

them or their husbands the

no arms she can call

right to

lay

claim

to the throne. Queen

Margaret, having
bites,"

reduced

to cursing and name-calling. Her admonition

.

her own, is to "take heed of yonder

even

dog,

useful

he fawns, he to Richard. He is the first to

.

when

is ignored, because

her insults

are

acknowledge

the extent of Margaret's suf

fering,

and

the first to publicly repent the wrongs he has done

her, thereby

giving his enemy, Lord Rivers, cause to commend him for his moral virtue: "A virtuous and Christianlike conclusion/ To pray for them that have done scathe
to
us"

(I.iii. 216-337).

Later, Richard
so
15

stands

between two

churchmen with a
pious

prayer

book in his hand

that the Lord Mayor of London will call him

(III. vi. 98- 100;

A

vii. 46-47).

vicious man may appear virtuous provided that he is sufficiently artful (III.i.7-15). This is so, because to determine the morality of a deed, the au

thor's
not
of

motive or what

intention

must always one must

be

considered.

To be

moral, one must

only do

is right, but

do "it for the

right reason or

for the love

God"

(Mansfield,
of

"Introduction,"

pp. x-xi).

All morality then

presupposes a

"profession
of

good"

speech,

and

when most ard's

primacy especially his own speech, which allows him to seem a saint he plays the devil. Baffled by the impossibility of discerning Rich
wonders whether or not

(Prince,

ch.

15). It is Richard's

awareness of the

heart, Anne

to take

him

at

his

word:

"I

would

knew thy heart./ Tis figured in my disciples are known less by their prowess waging
war with

tongue"

(I.ii. 192-93). Machiavelli's best

the battlefield than

on

by

their skill in

their

tongues,

by

their ability to manipulate the criteria

by

which praise and

blame

are assigned

(see Prince,

chs.

15

and

18).

Shakespeare'

Demonic Prince
virtue

265
vice,
men

In the Prince

and

the

Discourses, Machiavelli
good, how to
excuse

redefines

and

treating tyranny
will

under the rubric of a new and more

not

favorable

name so

that

leam how to be

behavior

which were

it

not

for

Machiavelli's instruction
Richard the
cause of

would otherwise

be

condemned.

When Clarence tells

"Because my name is Richard sug gests that Clarence be "new (Li. 46, 50; cf. Prince, chs. 15-17; Disc, 1.25-27). Redemption through new christening may be accomplished in
arrest
christ'ned"

his

George"

one of two ways:

by

reinterpreting the
ch.

accused's motive

(Disc, 1.9, 18, 29);

or

by feigning
ought

subjection

to some necessity to conceal

one's strength and

the exer

cise of one's will

(Prince,

to

govern

his

subjects

16 15; Disc, 1. 10, 17 and 29). A new prince indirectly (Prince, ch. 3; I.iii. 329-34; iv.221;

IV. iv. 225-26). Machiavelli

prince who appears of others with
whose rule who

prefers

the

word

"executive."17

An

executive

is

in the

guise of a servant

ostensibly ministering to the needs

greatest prince

little

or no regard and

for himself. The

that
of

is the

one

is

most

indirect

invisible,

Machiavelli

himself,

a prince

graciously

offers

to serve others

by teaching

them how to acquire and

Prince, ch. 11). descent, by humbling himself before his beloved in order to disguise his own selfish ambition (Li. 76-80; ii. 127-30; iii.124; Il.i. 74; IILi. 132-35; vii.17, 153-63, 204; IV.iv.336; cf. Disc, I.pref(I.ii. 206; ace; 11.13). Officially, he is not a ruler, but a "poor devoted iii. 121-24; IV.iv.355; cf. Prince, Epistle Dedicatory, and ch. 6's reference to
maintain states of

their own (cf.

Richard begins his

ascent with a

servant"

Moses

as a

"mere

executive").

Since

a profession of

love is

tacit

admission of

weakness,

incompleteness,
so

and

inferiority,

the

lover is necessarily
with
surrender.18

and

logically hierarchy

subordinate

to his beloved. His love invests her

the opportunity and the

right to rule, to dictate

of

to speak the terms of his

reversed on a
when

This

authority,

however, is

the prince merely impersonates a

lover.

By

placing his beloved

honor,
free to

the relative status of both parties

withdraw

his

affection and

by elevating her to a position of is radically altered. Since the lover is proclaim his subjection to another as soon as
pedestal,

it is to his

advantage

to do so, his

stature conferred

by

her lover's

profession of of

beloved, especially if she is proud of the love, is more dependent upon him
are

than he is on

her.19

Professions

love

quarrel most unnatural to

be

revenged on

difficult to resist, because it is "a (I.ii. 134), and him that loveth
thee"

because he is is

we want

to be

admired.

Professions

of

love

appeal

to our vanity and

our self-esteem
consumed

(cf. Prince,

ch.

23). Richard is impervious to The

not reason

by
a

self

-contempt.

he "cannot

prove a

flattery, because (Li. 28)

lover"

not

his

physical

deformity (he is
fool.

unloved), but his conviction that anyone

who

loves him is
Their

Richard's
nity.

"love"

impoverishes his beloveds

by

dignity is

diminished

as soon as

they

succumb

robbing them of their dig to Richard's rhetoric,

but also in the eyes of his audience. The recip merely in Richard's eyes, are favor Machiavelli's ients of similarly impoverished. His exaltation of the
not

266
state

Interpretation
is
accomplished

by

means of argument which reduces

the

political com

His use of stato is never impersonal; patriotism is munity to a gang of It is either self devotion to someone's state, one's own or somebody ishness or foolishness, depending upon whether or not one happens to be a
pirates.20
else's.21

member of

the ruling

class

longer

an association

dedicated to

(cf. Florentine Histories, III. 13). The state is no virtue and the common good, but a vehicle
subtler,
more

for the
of

expression and satisfaction of a

selfishness. eager

insidious,

and potent

form

human

Machiavelli is
selfish ambitions. return

for his
under

assistance.22

satisfy their if do his disciples notice the price Rarely, ever, they pay in A Machiavellian prince governs his subjects indi love in
order

to show men less gifted than he how to

rectly,
and

the

cover of a profession of

to disguise his authority

welfare

facilitate
cf.

attribution of ch. of

his

"sins"

to his solicitude for their

(I.ii. 38first

39;

Prince,

divest himself right

what can

26; Disc, 111.41). To govern in this way, pride, lest he take for granted his right to
fraud"

a prince must

rule and claim

by

only be his "by force or by Natural right is absent from Machiavelli's

a

(Florentine Histories, III. 13). political science, because no one has

his nature; a prince, if he wishes to maintain himself, must not only be bad, he must know how to be bad; he must be devoid of reverence and psychologically prepared to woo his subjects
rule over others

right to

by

virtue of

(Disc, 1.27). It is
most memorable and

no accident

that Richard's greatest accomplishment,

of

his
(On

Machiavellian moment, is the wooing

see

Lady Anne.

the wooing

25.) Edward, Prince of Wales (Anne's husband), was killed at the battle of Tewkesbury in 1471. His father, Henry VI, died of unknown causes while imprisoned in the Tower of London that same year. In 1474, Richard married
of

Fortuna,

Prince,

ch.

Anne. Shakespeare
with

exaggerates

the

power of

Machiavellian
and

historical band
days
one
and

sequence of events

Richard's villainy so that he might dazzle us In 3 Henry VI and Richard III, the is compressed so that the murder of Anne's hus
virtii.23

her father-in-law
see

Richard's

proposal of marriage occur within

of one another.

stroke,"

(On the necessity of committing all of one's cruelties "at Prince, ch. 8.) In 3 Henry VI, Edward IV, followed by Rich
stab

ard,

and

then

Clarence

Anne's Edward, their insolent

and unarmed pris

oner after

the battle is

over

(V.v. 38-40).

Richard, acting

on

his

own

initiative,
V.v. 46-

then hurries off to the Tower to murder

King Henry

VI (3

Henry VI,
marriage

50;

vi. 56-67).

"[U]nder is

what seem
of

circumstances,"

ing

the burial procession

scene
so

Henry VI,

wantonly unfavorable Richard proposes

dur

to

Lady

wildly implausible that it is usually considered "an un playable strain on credulity"24; perhaps, but it is also a tour de force so daunt less that the audience is stunned and stupefied (I.ii. 44-45; cf. Prince, ch. 7).
Was
ever woman

Anne. The

in this humor

wooed?
won?

Was every

woman

in this humor

Shakespeare'

Demonic Prince

267

I'll have

her, but I will not keep her long. What! I that killed her husband and his father To take her in her heart's extremest hate
With
curses

in her mouth, tears in her

witness of

eyes

The

bleeding
no

my hatred

by
bars
against me,

Having God, her

And I And But the
yet

conscience, friends to back my

and these

suit at all

plain

devil

and all

dissembling looks,
the world to nothing!

to win

her,

(I.ii.227-37)
When Richard
revenge.

accosts

Anne,

she

is

overcome

by

grief and

thirsting for
a

"Cursed be the heart that had the heart to do it!/ Cursed be the blood
hence!"

that let this blood from

magician,"

(I.ii. 14-15). Richard is

hell,"

evil

incarnate,
who

"black
a

a who

"dreadful "touch
think

minister of
pity,"

"lump

of

foul

deformity,"

beast

knows

no

of

a and a

"diffused infection

man"

of a also

is "fouler

than heart

thee,"

can

"devilish

slave"

(see

I.iii. 229). There is

conduct:

nothing Richard can say, and but one thing he can do to excuse his "Thou canst make no excuse current but to hang thyself (I.ii. 84). Richard
needs

to marry Edward's

widow

in

order

to

strengthen

his it

claim

to

the throne (Li. 58-59). But why would someone as clever as Richard choose this particular moment to ask for Anne's hand in marriage? Would
not

have

been

more prudent

to

wait a while

to allow Anne's grief time to subside? The

historical Richard inauspicious

To
as

waited

three years.

Only

fool

would choose a moment as

"madness"

this to proclaim
seems.

Machiavellian than it
genius.
win

his love, and yet, Richard's The timing of Richard's proposal is

must

is

more

a stroke of

Anne's

heart, Richard

find

Richard is

a clever

villain, but his

reputation

a way to dispel her suspicions. for cleverness is a handicap, a

he cleverly exploits. By imprudently asking for Anne's hand when her hatred of him is at its zenith, Richard looks like a man so blinded by love that he is incapable of thinking clearly. He masquerades as the perfect Chris

handicap

tian, overlooking Anne's insults, and rendering "good for bad, blessings for an "angel (I.ii. 69; iii. 334). To Richard, Anne is a "sweet whose beauty haunted him even in his sleep. fairer than tongue can name
saint," curses"

thee"

If thy revengeful heart cannot forgive, Lo, here I lend thee this sharp-pointed sword; Which if thou please to hide in this true breast

And let the

I

soul

forth that
the death

adoreth

thee,

lay

it

naked

to the

deadly

stroke
upon

And

humbly beg

my knee.

(I.ii. 173-78)

But Richard
acquit

must

do

more

than

convince

crimes."

himself

of

his "supposed

his sincerity; he must also But how? Richard blames Anne for Anne
of

268
his

Interpretation
(cf. Prince,
ch.

conduct

18; Disc, 1.29; Florentine Histories, III. 13). He

disclaims responsibility for Edward's death, but Anne knows better: "In thy foul throat thou li'st! Queen Margaret saw/ Thy murd'rous falchion smoking in his
blood"

(I.ii. 93-94). He
not

compounds
king?"

his dilemma
(I.ii. 101), "Is
not

by

answering Anne's

question, "Didst thou Richard asks Anne a

that
of

kill this

affirmatively.

Undaunted,

question of

his own,
and

a question which

leads to another,
as

motive,

which

he

alone can answer:

the causer of the timeless

deaths/ Of these Plantagenets,

tioner?"

Henry

Edward,/ As blameful

the execu

(I.ii. 117-19).
makes
and

The distinction Richard

surprise:

between

cause and effect catches

effect"

Anne

by

"Thou

wast

the cause
assertion

the most cursed

(I.ii. 120). The

was

plau

sibility
that

of

Richard's

to the contrary

"Your

beauty
his
deeds,"

the cause of

effect"

(I.ii. 121)

is

enhanced

by
his

the

timing

of

marriage proposal.

Having

reconsider

already her verdict in the light

condemned

Richard for his "heinous

of

Anne
she

must now

motive.

To her dismay,

discovers

that she cannot condemn Richard

ard

is

murderer, then
would

beauty, Richard
"to live
more one

without condemning herself as well. If Rich is his unwitting accomplice. Haunted by Anne's have undertaken "the death of the whole in order

she

world"

hour in [her] sweet liable for her "heavenly

cheeks"

bosom"

(I.ii. 123-24). Anne

of course

is

no

face"

than Richard for his physical

. . .

deformity, but

otherwise: "If I thought that, These nails should rend that from (I.ii. cf. IV. iv. 216-18). 125-26; beauty my Richard's descent, his profession of love, reverses everything. Her wretch

she

believes

edness pales

in

comparison with

his. Anne is his

day

and

his life (I.ii. 130), his

of

ruler, and his accessory, however

inadvertently,

to the deaths

"these Plan

tagenets,

Henry

Edward."

and
sweet
were

Richard.

Anne. Richard.

Thine eyes, Would they I

would

lady, have infected

mine.

basilisks to

strike thee

dead!

they were, that I might die at once; For now they kill me with a living death. (I.ii. 149-52)
profession of

Prior to Richard's

love, Anne could do nothing but shake her fist for divine vengeance, but now, Richard offers her pray the opportunity to punish him herself.
in impotent
rage and

Richard. Anne.

Then bid
I have

me

kill myself,
rage.

and

will

do it.

already.

Richard.

That

was

in thy

Speak it again, and even with the word This hand, which for thy love did kill thy love, Shall for thy love kill a far truer love.
To both their deaths
shalt

thou be accessory. (I.ii.

186-91)
execute

Richard's descent is Anne's

ard or

undoing.

She

cannot
an

bring

herself to

Rich

bid him to

commit suicide.

Already

accessory

to two murders, she

is

Shakespeare'

Demonic Prince

269

reluctant to

to punish

death
but to

or

accessory to yet a third (I.ii. 185). But having declined longer has the right to ask God to revenge Henry's Richard, to stand fast by her belief that Richard "canst make no excuse current
an she no
self."

become

hang [him]
and

Eager to "make the Anne

can

amends"

wench no

by becoming

"her
of

husband her but

her

father,"

hardly

say

to the man

who purged

her

grief and

"help[ed

her]

to a

better

husband"

moment now

ago, Richard

was a

"villain"

who

(Li. 155-56; "know'st nor law gladly

a

I.ii.138-44).25

of

God

man,"

or asks of

Anne "this

consents to accept

his ring,

and

grants

the boon he

her,

to allow "him who

noble

hath

most cause to

be

mourner"

to oversee the inter

ment of

king"

(I.ii. 70) (Cf. The

account of

this scene in

Strong,
only

pp.

206-8.). Her

joy

at

his

at

the success

seeing Richard "become so of his performance: "And will Edward's

penitent"

is

exceeded

by

she yet abase

her

eyes on me

...

On me,

moi'ty"

whose all not equals

(I.ii. 210-20, 246-50).

Richard

appears

both here

and elsewhere as an

executive, seemingly acting

in his

concert with others and at

their behest in order to diffuse responsibility for

actions and disguise his ambition to be king (Li. 63-65, 106; iii. 89-90, 173-80, 323-30; iv.171; H.ii.21, 151-54). When Richard finally accepts the crown, he claims to do so "against [his] conscience and [his] reluctantly 230sacrificing his will to that of his countrymen (III. vii. 140-72, 203-25, 35). Richard may "want love's (Li. 16), but his ugliness does not
soul," majesty"

prevent

him from

impersonating
man

lover

and

feigning

subjection

to the will of

his beloved.
A
magnanimous

is too
and

proud of

himself before his inferiors, ery

and

too contemptuous
which

his superiority in virtue to demean of honor to stoop to chican is his

flattery
is

to secure that

honor

by

right

and which cannot

be

justly

p. 288). Yet the honor due to the (Jaffa, "The Unity of To Richard, the untimely demise of Edward, Henry VI, and Clarence, whose virtues are superior to his, is proof that the earth is no proper home for the practice of moral virtue (Li. 118-20; ii. 104-8, 239-45; refused

Tragedy,"

virtuous

often withheld.

HI.i.79, 94). Richard's

in the fifteenth
of good

conclusion

is

reminiscent of

Machiavelli's declaration
to
make a profession
good."

chapter of

The Prince that he "who

wants

in

all

things

must come

to ruin among so many who are not

Lest

we condemn

Richard too

harshly

for the

murder of

his nephews, it
attempts

should

be

noted that were

it

not

for "Richard Ill's desperate

to himself
a
...

to gather the

varied strands of

legitimacy

the cycle of
would

rebellion and misrule

continued.26

that

plagued

England for

hundred

years"

have

Richard

needs all

to "murder

[Elizabeth's] brothers
damage"

and

then marry
also

her"

not

bring may (IV. ii. 57-61; iv. 471-72). Richmond obviously agrees. He marries Elizabeth to of the houses of York and Lancaster to put an end to unite "the true
hopes
whose growth

him, but

to

peace

only "to stop to England

succeeders"

wounds."

England's "civil
cal necessity, and not

Richmond's
although

conduct

love,

Richmond is

is equally determined by politi somewhat more honest about

it

than Richard (IV. iii. 40-42;

iv.256, 343, 416; V.v.29-40).

270

Interpretation
another
and

There is Clarence

more spare

disturbing

parallel.

Shortly
and

before his

death,

asks

God to

his "guiltless

wife"

his "poor

children"

(I.iv.72). Richard
reign:

spares

"Inquire

me out

them, but only because they pose no threat to his some mean poor gentleman,/ Whom I will marry straight

to Clarence's daughter./ The

boy
we

is foolish

and

I fear him

not"

(I V.ii. 52-54; bewail

iii. 36-37;
their fate
seems

iv. 145-46). When Clarence's

"What stay had
victims

children

appear on

stage to

but Clarence? And he's

gone"

(II.ii.75)

it

to be a dramatic device for the innocent

of

intensifying
dark

our

hatred

of

Richard
of

by

show

ing

us

his tyranny. But the

casts a

presence

Clarence's
subse

children on stage

simultaneously

shadow over

Richmond's

quent assertion of moral

would

superiority (V. iii. 24 1-72). An Elizabethan audience have known that Clarence's "last prayer had not been answered, for the
of

destruction

his

wife and children

by Henry

VII

and

Henry VIII,

who

feared

Clarence's wife and throne, was an oft-told and "foes to [their] rest and [their] sweet-sleep's 72). therefore beheaded lest their kingdom stand "on brittle (IV.ii.60,
their possible claims to the
children were
disturbers,"
glass"

tale."27

Margaret (see 3
ence,

Henry VI, I.iv. 79-180; I.iii. 173-86), Edward IV, Clar Richard, Rivers, Vaughan, Grey, Hastings, and Buckingham were no
of

innocents. None
might

them
said not

is free

of sin

(II. iii. 27-28). The same,

albeit more

of

course,

be

said

(and is

by Shakespeare,

subtly)

of

Henry

VII

and

Henry
worse

VIII. Were it
than theirs

(Strong,

for his soliloquies, Richard's conduct might seem no p. 201). With the possible exception of Margaret and
everyone

Henry VII,
from
a

of whom

nothing is explicitly said,

in Richard III

suffers

82guilty conscience, even the allegedly conscienceless Richard (IV.i. 84; V.iii.73-74, 119-223). Is Richmond's victory a refutation of Machiavellianism? Or does Richard

fail because in the end, his Machiavellianism is inferior to Richmond's? In his oration to his soldiers, Richmond's affirmation of the justice of their "good
cause"

is

capped

by
of

an appeal

to his

soldiers'

greed.

Richard's soldiers, despite

their numerical superiority, need

about the
enemies

justice

cheering up, but Richard is inexcusably silent their cause, dwelling instead upon the inferiority of their
whom you are

"Remember
and runaways/

to cope withal,/ A sort of vagabonds,

and

rascals,

scum of

Britains

base

peasants

lackey
fellow"

and

his

soldiers'

would

fear for the safety of their and "beauteous have his soldiers believe that Richmond is a "paltry

"lands"

wives."

Richard

consists of

"overweening

France,"

rags of on

their lives,/
themselves."

Who, but for dreaming

over

whose army "famished beggers, weary of this fond exploit,/ had hanged and
. . .

Had Richard prevailed, his victory

these "poor
rats"

would

have brought him

and yet

no

glory,
needs

victory

merits

no

commendation,

he

"to carry on some great enterprises and to give rare examples of himself (the phrase is Machiavelli's, see Prince, ch. 21) to mask his own injustice. His
use
of

fear to

strengthen

his

soldiers'

resolve

is

foolish, for
fight

as

Richmond Had
rather

shrewdly observes, "Richard except, those

whom we

against/

Shakespeare'

Demonic Prince

271

have

us

win

than him

follow"

they
his
whenever

(V. iii. 11, 238-72, 315-42). Richard is

successful when

he

conceals

selfishness

beneath

a plausible profession of

love, but he fails miserably

fear
unadorned

by

love

or

Machiavelli's teaching
not professions of
with

to rely upon naked fear, deceit (IV.iv.494-96; V. iii. 343-45). 28 is easily and frequently misunderstood; his object is
compelled
rather

he is

the resurrection of spiritedness, but

the manipulation

of

love,

and

love. A Machiavellian
virtues, but through
a

prince governs not of

by impressing

others

his

moral

blend

leave his demand

subjects satisfied and stupefied, or

nor

audacity intended to rather, grateful and fearful. Neither

humility

and

Machiavelli

his

pupils can afford

to be spirited or angry, lest

they

come

to

by

right

what can

only be theirs tragedies,

by

force

or

fraud. It is

no accident

that

Machiavelli is the
and

author of and no

three comedies (The Woman from

and

Andros, Clizia,
the union of a

Mandragola),
is to

that in each of his three plays the

object

overcome

the obstacles

which stand

in the way

of

man and a woman.

Richard has

no

difficulty deceiving
is ineffectual
not at

the nobility and the Lord Mayor of Lon

don, but his

Richard
tardy"

rhetoric

wooing the many is

asks of

the multitude, because his strategy for Machiavellian (II. iii; III. v. 75-94; vii. 1-42). Buckingham when he speaks to the multitude to "infer the bas
with

all

both Edward IV in

and

bestial
that
own
a

lust"

appetite

change of

his children, and "urge his hateful luxury/ And (III. v. 80-81). Does Richard honestly believe
"vices,"

few

allusions

to Edward IV's
will persuade

his

nephews'

bastardy,

and

his his
his

"superior"

lineage

the multitude to demand his

absurd

coronation

instead
claim

of

his

nephews on

(II.iii.8-15)? It is

for Richard to

advance

to the throne

the basis of his "form and nobleness of

peace,"

mind,"

his "bounty, virtue, [and] fair "discipline in war, wisdom in (ffl.v. 14-17). Richard has never done anything, at least so far as we know, to curry favor with the multitude (cf. the account of Caesar's liberality in Prince,
ch.

humility"

16). Richard's
approach

to foreign policy is also contrary to Machiavelli's teach

and

ing. Unlike
Caesarean

Henry

the young Edward

pp.

V, Richard has
V
went

no

imperial

or

ambitions

(Frisch,

2-4).

Henry

to

war with

France to
29

disguise
The

the

content to

be

illegitimacy of his title king of England, and of

days"

to the throne, but Richard is strangely

villain who rejects

213- 14). nothing else (2 Henry TV, IV. v. Edward IV's peace because he "hate[s] the idle plea author of a

sures of these

is the

conspiracy

whose goal

is

ironically

the

creation of a more profound and enduring peace than the one he spurns. If Richard had had his way, there would have been no one left to contest his right to be king: "What heir of York is there alive but we?/ And who is England's

king, but
realize

great

York's

heir"

(IV.iv.471-72)? What Richard does

as much right

not seem

to

is

that Richmond

has

to

wrest

can,
no

as

Richard had to

wrest

it from his
for

nephews.

from him, if he A Machiavellian prince has

the crown

right to take his

legitimacy

granted.

272

Interpretation

once

Edward V, assuming he meant what he said to Buckingham about his desire, he becomes a man, to go to war to "win our ancient right in France has
no more regard

again,"

for

peace and pp.

justice than Richard (IILi. 69-93)

109-12). I
rather

(Bloom
speare

with

Jaffa,
have

pp.

113-14; Alvis,
of

doubt that Shake

the tyrant

would

approved

Edward V's

ambition

to

emulate

Caesar. It is
peace,
albeit

no accident that Richard III

literally

begins
of

with a celebration of

by

a man contemptuous of

the virtues

peace,

and ends with

Richmond's

prayer

that

peace

"may long

live here, God say

amen!"

In Richard III, Shakespeare gives us cause to wonder whether Richard's tyranny would have been possible without Christianity, and whether Chris

tianity

might not

itself

stand

in the way
upon

of

England's

peace and

happiness. The
Machiavelli is

science of

indirect his

government as expounded and practiced

by

inspired

by

reflections

the Christian conquest and governance of

and subject

Rome. The

priest rules

over monarch

alike, but in the

name of

God,
order

or as

Machiavelli

to conceal

intimates, by feigning submission to the will of God in his own Similarly, Richard is most successful when he
rule.30

governs

his

subjects under

the cover of a profession of

love

and subjection

to

the

will of

his beloveds.
whets

Richard
against

the Queen's

Derby, Hastings, and Buckingham's brethren, but then sighs, and "with
us

appetite

for

revenge

a piece of not

Scripture/

Tells them that God bids guilty

of

do

good

for

evil"

(I. iii. 328-34). Is

Christianity
and

doing

the same thing?

Does it

not command
and

charity

as

it indulges

whets our appetite

for

vengeance? avenge

Time
their the

again, the victims of injustice in

not

Richard III implore God to

injury,

but

also

here

on earth.

To

Richard,

murder of

merely in the next world, Henry VI and Edward is an

not

act of

divine

vengeance so

that, in truth, it is "God,

we,

[who] hath

plagued

thy bloody
"If God

deed"

(I.iii. 173-80, 185). Although Christian doctrine teaches that

will

be

avenged

for the deed,/ O, know

him,"

you yet

he doth it

publicly./

Take

not

the quarrel from his pow'rful arm./ He needs no indirect or lawless

cut off

course/

To

those that have offended

its doctrine

of

divine

provi

dence

offers cover

to those who undertake on their own

initiative the

punish authori

ment of zation

their enemies (Li v. 2 18-22). Richmond does not ask for divine
an

to assemble

eve

of

his battle

chastisement,"

army and set sail for England, waiting instead until the Richard to pray that God "make us thy ministers of because his ambition to be king is sufficiently compelling
with of

(V.iii.114). The doctrine Machiavelli

always
puts

divine

providence

is

a godsend

to ambitious

men.

Or

as

it, "let

a prince win and maintain

his

state:

the

means will ch.

be judged honorable, and will be praised by The ordinary citizens in Richard III are too mindful
to "leave it
God"

everyone"

(Prince,
of

18).

Christianity's injunction
the conduct of the

all

to

to exercise a

salutary

restraint upon

nobility,

and

the nobility is too ambitious to restrain itself (II. iii).

Since

each of

God's

"ministers"

is himself in

need of

chastisement,

a moral

justification for

Shakespeare'

s
selfish ambition and vengeance against one's enemies

Demonic Prince
is
never

273

lacking, leaving
when

the state always on the verge of civil war.

am

inclined to think that

that.

Brackenbury

is speaking for Shakespeare

he

observes

Princes have but their titles for their glories, An outward honor for an inward toil, And for
unfelt

imaginations.
a world of restless

They

often

feel

cares;
name

So that between their titles

and

low

There's nothing differs but the

outward

fame. (I. iv. 78-83)

If so, then contrary to Machiavelli, the most important lesson of Shakespeare's Richard III is the insufficiency of glory, and by implication, the superiority of
private

life (Disc, III.2;

cf.

Plato's

Republic, 620c-d).

NOTES

1. All

unidentified citations are

from the Signet

edition of

Shakespare's Richard 111,

ed.

Mark

Eccles (New York: New American Library, 1964). Citations to Machiavelli's Discourses are abbre viated as Disc. All quotations from Machiavelli's The Prince are from the edition translated by

Harvey

C. Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago:

University

of

Chicago Press, 1985).

Tyrant,"

2. Morton J. Frisch, "Shakespeare's Richard III and the Soul of the 20(1993) 280; cf. Tracy B. Strong, "Shakespeare: Elizabethan Statecraft and
Political Vision, eds. Benjamin R. Barber Transaction Books), pp. 201, 215-16.
and
II,"

Interpretation

Machiavellianism,"

in

The Artist

and

Michael J. Gargas (New Brunswick: Thomas

3. Allan Bloom, "Richard in Shakespeare as Political Thinker, ed. John Alvis G. West (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), pp. 51-52, 60.
4.

and

Harry

Shakespearean

V. Jaffa, "The Unity of Tragedy, Comedy, and History: An Interpretation in Shakespeare as Political Thinker, pp. 284-86.
Universe,"

of the

defined

5. Cf. Prince, ch. 12, on as "confusion of the

good arms and good

laws,

and

Disc, III. 6,

where conscience

is

brain."

6. Cf. Mansfield, to The Prince, p. 10; Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p. 292: "In Machiavelli we find comedies, par There is no tragedy in Machiavelli because odies, and satires but nothing reminding of tragedy. he has
no sense of the sacredness of quoted

"Introduction"

'the

common.'"

in A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, Richard HI (hereinafter abbreviated as Furness), ed. H.H. Furness, Jr. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1909), p. 562; H. Giles, quoted in Furness, pp. 563-64.

7. H. Knight,

8. Justice is 295. 9.

no great theme

for Machiavelli either;

see

Strauss, Thoughts

on

Machiavelli,

p.

in History of Political Philosophy, 2d ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Rand McNally, 1972), p. 122; Aristotle, Politics 1031a36-39. 10. Charles Lamb, quoted in the Signet edition of Richard 111', p. 211; see also A. P. Rossiter, p. 287. quoted in the Signet edition, p. 247; Jaffa, "The Unity of

Harry V. Jaffa, Joseph Cropsey (Chicago:

"Aristotle,"

Tragedy,"

11. Rossiter,

quoted

Shakespeare'

189; E.M. Tillyard,

12. Cf. Prince, bloodline
ch.

in the Signet edition, p. 248; Holinshed, s History Plays (London: Chatto

on

quoted and

Windus, 1951),

in the Signet edition, p. pp. 204-8.

the

the wisdom of the

of the previous monarch, and

Romans, ch. 4 on the necessity of eliminating Disc, III. 2 on the insufficiency of private life.

274

Interpretation
quoted

13. Warner,
adoption.

in Furness,

p.

15;

cf.

Prince,

ch.

19,

and

Disc, 1. 10

on

the superiority of

14. Webb, quoted in Furness, glish Histories (Athens: University

p. of

191; Larry S. Champion, Perspective in Georgia Press, 1980), p. 61.

see

Shakespeare'

En

15. On the piety of the ordinary citizen, forty-seven lines; cf. Prince, ch. 18, on the 16. See my article, "Machiavelli and

II. iii
to

"God"

where

the word

appears seven

times in

need

appear religious.

Caesar,"

in Natural Right

and

Political Right,

ed.

Thomas B. Silver
17.

Harvey

Peter W. Schramm (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1984). C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive
and

Power (New York: Free

Press, 1989),

pp.

121-49.

18. Allan Bloom

pp.

with

Harry

V. Jaffa, Shakespeare's Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1964),

cf. the account of

51, 133-35.
19. See, for example, III. v. 24-32;

Lady

Fortuna

and

her

suitors

in Mans

field,

"Introduction,"

p. xxiv.
Charity,"

20. Prince, ch. 16; Clifford Orwin, "Machiavelli's UnChristian Science Review, 72 (December 1978).

American Political

C. Mansfield, Jr., "On the Impersonality of the Review, 77 (December 1983). Review of Politics, 47 (April, 1985), pp. 226-29. 22. See my article, "Machiavelli's 23. Horace Walpole, Historic Doubts on the Life and Reign of King Richard 111, \ldl re printed in Richard 111: The Great Debate, ed. Paul Murray Kendall (New York: Norton Press, 21. On Machiavelli's
State,"

use of stato, see

Harvey

Modem

American Political Science

Realism,"

n.d.),

pp.

160-65.
quoted

24. F.S. Boas,

tion and

in Furness,

p.

54; Strong,
III,"

pp.

202-3, 206; Wolfgang Clemen, "Tradi

Originality
Strong,
is
p.

in Shakespeare's Richard
to Callimaco
also
as

25. Cf. the

26. 27.

reference

Shakespeare Quarterly, 5 (1954), 254. Lucrezia's father in Mandragola, V.iv. England is

called a

201. See
to have

II. iii. 30

where

"sickly

land,"

and

V.v. 15-41

where she

said

"long been
quoted

herself."

mad and scarred edition pp.

Lily

B. Campbell,

in the Signet

223-24; Wright,

quoted

in Furness,
pp.

p.

5 n30; cf. Disc, III.4. 28. On how love and fear may be 1226.

combined

according to Machiavelli,

see

Orwin,

1224-

29. John Alvis, "The Career 107, 111. 30. Cf. Disc, 1.11
where

of

Henry

Monmouth,"

in Shakespeare

as

Political

Thinker,

pp.

Machiavelli

speaks of

Numa's

feigning

converse with a nymph.

Shakespeare's Richard III

Morton J. Frisch
Northern Illinois

and

the Soul

of

the Tyrant

University
did

Caesar's many
and a

successes

not

divert his

natural spirit of enterprise and

ambition to the enjoyment of what

laboriously achieved, but served as fuel incentive for future achievements, and begat in him plans for greater deeds and passion for fresh glory, as though he had used up what he already had. What he
was

he had

felt

therefore nothing else than emulation of

himself,

as

if he had been he
purposed

another

man, and a sort of rivalry between what he had done

and what

to do.

Plutarch, Caesar, LVIII.3.

Shakespeare's Richard III differs from the tyrant Socrates describes in Plato's Republic in that he has
sense cannot since of an attractive quality about him, attractive in the fascinating. There is something in the character of Richard which fail to attract us almost against our will, which is all the more incredible outset

Richard from the

is "determined to

villain"

prove a

(Li. 30). The

wonderfully guity

versatile power of

his mind, his talent for

equivocation and ambi performed

are objects of sheer

fascination. Shakespeare has

the extraordi

nary feat of presenting the serpentine wisdom of the tyrannic soul in such a way that it cannot fail to excite our sensibilities. In the satisfaction we receive in contemplating the character of Richard, in the Shakespeare has shown him, it is almost as if
various we situations sight
of

in
the

which cold

lose

blooded, calculating tyrant whose ugly extent obscured by the marvelous play
appeal

soul of

is

overshadowed and even

to some

his intellect. But his young

whatever plausible

Richard may have had because

when

of

the brilliant qualities of

nephews.

his

mind

dissipates
tion

he

orchestrates

the

murder of

Shakespeare delineates the

of

character of

the tyrannic soul in his

characteriza

direct way than the Platonic dialogue does, for here we see the tyrant in action. Shakespeare was able to write a play in which the tyrannic soul becomes a reality rather than something which is merely the Richard III in
a more

subject of conversation. self-love. although

The tyrant himself

as an

idea is

a perfect example of

limitless

Richard

prides

most on

he is

not

nearly

as effective on

his ability to deceive, to dissemble, this score as he has led himself to

part of

believe. He
precedes

conceives of

himself, in

the third

this one, as

someone

who can

prove

Henry VI, the play which his superiority to Machiavelli,

attempt,
so much so

who can accomplish

feats

which no one else would even plausible

that the impossible becomes

able to assume that

(3

Henry
of

VI Ill.ii. 193). It
the fact that

seems reason who

Richard is

not

ignorant

Machiavelli,

interpretation,

Spring 1993,

Vol. 20, No. 3

276

Interpretation
rather

teaches

than

practices

the tyrannical art, the

others and

art of

deception, is

more

capable of

dissimulation than

therefore must be
willingness

regarded as a most

serious competitor can therefore

for the tyrant. Richard's

to take on

Machiavelli

be

understood as a challenge

to the philosopher's reputed superior

knowledge

of political practice.

of

It is only too clear that the consciousness of power attending the working out Richard's schemes is the inexorable guide of his political existence. He is

driven

by

the restless
rather

desire

of power after

power, but the

pleasure

for him is in
attracted

the pursuit

than the

mere possession of power.

He is less

to

kingship by
exciting

the prospect of achieving anything with the

anticipated entire

kingship
and

than

by

the

problems

for its

acquisition.

Perhaps the

confrontation

in the

play is that between Richard

revealing the young Prince

most

Edward. Edward, when he leams that he along with his younger brother is being sent to the Tower of London, indicates his unpleasant feelings about that
place and asks whether

Caesar had built it. He remarks,

almost as an

aside, that
no con

Caesar's fame has

outlived

his death

and

that death therefore makes

obvious what

quest of this conqueror

(IILi. 68-69, 87-88). It is

appears

the praise of

Caesar implies. Caesar

to be a model for

Edward,

and

in Caesar, Edward introduces the thought of loftier motives than kingly power to someone whose soul has been consumed in his

by bringing kingship or
passion

for

securing the kingship. The problem for Richard is that his passion for power has nothing further to satisfy itself once he secures the throne. Richard is not like Caesar. He has no grand vision of empire as Caesar had. He even has no

interest in regaining territories in France lost by his brother's predecessor on the throne, Henry VI. But Edward says that, if he lives long enough to be king, he
will recover

England's

ancient

right in France

again

(IILi. 91-92).

There is certainly no reason for thinking that Richard would have been satis fied with performing the mundane tasks of rule upon receiving the crown. He
was not unaware of world of

the

fact that "the

sovereignty"

golden yoke of

imposes "a
or no

cares"

"burden"

and a

on someone

like himself

who

has little

interest in assuming those cares and burdens (III. vii. 145, 222, 228). But nev ertheless his action is animated by his obsession for securing the English crown
which

he looks

upon

as

"the high
view

imperial type
remark

of

this

glory"

earth's

(IV.iv.245). It

comes

best into

in his

that "what

other pleasure can

the world afford

make

[than]

to command, to check, to o'erbear?

crown"

[Therefore]

I'll

(3 Henry VI Ill.ii. 147, 166, 168). my heaven to dream upon the Prince Edward draws Richard's attention to some larger motive than the pas
sion

for

kingly

power

by

moving from the petty end does not leave further avenues for his lust for
ship.

alluding to Caesar's grand of Richard to the grand end

power

vision of of

empire, thus

Caesar. But Richard

No

other pleasure comes

nearer to

divinity

beyond securing the king for him than this kind of

pleasure.

He does

not

have the

vision and

to move on to greater goals. the young Prince Edward needs

The

episode

between Richard

further

Richard III
elucidation.

and

the Soul of the Tyrant

277

It is We

quite possible

that Edward's statement about Caesar creates

mind as

the shadow of a
superiority.

doubt in Richard's
sense

to his inflated

opinion of

his

own

hesitate to
ence

something important about the fact that Richard does not his superiority to Machiavelli, but not to Caesar. No differ between Richard and Caesar is more telling than that which is revealed in
proclaim

Richard's
refers

speech

to

to "these bastard
and

his army before the final battle at Bosworth Field. He Bretons, whom our fathers have in their own land
record

beaten, bobb'd,
never once

thump'd, and, in

left them the heirs

shame,"

of

but

does he consider the possibility of regaining England's lost territo ries in France (V.iii. 334-36). It is Edward's concentration on militaristic honor that leads him to
emphasize a return to

France. It is

not

impossible that
have har
and

Edward,
England

after

recovering England's lost territories in

France,

would

bored hopes

of

conquering

all of

France,

thus securing the

union of

France

under

the crown of England. He clearly has a

vision which could

easily transform itself into imperialism. Edward is devoted to militaristic honor

quest.

and

hence to foreign

war and con

He has presumably
would make

his opinion,
suggest make

Caesar's Commentaries, an account which, in Caesar's fame immortal. He even goes so far as to
read
wisdom encapsulated

that it is the wit and

valor

in those

commentaries which

Caesar's

live (IILi. 86). Caesar's his death. It

greatness

will

be

admired

and

praised

by

speare

made

many Richard III

exploits

generations after

goes without made

saying that Shake

Caesar evidently that he was

immortal, but Caesar

then through his

himself immortal first

through his
wanted

and

commentaries.

to be

remembered

long

after

his death. It is for this

reason

constantly seeking to outdo his past accomplishments with greater and greater deeds, but the highest part of his greatness was his commentaries. His greatness is more spectacular because of his commentaries. Caesar did not need a Shake
speare

to

embellish

his

greatness.

Richard
an

receives

his fame

at the

hands

of

Shakespeare,
oblivion.

the

fame

of

infamy, but

infamy

which

becomes
makes

a substitute

for

The young Prince Edward's

between Richard
and

praise of

Caesar

Richard

appear

low.
The
seen contrast

Caesar is

perhaps nowhere more

clearly

in reading Plutarch's characterization of Julius Caesar. Plutarch says that Caesar competed with himself to outdo himself, driven by his "plans for greater deeds [than he had already accomplished] and a passion for fresh glory,
than
as

though he had
else

used

up

what

nothing
sort of

than

emulation of what

he already had. What he felt was therefore himself, as if he had been another man, and a
and what

rivalry

between

he had done

he

purposed of

to

do"

(Plu
to

tarch, Caesar,

LVIII.3). Shakespeare's

Richard, by way

contrast,

means

that prove himself to himself by overpowering others, but apparently lacks further incentive to compete with himself, to outdo himself. He soliloquizes in
order

to

assure

himself
the

of

his

own superiority.

His

recurrent soliloquies exercises

(with

the

exception of

last)

can

be

construed

therefore as

in

self-assur-

278
ance

Interpretation
in
order

to reinforce

his

sense of

his

own absolute worth. able

He is absolutely

convinced
matter or

in his

own mind

that he

will

be

to capture the English throne no

how difficult that task

will

might

be, but

the

to compete with himself

by

missing is the incentive establishing any further goals beyond

altogether

that. The securing of the English throne somehow marks the limit of tions. He

his

aspira

lacks the incentive

or

the desire to set new goals

for himself. He is
anything, but only
crown.

constrained

by

the

narrowness of

his

vision.

It is true that Richard thinks he

within

can accomplish almost

the

narrow confines of

maneuvering his way to the

He has

no

interest in the burdens

understand

of statecraft or

the pursuit of empire. Richard gives us to

that he has the power of going to any length in contriving anything,

employing only speech, only persuasion (3 Henry VI Ill.ii. 182-93). He accom plishes feats which no one else would even think of attempting, like wooing Lady Anne in the presence of the corpse of her murdered husband's murdered

father, both
she could second

of whom

be

maneuvered

he had admittedly murdered. Who would ever think that into the intolerable position of having to live with a
for her first husband's death? He Anne. But he
are rather overestimates

husband

responsible

glories

in the

sweetness of

his triumph
and

over

his

own

abilities, for

his deceitfulness
well.

deviousness

transparent to those who know him

He may be

able

to break down the walls of Anne's restraint,

not

but the love

former Queen Elizabeth is

taken in

by

the

pretense of

his

profession of

for her daughter, the Princess Elizabeth. She feigns a reluctant acquiescence to his proposal of marriage to her daughter which has Richard convinced that he
has
won

her

support.

It

would

be fair to

assume that
of

Richard deceives himself

into thinking that Elizabeth is convinced sense of his own limitations. He cannot Richard

his

sincerity.

He

appears to

have

no

see

himself
the

correctly.
of

hardly

ever

lets his

conscience get

better

him, but his

con

science asserts

arranged
of a

itself in his sleep when the spirits of those he has murdered or to have murdered appear to him in a dream. This cold, unmoving rock
as

man, claiming
under

he does that he fears

of

neither

heaven

nor

hell, finally

conscience, brought on by the burden of a troubled soul (V. iii. 179-204). He claims that he is not touched by conscience, but the moment he is willing to admit that his "coward inspires
the pressure
conscience"

dissolves

him

There is

not seem to be the same Richard as before (V. iii. 179). decided difference in tone, for Richard is only Richard without a conscience. But even before this admittedly frightful encounter, Lady Anne, with a now

fear, he does

his wife,

reveals that she

had

never spent a restful night

in his bed

without

being

awakened

by

his frightful
he had had

or

timorous dreams (IV.i. 82-84). We

with

are

left

wondering
scorns and

whether

previous encounters

the conscience he

which only his wife is able to bring The former Queen Margaret, addressing Richard earlier in the play, prophesizes that "no sleep [will] close that deadly eye of thine unless it be

despises in the timorous dreams

to

our attention.

while some

tormenting dream

affrights

thee

with a

hell

of

devils,"

ugly

but

we

Richard III
are given no more

and the

Soul of the Tyrant

279

information than

that (I.iii. 225-57). It seems not

improbable

at all

that Richard is plagued nightly after Margaret's curse

she

by

the

tormenting
disturbers"

dreams

prophesizes, for
them
as

when

contemplating

the murder of the young

princes, he

"foes to my rest and my sweet dream's (IV.ii.72). What might have caused him to sleep uneasily was the anxiety brought about by his memory of the prophecies of Henry VI and a bard of Ireland that Richmond would be "likely in time to bless the regal (3
refers to
throne"

Henry

VI

IV.vi.74),

and

that he

would not

live

long

after

he

saw

Richmond

(IV. ii. 94-96, 104-5). Richard successfully conceals his nightmares for a long time. He rarely mentions his troubling dreams prior to the one nightmare which almost com pletely
that
unnerves

one's conclusion on
goes on

him. One may surmise that he suppresses them, but whatever that, it seems evident that he does not tell us everything in his thoughts. The dark shadow of guilt, dimly perceived in the
not

deepest
the

recesses of

play.

He does

his soul, does not appear to surface until toward the have to face up to the horror of his catalogue of
his
victims at
of

end of

crimes

until the visitation of the spirits of conscience

that time. He awakens to

only

after

he is

cursed

by

the ghosts

his

murdered victims.

Richard
tempts to

seems

willing to acknowledge the power of conscience as

he

at

he his

says

defy it, for in his remarks to his retinue made shortly after his dream, that "conscience is but a word which cowards use, devised at first to
awe"

keep

the strong in

(V.iii.310-11). He had

never

dreamed it

possible

that

conscience could get under

power of conscience.

By

his skin, but he is evidently intimidated by the his own admission, he is at war with his conscience.

diabolical enemy to be overcome. The action of the play moves between Richard's announcement in the opening scene of his determination to
a

Conscience is

prove

himself

a villain and

the eventual realization, after the ghosts of those

a

murdered ones appear to promise that

him in

dream,

that he is a villain (V. iii. 192). The

he

made

to himself to prove himself a villain, the desire for

his

own perfection as a

awareness

in

which

selfvillain, has been fulfilled. It is a moment of frightened he confesses to himself that he hates himself for the hateful

deeds he has

committed

(V.iii. 190-91). He is

stricken with remorse.

He

almost

completely loses his

presence of

mind, crying to Jesus for mercy (V.iii. 179). the existence of conscience,
gives

Richard,
over

who refuses to recognize of

himself
was

to the terrible tortures

conscience, but one cannot say that he

restrained

by

conscience.

It

can

be

shown

that the love of honor is a

possible

political

power, for the desire for

recognition

remedy for the misuse of makes it possible for rulers to

not a sufficient

perform selfless acts since

for

selfish reasons;
must

but it is led to

corrective,

the

appeal

to honor

be

perfected

by being

in the

service of some

thing far
that he

more exalted than

honor. We

are

reflect on

the possibility

of

Richard III

becoming

could

a beneficent tyrant, but there is absolutely have become that, inasmuch as he reveals a remarkable

no suggestion

indif-

280

Interpretation
and praise and

ference to honor
some others.
standard

therefore lacks the incentive to

no need

measure

up to

of praise.

He apparently has

for

recognition

from
Planof

It

seems evident

that there

is

no potential

for

goodness

in Richard

tagenet.

It

would

be

accurate

to say that Shakespeare's

characterization

Richard

goes a

long

way toward

showing the

impossibility

of

transforming

the

soul of the tyrant standpoint

into something fine. One cannot fancy Shakespeare, from the from which he viewed the actions of the unjust tyrannical soul,
correction of

holding
sion

the view that the

tyranny is

possible

through the conver

not

of the

tyrant from badness to goodness.

Shakespeare did

consider

Richard perfectible, his last soliloquy notwithstanding. Richard III is the only one of Shakespeare's kings explicitly associated with Machiavelli. Machiavelli may not be Shakespeare's model of a philosopher, but he is the only philosopher to whom Richard could conceivably relate. Rich ard knows without having to be reminded that he is not a philosopher in spite of

his

offer

in 3

Henry

VI to take Machiavelli to

school.

It

can

hardly

be

said that

he is

reflective.

tion of
est of

We obviously cannot take seriously Buckingham's characteriza Richard as someone bent on meditation and contemplation in the inter
soul rather than

his
a

having

an

simply
crown

ploy to feign

a reluctance on

interest in worldly pursuits, for that is Richard's part to accept an offer of the

(III. vii. 72, 74, 76). It is

not

the contemplative

life to

which

Richard

turns. The most that we can expect from him in a

reflective posture

is that he

derives delight from contemplating his shadow in the sun, his own projected image of himself (Li. 25-26; ii. 267-68). The fact that he mentions Machiavelli
does
not prove

that there is anything philosophic in

him, but it

should

not

surprise us that practitioners of politics are

retical understanding.

for the

most part

defective in theo it may seem, they

We
their
self

are always confronted with

tyrants and,

incredible

as

continue

to be a subject of peculiar

fascination

and attractiveness

by

virtue of

remarkable

best,

capacity for ruse and deception. Richard wishes to prove him but only to his own satisfaction. He is not at all concerned with being

admired or praised

by

others. Self- admiration or self-satisfaction

does

not

have

to

be

confirmed can of

by

the admiration of others,

but

without

the acclaim of others,

Richard

intensity

crown were

only prove himself best to himself by overpowering others. The his will to power is clearly manifested in his remark that, if the further off than it is, he would still pluck it down, but more than

that the very

impossibility

of

the enterprise

becomes

a supreme challenge

to

him (3
does

Henry

VI Ill.ii. 194-95). It is

hardly

the true statesman is to raise politics to its highest possible

not possess

necessary to say that the work of level, but Richard

the

moral

equipment as

citizens of

England, inasmuch

he

cannot

necessary to make Englishmen good be presumed to be guided by any

of

concern with

the common good. His statement that he is "unfit for state and
realizes

majesty"

is truer than he

(III. vii. 204). This greatest

English tyrants
the
world

attempts

in Machiavellian fashion to

set aside the moral order of

Richard III
through
a

and

the Soul of the Tyrant

281

policy

of

ruse,

treachery,

and murder.

His

ruthless

statesmanship,

a calculated ruthlessness characteristic of

kingly
to a

power,

and

Machiavelli

never

in acquiring in preserving it for so short a time, but his vow to outdo comes to pass. It appears to be a vauntingly ambitious claim

Machiavelli,

succeeds

superiority which could not be achieved, for he has hardly been crowned before his house of cards begins to collapse. He cannot maintain the sover eignty he has so recently acquired (IV. ii. 60-61). There is no indication that
Richard
could ever rule

England.

Richard III is the

The tragic
consumed
an attempt

most

history
in
a civil

of

exclusively political of Shakespeare's history plays. Richard III is not simply the tragic history of England
of

war, the War

the

Roses, England's

greatest

disaster, but
political

to sharpen our sense of the potential for

tragedy in
exceeds

life

through the

depiction
a

of

the actions
which

of an unjust

tyrannical ruler. The

murder of

the young princes,

cruelties of soul can

deed

is unqualifiedly evil, say

so

the greatest

the War

of

the Roses and shows how ugly or deformed a tyrant's

not

be. Shakespeare does

in

so

many words, but it

standards, is

would

be

reasonable

to assume that he believed that the responsible exercise of political

rule of wisdom with

power, the to

its very

strict

seldom available

represented

is very difficult to achieve. Henry V a very short time, the horror of the War of the Roses, culminating in the tyranny bred by these civil dissensions, and the resurrection of that regime out of the long madness that had scarred
political society.

The

rule of wisdom

England's finest

hour, but in

England,

would

be

succeeded

only

by

future fraught

with

uncertainty.

It

would seem

that the potentiality for absolute evil in human affairs is too great

to expect a transformation of the harshness of political life.

much as

There is simply no sufficient explanation for the villainy he is not really interested in being burdened with the He
proves

of

Richard, inas
than its

responsibilities of

a sovereign. retention.

indifferent to the

responsibilities of power other

One would be hard pressed therefore to argue that his villainy derives from his desire to reign as king. Richard is much more of a schemer mainly than an opportunist. He has an irresistible impulse to manipulate. It would
seem that
which

villainy has become is not really an end has

impossible to

an end

in itself, that is, that the means to an end supplanted the end and become an end in itself.
that what

It

seems almost

suppose

Richard has in his

mind

to prove himself a villain, to live for nothing except the need to

assert

is simply himself
can

violently,

unless of course

it is intended
much

as a

test

of

mettle.

But there

be

little doubt that Richard is

after

happier him

when

he

possesses

it,
is

for

what gives

most pleasure

he is seeking the throne than is the expectation of a

rather

satisfaction which

always and can

essentially in the future

therefore that the pursuit

than the reality

of that satisfaction.

We

say

is

more enjoyable

for

him
the

than the
pursuit

attainment of
obtained.

the end, but that enjoyment ceases once the object of

not

is

It is

hard to
course

understand

that the motivation which

no

had

spurred

Richard on to his

of action

is

longer there

once

he

282

Interpretation
of

becomes king. Richard

ment, but as king he is enjoy his power.

reduced

Gloucester plotting to take the throne is in his ele to merely securing his position. He cannot
understand

But however
significant

we are when

to

that,

he

realizes

that he is

Richard's motives, it is certainly most a villain, he is appalled at the very

thought. The nightmare has now

fully
his

invaded his

consciousness.

In the

most

astounding of turnabouts, his dream, but it is too late to

virtue of the character of

he faces up to his own villainy in his monologue after

seek own salvation.

Richard is

what

he is

by

his

actions.

He does

not

have the

means

to correct

himself. He defined himself

far in blood that
own

with precision earlier on when

sin"

sin will pluck on

he said, "I am in so (IV.ii. 63-64). He is imprisoned by his

treachery. His astonishing statement that

he hates himself

must

be taken

at

its face value, although nothing in his previous experience can account for the sentiment he now experiences. He apparently does not like what he sees in himself. He is
self-contempt.

but it be his

would

his villain's role any more. It almost borders on It certainly seems that his conscience takes the heart out of him, be a gross overstatement to say that Richard is repentant. It would
not even sure of

to say that he is ambivalent, for he both affirms and denies in the same breath. virtually for reason that we never leam, blurts out that he hates him some Richard,
more accurate

guilt

self

for the hateful deeds he has

committed.

It is his

at

first impossible to believe superiority

would ever

that one who is so apparently convinced

of

own

experience such a sudden change of attitude cation

toward himself. We have no indi

from any of his previous remarks that he ever entertained any misgivings concerning his conduct, but this in no sense implies that he did not harbor some
silent

doubts.

Why

should

the

mere appearance of apparitions

in

dream in in fact

duce him to

change

his

estimate of

himself,

unless of course

they

were

conjured up by his own imagination in order to create a himself? Richard might have intended to seek from such
exoneration of

confrontation with a confrontation an or

his

consciousness of

his

own guilt.

By

concealing,

leaving

to

inference,

this side of

ing by which ing remains unknown

to be reckoned
with

Richard, Shakespeare leaves to be figured out the he led himself to think of himself as deeply immoral. His
to us,

reason

reason

leaving

us

wondering
world,

what

he had in

mind.

It is

altogether possible that

Shakespeare

wanted

to tell us that conscience is a force

and

in

a conscience-ridden

that even someone as

altogether at

impervious
that

to conscience as Richard cannot extricate

himself

from
mo

moral consciousness.

We

are confronted with a tyrant

who,

least

mentarily, is out of heart with tyranny, who has just declared that he hates himself for the hateful deeds he has committed. Shakespeare's play shows that
a

goodness and conscience, one could even say that his grain, nevertheless recognizes himself as a hateful creature, because he does not know how to be altogether evil. Richard's greatest passion as it appears is to manipulate or overpower

tyrant

who

lacks both

goodness goes against

Richard III
others.

and

the Soul of the Tyrant

nature of

283
power

It

hardly

needs

to be

said

that it is in the

the desire

for

that it

can never

be fulfilled. The desire for be satisfying only

as

power must as

feed

upon more power.

The
end

pursuit can

long

the end recedes, and unless the

cease.

is continuously redefined, the pursuit will be over and the satisfaction will Richard thought that he wanted to become king, but what he really
to prove himself capable the
result of

wanted was

becoming

king. The

effort

is every

thing for him;

is inconsequential. The

pursuit of power or

the tyrant's

activity has no end other than more power, which is precisely Richard's prob lem. There is a certain reasonableness in Richard's actions, inasmuch as it is
not unreasonable

for

a prince of

the

realm

to think in terms of his possible

succession to the
objective

throne, but that is where his reasonableness ends, for the itself is unimportant to him. Shakespeare demonstrates, through his
of

treatment
no

tyranny,
end

a clear awareness of

the delusions of power, that there is

since

inherent
view.

satisfaction

in satisfying the desire for more,

there is

no end

in

The

is

endless.

We have

seen

that Richard is more interested in proving himself capable of

becoming king
unable

than in performing the role of a ruler, but more than that he is

to see that he was striving for something that

wanted

he

never

really

wanted.

He

only thought that he

to be king. It is conceivable that his wish to be

king

York,

is simply a projection of his youthful wish for his father, the Duke of to become king. In the third part of Henry VI, the young Richard tries to his father to
seize the

convince

crown,

saying:

"And, father, do but

think

how

and only after his father's death does he say that sweet it is to wear a he would make his heaven to dream upon the crown (3 Henry VI I.ii. 28-29;

crown,"

III.iii.168). There
can

can

be little doubt that Richard thinks he

wants

the crown,

have been projecting what was originally a wish for his father with but he out giving little more than a thought to what is actually involved in performing the functions of kingship. He has no interest in that kind of thing, but he never
abandons

his

youthful

addiction

to the crown. Shakespeare seems merely to

to

attempt to show that

becomes
not

quite clear

be king, but in the course of the play it that Richard does not really know what he wants. He does
Richard
seeks emphasized

know his

own mind.

It
soul

must above all of

be

the tyrant,

given

that, from Shakespeare's point of view, the its highest expression in this play, represents the
qualities

darker

side of

human nature, exhibiting

even conceivable that

ter itself. It is
net

the

gulf which separates

residing in the human charac Richard Plantagebe imagined

Richard
at

from the

rest of

the world

is

not as great as might

first ap

pearance.

Shakespeare's
soliloquies

absorption written

in the

character of

which emerges

from the
that
are

he has

for him

reveals a remarkable

sensitivity to

possibility.

Richard

represents a

disposition

to take seriously
of

lawless form
ever so

remark that terrible, desires is in every man, even in some of us who seem to be Shake(Plato, Republic, 572b). It would seem as though

Socrates'

by "surely

no means uncommon some

if

we

savage and

284

Interpretation
to show
utter

speare wanted

depravity

as

it

might

be
of

experienced

in

human

soul, the soul of a

what constitutes

tyrant; human happiness,

others,

revealing the

inadequacy
that this

the tyrant's conception of

con

and all

implies for the human

dition. It

would

be

a real question

for Shakespeare

whether everyone seeks

to

have more, to
was

overreach

as

his later contemporary, Thomas Hobbes,

to

maintain.

The Problem

of

Religion in Liberalism

Richard Sherlock
Utah State
AND

University

Roger Barrus
Hampden

Sydney

College

Liberalism,
ment

the political

theory
Its

and practice of

equality,

liberty,

and govern

by
of

consent of

the governed, is far and away the

success

most successful of

the

political

forms
the

of modernity.

is the

result of

its

recognition of

the

limits

modem project.

Modernity

aims

at the

liberation
The

of man

from the bondage

of

necessity
conquest

through the rational conquest and control of nature. This

and control of

involves the

human

nature.

reformation of politics and government

is,

then, a crucial element in the from the political alternatives

"scientific
master
socialism"

modem project.

What distinguishes liberalism

available

is its

recognition

in modernity for example, Marx's of the inherent limits in the effort to

human

nature.
of

At

some point the

nature comes

the mastery
em project

human

necessary means in the modem project into conflict with the end of the mod
of necessity.

the

liberation

of man

from the bondage

Human

na

ture cannot

be

understood

to

be

infinitely
be

plastic or malleable.

This means, completely

that
men

however,
under

that nature as a whole cannot

man.

understood as

finally

and

the control of

The

success of the modem project requires

simultaneously

struggle against and

bow before lower

nature and natural necessity.

They

must see must

themselves as both above and within the natural order of things.

seen as

Nature
success

be

both higher

and

than man. Liberalism's relative

acceptance of the fundamental ambiguity in the rela between man and nature inherent in the modem project. tionship This ambiguity is reflected, among many other places, in liberalism's treat ment of religion, in particular in its political system of religious toleration.

derives from its

Religion deals
questions of

with

the

ultimate

questions

of

human

its beginnings

and

its

ends and purposes.

life, pre-eminently the Religion is the means by

articulated, and are

which, for
given at

most men most of

partial and

the

time, these

questions are

least the

tentative answers that are

indispensably
as

for human

existence.
man's

Openness to these

questions of ultimate of

very essence of Religion can be

humanity,
only
men

and

hence

his freedom

necessary meaning is the a human being.

give

transcended

by

obviating the important questions that

it

life,

either

by inducing

to stop

thinking

about

them,

or

by

supplying

interpretation,

Spring 1993,

Vol. 20, No. 3

286
some can

Interpretation

final, definitive,

and comprehensive answer

be transcended

by

converting

man

into

either a

for them. That is, religion beast or a god. Either way,

political

there is nothing left of

humanity,

or of

human freedom.
more radical variants of of

This is the

irony

of

the apparently

the

modem project with their

intransigent

atheism.

The

"freedom"

Marx's

com and

munist man, another

the

omnicompetent

individual

who

does "one thing today

tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in

criticize after or

the evening,

dinner

without ever

becoming hunter, fisher

of moral

critic,"

man, shepherd,

is

"freedom"

that can only exist in absolute indif

ference to the

purposes.1

questions of ultimate

Devoid
passion.

seriousness, it
same can

is indistinguishable from slavery to impulse or who finds his said for Nietzsche's
"superman,"

Much the in the

be

"freedom"

self-conscious

creation of

his

own values.

Genuine freedom
moral seriousness

presupposes genuine alternatives

and

is

characterized

by

the

that necessarily accompanies the

which accepts the practical need
reflected

recognition of serious alternatives.

Liberalism,

for religion, does not liberalism's system of

attempt

to transcend or supplant it. This is

in

religious toleration.

Religious toleration, taming

or civil

izing

religion without

supplanting

it, in

effect establishes

the moral grounds of

human freedom.
an important part to play in liberalism, its place in liber best. Modernity, which aims at the conquest and control of nature by man, is in its main thrust antitheological or antireligious. It is not possible for man to make himself master of his world without at the same time

While

religion

has

alism

is tenuous

at

displacing
up
and

its

previous mler. who

This is the

root of

the antitheological animus

of

Machiavelli,
which was

initiated the

modem project with regime

his

call

to mankind to rise

conquer

fortune. Liberalism's

of representative

government,
certain of

invented

by Hobbes, Locke,

and others to solve at

least

the moral and political problems inherent in the modem project, participates in

fundamental hostility towards religion. It is profoundly secular. Liberalism's founders understood, however, that religion was an ineradicable part of human nature, rooted in the very realities that, according to them, made
modernity's

necessary the political regime of representative government. Since religion could not be abolished, it had to be accommodated. It
be accommodated, however, without being transformed expression of divine sovereignty into an instrument of human
not
changed

could an

from

sovereignty.

This

is the

Hobbes'

essential purpose of exegesis.

and

Locke's

now

largely forgotten
that

works of

biblical

This is

also

the

purpose

behind the liberal

philosophers'

rec

ommendations on
Hobbes'

the legal

and political arrangements and

should govern reli

gion

secular absolutism went no

Locke's have

religious on

toleration. Liberal

ism's founders liberal

gion

further in their thought

seems to

religion.

Only

the later

philosopher not

Tocqueville

recognized of

is

to be abolished in

and

through the progress

that, precisely if reli modernity, it must be

It has
a crucial part

understood to

have

necessary

place

in the

modem project.

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

to

287

play in the liberation of man from the bondage of necessity. Religion, which Tocqueville clearly foresaw would flourish under liberalism's legal regime of
religious stance

toleration,

provides

the absolute horizon

which gives

meaning

or sub

to man's freedom.

Hobbes, liberalism's
his
only
possible surcease

principal

architect,

attempts to

bring

to pass through
argues

new science of politics what

Plato's Socrates in the Republic

is the

from the

evils of political

life,

the

conjunction of philos
reason.2

ophy and political power, or the political mle of right fulfill in real political practice the philosopher's longing for
ernment,
or

He

means

to

rational self-gov
Hobbes'

for

what

the philosopher

would call

human freedom.

ra

tional political order

elaborated

by

very different thing from the just regime Socrates in the Republic. For Hobbes, reason mles indirectly, in

is,

of

course,

the system of representative government,

rather

than

directly,

as

for Socrates,
the existence
what

in the

person of

the philosopher-king.

Hobbes'

polity
Socrates'

presupposes

of modem

natural

science, foreign to

regime,

which reveals

Hobbes

conceives as

the hitherto unfathomed problems and undreamed-of pos

most

sibilities of political

life. The

important difference between

Hobbes'

ratio

Socrates'

nal political order and meant

best regime,

to be actualized. It is
a

not a mere pattern

may look to found

real political

right

order

that polity is laid up in heaven, to which men in their souls, as Socrates calls his city, but a
and
now.3

however, is

Hobbes'

possibility to be achieved in the here Plato's Socrates teaches that the coincidence is
an chance

power

for,
his

rather

philosophy and political circumstance, something to be hoped or prayed essentially This represents Plato's than directly worked for in political
of
practice.4

political realism. political

with

Plato's

Hobbes'

realism contrasts with

idealism. Hobbes in
enterprise of moder

idealism
call

echoes

Machiavelli,
fortune
on

who

initiates the

nity

his

to

conquer

behalf

of man's rational self-govern

ment.

Machiavelli teaches that chance, like

of
man.5

a woman, can

be he

mastered

by

the
a

right kind
the

The

right

kind

"virtue,"

of man possesses what

calls
not

combination of the
and

knowledge both
to
use either

of

how to be

good and

how

to be good,
needs of
with

flexibility
(ch.

the one or the

of

other

according to the
obstacle.

the

moment

15,

p.

61). To this kind

prohibitions,

virtue, traditional religion,

its

absolute

injunctions

and

is

an

impenetrable

Machia

velli's project

the

strictures

for human freedom requires, in the first place, a liberation from of traditional religion. This, too, is echoed by Hobbes in the
particular

treatment of religion, in
of politics.

the

religion of

the

Bible, in his

new science

Machiavelli's
voiced

critique of traditional religion

is

summed

injunction in The Prince to trust only in "one's

own

up in his frequently Those who

arms."

288

Interpretation
own

tmst in their

arms, like the

succeed

ancient

political

founders Moses,
those
who

Cyms,
on

Theseus,
arms of

and

Romulus,
to
min

in their endeavors,
pp.

while

rely

the

others, like
come

the wouldbe conqueror and uniter of modem

Italy, Cesare
the exam

Borgia,
ple of

(chs.

6-7,

22-24, 26-32). As indicated by

based
on

Cesare Borgia,

whose successes were

the

power of

his father,

Pope Alexander VI, and whose min resulted from the withdrawal of that power on his father's death, the counsel to rely on one's own arms is much more than a recommendation on military organization. It means to reject consciously all
outside

help,

and

that means, on the deepest

oneself

level,
all

to reject willfully all

restrictions on

help
of

from above, to free divine

assistance.

from

all

divinely

inspired

the

rational

pursuit of self-interest

by freeing

oneself

from

false hopes

or

delusions

This freedom
of

requires a

total break from the traditional

man and

religious conception

the relationship between

or creation of a

God, according
placed

to

which man

is the

off

spring

loving God,
of

Who

him in

a world stocked with all

that he needs for the fulfillment

his trials
reflected

and

his being, and Who actively cares for him in tribulations. Machiavelli's break with the traditional conception is
argument and

in his

that

"truly it
willful

is

desire to acquire,
blamed"

always,

when men

a very natural and ordinary thing to do it who can, they will be praised or

not

(ch.

3,

p.

14). This

break from tradition leads to

radically

nontraditional

teaching

on morality:

one should

be stingy

rather

than

liberal,
af

giving only
of

of other people's

substance;

one should strive

to be feared instead

loved, using well the cruelty fairs; one should keep faith only
reputation

that is necessary and

when safe

inevitable in human

to do so, making sure to

maintain a

for faithfulness (chs. 16-18,

pp.

62-71). These

rules of

conduct,

so

profoundly nothing but the nasty prerequisites for man's autoemancipation from the of chance, and hence for man's self-government and freedom.
Machiavelli's but
rather counsel

contrary to the standards of traditional religion, are for Machiavelli

power

to rely on one's own arms

does

not

lead him to ignore

the Romans in

to reinterpret religion. He transforms it into a political instrument.

essence of

This is the

Machiavelli's treatment

of

the religion

of

the Discourses. He concludes from his consideration of Numa

Pompilius,

the
a

founder

of

the Roman religion, "who feigned that he held

converse with

nymph,"

that "there never was any remarkable lawgiver amongst any people

divine authority, as otherwise his laws would not have been accepted by the people for there are many good laws, the importance of which is known to the sagacious lawgiver, but the reasons for which are not
who not resort to

did

sufficiently
mlers who

evident to enable understand of

him to

persuade others

to submit to
will

them."6

Those

"the

natural order of

things

seek"

to uphold the

foundations
people

the religion of their countries,

and

religious,

consequently
150).

well

for then it is "easy to keep their conducted and The founda

united."

tions

of religions are

the miracles, the exhibitions

p.

of superhuman

power, that

they

celebrate

(1.12,

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

What the
political use of religion means

289

in

practice

is

reflected

in Machia

velli's appropriation
uted

purposes, in The Prince, of the miracles attrib in the Bible to Moses (ch. 26, p. 103). Traditional religion is, according to
own
an

for his

Machiavelli,
reformed

immense

obstacle

to the achievement
religion

of

human freedom. As if
not

by Machiavelli, however,
means

is

a useful

indispensably

necessary Machiavelli

to that same end. Either way,

attempt

indicates, by his
it is
as a

it is something very powerful. to transform religion into a political tool,

affairs.

just how

potent

force in human

Religion

represents the project

longing
con

for transcendence that, for

quest of chance.

Machiavelli,
be
called a

culminates

in his

for the

Machiavelli is

what might

hypothetical
He is

atheist.

That

is, his

athe

ism is

bottom nothing reality, Machiavelli is not

at

more

than

hypothesis
a

of

his

political project. name of

In

an atheist at all.

rebel, in the

human

freedom,
God
as a a
as

against

the mle of

God. His

rebellion presupposes political

the existence of

kind

its necessary object. Machiavelli's of fulfillment of the will of God,

and a problem with achieved

teaching

can

be

conceived

understood as

the Creator of man as

rational,

that there is
man can

hence potentially free being. Machiavelli understands, however, God's providence. What God evidently wills for

only be
more of

by

man

rising up

against

the

government of

God.
or

There is
misuse,
plays

to Machiavelli's appropriation of religion

including
Lost,

his use,

the Bible and Roman paganism

of

than mere political utility. He

whose rebellion

against

something God is a

the part of Satan in Milton's Paradise

crucial element

in God's

providence

for

man

(see John

Milton,

Paradise Lost, story of David

which

part and

1). This is the

warrant

Goliath, in
and

the

central

for Machiavelli's retelling of the chapter of The Prince, according to

himself,"

David fights to "give

a good account of

rather

than to vindi

cate the

God

of

Israel,

David,

rather than waiting

humbly

for God to

supply him with the arms necessary to kill Goliath, has his own knife to do the job (Prince, ch. 13, p. 56; cf. 1 Samuel 17). This is only one example of Machiavelli's many blasphemies. Machiavelli is unquestionably a blasphemer. It should be borne in mind, however, that the sin of blasphemy presumes

knowledge
that is

of

the tme God.

atheism

Machiavelli's hypothetical
ence

is

related

to the hypothetical natural sci

science of politics.

the theoretical

foundation for

Hobbes'

Scientific

knowledge,
knowledge
which,

of consequences,

according to Hobbes, is not absolute but conditional: it is "the and dependence of one fact upon another; by

out of what we can

will"

when we of science.

presently do, we know how to do something else (Leviathan, 1:5, p. 115). This is essentially Bacon's conception Baconian science is an instrument of human power. Its subject is
of

"the knowledge

Causes,

and secret motions of

things;

and the

the bounds of human Empire, to the effecting of all things means, perhaps the most effectual means, to Machiavelli's end
of

possible."7

enlarging of It is a

of

the conquest

fortune. Baconian

science represents a new path

to the understanding of the

290

Interpretation
method

world, through the

catch nature

of controlled
art"

experimentation,

which

attempts to

in the "vexations

of

as

its

standard of

intelligibility

(The Great Instauration, for the natural world, human

p.

28). It adopts,

power or utility.

Human beings really understand, in Bacon's science, only what they make. All of this is analogous to the Machiavellian injunction to tmst only in one's own
arms.

The
the

premise of

Bacon's The

science

is the denial is

of

the

natural

intelligibility

of

world

to

man.

natural world

a chaos rather than a cosmos.

It be
mind.

comes a cosmos

Tmsting
in

one's

only through the imposition of order by the human own arms, in Bacon's science, means to reject the world
which man

given

natural

experience, in

is

a mere part within a new order of

the whole, a

form

among many forms, bodies in purposeless motion,

master.

and constmct

in theory

over which man can make

things, himself the

a world of undisputed

Thinking

of

things as just more or

less

complex organizations of un
power.

differentiated
neous

matter which

brings them

within

the reach of human

Homoge
while

body,
and

has

no purposes of

its own, is

manipulable

by

man,

heterogeneous forms,
new,
moral

which

have their
of

own purposes or about

ends,

are not.

This

radically artificial, way

related

thinking

things also removes the

on their manipulation. of willful atheism.

restraints,

to the

heterogeneity
there

of

form,
a

Underlying
Bacon's
of

Bacon's

natural science with

is, then,

kind

natural

science,

this willful atheism, is crucial to the tme science

reveals

politics, according to

Hobbes, because it

the reality of the human

condition, the tion.

depths

of

the human problems and the heights of human aspira

The lows

and

highs

of

the human condition appear,

for Hobbes,

when man

is in

viewed

in the light

of

the new natural science, that

is,

the science of bodies

motion.

Hobbes begins his teaching

on politics with a scientific

analysis,

while

studiously avoiding the use of the word, of the soul and its powers. Soul, according to Hobbes, is nothing but a manifestation of body, its powers nothing
effects of

but the
sense.

the

interactions
results

of

bodies. The first

cause of all

thought is

Sense, however,

from

body

and

its

motions.

Sensible qualities,
several motions of

he claims, "are in the

the matter,

object

that causeth

them, but

so

many

by

which

it

diversely,"

presseth our organs

which means

that "Nei

ther in us that are pressed, are

motion produceth

they anything
Sense
thought."

else, but diverse motions; (for

percepts are connected together
either

in

what

nothing but Hobbes calls "trayns 95).

of

motion.)"8

of

These may be

directed
and

or

undirected; those that are directed are "regulated

by

some

desire,
senses

design"

(Leviathan 1:3,
Hobbes'

p.

grounding
subordinate

thought in the

motions

of

the

leads him to
the

reason,

which

is only

one mode of

the ordering of

thought, to

desires
and

or passions.

spies, to range the

minds

"The Thoughts, are to the he claims, "as Scouts abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedimotion,
p. and all quickness of

Desires,"

nesse of
thence"

the same,

(Leviathan 1:8,

139).

Reason,

according to

proceeding from Hobbes, is not an inde-

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

pendent cause of

291

underlying cause Since there is

natural

of no

human action, but only an instrument for the all-powerful, desire (Leviathan 1:6, pp. 129-30).

"Finis

ultimis"

or

"summum

Bonum"

for man, there is

no

limit to his desires (Leviathan 1:11, p. 160). This means, however, that there is no common good for mankind. This in turn implies that there is no
natural

basis for human

The
are

association.
no

By

nature,

men possess rights

that

they

can

assert against one

another. and who

another, but

duties that they

must observe

towards one

natural condition moved of

by

for human beings, who are inherently asocial, desires that are essentially limitless, is a "state of
a

warre,"

and

indeed

"such

Warre,

as

is

man"

of

every man,

against

every
nature

(Leviathan, 1:13,
oppression,

p.

185). This is the

root cause of

the problems of anarchy,

and war

in

political society.

The
of

scientific analysis of
of

human

is the

key

to the
and

discovery by
as

Hobbes

the "state

nature,"

with

its chaos,

violence,

terror,

the bedrock reality of the human condition.

That

same

scientific

analysis, for

Hobbes, brings
implies

to light the real possi

condition.

bilities for solving follows from what human

within nature.

once and
Hobbes'

for

all

the problems of the human

about

This

scientific analysis no

the malleability of

Because there is

highest

good

limits fixed
with

by

the passions, shape and

mold

naturally given to man, he can, himself to his own ends.

can

Cooperating
plished

the passions,

human beings

selves, to remedy the

defects

of their natural condition. of

rationally remake them This is to be accom

what

in

and

through the

Hobbes
Man"

calls an

imitation

of

restructuring "that rational

p.

the political community,

and most excellent work of

Nature,

(Leviathan, Introduction,
intention in his how to

81).

Hobbes'

political science
with

is to

refound

society

and govern

ment

by teaching
society.

cooperate

the passions in the organization of

political

Recognition

of

the horrors of the natural condition leads

Hobbes to the
that

discovery
his

of certain prudential rules of

behavior, his "laws

of

nature,"

guide

rational reconstruction of

is

one

and

Liberty,

and

only dominion

one purpose over

for

which can
of civil

society and government. There human beings, who "naturally love

understood

other,"

be

to consent to submit

themselves to the

artificial

bonds

society,

and

that is "the foresight of

their own preservation, and of a more

contented

getting themselves out from that

...

miserable condition of

life thereby; that is to say, of Warre, which is neces

to the natural passions of men, when there is not visible sarily consequent Power to keep them in (Leviathan, 11:17, p. 223). For Hobbes, all legitimate government is representative, because it is founded
awe"

on

the

consent

of

the governed, and nonpartisan, because it benefits all its

subjects

equally

by

addressing

a need that pertains

to all of them alike. Nonpar

tisan

government enables men

to live in

peace

by

giving them something that

Hobbes'

they
ment

can

trust in to
nonpartisan

protect

their

lives, liberties,
artificial.

and estates. artificial mler

govern

is

because it is

An
on

has

no selfish

interests,

nor

self-serving opinions, to impose

its

subjects.

Whatever inter It is from

ests or opinions such a mler might enforce would

be strictly

general.

292
this

Interpretation
scientific analysis of and

human

nature

that Hobbes leams

of

both the

possi

bility

the means

beings

as a method

for creating an artificial man to govern for solving their real world problems.
in
Hobbes'

over actual

human

An important

element

scientific

refounding

of

formation

of

religion, particularly the religion of the Bible.

not

society is the re Religion, Hobbes

politi

understands, is
cal organization.

going to disappear
roots run much

with

the change of social and

Its

too

deep

for that. It

represents

the fear that

condition.

is, according
"This
thing.

to

Hobbes'

analysis, the bedrock reality

Dark,"

of

the human

perpetual as

feare,
in the

always

causes,

it

were

accompanying he argues, "must

mankind

in the ignorance have for

of

needs

object some

And therefore
either

when

there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to

or evil

accuse,
ble"

for their good,

pp.

fortune, but

some

Power,

or

Agent Invisi

170-71). Religion represents, then, the reality that also possible refounding. Representative but only necessary supplies the for Hobbes, government, necessary prerequisites, left unprovided by God, for man's comfortable self-preservation, to which the most powerful

(Leviathan, 1:12,

Hobbes'

makes not

passions

implanted

by

God incline him. It

of

lion

against and a

fulfillment from

the

is, then, paradoxically both divinely established order. Hence,

traditional

a rebel
religion

cannot

be

Hobbes'

excluded

commonwealth. particular

Traditional religion, in
ever,
with

Christianity, interferes, how

the

rational reconstruction of society. rather

Insisting

on

the absolute do

minion of

God, counselling faith in Him

punishment

than tmst in the arm of the

restrains

flesh, threatening everlasting

men

for human assertiveness, it

from assuming the powers of litical forms of human sovereignty.

purged of
Hobbes'

self-government and

Christianity

establishing the po must, then, be transformed,

purpose

its belief in divine

treatment

sovereignty.

This is the deepest

behind

extensive

of religion

his teaching

of secular absolutism.

sovereign power

for the

peace of

in his political writings, culminating in Secular absolutism, according to which the society fixes the doctrines and practices of

religion, is necessary for Hobbes because sovereignty cannot be divided, "be tween the Church and State between Spiritualists and Temporalists; between
the Sword of
Man"

Justice,

and

the Shield of

faith."

The

more profound problem

is

that human beings in their fears cannot be divided "between the the

Christian,

and

(Leviathan, 111:39,
of

conclusion

499). That sovereignty must not be divided is a that Hobbes draws from his consideration of the state of nature as
p.

the fundamental reality

human

existence.

The

real of

meaning

of

this

teaching
own

is that human beings,

compelled affairs.
Hobbes'

moved

by

the dire necessities

the natural condition, are

to govern

to assume for themselves the

right

and power

in their

defense

of secular absolutism

is

at

bottom

a vindication of

the

sovereignty Hobbes in his biblical exegesis, for

viathan, attempts to transform

of man.

example

in Parts III

and

IV

of

Le

Christianity

from

transcendent faith into

a civil

theology, cutting
skin, to
give

out the core of the religion while

the appearance of

preserving its rhetorical divine imprimatur to the authority of the human

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

sovereign.

293

The

preservation of

the

power of

traditional Christianity is that, since the depends on the dispensation of justice, and "Justice on society Life and Death, and other lesser Rewards and Punishments, resid
political problem of

ing

in them that have the

a

Sovereignty of the
should

Commonwealth,"

it follows that "it

than the Sover
greater

is impossible
eign, hath

Common-wealth
Death."

stand,

where

any

other

a power of

punishments, than
Nature"

giving "Eternall

greater rewards than

life,"

Life; however, "is

and of

inflicting

a greater

reward, than

the life present; and Eternall torment a greater punishment than the death of

(Leviathan, 111:38,

p.

478).
of

To

undermine

the sovereignty

the Christian God Hobbes

attacks

two of

the pillars of divine sovereignty: the setting

punishing infractions (i.e., damnation

or

laws (i.e., revelation) and hell). First Hobbes undermines the

of

forth

system of rewards and punishments without which

God

cannot command obe

"heaven"

dience. Hobbes
"hell"

criticizes

the

belief in the afterlife, transforming

and

into strictly this-worldly concepts, denying eternal punishment in any form. Hell is not only immanentized but also psychologized. It is the punish
ment of

knowing
of

that

one

has

missed a possible reward.

The focus
tion. God

Hobbes'

critique,

however, is

on

the belief in divine revela

cannot mle over men

if He

cannot make

His

will

known to them. A
most

subject cannot

be

expected

to obey laws that he cannot know. Perhaps the

doctrines, for Hobbes, is the teaching "That Faith Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion, which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or
pernicious of all religious and

why any

man should

take the Law

tion, for the mle of Hobbes attacks all

lation
of

action"

of his Country, rather (Leviathan, 11:29, p. 366).

than his

own

Inspira
made

of

the means

by

which revelation

is supposedly

available to man: the immediate revelation of the

Holy Spirit,

the mediate reve

the scripture, and the exemplary revelation of Jesus. Revelation cannot

as such
past

be known from the

Hobbes'

because the
have leaves the

marks of

revelation, miracles,
present

cannot

be known
p.

and

ceased

in the

(Leviathan, 111:32,

414).

argument

political sovereign as with

tween to

man and

God. Christianity,
who

the only real mediator be its Divine Sovereign revealing His laws

man and

punishing those

disobey Him,
atheism. of

Hobbes transforms
of man.

doctrinally
Hobbes'

into
form

a civil religion of

in the

service of

the sovereignty

This is

Machiavelli's hypothetical
a

The

secular reformation of

Chris

tianity,
for

Hobbesian
arms, is in

manifestation
Hobbes'

the Machiavellian counsel to trust in

one's own

version of

liberalism the

ultimate requirement

man's self-government or

freedom.

II

make

While agreeing with Hobbes that the exigencies it necessary to enlist religion in the effort to free

of

the human condition

man

from the

necessities

294

Interpretation
upon

that bear down

him, Locke, in his

of what can
more

version of

liberalism, differs from

the political

Hobbes in his understanding use of religion. He is much

much

be

accomplished through
expectations.

tempered in his

He looks for
relative

less from religion,

even when

appropriately

reformed.

Locke's

pessimism on

the question of the

real

political use of religion

is

related

to a deeper
to the

pessimism, concerning the

problem of

human

existence.

possibility of a final political Human nature as revealed by

solution

Hobbes'

scientific
all

analysis

by

is simply too strong and intransigent to be subjugated once and for the tool of human reason. Reason itself is driven by subrational desire.
understands

Locke clearly
present

that the state of nature persists, if only as an

civil
society.9

ever-

possibility,
argument

even

in

This understanding is
exercised

reflected

in

Locke's

for the right

of

revolution, to be

by

the citizen

body

when

those entrusted with government authority in effect plunge society

into the
limited cally cally

state of nature
government.

by

abusing their powers,

who rejects

and

in the

related argument

for

Hobbes,

any

right of revolution

by

categori

denying

that subjects may judge the actions of their sovereigns,

Hobbes'

is

radi

more optimistic

than Locke on the decisive question. Optimism about the

argument

saving

power of science underlies

for

absolute

sovereignty,

and with

it his

argument

for

secular absolutism. end of political

Locke understands, however,

absolute subjection

that if self-preservation is the to the

will of

society, then

the

sovereign

is

a contradiction

in terms,

since

it

reduces

the

establishment of political
oppression of one with potential

society to nothing more than a substitution of the

the force of a multitude and the cover of

threat from many acting

individually

and without

law, for the law (Two Treatises,

316-17). More clearly than Hobbes, Locke respects human nature as the inviolable ground of the modem project of human self-government and

11:2,

pp.

freedom. The
Hobbes'

problem

with

treatment

of

religion, from Locke's

of religious

point of

view, is that he underestimates the strength

strength of argument.

belief,

or rather
Hobbes'

the

the

passions

that account

for belief. This is implicit in

of

own

Religion

originates

in the fears
and

man,

who

"looks too far before

all and

him, in the care of future long, gnawed on by feare

repose,
nor pause of

time,"

consequently "hath his heart

poverty,
or other

the

day
no

of

death,

calamity;
p.

has

consolation

169). It is a (Leviathan, 1:12, for these horrors, revealing their transcendent purposes, promising supernatural protection from them, and explaining what human beings must do
avail themselves of divine salvation. The starkness of these terrors, inherent in the human condition, accounts for the strength of the religious passions. This is perhaps what Locke has in mind when he argues that "The imagination is

his anxiety, but in

sleep"

to

always restless and suggests

variety

of

thoughts,

and the

will,

reason

being

laid

aside, is ready for every extravagant project;

and

in this

State, he

that goes

farthest And

out of

the way, is thought

once

fittest to lead,
what

and

is

sure of most
or craft

followers:

when

Fashion hath

Established,

Folly

began, Custom

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

makes

295

question."

it Sacred, and 'twill be thought impudence or madness, to contradict or At any rate this is the origin of much in the "Governments, Reli
Manners"

gions,
what and

and
with

of

the nations of the

calls

earth.10

These fears

are the root of

Locke

heavy irony

the

"burning

zeal

for God, for the church,

a coolness of

for the

salvation of
secular

souls.""

Hobbes'

absolutism,

however,
forms

presupposes

the reli to

gious allow

sentiments,

an enlightened cynicism about religious of religious

belief,

sufficient

for the imposition

peace.

by

the sovereign for the sake of

this-

What he presumes as necessary for the proper organization of he appears to contradict in his scientific analysis of man, which society culminates in the theoretical recovery of the horrific state of nature. His defense
worldly
civil
of secular absolutism

is based

on an abstraction
Hobbes'

from the

state of nature as a

spiritual or psychological phenomenon.

secular absolutism

in

practice

is

more

likely

to excite than allay conflict,

by impinging

on matters

that indi

viduals cannot

help
of

but hold to be

of

the highest importance. It

is, then, in

practice rather a

threat to than a support for the

man's self-government.

Recognition
of

immutability
he
adheres

of

the state of nature as the essential reality

on religion

the human

condition which

leads Locke in his thought

in his

from

secular

absolutism, to
gious

earliest writings on

the subject, to reli

argues

toleration.12

In the Letter

Concerning
both

Toleration Locke

for his

new

approach

to the

problem of religion on

political and religious grounds.

The

political argument

is

a straightforward application of

the scientific political the

ory "civil

of

the Second Treatise. Since the ends of political society are

interests"

limited to the
and

of

"life, liberty, health,

things,"

and

indolency

body"

of

the "pos

session of outward

The "civil
the
laws"

magistrate"

is to

it has nothing to do with the saving of men's souls. concern himself only with securing to his subjects

enjoyment of

the goods of this world,

"by

the impartial

execution of equal

(Letter,

p.

17). Salvation is entirely the business

of the

church, "a

volun

tary society
public

of

men,
of

joining
God in

themselves together of their own accord to the

worshiping

such manner as
souls"

effectual to the salvation of their

to do with "the
and state

possession of civil and

they judge acceptable to Him, and (Letter, p. 20). The church has nothing (Letter, p. 23). Church worldly
goods"

occupy entirely distinct between

spheres.

Mutual toleration

is, then,

the only

sensible policy.

The

separation

church and

state,
at

however,
paints

turns out in the end to

be

not quite so clear and clean as

Locke

first

it. Actions

prohibited

by

law because they are injurious to the legitimate interests of society are not made legal by incorporation in the worship of some religion. Even of opinions, only
those that
gious

entirely speculative opinions that have practical

are of

must

be tolerated

without exception. on

Reli

implications, by touching
regulation.

"the

will and

manners"

society,

are subject

to

Locke
are

allows

for the

outright moral which

suppression of some religious

beliefs: those that

contrary "to those

society"; those

mles which are necessary to the preservation

of civil

by

296
some

Interpretation
"men
and arrogate

to themselves and to their own sect some

which citizens

peculiar preroga

tive";

those

by

"ipso facto deliver

He Locke's

themselves

up to the

prince."

protection and service of another

also countenances the suppression

retractions

of atheism

(Letter,

pp.

45, 50-52).

from the hard-and-fast

secular purpose of

separation of church and state point to the

system of religious toleration.

underlying

the

Apropos the
addresses

social and political situation

in

which

he finds himself, Locke

reli

his

religious argument

for toleration to Christian believers. The

gious argument cal argument

is essentially rhetorical. It is necessary to make such a rhetori because, from the point of view of Christian belief, the political
on

argument, based
the

the scientific analysis of the human condition, simply begs

crucial question

pertaining to the

ends and proper organization of civil soci

revelation.

ety,

i.e.,

the question of the truthfulness of the Christian

The

politi

cal argument

only if government is limited to the purposes of Locke's "civil The limitation of government to the security of life, liberty, and property presupposes the doctrine of the state of nature and what it teaches about the ends of human existence.

is

valid

interests."

The Christian revelation,

man's

however,
This
can

opens

for the believer the

to

vision

of

transcendent

purposes.

be

understood

imply
and

a rather more

expansive role

for

government

than is admitted

by Locke,

perhaps

including the
seeks

care of men's souls. prove that the gious

Locke

avoids

the decisive question

instead

to

Christian

revelation prohibits enforcement

beliefs

and practices. of

He

argues

that "the Gospel

by state power of reli frequently declares that

church of

the tme disciples

should persecute
and

Christ

must suffer

persecution; but that the

Christ

others,

and

force

others

by fire

and sword

to embrace her faith

Testament"

doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the books of the New (Letter, p. 22). Examples from the Old Testament he dismisses as irrelevant
those
who are under

to

the new

law

of

Christianity. For his

own

esteems

"toleration to be the

church"

chief characteristic mark of

the tme

part, Locke (Let

ter,

p.

13). This is the

premise of

his reading

of

the Christian

gospel.

He

can

present

his

own version of

Christianity, according
toward
all

to which the chief obligation

apostles"

of anyone who

"pretends to be

a successor of the
men,"

is to

teach

"the

duties

of peace and goodwill

because

on

the deepest level all

as

religious

opinions of their

belief is radically subjective (Letter, p. 28). Religions exist only believers. In the unpublished "Fourth Letter on
and

Toleration"

Locke clearly distinguishes between knowledge uously assigns Locke does

religion

opinion,

and

unambig

to the sphere

of

opinion.13

not restrict

his

effort at

the reconstruction teaches

about

reconciling it to what his political ends of human life, to the Letter

science

Christian theism, the beginnings and the

of

Concerning
writings

Toleration. The

general purpose
within

behind

all of

his explicitly

religious

is to fit

Christianity

the

politically legitimate sphere of tian belief from the strenuous

religion.

Locke

narrows the essentials of

and

Chris

creeds of

Catholic

Protestant orthodoxy to

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

the
one

297

necessary

and sufficient article of

church"

faith,

that "Jesus is the

Messiah."14

He

arrives at

this "low

version of

Christianity by denying

the signifi

cance

for Christian theology of any portion of the Bible except the words of the Savior. The Old Testament is superseded by the revelation of God in Christ,
the epistolary writings of the New Testament, since they individuals who are already Christians, are inadvertently silent
and are addressed about

to

the beliefs

necessary for
moral

being

Christian in the first

to

place

(Reasonableness,
as
"king."

pp.

186-91).
of

Furthermore, according
teacher. The word

Locke,

Jesus'

office
"mler"

the Messiah is that

"Messiah"

means

or not of

If Jesus is

mler,

then his teachings are laws. His

kingdom is
individuals

this world,

however,
moral

and so

his laws
lies

are

but

mles of

right

conduct or

behavior, backed up only by

who accept

the force

of moral suasion.

Christians
example
call

are

the simple

homi
(Rea

Jesus, for extracts from

of

the Golden Rule. This is the meaning that Locke

Jesus'

to

"repent, for

the kingdom of God is at

hand"

sonableness,

pp.

124-36).

Christianity
homilies fit

for Locke is
even

purely Jesus

moralistic reli

gion,

a collection of simple

for the divine

common

lot
as

of

mankind,
apostles.

represented

by

the illiterate and credulous

men chosen

by

his

Locke very carefully

tion is necessary in
mankind"

avoids the argument that

morality.

revelation

is necessary for

the elaboration of the tme

order

He does

admit

that the assertion of revela

to teach the tme morality to the "vulgar and mass of

pp.

(Reasonableness,
its

lOlff.

170-75ff).
political

The theoretical justification for Locke's

interpretation

of revelation

is his

critique of

epistemological claims

in the

Essay Concerning

Human

Understanding. He
of

argues

that there is really only one proof of the truthfulness

performance of miracles

revelation,

and

that

is the

by

those

who claim reve

latory authority for their words. This alleged proof of revelation, however, is self-canceling. There have been many founders of religions, claiming the au thority of revelation for their divergent teachings, who have substantiated their
claims with miracles.

More important is the

problem

that miracles cannot really

be known The is

as such without a complete

proof of revelation requires

understanding of the powers of nature. plenary knowledge of the whole of which man

a part.

The

possession of such

knowledge, however,

would make revelation

supererogatory.'5

Locke in his treatment

way to tame or for it to be simply
a

of religion seeks not so much a

way to

use religion as

domesticate it. Religion is too

appropriated

much a part of

human

nature

by

man as a

tool for

his

use.

Taming

religion

is

the underlying

purpose of

Locke's

system of religious

toleration. Religious tol them as an essential ele

eration civilizes the religious passions

ment

by dignifying

in the

proper

ordering

of society.

It legitimates them politically, giving

them a significant part to play in toleration turns the religious to its appropriate sphere,

them something of a place, admittedly a limited and carefully defined one, in

political society.

More

importantly, it
The

gives

the

functioning

of society.

system of religious

passions

to the useful purpose of

limiting

government

298
at

Interpretation
pertaining to religion. Locke's arguments against the intru government into religious affairs have the effect of arming the religious
matters

least in

sion of

passions while

for this very important purpose. Locke redirecting them, away from the "burning
of

excites

the religious passions

other men's

zeal"

for

souls, to

the defense

limited

government.

At the

same

time,

religious toleration

domesticates the

religious passions

by

turning

them against themselves. Locke's arguments concerning the absolute

religion

disjunction between
passions

and politics

are

intended to

enlist

the religious

in the

resistance

to the intmsion of the church in secular affairs. The

mingling

of church and

state, "which
and

everything perfectly distinct

offense not

in their original, end, business, infinitely different from each

are

and

in
an

other,"

is

only

against political order of

but

also against religious

faith,

amount

ing

to the

jumbling

"heaven

earth"

and

(Letter,

p.

27). The
gently,

system of re as

ligious toleration transforms, however indirectly for other men's souls into the "burning
zeal"

and

religion man

the

"war"

own

lusts

vices"

and

(Letter,

p.

every 13). The internal transformation

of

"upon his

of religion will

inevitably
for

influence the

political

behavior

of

believers. Instead

of

demanding

political power political

for themselves, they will be on the lookout to resist demands power by others. Churches will police each other to insure that
affairs of state.

none

becomes too influential in the

Locke argues, "like

"All the

several separate public

congregations,"

so

many

guardians of

the

peace,

will watch one of

another, that nothing may

be innovated

or changed

in the form

the government,

because they

can

that is, already enjoy just and moderate

an equal condition with

hope for nothing better than what they their fellow subjects under a
p.

government"

(Letter,

55).

Locke's treatment
version of

of religion

points to what

is

new

and

different in his

liberalism. Locke recognizes much more distinctly than Hobbes that, precisely if liberalism's scientific analysis of human nature is valid, then human freedom and self-government are ultimately to be attained only in and through
the rational

balancing

of

the primordial

forces

at work

in man,

rather

than

in

reason's absolute mle over

those forces.

Ill

generative phase of classical

What has been usefully termed the second phase of modernity, i.e., the liberal theory, culminated in the overt and covert
to religion that is evident in

hostility
others.16

Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke

and a

host

of

Such

a strident conclusion with respect was not

to an abiding human commit

ment,

however,

the

sort of advice

that pmdent statesmen could

follow.

Those
that
or

with actual responsibilities of governance could recognize

immediately
of

hostility to what the common man holds sacred was not a holding his allegiance. More pointedly, thoughtful liberals

way

winning
well

knew very

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

the enduring human realities to which religious
patent

299
the

belief

speaks as well as
questions.17

deficiencies

of militant atheism as an answer to such

were not

These lessons American

lost

on

the American
of

founding

generation.

The

founding
it

was an

ism. In

a sense

was a

both the theory and practice of liberal activity practical activity of the highest sort, which is to say a
about

practice governed
respects

by

theory

the highest of
a

human things In its decisive

.

the American

founding

was

essential

themes

of modernity.

But this

fully fully

modem

event,

governed

by

the

modem character also reflected

itself.18

the tension concerning religion that is coeval

with

modernity

As
that

architects of a

democratic
as

regime

founded ("to

on a primeval quest which

for

liberty
and

even

they

saw

divinely

grounded

the laws

of nature a regime

nature's god entitle cated

to

liberty

must

them"), find a

the American
space

founders knew that

dedi
that

for the very transcendence

of nature

liberty

requires and religion articulates.

The tension between the necessity of accommodation and the danger of reli gious passion which is endemic in liberalism underlies the deep ambiguity re garding religion in the American founding. Though in practice none of the founders wished to establish a specific church in America, they were pro

foundly

uncertain about

the ends of toleration and disestablishment and were, the practical questions that have so bedeviled
a practical matter of relationships

therefore, silent later generations

about most of of

Americans. As

they

were

obviously

pre

pared to tolerate the manifold

and era.

ing

array among the various churches that were present in the states in the founding In theory, however, the founders were open to a number of widely differ solutions to the seemingly intractable tension between religious commit liberty.
exception of possible

between

church and state

ment and political

With the

Madison,

the founders
an

ways that some variant of religion

was, in practice,

agreed in varying important instrument for was an enlightenment received

supporting both
commonplace,

public

morality
under

and private virtue.

This It

largely

the influence of
period

Locke.19

its

most elo
Address,"

quent expression

in the

founding

in Washington's "Farewell
twice: once

but it

was such a

commonly

accepted

belief that its

most pertinent practical under

expression, the Northwest

Ordinance,

was passed

the Con

federation

and again even

by

the first

Congress.20

Moreover

those like

Madison,

whose

first

concern was religious

tolera

tion,

understood

the need to accommodate the religious sentiments of the citi

zenry. morial

careful

reading

of

Madison's
shows

most

important contribution, the "Me

written

Remonstrance,"

and

that it was closely

adherents.

to appeal to
advanced
state can

independent, i.e.,
therein
seeks

nonanglican, religious

The

argument

to demonstrate how religious neutrality on the part of the

benefit nearly

religion

absolute

assertion

itself. In this respect the conclusion is surely Lockean (i.e., toleration), but the argument plainly goes beyond Locke in its that religion itself will flourish best in a regime of
toleration.21

300

Interpretation
sits astride
overt

Madison's Memorial
a manner

the tensions

over religion

in the

founding

in

that belies its

indebtedness to Locke. The

of religion suggests at manner

claim

that disestab
a

lishment

will redound

to the benefit

least

friendliness
toleration.
well

to religion that

is hot found in this

in Locke's defense

of

While Madison's primary interest in toleration is evident in his theory as as his practice, his concern for the nefarious effects of sectarian religious
sion

pas

did
to

not

transform itself into

reflects

hostility

to religion as

such.22

Madison's Memorial
gard
religion.

the complex themes of the

founding
is the

with re

One
and

of

the most

fashionable

of

these themes

concern

for

religious

zealotry This theme received its

who

the concomitant need to tame

most

divisive

religious passions. of

penetrating

expression

in the thought

Jefferson,
on the

among the founders

most

deeply

reflected

the Lockean

teaching

matter of religion.

Practically speaking, Jefferson regarded religious toleration as an essential element of liberty and his actions to secure it as one of his greatest achieve ments. This toleration was not, however, universal. Religions that were intol erant could be suppressed, since they refused to play by the rules of toleration
themselves.23

Moreover, Jefferson
public peace and

admitted that some religious opinions might

be inimical to

that open expression of such opinions might be

notes

forbidden. Significantly, the one opinion that he expressly is the claim that "a foreign prince has power in this

in this

regard

commonwealth."

Though

superficially directed at Catholic allegiance to the pope, the principle itself constitutes a far more ominous assault on the central Christian claim of alle
giance to a

Divine

prince

("Notes

on

Religion").
state

In this

regard

the supposedly overt neutrality of the

in

religious matters of

transforms itself into

citizens.

hostility

to the essential religious belief

many

of

its

Jefferson, however,
religious

was not

hostile to its

some

forms

of

religion,

broadly

conceived, only to
tion
of

belief that

could not

be

squared with

liberalism.
be

Properly

trimmed of

explicit adherence

his concep to foreign powers,

Like his
pa connection

religion can

a powerful source of support never claimed

for

public morality.

tron

Locke, Jefferson

that there

was a

necessary

be

tween religion

and morality.

He was,

however,

convinced

that, in practice,

such a connection was

The

culmination of
of religion

extremely useful. Jefferson's attempt to

and the

resolve

the tension between the

utility
son

expressions

many of its traditional be seen in his own liberal unitarianism, a religion that Jeffer may America.24 This religious teaching confidently hoped would soon dominate
character of seen
Jesus'

itself

dangerous

eloquently in his attempt to distill the fundamental core of message from the pages of the New Testament, a distillation made necessary because of the manner in which Christianity had been corrupted the priests

may be

by

teacher, nothing more. This was the sort of religion that Jefferson thought would be helpful to the success of popular government. covered over with pious
of

and

doctors

of

the Church. The result is the Jesus

Locke:

a moral

Properly

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

homage to the
men on

301

greatness of

Jesus, it

might succeed

in

focusing

the

attention of

those

moral convictions on which

they

might all agree and

away from

divisive

claims of an absolute path

to

salvation.25

same

Jefferson's taming of religion nonetheless points to an enduring reality in the way that Machiavelli's militant functionalism does. If religion were as
as some of

essentially dangerous would be absurd for

which

Jefferson's

most

impolitic

rhetoric

suggests, it

a pmdent statesman

to employ it for the noble ends to

Jefferson ultimately sought to put it, i.e., as the foundation of virtuous behavior. In short, his own practice with respect to religion belies the one-sided concern for the effects of religious faction with which he is usually saddled. Even more so does the practice of the founding generation belie attempts to
saddle
part or

it

with

Jefferson's thought

and practice with respect to

of

religion,

either

in

in

whole.

From Jefferson's invocation

the

God

of creation

in the
and and

Declaration, to Washington's Farewell Address, to the piety of Hamilton Adams, the founders employed religious rhetoric, invoked religious piety,
manifested a

that is
matter

quite

properly overwhelming to those whose understanding of the founders on this has largely been limited to one phrase from Jefferson. The founders

religious sentiment with respect to

Divine Providence

were, for the most part, not particularly orthodox in their theological opinions. But they would never have confused heterodoxy with impiety.26 The founders also may have thought more of "nature's than of the special revelation entrusted to one ancient people in Palestine. But this very
God"

rhetoric suggests an attentiveness ment of

to religious conviction and an acknowledge

the ends of

which

it

speaks.

Furthermore, in

some respects nature's of

God His

was a more expansive and commands were visible

demanding
The God

Lord than that

biblical theism.
theism
not

to man as such.

Being

thus visible, he could re

a

quire universal obedience thereto.

more attractive

of nature

to the egalitarian spirit of

sort.27

may have been democratic ages, but it

was

thereby ing,

atheism of

any
and, in decisive respects,
new undertak

Having
that

embarked on a momentous were

evidently unsure of the exact character of the practices This uncertainty is seen plainly in the founding debates over the one wholly new feature of the American religious settlement: the disestab lishment of religion. Its critics viewed it as a covert means of supporting irre
would result.

the founders

ligion,

while

its

supporters

thought it a means to

free
the

religion

from

politics

that

religion

itself

might

flourish. For Americans

of

founding

generation

this

uncertainty

about practical matters was not synonymous with

or revulsion

towards religion itself. That the polity was to

uncertainty be unchurched did

manner

about

not mean that

religion was

the

regime was

to

be irreligious. Even the

be

in

which an ac

universally knowledgement that the ends

presumed of

to be a support for virtue

can

implies

the human soul

most

properly

nurtured

by

conviction.28

religious

The

complex character of

the

founders'

attitudes

toward religion is reflected

302

Interpretation
and practice of

in the thought

later

generations

of

Americans. The founders

community:

understood well modem parlance relation

that

religion

was a powerful
"function."

force in human
nature of

in

it had

a social

The

this function and its

to the ends of politics were, transferred to

however, deeply
Americans

uncertain. who

This

uncer

tainty
been

was

later

generations of

have themselves
America.29

deeply

divided

over

the place of religion in the public life of

One
He

who understood

this uncertainty with the most penetrating insight was

"function"

the greatest student of the actual practice of democratic regimes, Tocqueville.

understood

the obvious fact that religion has a

observation

in

political re

gimes.

But this

is

so general

that it says nothing of any

importance.

Significance begins to
gion

emerge when

the query is rephrased. Granted that reli

not

has

function,
necessary

what

is it? Put differently, functions do

which

appear as
tionally"

pointing toward some end for

or at point and

religion

is

said to

just appear, they be "func

At this Hobbesian

least extremely the difference between Tocqueville

useful.30

and

the

traditions of

Lockean thought
as religion

could not

be

more

fundamental. On virtually
a much more subtle and

every point, insofar

is concerned, he is
the "first
founders"

sympathetic analyst than

any

of

of

liberalism. Insofar

as the

origin and end or purpose of religion are

ments with

concerned, Tocqueville's disagree

Hobbes

sal phenomenon of

fundamental. Hobbes, for example, located the univer religion in one of the basest of human passions: fear of the
are

unknown.

From thence he (this fear itself

concluded

that, though

religion

itself

could not

be

suppressed

cannot

be

overcome and

in

one

form leads

directly to

the Hobbesian state), its denominational manifestations could be

political artifact.

refounded as a

Religion, in

other

words,

could

be

understood

completely in

terms

of

its

political

function (Leviathan, 1:9).

problem of religion

For Tocqueville the

manner.

Religion is

natural to man not

emerges in exactly the opposite because his lowest passions demand to natural

be

numbed or quelled. seek

Rather
and

religion

is

because

man's

highest

aspira

tions

fulfillment
a

disparages
sider such sal

grounding in the transcendent. Tocqueville never belief in the human soul and its relation to God, nor did he con

of merely political utility. These beliefs spring from a univer human source, the striving for perfection that is the often silent wellspring of human activity itself: "Nothing can prevent such ideas from being the spring from which all else
originates."31

beliefs

His relation to the human soul, is natu precisely because of our striving for virtue and our desire to grasp the ultimate foundations of human existence and human destiny. Religion gives voice and substance, often in mythic ways, to that which is highest in human
of and ral

Thus,

the core

religion, God

to man

nature, that

which

sensual world of animate and

positively distinguishes human beings from the material inanimate objects which they inhabit.

and

As such, the

problem of religion

the opposite of that

for liberalism is in crucial ways precisely found in Hobbes. Since religion articulates the highest of

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

303

human aspirations, the problem is not, as in Hobbes, finding relief from fear in human society. Rather it is how to create a space for the noble in a regime that

is admittedly dedicated to giving the

regime of the

widest possible

freedom for the base de

contained

sires of material acquisition and progress.

How

can

the high be

in

low? Democratic equality seems to breed contempt for the very distinction between the noble and the base, and the reliance on public opinion
and observation which render

dominates the thought

of

the common

man

seems

to

the truths of religion than the purely

at

deeply troubling

in democratic

regimes

in any
the

sense other

functional.
make

The sharp

key

this point is to recognize that Tocqueville refuses to

modem

and

entirely

distinction between it
as

purely functional

understand about man's

with.32

ing

of religion and a view of

pointing to fundamental tmth

transcendent

destiny,
seeks

distinction that he has been

frequently
its

charged

To be

brief, he

to reformulate

liberalism,

not

religion, because the funda

noble on own

mental religious aspiration rooted so

is

not

only useful, but

terms and

deep

in human

nature

that it cannot be suppressed in a

manner consis

tent

with

democratic liberalism.

nature ultimately aspires to transcendence, this striving can be fulfilled in two ways: by religious conviction in a divine end for man or only in a commitment to earthly salvation in a political kingdom. Man either has

Since human

faith in God

or

widespread religious conviction

in God's earthly lieutenant or vice-regent. The alternative to is not secularism but tyranny. For Tocqueville,
was a con

democratic secularization, the ideal of enlightenment intellectuals, tradiction in terms (Democracy in America, 11:1:5, 11:2:7). Tocqueville's lem
of religion
rejection of

the Hobbesian and Lockean solution to the prob their formulations of liberalism itself. The

implies

a rejection of

soulless materialism that

lies

at

the core of their thought implies the

hostility

they display
as

to religious faith and the need to contain and tame religion insofar
possible.

politically

But if

religion speaks

without which must

liberalism in

cannot

be

constituted
and

such a

to the nobility of man, a nobility be sustained, then liberal regimes themselves manner that the legitimate desire for peace be
not

tween sects

denominations does
great end of

transform itself into

hostility

to

reli

gion as such.

The

democratic statesmanship in this

while

regard will

be

to

preserve people

the respect for

diversity

sustaining the religious sentiment of

the

itself.
would

Tocqueville

and aspirations of

have understood perfectly the religious motivation behind Martin Luther King's public activities, even the deeply reli
speech.

gious cadence of

his

Nor

would

he have been

ashamed or embarrassed
manner

by

it. What he

would

have

regarded as shameful
public

is the

in

which

the

religious character of

King's
that

life

and

thought embarrasses contemporary

Americans to the
would

point

they studiously ignore it. In

short, Tocqueville
a a

have

understood

sectarian creed and

perfectly the distinction between the promotion of friendliness to religion as such, a distinction that was

304

Interpretation
among the American founders but
which

commonplace

has been lost two

cen

turies later.

Quite obviously this represents a fundamental reformulation of the task of liberal statesmanship with respect to religion, even from the admittedly less hostile version set forth in Locke. But it is also a refounding of religion itself,
or at

least

religion

insofar

as

it has

political aspirations.

This is best

seen with

respect

to the policy of toleration. Locke's program of toleration was

upon a rejection of

irreligious

to the core and was founded

itself.33

the essential claims of religion

was required

Tocqueville too thought that toleration

in liberalism for

what is essentially the opposite reason. Religion itself flourishes best when it is left free of entangling alliances with the regime. Tocqueville never claims that toleration is demanded because religion, though useful, is a fraud. It is the

noble aspirations of religion that require

independence to

flourish,

not

in his

order

to be tamed. When
as

religion

lies down

with

the regime, it suffers the same fate

of

the regime. This was a

communion

Catholic
gion

fate that he saw plainly in the case in postrevolutionary France. In deposing the itself is deposed.
saw a religious

own

regime reli

Tocqueville

life in America that

was at once more vibrant

was also more concerned with

and more varied

with what might

than anything in his homeland. It

be

called

the core of religion and less concerned

seen
elsewhere.34

formal
to the to the

ity

and ritual than

anything
of

This too

was attributable

activist and egalitarian spirit of

most

democratic times that

but
which was

sought answers

fundamental

human

questions

impatient
and

ritual

and suspicious of

inegalitarian

ecclesiastical

forms

with empty hierarchies. In

democratic

regimes religion which of all

taught of a transcendent God and the equal

would

relationship democratic souls

human beings before this God

flourish to the
Religions

good of

and the

benefit

of

democratic

regimes.

which

failed

to speak to the deepest needs of

would wither.

(Democracy
saw

democratic citizens, as both in America, 11:1:6, 1:2:9).

men and

citizens,

Tocqueville

to provide a means

ever, requires
ation

American religious life and sought for nourishing it in democratic republics. To do so, how reformulating both the nature of liberalism and the case for toler
the robust character of
was more

therein. Liberalism

than
and

a collection

of rational contractors
regime as

pursing their own acquisitive

convenient means of so

desires

finding

the

liberal

the

most

doing.

Properly

thought-out free liberal

a

societies could

achieve a plentiful measure of

ual commitment to refuses to reduce
will

human greatness,

the ideals

of

liberty
for

and

nobility bom out of individ dignity inherent in a liberalism that

acquisition.35

itself to

a vehicle

material

Such

liberalism
our
will

nurture religious

conviction

basest desires
uals
of

and give

precisely because of its ability to tame substance to the highest of human aspirations. It

recognize at the

heart
of

of religion not credulous

believers
corrupted

and superstitious rit

but "things human

the very highest

concernment"

about the

dignity
no

and

destiny
than
an

the

soul.

That

religion can

become

is

more

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

eternal observation about all
well as religion.

305

things of which human

beings partake,
on

politics as

At its

best, however,

religion articulates

the very nobility that

which

distinguishes

man

political order

from his fellow creatures, a difference rests and which liberalism forgets at its peril.
was not sanguine

humane

Tocqueville himself
alism.

He

understood

full

well

the powerful

concerning the success of such a liber forces of commercial acquisition

unleashed

only
the

underscores

publics

by liberalism, especially in large republics such as America. But this the fragility of such a liberalism as he envisioned. Large re such as America must inevitably foster the lowest of human ends and
ties. But only large republics of sufficient be able to defend themselves successfully from despotic may both foreign and domestic. Insofar as this is tme, liberalism may ulti
minimal

most

of communal

wealth and size

enemies

mately be incoherent at its deepest level. It cannot defend itself without an enormity of size. But that very size and wealth diverts its citizens from the very
commitments that might make

liberalism

worth

defending.
was a

What Tocqueville
republic

saw

in America before the Civil War in local ties

and

democratic

inevitably
He
saw

rooted

institutions

and suffused with reli

gious, specifically
courage.

Christian, belief
well also saw was

that public institutions did nothing to

dis
it

full

the forces that gave that republic a tenuous hold on the primordial human

American

life, but he

impulses that

made

necessary if liberalism itself

NOTES

to thrive in

ages

to come.

1. Karl Marx

and

Friedrich

Engels, Basic Writings

p.

on

Politics

and

Philosophy,

ed.

Lewis

Feuer (Garden City:

Doubleday Anchor, 1959),

254.

2. Plato, Republic, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 473d, p. 153. 3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1976), Intro duction. 4. Consider in this
regard

the manner in which Socrates may be said to rule over the people of
was

Athens in the Apology. This ruling

opportunities provided

largely

due to

a chance union of

the

philosopher and

the

by

the trial.

5. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), ch. 25, pp. 98, 101. 6. Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, trans. Christian Detmold, in The Prince and the Discourses, ed. Max Lerner (New York: Modern Library), 1:11, p. 147.
Machiavelli's
animus of

toward traditional
on

Christianity is

well

known. The best

sources

for

under

Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli of Washington Press, 1969), and Harvey Mansfield, Jr., s New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). The reading offered in J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) fails completely to come to grips with the depths of Machiavelli's rejection of the ancients
standing the depths (Seattle: University

his thought

these topics are: Leo

Machiavelli'

and

therefore mistakes the surface of his

surface.

use of

language

similar

to that

found in the

ancients with

the substance below the

7. Francis Bacon, New Atlantis, in The Great Instauration

and

the

New Atlantis,

ed.

J. Wein
Hobbes'

berger (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1980), p. 80. 8. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1:1, p. 86. One of us has already written

at greater

length

on on Reli-

teaching regarding

religion.

See Richard Sherlock, 'The

Theology

of

Leviathan: Hobbes

306

Interpretation

Interpretation 10(1982), 43-60, and Richard Sherlock, "The Politics of the Netherworld: in Klaus Kodalle, ed., Hobbes on Religion (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Leviathan, Part Publications, 1990). The literature on teaching on religion is now reasonably extensive but of very uneven quality. Cf. F.C. Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Howard Warrender, The Political Theory of Hobbes (London: Oxford in R. Peters and University Press, 1957); Ronald Hepburn, "Hobbes on the Knowledge of M. Cranston, eds., Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City: Doublein K. Brown, ed., Hobbes day, 1972), pp. 85-108; Willis Glover, "God and Thomas Studies (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 141-68; Stewart Sutherland, "God and Journal of Theological Studies 25(1974), 373-80; Patricia Springborg, Religion in Political Studies 24(1976), 171-83; D.H.J. "Leviathan: The Christian Commonwealth, Journal of Religious History 5(1969), 299-313; Interpretation of the Warner, Daedalus 105(1976), 1-21; J.G.A. Pocock, "Time, Shirley Letwin, "Hobbes and
gion,"

IV,"

Hobbes'

God,"

Hobbes,"

Leviathan,"

Inc.,"

"Hobbes'

Trinity,"

Christianity,"

History

and

Eschatology

in the Thought

of

Thomas

Hobbes,"

in Politics Language
Hobbes'

and

Time (New

York: Athenaeum, 1972), pp. 141-202; David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan (New Haven: in What Is Yale University Press, 1987); Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Political Philosophy (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 71-96. With exception of Johnston
Philosophy,"

and

Strauss the

sources

listed

above

are

beneath the

Hobbes'

superficial rhetoric of

severely deficient because they completely fail to see treatment of religion to the deeply irreligious core of his
Hobbes'

thought. As such the interpretations

writer

they

offer of

texts

render

him to be

such a confused

that one wonders why anyone should consider him worth studying.

9. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), 11:3 p. 321. 10. Locke, Two Treatises 11:6, p. 219. Locke's writing on religion is the subject of an increas

ing body
Most

of

writers

interpretive work, most of it subject to the same deficiencies believe that Locke's religious writing can be understood as
no

as

in the

case of

Hobbes.

a sincere statement of

his

own religious convictions.

thinker.

There is

But this starting point immediately makes Locke an utterly confused possible way in which the overt teaching of the religious writing can be made

to cohere with the explicit

teaching

of

the

Essay Concerning Human Understanding

protestations of religious

on

the

founda
"infal

tions of knowledge and belief. Either

lible"

Locke's

belief, indeed

of an

knowledge, are not to be taken at face value or the whole epistemological foundation of Locke's teaching must be seen as erroneous or itself a kind of rhetorical fraud. For representative secondary sources see: Richard Aaron, John Locke (London: Oxford University in John Yolton, ed., John Press, 1971); Richard Ashcraft, "Faith and Knowledge in Locke: Problems and Prospects (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969); John Biddle, "Locke on Reasonable Journal of the History of Ideas 37(1976), 139-60; William Bluhm, "Locke's Ideas of Journal of Politics 42(1980), 414-38; John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Eldon Eisenach, Two Worlds of Liber alism: Religion and Politics in Hobbes, Locke and Mill (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Philosophical Quarterly, 23(1973), 52-66; 1980); Paul Helm, "Locke on Faith and J.T. Moore, "Locke on the Moral Need for Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1 1(1980), 61-68; S.C. Pearson, "The Religion of John Locke and the Character of His Journal of Religion 59(1978), 244-62; Fred Vaughan, The Tradition of Political Hedonism From Hobbes to Mill (New York: Fordham University Press, 1975). 11. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Patrick Romanell (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1955), p 13.
source of religious
Locke,'

Christianity,"

God,"

Knowledge,"

Christianity,"

Thought,"

works defending suppression of religious dissent are found in John Locke, Two Government, ed. Phillip Abrams (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967); also see Robert Kraynak, "John Locke: From Absolutism to American Political Science Review 74(1980), 66-68. 13. See, for example, Locke, "The Fourth Letter on in The Works of John Locke (London, 1823), vol. 8, pp. 558-59. (Chicago14. John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. George Ewing Regnery 1965), pp. 16 ff.

12. The early

on

Tracts

Toleration,"

Toleration,'

The Problem of Religion in Liberalism

15. This
the
critique

307
In

is in two
Human

parts

that are almost

hidden from
sets

each other

in Locke's

corpus.

understanding of the supposed relationship between reason and revelation and the tests that must be passed if any assertion of revelation is to be properly accepted as such. Later, in the posthumously published "Discourse on it becomes clear that no revelatory assertion can possibly pass the test; in fact the test is
an
Miracles"

Essay Concerning

Understanding

Locke

forth

designed to be impassable.
16. Leo

University

of

Strauss, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, Chicago Press, 1989).

respect we point

ed.

Thomas Pangle (Chicago:

evident

17. In this

in the first instance to the

seen

dichotomy

in the thought

of

Hume. Hume's Dialogue has been

sions of theism
such as

largely

"natural
about

religion,"

Hobbes'

updating
such

of

thesis

the origin

eighteenth-century ver and his Natural History of Religion is a trenchant of religion. But in his most important work concerned
of England, little
religion of

as an attack on prevalent

with political

practice, the

mammoth

History

this bitter

hostility founding

to religion as

is to be found.
on

18. The secondary literature

a

the problem of

in the American

is

vast.

Only

few

of

the

most

important

recent

titles can be noted here. See especially Thomas

Curry, The First

Freedom (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1986);

Leonard Levy, The Establishment Clause

(New York: Macmillan, 1986); Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Walter Bums, The First Amendment and the Future of Ameri
can

Democracy

Establishment: Formation
waukee:
Clauses,"

(New York: Basic Books, 1974); Chester Antieau, et al., Freedom from Federal and Early History of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses (Mil

gion

Bruce Publishing, 1964); Gary Glenn, "Forgotten Purposes of the First Amendment Reli Review of Politics 49(1988), 340-67; Patricia Bonomi, Under the Cope of Heaven:
and

Religion

Politics in Colonial America (New York: Oxford

and

University Press, 1985);

Ralph
682-

Hancock, "Religion
703.

the Limits of Limited

Government,"

Review of Politics 50(1988),

19. This view was extensively represented in eighteenth-century thought, and versions of it can be found in Locke, Kant, and Rousseau. More relevant for the intellectual foundation of the colo nists was probably its extensive representation in British, often Scottish, moralists of the Enlighten
ment.

Press, 1975). This

See especially D.D. Raphael, ed., British Moralists, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University argument was also a backbone of antifederalist thought and can be seen in in Herbert Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7
vols.

numerous selections

(Chicago: Uni

versity of Chicago Press, 1981), especially selections 4.24, 3.6, 4.6, 6.14, 2.8. 20. See especially Linda Depauw, Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 3 vols. to date (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977-), 3:114, 137; Washington's "Farewell
Address"

in the

version

drafted

by

Hamilton is in Morton Frisch, ed., The Political Writings of

Remonstrance,"

Alexander Hamilton (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), pp. 431-47. 21. James Madison, "Memorial and in M. Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 5-12. 22. Madison's language is often
vigorous

in his

concern

for the

evils

that

religious strife can

spilt"

bring

upon a

community, such as

his
5.

claim that

"Torrents

of

blood have been

in Europe in

attempts

to enforce
pp.

religious uniformity. par.

Also

see

Madison to William Bradford, Jan. 24, 1774, in

Meyers,

2-5; Memorial,

23. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on sity of North Carolina Press, 1955),

the

Query 17;

State of Virginia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill: Univer Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on in Edward
Religion,"

Dumbauld, ed., The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: New American Library, 1955), pp. 937-46; Jefferson to Timothy Pickering, Feb. 27, 1821; Jefferson to Miles King, Sept. 26, 1814; Jefferson to Charles Thomson, Jan. 29, 1817. 24. Jefferson to Jared Sparks, Nov. 4, 1820; Jefferson to James Smith, Dec. 8, 1822; Jeffer son's own religious views are described extensively in Charles Sanford, The Religious Life of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1984); also see Jefferson to John Adams, May 5, 1817. 25. Thomas Jefferson, The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth, in O.I. A. Roche, ed., The

308

Interpretation
Potter, 1964); also Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, Apr. 21, Dowse, Apr. 19, 1803; Jefferson to George Logan, Nov. 12, 1816; der Kemp, April 25, 1816; Jefferson to Timothy Pickering, Feb. 27, 1821.
call attention

Jefferson Bible (New York: Clarkson

1803; Jefferson
26. We

to Edward
van

Jefferson to Francis
would

especially

to the evident piety, especially

with regard

to Divine

Providence,
are

that pervades the

public rhetoric of

Washington. The Farewell Address is

various messages

not unique

in

its invocation
loaded Lester 1959).

of religious themes.

Washington's
also

to the

colonies

during

the war

with such references.

See

Adams to Jefferson, Dec.

8, 1818,
of

and

Apr. 19, 1817, in

Cappon,

ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill:

religion,"

University

North Carolina

Press,
an

27. The

concept of

"natural
some

while

extremely
and

common and

historically

crucial, is

elusive phenomenon.

For

attempts

to comprehend it see especially

Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons

Margaret Jacob, The Republicans (London: Allen and Unwin,

1981); Frank Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), and Robert Sullivan, John Toland and the Deist Controversy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
28. The most penetrating analysis of the meaning of establishment at the time of the founding is in Curry; Glenn gives the best analysis of the divided sentiment of the founding regarding the specific purposes of the first-amendment religion clauses. 29. On the
see
current

dilemma faced

by trying

find

a place

for

religion

in American

public

life,

especially Richard Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984). 30. On the problem of religion in Tocqueville one can compare the variously flawed accounts
Tocqueville'

of

s Thought (New York: Doris Goldstein, Trial of Faith: Religion and Politics in Elsevier, 1975) and Marvin Zetterbaum, Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1967). Zetterbaum's account attributes to Tocqueville too much of Ma chiavelli's political functionalism, while Goldstein fails to penetrate to the deepest tensions in his

thought on religion. We are indebted

here to

serious
of

insights

contained

in

an as yet unpublished

Ralph Hancock, "The Uses Democratic

paper

by

and

Hazards

Christianity
ed.

in Tocqueville's Attempt to Save George Lawrence

Souls."

31. Alexis de Tocqueville, (New York: Harper

and

Democracy

in America,

Max Lerner

and

Row, 1966), 11:1:5.

that

32. This is the

account of

point

Zetterbaum
of religion.

overstates

with

his focus

on

Tocqueville's functional clearly in the Fourth

the

political

utility

33. This irreligious

34.

core of

the practical

effect of

toleration is seen

most

Letter but is implicit in the

original

Letter itself.

regime

of

Democracy in America, 1:2:9. Tocquville's account of the place of religion in the American is perceptively treated in Catherine Zuckert, "Not by Preaching: Tocqueville: On the Role Religion in American Review of Politics 43(1981), 259-80. 35. On Tocqueville's reformulation of liberalism in general the superior account is Pierre Man
Democracy,"

ent, Tocqueville

et

la Nature de la Democratic (Paris: Juilliard, 1982).

Ethnicity

and

the Problem of
Jr.

Equality

Kenneth C.
Northern State

Blanchard,

University

of

The study of ethnicity is an appreciation human beings are characterized by their

physiognomies

of

difference. Discrete languages

and

populations
myths

own

idioms,

at thought, tracted to these differences merely because they are at tracted, it is because we have cultivated a new taste. This appreciation of dif ference appears as a healthy counterpart to a more primitive sort of thinking,

and modes of

and physiques.

We may become novel; if we remain

according to which is indistinguishable from

represents progress progress

'stranger'

has the

'enemy,'

'foreign'

same

meaning

as

and

'bad.'

If

we can agree

that the first mode of thought

beyond the second, then we may well inquire how this became possible. I submit that the authentic appreciation of difference
the realization

depends

upon

they
The

are all

human

and that this

that, however diverse the families of men may be, is what makes it possible for us to love them.

ethnicity are more than a random collection of interesting col ors, sounds, and flavors: they are the manifold expressions of a power which the Greeks called logos. This power, Aristotle believed, is the definitive human
subjects of characteristic: origins or

it distinguishes

us

from

all other visible creatures.

Whatever

our

appearances, then,

we are all

ontologically
and

akin.

This
thinkers

paper explores

the concept
as a

of ontological

kinship

in the

writings of

two

men who confronted recognized

it

problem, Aristotle

Thomas Jefferson. Both

that profound differences exist between human

can

beings

and

that these differences

another.

easily become the basis

of claims made against one

Both

men were compelled

to ask whether or
of

in

what

degree

observable

inequalities
nature?

justify

an unequal

distribution

goods,

honors,

and powers.

And

what common

rights,
and

Aristotle

if any, can men claim solely on the basis of a common Jefferson reached surprisingly similar answers to these be
of use

questions,
ple with

answers which can same problems.

to us

today, for

we are

the

Hostility

between

populations continues to

forced to grap be gen

erated,

not

unequal a single

only by the ethnic and racial distinctions themselves, but also by the distribution of power and wealth among these groups. To mention but example, Asian Americans tend to score higher on Scholastic Aptitude
white

Tests than
cans. over
all.1

Americans,

who score

higher than Hispanic

and

black Ameri

These

scores reflect
accounts

in turn

greater academic and economic achievement

What

for these disparities?

"They

are

due to

discrimination,"

we would

say, to

give what

is

at

any

rate

the most pious answer. But even if

it

interpretation,

Spring 1993,

Vol.

20, No. 3

310

Interpretation
to explain away the position of Asian Americans at the

were possible would still unequal

top,

we

be haunted
of

by

the

suspicion

that these unpleasant

a

data

reflect an

distribution

intellectual talent. I believe it is

the

fear

of this

possibility
contempo

that

underlies much of academic

hypersensitivity
We have

over race and

ethnicity in
attempts

rary

discourse. We have
"racists."

witnessed on
witnessed

many

college campuses virtual

witch

hunts for

increasing
and

to

divide

stu

dent bodies into discrete

sion standards

and

homogeneous groups,

to alter not only admis

but

course content

for these
teach the

various groups.

We have

witnessed

the

reintroduction of race and

ethnicity

as standards of
civil rights

fitness in the academy,

movement, or Hispanic
one

such that
scholars

only black

scholars can

the

history

of

Mexican Americans. More than

that the underlying
it"

professor,

witness

ing these
a real

events, has

suspected

motive of

their proponents

is

fear that minority

environment.2

students

"just

can't cut

in

an open and equal aca

demic

If the
suggest

source of

this

hypersensitivity

is indeed

fear

of

inferiority,

one might

that the most potent remedy is to prove the opposite: to show that intelligence is equitably distributed among all racial and ethnic populations. My first response is that, in the current environment, it is simply impossible to put

the

question.

But there

are

two additional reasons

while

which make

this avenue of

address unpromising.

First,

favor

genetically impossible to establish. Etiological difficult to

resolve.

of a

unequal

it is easy enough to refute any argument in distribution of intelligence, the converse may be
questions

in

social science are

notoriously
am confi

Like

almost all social and political achievement

scientists, I

dent that the disparities in nothing to do

enough

between

groups are ephemeral and

have

with natural endowment.

But is my

feeling

of confidence a secure people?

foundation for the

place,
even

rights and

dignity

of so

many

No. In the

second

if

we could

demonstrate that

natural endowment were en

tirely
are

unrelated to race and endowed.

ethnicity, this

would not mean are

that all individuals

taller, stronger, and faster than equally Some individuals are, almost certainly, more intelligent than others. There exists, then, a conceivable population which would be inherently more
others.

Some human beings

intelligent
would

than the rest of us. If such a population were somehow to coalesce,

members

intellectual superiority entitle its Would they be entitled to lordship over the did
not make

to exploit

nonmembers?

persons and properties of those who

we must

the

cut?

If the

answer

is to be no, then

discover

and

elucidate some ground

ment

for human

rights and

dignity

more

firm than any judge

concerning the diverse talents of men. Such a basis was discovered by Aristotle and, perhaps independently, by Jefferson. It is the purpose of this essay to isolate the idea of human equality in
their writings and, more
power.

importantly,
our

to show that this

idea has

a redemptive

I hope

we all agree clear

that tolerance and mutual respect are civilized quali times are, on the whole, more civilized in this
also clear that the

ties. I believe it is
respect

that

than ages past. I

believe it is

study

of

ethnicity is

or

Ethnicity
at of

and the

Problem of Equality
I
submit that and

-311

least

ought

to be a particularly civilized
made

activity.

it

was

the

idea be

human equality that

it

possible

for Aristotle
review. will

Jefferson to become

more civilized

than their own times tended to be. If these suggestions may

credited, then we might

tance or rejection of the

benefit from this idea

of

It may

well

be that the accep

equality

determine

whether ethnic studies

in the

next century will contribute to progress or to decline. In Chapter 2 of the first book of the Politics, Aristotle makes two

arguments

to support

his

contention
argues

that politics is

a natural rather than an unnatural activ

ity. First, he
man

that political communities

develop

naturally,

and growth
argues

toward a predetermined end is the meaning of

"nature."

Second,

he

that

is

the political animal, that

is,

that

it is the capacity for

moral-political

activity that distinguishes human beings from

assertion men are seem

all other visible creatures.

This

odd, may drifters. But according to Aristotle, man alone possess the power logos. Logos is that power which makes possible both reason and speech.

given

that some

animals are gregarious and

that some
of

Voice,
reason

of

course, serves as a sign of the

other animals

painful and

the

pleasurable and

for this

it belongs to
But

also; for the nature of these advances only up to

the point of sensing the painful and the pleasurable and of

one another. so what speech serves to make

known

what

communicating these to is beneficial or harmful, and

or

is just

or unjust;

for

what

is

proper

to man compared to the other animals

is this: he
and

alone

has the

sense of what

is

good or

evil, just

unjust,

and the

like,

it is

an association of
(1253al0-15)3

beings

with this sense which makes possible a

household

and a city.

Logos is the

power

to make certain
capable of

distinctions

and to communicate
most

them to
of

others who are

equally

apprehending them. The

to
us

important

these is between

what seems good

for us,

and

between justice

and

really is good injustice. Logos is the definitive human charac

and what

(the pleasant)

teristic. Just as the powers of sensation and

locomotion

separate animals

from

plants,

so the power to perceive and communicate moral

all other visible creatures.

distinctions

separates

human beings from

which

is the foundation
of such

of the

family
or

and

And it is precisely this activity the city. Indeed, any creature who is self-sufficiency does
not need or a god.
mean

incapable

association,

from

a natural

it,

is

either subhuman or superhuman: a

beast
to

Taken
equal

at

face value, this

not

would

seem

that all human beings are

in kind: they

only

can

but

must participate

in

politics.

But for Aris

and

totle this equality

presents a problem: political

life

requires

that some mle

others obey; familial life requires the subordination of the wife and

children

to

the

father;

and

last but

not

least, in his
can

times

civilized

life itself did

The

not seem

possible without slavery.

How

these necessarily

unequal relationships

be

reconciled with the natural

respect to

equality that is

spoken of above?

answer with

slavery,

of

course, is that it
a slave

cannot

be

reconciled with natural equal

ity. Aristotle defines

by

nature as

"an individual who,

being

man, is

312

Interpretation
nature not

by
a

his

his

own

but belongs to

another."

That is to say,

a slave

is like

hammer. A

man can survive and what

be human

without a unless

hammer, but
on

hammer

really be human being. A

cannot not exist apart

it is

an

instrument

it is life

owned and used

by
be

man who

by

nature could

have

no

his own,
man,

who could

from

being

owned and operated

by

another

would

human instmment
to say that the

or slave. one of

This difference
rather slave

which

justifies the

mle of

the mas

ter over his slave is

kind
the

than one of degree. It

smarter

would

be

as absurd

master rules

because he is

than the slave, as to

his hammer, or that a runner is smarter than his legs. Consequently, only "those [men] who differ from others as much as the body does from the soul or brutes do from men (they are so disposed that
say that a carpenter
smarter

is

than

their best function is the use of their

bodies)
.

are

by

their nature slaves, and

one would whether

it is

better for them to be

our right
clusion

mled

despotically. The

(1254b 16- 19). No

deny
con

to

exploit something.

abortion

rights

argument

its

is

valid or not

begins

with

the

unobjectionable premise

that it is just
the most ex

to exploit one's own

body

for the

sake of one's self.

And

even

treme

animal

rights

activist would acknowledge

the

right of animals

to

exploit

plants and of nonhuman predators

to exploit their prey. And so, according to

Aristotle, it is just for

nature exploited.

the master to appropriate and exploit any creature whose

own

differs from his

in the way described. Such creatures exist to be But his fundamental political principle, that the human differentia is

the
are

power of

logos,

stands

in direct

contradiction

to the

proposition

that there
soul.

in fact

men who

differ from

others as much as the

body

does from the

It is doubtful

Aristotle really believed that any human beings were slaves by nature; certainly he suggests no empirical test by which natural slaves could be differentiated from tme human beings. And the theoretical standard he
whether

does

set would

be

sufficient to condemn all or almost all

slavery

as

it actually

existed.

On the
wife

other

hand, Aristotle insists

political.

is

not

despotic. It is

that the relationship between man and Why? Because it consists of two free human

beings

whose

male and

capacity of soul differs not in kind but only in degree. Both the female are able to deliberate, but the male also possesses
"authority."

Consequently,

their relationship

is

similar to that of

fellow
rotate

citizens

in

free

regime, the only difference

turns ruling and

being

that citizens

usually his

in

offices

taking
in the

being

mled

whereas the superior position of the male

a man

household is
regards

permanent.

For

to regard
animals

wife

in the

same

his

slaves and

domesticated

is

barbaric,

for her

nature

way as he differs

from that. Similarly, nature confers authority over children to the father. This is because the deliberative element in the soul is not yet complete in the child.

Accordingly, Aristotle says: "The mler of a household, as a husband father, rules both his wife and his children, who are free, but he does this
the same manner:
dren"

and a not

in

he
the

rules

politically
of

over

his

wife

but royally

over

his

chil

(1259a39-bl). The

most obvious characteristic of political

mle, accord

ing

to

Aristotle, is

tendency

the citizens to take turns in office.

Since the

Ethnicity
wife

and

the Problem of Equality

can

-313

does
as

not take

turns mling over her

husband, how

this mle

be de

only be because the wife participates in eco nomics decision making for the good of the household. If she did not, the deliberative element in her soul would be useless, and Aristotle denies that
scribed

political?

It

can

nature makes

described

"royal"

as

anything in vain. Rule over the children, on the other hand, is because children do not participate in that deliberation;

instead,

their parents

citizens or as a shepherd

deliberate for them, looks out for the

as a

king

tends the

interests

of

his

good of

his flock.

There are, then, important differences of degree between the capacities of soul of the different members of the household. But there is no difference of kind, and this has fundamental moral and political consequences when we turn
to the question, Who
totle defines the

benefits,
or

and

in

what

degree, from household

the
members of and slaves.

mle?

Aris

teleology,

purpose,

of mle over

the house

hold in
the

contrast

to that of the mle over animals

mled possess a

In the latter case,

to

mler and

the

fundamentally
truly
is

different

status with respect

the purpose of the association.

The

rule of

the master, although when

exercised

is to the interest

of

both the
of

slave

by

nature and the master

by

nature,

the master
when

but

indirectly

to the interest of

primarily to the interest the slave; for it cannot be preserved

nevertheless

the slave perishes. (1278b32-37)

one might argue

That is,
are

that cattle

benefit from the beef industry: their herds deaths less

painful

larger,

their lives longer and more comfortable, and their

apart

than

if they lived

from in

man.

The

same would

be

even

tmer of horses.
rather subor

Mutual benefit

makes

the relationship

appear

friendly

and

harmonious

than violent, and therefore

accord with nature.

But the benefits to the

man

dinate are purely incidental to animal husbandry: a horses for his own sake, not theirs. And he feeds his
as we put gas

feeds his

cows and

slave

for the

same reason
work.

in

our cars:

because

otherwise

these devices will do no

On

the other
says

hand, Aristotle, "whether

common
. . .

"the

mle over a wife and children and exercised

the

household,"

entire

for the

sake of

those mled or for the sake of

sake

something
those ruled

to

both

mler and

the mled, is essentially for the

of

but

indirectly

it

might

be for the

sake of

the mlers

themselves"

(1278b39-1279a2). The father, then, may indeed benefit from the operation of the household, but he earns this benefit only in so far as he is one more mem

ber,

not

by

virtue of

his

superior status as

father. Household
economics

mle

is

by

nature

entirely distinct from the

acterize
sense.

appropriation and exploitation of resources

that char

slavery,

animal

husbandry,

and

The

association of

the household exists for the sake of each of

of some of

in the purely financial its mem does

not

bers. The

superior

intellectual talent

those members

in the

in its benefits; if anything, it is the weakest least earn them members who deserve to benefit the most. As objects of value, then, all the
a greater share

human beings

enclosed within

the

household

are created equal. not

Aristotle goes to

such

trouble about the

household

only because it is

an

314

Interpretation
element

important
tween
most

in the

political

association, but because the distinction be

mle

household

mle and

despotic

becomes the
Which

standard

for

one of

the

important

political

judgements
that

of all:

constitutions are good and

just? Which
understood

are

bad

and unjust?

The
of

purpose of

the political community

is

in the

same

way

as

the household: it is the good both of the

society

as a whole and of each

human

being

in

it.4

It is evident, then, that the forms

of government which aim at

without

the common interest

happen to be forms from the

right with respect

to what is just
of

qualification; but those

which aim right

only

at the

interest
are

the

rulers are all erroneous and whereas a political

deviations
an

association of

despotic, freemen. (1279a 16-21)

will

forms, for they

community is

differ in talent, education, etc., within regimes, and the proportion of talented and educated individuals may differ between regimes. Consequently, we may speak of some institutions such as a property quali Human beings fication for
office as

just

relative

to

an aristocratic constitution.

The

appro always as

priation and exploitation of one

group

of

human beings

by

another

is

and everywhere

unjust, however. Whether the

as

government

is

a single

man,

in

Iraq,

or a

minority,

in South Africa, it is
a

or a

the judgement. A just regime, on the

the ruling group
over
whether

other

majority faction, does not affect hand, is one in which the benefit of

majority

or not

is

given no preference at all

would agree with

that of any human

being

within

the regime. Aristotle

Jefferson that
senator. stand

some persons

are more

fit than

others

to be a president or a
we under unalien

But

when

it

comes

to the

purpose of

the regime, whether

this purpose as a distribution of resources or as a protection of

able

rights, all men are created equal. Furthermore, Aristotle doubted whether
occasionally distinguish

the obvious differences in

character

and talent that

one citizen

from

another could

the political elevation of one class of citizens over another. The

justify difficulty is

that any

characteristic which men

is

susceptible to

dividing
scale

into

upper and
most.

from least to
who claim

lower classes, will rank them This is tme regardless of what the
wealth or

differences in degree, instead of on a single linear

standard

is.
are

Those

to rule because of

similarly because

of

birth,

thought

not to speak

justly
is
and

at all.

For it is

clear

that again, on the same principle of

justice, if

one of them

more

wealthy than

each of the others,

he

should

be the birth
of all

ruler of all the

others;

in

a similar

way, the

one who surpasses

in

noble

all the other contenders on the

basis

of

freedom

should assume the

leadership
if,

the others.

The

same applies

to aristocracy, which is based on virtue; for

of the

ruling body, then,

on

one of

them is

more virtuous

than each of the other virtuous men,

should

the same principle of

justice, he

be the

authority. (1283bl4-

27)
over

Any

argument, then,

which could of

justify
or

the mle

of one ethnic

group

another

say

on

the basis

IQ

tests

SAT

scores

would

immediately

be-

Ethnicity
come a ment

and

the Problem of Equality

-315

threat to every member of the mling

close

(so

it may be

group but one. An identical argu transliteration) is found in a fragment of Abraham

Lincoln's.
You say that A. is white, and B. is black. It is color, then; the light, having the to enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first
meet,
with a

right

man you

fairer

skin

than your own.

You do

not mean color exactly?

You

mean the whites are

intellectually
meet,
with an

the

superiors of again.

the

blacks;
own.5

and, therefore have the right to enslave them? Take care

By

this rule, you are to

be

slave

to the first

man you

intellect

superior to your

Since any
race ends
political

argument which would

justify

the mle of

a master class or master

up putting everything into the hands of a single master, the only order which would be just by nature would have to emerge by means equality
of election. sets universal rotation opportunity In his reflections on these of

of a universal

offices,

selection

by lot, or democratic the Politics, Aristotle

constitutionalism
.

and other of

devices in
the idea of

in

motion

the

historical development

Almost
I

at

the other end of this

history

are

the writings of Thomas Jefferson.

concentrate on

Jefferson because he

expresses

in his

own

thoughts

and senti

ments not

only everything that is

solution to place

problematic about

equality, but

also a clear an un

grasp

of

the

the problem. At first sight, his

well

work seems

promising not only inclined toward the

to look for this solution, for as is

view

that Negroes were

race

known, Jefferson was less intelligent than white

ugly.

Europeans, but
examples of the

also

believed that the black

and

was

The best-known
on

idea

the

sentiment are

found in his Notes

proposal

the

State of

Virginia. In

Query

XIV, Jefferson discusses his

Africa. He
will

for the

emancipation

of the slaves and their repatriation to

anticipates a question concern

ing
and

the second part of that proposal: "It

ing,

probably be asked, Why not retain incorporate the blacks into the state, and thus save the expense of supply To this he by importation of white settlers, the vacancies they will
leave?"

objects:

Deep

rooted prejudices entertained

by

the whites; ten thousand recollections,

new

by

the

blacks,

of

the injuries

they have sustained;

and

provocations; the

real

distinctions

which nature

has made;

many

other

circumstances, will divide us into parties,

never end

and produce convulsions which will

probably

but in the

extermination of

the one or the

other

race.6

Jefferson describes this

rather than

"political,"

objection as

by

which

he

means practical and a

fundamental. It is
good reason
suppose

fact that

whites

dislike blacks
no

fact that

blacks have

for
a

disliking
reciprocal

whites.

one might even

doubt a connection, relationship, between these two facts:

There is

316
whites

Interpretation
continue

to wrong

blacks because they

cannot

bear to face the tmth

they have done in the past; out of denial, then, come new reasons for the black race to despise the white. So regardless of whether integration is a
about what good or a bad thing, white prejudice and the memory of real injustices by the blacks probably render it impossible. Instead, the two races are likely to be divided, for as long as they exist together, into mutually hostile factions.

However distasteful be
almost

and out of season

these thoughts may be to us,

of evidence would

it

would

two

centuries

before the balance black

shift against

Jefferson. And the States

would

existence of

nationalism and separatism

in the United

indicate that the

question

is

still

alive.

In
not

political white

objection, Jefferson
on

was

passing judgement

fact, in making the on the black or the

we would say only in light of the Civil War and the civil rights that, movement, our estimation of what is practical has changed. But he did not leave it at that. He added other

races, but

the human race. Had

he left it

at

that,

grounds, "physical
course concerns

moral,"

and
which

for his

separatism.

The

physical objection of of a

color,

Jefferson

considered to

be the foundation

difference in the
Are
not

share of

beauty

between the two

races.

the fine

greater or

less

which reigns

the emotions

white, the expressions of every passion by in the one, preferable to that eternal monotony, in the countenances, that immoveable veil of black which covers all of the other race? Add to these, flowing hair, a more elegant
mixtures of red and

suffusions of colour

symmetry

of

form,
them,
those

their own
as

judgment in favour

of

the whites, declared

by

their

preference of women over

of

uniformly as is the preference of the Oranootan for the black his own species. The circumstance of superior beauty, is
not

thought worthy of attention in the propagation of our

domestic animals; why

in that

of man?

(Pp.

horses, dogs, 264-65)

for his

and other

Jefferson

expresses

more

here than

a mere preference

own

kind. He
ugliest
an ele

endorses a creatures to

Heraclitean
the
white

scale of

beauty
at

Europeans
to

ranging from the lowliest and the The black race occupies
top.7

vated position on

this

scale

sentiment

is

as repugnant

be certain, but one below that of the whites. This to us as the idea of the biological integration of the

races was to

that black and white

Jefferson. And it is clearly a dangerous sentiment: if it turns out Americans are fated to live in close proximity, the view of

would surely poison their relations. However, nothing more than an erroneous aesthetic judgement. I call it an error, for I believe it to be an idea with no natural (i.e., self-sustaining) founda tion beneath it. Consequently, unless some artificial foundation is supplied, the

the one

race

that the other

is ugly

it is

at root

judgement
against the almost

will not

be

enduring.

Was there

an artificial

foundation beneath Jefferson's

aesthetic

judgement
seem

black

race?

This is to ask, Was Jefferson

a racist?

It may

impious

to ask such a question, given the evidence that I

no one who made such comments

have just
the

produced.

Surely

today

could escape

Ethnicity
scarlet precise racist

and

the Problem of Equality

-317

letter R. But
than

we are social

scientists,

and our

judgements
a

must

be

more

public speech

is

wont to

be. Racism is

form

of prejudice:

the

pre-judges,

i.e.,
this

he

makes

some

judgement in

advance of

the proper

evidence on which

judgement
most

ought to

him for

evidence

contrary to his
the

judgement,
important

be based. Nor is it any use to show for he has already made up his mind.

Prejudice is

one of

concepts and

in

social and political

science,
the

prejudices

both large

and

small, benign

malignant, form

much of

currency
nothing

of social

more

than to

intercourse. Indeed, it has been suggested that action on the basis of some public prejudice.
prejudice means

politics

is
to

According

Plato,

avoid an unpleasant

the original reason

tmth, forgetting for the judgement,

we

why.8

making up And in

one's

mind, and, in

order

order to avoid

some alternative must

remembering be substituted in is
an

its

place.

suggest that

the original judgement

lying

beneath
of a

white racism

entirely justified feeling of guilt:

guilt

have been guilty

crime,

and unless

this

be expiated,

some

terrible punishment must

inevitably

follow.9

This tmth

is very unpleasant. It is scarcely any wonder that some white Americans have been tempted to conceal it beneath the idea that blacks are morally and intellec

tually inferior
and

and somehow responsible

them. The Negrophobe

has in fact for that

concluded

for everything that has happened to that the black is a threat to him,
avoid

if he trades in

puerile myths about

the black character, this is only to

facing

the real grounds

conclusion

his

own guilt.

But how

can we

determine
this: the

whether such a prejudice operates

in any

particular case?

The test is

man who

is in

error will not will go

fear to

subject

his

opinion

to criticism; the

racist,

on

the other

hand,

prejudice, for I do
tmth.

not suppose

to any lengths to avoid real criticism of his he is willing to risk exposing the unpleasant

We may now see that the question Was Jefferson a simple as it seemed. In the first place, Jefferson was
terrible
crime of slavery.

racist?

is

not

nearly

as

intensely

aware of the
state

This is

made

ment on

slavery in

Query

XVIII

of

the Notes

abundantly on Virginia.

clear

from his famous

I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever: that considering numbers, nature and natural means only, a revo

lution
that

of

the

wheel of

fortune,

an exchange of supernatural

it may become

probable

by

situation, is among possible events: interference! The Almighty has no

attribute which can take side with us

in

such a contest.

(P. 289)

If,
not

as

I have suggested, the for

root of racial prejudice

in the United States is the

that Jefferson's mind was

refusal to accept one's own

guilt,

we

may

conclude

fertile

soil

racism.

may be found when we turn from the physical to the moral grounds which he adduces for separatism. Jefferson clearly did incline toward the view that blacks were less intelligent than whites.

Further

evidence

318

Interpretation

[the races] by their faculties of memory, reason, and imagination, it me, that in memory they are equal to the whites; in reason much as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and inferior, comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination they are dull,

Comparing
appears to

tasteless,

and anomalous.

(P.

266)
favorable term,
a

But

an

inclination,
All
are

or

to use a less

bias, is

not

the same

thing
lack

as a prejudice.

of us who

have

opinions on a subject of which we

knowledge

confess that we

guilty of a bias. After much investigation and thought we must do not know, but are inclined to believe, that the earth is round,
wave, that centrally
a
controlled economies

that light is

inevitably
who

fail. The holds the

that
man

difference between

bias

and a prejudice

is that the

person

former is willing to admit that he may be wrong. This is to say he knows he does not know, but merely opines about a subject. On the other hand, a
who

is

prejudiced exposed was

is unlikely to
aware

admit

any uncertainty, for uncertainty

would

leave him

to the terrible tmth. that his views on the intelligence of the black race

Jefferson

fully

were unsubstantiated opinion.

He

says

in

Query
justify

XIV that
of reason and

The opinion, that

must

[Negroes]
with great

are

inferior in the faculties

imagination,

be hazarded

diffidence. To

a general

conclusion, requires

knife,

many observations, even where the subject may be to Optical glasses, to analysis by fire, or by
where

submitted to the solvents.

Anatomical
then

How

much more

it is

faculty,

not a

substance,

we are

examining;

where

it

eludes

the

research of

the sense; where the conditions of its existence are various and
of

variously combined; where the effects

those

which are present or absent

bid

defiance to calculation; let

scale of

me add

where our conclusion would

too, as a circumstance of great tenderness, degrade a whole race of men from the rank in the
perhaps

beings

which

their

Creator may

have

given them.

(Pp.

269-70)

Two

characteristics which

distinguish the

physical

from the

moral sciences re

quire caution

dealing
cedes

with

here: one, that precise data are far more difficult to acquire when human faculties than with tangible substances. And Jefferson con
race

that the black

has

not yet

been

viewed as a subject of natural of

history. in the
when

Consequently,
is
unavailable natural

a solution to

the empirical problem

more

the distribution of talents

to him.

Secondly,
scientist

is

often at stake

in the

moral

than

sciences.

The

is

much

less

likely

to

injure

someone

speaking of an arrangement of organs the faculties of men. An error in this

race of cion

or angles of

light than

when

he

compares

human beings

out of their

matter may cheat not just a family but a birthright. "I advance it therefore as a suspi

only, that the

blacks,

whether are

by time and body and of

circumstances,
mind"

originally a distinct race, or made distinct inferior to the whites in endowments both of

(p. 270).

And indeed, Jefferson is not only aware that his opinion may be erroneous; he professes an earnest desire to see it refuted. "Nobody wishes more than I

Ethnicity
do,"

and

the Problem of Equality

-319

he

wrote

to Benjamin
nature

Banneker,
given

you of

exhibit, that

has

to

our

black scholar, "to see such proofs as black brethren, talents equal to those
America"

the other colours of men, and that the appearance of a want of them is owing merely to the degraded condition of their existence, both in Africa &

(p. 882). Jefferson

understands

that, because
of

of

slavery, the "opportunities [in

favorable."

Virginia] for the development quently, he wishes "ardently to

condition

their genius were not

Conse

see a good system commenced

mind

both

of

their

body

&

to what

it

ought

to

be,"

as

for raising the fast as condi

tions may permit.

From cerning

our

historical

vantage point we can correct

Jefferson's

pessimism con

integration; nor is it any longer possible to doubt that the black race can produce Euclids, let alone students who can understand geometry. All that remains of Jefferson's separatism is his racial that is, a
peaceful
"conservationism,"

desire to leave the ecology

could exist

of colors

unchanged.

Whether
not

such

a sentiment

today

without

any trace of race is unlikely to

the

hatred, I do
of

know. But I believe

much

that

racial conservationism

persist or

to have

influence

on

its

own.

For

our perception of of

beauty

anything is rarely detached from

men are

our

understanding

the nature or inner power of that thing:

what

by

nature

inclined to believe that

is ugly, bad; and of good; 457b4-5). Our distaste for spiders and course, vice versa (Plato, Republic cockroaches is directly related to our perception that the one is venomous and
also what

is beautiful is

the other a spreader of pestilence. These perceptions are of course

unreliable:

only

some spiders are

venomous,

and

the species is on the whole beneficial.

Similarly,
view of

suggest

that separatism based on aesthetics is unlikely to persist

in

the absence of the opinion that The Other

his inner

corruption.

is bad, that his ugliness affords a And this in turn depends upon the idea that some
bad by nature. Indeed, it may in the long run belief that a racial appearance is ugly unless

human beings
prove one
or

are good and others

persist

impossible to

in

believes

that a man may

white.

be guilty of something merely because he is black,

made

for that matter,

It is

on

this point that Jefferson

equality.

his

greatest contribution

toward solv
us

ing

the problem of

Indeed, it is

this contribution that led

of

to be the

interested in him. Jefferson drafted the Declaration

core of that
nation

Independence,
of

and

document

which

became the birth

certificate

the American

equal."

is the

self-evident

tmth that "all men are created

of

What does

this phrase

mean?

From the logic

men

the Declaration alone we

can

determine the

following: that
erned) have

all

certain

(i.e., human beings, for women are among the gov essential rights, merely in virtue of being human. This is to
human
not depend on any quality or power which from another, hence equality. The Declara being principles from the idea of equality: that the purpose of rights

say

that these fundamental

do

could

distinguish is to

one

tion draws two

government

political

protect

these

rights,

and

that no man may exercise the powers

of government over another without that other's consent.

Since this is described

320

Interpretation
tmth,
we

as a self-evident

very idea
to govern

of

humanity. Man is
as an

infer that these things follow necessarily from the by definition the creature whose nature it is individual
and
and as part of a political community.

himself, both

He is

capable of
of

recognizing

quently
consent
whose

deserving

that his own rights be

which

respecting the rights of others, and conse respected. He has a natural right to
enter

to government,

is to say that he may

see

into

community
commu

essential purpose

it is to

that men get what

they deserve. If he
that
punishment.

respects

the rights of others, then he deserves the full

violates

protection of

nity; if he

the rights

of

others, then he deserves

This

power of self-government

behind the multiplicity

that any

of

is human nature, it is the inner power concealed human faces. It is then a fundamental error to believe

physiognomy can betray guilt or innocence; rather, the human physiognomy is the natural indication of responsibility and hence of And if every human face indicates only one kind of being, dignity and
racial or ethnic
worth.10

any of us continue long to believe that a racial type is ugly? There are two obvious objections to reading the Declaration in this way. The first was made by Stephen Douglas in his famous debates with Abraham Lin
can

coln,
and

and

is

frequently

repeated

today both by
behalf of

critics of

the American

founding
was

by

southern conservatives

like M.E. Bradford. Since the Declaration

slave
equal"

ratified word slaves.

largely by
Instead it

slaveholders on
men are

states, the argument goes, the

"men"

in "all

created

could not

have

referred

to the

"Englishmen,"

meant of

i.e., "men
least
as

who as

look like

us."

This

argument

is disposed
at

by

glancing

Jefferson is concerned, easily enough; original his draft of the Declaration. In a passage later edited
at refers

far

out, Jefferson explicitly

nature,"

to slavery
a

as a part of a where

"cmel
should

war against

hu
and

man
sold."

and

condemns

market

"MEN

be bought

This

much and

elsewhere,

is perfectly consistent with Jefferson's treatment of slavery with his lifelong advocacy of emancipation. His writings and
no

letters simply leave

of

doubt that he

considered negro
and

slavery to be
right.11

a violation

the

principles

of

the

Declaration,

hence

of natural

And

even

Jefferson's antislavery passage, the logic of the Declaration is strictly inconsistent with any justification of human slavery. To read the word
without
"men" "Englishmen"

as

would reduce an

the document from

justification

of

indepen

dence to
would

entirely arbitrary defeat its explicit purpose, described in its first

"out
of a

statement of preference

for independence. This

sentence: to explain

ourselves

decent

respect

for the did

mankind."

opinions of
not

certain that

thought

or

many in deed, but it is in the

of

the signatories

fully

implement its logic

and

Of course, it is either in
especially

nature of

evidence, argument,
we would

law,

that

what we

this reading is that it is inconsistent with black intellectual talent. After all, the justification for slavery had always rested on the idea that the slave belongs to that immense set of creatures who are intellectually inferior to the white master. Stephen Dougmore

The

say decisive

often means more

than

like it to

mean.

objection to

Jefferson's

opinion of

Ethnicity
las
"pro-choice"

and

the Problem of Equality

321

whose

attitude toward

tion of slavery
white man and a

expressed the

Negro's

status

slavery rested on an implicit justifica in this way: in a fight between a

the
white

Negro, I

must side with

must

man; in a fight between

elegant at

Negro

and and

alligator, I

side with

the Negro. This

analogy
superior

combines a small measure of

liberality

toward the slave (he

is,

least,

in
a

dangerous reptile) with the implicit argument that anything which Negro may with justice do to an alligator, a white man may with justice do to a Negro. The question which becomes decisive here if indeed men may in deed be divided into classes according to intellectual talent is whether such a
status

to

classification commits of

Jefferson,

or

ourselves, to Judge Douglas's

arrangement

justice. Jefferson demonstrates that it does In the first place, he draws a distinc talent. He says in Query XIV that
not.

tion between intellectual and

moral

Whether further heart

observation will or will not

been less bountiful to them in the

of the
she will

endowments of the

verify the conjecture, that nature has head, I believe that in those
and not to

be found to have done them justice. That disposition to theft

they have been branded, must be ascribed to their situation, any depravity of the moral sense. (Pp. 268-69)
with which

Jefferson is

not

is arguing that,

even

arguing here that blacks are goodnatured but childish. Rather he if their race is less likely than that of the whites to produce

Epictetus, Terence, and Phaedms, it is equally capable of functional human beings. Whereas the ability to understand or producing fully derive advanced geometrical theorems may indeed distinguish one human being
such geniuses as

from another, the

about

justice,
For

moral sense, the ability to understand and derive conclusions distinguishes human beings from all other visible beings. Jeffer

son reads their so-called sense.

disposition to theft precisely

as a sign of

this moral

The man, in whose favour no laws of property exist, probably feels himself less bound to respect those made in favour of others. When arguing for ourselves, we

lay

it down in

as a

fundamental,
this

that

laws,

to be

just,
I

must give a reciprocation of

right: that
and not

without

they

are mere

arbitrary

rules of

conduct, founded in

force,
.

conscience.

And it is
not as

a problem which

give to the master

to solve,

whether the slave

from him,

as

may he may slay

justifiably

take a little from one, who has taken all

one who would

slay him? (P.

269)
the moral sense,

Since the
relations

master and of

the slave are equal

in their

possession of

justice between them

fundamental

ought

to involve a reciprocation of right.

Slavery
refuse

is

violation of

this reciprocation, based as

it is if he

on the should

simple principle:

"You
the

work.

I'll

eat."

It is to the

slave's credit

to

accept

master's

terms. And there is no reason to suppose that a

exploited

morally

responsible

creature,

by

his equal,

as

the slave has

been,

322

Interpretation

forever limit his response to petty theft. Jefferson was a careful reader Locke's Second Treatise, and Locke makes it clear that deadly force is justified against anyone who would try to get me into his power, for "I have no
should

of

reason

to suppose, that
me

he,

who would take

he had

in his

Power,

take away every

away my Liberty, would not when (III. 18.6-8). By enslaving thing

else"

a creature who

is his

moral

equal, the former has given to the latter

reason

not

merely

just

reason

to steal but

just

to slit his throat in the night upon the earliest this tmth
suspicion

opportunity.

Jefferson's

recognition of

led to his insistence

upon grad

ual emancipation and accounts races was

for his

that peaceful integration of the

politically impossible. But he did not suppress the tmth, as his fellow Virginians did, and so he stands, I would argue, outside the evolution of race
southern

hatred in the

United States.

From these considerations, Jefferson could draw two inferences. First, that the black race was as capable of moral excellence as the white race. "We find
among them
fidelity"

numerous

instances

among their better instmcted masters, of

(Query XIV,

p.

integrity, and as many as benevolence, gratitude, and unshaken 269). Second, and more importantly, that the question
of

the

most rigid

concerning their measure of intellectual talent is quite irrelevant to the basic questions of justice. In a letter to Henri Gregoire, Jefferson repeats his sincere
wish

to see "a complete the grade

of

refutation of

the doubts I
allotted them

myself entertained and ex

pressed on

understanding
were

by

nature, and to find that

again ac

in this

ourselves"

respect

they

are on a par with

(p. 1202). And he

evidence:

knowledges that these doubts

them therefore with great
gree

based

on

insufficient
goes on:

"I

expressed

hesitation."

But he
rights.

"whatever be their de
was or

of talent it is
of

no measure

of their

Because Sir Isaac Newton

superior to others

others"

property intellectual
political unequal

in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the person (p. 1202, my emphasis). This distinction between talent
and rights

or otherwise

is fundamental
well. ways else

liberty

but to

democracy

as

not only to the idea of For human beings are manifestly

in many respects and in many But they must be equal in something,

may be

ranked as

better

or worse.

there would be no common name.

Said Lincoln, "the negro is not our equal in color perhaps not in many other respects; still, in the right to put into his mouth the bread that his own hands

have earned, he is the equal of every other man, identity is a matter of not of talents but of rights,
nature as

white or

black."'2

Human

flowing

from

our common

morally

capable

beings.
and the

only thing that will redeem us, is a simple appreciation of what the human being is. There are many obstacles to such an appreciation. We tend to confuse the look of things for what those things really
redeemed

What

Jefferson,

are,

we are

tempted to

judge

people

by

the color of their skin rather than the

content of

their

characters.

But there

are other obstacles as well.

Most

of us are

strongly inclined to believe that the intellectual endowment of diverse races and ethnic groups is roughly equal. And since racists almost always believe that the

Ethnicity
other

and the

Problem of Equality

323

that anyone

group is unequally endowed, we allow ourselves to suspect the converse: who believes in or suspects unequal endowment must be a racist.

This is dangerous

not only because it prevents us from appreciating men like Jefferson but because it leaves the argument against racism dependent on an empirical question which with regard

is

not

in

our power

to

resolve.

Nor

would a resolution

to race

be

enough.

beings

will

turn out to be equal in

For it is very unlikely that individual human intellectual endowments: we are not all Isaac

Newtons, or Thomas Jeffersons, or Martin Luther Kings. But we are human beings, and as such we demand to be treated as responsible creatures, capable
of self-government.
we please with whatever

This is to say that we insist on the right to do precisely as is exclusively our own. We insist on this as individ

uals

this is

what

we mean

by
is

"liberty,"

and we what we mean

insist

on

it

when we

join

together as communities

this

by

"democracy."

And
not

unlike

the

characteristics mentioned

above, the
one either

right of self-government

is

tible to
not

differences in degree:

has it

or not

because

one either

suscep is or is

human.

am strongly inclined to believe that we will discover, over the course of time, that no differences in the intellectual endowment of various ethnic groups exist, or that if they do exist, they are both marginal and ephemeral in nature.

But I insist that this

empirical problem confronted us

does

not affect

the principal questions of

and will not continue

justice

which

have

in

previous centuries

to

confront us
was

in the

next.

Slavery

was a monstrous

injustice

because Jefferson

which I believe he wrong about the intellectual endowment of the Negro was but because it is the very meaning of injustice for any human being to make himself lord of the person and property of another. Segregation had to be

abolished not

because black

children possess as much promise as white chil

dren group

which

I believe they do
even

but because it is

a manifest

injustice for any

of

citizens,

the majority, to govern in their own interest at the

of

expense of others.

The idea
and

equality,

which

Aristotle, Jefferson,
social and political

ourselves,
not

ought

has been equally accessible to to be the point of departure for any

also

science,

merely because it is good, but

because it is

tme.

NOTES

1
tiny:

The

relative achievements of and

black

and white

America

are summarized

in A Common Des
Conclusions."

ton:

Society, Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, eds. (Washing National Academy Press, 1989). See especially the first chapter, "Summary and
Blacks
American
presents an account of

This study 2. "It's

impressive

absolute progress

on the part of

black Americans

measured against a persistent

easier

for the

ideology

than

it is to

disparity between them and their white counterparts. faculty to level down by arguing that everything in the curriculum pile on the work that's required, because deep in their hearts many
it."

is just
of the

Quotation from Fred Siegel, "The Cult ideologues don't believe that these minority kids can cut The New Republic 204 (Feb 18, 1991):36. of
Multiculturalism,"

324

Interpretation
are taken

3. Quotations from Aristotle's Politics G. Apostle

and

from the

excellent

translation of

Hippocrates

less

accessible

Lloyd P. Gerson (Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic Press, 1986). Slightly more precise, but to those unfamiliar with Greek, is the translation by Carnes Lord.
to

4. This is
to Aristotle.

not

deny

that the household the Politics

and

the city are very different

us against

institutions, according

Indeed, he begins

by

warning

those who confound the two. The

primary natural purpose of the family is to serve the needs of everyday life. But what is one living for? The family alone cannot provide an adequate answer to this question, but the city can. The end
city is the good life, the life which justifies itself. In order to achieve this end, the city incorporates the family but is obviously more than the sum of the families. 5. Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, Roy P. Basler, ed. (New York: World Pub
purpose of the

lishing Company, 1946), Henry Clay. Clay argues

the

p.

278. The

same argument also occurs

of

in

fragment

where

Lincoln

cites
of

that the

defense
all,

slavery
too

on

the grounds of the intellectual

inferiority

Negro "if it any

proves

anything
rule

at

proves

much.

It

proves that which

no

world

one might

properly be
easily be

enslaved

by

any

other

among the white races of the had made greater advances in

why it
should not

civilization.

And, if
and

this

applies to nations there

proved

is

reason

apply to

individuals;
all other

Current,

rightfully reduce bondage." men and women to The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln, Richard N. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 328. One should note that Clay's argument is

it

might

that the

wisest man

in the

world could

supported

by

the

theory
folk

and practice of

the Third Reich. Both in Mein

elevation of

Kampf and
p.

in the Nazi

state

the elevation of the

resulted

in the

the Ftihrer.
of

from Jefferson

6. Thomas Jefferson, Writings (New York: are from this source.

7. "The handsomest
ape

Library

America, 1984),

264. All

quotations

when compared with a god

is ugly compared with humankind; the in wisdom, in beauty, and in all other
most

wisest man appears as an ape

ways"

(Heraclitus).

8. The

earliest and

Apology

of

compelling analysis of prejudice can be found in the Socrates. Socrates finds himself accused of conducting certain investigations and of
to my mind

teaching certain sciences, such as physics and rhetoric, when in fact he has no part in these things. How, then, did he come to be accused of practicing them? He explains that his real business the
public

business

of

that citizen

is

as

wise as

philosophy he

was

to interrogate each of the citizens in order to find out whether to be

whether

claims

he knows

what

he

claims

to know

about

important things like justice, virtue, and piety. Inevitably it turns out that the citizens know less than they had supposed: by asking them embarrassing and difficult questions, Socrates exposes their ignorance. This is not a pleasant experience. They learn to hate Socrates, and say that he is

disgusting and corrupts the young. When someone asks what Socrates does or says that is disgust ing and corrupting, "they say the things that are ready at hand against all who philosophize. For I
do
not suppose

they

would

pretend

to

know, but know

nothing."

be willing to speak the truth, that it becomes quite clear that they To put it in more familiar language, Socrates is the victim of
wrote

a stereotype.

9. "I
should

view their

distresses,"

that if 1 should not exert myself, when, and as

be

guilt."

partaker of

the
the

David Rice in 1792, "I read the anger of Heaven, I believe far, as in my power, in order to relieve them, I From Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds. American

Political

Writing during Founding Era (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983), p. 859. 10. See First Things, by Hadley Arkes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Professor Arkes argues that the entire logic of politics and morality flows from the fact that human beings
are,

by nature, morally 11. Jefferson says

This
will

responsible creatures. at the end of

Query

republican of slaves.

government, the assembly

passed a

VIII that "In the very first session held under the law for the perpetual prohibition of the importation
of

in

some measure

stop the increase

this great political and moral evil,

of

while

the minds

of our citizens

may be
such a

He

continued to

hope for

ripening for a complete emancipation ripening to the end of his life.

human

nature"

(p. 214).

12. Springfield Debate, July 17, 1858. In Paul M. Angle, ed., Created Equal: Complete Lin coln-Douglas Debates of 1858 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 82.

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