Spring

301

1995

Volume 22

Number 3

Leo Strauss Mark Blitz Jacob A. Howland

Two Lectures Plato's Alcibiades I Aristotle

Tragedy:
the Poetics

339 359

on

Rediscovering

Discussion

405

Dorothy

L. Sayers

Aristotle

on

Detective Fiction

Review Essays

417

Daniel J.

Mahoney

Modern Man
Review

and

Man Tout Court: The Flight Modern Difference, La Cite de I'homme,

from Nature

and the on

Essay

by

Pierre Manent
Popular Government Review

439

Peter McNamara

and

Effective Government,

Essay

on

The Effective Republic,

and

by

Harvey Flaumenhaft,
and

Alexander Hamilton

the Political

Order, by Morton J. Frisch

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept.
Leonard
of

Philosophy, Queens College

Executive Editor Genera] Editors

Grey

Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974) Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson
Christopher Bruell

Consulting

Editors

International Editors

Terence E. Marshall

Heinrich Meier

Editors

Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumarm Michael Blaustein Patrick Coby Thomas S. Engeman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Joseph E. Goldberg Steven Harvey Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Grant B. Mindle James W. Morris Will Morrisey Susan Orr Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Susan Shell Richard Velkley Bradford P. Wilson Michael Zuckert Catherine Zuckert Lucia B Prochnow
.

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Political Philosophy

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Well

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Those

Theology, Literature

and

Jurisprudence.

follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th ed. or manuals based on it; double-space their manuscripts, including notes; place references in the text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their
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other
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Inquiries: Patricia D'Allura, Assistant to the
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Interpretation A
Spring
1995 Volume 22 Number 3
Leo Strauss Two Lectures 301 339

Mark Blitz Jacob A. Howland

Plato's Alcibiades I
Aristotle
on

Tragedy:

Rediscovering

the Poetics

359

Discussion

Dorothy

L. Sayers

Aristotle

on

Detective Fiction

405

Review Essays Daniel J.

Mahoney

Modem Man Review

and

Man Tout Court: The Flight

the Modem

from Nature

and on

Difference,

Essay

La Cite de I'homme,

by
417

Pierre Manent
Peter McNamara Popular Government
Review
on

and

Effective Government,

Essay Harvey Flaumenhaft,

and the

The Effective Republic,

and

by
439

Alexander Hamilton

Political Order,

by

Morton J. Frisch

Copyright 1995

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Executive Editor General Editors Hilail Gildin, Dept. Leonard
of

Philosophy, Queens College

Grey

Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974)
Christopher Bruell Joseph Fortin John Hallowell (d.

Consulting

Editors

David Lowenthal Muhsin Mansfield Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson
International Editors Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier
-

Cropsey Ernest L. Harry V. Jaffa Mahdi Harvey C.

1992)

Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Michael Blaustein Patrick Coby Thomas S. Engeman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Joseph E. Goldberg Steven Harvey Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Grant B. Mindle James W. Morris Will Morrisey Susan Orr Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Susan Shell Richard Velkley Bradford P. Wilson Michael Zuckert Catherine Zuckert
*

Manuscript Editor

Lucia B. Prochnow

Subscriptions

Subscription rates per volume (3 issues): individuals $25 libraries and all other institutions $40 students (four-year limit) $16 Single
copies available.

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outside

weeks

Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by a financial institution located within the U.S.A. (or the U.S. Postal Service).

The Journal Welcomes Manuscripts

in

in

Political Philosophy

as

Well

as

Those

Theology, Literature

and

Jurisprudence.

follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th ed. or manuals based on it; double-space their manuscripts, including notes; place references in the text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their
contributors should
other work;
with

put,

on the

postal/zip

code

in

full,

title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address and telephone. Contributors using computers should, if

possible,
clear

provide a character count of the entire manuscript.

will not

Please

send three

copies, which

be

returned.

Composition
Printed
and

by Eastern Composition, Inc., Binghamton, N.Y. 13905 U.S.A.

bound

by

Wickersham

Printing

Co.

Lancaster, PA 17603 U.S.A.

Inquiries: Patricia D'Allura, Assistant to the Editor, interpretation, Queens College, Flushing, N Y 11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542

Two Lectures
Edited By

by

Leo Strauss

David Bolotin
St. John's

College, Santa Fe

Christopher Bruell
Boston College

Thomas L. Pangle

University

of Toronto

The

following

two

lectures

are

the

first

of a number of

lectures

by

the late

Leo Strauss from

which

Interpretation has

undertaken able

to publish. The editors of

these lectures for Interpretation have been

various sources: none of

to obtain copies or transcripts

the lectures was edited

by

Professor Strauss for

the purposes
state

of publication nor even

left behind his

by him

that

would

have

suggested a wish on

part that

among his papers in a it be published post

humously. In

order

to underline this

fact,

the editors have the

decided to

present

the lectures as
changes.

they have found them,

all

with

bare

minimum

of editorial

These lectures have

more

been

published once

before,

at

least in part, but in

heavily

edited

form intended

to make them more accessible to a wider

audience

(The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the

Thought of Leo Strauss, edited by Thomas L. Pangle [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989]). The University of Chicago Press, which holds the copyright on the materials and which retains the copyright on them in the ver
sion now to

lication in Interpretation,

be published, has generously given its permission for their repub as has Professor Joseph Cropsey, Leo Strauss's be
attached

literary
A

executor.

notice will

to each lecture

indicating
list
will

the state in which the

manuscript or transcription was

of

found;

and a

be

appended to some

the lectures calling

attention

to divergences from the previously

published

version.

interpretation,

Spring 1995,

Vol. 22, No. 3

302

Interpretation
"Existentialism,"

The first of these two lectures,

was

delivered

by

Professor

Strauss fourteen

years earlier than the second one,

related to one another

"The problem of

Socrates."

They

are,

however,

by

their common concern to under

are

stand and to respond to the thought

of Heidegger. Indeed, they

Professor
so

Strauss's
we

most extensive public statements about and we

Heidegger,

at

least

far

as

know,

have accordingly

chosen

to present them

here

together.

Existentialism
Leo Strauss

According to Dr. Victor Gourevitch, whose own lecture on Existentialism is referred to by Professor Strauss in the text, this lecture was delivered in Febru ary, 1956, at the Hillel Foundation of the University of Chicago. The lecture
was available to the editors

tions,

and alterations with

by

copy of a typescript with additions, correc Professor Strauss's own hand. The original of this
a can

in

typescript,

Professor Strauss's revisions,

be found in

the

Strauss

ar

chives at the
version where

University
while

of Chicago. We have

chosen to present the revised

in the text,

indicating

in

notes what the revisions were.

However,
he
have
pre

Professor Strauss merely

only the

corrected a

typographical mistake, or where

added a comma or made other small changes sented corrected version.

of punctuation,

we

We have

also taken the

liberty

of correcting,
to

without

comment, a few misspellings in the typescript. We

are grateful

Hein

rich and

Wiebke Meier for

their most generous

help

in

deciphering

Professor

Strauss's handwriting.
A
more

heavily
seen

edited version

of this

lecture, based

on a typescript that

differs, in part, from

the one we used, and on a copy that gives no indication of

having
sical

previously published, under the title "An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism, in The Rebirth of Clas
was
"

been

by

Professor Strauss,

Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought

of

Leo Strauss (Chi

of Chicago]), be the most

cago: pp.

University

of Chicago Press, 1989

noted

1989

by

The

University

2746. We have

in

an epilogue what appear to us to

important divergences between

the earlier version and the present one.

This
should

series of

lectures

a reminder of

the perplexities towards

of modem man

help

the Jewish students in

with

particular

facing

the perplexities of
reminded

the modem Jew

people

somewhat greater clarity.

Existentialism has

many thinking is incomplete and defective if the thinking being, the triinking individual, forgets himself as what he is. It is the old Socratic warn ing. Compare1 Theodorus in the Theaetetus, the purely theoretic, purely objec
that tive
man who who

objects,
about

loses himself completely in the contemplation of mathematical knows nothing about himself and his fellow men, in particular defects. The
thinking2

his

own

man

is

not a pure

mind, a

observer, for instance. swered by science, for this

The3

question what am
would mean

I,

or who am

pointer-reading cannot be an
self-forgetting

that there are some

1995

by

The

University Spring

of

Chicago. All rights

reserved.

interpretation,

1995, Vol. 22, No. 3

304

Interpretation
who

Theodoruses

have

gotten

hold

of the

limits

of the

human

soul

by

means of

For if they have not done so, if their results are necessarily provisional, hypothetical, it is barely possible that what we can find out by
scientific method.

examining

ourselves and our situation

honestly,

without

the pride and the pre

tence of scientific

knowledge, is
a
school

more

helpful than

science.

'Existentialism is

of philosophic

thought.

The

name

is

not

like

Platonism, Epicureanism,
ment

and

Thomism. Existentialism is

a nameless move owes

like

pragmatism or positivism. significance

This is

deceptive.5

Existentialism
alone

its

overriding
thought in

to a single

man:

Heidegger. Heidegger
thought as
and

brought
all

about such a radical change

in

philosophic

is revolutionizing

Germany, in

continental

Europe,

is

beginning

to affect even

Anglo-Saxony. I

am not surprised

by

this effect. I remember the impression

he

made on me when

I heard him first

as a

young Ph.D. in 1922.

Up

to that time I

had been particularly impressed, as many of my contemporaries in Germany Weber's6 intransigent devotion to intellectual hon were, by Max Weber, by
esty,

by

his

passionate

devotion to the idea

of

science,

devotion that in Frankfurt

when

was

combined with a profound uneasiness

regarding the meaning of science. On my

saw am

way north from Freiburg Main Franz Rosenzweig

where

Heidegger then taught, I

name will

whose

always

be

remembered

in
said

formed
in

people speak about

Existentialism,

and

I told him
appeared

of

Heidegger. I

to him: in comparison with

child regard

Heidegger,

Weber

to

me as an orphan

to precision, and probing, and competence. I had never seen

and concentration

before

such

seriousness, profundity,

in the interpretation

of

philosophic

texts. I had heard Heidegger's interpretation of certain sections in

same

Aristotle. Sometime later I heard Werner Jaeger in Berlin interpret the

texts.
no

Charity

compels me

to

limit the

comparison to the

remark7

that there was

which

comparison. was

Gradually

the breadth of the

me and

revolution

of

thought

Heidegger
our own

eyes

preparing dawned upon that there had been no in

a short

my

generation.

We

saw with

such phenomenon

in the

world

since

Hegel. He
of

very dethroning philosophy in Germany. There was a famous discussion between Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in Davos which revealed the lostness and emptiness of this
succeeded

time in

the

established schools

remarkable representative of established academic

had

eyes.

Cassirer had been

a pupil of

philosophy to everyone Hermann Cohen, the founder of the

system

who
neo-

Kantian

school.8

Cohen had

elaborated a system of

was ethics.

Cassirer had transformed Cohen's

philosophy whose center into a new system of

philosophy in which ethics had completely disappeared: it had been silently dropped: he had not faced the problem. Heidegger did face the problem. He
declared that
ethics

is impossible fact
opens

and

his

whole

being

was permeated

by

the

awareness that this

most

pher

up I would say the outstanding German philosopher was Edmund Husserl. It was Heidegger's critique
which

an abyss.

Prior to Heidegger's emergence the

only5

German

philoso

of

Husserl's

phenom

enology

became decisive: precisely because that

criticism consisted

in

Existentialism
radicalization of once said

305

Husserl's

own question and questioning.

in9

Briefly,

as8

Husserl
the10

to

me who

had been trained

the

Marburg

neo-Kantian

school,

neo-Kantians were superior made

to all other German

with

philosophical

schools, but

they

the

mistake of

beginning

the roof. He meant: the primary theme of

of science.

Marburg

neo-Kantianism was the

analysis

But science, Husserl

from our primary knowledge of the world of things; sci taught, is derivative ence is not the perfection of man's understanding of the world, but a specific
modification of

that pre-scientific

understanding. a

The

meaningful genesis

of

science out of pre-scientific

understanding is sensibly

problem; the primary theme is

the

philosophical

understanding began
with

of the pre-scientific world and therefore

perceived

in the

first

place the analysis of the

himself5

thing.

According

to Heidegger

Husserl

the roof: the merely

sensibly

perceived

thing is

itself derivative; there are not first sensibly perceived things and thereafter the same things in a state of being valued or in a state of affecting us. Our primary understanding of the world is not an understanding of things as objects but indicated" what the Greeks by pragmata, things which we handle and The horizon
within which

of

use.12

Husserl had

analyzed

the world of pre-scientific un

derstanding
the

was the pure consciousness as the absolute being. Heidegger ques

tioned that orientation

by

pure consciousness cannot

referring to the fact that the inner time belonging to be understood if one abstracts from the fact that

this time is necessarily finite and even constituted

same effect which

by

man's

mortality.

The

Heidegger had in the late twenties

soon

and

many, he had very

in

continental

Europe

as a whole.

early thirties in Ger There is no longer in Marxism

crude

existence a philosophic position apart or refined.

from

neo-Thomism and positions

All

rational13

liberal

philosophic

have lost their

signifi

One may deplore this but I for one cannot bring myself to be8 inadequate. I philosophic positions which have been shown to to clinging great effort in order to find a solid shall have to make a afraid that we very
cance and power.
am14

basis for

rational

liberalism.

Only
great

a great

thinker could

help

us

in

our

intellec

tual plight. But here

is the

trouble, the only

of course

great

thinker in our time

is

Heidegger.

The only
ger's

question of

importance

is the is

question whether

Heideg

teaching is true
great
Kant16

or not.

But the very

question

is deceptive because it is
competent
of5

silent about the question of competence

of who

to judge. Per

haps only
thinkers.

thinkers are really competent to judge

made a

the thought of great those

distinction between

philosophers and

for

whom

philosophy is identical with the history of philosophy. He made a distinction, in other words, between the thinker and the scholar. I know that I am only a
scholar.

But I know
at

also

that

most people

that call themselves philosophers are

on

mostly,
great

best,
The

scholars.

The

scholar

is radically dependent
problems without
not

the work of the

thinkers,

of men who scholar

faced the

being

covered"

authority.

to

our sight

in,

to

us

is cautious, methodic, inaccessible heights and

bold. He does

not

by any become lost

mists as

the great thinkers do. Yet

306
while

Interpretation
the great thinkers are so bold

they

are also much more cautious than we

are;

they

see pitfalls where we are sure of our ground.

We

scholars

live in

charmed

lems
the

by

circle, light-living like the Homeric gods, protected against the prob the great thinkers. The scholar becomes possible through the fact that
thinkers disagree. Their disagreement their differences
creates a

great

possibility for
more

us

to
to

reason about

for wondering

which of

them is

likely

be right. We may think that the possible alternatives are exhausted by the great thinkers of the past. We may try to classify their doctrines and make a kind of herbarium
and think

that we look over them from a vantage point. But we

other great

cannot exclude

the possibility that

thinkers might arise in the fu thought

ture

in 2200 in Burma for

the

character18

of whose

has in

no

provided out

by

our schemata.

For

who are we

to believe that we have

way been found

the limits of human the little we

scholar

possibilities?19

In brief,

we are occupied with

reasoning
of

about

understand oP what

the great thinkers have said.

problems

The

faces the fundamental

through the
of

intermediacy

books. If he is
great thinker

a serious man through the

problems

intermediacy

the great books. The

faces the

directly.

saw

I apply this to my situation in regard to Heidegger. A famous psychologist I in Europe, an old man, told me that in his view it is not yet possible to
a

form
work. a

judgment

about

the

significance

as well

as

the truth

of

Heidegger's
that

Because this

work changed

the intellectual

orientation so

radically21

long long
in

time is needed in order to understand with even tolerable

way22

adequacy
The
most

and

a most general

what

this

work means.

The

more

understand what

Heidegger is aiming at the more I see how much stupid thing I could do would be to close my eyes There is became
a a not altogether unrespectable
was not

still escapes me. or

to reject his

work.

justification for
above the

doing

so.

Heidegger
on

Nazi in 1933. This lived

read

due to

a mere error of

judgment

the

part of a man who

on great

heights high
book

lowland23

of politics.

Everyone
the trees

who

had

his first

great

and

did

not overlook

the wood for

could see

the

kinship

in temper

and

direction between Heidegger's

thought and the Nazis. What was the practical, that is to say serious meaning of

the contempt for

the
work24

reasonableness and

the

praise of resoluteness which permeated movement?

except

to encourage that extremist

of

When Heidegger

was

rector of which

the

University
not yet

Freiburg
with

in 1933 he delivered
that speech

an official speech

in

he identified himself

the movement which then swept

Germany. his

Heidegger has list in

of

dared to in

mention

in the
on

otherwise complete
of

his writings, he

which appear
Yet8 195325

from time to time he

published a

the book jackets

given

recent publications.
which

book, lectures

spoke of

the greatness and

dignity
he

of

in 1935, the National Socialist move

ment. rected.

In the The

preface written

in

195325

said that all mistakes

had been

cor

case

of

Heidegger
naturally,

reminds would not

to a certain extent of the case of

Nietzsche.

Nietzsche,

have

sided with
and

Hitler. Yet there is

one rejects

an undeniable

kinship

between Nietzsche's thought

fascism. If

Existentialism
as

307

passionately be

as

Nietzsche
with
a27

did26

the conservative constitutional monarchy as

well as will

democracy

view

to a new aristocracy, the passion of the denials

more subtle
his29

much more effective

than the necessarily

To28

intimations

of

the

character of the new nobility.

political action against such things

It is

politically sufficient. not only from without but from within as well? Is there no problem of democ racy, of industrial mass democracy? The official high priests of democracy with
their
amiable reasonableness were not reasonable enough

not even

blond beast. Passionate say nothing of is absolutely in order but it is not sufficient. Are there no dangers threatening democracy

to prepare us

for

our

situation:

the decline of

Europe,

the danger to the west, to the whole western than that which threatened
era.

heritage

which

is

at

least

as great and even greater

Mediterranean
And30

civilization

around

300

of

the Christian

It is

childish

to

believe that the U.N.

within

organization

is

an answer even

to the

political problem.
31
and5

democracy: it
and5

suffices to mention the name of

positivism with

France

the

commercials

logical

their indescribable vulgarity.

They

have indeed the

merit of not

sending
of

men

into

concentration camps and gas

chambers, but is the absence

once

these unspeakable evils sufficient? Nietzsche

described the

change which

had been

effected

in the

second

half

of

the

nineteenth

ing day

follows.32 The reading of the morn century in continental Europe as prayer had been replaced by the reading of the morning paper: not every

the same

destiny,

thing, the same reminder of but every day something new with

men's

absolute

no reminder of

duty duty

and exalted and exalted practical

destiny. Specialization,

knowing

more and more about

less

and

less,

impossibility
universality,

of concentration upon

the very few

this33

essential

things upon which

man's wholeness

entirely depends

specialization compensated

by

sham

by

the stimulation of all kinds of interests

philistinism and problem.

and curiosities without

true passion, the danger of universal

let

me

look for

a moment at

the Jewish

creeping conformism. Or The nobility of Israel is

beyond praise, the only bright spot for the contemporary Jew who knows where he comes from. And yet Israel does not afford a solution to the

literally
Jewish

problem.

"The Judaeo-Christian tradition"? This

pluralism can

means

to blur and to
seems at

conceal grave
price of

differences. Cultural
all edges.

only be had it
not

the

blunting

It

would

critics of

be wholly unworthy of democracy even if they are may

recall

us as

thinking beings

to listen to the

enemies of

thinking
As

men and

you

especially great thinkers and from Mr. Gourevitch's lecture, Existentialism

democracy not blustering

provided

they

are

fools.

appeals

to

a certain experience

(anguish)

as the

basic

experience

in the light

of which

everything must be understood. Having this experience is one thing; regarding it as the basic experience is another thing. Its basic character is not guaranteed

by

This argument only be guaranteed by in our time. admitted in what is it is implied generally may be invisible because What is generally admitted may imply, but only imply a fundamental uneasithe
experience

itself. It

argument.5

can

308

Interpretation

is vaguely felt but not faced. Given this context, the experience to which Existentialism refers will appear as a revelation, as the revelation, as the authentic interpretation of the fundamental uneasiness. But something more is
ness which

required which

felt

uneasiness
man.

however is equally generally admitted in our time: the vaguely must be regarded as essential to man, and not only to
present5

day
non.

Let

us assume

Yet this vaguely felt uneasiness is distinctly a present day phenome however that this uneasiness embodies what all earlier ages

have thought, is the result of what earlier ages have thought; in that case the vaguely felt uneasiness is the mature fruit of all earlier human efforts: no return
to an older interpretation of that uneasiness is possible. Now this
view

is

a second

generally vaguely felt but not I have already referred to the

more about

accepted

today (apart from the fundamental uneasiness which is faced); this second element is the belief in progress.
well

known

expression

'we know that

more and

less

less.'

and

What does this

mean?

It

means

modem science

has
the

not

kept the

promise which

it held

out

from its

beginning

up to the

end of

nineteenth century:

that it would reveal to us the true character of the uni

verse and

the truth

about man. of

You have in the Education of Henry Adams

memorable

document

the change in the character and in the claim of science

which made
and which

assertion

itself felt in the general public towards the end of the last century has increased since, in momentum and sweep. You all know the that value-judgments are impermissible to the scientist in general and
in
ways that

to the social scientist in particular. This means

increased

man's power

former
use5

men never

certainly that while science has dreamt of, it is abso Science

cannot tell
or

lutely

incapable to tell

men

how to

that power.
and

him
and

whether

wisely devilishly. From this it follows that science is

it is

wiser

to

use

that

power

beneficently
in

foolishly
own

unable

to establish its

mean-

ingfulness
We

or

to

answer

the

question whether and

what sense science

is

good.

are then confronted with an enormous apparatus whose

but8

bulk is
say

ever

increas

ing,

which

in itself has

no meaning.

If

a scientist would

as

Goethe's
would

Mephisto

still said

that science and reason is man's highest power,

he

be

told that he was not

which

talking

as a scientist

but

was34

making

a value

judgment Someone

from the

point of view of science

is

altogether unwarranted.

has

spoken of a

flight from

scientific reason.

This flight is

not

due to any

perversity but to science itself. I dimly remember the time when people argued as follows: to deny the possibility of science or rational value judgments means
to admit that all values are of equal rank; and this means that respect

for

all

values,
gone.

universal we

tolerance, is
science

the

dictate

of scientific reason.

But this time has

equal
we

Today
draw

hear that

no conclusion whatever can

be drawn from the

ity

of all

values; that

does

not

legitimate

nor

indeed forbid that

should

rational conclusions

from

scientific

findings. The

assumption that
31

rationally and therefore turn to science for reliable information this assumption is wholly outside of the purview and interest of science proper.
we should act

The flight from

scientific reason

is35

the consequence of the

flight

of5

science

Existentialism
from5

309
his

reason

from the

notion that man

is

a rational

being

who perverts

being
does

if he does

not act rationally.

It

goes without

not allow of value

judgments has

no

saying that a science which longer any possibility of speaking of

the con

progress except

in the

humanly

irrelevant

sense of scientific progress:

cept of progress

has accordingly been

replaced

by

the concept

of change.

If

science or reason cannot answer the question of

sufficiently
selves to
nal: one

gifted and otherwise able people science says

why science is good, of why fulfill a duty in devoting them

choice of science

science,

in

effect

that the

is

not ratio myths.

may

choose with equal

science

right pleasing

and otherwise

satisfying

Furthermore,

does

no

longer

conceive of

itself
on

as

the perfection of the

human understanding36; it
which will always remain rest on evident necessities.

admits

that it is based

fundamental hypotheses does

not

hypotheses. The

whole stmcture of science choice of

If this is so, the

the scientific orientation

is

as groundless as the choice of

mean

any

alternative orientation. as

But

what else

does

this

except that

the reflective scientist discovers

a8

the ground of

his

science and entific

and

his

choice of science

groundless choice

an abyss. on

For

a sci

interpretation

of the choice of the scientific

on

orientation,

the one

hand,

the choice of alternative orientations,

the other, presupposes already the

acceptance of the scientific orientation.

non-hypothetical phenomenon.

The fundamental freedom is the only Everything else rests on that fundamental free Existentialism. itself
as well as poor and stupid positiv we not

dom. We

are

already in the say that helpless

midst of

Someone ism ism have have

might

science
against

by

are of course
a rational

the Existentialist onslaught. But do

drop it,
asked

philosophy for which poetic, emotional Existentialism is myself for a long time where do I find that rational
and where of

which

takes up the thread where science and positiv

no
match?19

I If

philosophy?19

I disregard the neo-Thomists, to say that he is in possession

reveal character of

do I find today the

philosopher who

dares

the true metaphysics and the tme ethics which

to us in a rational, universally valid way the nature of

being

and the

the

good

life?19

Naturally

we can sit at

the

feet

of the great philoso

phers of

old,
of

of

Plato
as

and of

Aristotle. But
or

doctrine

ideas

he intimated it,

dare to say that Plato's Aristotle's doctrine of the nous that does
who can

nothing but think itself and is essentially related to the eternal visible universe, Are those like myself who are inclined to sit at the feet of is the true
teaching?19

the old philosophers

not exposed

to the danger of a weak-kneed eclecticism

which will not withstand a single

blow

on

the part of those who are competent

enough

to

remind

them

of

the

singleness of purpose and of

great?19

inspiration that

characterizes every thinker who deserves to be called

Considering

the

profound
appeal proper

disagreement among the

without

great thinkers of the

past, is it possible to

to them

is taken

more and more

blunting all edges? by what was

The

called

Weltanschauungslehre, theory
mitted

of comprehensive

philosophy in the country of its origin views. In this stage it is ad

place of rational

that we cannot refer to the tme metaphysical and ethical

teaching

avail-

310
able

Interpretation
in any
of

the

great thinkers of

the past. It is admitted

that37

there

are n

answering the fundamental questions, that there are n types of absolute presuppositions as Collingwood called them, none of which can be said to be
ways of

rationally

superior

to any other. This

means

to abandon the very

idea
as

of

the
the

truth as a rational philosophy

case of the social
scientists38

has

always understood

it. It

means

just

in

that the choice of any of these

again

presuppositions

is
of

groundless;

we are

thus

led39

to the abyss of

freedom. To say nothing

the fact that any

such

doctrine

of comprehensive views presupposes

that the

fundamental
at

possibilities are available or

that fundamental human creativity

is

its

end.

Furthermore there is

a radical

disproportion between the

questions

analyst of

comprehensive views who

does

not

face the fundamental

directly

and

does

not even recognize

them

answer

only,

and

the great
created

in their primary meaning, viz. as pointing to one thinkers themselves. He is separated from them by a his
pretended can we as

deep

gulf which

is

by

knowledge

of

the Utopian character

that40

of original position must

philosophy itself. How

understand

to

the thinkers

possibly believe want to be understood they

order and

he is in
as8

and

they

have been

understood

if

one

is to

tabulate their teachings. We

are

order not

sufficiently familiar with the history of moral philosophy in particular in to be taken in for one moment by the pious hope that while there may disagreements among the
will rational philosophers

be

profound

in

all other re

spects, that they

possible
views

way out finds itself

this8

of

regarding human conduct. There is only one doctrine41 of comprehensive the predicament in which the

happily

agree

and that

is to find the

ground of

the variety of comprehensive

views

in the human

If

one takes

soul or more generally stated in the human condition. indispensable step one is again already at the threshold of

Existentialism. There is
another

very

common

way

of

People say that

science
of

we must adopt values and

Our42

solving the so-called that it is natural for

value problem. us to adopt

the
of

values of our society.

values are our

highest

principles

if the meaning
the

itself depends

on values.

Now it is impossible to

overlook

relation

society to our society5, and the dependence of the principles on the society. This means generally stated that the principles, the so-called categorial system or the essences are rooted ultimately in the particu
the
principles5

of our

lar, in something
or relative to the
empire?19

which exists.

Existence
that the

precedes essence. natural

For

what else rooted

do
in

people mean when

they

say,

e.g.

Stoic

law teaching is

decay

of the

Greek

polis and

the emergence of the Greek

As I

said,43

sometimes people

try

to avoid the

difficulty indicated by

that we have to adopt the values of our society. This is altogether

saying impossible
are the

for

serious men.

We

cannot

help

raising the

question as

to the value of the

values of our society. values of one's

To

accept the values of one's

society because they

society

means

simply to shirk one's responsibility, not to

make

face

the situation that everyone has to

his

own

choice, to mn

away from

one's

Existentialism
self.

-311

To find the

solution

to our problem in the acceptance of the the

values of our

values of our

society, because

they

are

society

means

to make philistinism a

duty

and to make oneself oblivious

to the difference between tme individuals

and whitened sepulchres.

The

uneasiness

which

today is felt but

not

faced

can

be

expressed

by

single word: relativism.

Existentialism

admits

the truth

of relativism

but it

real

izes that

relativism so

far from

being

a solution or even a

relief, is deadly.

Existentialism is the

reaction of serious men to

with

their own

relativism.

Existentialism begins then

the realization that as the ground of all ob

an abyss.

jective,

rational

knowledge
to

we

discover

in the last be
he

analysis

have

no support except

All truth, all meaning is seen man's freedom. Objectively there This
nothingness can

is in the last

analysis

only meaninglessness,
but this
made

nothingness.

experienced

in

anguish

experience cannot

find

an objective expres
originates

sion:

because it

cannot

be

in detachment. Man life

freely

meaning,

originates

the

horizon,
project,

the absolute presupposition, the

and are possible.

ideal,

the project

within which

understanding

Man is

man a

by

virtue of such

horizon-fonning

of an

unsupported

project, of

thrown project.

More precisely man always lives already within such a horizon without being aware of its character; he takes his world as simply given; i.e. he has lost

himself; but he

can call

himself back from his lostness

and

take the respon

sibility for what he was in a lost, unauthentic way. Man is essentially a social being: to be a human being means to be with other human beings. To be in an
authentic oneself

way means to be in an authentic way is incompatible with being false to others. Thus
with44

others:

to be true to

there would seem to

exist
a

the possibility of

an existentialist ethics which would

have to be however believed in the

strictly formal

ethics.

However this may

means

be,

Heidegger

never

possibility of an ethics. To be a human being

authentic and one's own sham certainties

to be in the world. To be authentic means to be

in the world; to

accept

the things

within

the world as merely resolutely,

factual

being
(and

as

merely

factual;

to risk

oneself

despising
is in this
are.

all objective certainties are sham). world reveal

Only

if

man

way do the things in the

concern with objective
consequence

themselves to him as
narrows

they

The

that

man erects around

certainty necessarily himself

the horizon. It leads to the

an artificial

from him the To live We

abyss of which means

he

must

be

aware

if he

wants

setting which conceals to be truly human. But

are we

dangerously
ultimately

to think exposedly.

are

confronted with mere

facticity help
do

or contingency.

not able and even compelled to raise the question of the causes of ourselves and of the things
Where45

in the

world?

Indeed

we cannot

and

Whither,

or of

the Whole. But

Whole.46

we

raising the questions of the not know and cannot know

the Where and Whither and the

Man

cannot understand

himself in the
irredeemable47

light

of the whole,

in the light
of

of

his

origin or

his
of

end.

This

ignorance is the basis

his lostness

or

the core

the human

situation.

By

312

Interpretation
assertion existentialism restores man's

making this
of objective

Kant's

notion of

the

unknowable

thing-in-itself and of

ability to grasp the fact

of

his freedom

at

the limits

knowledge

and as

the ground of objective knowledge. But

and no other world.

in

exis

tentialism there is

no moral

law

It becomes necessary to

make as

fully

explicit as possible

the character of

human existence; to raise the question what is human existence; and to bring to light the essential structures of human existence. This inquiry is called by
Heidegger
tenz
analytics of
outset as

Existenz. Heidegger

conceived of

the analytics of Exis-

from the
and

the fundamental ontology. This means he took

question what

up

again

Plato's any

Aristotle's
said

is being? What is that Plato

and

by

virtue of which not

only as to this, that the question of what is to be is the fundamental question; he also agreed with Plato and Aristotle as to this, that the fundamental question must be primarily
addressed

being

is

to

be?19

Heidegger

agreed with

Aristotle

to that
while

being

which

is5

in the
and

most emphatic or

the

most

authoritative way.

Yet

according to Plato

Aristotle to be in the high

that to

est sense means

sense means

to be always, Heidegger

contends

be in the highest
is: to be

to exist, that
sense

is to say, to be in the

manner

in

which man

in the highest

is

constituted

by

mortality. of existence.

Philosophy
Is then the
rational

thus becomes
essential

analytics

Analytics

of

existence

brings to light the

new

structures, the unchangeable character

of existence.

Philosophy
the
new

in

spite of the

difference

of

content, objective,
analytics of subjec

philosophy, comparable to Kant's transcendental

not

tivity? Does

knowledge,

complete

philosophy too take on the character of absolute knowledge, final knowledge, infinite knowledge? No

the new philosophy is necessarily based on a specific

cannot analyze existence
choice which

ideal

of existence.
must

One

from
to

a neutral point of

view; one

have

made a

is

not subject

examination

in

order

to be open to the
of absolute

phenome

non of existence.

Man is

finite being, incapable

knowledge: his

very knowledge of his finiteness is finite. We may also say: commitment can only be understood by an understanding which is itself committed, which is a commitment. Or: existential philosophy is subjective truth about the
specific5

subjectivity
guided
which

of

truth.48

To

speak

in

general

terms,

rational

philosophy has been

of existen

by
is

the distinction between the objective which is true and the subjective

opinion

(or

an equivalent of this

distinction). On the basis

itself to be
as49

tialism

what was and

formerly
what
with

called objective reveals

superficial

problematic;

was

formerly

called

subjective

reveals

itself

as

pro

found
The
tenz;5

assertoric,
great

the understanding that there is no apodicticity.

of

achievement
Existenz.5

Heidegger

was

the coherent exposition of the

experience of of

coherent exposition
Existenz.5

based

on

the experience of Exis

spoken of exis

the

essential character of

Kierkegaard had
the

tence within the traditional

horizon,

i.e.

within

distinction between
tence out
of

essence and existence.

the traditional Heidegger tried to understand exis

of

horizon

itself.

Existentialism
Yet the
analytics
of existence was a exposed

313
which

to serious difficulties
new

eventually induced Heidegger to find to break with existentialism. I shall

1

fundamentally

basis,

that is to say,

mention now some of

these difficulties.

Heidegger demanded from philosophy that it should liberate itself com pletely from traditional or inherited notions which were mere survivals of for mer ways of thinking. He mentioned especially concepts that were of Christian theological origin. Yet his understanding of existence was obviously of Chris
tian origin
analytics

(conscience,
the

guilt,

being

unto a

death,
specific

anguish).

2)50

The fact that the 3 The

of existence was

based in the

on

ideal

of existence made one

wonder whether

analysis was not

fundamentally
while

arbitrary.

analytics

of existence
no to

had

culminated

assertion that there can

be

no

truth and

hence

be, if there
be beings

are no

human

beings,
are no

there can be

beings (for
4

example

the

sun and

the earth), if there

without

human beings. This is hard: that there

should

that

by

virtue of which

beings
of

are.

The highest
yet

form

of

knowledge it

was said

to

be finite knowledge
not seen

finiteness:
of

how

can

finiteness be
other words

seen as was

finiteness if it is
said

in the light Professor

infinity?19

Or in

that we cannot know the whole; but does this not

necessarily

presuppose awareness of as

the

whole?

Hocking

stated

this

difficulty
poses

neatly

follows: desespoir
rather

presupposes espoir and espoir

presup

love; is

then not love

than despair the

fundamental

phenomenon?

Is therefore These

not that which man

objections which

ultimately loves, God, the ultimate ground? Heidegger made to himself were fundamentally the
made

same objections which

Hegel had

to Kant. The
of

relation of

Heidegger to
objections

his

own existentialism

is the

same as

that

Hegel to Kant. The

mentioned would seem

to lead to the consequence that one cannot escape meta

consequence what

physics, Plato
return

and

Aristotle. This

is
is

rejected

by

Heidegger. The be

to

metaphysics

is impossible. But
on an

needed
plane.

is

some repetition of cannot

all5

what metaphysics
the5

intended

entirely different

Existence

clue, the clue to the understanding of that

by

virtue of which of

beings
to

are. all

Existence
are.

must rather

be

understood

in the light

that

by

virtue of which

beings I have

From this

point of view

the

analytics of existence appears still

subjectivism.51

partake of modem
compared

the relation of Heidegger to existentialism with the relation

of

was aware

Hegel to Kant. Hegel may be said to have been the first philosopher who that his philosophy belongs to his time. Heidegger's criticism of be
expressed as

existentialism can therefore

follows. Existentialism
man, the final

claims

to

be the insight into the

such would

essential character of

insight

which as

belong

to the final

ism denies the possibility of ishable; man is and always

existentialism claims

time, to the fullness of time. And yet existential a fullness of time: the historical process is unfinwill

be

historical being.
its

In

other

words

to be the understanding of the

does

not reflect about

its

own

historicity,

of

historicity of man and yet it belonging to a specific situation

return

of western man.

It becomes therefore necessary to

from Kierkegaard's

314

Interpretation

existing individual who has nothing but contempt for Hegel's understanding of man in terms of universal history, to that Hegelian understanding. The situation
to which
existentialism

belongs

can

be

seen

to be liberal democracy.
uncertain of

More its This

democracy precisely future. Existentialism belongs to the decline

a
which

liberal

has become
of

itself

or of

Europe

or of the a

West.52

insight has

grave

consequences.

Let

us

look back for

moment

to

Hegel.

Hegel's philosophy knew itself to belong to a specific time. As the completion or perfection of philosophy it belonged to the completion or fullness of time. This
meant

united

for Hegel that it belonged to the post-revolutionary state, to Europe under Napoleon non-feudal, equality of opportunity, even free enter
government not
which

prise, but a strong

expressive of of

dependent is the
of

on

the

will of

the majority yet

recognition monarchic

the general will

man or of

reasonable will of

each,

the rights of
of

the
a

dignity

every human being, the

head

the state guided

by

first final

rate and

ety thus constructed was the

society.

highly History

educated civil service.

Soci Pre

had

come

to its

end.

cisely because history had come to its end, the completion of philosophy had become possible. The owl of Minerva commences its flight at the beginning of dusk. The
the
completion of

history

is the

beginning

of

the decline

of

Europe,

of

west and

therewith,
of

since all other cultures

have been

absorbed

into the

west, the

beginning

the decline of mankind. There

is

no

future for

mankind.

Almost

everyone rebelled against

Hegel's conclusion,

no one more

powerfully

than Marx. He pointed out the untenable character of the

settlement and the problem of the
arose

working

class with all

post-revolutionary its implications. There

for
ever
Occident53

the vision of a world

society

which presupposed and established

the complete victory of the town over the country, of the

over

the

Orient53;
of man who

which would make possible

the

full

potentialities of

each,

on

the basis

having become completely collectivized. The man of the is perfectly free and equal is so in the last analysis because
all

world

society
seen goes

all specializa

tion,

division

of

to be due ultimately to

labor has been abolished; all division of labor has been private property. The man of the world society
paints at

hunting
in his

in the forenoon,

noon,

philosophizes

in the afternoon,
of all

works

garden after

the sun

has

set.

He is

a perfect

jack

trades. No one

questioned

the communist vision with greater

fied the
the

man of

the

communist world of man.

extreme

degradation
European

energy society as the last man, that is to say, as This did not mean however that Nietzsche As
he
saw

than Nietzsche. He identi

accepted

the non-communist society of the nineteenth century or its future.

conservatives

all continental

in

tent

completion of

democratic

egalitarianism and of

freedom

which was not a

distinction to the European doomed. For

all

freedom for, but only a conservatives he saw that conservatism

only liberalistic demand for freedom from. But in contra

that
as such

communism

the consis

is

looking
alism.

merely defensive positions are doomed. All merely backward positions are doomed. The future was with democracy and with nation
were regarded

And both

by

Nietzsche

as

incompatible

with what

he

saw

Existentialism
to be the task of the twentieth
age of world wars,
century.

-315

He

saw rule.

the twentieth century to be the

leading

up to planetary
exercised

If

man were

to have a

future,

this rule would

have to be iron

by

a united

Europe. And the

enormous

tasks

of such an

age could not

and unstable governments situation required

possibly be discharged, he thought, by weak dependent upon democratic public opinion. The new
new5

the emergence of a new aristocracy. It had to be a

nobility,
and

nobility formed
reason also

by

a new

ideal. This is the meaning

of

most obvious

meaning

for this

the

most superficial

his

notion of

the super

man: all previous notions of

human

greatness would not enable man to

face the
mlers of

infinitely increased responsibility that possible future would be the

an overstatement to
what a philosopher

of

the planetary age. The

of

invisible

philosophers5

the future. It is certainly not

say that no one has ever spoken so greatly and so nobly of

is

as

Nietzsche. This is
Plato's5

not to

deny

that the philosophers of than

while

the future as Nietzsche described them

self seems

remind much more philosophers.

Nietzsche him
Plato had
seen

to have thought, of
question
as5

For

the

clearly clearly than he had intimated rather than stated his deepest insights. But there is Nietzsche, one decisive difference between Nietzsche's philosophy of the future and
as and perhaps more

features in

Nietzsche

Plato's

philosophy. an

Nietzsche's

philosopher54

of

the future is

an

heir to the

Bible. He is

heir to that

deepening

of

the soul which has been effected

by

the biblical belief in a God that is holy. The philosopher of the future as distin
guished

from the

classical philosophers will

be

concerned with

the holy. His

philosophizing intrinsically lieves in God, the biblical God. He is

will

be

religious. an

This does

not mean that

he be

atheist, but

an atheist who with

for

a god who
and

has

not yet shown

himself. He has broken

the biblical

is waiting faith
world

also

outside
world

especially because the biblical God as the creator of the the world: compared with the biblical God as the highest

is

good

the

is necessarily less than perfect. In other words the biblical faith neces leads according to Nietzsche to other-worldliness or asceticism. The con sarily highest human excellence is that man remains or becomes fully of the dition loyal to the earth; that there is nothing concern to us be it god or ideas or knowledge
outside of
or

outside the world which could

atoms of which we could

be

of

any

be

certain

by

by

faith.

Every
of

concern

for

such a ground of

the world as is

the world, i.e.

the world in

which man

lives,

alienates man

from
and

his

world.

Such

concern

is

rooted

in the desire to

perplexing is rooted in

character of

reality, to cut
comfort. shook

from the terrifying down reality to what a man can bear

escape

it

desire for

The First World War

of

Europe to its foundations. Men lost their

sense

direction. The faith in

original vigor were

progress

in its
the

decayed. The only people who kept that faith the communists. But precisely communism showed to

non-communists

the delusion of progress. Spengler's Decline of the West

seemed

to be much more credible. But one had to

prognosis.

be inhuman to leave it for

at

Spengler's

Is there

no

hope for Europe

and therewith

mankind?

316
It
was

Interpretation
in the
spirit of such

became disappointed
united

and withdrew.
for55

hope that Heidegger perversely welcomed 1933. He What did the failure of the Nazis teach
a united

him? Nietzsche's hope only

rule

Europe ruling the planet,

for55

Europe

not

but

revitalized

by

this new, transcendent responsibility of planetary

either

had

proved

to be a delusion. A world society controlled

appeared

by Washing
not make a and

ton or Moscow

to be

approaching. or

For Heidegger it did be the He

center:

difference
this

whether

Washington

Moscow

would

"America

Soviet Russia
world

same."

are

metaphysically the

What is decisive for him is that

calls

society is to him
means

more than a nightmare.

it the "night

of

the

world."

It

indeed,
and

as

Marx had predicted, the victory

west over regardless whether

of an evermore

urbanized,
complete

evermore

completely technological, uniformity

the whole planet

about

levelling
of

it is brought

by

iron

compulsion or

means
self

unity

soapy advertisement of the output of mass production. It the human race on the lowest level, complete emptiness of life,

by

perpetuating
no

routine without rhyme and

reason;

no

leisure,
no

no concentra

tion,
no

elevation,

no

withdrawal, but
crowds."

work and

recreation;

individuals

and

peoples, but

"lonely

How

can

there be hope?

which cannot

be

satisfied

Fundamentally because by this world society: the

to be
related

there

is something in man desire for the genuine, for

man's

the noble, for the great. This desire has expressed itself in
previous

ideals, but

all

ideals have
The
old

proved

to societies which were not world to

overcome5

societies.

ideals

will not enable man

the power, to

master5

the

technology. We may also say: a world society can be human is if there a world culture, a culture genuinely uniting all men. But there only never has been a high culture without a religious basis: the world society can be
power of

human only if all

religions are

men are

genuinely

united

by

a world religion.

steadily

undermined as

far

as

their effective power

by by

the

progress

towards a technological

world society.

all existing is concerned, There forms itself an

But

open or concealed world alliance of the

their

conceal
ible5

existing religions which are united only Their union requires that they (atheistic communism). enemy fact56 that they are incompat from themselves and from the world the
common

with each other not

that

each regards

the

others as man

This is

very

promising.

On the

other

hand,57

indeed noble, but cannot make or fabricate

receptive

untrue.5

world religion.

He

can

only

prepare

becomes
tion.

receptive

to it if he thinks

by becoming deeply enough about

extinction

it

to it. And
and

he

himself

his

situa

Man's

humanity is

threatened with

by

technology.

Technology
at

is

the fruit of rationalism

and rationalism

is the fruit

of

Greek philosophy. Greek

and

philosophy is the
same

condition of
impasse5

the possibility of

technology

therefore

the

time of the

created

by

technology.

technological mass society if there are no essential

hope beyond limitations to Greek philoso

no

There is

phy, the root

of

technology, to say nothing

of modem

philosophy.

Greek

phi

losophy

was

the attempt to

understand the whole.

It presupposed therefore that

Existentialism
the whole

"317

is intelligible,
the disposal of

or

that the grounds of the whole are essentially intel

ligible:

at

man as man
man.5

that

they

are

always5

and therefore

in

principle always accessible to

This

view

is the

condition of the possi

bility
ing58

of

human mastery

of the whole.

consequences are

drawn,

to the ultimate

But that mastery leads, if its ultimate degradation of man. Only by becom
can we of

aware of what

is beyond human mastery

the
on a specific

have hope.

Transcending
viz.

the limits of

rationalism requires

discovery

the limits of rationalism.

Rationalism is based
to

understanding
always

of what

being

means,

that

be

means

primarily to be present, to be ready at hand and therefore that to be

sense means to

in

the

highest

be

present, to be

always.

This basis

of

rationalism proves

to be a

dogmatic

assumption. spite of

Rationalism itself

rests on

non-rational, unevident assumptions: in

power,

rationalism

is hollow:
to

rationalism

itself

rests of

its seemingly overwhelming on something which it

cannot master. assertion that to

more adequate means

be

be

elusive or to

understanding be

being

is intimated
This is the

by

the

a mystery.

eastern

understanding of being. Hence there is no will to mastery in the east. We can hope beyond technological world society, for a world society only if
genuine5

we

become

capable of

learning

succumbs to western rationalism.

from the east, especially from China. But China There is needed a of the west and of
meeting5

the east.

The

west

has to

make

its

own

contribution to the
within

overcoming

of

technology. The west has first to recover

possible a own

itself that

which would make

meeting of west and east. The west has to recover within itself its deepest roots which antedate its rationalism, which, in a way, antedate the

separation of west and east.

No

genuine

the level

of present

day

thought

meeting of i.e. in the form

west and east of

is

possible on

the meeting of the most

most superficial period

vocal,
of

most

glib,

most superficial representatives of

the

both

west and east. roots of

The meeting
man who

of west and east can

only be

meeting

of

the deepest

both.

Heidegger is the only The

western

has

an

inkling

of

the dimensions of the

problem of a world society.

thinker

can prepare

that

roots of

the west. Within the west

meeting by the limitations of

descending59

to the deepest

rationalism were always ele

seen

by

the biblical tradition. (Here

earlier

lies the justification for the biblical

this must be

ments

in Heidegger's
one

thought.) But
Eastern60

rightly

understood.

Biblical thought is

form

of

thought.

By taking
as

the Bible as abso

lute,

one

blocks the
us,
us

access

to other

forms

of eastern

thought. Yet the Bible

is
as

the east

within

within61

western man.

Not the Bible

Bible but the Bible

eastern can

in overcoming Greek rationalism. help The deepest root of the west is a specific understanding
being. The specifically
the
used ground of grounds was

of

being,

a specific

experience of

western experience of

being

led to the

consequence that
ence of

forgotten
of

being was experienced being

only for the investigation way

which prevented

primary experi the beings. The east has

and

the

in

the investigation of beings and

318

Interpretation
western experience of

therewith the concern with the mastery of beings. But the

being
em

makes possible

in principle,

coherent speech about

being.

By

opening
west-

ourselves to the problem of

being
we

and to

the problematic

character of

the

understanding only

of

being,

The
not

ground of grounds which of religion

may gain access to the deepest root of the east. is indicated by the word being will be the ground any
possible gods.

but

even of

From here

one can

begin to

understand

the possibility

of a world religion.

The meeting of east and west depends on an understanding of being. More precisely it depends on an understanding of that by virtue of which beings are esse, etre, to be, as distinguished from entia, etants, beings. Esse as
Heidegger

superficially and even misleadingly, but not altogether misleadingly, by saying that it is a synthesis of Platonic ideas and the biblical God: it is as impersonal as the Platonic ideas and
as elusive as

understands

it may be described crudely

and

the biblical God.

NOTES

"compare"
.

has been

changed

by

hand

by

the insertion of the capital letter. The period at the

correction of a comma

end of

the previous word

"warning"

is the

editors'

that seems to have been

left

uncorrected

in the typescript.
added

2. begins

"thinking"

by

hand to

"theoretical"

replace

which

has been

crossed out. and

3. In the typescript the

with

previous sentence ends after the word

"observer,"

the new one

the words "For

instance,

the.

"

The

punctuation and capitalization

have been

changed

by

hand.
of the old paragraph

4. Continuation

in the typescript, but

with a marginal

indication

by

hand

for

a new one.

5.

Underlining
"Weber's"

added

6.

added

by hand. by hand to

"his"

replace

which added

has been hand to

hand.

crossed out. replace

7. "to limit the

crossed out.

remark"

comparison

to the

by

"to

say"

which

has been

8. Word

added

(in the

margin or
replace
"the"

between the
"the"

lines) by
has been

9.
11

"in"

added
word

by

hand to

which

crossed out.

10. The
.

"that"

before

has been
replace and

crossed out. which

"indicated"

added comma after

by

hand to

"meant"

has been

crossed out.
use"

12. The
added

"pragmata"

the words "things which we handle and

"rational"

have been letters

by

hand.
"rationalistic"

13. The
"istic.''

word

has been

changed

to

by

hand

by crossing
"

out the

14. The
"am"

"I'm"

word

has been

replaced

by

"I

am"

by hand, by

crossing

out

'm

"

and

adding

above

the line.
added

15. "of 16.

by

hand to

"about"

replace

which
"Heidegger"

has been
which

crossed out.

"Kant"

added
another

by

hand to

replace

has been

crossed out.

typescript, but not one that gives any clear indication of having been seen by "cowered." Professor Strauss, this word has been changed by an unknown hand to This other Professor which has been Strauss's students for some years, is the typescript, circulating among 17. In
one

from 18.

which

Thomas Pangle

worked

in editing this lecture for The Rebirth of Classical Political

"possibility"

Rationalism.
"character"

added

by

hand to

replace

which

has been

crossed out.

19. The

question mark

has been

added

by

the editors to correct a period in the typescript.

Existentialism
20. "of 21. The
added

319

by hand

"about"

to replace
changed

which

has been

crossed out.

word order

here has been

by

hand. The

original

typed phrase is "so radically

the intellectual

orientation."

22. "and in hand. 24. "which 25.

"1953"

way"

a most general

added words

by

hand.
which

23. The typescript has the

permeated the added
words

"low

land"

have been joined into

a single word

by

work"

added

by

hand.
"1952"

by

the editors to correct

does"

in the typescript.

26. The

"as Nietzsche

have been
"as"

replaced

by

"as passionately
"does"

as

Nietzsche
"did"

did"

by hand, by
the line.

adding
added

"passionately
hand to

as"

after

and

by

crossing

out

and

adding

above

27. 28.
of

"a"

by

"the"

replace

which

has been

crossed out.
period at

"to"

has been

changed

by

hand

by

the insertion of the capital letter. The

correction of a comma

the end

the previous word

"nobility"

is the

editors'

that seems to have been left

uncorrected

in the typescript.
added

29. 30.

"his"

by

hand to is

"the"

replace

which

has been

crossed out.

"and"

has been

changed

by

hand

"problem"

previous word

a correction

by the insertion of the capital letter. by hand of the original comma.

added

The

period after the

31. The dash has been inserted

by

hand.

32. The 33. 34.

words

"as

follows"

have been

by

hand.

"this"

added
"was"

added word

by by

hand

to replace
replace

"the"

which
"is"

has been

crossed out.

hand to

which

has been

crossed out.

35. The

"is"

has been

added

by hand,

though not, it seems,

word

by

Professor Strauss's hand.

confirmed as such

36. The typescript

an unknown

referred to of

in

note

17 apparently has the

"mind,"

by

hand, instead
words

"understanding."

37. The
of

"we

cannot refer

to the true

metaphysical and ethical

that"

the great thinkers of the past. It

is

admitted

have been

added

teaching available in any by hand, though not by

"scientists."

Professor Strauss's hand. 38. The typescript 39. The hand to 41. 40. The
referred

to in note 17 has the

and
which
"that"

"sciences"

word are

instead
led"

of

"groundless"

semicolon after

the words "we

crossed out.

thus

have been

added

by

replace

"and leads
"him"

us"

has been has been

word

before

crossed out.

"doctrine"

editors as a

is the reading of the typescript referred to in note 17. It is included which appears in the primary typescript. correction for the word
"doctrines," "Yet"

by

the

42. The

word

before

"our"

has been

crossed out and the capital

letter in

"Our"

has been has been

inserted

by

hand.
said,"

43. "As I
removed

added

by

hand. A

capital

letter

at the

beginning

"sometimes"

of

by

the editors.
added
other

44.

"with"

by

hand to

"to"

replace

which

has been

crossed out.
"Whence"

45. The
46. The 47. The
deemable."

typescript referred to in note

17 has the

word
"whence,"

instead

"Where."

of of

other typescript referred

to in note 17 has the

Whole."

word

in brackets, instead instead

of

the phrase "Where and Whither and the

other typescript referred

to in

note

17 has the

"irremediable"

word

"irre
truth"

The

editors suspect

that this is the correct

truth"

reading.

48. The

words

"about
"the"

subjective
"about,"

have been

replaced

by

by hand, by
letters 50.
"ity"

adding
above word added

after

the

line,

and

49. This
"2)"

is

enclosed

by crossing adding "of between in parentheses inserted by hand.

out

the final

"e"

"about the subjectivity of and adding the in

"subjective" "truth."

"subjectivity"

by

and

by

hand to

"Secondly,"

replace

which

has been

crossed out.

51. Quotation
jectivism."

marks

have been added,

the
West"

by

an unknown

hand,

around

the

words

"modern

sub

52. The 53. The

"west"

words words

"or

of

have been
"Orient"

added

by

hand.

"Occident"

and
which

have been inserted

crossed out.

by

hand

above

the typed words

"east,"

and

have not, however, been

320
54. adding 55.

Interpretation
"philosophy"

has been
line.

changed

by

hand to

"philosopher"

by

crossing

out

the final

"y"

and

"er"

above the
added

"for"

by

hand to
fact"

replace

"of

which

has been
hand.

crossed out.

These

changes are appar

ently by 56. The

not

Professor Strauss's hand.

words words at

"the

have been
very
"man"

added

by

57. The
capital

"This is

not

promising.

On the

hand,"

other

have been

added

by

hand. A

letter

the

beginning

of

has been

removed

by

the editors.

58. The 59.

sent"

"man"

word

before

"becoming"

has been

crossed out.

"dissenting"

has been

replaced

by

"descending"

by hand, by

crossing

out the

letters

"is-

"escend"

and

adding
capital word

above

the line.
"Eastern"

60. The 61. The

letter

at

the

beginning

of

has been inserted

added

by

hand.

"within"

before

"western"

has been

by hand,

but not, it seems,

by

Pro

fessor Strauss's hand.

EPILOGUE

this text and the

divergences, most of which are apparently minor, between in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduc tion to the Thought of Leo Strauss. Those divergences which appear to be most significant, apart from the fact that the paragraph breaks are different, are the following (page references are to the
There
are a considerable number of
version published

earlier version):

The title is different, and the first p. 29, line 32: Instead of
p.

sentence

is missing in the

earlier version.

"Heidegger"

the present version reads "Kant".

version

30: Between the first

paragraph.

and

the second paragraphs on this page, the present

inserts

a short

p. p. p.

30, line 5 of the second 31, line 22: Between 38, line 25: After
another

paragraph reads and

differently

in the

present version.

"era"

"Nietzsche"

the present version

inserts three

sentences.

"that"

the present version inserts a

new completion of

this sentence and then

a new sentence. as

full

sentence.

After this

insertion,

the

"the,"

word

capitalized, begins

p.

39, line 7 from bottom: The

the meaning considerably.

present version

has

a sentence worded so

differently

to change

p.

43: The

one-sentence paragraph

beginning

with

the words "Heidegger

is the only

man

is in

the present version placed

p.

just before the

paragraph

44, line 24: The

being,"

remainder of

this paragraph,

beginning at the bottom of the page. beginning with the words "The ground of
a

all

as problem of

well

as the entire subsequent

which

paragraph, is taken from

years

Socrates,"

Professor Strauss delivered many

different lecture, "The later. Cf. page xxix of the

Introduction.

The

problem of

Socrates

Leo Strauss

"The
the

Socrates"

problem

of

was

delivered

as a

lecture

on

April 17, 1970,

on

Annapolis

campus

Professor
ginia,

Jenny

of St. John's College. Professor Strauss's daughter, Clay, of the Department of Classics at the University of Vir

has generously
a tape

Also,

made available to the editors a copy of the manuscript. recording of the lecture in the St. John's College library in An

napolis was available to the

editors,

as were copies

of an

anonymous
after about

transcrip
forty-five

tion of that tape.

Unfortunately,

the tape is

broken off

minutes,

with

nearly

half of the

manuscript still

unread, and the transcription

also ends where The editors on the

lecture

which

tape does. Still, the transcription, as corrected by the basis of the tape itself, offers a version of the first part of the differs from the manuscript in a number of places and which

sometimes appears to

be

superior

to it.

Thus,

we

have

chosen to give the re

corded version almost equal weight with published text.

the manuscript as a

basis for

our

When the lecture

as

delivered merely
and where we

contains a word or words

that are not in the manuscript, we

cases where the two authorities

have included

these in

brackets. In the

other

differ have

have
in

preferred the version

in the lecture
cases we

as

delivered,

we

again

included it in brackets, but in these

a note.

have

also

included the
where we

manuscript version

In the

case

of

those

discrepancies

have

preferred the manuscript version, we

and we

have

included it in the
in
a note.

text without

brackets,

have included
on

the oral version

All italics

and paragraphs

are

based

the manuscript.

note

indicates
Strauss'

where

the tape is
on

broken off,
manuscript

and after alone.

this point we are of course

preserved

compelled

to

rely

the

We have

Professor sacrificing (apart

s punctuation to the extent that we thought possible without

clarity.

In those few

cases where we

have

made a change on our own

from adding or subtracting a comma), we have so indicated in a note. We have been compelled to substitute transliterations for Professor Strauss's Greek
words and script.

phrases, all of

which appear

in the

original

Greek in the
generous

manu

Finally,

we are grateful to

Dr. Heinrich Meier for his

help

in

deciphering
A
within a

Professor Strauss's handwriting.

small portion

of this lecture has been published previously, incorporated different lecture and in a somewhat modified form, in The Rebirth of
of

Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought

Leo Strauss

1995

by

The

University

of

Chicago. All rights Vol.

reserved.

interpretation,

Spring 1995,

22, No. 3

322

Interpretation

(Chicago:

University
pp.

of Chicago

Press, 1989 [ 1989 by The University of

Chicago]),
[I
was

44-46.

told that the local

Socrates."

paper

has

announced that

I lecture

tonight on

"The

problems of

This

was an

than one problem of

Socrates,

engaging printing error; for there is more in the first place, the problem with which Socra
with which

tes was concerned. But one could say, the problem

concerned

Socrates

was

may be

of no concern

to us, that it may

not

be

relevant.

Therefore obviously But we

after all there are so and

many things

which concern us so much more

urgently than the

answer

problem with which

Socrates

was concerned.
Socrates'

receive an

listening
far last
as

why we should be concerned with to the man from whom I took the title of this
was coined

problem

by
as

lecture,

and

which,

I remember,

by

him.]1

"The

Socrates"

problem of

is the first,

immediately
Socrates
in

revealing title

of a section

publications.
was a

Socrates

and

decadent

who

in Nietzsche's Dawn of Idols, one of his we hear, were decadents. More precisely, Plato, belonged to the lowest stratum of the common

people, to the

riff-raff.

[I quote:]

"Everything

is exaggerated, buffo,

caricature

him,

ranean."

everything is at the same time concealed, rich in afterthoughts, subter The enigma of Socrates is the idiotic equation of reason, virtue and
an equation opposed to all
and nobility. quest

happiness

instincts
and2

of

the earlier

Greeks,

of

[the]

Greek health

The

key

is

supplied

by

Socrates'

discovery
by

of

dialec

tics, i.e. the

seek

for

reasons.

The

earlier

high-class Greeks disdained to To

abide

for,

and

to present, the reasons of their

conduct. was

authority,

by

the command either of the gods or of

of good manners.
other means

themselves,
have

Only

those

people

recourse

for them simply a matter to dialectics who have no

the low-bom take of the to prove that

less."

for getting listened to and respected. It is a kind of revenge which high-bom. "The dialectician leaves it to his adversary he is
not an

idiot. He

enrages and at the same time makes

a new

help
of

Socrates fascinated because he discovered in dialectics

won over

form

agon, [of contest]; he thus them

and above all

the noble

youth of

Athens

and

among
surety,
was4

Plato. In

an age when

the

instincts had lost their decadence

ancient

[were

disintegrating]3,
cure

one needed a non-instinctual as much

tyrant; this
also of

tyrant

reason.

Yet the

belongs

to

as

the illness. the

philoso

When speaking

of the earlier

Greeks,

Nietzsche thinks

phers, the pre-Socratic philosophers5, especially Heraclitus. This does not mean that he agreed with Heraclitus. One reason why he did not was that he, like all

philosophers, lacked the

[so-called]
illusion

"historical

sense."

Nietzsche's
in reality,

cure

for

all

Platonism
age

and

hence Socratism
without

was at all

times Thucydides who

seek reason

had the

cour

to face reality

and to

and not

in its

ideas. In Thucydides the

full6

sophistic

culture, i.e. the realistic culture, comes to

expression.

The
of

section on the problem of

Nietzsche's first publication, The Birth of Tragedy

Socrates in the Dawn of Idols is only a relic out of the Spirit of Music

The
which stood

problem

of Socrates
he Had

323
under

he disowned to

some extent

later on,

one reason

being that

[in that early work] Greek tragedy in the light or the darkness of Wag nerian music, and he had come to see that Wagner was a decadent [of the first
order].

In

spite of this and other

work with

defects Nietzsche's first [I

will

work

delineates his

future life

amazing
as

clarity.

therefore say something about

that.]
Nietzsche
paints

Socrates

"the

single

turning

point and vortex of so-called

world-history."7

[Nietzsche's]8

concern was not

or

cerned with

the

future

of

Germany

the future of Europe

merely theoretical; he was con a human future

achieved]9

that
man

must surpass

the highest that [has ever

manner of

been

before. The

peak of

hitherto is that

life that found its

"tragic"

expression

in Greek tragedy,

especially in Aeschylean tragedy. The understanding of the world was rejected and destroyed by Socrates, who therefore is "the most questionable
antiquity,"

phenomenon of

a man of more than

human

size: a

demigod. Socra

brief] is the first theoretical man, the incarnation of the spirit of science, radically un-artistic and a-music. "In the person of Socrates the belief in the
tes [in

comprehensibility has first come to

the optimist,
possible all

of nature and
light."

in the

universal

healing

power of

knowledge

He is the is
not

prototype of

the

rationalist and

therefore of

for

optimism also

world, but

merely the belief that the world is the best the belief that the world can be made into the best of

imaginable worlds, or that the evils which belong to the best possible world can be rendered harmless by knowledge: thinking can not only fully understand

being

but

can even correct

it; life
deus

can

be

guided

by

science; the

living

gods of

myth can

be

replaced

by

ex

machina, i.e. the forces

egoism".10

of nature as

known
since

and used

in the

service of

"higher

Rationalism is optimism,

it

is the belief that

reason's power

is

unlimited and all

science can solve all since

riddles

and

loosen

essentially beneficent or that chains. Rationalism is optimism,

ends or since rationalism of

the belief in causes

depends initial

on the

belief in

presupposes

the belief in the

or

final supremacy

the good. The

full

and

ultimate consequences of

the

change effected or represented

by

Socrates

appear

only in the contemporary West: in the belief in universal enlightenment and therewith in the earthly happiness of all within a universal society, in utilitarian

ism, liberalism, democracy,

and the

pacifism, and

socialism.

Both these

consequences

insight into the

essential

limitations
of

of science
man

have

shaken

"Socratic

culture"

to its foundation: "the time

a

Socratic

has

gone."

There is then

hope for
the

future beyond the

no

future that is

but

knowingly

a philosophy of longer merely theoretical [as all philosophy hitherto was] or on decision. based on acts of the
peak of pre-Socratic
,
will11

culture, for

Nietzsche's liberator from

most

attack on all

Socrates is

an attack on reason:

reason, the

celebrated

prejudices, proves itself to be based on a prejudice, and the the prejudice stemming from decadence. In
so

dangerous

of all prejudices:
which

other words,

reason,

waxes

easily
rests

and

so

highly

indignant

about

the demanded

sacrifice

of the

intellect,

itself

on the sacrifice of the intel-

324

'Interpretation

lect.12

This

criticism was made

by

a man who stood at the opposite pole of all

obscurantism and

fundamentalism.
misunderstand the utterances of Nietzsche on

One
which

would

therefore

Socrates

quoted or to which exerted a

referred

if

one

did

not

keep

in

mind

the

fact that

Socrates
perhaps attempt
tes]13

life-long fascination
passage

on

Nietzsche. The

most

beautiful docu
and

ment of this

fascination is the
most

penultimate aphorism of

Beyond Good

Evil,

in Nietzsche's [whole] work. I do not dare to translate it. Nietzsche does not mention Socrates there, but [Socra
the

beautiful

is there. Nietzsche

says

there14

that the gods too philosophize, thus obvi

ously contradicting Plato's according to which the gods do not do not strive for philosophize, wisdom, but are wise. In other words, [the] gods, as Nietzsche understands them, are not entia perfectissima [most perfect beings]. I
add
rates can also power
few16 points. The serious opposition of Nietzsche to Soc only a be expressed as follows: Nietzsche replaces eros by the will to

Symposium15

striving which has a goal beyond striving by a striving which has no such goal. In other words, philosophy as it was hitherto is likened to the moon and philosophy of the future is like the sun; the former is contemplative
a and
[sends]17

preceding it; power. Nietzsche's Zarathustra is "a book for

title page]; Socrates calls
on some.

only borrowed light, is dependent on creative acts outside of it, the latter is creative because it is animated by conscious will to
none"

all and

[as it

says on

the

add one more point of no small

and

impor Plato

tance. In the Preface to Beyond Good

and

Evil,
it

when
were

taking issue
in
passing:

with

therewith

with

Socrates,

Nietzsche

says as

"Christianity

is Platonism for the

The
profoundest

interpreter

and at

the same time the profoundest critic of

profoundest

Nietzsche is Heidegger. He is Nietzsche's

interpreter

[precisely]
takes

because he is his
may be indicated

profoundest critic.
as

The direction

which

his

criticism

follows. In
animating

his18

Zarathustra Nietzsche had

philosophy; the spirit

spoken of

the

spirit of revenge as

all earlier

of revenge

is
is19

however in the last

the attempt to
also taught eternal sense or even cause of

analysis concerned with revenge on

escape

time, from time to eternity, to an eternal being. Yet Nietzsche return. For Heidegger there is no longer eternity in any

and therewith

it

sempiternity in any relevant sense. Despite of this or rather be Nietzsche's21 condemnation or critique of Plato as this20, he preserved

the originator of what came to be modem science and therewith modem tech
radical transformation of Nietzsche, Socrates disappeared. I remember completely only one statement of Heidegger's on Socrates: he calls him the purest of [all]22 Western thinkers, while making it clear that is something very different from "greatest." Is he insuffi nology.

But through Heidegger's

almost

"purest"

ciently
To

aware of the

Odysseus in Socrates?
Socrates'

[Perhaps.]23

But he surely

sees the

connection

between
way in

come
no

purity and the fact that he did not write. back to Heidegger's tacit denial of eternity, that denial implies
singular
which

that
all

there is

thought can transcend time, can transcend

History-

The

problem

of Socrates

325

thought belongs to, depends on, something more fundamental which thought cannot master; all thought belongs radically to an epoch, a culture, a folk. This
view

is

of course not peculiar to

Heidegger; it

emerged
24

today has become for many

through more

people a truism.

in the 19th century and But Heidegger has thought it

"historicism"

define it based

as

radically than anyone else. Let us call this view follows: historicism is a view according to which vary from
epoch
which are not questioned and cannot

and all

thought is

on absolute presuppositions which

to epoch, from cul

ture to culture, tion to which

be

questioned view

in the

situa

they belong
of

and which

they

constitute.

This

is

not refuted

by

the

"objectivity"

science,

by

the fact that science

down,

all cultural

barriers; for

the science which

of

transcends, or breaks does this is modern Western

Greek
science was rendered

science, the child or stepchild

possible

Greek

science.

by

the Greek those

[suggested]25

language, insights, divinations

a particular

language;

the Greek language

or prejudices which make science pos means

sible.

To

give

[a

simple]26

example, science

knowledge Hebrew
or

of all

beings

(panta

ta onto), a thought

[inexpressible in
philosophers

original

Arabic;]27

^he
to

medieval

Jewish

and

Arabic

had to invent

an artificial term

make possible

the entrance of Greek science, i.e. of science. The

therewith in

particular

Socrates

and

Plato, lacked

the awareness of

Greeks, and history, the

historical
sion of

consciousness.

This is the

most popular and

least

venomous expres

able

why in particular Socrates and Plato have become for both Nietzsche and Heidegger, and so many of
most simple explanation of

altogether question

our contemporaries.

This is the

why Socrates has become

which

problem,

why there is a 29This does delineate is

granted the

problem of not mean

Socrates. I have tried to

It

that the anti-Socratic position

would

unproblematic.30

[so-called]

be unproblematic, if we could take for historical consciousness, if the object of the historical

History [with a capital H], had simply been discovered. But History is a problematic interpretation of phenomena which could be interpreted differently, which were interpreted differently in former times and especially by Socrates and his descendants. [I will illustrate the fact starting from a simple example. Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, wrote a history called
consciousness,
perhaps

Hellenica, Greek history. This

"Thereafter."

work

Thus Xenophon

cannot

begins abruptly with the expression indicate what the intention of this work his (the

is.]31

From the

begirrning

of another work of

Symposium)

we

infer32

that

the Hellenica is devoted to the

gentlemen; hence the the do not strictly speaking of those notorious non-gentlemen, tyrants, [to history, and are appropriately treated by Xenophon in
serious actions of

actions

belong
More

excursuses.]33

important[ly]: the
what we call which tarache of a

Hellenica1*

also

ends, as far as

possible,35

with

Thereafter
each of

History

is for Xenophon
rules.

a sequence of also a

Thereafters, in
and

[confusion]
is'

Socrates is

gentleman, but

a gentleman

different kind; his gentlemanship

'What regarding the

consists

question

various

answering the human things. But these 'What is'es

in

[raising

326
are

Interpretation
and

unchangeable,]36

in

no

the37

Hellenica is only
a

political

way in a state of confusion. As a consequence, history. The primacy of political history is still
a political

recognized:

"historian"

still means

historian, [unless
modem

we
or

add an

adjective, like economic, art, upon, philosophy

Vico's]39

and so on]38.

Still,
of a

history is,
with

is based

of

history. [as he

new science

called

Philosophy it] is

history
doctrine

begins

Vico

[but
a

of natural

right, i.e.

political we

doctrine. However this may be, modem history [in know it] deals with all human activities and thoughts,
"culture."

the

form in

which

with

the whole of

are

[what is called] for instance arts,

There is

"culture"

no

in

[Greek]40

thought

but [there
arts]41

including

the art of moneymaking

about the

and

the imitative

and

[opinions,] doxai, especially

highest in
nation

are therefore the

what we

highest (the gods); these would call "a culture". These

undergo changes

[opinions]42 [opinions]42

differ from
Their

to nation and

they may

within nations.

objects43

have the
held,"

cognitive status of

nomizomena,

of

things owing their

frozen results of abortive reasonings which are declared being to be sacred. They are [to borrow from a Platonic simile] the ceilings of caves. What we call History would be the succession or simultaneity of caves. The [caves, the] ceilings are nomoi [by convention] which is understood in contra distinction to phusei [by nature] In the modem centuries there emerged a new

being

to

kind
tive

of natural

right

[doctrine]45

which

is based

on

the devaluation of nature;

Hobbes'

state of nature
standard:

is the best known

law [as it

example.

that from which one should move the

moral was

away.

Nature is here only a nega On the basis of this, the

ceased

law

of reason or

called]

to be

natural

law:

nature

is in

no

condition

of the

way a standard. This is the necessary, although not sufficient, historical consciousness. The historical consciousness itself

may be

characterized

from [this

earlier]4*

point of view as sequence of

follows: History, the

nomoi, phusis

object of

the historical consciousness, is a

understood as one nomos ger

among many

nomos

has

absorbed phusis.

being Heideg
phaos-

tries to understand

phusis as

related, not to

phuein

phds

(light)
in
a

"to

grow"

is for him

above all man's

(to grow) but to being rooted in a human

tradition.47

creatively transforming that Nietzsche's Jenseits aphorism 188. 48

past,

tradition,

and

cf.

also

Let

me restate

the issue in somewhat different terms as follows. The human

species consists phusei of ethne.

This is due partly

philosopher
must

directly to

phusis49

(different
nomos

races, the

size and structure of

the surface of the earth) and

partly to

(customs
ethnos

and

languages).

Every
he

but

as

[a]

philosopher

belongs essentially to this or that transcend it The prospect of a miracu

.

lous
out

abolition or

in

somewhat

overcoming of the essential particularism for all men was held different ways by Judaism, Christianity and Islam. A
was visualized

non-

miraculous

overcoming

in

modem

times

by

means of the con

quest of nature and the universal recognition of a

so as

purely50

rational nomos

[law]

that only the difference of languages

remains

[which

even

important]. In

reaction to this

levelling,

which seemed

to

Stalin recognized deprive human life

The
of

problem

of Socrates
and

327

its

depth,
is

philosophers51

began to
of

prefer

the

particular

(the local

tempo

ral) to any universal

instead

merely accepting the particular. To

example:

illustrate this
man

by by

what

probably52

the best-known

they

replaced

the rights of

the rights

of

Englishmen.

historicism every man belongs essentially and completely to a historical world, [and he]53 cannot understand another historical world exactly

According

to

as

it [understood
than

or

understands]54

ferently
itself is lier

it

[understands]56

[he necessarily itself. Understanding it better than it

itself

understands]55

it

dif

understood

of course altogether

anthropologists].
philosophic

Yet Heidegger
thought

impossible [and only believed in by very simplistic characterizes [all earlier philosophers] all ear
"oblivion
Sein,"

by

of

of

the ground of grounds:

earlier phi

losophers]57

[which means] in the decisive respect he claims to understand [the better than they understood themselves. This

difficulty
since

is

not peculiar

to Heidegger. It is
that

essential

to all forms of
all earlier

historicism. For historicism

must assert

it is

an

insight surpassing

insights,
it

it

claims

to

bring

to light the true character of all earlier insights:

puts them

[historicism]58

gests

in their place, if one may put it so crudely. At the same time asserts that insights are [functions of times or periods]59; it sug therefore implicitly that the absolute insight the historicist insight be
absolute

longs to the
this would

time, the
raising

absolute moment such a claim an end

[in
our

history]; but it
time,
or

must avoid

even the semblance of

for
to

for any time; for

process of

be tantamount to putting
Nietzsche).60

History, i.e.

to significant time

(cf. Hegel, Marx,

rational;

In

other words:

the historical

is

not

each epoch

has its

absolute

presuppositions; [in the formula

Ranke]
to light

(all

epochs are

this very

fact,

equally immediate to i.e. the truly absolute

God); but historicism has brought

presupposition.

The historicist insight

forgotten ion in
[That

at some

which man of course

for all times, for if that insight were future time, this would merely mean a relapse into an obliv has always lived in the past. Historicism is an eternal verity.
remains true

is

impossible.]

61

According

to Heidegger there are no eternal

verities: eternal verities would presuppose

the eternity

human
this

race

(Sein

und

Zeit 227-230;

Einfuhrung
is

sempiternity of the in die Metaphysik 64)60.

or

Heidegger knows that [the human

race]62

not eternal or sempiternal.

origin,"

Is

not

mological

knowledge, insight, if
would

the knowledge that the human race had an

not the
basis,64

a cos

at

65The
"Sein"

ground of all

beings,

and

least basic, for Heidegger? especially of man, is [said to

writer other

be] Sein.

every by "being"; but for Heidegger everything depends on the radical difference be tween being understood as verbal noun and being understood as participle, and
case of

be translated in the

than Heidegger

in English the

verbal

noun

is

undistinguishable

from the

participle.

shall

into Greek, having Seiendes is etant. Sein is on, ens, Latin and French: Sein is einai, esse, etre; not Seiendes; but in every understanding of Seiendes we tacitly presuppose that
therefore use the German terms after translated them once

328

Interpretation

Sein. One is tempted to say in Platonic language that Seiendes is be a only by participating in Sein but in that Platonic understanding Sein would Seiendes.
we understand

What does Heidegger

understand

mean

by
be

Sein? One Sein

can

begin [at least I be

*

can

begin]

to

it in the

following
cannot

manner.

cannot

explained

by

Seiendes.
of

For

instance, causality

explained

the categories

[surely

in the Kantian

place causally is sense]. This change necessary because

presuppositions

Sein takes the

the categories, the systems of categories, the absolute

change

from

epoch

to epoch; this change is not progress or rational

the

change of

the

categories cannot

be

explained

by,

or on

the basis of, one

particular system of

categories;

yet we could not speak of change

lasting

in the change; that

lasting

which

is

responsible

if there [were] not something for [the] most fundamen

puts and

tal change [fundamental

thought] is Sein: Sein [as he

of

it]

"gives"

"sends"

or

in different
thing."

epochs a

different understanding

Sein

therewith of

"every

But

This is misleading insofar as it suggests that Sein is inferred, only inferred. of Sein we know through experience of Sein; that experience presupposes
a

[however]
and about

leap;

that

leap

was not made

by

the

earlier philosophers and there

fore their thought is

characterized

by

oblivion of

Sein.

They

thought only of

except on

Seiendes. Yet they could not have thought of the basis of some awareness of Sein. But they
was

and about

Seiendes
to

paid no attention

it

this failure

due,

not

to any negligence of

theirs, but to Sein itself.

the Sein of
man.

The

key

to Sein is

one particular manner of

Sein,

Man is his
(or his

project: everyone

is

what

(or

rather

who) he is

by

virtue of the exercise of

project

freedom, his
failure to do limited

choice of a
so).

determinate ideal is finite: the

he has

of

existence, his

But

man

range of

his fundamental
man

choices

is is

by

his

situation which

not chosen:

is

a project which

thrown somewhere (geworfener Entwurf)60.

experienced

The

leap

through which Sein is

is primarily the
in

awareness-acceptance of
of a

being

thrown,

of

finite
must

ness, the

abandonment of

every thought
to

railing,

a support.

(Existence

be

understood

contradistinction

insistence.)66

cially Greek philosophy was oblivious of based on that experience. Greek philosophy

Earlier philosophy and espe Sein precisely because it was not

was guided

by

an

idea

of

Sein

to be present, and therefore according to which Sein means to be "at Sein in the highest sense to be always present, to be always. Accordingly they
and

hand,"

their successors understood the soul as substance, as a

self

thing
or

and not as

the

which, if truly

self, if

authentic

[and

not mere

drifting

shallow], [is

based
that is

on

the awareness-acceptance of
mere

the]67

project as thrown.

No human life
an

not68

drifting

or shallow

is

possible without a
of

project, without
takes the
to

ideal
of

of existence and

dedication to it. "Ideal

the good

existence"

[this]

place

"respectable
"ideal

opinion of
of what

life"; but

opinion points respect

knowledge,
knowledge
of

existence"

whereas

implies that in this

much

there is no

[possible] but only

what

is

higher than

knowledge, i.e. knowledge

is

project, decision.

The
The
grounds ground of all

problem

of Socrates

329

beings,

and

especially

of

man, is Sein

this ground of

is

coeval with man and

therefore also

not eternal or

sempiternal.69

But

if this is so, Sein cannot be the man, in contradistinction to the

different from Sein. [In
not the other

complete ground of man:

essence of

the

emergence of

man, [would
not

require]70

a ground

words] Sein is

the ground of the That. But

is

That,

radically,
stand

the

That, Sein? If we try to understand anything we come up against facticity, irreducible facticity. If we try to under That of man, the fact that the human race is, by tracing it to its
and

precisely the

causes, to its conditions,

specific

we shall

find that
an

the whole effort

which

is directed is

by

understanding

of

Sein

by71

by
it

Sein.72

The condition[s]
anything

of man

understanding [in this view say anything Heidegger also

and

given or sent

are]73

comparable

to Kant's

Thing-in-itself,
contains cannot speak of while man

of which one cannot

[sempiternal].74

in

particular not whether

replies

as

follows75:

one

anything

being

prior to man

is;

authentic or

primary time

is

and arises

in time; for time is or happens only only in man; cosmic time,

or

the time

measurable

by
to,
of

chronometers, is secondary
or made use

derivative

and can

there

fore

not

be

appealed

of, in fundamental

philosophic considera

tions. This
temporal

argument reminds of

the

medieval argument

finiteness

the

world

is

compatible with

according to which the God's eternity and uncannot

changeability because, time

even

being dependent on
"prior to the

motion, there

have been in the

time when there was no motion. But yet it [seems that

it] is
the

meaningful and and

indispensable to Heidegger
of

world"

speak of

creation of

case of

"prior to the

man."

emergence of
what

It

seems

thus that one cannot avoid the question as to

man and of

is

responsible

for

the emergence of
ex nihilo nihil

Sein,

or of what

brings them

out of nothing.
.

For:

fit [out

questioned

by

nothing nothing Heidegger: [he says] ex

as

of

comes nihilo

into being] This is apparently omne ens qua ens fit [out of
the Biblical
for76

nothing every being being doctrine of creation [out of Creator-God. [This

through nothing,
nor would

comes out].
nothing].

This

could remind one of no

But Heidegger has

come

place

the
and

suggest, things
nihilo].77

into

being

out of

nothing

ex nihilo et a

This is [of course]

must

not

literally

asserted

literally

denied

by

Heidegger. But

it

not

be

considered

in its literal
fit.78

meaning?

Kant found "nowhere ble any

even an attempt of a proof of ex nihilo nihil

His

own proof establishes this principle as possible experience

but only for rendering possi necessary (in contradistinction to [what he called] the Thinglegitimation [of
to
the]79

in-itself)
[In the

he

gives a transcendental

ex nihilo nihil

fit. The

transcendental deduction in its turn

same
spirit]79

primacy of practical reason. Heidegger80: "die Freiheit ist der Ursprung des Satzes vom
points
speak of

Grunde."

Accordingly
mystery

Heidegger does

the origin of

man

he be

says

that

it is

what

is the

status of

the reasoning
premises:

leading

to this sensible result?

cannot

It

follows
Seiendes

directly
cf.

from these 2
cannot

1) Sein

explained

causality

be

explained

causally

2)

man

is the

by being

330

Interpretation

constituted

by

Sein Sein.

explicability
tered
within

of

indissolubly linked with it The difficulty re: the origin

man participates

in the

in-

of man which was encoun

biology
seems

Heidegger left
open a

(See Portmann) was only an illustration, not a proof. to have succeeded in getting rid of phusis without having
a

back door to

Thing-in-itself
could

and without

being

in

need of a philos

ophy

of nature

(Hegel).81

One

say

that

he

succeeded

in this

at the price of

the unintelligibility

of

Sein.

Lukacs,
which

the

most

intelligent

of the

Western Marx

ists, using
spoke of

the sledgehammer

Lenin had

used against empirio-criticism,

Lukacs only harmed himself by not learning from Heidegger. He prevented himself from seeing that Heidegger's understanding of the contemporary world is more comprehensive and more profound than
mystification.82

Marx's (Gestell
the claim of

Ware,

Ding)83

or

that Marx

raised a claim

him

who claimed

to

have

sold the

surpassing by far Brooklyn bridge. In all impor

than

tant respects Heidegger does not make things

obscurer

on the

Heidegger tries to deepen the understanding of what German word for thinking. To this procedure he
word

they are. thinking is by reflecting

makes

the objection

that a German

obviously belongs to a particular language, and thinking is something universal; hence one cannot bring to light what drinking is by re flecting on one word of a particular language. He draws the conclusion that
there remains
gerian return

here

a problem.

Which

means

that historicism even in its

a solution cannot

Heideg
lie in
a

form

contains

for him

a problem.

For him

to the supra-temporal or eternal but only

meeting of the most different ways of ing of East and West not of course of the
on

in something historical: in a understanding life and the world, a meet

opinion pollsters or opinion rooted

leaders

both

sides
an

but

of

those who, most

deeply

in their past,

reach out

If this is reasonable, our first task apparently unbridgeable the task of understanding would be the one in which we are already engaged the Great Western Books.

beyond

gulf.84

I began
validity,

by

of

that the worth, the saying that Socrates has become a problem problem. the question of the But what he stood for has become a

worth of what was

Socrates he

stood
85

for,

presupposes or

that we know already

what

it

for

which

stood.

This second,
stems

primary,

question

leads to the

problem of

Socrates in

another sense of

the expression, to the historical prob

not

lem. This
write and

problem of

Socrates

indeed from the fact that Socrates did

for
our

that we depend therefore

knowledge

of

him, i.e.
not

of

his

thought,
tors are

on mediators who were at

the same time transformers. These

and

media

Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon,

except

Aristotle. Aristotle did

In

know

Socrates

through reports

oral or written.

Socrates is
that he
was

a restatement of what

Xenophon

said.

fact, what he says about Aristophanes, Xenophon and

Plato knew Socrates himself. Of these 3

willing to be a
of
today"

men the

historian,

was

only one who showed Xenophon. This establishes

by

deed

a prima

facie

case

in favor

that "we know

Xenophon. As for Plato, I remember having heard it said that some of his dialogues are early and hence more

The
Socratic than the later ference
virtue"

problem

of Socrates

331
indif

ones.

But for Plato it

was a matter of complete

which were

implications

or presuppositions of

the Socratic question "what is

known to Socrates
question;
so much

and which were not: so much was

he dedicated
to say of
prosthe

to

Socrates'

did he forget himself. It is

much wiser

Socrates, with Nietzsche, jocularly and opithen te Platon, messe te Chimaira. At any Platon,
is less
eusunoptos

the Platonic

even

frivolously,
limit
we

rate, the Platonic Socrates

shall myself

than is the Xenophontic Socrates. I

not
Aristophanes'

there

fore to the Xenophontic Socrates. But this is

ourselves of

feasible if

do

not remind

the Socrates
was

of of

Clouds. believe in the gods, especially the

the stronger, that

That Socrates
gods of the

manifestly guilty
time:

the two stock charges made against the

not

philosophers at the

1)

that

they did
made
over

city,

and

2)

that

they
the

the

weaker argument

they
2

made

the Adikos Logos triumph

the Dikaios Logos. the compulsions

rhetorike.

For he

engaged

in

activities:

1) in phusiologia,

study
and

of

by

which

heavenly

phenomena come

about,

2) in
to

The

connection

especially between
was

the 2 pursuits is not

immediately
all

clear, for the Aristophanean Socrates

altogether unpolitical and rhetoric seems

phusiologia

be in the
particular

service of politics.

Yet:

liberates from

prejudices, in
upon

the belief in the

gods of

the city; and this liberation

is frowned
in

by

the city; the philosopher-physi

ologist needs therefore rhetoric

order to

defend

himself, his

unpopular activ skill

ity, before
make can use

the law courts; his defense is the highest achievement of his

to

the Adikos Logos triumph over the Dikaios Logos. Needless to say, he that skill also for other, in
a sense

lower purposes, like

defrauding
and

debtors. The Aristophanean Socrates is

endurance. stage

a man of

the utmost continence

This fact
Socrates'

alone shows

that the Adikos Logos who appears on the

at

is

not

Adikos Logos,
effect or

Adikos Logos is to the

in its pure, ultimate form. This that the tme community is the community of the
not

least

knowers,

and not

the polis,

that the knowers

as

have

obligations

one another: much closer

the ignoramuses have to

another

little rights

as madmen.

only toward The knower is

knower than he is to his family. The

and

ted

by

paternal

against

killing

one's

authority father

the prohibition against incest

family is constitu by the prohibition

prohibition against

and

marrying

one's mother.

The

incest,
polis,

the obligation of exogamy, calls

an expansion which

for the

expansion of

the

family

into the

not able

is necessary in the first place because the family is to defend itself. But the 2 prohibitions would lack the necessary force
Socrates he
oud'

if

there were no gods.

questions

all

this:

esti without

Zeus. He thus
polis.

subverts the polis, and yet

words of the

could not

lead his life

the

In the

Xenophon does not reply to Dikaios Logos, the polis feeds him. Aristophanes directly. But the 2 main points made by Aristophanes became in a
somewhat
modified

form the 2
Lykon.

Socrates'

points

of

indictment

formed87

by

Meletos,

Anytos

and

By

refuting the
of

indictment, Xenophon
tanthropina
yet

refutes

then, if tacitly, Aristophanes

re asebeia

too.

no phusiologia

but only study

Socrates did

332

Interpretation
proof of

study nature in his manner ( + the gods of the city)

re

the

existence and providence of

the gods

diaphthora

Socrates the
kaloka'

perfect gentleman

(on the basis

which

of

his

egkra-

he even taught teia) did not separate wisdom

was

gathia

to the extent to

it

can

be taught

he
then

and moderation

from
with

one88

another

accordingly he

law-abiding, he

even

identified justice

law-abidingness

he

was

a political man

the xenikos

bios

not viable

he

even taught ta politika

in

this context, he criticized the established

was a

politeia

(election

by lot)
Socrates'

but this

alleged gentlemanly view to take. Yet we are reminded of handle everyone ton hetto logon kreitto poiein could the fact that he ability by in speeches in any way he liked therefore he attracted such questionable gen

tlemen as Kritias and Alcibiades

responsible

but it

would

be very

unfair

to make

Socrates

for

their misdeeds.
not always

Xenophon's Socrates does

take the high

road of

kalokagathia
a philistine.

but in

doing

so

he became,
of

not a

86E.g. his treatment

economical

friendship

dangerous subversion, but rather friends are chremata ne

Di'

utilitarian,

treatment
=

reducing the
chresimon more of

kingly

art

to the economic

art.

Ultimately:

kalon
86

agathon

Yet: kalokagathia has

than one
the ti

sense.

What did Socrates

such

understand

by
not

kalokagathia^ Knowledge
possessed

esti of

tanthropina

knowledge is

by

the

gentlemen

in the

common sense of the term.

Xenophon dis

pels any possible confusion on this point by presenting to us one explicit con frontation of Socrates with a kalos kagathos (Oeconomicus 11 nothing of this

kind in Plato). This between Socrates

makes us wonder as

to the full

extent

and the

kaloi kagathoi

in

chapter of

of the difference the Memorabilia

devoted to gentlemanship (II 6.35) Xenophon's Socrates tells us what the arete andros is: surpassing friends in helping them and enemies in harming them

but in speaking
people

Socrates'

of

virtue

Xenophon does

not mention at all

Socrates'

harming
virtues.

andreia

does

not occur

in Xenophon's 2 lists
conduct

of

Xenophon
sumes

Socrates'

speaks of
Socrates'

this

under prowess.

exemplary justice and he does

in

campaigns

but he

sub

not give a single example of

Socrates'

military understanding, believed that

Bumet,
people

very low view of Xenophon's like Xenophon and Meno were attracted to
who

had

Socrates by his military reputation while all we know of that reputation we know through Plato. Socrates was then a gentleman in the sense that he always
considered the examples

What is?

of

human things. Yet Xenophon

gives us

very few
is'

of such

discussions;

there are many more Socratic conversations

vice without
esti}9

which exhort

to

virtue or

dehort from

tion than conversations

Socrates'

dealing

with ti

raising any 'What Xenophon points to the

or at all.

ques
core

of

life

or

thought

but does

not present

it sufficiently

The Xenophontic Socrates

all

characterizes

those who worry about the nature of

things as mad: some

of

them hold that

some of

are90

infinitely

many beings;

is only one, others that there them hold that all things are always in

being

The
motion,
others that

problem

of Socrates

333

nothing is
and

ever

in motion;

some of

them

thing

comes

into

being

perishes,

others that

nothing

ever comes

hold that every into being

and perishes.

He thus delineates the

sane or sober view of the nature of all

things; according to

that wiser view there are

many but

not

beings,
perish.

these beings

( i=

other

things)

never

change,

never come

infinitely many into being and

As Xenophon

says

considering

what each of

is'es,
his

the tribes (=

the

entirely different context Socrates never ceased beings is: the many eternal beings are the 'What infinitely many perishable individuals). Socrates did
an

in

the

then worry about the nature of all things and to that extent
madness

he too

was

mad; but

which

There is only sobriety Xenophon calls Socrates "blessed": when he speaks

was sobria ebrietas

one occasion on
of

how Socrates

acquired

his friends

or rather

his

good

friends

he

acquired

them

by

studying

with them

the writings of the wise men of old and

them the good things

example of

they found in
activity.

them

selecting together with but Xenophon does not give a single

a

by

this blissful

Xenophon introduces
was well

Socratic
Plato.

conversa

tion with Glaukon as follows:

sake of

Socrates
Glaukon

disposed to Glaukon for the

sake of with

Charmides the

son of

and

for the

Accordingly
are

the next chapter reports a conversation of

Socrates

Charmides. We

thus induced to suspect that the next chapter will report a conversation of Soc
rates with with an

Plato. Instead the

next chapter reports a conversation of peak

-the

Socrates

Ersatz for

Plato,

the philosopher Aristippos: the

conversa

tion with Plato

is

pointed to

such conversations.

but missing and not because there were no That Book of the Memorabilia which comes closest to

presenting the Socratic teaching as such, is introduced by the remark that Soc rates did not approach all men in the same manner: he approached those who had
good natures

in

way; but the

chief

one way and those who lacked interlocutor in that Book, the chief

good natures

in

another

addressee of the

Socratic

teaching
nature.

presented

by Xenophon,

A last

example:

is manifestly a youth who lacked a good Socrates used 2 kinds of dialectics one in which he
to its hupothesin and made clear that
manifest.

led back the

whole argument

hupothesin;

in this way the truth became

through the things
most

In the

other

kind Socrates took his way

by

human

beings;

in

this

generally agreed upon, through the opinions accepted way he achieved, not indeed knowledge, or truth, but
second

agreement or concord.

In the

kind

of speech

Odysseus excelled; and,

as

frequently cited the verses from the Iliad in which Odysseus is presented as speaking differently to men of worth and to worthless people. Only by following these intimations, by linking them with one another, by thinking them through and by always remembering them
the accuser of Socrates said, Socrates
even when near

reading how Socrates gave good advice to a poor fellow despair because 14 female relatives had taken refuge in his house

who was
and were

about to starve

him

and themselves to

death

only
see

by

always

Xenophon's intimations, I say, can one come to phon saw him. For Xenophon presents Socrates

the true

remembering Socrates as Xeno

as

also and

primarily

innocent

334

Interpretation
helpful to the
and meanest capacities.

and even

He

conceals

the difference between

Socratic

ordinary kalokagathia

as much as possible,

i.e.

as much as

is

compatible with

intimating
or, if

their conflict.

^Nothing
right

is

more characteristic of gentlemen than respect

for the law

not

for the
It is
never of no

kind

of

law;

you

wish, the wrong kind is

esti

law

at all.

therefore necessary to
raised

raise

the question ti

nomos; but this

question

is

by Xenophon's Socrates; it is raised only by Alcibiades, a youth extreme audacity and even hubris who by raising that question discomfited
less
a
man

than the great Perikles.

good a citizen

Socrates'

failure to
on

raise

that question

showed
citizen

how is

he

was.

For laws depend

the regime, but a good

a man who obeys the

law

independently
will

of all changes of regimes.

But,
chy.
law.'

according to a more profound view, "good

citizen"

is

relative

to the re

gime: a good citizen under a

democracy

be

bad

citizen under an oligar

Given this complication, it is prudent not to raise the question 'what is But, alas, Alcibiades who did raise that question was a companion of
at

Socrates

the time

he

raised

it,

and the

way in

which

he handled it

reveals

his

Socratic bidden

training.

ternal authority. As

punished

the defective character of the offspring, good offspring coming parents who are both in their prime. The Socratic argument is silent from only on incest between brother and sister. Above all, the punishment for incest be tween parents and children
on an oldish

by by

openly for incest, Xenophon's Socrates asserts that incest is for divine law, for incest between parents and children is automatically

Xenophon

almost

admits that

Socrates

subverted pa

does

not

differ from the young

wife.

"punishment"

that is visited

husband very
of

who marries a close to

On this

point

the Xenophontic

Socrates

comes

the Socrates

of

the Clouds.
of

The Socrates

the Clouds teaches the

omnipotence

rhetoric, but this

teaching is refuted by the action of the play. The Xenophontic Socrates could this means that he could not handle handle everyone as he liked in speeches
everyone as

he liked in deeds. The

greatest example

ing Clouds)
of also as
not

his
is

accusers. aware of

But the Xenophontic Socrates (=

is Xanthippe, to say noth the Socrates of the

the essential limitation of speech. Xenophon indicates this

comrade-in-arms

follows. His

Proxenos

was able

to rule

gentlemen

but

the others

who regarded

him

fear; he was Gorgias. Xenophon, however, the

run of soldiers with

naive; he was unable to instil the general unable to inflict punishment; he was a pupil of
as pupil of

Socrates,

was

able

to rule both

gentlemen and non-gentiemen;

he

was good at

doing

as well as at speaking.
or almost

86From Aristotle
and

we

learn

that the sophists

identified

identified the

political art with rhetoric.

Socrates,

we

infer,

was opposed

to the sophists also

especially because he was aware of the essential limitations of rhetoric. In this important respect, incidentally, Machiavelli had nothing in common with the sophists but agreed with Socrates; he continued, modified, corrupted the Socratic tradition; he was linked to that tradition through Xenophon to whom
he
refers more

frequently

than to

Plato, Aristotle

and

Cicero taken together.

The
This is
an additional reason

problem

of Socrates

335

than one

why one should pay greater attention to Xenophon ordinarily does. This lecture consists of 2 heterogenous parts they are held together appar the title "The problem of which is necessarily ambig ently only by uous: the problem of Socrates is philosophic and it is historical. The distinction
Socrates,"

between
total
made

philosophic one

and

historical

cannot

be avoided, but distinction is

not

separation:

cannot

study the philosophic problem without

problem and one cannot

having

up

one's mind on the

historical
made

study the histori

the philosophic

cal problem without problem.

having

up

one's mind

implicitly

on

NOTES

1. The
should we

manuscript contains the

following
should and

sentences

instead

of

these bracketed ones:

"Why

be interested in it?
to the

Why

it be

relevant

to us? There are so many things that

receive an as

concern us so much more

answer

by listening
coined omitted

obviously man from

whom

urgently than the problem of Socrates. We I took the title of my lecture and who,
Socrates.'"

far

as

remember,

the expression 'the problem of

2. Word

in the lecture is
written

as

delivered.
of as

3.
4. 5.

"disintegrated"

instead

"were

disintegrating"

in the

manuscript.

"is"

"was"

replaces
"pre-Socratics"

in the lecture

delivered.
philosophers"

replaces

"pre-Socratic

in the lecture

as

delivered.

6. The 7. A

word

in

the text was

notation above

has been crossed out. originally "fullest"; the line directs us to insert here the following words, which

"est"

are written at

the bottom of the page in the manuscript:

"anti-Hegel,

Schopenhauer."

(The

word which we

have

interpreted
present

is difficult to read, in the lecture as delivered.

as

"anti-"

and perhaps we are

in

error about

it.) These

words are not

8.

"His"

is

written

instead

"Nietzsche's"

of

in the
of

manuscript. ever

9. "man has 10. A

ism)"

achieved"

ever

is

written

instead "i.e.

"has

been

achieved"

in the

manuscript. written at

notation above

the line directs us to insert here the

manuscript:

following

phrase, which is

the bottom of the page in the

collective egoism of

the human race (utilitarian

This

phrase words

is

not present

in the lecture

as

delivered.

11. The

"on acts,

will,"

on the

replace us

"on

acts of

the

will"

in the lecture

as

delivered. it

12. A
at the

notation above the of

line directs
This

to insert here the

following

sentence, which is written

bottom
"he"

the page in the manuscript. "Science cannot answer the question

foundation."

'why

science':

rests on an irrational

sentence

is

not present
manuscript.

in the lecture
omitted

as

delivered.
deliv

13.

is

written

instead

"Socrates"

of

in the

14. The
ered.

"there,"

word

which

has been

added above

the

line, is

in the lecture

as

15.

"Banquet'

"Symposium"

replaces words

in the lecture

as

delivered.
"one"

16. The

"a

few"

added above

the line to replace

which

has been

crossed out.

In

keeping
Also,
Plato

with this addition, the word

manuscript contains

"points"

has been

made plural
which

by

the addition of the final "s".

crossed out
when

the

here the

following

sentence,

has been

ever, the
and

end of

the

paragraph):

"In the Preface to Beyond Good

says as

and

Evil,

(see, how taking issue with

is Platonism

therewith with

Socrates, Nietzsche

it

were

in passing in

'Christianity

for the
17.

people.'"

"spends"

18. 20.

"the"

is [inadvertently] written instead of in the lecture as delivered. replaces

"his"

"sends"

the manuscript.

19. "it

is"

added above
"this"

the line.

"it"

replaces

in the lecture

as

delivered.

336
21.

Interpretation
"Nietzsche's"

added above the

line to

"the"

replace
"the."

which

has been

crossed out.

In the

lecture
22.

as

delivered, however,
is
written

the reading
"all"

is

again manuscript.

"the"

instead

of

in the

23.

"Probably."

is

written

instead

"Perhaps."

of

in the

manuscript.
truism"

24. "a truism for many replaces "for many people a 25. is written instead of in the manuscript.
people"

in the lecture

as

delivered.

"supplied"

"suggested"

26.

"an"

is

written

instead

of

"a

simple"

in the

manuscript.
thought:"

27. "inaccessible

e.g.

to original Hebrew or
Arabic:"

Arabic

is

written

instead

of

"inexpress
manuscript

ible in is

"original"

original

Hebrew

or

in the

manuscript.

Also,

the

word

in the

added

only above the line. 28. The remainder of this

a pause of about

paragraph

is

omitted which

in the lecture

as

delivered. The tape contains

here

of shuffling pages. during preceding paragraph, the manuscript has the marginal notation "turn to 8" sheet (in Professor Strauss's own hand). Accordingly, the editors have chosen to omit, for the time being, a large portion of the lecture and to continue instead from the beginning of sheet 8. At

fifteen

seconds

the only sound is that

29. At the

end of the

the end of sheet 10 of the manuscript, there

notation points

is

another marginal and thus also to

notation, "Continue

4b."

That

back to the

present

one,

on sheet

4b,

the omitted portion of the text.

This

omitted

portion,

which we will return

to as directed

by

that later notation, continues to what

appears to

be the

end of

the lecture. Our editorial procedure is

continues

further justified
occurrence of

by

the fact that the

lecture
sheet

as

delivered in Annapolis

here in the
off

manner

that we are presenting it (i.e. from the second marginal the omitted section was
where

of the manuscript).

Since the tape breaks be

certain

before the
of

notation,

however,

we cannot

how much, if any,

as

included in

Professor Strauss's 30. This

sentences:

oral presentation.

(A

subsequent note will

indicate

the tape breaks off.)

sentence

is

omitted

from the lecture

delivered

and replaced

by

the two

"We have to pay some attention to this question of historicism, that is to say in the first place. The anti-Socratic position, which I have tried to delineate, is not

of

following history

unproblemati

31. The
cannot

sentence what

indicate

"Xenophon's Hellenica begins abruptly with is." is written instead the intention of his work
Symposium)"

'Thereafter'

thus

Xenophon
sen

of these

four bracketed

tences in the manuscript.

32. The
infer"

words

"(the "in

are omitted

in the lecture
history,"

as

delivered,

and

the words "we

are also omitted and replaced

by

"one

infer."

can of

33. The

it."

words

are written

instead

"to

in the

manuscript.

Also, instead

of

the words "and are appropriately treated

words

by

Xenophon in

excursuses."

the

manuscript contains

the

"belong

in

excursuses"

above replaces

the line.

34. "this

work"

"the
as

Hellenica"

in the lecture

as

delivered.
as

35. The 36.

written

phrase

"as far

possible"

is

omitted

in the lecture

delivered.

Instead,

the

next

occurrence of the word

'Thereafter"

is followed

by

the phrase "within the limits of the

possible."

"considering
instead
of

the 'What

is'

unch

of

the human things, these 'What is'es

being

is

these bracketed words in the manuscript.

"the"

37.

"Xenophon's"

replaces
economic

in the lecture
historian "but
.

as

delivered.
written

38. "(=

historian,

art

is

instead

of

these bracketed

words

in

the manuscript.

39. "yet
40.

his"

is

written

instead

Vico's"

of

in the

manuscript.

"classical"

is

written

instead

"Greek"

of
and

in the

manuscript.

41. "technai
words

(including
is
written

mimetike)"

chrematistike

is

written

instead

of

these bracketed

in the

manuscript.

42.

"doxai"

instead

"opinions"

of

in

the manuscript.

43. The
out.

words

"Their
as

objects"

added above the

line to
"They"

"They"

replace

which

has been

crossed

In the lecture

delivered, however,

the word
held"

is the
the

one used.

44. "of things owing their being to script. A notation above the line directs

being
us

added at

bottom
and

of

to insert this

phrase

here,

the page in the manu it is included here in the

lecture
45.

as

delivered.

"teaching"

is

written

instead

"doctrine"

of of

in the

manuscript.

46. "the

classical"

is

written

instead

"this

earlier"

in the manuscript.

The
47. A
notation above

problem

of Socrates

337

the line directs

us

to insert here the

following
=

words,

which are written at

the bottom of the page in the manuscript: "das Gewachsene

not present

das

Gemachte."

These

words are

in the lecture

as

delivered.
with

48. These last few lecture 49.

50.
as

lines, beginning
"phusis"

the

words

"Heidegger

tries,"

are omitted

from the

delivered.
replaces

"nature"

in the lecture line.

as

delivered.
"men"

"purely"

added above the

"philosophers"

51.
53.

added above
probably"

the line to replace

which

has been

crossed out.

52. "what is
"

omitted

from the lecture "and

he"

as

delivered.
understands"

we"

is

written

instead

of

in the
of

manuscript.

54. "understands

understood"

or

is

written

instead

"understood
of

or

in the

manuscript.
manu

55. "we necessarily

script.

understand"

is

written

instead

"he necessarily in the

understands"

in the

56.
57.

"understood"

is

written

instead
of

"understands"

of earlier

manuscript.

"them"

is

written

instead
of

"the

philosophers"

in the
times

manuscript.

58.

"it"

is

written

instead

"historicism"

in the
of

manuscript.
periods"

59. "f(times

periods)"

or

is

written

instead

"functions

of

or

in the

manuscript.

60. This
61. This 62.
"it"

entire parenthesis sentence

is

omitted

from the lecture

"Yet"

as

delivered.

begins instead

with of

the word

in the in the

manuscript.
manuscript.

is A

written

"the human
race

race"

63. "the knowledge that the human

manuscript. notation above

had

origin"

an

added at the

bottom
and

of

the page in the

the line directs us to insert this phrase

basis"

here,
as

it is included here in

the

lecture

as

delivered.
not

64. "is this includes

the

basis"

replaces

"if

not the

in the lecture
that the

delivered.

65. Professor Strauss indicates

which over

also occurs
crossed out.

section of the text, four paragraphs, written on two separate sheets, belongs here. This section here in the lecture as delivered. It replaces the following sentences, which have been
a marginal notation

by

following

"The

ground of all

beings,

and

especially

of

man, is Sein

this ground of grounds is

coeval with man and therefore also not eternal or sempiternal.

But if

this

is so, Sein

cannot

be the

complete ground of man: the emergence of man

ent

(+

the essence of man) requires a ground differ

or

not the ground of the That. To this one can reply as follows: the That of man is necessarily interpreted in the light of a specific understanding of Sein of A subsequent note will indicate the end of this understanding which is given or sent by interpolated section.

from Sein. Sein is

condition

its

Sein."

66. This

entire parenthesis
word

is

omitted

from the lecture

as

delivered. Also, Professor Strauss is

sense of

"insistence"

probably using the

upon."

here in its older,

and

Latinate,
is

"standing
of

or

resting

words

67. "is resoluteness, i.e. the in the manuscript.

"not"

a"

awareness-acceptance of

written

instead

these bracketed

68. 70.
71.

is

inadvertently
or written

omitted

from the lecture

"eternal
or

as

delivered.

69. "sempiternal
"requires"

eternal"

sempiternal"

replaces

in the lecture

as

delivered. delivered.

is

instead
to

of

"would

require"

in the

manuscript.

"by"

added

by

the

editors

replace

"of in the
are"

manuscript and

in the lecture

as

72. This is the 73.

74.
"is"

end of the

interpolated
of

section which was mentioned

in

note

65.

is

written

instead

"in this
of

view

in the in the

manuscript. manuscript.

"aidion"

is

written

instead

"sempiternal"

reply"

75. "mentions this 76. "has

for"

replaces

"also
"ex

follows"

replies as replace

in the lecture
which
fit."

as

delivered.
crossed out.

no place
symbol
"
"

added above

the line to

"denies"

has been
is

77. The

followed

by

nihilo et ab nihilo omne ens

ens"

written

instead

of

this sentence in the the words "omne

manuscript.

Also,

the words "qua

are

written, but then crossed out, after

ens."

78. A

notation above

the line directs us to insert here the

following

words,

which are written at

Substanz."

the bottom

of the page

in the

manuscript:

"Grundsatz der Beharrlichkeit der

These

words are not present

in the lecture

as

delivered.

338

Interpretation
symbol " where
"

bracketed words in the manuscript. delivered in Annapolis breaks off (cf. note 29). Accordingly, we have only Professor Strauss's manuscript of the remainder of the lecture. 81. Beneath the line here there are added two distinct groups of words in the manuscript. The

79. The

is

written

instead

of these
as

80. Here is

the tape of the lecture

first,
other.

which

begins

under

the

word

"Thing-in-itself,
Without."

consists of two

lines,

one

underneath

the

The top line is "(Kant) nature 'an for Heidegger and Nietzsche: no Beyond or
"for,"

sich' unknowable."

The bottom line

appears

to be "but

have interpreted

as
which

group
mind

of

words,

(This line, and especially the word which we is difficult to read, and perhaps we are in error about it.) The second is "nature as is found underneath the words "philosophy of nature
(Hegel)"

in its

Anderssein."

82. A
written at

notation above

the line directs us to insert here the

manuscript.

the

bottom is the

of

the page in the

of the

if

mysticism

discovery

life

of

following two sentences, which are "Heidegger has something to do with mysticism the deity in the depths of the human heart. But the
meant

mystery

which

Heidegger
",Ding"

claims to

have discovered is
God."

to be

deeper,

and

less based
"Ware"

on

questionable

presuppositions, than the

word

mysteries of written underneath

83. The
the

(with the preceding comma) is

the word

in

manuscript.

84. A
at

notation above

the line

directs

us to

insert here the

following
of

sentence,

which

is

written upholds

the bottom of the page in the manuscript. "In this way, and only in this way, the trans-national or trans-cultural

Heidegger

the universalist

intention

philosophy."

85. Here,
4b,"

at

the end of Professor Strauss's manuscript, occurs the marginal notation

"Continue
we with

to which we referred in note

omitted so

29,

and which of

directs

us

back to the

portion of the

lecture that begins

have

far. At the
which

beginning
has been

this portion of the

lecture,

a new paragraph

the

following

sentence,

crossed out: stood

tion of the

worth of what

Socrates
that

for,

nay, can one properly

stood."

"However this may be, can one answer the ques formulate it, if one does not
As the
reader will

know in the first nearly the

place what

it is for

which

he

notice, this sentence is

4b."

same as the one

immediately

precedes

the marginal notation, "Continue

Ac

cordingly, in turning now to this omitted section, we have chosen not to begin a new paragraph. 86. No indention in the manuscript, although the previous line appears to be the end of
paragraph.
"framed"

87. It is
88. 89. The
manuscript.

possible
added

that Professor Strauss wrote the

word

here instead

"formed."

of

"one"

by

the

editors.

words

"than

conversations

dealing

with

ti estr are

added

beneath the line in the

90.

"are"

added

by

the

editors.

Plato's Alcibiades I
Mark Blitz
Adelphi

University

Although Plato's Alcibiades I has

not

been

analyzed

extensively in

modem

times,
a

ancient authors

treated it as a fundamental work. Proclus discussed it in

summarized

full-length commentary, for example, and it is the first dialogue that Alfarabi in the section on Plato in his Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.
reason

For this

alone, it deserves to
the arts,

command our respect.

More fundamen in the

past:

tally, has much to teach

no onlookers. are

the cause of its earlier prominence

us about

is

as significant now as
and

it

knowledge, justice,
the visibility of

the soul.

The Alcibiades I

portrays a conversation contrasts with

between Socrates

and

Its privacy

Alcibiades'

Alcibiades, with life, as if we

being

what with must

told that we need to have seen nothing of that life in order to understand Plato is teaching in the dialogue. The discussion is divided into seven parts, the last three paralleling the first three. But this stmcture is something that we

discover for

ourselves: neither

Plato

nor

Socrates furnishes

us with an out

line. Indeed, Alcibiades, it

even

might

if Socrates had explicitly described the stmcture of the still be imprudent to take him at face value, because the array of intentionally misleading arguments. In my be imprudent to make any element of the interpretation of
the
picture of

dialogue features

a wonderful

judgment,

it

would also on

Alcibiades I depend
Alcibiades II.
terms can
we

Alcibiades

presented

in the Symposium
on

or

Only

when we

become familiar

with each

discussion

its

own

discuss
I

with confidence

the connections among them. the dialogue and then com

In

what

follows,

will

first

summarize a part of

ment on

it. The commentary is intended to

shortoornings of

make clear and the

how

Socrates'

explicit
of

arguments, the

these arguments,

dramatic details

the

illuminate the basic underlying subject. The summary is intended to allow the reader to follow Plato's argument in a manner that is faithful to him. Because I am summarizing and not offering a complete translation, however, it will sometimes be more
conversation combine to
problems

that are the

Alcibiades'

useful to

bring

out

details

of

Plato's text,
than

such as some examples

that

Socrates

uses, in my commentary,

rather

in the summary itself.

In the first ning

ages this

part of the conversation

consent

(103a-106c3), Socrates

succeeds

in

win
man

Alcibiades'

to serve him

by

answering

questions.

Socrates

largely by

presenting two

speeches.

interpretation,

Spring 1995,

Vol. 22, No. 3

340

Interpretation

allow

In the opening speech, he flatters Alcibiades by describing the resources that Alcibiades to stand apart from others and to overcome them. At the same
makes clear

time, he

that he himself has not been

overcome

by

Alcibiades and,

indeed,
whom

that his own movements are governed

by demons,
wonders

not men.
about

Socrates describes

as

needing

no

man,

Alcibiades, Socrates, who

stays put while

Socrates'

the others flee.

Alcibiades'

speech and of

reply are, first, merely

and

an elevated version
which

the ridiculous

combination of

cajolery

posturing

by

lovers

still

Saying extraordinary things, as Socrates does here, belongs to the ordinary commerce of love (see, e.g., 103a5-6). Beyond this, Socrates presents clearly, but without thematic emphasis, the group of questions inherent
stalk their prey.

in the

phenomena of

wonder, causality, motion, need,

and

stability

(see,

e.g.,

103 al, 103a6, 103b6, 104a2, 104c8).

Having
he did
the
at

Alcibiades'

aroused

interest, Socrates
Alcibiades'

must now strengthen and re

tain it. He does so with a speech that makes him appear even more strange than

first. Socrates

reads

mind and

discovers his hope: to be

most powerful and

renowned,
or

he

plans

to

speak

presently,

another

Cyms

or

Xerxes.

not only in Athens, before whose assembly Greece, or Europe, but in Asia too to be But, claims Socrates, only he can transmit (this) most valuable

Alcibiades; he can show Alcibiades that he is the him. Indeed, only because Alcibiades has these hopes has the
power to

to

god now allowed

Socrates to talk to him.

Socrates
through him
retains

and

increases

Alcibiades'

attraction

by

seeing into

and

by displaying his concern, attention, and understanding and, simultaneously, by continuing to flatter him. More broadly, he presents himself
almost as a

god,

who can read

intentions

and who answers

only to

other gods

(see 105al6-7 105d8-106al). Despite

Socrates'

flattery, he

nonetheless also

subtly displays
those
on whom

Alcibiades'

limits

by

measure even as he is claiming that Alcibiades hopes to go beyond them. More subtly still, Socrates indicates these limits by setting as goal something that would not in fact differentiate him from Cyms
Alcibiades'

emphasizing his always depends

parents and relatives

he in

some

or

Xerxes. Nor does he

not claim

even name

this goal

world

tyranny
stranger
mind

as such.

More

over, he does

that Alcibiades himself seeks to be a god.

"speech"

Alcibiades finds (106a2-4). In

Socrates'

to

be

even

than his

"looks"

neither case

does Alcibiades have in

between looks Alcibiades

something general,

but the theme

raised.

has been his first speech, Socrates had also spoken commonsensically about desire to know what Soc "ending" intention is, and about own difficulty in what he is about to (104d7-10, 104al-3, 104el-2). One way in which to inter
and speech

of the connection

("ideas")
after

Moreover, in his byplay

with

Alcibiades'

rates'

Socrates'

"begin"

pret what might otherwise seem

to be the merely

indeed,

random use of

these terms is to see that

decorative, gratuitous or by employing them Plato subtlv

Plato's Alcibiades 1-341

lays in
place elements of an unspoken

but

evident theme of

the dialogue
things brings

the
us

possibility that the

closer

philosopher's attempt to

know the

whole of

tes

than can any political way of life to the Alcibiades' divines to be wish.

comprehensive

grasp that Socra

Alcibiades'

byplay

with

Socrates
and

Socrates'

after
Socrates'

second speech greater mastery.

(106a2-c3)
ac

Alcibiades'

makes clear
Socrates'

mastery
asks a

Alcibiades

cepts

characterization of

his intention
which

with a minimum of replies with a

coyness,
a

but

not

frankly. He

question, to

Socrates

question,
can

refusal,

and an offer reach

to show

how, if Alcibiades

will serve

him, he

help

Alcibiades
easy, and
after

his intention. Alcibiades consents, but only if the service is his opinion is that answering questions is easy. But he answers only
allows

Socrates

him to

command

Socrates to

ask!

Socrates has

established

that

Alcibiades'

first step

will

be to

come

before the

Athenian assembly (105a9). The second part of the dialogue (106c4-114ell) consists of his showing to Alcibiades the rudimentary requirements of advising,
and
part

the subject

Alcibiades'

of

first

effort at advice.

In the first

section of this
with

(106c4-108d8), Socrates begins by equating

Alcibiades'

speech

in the assembly

advising,

next wins

agreement or

that we advise others on what we

know through

learning

discovery,

and

then shows Alcibiades that he will not

be advising the assembly on the three things

that
"things,"

writing, wrestling, and

harping
is

he has learned. He then leads Alcibiades to say that he will the city's especially war and peace, and shows him that
about what
music.

advise about
all advice

is

"better,"

according to the art in question, such as gymnastics or

But Alcibiades
"better"

disgracefully
the
unjust.

cannot even think of

the

word

to

describe

what

is

in

war and peace until and

Socrates leads him

achieves

with much

prompting

to
of
all

mention

the just

Socrates thus
Alcibiades'

the

remarkable result

displaying
Athens,
justice

to Alcibiades his ignorance

of what

he is

about to

discuss before
argument

although

it is

not until
part of

complete

defeat in the

about

itself,

in the third

the

dialogue,

that he admits the depth of

his perplexity (116e2-5). Socrates achieves his result here in

two ways,

both dubious. First, he is

able

to equate advising to speaking before the assembly only by abstracting from that is not identical to advising. He everything in speaking before the assembly
acts as place

if rhetoric, charm, is

persuasion,

in

politics, or even outside

display, and economic class have no it (106c4-d2, 107b4-c2; see also 114b7-d7).
his
wouldbe

This logic

abstraction

tendentious: to take
overwhelmed

cibiades

has

hardly

only the most obvious example, Al lovers through the power of his

alone.

Socrates

alludes

to the limits of his own argument

references

by

making

otherwise extraneous and

inexplicable

to rich and poor, and tall and

342
short,

Interpretation
and

by discussing

music, thus paying

playful

but

silent

homage to the

place of

rhythm, tone,

and

display

Second, Socrates is
of

able

in speaking before assemblies (108c 12- 13). to show Alcibiades that he is completely ignorant

the arts he has

contained as

learned only so that what is possible,

not

by treating in,
"better"

every
say,

art as

if it is

as

self-

gymnastic

is solely

what

is

"gymnastical,"

more
with

and can

therefore be known only

which we

by

the trainer.

Socra
as

tes deals

the end or purpose of an art,

ordinarily believe is

known

by

an art's user or customer at no

least

as well as

by

the artisan

himself,

if it is in
ment,
asks will

way

apart

from the

art and so

the artisan. In the course of the argu

indeed, Alcibiades becomes

whether

tamed

by

Socrates that

when

Socrates

him
not,

he

will advise about what ships shipbuilder should

the city needs, he says that he

as

if only the

say

what ships should

be built

and

not

the general, the assembly, or the

abstracts

statesman who will use

them. In short,

Socrates

from the
his

user of

the art's product, from the way in which, for

with

example, the purchaser of a

house,

his

varied

needs, is a source, separate that directs the architect's

from the design. Even ducers

architect and

skill as

such,

of the goal

when we consider artistic examples

that less obviously

involve
is

pro

and

their products, we still see that

it is

some of what

Socrates is

says

that he

alone

not only the knows. Such an

artist who assertion

"healthy"

knows
quite

problematic, for instance, in

which specifies what

Socrates'

own example of

the

as

that

meant

by

"better"

when the physician says or

that

some

food is
what

"better"

than

another at

this time

in this

amount

(108e6-109a5). For

health is (as distinguished from how best to

restore

it) is something
rest of

that

many people, not only physicians, know. As is tme of the learn what health is before they arrive at medical school.

us, physicians

Socrates
or rank

also abstracts

from

ends

that go beyond any of the arts and that link

guide what

them, as, say,

courage

helps to

is

proper

in

war

and,

conse

quently, helps to define

trainer

useful and proper gymnastic

training beyond

what

the

who could quite

cowardly
the

knows

as

easily be ignoble, insufficiently courageous, or even such. Instead of considering these ends, Socrates treats
a matter of mere

connection of also

the arts, in this section, primarily as

also

naming

(108c6-10;

108al2-b4). He

ignores the

arts'

competition about simi

lar subjects, which further makes evident the peculiarity of treating each art as if it is the self-contained master of its own fully discrete purpose. Should the physician, chef, or diviner, for example, tell us how to prepare sacred cows? Which treatment is "better"? Even
true art among these
ter"

were we to suggest that medicine is the only three, it is clear in other ways that health is not a good that is simply isolated from all the other goods; it, therefore, could not be the "bet that completely defines appropriate food and drink. For health is not what

the aged nobleman who seeks one last political

wounded general who

honor,

or

the courageous
war
or even

and

desperately

attempts

to save

his city in

the
are

ill

gymnast who strives to win a vital

competition, should choose: there

Plato's Alcibiades I
good reasons

343

why

we

do

not

follow the doctor's

good

orders everywhere and always.

The

bodily

example of a

human

that is

closest

in its breadth to justice

health
plexing Here

thus shows the

argument.
as

inadequacy

Socrates'

of

nonetheless

demonically

per

earlier,

of

course, Socrates indicates that his

makes

abstractions are

inten

tional. The chief way that he

his

self-awareness clear

to us is through that he

apparently trivial matters such as the order and uses, the different terms that he employs for

identity

of the examples

"know,"

and

the like.

(See,
is to

e.g.,
offer

106c9, d3; 107al0-ll,

an account of

the

"substance"

c8-9; 108e6-7. The task of the of the dialogue that also

commentator

explains such mundane

which we can see we observe

matters, coherently
Socrates'

and

completely.) Another way in

that

abstractions are

intentional is is

by

recognizing that

them

primarily

by

reflecting

on what

available

to us through the same ordinary

order to conduct

opinion and common sense on which

he himself draws in

his

discussion

and make

it intelligible.

By treating each art as independent, as self-contained, Socrates has led us to reflect briefly on instances in which the arts are interrelated, overlap, and are hierarchically ordered, i.e., on instances where they are in fact not indepen
say a word about the beneficiary. Whom exactly is it that
us also proved

dent. Let

related problem of the

an art makes

ambiguity of their better? The artisan is im

by

the art

bis art, but only incidentally; his reward comes from others. And, if improves only the artisan, how useful is it? The person whom an art
"city,"

improved, but not by all arts at once, or consistently. The or the Athenians, may be improved, but also not by all arts at once in the same degree. Indeed, this problem is exacerbated by art's cosmopolitan status, that is, by the fact that not merely one individual or city, but many indeed, possi ble competitors can equally be improved or destroyed by, say, the art of war. that the arts or some arts can improve simply What, then, is the proper
"whole"

treats may be

For whom, and in what ways, is knowledge good? It is too early to say just why Socrates chooses to take the tendentious direc tion that he does in his discussion of advising and the arts, beyond his immedi

by being

artistic?

ate goal of

forcing

Alcibiades to

see

that knowledge is
phenomena of

crucial and

his

general and

goal of encouraging us to reflect on the

knowledge,

virtue,

the

city.

is important is to

After all, the best way to begin to convince Alcibiades that knowledge act as if it is everything. What will become clear as the

dialogue continues, however, is that Socrates is exploring the powers and limits Alcibiaden tyranny, the arts, his own philosophic that a variety of phenomena display when we look at them as if they could have the full way of life
independence from,
unintentionally
or
crave.

mastery of, other phenomena that they intentionally If the Alcibiades I truly is about its traditional subtitle

or

human

nature

activities

it is because Socrates explores and shows the limits of human insofar as they claim, or imagine that they could claim, to be fully
self-sufficient,

comprehensive and

i.e.,

to be that nature. The limit of each of

344
our

Interpretation
activities, the

impossibility
altogether

of

its

simple self containment, shows that noth

and self sufficient.

ing

human

can

be

independent

We

are oriented

to

what

is natural, but

we cannot ourselves
with

Socrates'

"dialogue"

be completely Alcibiades in this section

on several

natural.

of

the second part also

touches, usually unobtrusively,

menting
on

issues that

we mentioned when com

the opening

part. with

What is discussed
the

more or

less

thematically is
obviously
and

knowledge,
of

in

keeping

the fact that lack of

playful
argument

knowledge

commonsensically, however

is the

singular

deficiency
claims that

Alcibiades that Socrates brings to light in this

section.

Socrates

whatever one

knows

one

is taught,

his

claim by making clear searching requires that one consent to know (106d6-dl4). One consents and is, therefore, able to search, Socrates says, because one knows that one does not know. But we can see that conscious ignorance is often

discovers for oneself, and he elaborates that discovery is primarily searching, and that
or

insufficient

unconcerned about

here to
the

discovery, because one may be indifferent or is ignorant, as Alcibiades is said something be indifferent to fluting, and, therefore, fail to seek to know it. Indeed,
as a spur

to

of which one

insufficiency
using justice and

of conscious

ignorance be

as a spur as

is

even more obvious

if

one

equates

an art

properly

with

knowing it,

Socrates does here. For

or will

with

out

concern an art will not

used at

all,

be misused,
not

even

if

one possesses

its knowledge. (Who successfully

Socrates'

could murder an

enemy,

or cheat a sick

patient,

more

than a subtle physician?)

philosophic

It is

difficult to see, activity that to be simply

however, how
shows

own

searching is the

one

his

argument

connecting art, knowledge, his knowledge his

consent could

and proper use

tme. The philosopher as such has no motive but the

desire to know. Therefore,

there is

no ground on which

could cause
Socrates'

him to

withhold

from

an

be misused, and nothing that attempt to know.

treatment of knowledge also conveniently

or

leaves

out

opinion,

as

if

one either ordinarily:

more or

knows

fully fully ignorant. This may be true ultimately, but not Socrates does not acknowledge here what we know when we have
opinions.

is

less true

My
ment,

reminders are not meant we can come

to suggest

that, in

opposition

to
or

Socrates'

argu

to know other than through

and the

learning

discovery. Re

membering, seeing,

knowing,

are

types

of

like, which might seem to be discovery, and though they may not
require our consent

additional ways of always require our

immediate consent, they

eries are not to

in the last
we

analysis

if their discov

fact
able

either

known we in discover through memory or exercise as a skill. Of course, we are to do many things before we can teach the skill to others or recognize from here is not way of knowing, but the dependence of knowledge upon ability or This abstraction fits together with his attempt to moderate Alcibiades
and as

be

obliterated.

Even things that

have

"always"

knowledge,
some third
"nature."

such, in ourselves. What Socrates abstracts

by

elevating the status of knowledge his gifts, does not fully possess.

art, which

Alcibiades, however

great

Plato's Alcibiades I
In the
wins
war

345

next section of

the

dialogue's both that be the

what

second part

(108d9-114ell), Socrates
is
"better"

Alcibiades'

"justice"

agreement

is

what

in making
discovered

(and, therefore,

should

subject of

his

advice

to the assembly), and

neither

that Alcibiades does not know

nor

justice is because he has

learned it. He has

since

not

discovered it because he has believed that he has And

known it

he

was a child.

if,

the many, he the

did

not

leam from

mature not

Alcibiades says, he learned it from teachers, because the many differ about
as

just, but

good

teachers do

many differ most because of these

things.

of all about
-differences.

just

men and

disagree. In fact, Socrates continues, the things and, as Homer shows, fight
about

Alcibiades is in fact bewildered

the just

Alcibiades
about what
expedient

counters that the

Greeks deliberate
neither

about what
nor

is just. Yet, because he has

this?
and

learned

is expedient, not discovered what the

is, how does he know

the

Socrates that the just

man

expedient

But, Socrates says, let him persuade are different, if he can. Persuading one

is no different from persuading many, so persuading Socrates will not be different from persuading the assembly. Alcibiades accuses Socrates of inso lence, and Socrates then insolently claims that he will persuade Alcibiades that just things
are expedient.

What Socrates does in this

the way that the
arts are

know

what

is to treat justice as something known in he then makes clear that Alcibiades does not known; justice is. In conducting his argument, he continues to take for
section
used

granted

that the standard

by

an art

is

self-contained within the

produces

art, and,
sake of

implicitly,
the one

that the art wields its standard or the art is

practiced.

its
the

good

for the

on whom

Alcibiades becomes trapped

within

the

argument at

the same time that he is

overwhelmed

by

insolence,

the

mad

ness,

of what

it implies here
of

that war is for the sake of the enemy's

justice.

Near the

beginning
and

this section, Alcibiades had said that the

difference

between the just

the unjust is the whole difference in all

section

(109b9-10),

though he concludes the

by differentiating
and noble.

the just from the expedient.

Along

the way, Socrates is able to mm to his own argumentative advantage the

connection

between the

just, lawful,

As
of

was

tme earlier,

however,

Socrates
the
arts

still

leaves

largely

in the dark the issue

the

interconnection among

themselves, the things to which they apply, and the goods with which deal. From the standpoint of the reigning conceit, or experiment, of the they dialogue such unity would have to be found in Alcibiades himself, or in his

insolent

teacher

Socrates,

who asks

Alcibiades to

"imitate"

him (108b6).

Some light
"agreement"

on

these issues of interconnection is shed

as a criterion

that Socrates treats

on

by considering the for knowledge in this section,

cities

and

by

reflecting

the

examples

that

he

uses

in his discussion (see lllb2 ff.). know is Greek

Perhaps the

surest

thing

that those

in

all

Greek

itself;

(injustice. This agreement, how almost as certain because they often go to war. All artisans ever, hardly makes them friends, be as one, but physicians from two may agree in their art, and, therefore,

is that they

all talk about

346

Interpretation
cities will

warring
true
of

be

enemies.

All

citizens of
and

Athens may be citizens, but the

or wouldbe noble of us

noble are noble and the

base, base,
act
Socrates'

the noble

can, as

is

"stones"

Alcibiades here, are (another of

"disgracefully."

Each

may know
a unique
all

what

examples), but
or
"agreements"

perhaps

only

inso

lence does
city,
cal

can convert stones not explore at what

into currency
various

jewels. Socrates,

this

is to say,

how far the

stretch: which

transcend the

times?

Indeed, he

presents neither a comprehensive

commonsensi-

division

and agreement of

things based on bodies or conventions nor a

on

conventional or natural

unity based
of

hierarchy
results of

or

imitation. This

abstraction
can

enables
move

and

many easily among different examples ignore differences in the

Socrates to

achieve

his

in the argument, because he

examples'

scope and range.

discovery, teaching, Witness, for

and agreement

example,

the insolent way in which he can treat persuading one as

many,

as

if dialogue
and

alone were sufficient and were one and

identical to persuading rhetoric unnecessary, or as if

advances

persuading
of

teaching

the same.

Socrates'

discussion
and

of agreement also

obviously
that is

his

consideration
much

learning

discovery. We

are struck most of

all,

however, by how

his

conversation

depends

"knowledge"

on after a search.

neither artistic or

scientific,
which the

nor attained

by discovering
conducted

Once again, the way in

justice is

discussion is

sented explicitly.

silently limits Alcibiades

and corrects the arguments what

that are pre

"knows"

by learning
of

Greek

and

hearing

opinions,

and

he

can

confidently

and

from the time

his

youth call a

variety of things, such as cheating and stealing, unjust without knowing enough about justice to discuss with clarity its relation to expediency. Everyone appar pace Socrates what wood is and stones are, without having ently
"knows"

to be a carpenter or stonemason (HObl

ff.,

Illbl0-d7). Upon reflection,

of

course, it is easy to
or which are when

see or

that

not everyone

knows

fully

what all

the stones are,

useful,

beautiful,

or why.

Socrates himself

makes this clear

he

encourages

Alcibiades to

confirm that although we all

know

what a

horse is, few know what a horse able to run is, not to mention a good horse or man simply (llld8 ff.). Once more, his argument indicates that
man or

though we may know this or

"know"

that,

we

it only

by treating

it

as

indepen

dent: combining it properly with other things truly differentiating it is more difficult.
Beyond this, these examples, ment that two is greater than one
Alcibiades'

or properties

and, therefore,

and

knowing in the course of the argu his ability to follow Socrates within

again draw our attention to the place of ability, opinion, and half-knowl in coming to know things strictly (112e8-13). One might say that being willing to leam and seeking to discover are necessary but not sufficient for knowledge: there are things that some of us cannot leam no matter how much we try, and none of us can leam or discover at all unless what is knowable makes its appearance, constantly, however much it is distorted. It is not that Socrates is incorrect in claiming that knowing is always a matter of

limits,
edge

learning

or

Plato's Alcibiades I

347

discovering but,
edge

rather, that he does

not make these other elements

in knowl

clear,

although

he

points to them.

On the
depends

one on

discovery flows
willingness

from

inquiry, inquiry

hand, Socrates acts as if willingness to leam, and

to leam follows from

knowing

that one does not know. This is

and delight in coming to know things, and from the attractiveness of what one wishes to know. Sim ilarly, Socrates draws attention away from testing one's abilities, and exercis

correct, but it draws attention away from curiosity

ing

one's spirit.

Socrates downplays for Alcibiades these Alcibiaden factors in

other

knowing. On the

hand,
of

Socrates'

examples make more clear sometimes connected

than his to com

discussion itself the degree

to know
others

imposition that is
things

for us, perhaps before we asked ing (11 lc6 9; see 118b4-6). Indeed, Socrates himself appears here more as a con than as a seeker. Ultimately, and even by and large, a god jurer and diviner
often name what

Socrates
of

says

ditions

knowledge

is completely true. But he does not discuss or the characteristics of the knower.

fully

the

precon

Socrates

now continues with which

the discussion of the relation between

justice

and

expediency by demonstrating cibiades, in the dialogue's third part, that the just things are the expedient things. He uses war as his battleground, nobility and goodness as his intermedi aries, and courage and death as his examples. Just things, he argues, are noble
the second part concluded

to Al

things; his
more

example of

nobility is

a virtue

(courage). Noble things

are good

good things are the most choiceworthy things. (What is for a man such as Alcibiades than a virtue such as cour choiceworthy just things are good things (and good things and expedient age?) Therefore, things are more or less equated) (115al-116el).

things, because the

Socrates'

proof

is clearly inadequate,

although

it

convinces

Alcibiades.

For

Socrates'

tme aim

here, successfully
only

achieved,

is to leave Alcibiades

bewildered.
The
errors.
argument succeeds

by

making

several

intentional

abstractions or

First,

Socrates

can

respect of
not show

the thing or act

good

that it is

thing in only courage. But he does of an act for example, itself, Commonact. performs the who for the man (or city)
show

that a noble

thing is

a good

sensically,

a noble act that

leads to

one's act
all

death is

not expedient

for the brave

man, however good the courageous from the fact that just things are not

itself is. Second, Socrates abstracts noble because some may be too ordi
noble?

nary,

or even

disgraceful:

retreat can

be just, but is it
that

Noble deeds have do

all noble

a splendor that most

just deeds lack, indeed,

community?

a splendid

isolation

things

justly

serve

the

Third,

(all) just

things are noble and

(all)

expedient

(good)

things are noble no more proves that

just things

are good

348

Interpretation
all crows are

than does the fact that that

crows are

black

and all telephones are

Socrates'

black

prove

telephones. But this is the form of

argument.

At the
things

least, he
are

alternates

between saying that

argument, the

good things are noble and noble no difference. Even if

noble

just

as

if, for this

have

order makes

Socrates
good),

had he

stayed with

the correct order (just things are noble;

needed

things are
"the"

would still

to speak of all noble things or

of

noble, the

just,

In fact, he speaks only of some things or things. Although the proof is inadequate, we should reflect on it further. Most im
and the good.
equation of

mediately, the

the just and the expedient is politically

of

healthy,

even

if here
where

Socrates'

demonstration

this

identity

is ironic. If

we

then consider

be simply true to say that justice is good, our attention is turned to the question of the unity for which and with regard to which the equation
might

it

could

be

correct.

Indeed,

this

issue becomes partially thematic late in the dia

goodness of

logue. Is the

proper

unity the individual? The ruler? His body? His soul? Or is

the
whole of

the unity somehow beyond this, say, the

things as

Socrates

presents

it in the Republic!
his discussion he expediency by asking do anything but ridicule someone who would For has he not said that just things and expedient
of and

Socrates had
Alcibiades

concluded

justice

whether

could now

say that just things

what

are evil.

things are the same?

But, arguing that what is unjust can be profitable, and is just, disadvantageous, i.e., arguing that what is just is not expedient, is
what

precisely

Alcibiades had done

earlier

(113d 1-9).

IV

Hence, in
he feels
another.

the

dialogue's

central

section, Alcibiades
now with

replies

by

swearing that

altogether

strange, answering

one opinion

and then with

feeling, Socrates shows him, is bewilderment, and it comes from of what he is discussing, and, more, from his ignorance of what he believes he knows. For one is not bewildered, nor does he make mistakes in action, about things he knows he does not know, but, rather, he entrusts these
This

his ignorance

to others.
cend to

(Alcibiades admits, for example, that he does not know how to as heaven.) This ignorance causes evil, moreover, and from ignorance of bewildered because he
of

the greatest things comes the greatest evil. Alcibiades is

is ignorant

the greatest but believes he knows them although he does not

(116e2-118b3). Socrates
advances
needs no

trickery

to show

Alcibiades his
do is to

bewilderment,
for this in

because he
a

is in fact bewildered. What Socrates

that
you

must

account

way that

his intention: strange, bewildered, artlessness is caused by know what you do not know (rather than, say, by a web of
has
ensnared you). now

believing
sophisms

in

which someone else

For

brief

moment at

least, Alcibiades is

completely different from

the

Plato's Alcibiades I
way in duced
which

349

Socrates had
once run

presented

him

at

the beginning: Socrates has re

elevated?

the masterful Alcibiades to a

dizzying

swoon, and
changes

where

his lovers had

moment

from Alcibiades,

now

he himself

from

one

to the next.
convinces

Alcibiades that he is bewildered because he believes he knows what he does not, and this enables Socrates to continue to teach him. But we must recognize that bewilderment does not spur us to knowledge in the
Socrates
same

way that

wonder

might,

and

that Alcibiades

is

not now

portrayed

as

experiencing

wonder.

know,
can

not charmed

This is to say that he is not attracted by what he does not by the imperfect appearance in opinions and deeds of what
Alcibiades'

be known. Socrates is
current

able

to convert
not

initial

wonder at
or

Socrates

himself into his

bewilderment, but
show

(either here

later in the dia

logue) into
not,
and

an unbridled search

indeed,

cannot,

for knowledge simply (see 104d5-7). He does Alcibiades that knowledge is simply attractive,

but

at most

that it is

necessary. rather

For bewilderment,
which

than playful

irony, is
a man of

the

characteristic

way in
and

full ignorance
as

announces

itself to

Alcibiades'

abdities

intentions,
tes

these are depicted here. It is of a piece with his wishes, as Socra

divines them, to rule completely, with courage as the example of what is noble, with death as a leading yet ambiguous example of evil, and with "na largely reduced, as it is in this dialogue, to birth and blood (see 11 9c 1-2,
ture"

123d4-7). Whatever the traditional

view of

him,

the Alcibiades presented in

Alcibiades I is

not erotic

he does
not

not seek or give

to join himself with another to

imitate

or produce.

He does

love

thanks. Socrates attempts to have

Alcibiades join him in dialogue, imitate him, be his friend and beyond, but he does this by presenting himself at first as demonically strange and later as necessary
around
and useful

(see 106a2-8). Alcibiades is

not

fascinated

with what

is
to

him; indeed,

there are several things that he is too proud to even

try

leam. Rather than

stand apart

being
and

portrayed as

erotic, Alcibiades is
stand

pictured as

wishing to

from

over, to master, to

nobly

and

courageously alone, to
the
madness of erotic

differentiate himself. His extremism, his madness, is

not

longing, but,

rather, the extremism of

separateness and

isolation,

whose ulti

mate success would be permanent mastery simply because of who he is, the 118el-5). Death is not particularity of his name, his renown (see 113c2-7,

simply
validate

opposed

to this
not

wish

cowardice, but

more evil

for Alcibiades, it is at (115d7-e8) because it

most equal needs

in

evil

to

to be risked to
of a

Alcibiades'

his

singularity.

bewilderment is in fact the true state

soul that recognizes

nothing

outside as

itself, because
contradiction.

such a soul can as

and as properly hold an opinion derment shows that the

its

Indeed,

Alcibiades'

easily bewil

"courageous"

isolation

of such

a soul

hardly
vice

different from

utter panic and cowardice: no

the extremes of a virtue and

is ultimately its

sometimes

look

different from

each other.

In the last analysis, Socrates

350

Interpretation
to Alcibiades that his hopes
version of and powers could

might show

be fulfilled

and

justified only in the truest

toward
Socrates'

the differentiation for

argument on not

which

he

wishes and

Alcibiades'

which

reliance points.

in this

ability to dis
this

criminate

numbers

But he does

take the

argument

far and,

indeed,
sophic

never mentions

philosophy to Alcibiades,

because Alcibiades lacks the

of

awestruck

longing

that is both a condition

and a characteristic

the philo

life.

the greatest things

would

Nonetheless, Socrates does indicate the power of knowledge: ignorance of is, or causes, what is most harmful and base. Again, this
be simply true
as we
were

knowledge

ever

both necessary

and sufficient

to be

or

to cause what is good, but this is not so with political or moral things.

Ignorance,

say, may

sometimes

be blessed

and some

ignorance
asked

some
attain

believing
what whether

that one knows even though one

people

does

not

is necessary to
who

anything filling? Nonetheless, the opinion that Soc rates is suggesting here is fundamentally correct, and it is salutary for Al cibiades to believe it, however briefly, because it will moderate him and may
his
own

most

desire.

Who

could

obtain

always

desires

were worth

lead to his better serving the city by educating himself and especially to those who know, if, indeed, he can leam who these are. The brief
parts,
section on

by turning

bewilderment

gives

way to the dialogue's final three

which mirror

the first three.

Because Alcibiades is
enter politics city.

wedded

to stupidity, Socrates claims, he wishes to

before he is educated, just as do all but a few who deal with the Pericles may be an exception, as Alcibiades says, because he consorted
men, but he has taught
tells us,
no

with wise

one, and one demonstrates

knowledge,

Socrates he
of

now

by

Alcibiades
amateurs that

now takes

must now take care

making heart: Socrates is correct, but this does not mean that to learn and to practice, because his rivals are such

others

learned.

his

nature will and

be

enough.

Not so,

says

Alcibiades'

looks

beginnings;

a proud man's contest

Socrates: how unworthy is not with the

barbarians here, but with the Spartan kings and generals and the Persian Great King. Alcibiades may believe that these are not so different from others, but he would take more care and not harm himself if he feared them. Besides,
mean

the well-bom

likely

give
as

birth to better

natures who when well reared are per

fected in

virtue.

And,

Socrates
than

shows

in
or

brilliant speech, their birth

and

rearing are in fact better virtue (118b4-124b9).

In this
section

Alcibiades'

Socrates',

as are their wealth and

Socrates

returns to the own

ically

mentions some of

his

rivals

beginning of the dialogue. He iron Damon, Anaxagoras, and Zeno, for

Plato's Alcibiades 1-351

example speech

in the

course of

developing
near

the

discussion,

and

he delivers the
(cf. 108al-5

long
and

that he refused to deliver

and

the

conversation's start

119al-7, 106bl-3
Socrates'

121a3-124b6).

claim

that one proves his knowledge

commonsensical: we

by teaching

another who can

teach still another

is

usually find

our professionals through

word of mouth and are

especially
his

prone

to trust

physicians attached

to

medical

schools, and other

teaching
what

professionals.

Nonetheless, Socrates, for

displays

this argu

ment, leaves hidden

long

speech soon

the inherent circu

larity

of

the process. For mistakes can be handed down from generation to

generation.

Socrates known

abstracts

no standard artisan
wishes

by

an art's user that can

from this possibility be

passes over

and again acts as used

if there is

to

check whether the not everyone who

is

wise.

Moreover, Socrates

the

fact that

to leam can in

the simple

arts such as

everyone who could

fact be taught, even the simple sometimes especially horsemanship. And, as Socrates himself indicates, not be taught is willing to leam. In general, Socrates here, as

earlier,
when

understates

the importance of

bodily

differences

and native

abilities

Socrates'

he is emphasizing the importance of knowledge. abstraction may account for the tack that Alcibiades why he
need not

now

takes in

order to make clear

take care to leam: he points to his nature.

In any event, his quick recovery from his bewilderment displays this nature. But Socrates is able to defeat move by indicating the utility, none
Alcibiades'

theless, of prudent fear of beginning: he appeals to

Alcibiades (and his
others.

one's

rivals

and

by

then paralleling the dialogue's

reduces

Alcibiades'

proud

intentions, but he subtly

generation

"nature")

to the blood and

that

he

shares with

More generally, important things is simply

reminded that
Socrates'

Alcibiades'

dealing

with politics

before he leams the

Alcibiades is

an extreme version of a universal error:

he is

never as altogether special as

he believes.

praise

long speech about the Spartans and Persians elicits ungrudging from Alcibiades, who at its completion no longer bothers to be coy about his intentions: Socrates has shown his mastery in the type of display Alcibiades
had
not
sought

from him (106a7-b5). Brilliant

show what

as

the speech

is, however, it does

inferior to

in fact
of

it

Alcibiades'

pretends to: that

abilities are

those

the Persians

and

Spartans.

VI

Nonetheless, the speech convinces Alcibiades that his competitors are not speech is very likely that easy marks. So, after Alcibiades exclaims consider in common true, Socrates, in the dialogue's sixth part, proceeds to better or, indeed, become to order in take to need that with him the care they
Socrates'

the best. But in

what virtue are says

they

to become the best? The

which things or

doing

(or manag
horseman-

ing)

of

things,

Alcibiades. But

business? Not

352
ship

Interpretation
or

seamanship,

they say, but

as

the Athenian
prudent and
and

gentleman's

business. But be

cause each same man,

is

good

insofar

he is

bad

wherein

he is is

not

wise, the

by

this argument, is both good are,

as

bad,

and this

contradictory.
rule

Perhaps the
other men?

good men

Alcibiades

now

says, those able to

the

But in

what

do they
a

rule men and what

men

is their in
each

characteristic

city or knowl

edge, if

some

artisan, say,

physician, rules

case, say,

illness?
the city.
what

But

Perhaps they rule for the better while health becomes present
present when the

management and preservation of

when

the

body

is better preserved,

becomes

city is preserved? Alcibiades replies that it is friendship that becomes present, with hatred and faction absent. But friendship is agreement, Socrates shows, and it is an art
such as arithmetic

that in each case

brings

agreement

in

mind and What, then, is it, say, the friendship and agreement between brothers or between husband wife? But, as Socrates shows, husbands and wives could not agree on

the agreement that Alcibiades

has in

city or a man. what is its art? Is

and

the

arts

such as

the military art and

are not

wool

Therefore, they
have
no

friends in these,

working and husbands

that only one of them

and

has.

wives,

and

cities,

Perhaps
says.

friendship or good order when each person does his own business. friendship arises on account of each doing his own, Alcibiades now But how can there be friendship when there is no agreement? Yet, when
own

each

does his
arise

business he does

what

does
what

among in

citizens when each or agreement

does

what

is just, and friendship, they agree, is just. Therefore, it is unclear

in
whom

this

friendship
do
not

is

about and

it is, in

which

they
both

must

be

wise

order

to be good.

For, by

Alcibiades'

account, the

same

have

and

have it (124bl0-127d8).
more perplexes

Socrates
swear about

once

Alcibiades (and leads him

at

127d6-8 to
that is

his ignorance in He

and proclaim

his disgrace)

with an argument

strictly

correct

a special

instance

and

remarkably tendentious

in

almost all

normal circumstances. and wife are

or

achieves

his

result

by ignoring
Their

the obvious. Husband

obtain

in fact

"friends"

because their

actions are

directed toward
stems

ing producing directed toward a

man as

goods

for their

"care"

own use.

from

and

is
or

common repository.

Socrates ignores the full

family,

city,

the user or enjoyer of goods. (He also

ignores the

goods

that can be

produced

and the implications of his children, for example only in common with Alcibiades in consulting here.) This abstraction parallels the earlier abstraction from use and enjoyment in the second part of the dialogue,
"common"

an abstraction

that

also

had

enabled

Socrates to treat

arts and sciences as mas

tering both
product and

their products and how

they

are

produced,

as

if the

user of the

his understanding

of

its

purpose were
Alcibiades'

irrelevant,

and as

if luck,

wealth,
one

or untutored

qualities

e.g.,

good looks could not

help

to obtain goods.
argument might

Socrates'

be identical

with

love

of some

be strictly good, if

correct were care

for

one's own ever to

a science on which we agreed were

that

Plato's Alcibiades I
good,
and

353

point out

wisely possessed that science. Here, however, he does not goal is to moderate Al the limits of his argument. For
if
we
Socrates'

cibiades'

excessive
result poses

self-absorption

by

is that justice

all

differentiation

makes agreement

ensnaring him in an argument whose impossible and, therefore, op

acts as

and what

is good; in fact, he

if differentiation itself is
allowed

contradictory.

Indeed,
of

we presume that

Alcibiades has

Socrates to
of

re

place a

discussion

how Alcibiades

will win renown with a

discussion

how

he
no

will

become the

"best"

difference between them

what

precisely because for Alcibiades there ultimately is and therefore we all want the best for
"ourselves"

distort

is

good

to a greater or lesser degree.

of

Socrates'

discussion

justice,

understood

here

as each

doing his

own,

ad

vances

the conversation and brings to light more about the city than meets the

eye,
mind and

as

long

as we attend to the surface

result with which

blemishes

of

the argument and

keep

in

the contradictory
we

this part of the dialogue concludes.

He

Alcibiades,
the
the

remember,

cannot or

find the business that belongs to the

gentieman sider

good

they

seek

the basis of his rule. But when we con

problem of rule

from the do if

standpoint of

using, enjoying,

and

producing
to

goods

in

common

as we

we

try

to account

for

Socrates'

references might

use and production

we can see

that the statesman's purpose

or use which

precisely
and

be to in

choose who will

produce, enjoy,
statesmanlike

goods,

at which

times,

what amounts. as a

This

the city

"whole,"

as opposed

function, of course, raises questions about to the individual, and about the variety of
the
question of

political types. goods

Most urgently, it
are

raises

how

we

know that the

being

distributed

indeed

good.

Now,
whom

the city that

with

Socrates
find

portrays

here is

composed of artisans each of

disagrees
in

the

practitioner of no place

he

and

Alcibiades
such a

can

It is not surprising that every for the gentleman or statesman here, be

other art.

cause

city there is no measure that might guide production other than

production

what occurs

in

itself. The city

satisfying
either a

composed of each

disagreeing
if it limitless

artisans

is

essentially
any
of

city for the

at

sake of

desire

as

were unlimited

by

other

desire;

root, it is

city

dominated

by

the

production

the strongest producer or dedicated to satisfying one disconnected desire

after

the

other

it is

city (or for that

who

matter an

individual) for

the sake of its

sheer,

immediate,

cal analogue to

world whose

a city is an appropriate politi desires to be the only one in the Alcibiades, ultimately such a name is heard anywhere. But city would be an unsatisfac

"thisness."

unqualified,

Such

tory home for Alcibiades because it

cibiades'

neither needs nor can admit a mler.

Al

love

of

renown,

however,

would, if driven to the extreme and

fully

achieved, lead to similarly unsatisfactory results. Alcibiades seeks to have all by ruling all, but the difference between all and nothing (extreme courage and

death) is
is
all

insignificant
remains.

when all

that one does is for

one's

name,

and one's name

that

Socrates

points

to the

problem

that we have been

discussing

of

the

connec-

354

Interpretation

tion, agreement, and disagreement of the arts through the examples he uses. He in the course of also indicates the complexity of the problem by differentiating his discussion between the body's health, the eye's sight, and the ear's hearing health the (126a6-b8). Is there a single or is health itself always the of this or that bodily part? More broadly, if all our ends are sight, the hearing
"health,"

produced presents

by arts and care for the body, as is tme in the city that Socrates here, there is no clear ground on which to condemn Alcibiades or any lesser Alcibiades, because the ends that guide us suffer from the same defect:
each

fails to differentiate

citizens and their

tasks in a way that could

lead to

agreement,

justice,

and

rank, because
Socrates'

no one who

is totally

self-absorbed need

listen to any other; some simply have stronger discussion so So, on the basis of nary
goal or set of goals

natures or more ability.

far, it is

unclear

is different in kind from

noble,
or

what

how any ordi Alcibiades seeks. In

appear

deed,
of

even the virtues that are

now

choiceworthy, in themselves
related

in

the discussion up to the body.

or

to be dispositions that ultimately are

even a

to things
sake of

Therefore,
maintaining

if

politics or the
"soul"

individual is for the

producing
appears men are

type of

type of user or

enjoyer of goods

and capacities such as

this city's wouldbe ruling gentleman

the soul in

fact

ultimately to be for the sake of the body. The implication here is that if only their bodily desires and the arts that serve these desires, there can
agreement

be

no

tme
can

among them.
goods

We

see, nonetheless, that

do

exist

such as

the

music

to which
men

Socrates refers,
tioned
and affect seem

or magnificent courage and other virtues removed

that I have just

though

that are far

from the body's needs,

even

they

shape

it. Indeed, despite any implications to the contrary, the somehow different from the body and connected to these and

"soul"

does

other tran

scendent goods.

Perhaps, then, if
there
can

we

better

understood

the soul we might find

the unity for

which

be both

agreement and we

differentiation and, there

the soul
we might

fore,
be

standards

(justice). Moreover, if

better

understood

able to separate the arts as examples of

knowledge from the

bodily

goods

to

which

they

are connected.

Furthermore,
own

understanding

the soul might enable us

better to
and

account

for

Alcibiades'

abilities, his

"bewilderment,"

his pride,
there can

his intentions
of

the characteristics that set him apart the soul, that

while

characterizing

him. Discussion be it may

is to say, may simply

make

intelligible how
the

goods that are apart

allow us

from,

or not

reducible

to,

body. Beyond this,

to arithmetic and
mathematics re

to

develop
are the

counting here. How lated to Alcibiades'

theme of
which

intriguing differentiating and assembling

gifts,
and

Socrates'

references

in

peculiar

how

are

they

related to

the broader

separating and combining, and types of wholes or commons, on Socrates has been touching? In order to illuminate such there
questions,
now

fore, Socrates
natural and

turns to the issue

of the soul.

His turn

strikes us as

both
the

surprising, for he has prepared the soul, but he has not done so explicitly.

ground

for discussion

of

Plato's Alcibiades I
Va

355

in the

sixth part of

the

dialogue, Alcibiades had

and

contradicted

himself

about

justice, friendship,

and

agreement,

he

concluded

by

swearing that he had,

unawares, been disgraceful. Now, in the seventh part, Alcibiades agrees with Socrates that he must care for himself. This, however, does not mean caring for what is of (or belongs) to him any more than we care for our feet by caring for
our shoes: although

it is the
better.
art

shoemaker who makes shoes

better, it is

gymnastic

that makes the

body

We

cannot

know the

that improves us, and will not know how to care

we ourselves are.

for

ourselves, unless we know what

discuss it, Socrates The

now

says, if

we

This is difficult, but discover the same in itself.

we can

user and what

he

uses are always

different,

as are

the shoemaker, cut

and eyes

ter,
use.

and

harper different from their tools

own

and

from the hands

user of

that

they

Man is different from his

body: he is the

the body. The

user or

mler of the or

the

whole of

body is either nothing, or it is the soul; it cannot be the body itself body and soul because the body does not rule. This (statement),
not

however, is
rather, have
more than

exact, because

they have

not

discovered
at

considered what each

(thing) is:

in itself, but, least, nothing dominates us

the same
and to

the soul.
to
Alcibiades'

Socrates, therefore, is speaking

to

soul, craftsman,

know

oneself

is

know the
of the

soul.

The physician,
and not even

farmer,
their own

and moneylender

know

things
not

body,

things, let
Alcibiades'

alone the soul:

they do

lover, therefore, loves his soul, not his body, and will not release him: Socrates, thus, is his only friend and will not leave him as long as he does not become deformed by
and are not moderate.

know themselves

becoming a lover of the Athenian people. He can take precautions against this by learning before he enters politics. If they can bring about knowledge of the soul, they continue, they will know
themselves
and care

for the
of

soul.

As the

eye can see

itself in

a mirror or

in the

pupil where

the virtue

the eye, sight,

is,

so

the soul knows itself if it looks

especially
other

where the virtue of

the

soul

wisdom,

knowledge, thought,
we will also
who

or

any

like this
what

know

is. If we, then, do know ourselves, belongs to ourselves and to others. One
a statesman and will

moderately does not know this

and, therefore,

could not
unhappy.

be

do

evil

and

be

wretched

have virtue, and, therefore, the one who will manage the city rightly and nobly will have the citizens participate in virtue and for himself, and not justice and temperance thus must first acquire virtue mle in order to do as he wishes. One who can do as he pleases, but without

To be

happy,

cities will

intelligence,
tes is

will

do

evil.

Alcibiades, therefore,
strength of

needs

virtue, not tyranny. Al

as

cibiades, Socrates concludes, will, therefore,

not overcome
part

care

for justice,

long

as

Socra

by

the

the city (127d9-135e8).

This

has the salutary

personal and political result of

leading

Alcibiades

356

Interpretation
he
must care

to see that

for justice

not tyranny.

Socrates does

not

lead him to

philosophy,
the

however,
problems

even

though his

explicit mention of the same

in itself

and

it. Neither philosophy nor "regime" is said in the dialogue. As with the earlier parallel section, the just or justice is shown to be both noble and good. Our delight with this is tem

implicit

he

raises make us think of

pered,
cluded

however,

when we remember

that the

problems

left

after

the

just-con
unsolved.

discussion

of

Moreover,

this connection of the

justice, friendship, just, noble,

and

agreement

remain

and good

is

accomplished

by

first

sundering the grounds for the equation, for in order to claim that man is soul, Socrates must unnaturally (and unconventionally) completely separate improv

ing

something,

artifices that effect an

improvement,

and

the tools that produce

these artifices. Whereas Socrates had earlier shown the equivalence of the

just,
his
with

noble,
art

and good

by

enclosing
shows

within

the artisan's mastery everything that

touches, he

now

which the artisan

by separating everything deals. Socrates demonstrates his uncanny skill by reaching the
this equivalence
opposite paths!

same conclusion
Socrates'

from

discussion
and

of soul
virtue

is
is

notable

user, the mler,

its

wisdom.

for saying so little about soul. It is the But what are its powers and parts?

Who is the

soul's

physician or

trainer?

What,

so

to speak, are

its feet
of

and

hands, its shoemaker and love, and care throughout

here. The
passions are not

shoes?

More directly, the dialogue, he does discussed explicitly,

while

Socrates talks

fear,

not connect

them to the soul

nor are

the soul's movements,

its reaching toward and pushing away, its eros and self protection. In a sense, the soul is the very nothing that Socrates suggests that it is. Most significant of all, although the soul's virtue is said to be wisdom, its orientation toward what it knows is
tion are

Indeed, knowing substantially identified, as if they are

not
out. earlier self-enclosure of an art and

brought

the

soul and

unmeasured

knowing its by anything

given

perfec outside

them. The

its

purpose

has

way to the

self-enclosure of the soul and

soul could

its virtue,

with

the

body

and

the arts ruled

by

the

but for what, and how, it is not said. Socrates almost acts as if there be soul without body and without anything other than itself for a soul to
revealed

know.
In presenting this picture, Socrates has
cators'

his

own

or

his rival

edu

body, only itself. This picture, indeed, is the analogue to deepest wish. For to be the single somebody all else serves is hardly different from being a simple,
wish: soul without

deepest

whose

perfection

is to know

Alcibiades'

self-reflective, self-absorbed wholly independent from, even if identical to, others. The difference between completely prideful separation and mastery and completely absorbed self-reflection is practically immaterial, and Socrates no more here than earlier describes the complex of hierarchical connections
within which

"soul,"

the arts, the virtues,

and

their objects are embedded. Socrates

wishes of

thus shows the

similarity between the deepest

or

poetry

and an

utterly self-absorbed,

disembodied, thinking

tyranny, religion, and that springs from

Plato's Alcibiades 1-357

bewilderment
and

is

rooted

insufficiently

in

attraction.

However,

there

is,

of

course, truth in

thinking
is

of man as

soul, because the

movements and passions

that, together
shortcoming
reflect what

with

reason, come to

mind when we mention the soul

indicate the
simply to it re

of what

presented as the soul

here. Were the

longer

"soul"

it

sought to
case

know,

it

would

be indistinguishable from

what

flected. But in that

the thinker
soul.

would no

need care or courage

for

himself: he
Socrates'

would no

longer be

remarks about the same about

in itself,

about

likeness

and

resemblance,

wholes, and about the

self-contained arts enable us

to consider further

several

thought.
are

issues concerning thinking and the order among the things that are These issues are beyond the dialogue's immediate problem. But they
cause of

the deeper

the immediate task,

which

is to lead the

masterful

Alcibiades to
Socrates'

wish

to be just.

both in equating things (e.g., the just, noble, and expedient) and strictly differentiating them (e.g., justice and the arts, the arts and what they serve) is remarkable. The ease is caused, among other things, by the
ease manner

in
and

which

he deals

with what

is the

same

in itself. When Socrates

not with

says

that

he

Alcibiades have dealt intentions.

with each

one, but

the same in

itself,
have

he has

several

They

have

not

dealt

with sameness as

such,

nor

they
in

considered the or

itself,

way, if any, in identical to itself, is or

"nature"

which each can

thing

that

they

treat as the same

not speak of

be in itself. Socrates does

not even

"idea"

or of or

in this

context.

He does

independence,
exact,
also

or change.

Nor does he
nor

ask what makes each are so

discuss self-sufficiency, just thing just,

souls.

or what makes each soul a

soul,

why there

many

His

analyses

are never

although

there is

always some

level

at which or the

they

are correct.

Socrates Because it is
when

does

not

discuss

the parts of the

types of wholes,
of

or what resemblance and

city imitation are. how He

soul, the different

this reticence, he also does

not ask

each

thing
clues

remains what

it is

combined with other things.

mentions

provides

the

to examining

these issues because he

reason

them all, but almost never as issues. The

for this is

what we

have

called

his

experiment

in the dialogue: to
[justice]).

push to

their limits the possible

independence

or enclosure of certain things and virtue

(the soul,

the single name of surpassing renown, arts,

Sophistry

(philosophy), tyranny,
in their deepest
not
wish:

artistic

(poetic)

making, and

virtuous mle are all shown stand alone while of wisdom

to stand

fully

alone

and, ultimately, to

being

open

to

other parts of a whole.

In

each case

but that

(the
but

soul), the limit is

ther problems are
not reached must

shown explicitly through a contradictory argument; and fur

shown

implicitly. With the Socrates has

soul

the limit is
of

announced

in

argument.

revealed

something

how

each

thing

be if it is to be
we

simply.
Socrates'

As

have said, human

experiment

justifies the dialogue's traditional

would need

subtitle: on

nature.

For

men

to have a nature, strictly, we the

ways

to

be

able

to be

fully

independent in

one of

just

mentioned.

If

we cannot

358

Interpretation

we and the dialogue means to teach that we cannot be entirely independent or formed open to are however much we nature have a do not by simply, nature, and however much this openness varies among different men. Men
cannot

be

without

being
of

conventional.

By

the same account, men are natural

in

greater and

lesser degrees;
ask,

what

is

natural provides us with

One
image
what can

might

course, how those things that can

guiding standards. be simply are to be

connected

in

a manner that still allows each to

Socrates'

of

this is

be. In the Alcibiades, Plato's love for Alcibiades. Socrates Alcibiades for
"loves"

he

can

be, for his

good, and, therefore, for

what

he is in terms
what

of what

he

be. But does this love

help

enable

Socrates to be

he

can

be? Is he

merely protecting himself and others from Alcibiades? Or does Socrates see in Alcibiades something he needs, although he might also find it in others?

The

wish

to be nothing but a

thinking

soul,

whose

thought would be

like

counting measured merely by itself, leads to a distortion that would make Soc rates less than he can be. Socrates needs to be attached to the full range of what
can

be articulated, and, therefore, to other men. But this Socrates might discover in another something that would haps Socrates hoped that his
own care would

need also means

that

surpass

himself. Per

be

perfected

in Alcibiades.

Aristotle

on

Tragedy:
the

Rediscovering

Poetics

Jacob Howland

University

of Tulsa

That Greek tragedy is beautiful is beyond dispute. The cists and cultural historians, including in particular
individual
tive
plays and of of

recent work of classi

"structuralist"

studies of

the dramatic

festivals,

has

established two other

distinc

features drama

tragedy: that its ambiguous presentation of the human lot pro

vokes a range of critical philosophical

questions,

and that the performance of

tragic

played an

important

role of

in the

political education of

Athenian
philo

citizens.1

Yet these three dimensions

significant tensions and

tragedy
way that

its
and

profound

beauty, its

sophically
polis

ambiguities,

its

educative role within explanation.

the

strain against one another

in

demands

Philo

sophical

ambiguity, for example, is

not

incompatible

with poetic

beauty, but
One way
shown

seems to conflict with the expression of a coherent vision of the polis and the cultivation of

habits

of

citizenship in

accordance with such a vision.

in

which

this conflict surfaces is explored

by

Simon Goldhill,

who

has

that the Great Dionysia opened

ception of the

quently

called

con by ceremonially reconfirming an between the that was subse individual and the polis relationship into question in the plays themselves by the problematic choices,

"official"

conflicting obligations, and ethically ambiguous qualities of dramatic characters Ajax.2 such as Neoptolemus and This tension becomes all the more interesting
if John Winkler is
correct

in suggesting that the tragedies

of

were

directed

partic

ularly toward an audience full responsibilities of

gaps and

ephebes,

youths on

the

verge of manhood and on one

the

citizenship.3

Yet if the tragedies

also open

level

expose

tensions in the civic

of a

ideology, they

up for

the audience the

possibility
ology. selves

genuinely self-conscious political education The tragic festivals provoke reflection because they
complex ways. can

that transcends

ide

point beyond them

in

Aristotle's Poetics, a philosophical study of tragedy, teach us about the relationship between the three dimensions of tragic drama identified most modem scholarship. While the if we are to judge above? Not

What

meaning

of

much, by the Poetics is notoriously contestable, there has been broad

agree-

interpretation,

Spring 1995,

Vol. 22, No. 3

360

Interpretation
Aristotle
presents us with a

ment on one major point:

theory

of

tragedy

that

its three distinctive features. Scholars writing on the Poetics are likely to endorse at least one of three general claims about Aristotle's interpretation of tragedy. The first claim is that

fails to do justice to

one or more of

Aristotle failed to
there to

appreciate

the

essential

ambiguity
writes

of

the tragic situation. "For

be

tragedy,"

Jean-Pierre Vemant

ton-Ingram's reading of a the text simultaneously to

calls
daimon"

in paraphrasing R.P. WinningHeracleitean famous dictum, "it must be possible for

two things: It is his character, in man, that one
what one calls

imply
or p.

daimon and, conversely,

a

character, in man, is in reality a

fate, destiny,
and

lot that

one can neither control nor understands

fully

under
as

stand

(Myth

Tragedy,

37). Because Vemant

tragedy

the

product of a unique

historical moment, he finds it

tragic
man who

possible
so

to argue that Aris

a

totle "no longer

stranger."4

understood

had,

to speak, become

Vemant'

assertion,

which

implies that Aristotle is insensitive to the

of

philosophical provocations at the the

heart

tragic

drama, is frequently

echoed

in

secondary The second

literature.5

general claim

is that Aristotle

never

intended to illuminate the

actual cultural significance of

tragic drama and the dramatic

of

festivals, because

he

sought
of

to transform the traditional understanding

the nature and mean

ing

tragedy. Some scholars who hold this view maintain that the Poetics
with ancient

breaks

tradition in arguing that the production and appreciation of

poetry fall
political,

within a

distinct

and autonomous

domain

of aesthetic

experience,

the pleasures of

which can

and ethical

considerations.6

be adequately explicated independently of religious, Insofar as they begin by positing the inde
of political and philosophical

pendence of poetic
"aestheticist"

beauty
might

from issues
of

relevance,
re

interpretations

the Poetics offer

little hope that Aristotle's

flections

on

poetry
is

help

to clarify the unity of these elements in the tragic

experience.

A third
of the

claim

advanced

by

some scholars who oppose aestheticist readings

Poetics. These
the

scholars argue

that Aristotle

fully

appreciates

the role of

tragedy in
to one or

education of

the citizen, but that the

general philosophical com

mitments that

inform his understanding of this role lead him to fail to do justice both of the other two fundamental dimensions of tragic drama.7
notice

It is important to

the

extent

to which the above claims, although

as

they

may be

advanced as

conclusions, actually function

widely

shared

interpreta

tive presuppositions that have shaped the scholarly debate over the meaning of terms in the Poetics. Consider first the issue of methodology. Although key

basic

methodological choices will

whether to read the

decision

necessarily influence one's conclusions, the Poetics as a self-contained investigation or in close

and

connection with the

Nicomachean depend

Eudemian Ethics, the Politics,

and the

Rhetoric is
cist

likely

to

upon whether one endorses or rejects aestheticist

way around. Both aestheticist and nonaesthetiassumptions, in turn, are loosely connected with certain patterns of inter pretation. The notion that Aristotle viewed the production of aesthetic

assumptions,

and not the other

pleasures

Aristotle
as

on

Tragedy

361

the end of

tragedy

coheres well with a

fundamentally
Similarly,
as
well

aesthetic account of noth

tragic

katharsis,
saw

as well as with

the view that tragic hamartia designates

"mistake."8

ing

more

than an

ethically
as at

neutral

the

assumption

that

Aristotle broad

tragedy

least in

part a pedagogical vehicle

fits
an

well with a account

view

of

the significance of

katharsis,

as

with

of

hamartia
nificant

as a range of errors

that may include ethically and

intellectually sig
of

failures to hit the

most

mark.*

Perhaps

important, it has long

been

hidden implication

the

schol

arly debate over the meaning of hamartia that Aristotle ignores or fails to un derstand the tragic situation. For at least the last century, this debate has been framed in terms
part of

of

the presence
protagonist.10

or absence of significant

the tragic

responsibility on the Yet if Aristotle indeed takes a definite and

unambiguous stance on

the

dently

of an exploration of

issue thus framed, he thereby also settles, indepen the concrete fabric of any particular play, what is
each and

arguably the question posed by support the implicit assumption

tragic drama of

of

every tragic drama. Does the Poetics Aristotle in this way robs many
scholars that

its definitive

paradoxical

tension?

The preceding reflections Poetics to be self-conscious

cuses on

underscore the need

about

its

presuppositions.

for any interpretation of the The present essay fo

that can lead
one

five books that

provoke the

kinds

of questions

to

reconsider unexamined assumptions and to see the and richer

text of the Poetics in

a new

in

ways

that

light. Taken together, these books challenge the scholarly tradition help to reclaim the Poetics as a text from which we may leam
all of

about

Greek tragedy in

its dimensions.

Carnes Lord's Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle, the first of these books to appear in print, provides an interpretative keynote for
the other four. Lord's book is for the most part
not

directly

concerned with

the

Poetics. It is
and of

an

examination, in the light

education and
of

of ancient writings on mousike, of the

relationship between

"music"

dance)

in the last two books

that the

poetry as well as song Aristotle's Politics. Yet a major implication

attention not

(including

Lord's study is

Poetics deserves the

only

of philoso

phers and

and indeed especially classicists, but also Lord begins by noting that a liberal prejudice in favor

of political theorists. of

the

"autonomy

of

culture,"

together

with

the "aesthetic of
. . .

modernism"

(whose distinctive features

include "the

repudiation of realism obstacles

and

the rejection of meaning and repre

sentation") are both in general

we

and with

understanding of Aristotle (p. 17). He urges, respect to the interpretation of Aristotelian texts, that
to
our

take seriously the

classical view

that

music and

literature

could

"constitute

the

core of an education

good citizens and

free

men"

designed to form the tastes, character, and judgment of a possibility, he notes, given thematic attention
only

among

modems of stature

by

Rousseau (p. 19).

362

Interpretation
and

Education

Culture

attacks

the

aestheticist assumption

that "Aristotle

insisted

on

understanding poetry, in
thesis

opposition of

to the procedure of Plato

...

as

a phenomenon possessed of a

dignity

its

own and governed

by

its

own

laws"

(p. 23). Lord's

aesthetic

main

enjoyment,

not moral

is that "the prevailing understanding of catharsis [as improvement], and with it the prevailing under
of

standing of Aristotle's view ally, is fundamentally in relying

cist
on

the political role of

literature

or culture gener

error"

(p. 34). Although he

of

makes a point of not

Plato in his interpretation

of

Aristotle, Lord
part

asserts

that the aestheti

reading between these two

Aristotle has

gained

influence in

from

false

opposition
as
of

inaugurating

In his view, those who understand Aristotle liberal defense of culture in the face of a Platonic attack
philosophers.

ostensibly monumental illiberality ignore the "healthy regard for the political importance of that both of these men share (p. 20). In addition, the latter conception of Plato's attitude toward musical culture betrays an insuffi
culture"

cient regard
and the which or

larger

for the relationship between specific claims in the Platonic writings literary contexts in which they are advanced a problem from
suffers as well

Aristotle

(pp.

22-23, 25), due in

of

part

to the chronological

"genetic-analytic"

preoccupations

the

highly

influential Aristotelian insists

scholar upon

Werner Jaeger. In

contrast

to dominant scholarly practices, Lord

about

interpreting

Aristotle's

remarks

ethical and political writings and of

poetry within the context of his the classical Greek view of musical culture
the Poetics as
extent reflected

in

general.

Lord's

opposition

to

an

aestheticist

reading

of

well as

his

general methodological commitments are

to a great

in the later

books
essays was

by

Stephen Halliwell, Elizabeth Belfiore, and Michael Davis, and in the collected by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty. Halliwell begins his study, which four
years after

published

Lord's, by calling
in
mind

attention

to the

extent

to

which

Aristotle had Platonic

the central

introducing
his
own

in composing the Poetics, and by thesis that in the Poetics Aristotle "set[s] out to argue in
material

way for

poetry's

intellectual
(p.

and moral

status,

and

hence for its

poten

tial place in the conception of the good life which

is

a common premise of all

Plato's Poetics

and

Aristotle's
integral

thought"

2).u

Writing

six years after

we

Halliwell but in
at

much the same as an

spirit, Belfiore
part of

states that

"it is time

began to look
whole,

the

Aristotle's philosophy
a

as a

and as a part

societ

of, and response to, the

task.12

literary

and philosophical traditions of a

living
in undertaking

(p. 5). The books discussed here employ

variety

of approaches

precisely this

HI

The best

argument

I have encountered to the

effect that

the Poetics is a
of

self-

conscious exploration of the

relationship between the

beauty

tragic drama

Aristotle
and

on

Tragedy

363

its

philosophical and ethico-political significance

is

provided
.

in Michael
poses

Davis's book, Aristotle's Poetics: The

a special challenge to scholars

Poetry

of Philosophy The Poetics

the

because it

was not written with

disciplinary

divisions

academy in mind. Lord addresses one aspect of this situation, but the problem goes beyond the neglect of political theorists. While
of

the modem

specialists on
philosophical

Aristotle tend to

prejudge the

Poetics

as

a work of

interest,

classicists,

philologists,

cultural

historians,

secondary and lit

generally have only a moderate taste for the rigors of philosophical Arbeit. Davis suffers from neither of these limitations: he loves to think hard,
terateurs
and

he

approaches

Aristotle's text

with

unassuming

wonder.

His

explication of

the

philosophical core of

the Poetics helps to

establish

its

place at

the center of

Aristotle's thought,

as well as

to illuminate
of

essential points of contact

between

Aristotle's Davis
an
.

philosophical

offers what

activity and that Olof Gignon would

the
sort

the tragic dramatist.

"interpretation"

call an

of

the Poetics

investigation

of

"most

lacking

in Aristotelian scholarship today

text and to
context."13

that

is, [one]

which seeks

to trace the

argument of a particular

understand

the meaning of each sentence in itself and in relation to its

shows

Furthermore, Davis

that the Poetics

is itself

concerned

ing

the nature of interpretation in general. His commentary

clarify demonstrates that

with

the task of providing a specific interpretation of the Poetics cannot be separated

from die
It

process of

task. Davis reads

will therefore

reflecting upon the requirements and limitations of this the Poetics and teaches us how to read it at the same time.

be

doubly

worth while

to retrace here the

main

lines

of

his

argument.

Davis
which

adheres us

to the principles of charity and

humility
he

in interpretation,
was

direct

to assume that Aristode

our

understood what

doing

and not

to assume that
with

understanding

of

things Greek is better than his. He begins

the presupposition that Aristotle's works are

like

tragic

dramas

and pieces

of music

(and, I

would

add, Platonic
whole.

dialogues), in

that their

parts are unintel

ligible in
surface

separation

from the

But because the Poetics is

at

least

on

the

"an extraordinarily crabbed, difficult piece of Poetics, p. vii), Davis's commentary, which carefully
and structural ambiguities of the

writing"

(Else,

Aristotle's

explores

the linguistic

study treats the

question"

difficulty

of

text, is unavoidably also difficult. Yet his Poetics the thematically, for it makes its "guiding

Aristotle's
Poetics is

the problematic relationship between the form and the content of treatise (p. xv). This question is provoked by Davis's thesis that the
not

only about poetry generally and tragedy in particular, but also about the fundamental structure of human action and the nature of reason. "Po he writes, "are so profoundly connected that a discus etry, action, and
reason," others"

(p. xiv). But why does Aristotle's necessarily involves the into an like poetry, and why is a discussion of inquiry inquiry into action look poetry? The reason, Davis suggests, is that reason embedded in a discussion of
sion of one

the Poetics is

concerned not so much with

poetry

as with mimesis

(imitation

or

364

Interpretation

representation), "not in its various forms or products but what

itself (p. 3). Yet

accessible apart

mimesis

is

no more

directly

accessible

it really is in in itself than thought is

from the

objects of

thought and the soul apart

must

from its

speeches

and

deeds,

so

that an

products one

(p. 4).

inquiry Poetry is only

purposes

into imitation
one such

look like

an

inquiry

into its

product, but it is the

most appropriate

for Aristode's

because

action and

thought share the form of poetic

mimesis.

When

we

act,

we

first

represent

to ourselves our action

as completed.

In

deed,
more

moral action

depends
the

upon the

initial possibility

of

imaginatively

repre

senting the

bad in this way as alternatives. "Intentions are nothing than imagined actions intemalizings of the external. All action is there
good and of

fore imitation
the

action; it is

poetic"

(p.

9;

cf. pp.

xvii, 18). In human action,

always prior to
.

completion of even

doing
If

itself:

Achilles, Davis
(p.
xviii).

in thought is paradoxically notes, "knows his fate

.

the

doing

[and]

wants

'to die like

Achilles'"

action always

involves

mimetic

case

that

"understanding
as

our nature as mimetic proves

thinking, it is also the to be an interpretation of

mimetic"

rational"

our nature

(p. 4). We

humans,

the "most the

of animals
things"

(1448b7), have an "uncontrollable urge to This urge finds satisfaction in mimesis,

soning]
about

see past
which

surface of

(p. 3).

involves

"learning]
with

and rea

[sullogizesthai]

is"

what each

thing

(1448M6-17). Mimesis has

together
"that"

the form of

thought, for sullogizesthai, putting that, is the essence "to say 'this is
of

"this"

so as

to see this as

thinking.

that'

tally
that"

mimetic:

one must

Thinking, in turn, is fundamen first think this as independent from

objects

(p. 27). This initial

process of

"framing

in the

world

setting

them apart from what surrounds them so as to make them objects

templation"

for

con

is nothing other than poetic representation, which amounts to "sep arating something from other things so as to give it a certain (p. 27). Finally, poetry, thinking, and doing or acting all necessarily unfold in

wholeness

time. This means that poetic mimesis and

straint:

thinking
means to of

operate under

the same con

poetry, like any logos

or

account, "must

present the parts of things as

independent
connection"

of one another even when

it

(p.

15). We have
things

"way
to

demonstrate their necessary making independent and separate

(p. 16),
even when

beings
things

out of the

understand"

we attempt

these

are not self-subsistent parts whole.

but eide,

or

inseparable
visible

constituents of a

larger

This feature

of

thought

(logos) is

independence

of the eide of reasonable speech

(logos),

in the merely apparent as Davis shows in his

of

examination of

Aristotle's

reflections on speech

in the last third

or overstates and

the Poetics.
able to tell

Aristotle's indirect demonstration

the
of
truth"

that

logos "lies
of

to

be

in that "the

appearance of

independence
an

speech] is necessary for the possibility

logos"

stability [of the elements (pp. 108, 110) establishes

dimen
have
thought
can

that even philosophical thought

sion.

has

irreducibly

productive or poetic

But

as

tragedy

makes

evident, the
our

poetic character of

important

consequences

for

deeds

as well as our speeches.

Aristotle

on

Tragedy

365

The first step in understanding the connection between the style and sub stance of Aristotle's treatise is to see that the Poetics is necessarily indirect because it is about the mimetic core of thought and action, and mimesis is
invisible in itself. This
suggestion underscores the

fact that interpretation is

itself
could

a mimetic process:

justify

attempting to see

by

pointing out and Platonic dialogues, the

are and

it involves seeing beyond the surface of the text. One into the interior of a text in a particular way only the provocations that lie on its surface. As with tragic dramas
provocations on

the surface of Aristotelian treatises

of

many is the comprehensive way in which it identifies these provocations arise from the ambiguity of
act"

various,

and a nice

facet

of

Davis's interpretation
and accounts

the Poetics
of

for them. Some like

poiein

particular words

("to

or

"to make"),
use of

or

from their hamartia

suggestive use or the verb

in different from

contexts

(for

exam errors

ple, the
of

the

noun

hamartanein to describe the

obvious errors

tragic characters, critics, and poets). Others arise

and still others

in the

text, form

from

significant conflicts or

and content.

Concerning

the

that the Poetics "is replete

example of what

with

striking parallelisms between Davis makes a good case for his claim latter, that Aristotle means it to be taken as an signs
(p. 16). Examples include the many in chapter 25 and the "choral
errors
of
ode"

he is talking in Aristotle's discussion of poetic

12 in
which

about"

errors

chapter

Aristotle

calls attention

to the nature of the chorus (pp. 70-

71, 143-56). An

example of significant conflict

"genetic"

between form
as

and content

is

Aristotle's ostensibly
and

treatment of logos

coming to be from inde

pendently existing parts,

the
rest
...

within which

he in fact
it"

shows that

"letters,

syllables,

are the results of an analysis of a

larger

whole

meaningful

speech
of

and would make no sense without a microcosm of the

(p. 107). Aristotle's discussion

which

logos is

Poetics

as a

whole,

looks like

handbook

for generating poetry from its parts but is in fact an analysis of its eide (p. 6). The philosopher thus invites us to reflect upon the limitations of his own logos
about the

limitations
reveals

of

logos.
much closer

Davis

that the Poetics is

to tragic drama than it has

previously
ophy
and

appeared to

tragedy

address the same challenges about can

be. Aristotle's writing imitates tragedy because philos in similar ways. No less than the itself.

Poetics, tragedy is
understood

Tragedy

must provoke reflection subject matter

in

order

to be

because it

illuminate its

the implications of the

poetic character of thought and action

ophy "is the perfection of the mimesis true that drama in general and tragedy in

only indirectly. If it is true that philos (p. 28) it is also that is central to
poetry"

particular

are

the most philosoph

ical forms
narrative

of poetry.

Drama

provokes

interpretative

reflection

in

way that
of

poetry does not, because it

and

imitatively
action.

reproduces

the

invisibility

thought,
of

world resists the

specifically direct representation

a

of

intention, in
of

Drama "represents the way our invisible": "there is no possibility the

on

detached way what was going explanation is itself a part of the every

explaining in

in

someone's mind

because

action"

(p. 19). What is more, the

366

Interpretation
detachment
of the spectator

peculiar

edy,

which calls attention

in drama is especially emphasized in trag to itself as a play in a way that comedy does not Poetics
allows

(pp. 30-31). Davis's

approach to the

for

compelling

account of

the na

ture and interconnection of the major

elements of

tragedy,

including beauty

(to

kalon), katharsis, hamartia,

sis).

reversal

(peripeteia),
of

and recognition

(anagnori
when,

Beauty is

an

idealized distillation

reality that

sometimes results

in

an attempt

to see this as

that,

we cut

uum of experience artificial wholeness. a

by

placing artificial This process of simplification,

isolation"

something boundaries

out of the complex contin around of

it

and

giving it

an

single-mindedly
and so

bringing

thing into

the "splendid

of

the

foreground

all else as

and so all action

background, involves a kind of error (pp. 39-40, 147). This simplification

reality,
and

artificially seeing that is inherent in all thought

of things

is

katharsis

or purification of

is

also at

the

root of

tragic error (hamartia). On

level, Aristotle's reference to a katharsis of passions in his definition of tragedy (1449b24-28) points toward the imaginative process by which the poet
one

distills
them

real passions

from the impure

them separate

mixture

in

and represents

and pure on

actually experience the tragic stage. The result is a

somehow the and

which we

paradigmatic representation of certain passions

(Othello is

jealous

man) that brings

us pleasure:

"like 'shapes in their

of

dishonored beasts

corpses'

(1448b 12),

passions rendered

perfection can

be

experienced with plea another

sure even when

their impure versions are

painful"

(p. 38). On

level,

Aristotle is speaking of a is made possible by the

tional involvement
and

process of purification on

the part of the spectator that

combination of contemplative

detachment
where

and emo

he

experiences

in viewing tragedy. Here is

katharsis

hamartia

meet.

Tragedy

puts on stage characters whose wholeness or per

fection is the spurious, abstract wholeness of to kalon. By showing the imper fection of such abstract perfection for example, of Antigone's pure love of
which looks like unalloyed virtue precisely because of its purity trag displays the hamartia involved in or "the edy overlooking forgetting discrep (p. 42). ancy between the real and the beautiful understood as the

family,

idealized"

Tragedy

thus

"imitates human life in

element of

such a

the characteristic

human

life"

way as to display the dangers of (p. 42). In particular, it calls attention

a

to the necessarily erroneous dimension of any representation of ourselves to

ourselves.

Of course, this
a

applies to

tragedy itself. Because tragedy is itself

and so exaggerates

beautiful
of

and pure critique of

purity, it idealizes

the

effects

hamartia. As

result, the

passions of

response to these effects are experienced

pity and fear that the spectator feels in in an unusually pure form. This, too,

is katharsis. Davis
suggests that

tragedy

educates

by indirectly turning
which

the spectator's
ade

attention toward the

highest

virtue of

action,
a clue

cannot

in itself be
remark

quately

represented on the stage.

Taking

from Aristotle's

that the

Aristotle
tragic protagonist epieikeia, the

on

Tragedy

367

is

not epieikes

(1452b34

ff.), Davis identifies

this virtue with

disposition

of one whose recognition of

the imperfection of law

as an expression of naive

justice is

connected with a more general

freedom from the

1137a31-

demand that justice

an

and virtue prevail article cited

in life (p. 71; Eth. Nic. Ronna Burger

1138a4). In
epieikes

important
such

by Davis,

notes

that the

has

overcome a

longing

for justice that is

of all

deeply

imbedded in the

human psyche,
mensurate with presses

that "the fortune

human beings

would

be

com ex

their action and

moral

character."14

This
a

longing

characteristically
with which

itself in

protagonists are

indignation (nemesis), ordinarily filled but from which

pp.

passion

tragic
cf.

the epieikes thus

is free (p. 72;

Burger,
upon

"Nemesis,"

72-73). The highest

virtue

involves

reflection

the imperfect character of human life. Rather than attempting

poet provokes reflection

directly
the

to

imitate epieikeia, the tragic by displaying as is only apparently perfect, or of the tragic protagonist's of such virtue quacy beautiful but spurious self-understanding. Tragedy represents less than the best

inade

(1453a7-8) in
between the

order

to show that the best is in fact best. The the beautiful

discrepancy
peripe

real and

becomes

evident to

the spectators in

dramatic events, and teia, to the dramatic character in anagnorisis. In assuming that his life is a whole of ordered parts, the tragic protagonist "treats himself as though he were a charac
which provokes a reassessment of

the connection of

ter

in

play."

"Because his

assumption

is

an action

in in

play, he play, his

pays

for

it"

(pp.

65-66),
it

and

because he is in fact

a character

recognition

about what

never

were a character in a play is (pp. 75-76). In this way, entirely tragedy like the Poetics errs and thereby provokes wonder about the nature of its own limitations. Although the preceding summary serves only to outline Davis's unusually

means to

treat oneself as though one

adequate

rich

argument,

we are now

in

a position

to appreciate

what

is for

our purposes

perhaps the greatest virtue of

the poetic

nature of

thought

By itself, Davis indirectly

his book.

explicating tragic errors

warns us against

in terms

of

committing any texts way fated

together

such errors

in

interpreting
worth

the writings of

Aristotle,

or

for that
we are

matter

that

we

deem

studying.15

Like tragic characters,

act,
which means
real

in

one

to err simply because

events shown

we must wholes

that we

must put

into

meaningful

before the

connectedness

of events

has

itself. As in tragedy, the

and of

likely

and

the necessary

the conflicting per

spectives of the actor and the spectator, of

dom"

"openness,

contingency, and free

"total

intelligibility"

are

in

an

impure

mixture

(p.

65;

cf. p.

necessarily combined in human action 53). Yet we can and should be reflective

about our apart

essentially
he does

to pull necessary imperfection, including in particular our tendency nature or that are things (and put together in spurious ways) by art by implications and broad related. If Davis sees in the Poetics more
and it is by it actually possesses in the spirit of Aristotle himself, no means obvious

more coherence than

that

he does

so

who recommends that

368
those
ward

Interpretation
who

incline toward

a given extreme should

much

the opposite; for in withdrawing

from

error

"drag themselves away to [hamartanein] we will

arrive

in the

ground"

middle

(Eth. Nic. 1109b4-6).

IV

suggested earlier

that any reading of

tne

Poetics

should

be

self-conscious

about

its

presuppositions and should adhere

to the principles of

interpretative interpretation
compelled

charity
guided

and

humility. So

far,

I have

argued

that a reflective
not

by

these principles will begin

by

assuming (but is
as a

thereby

to conclude) that Aristotle viewed

significance.

tragedy

literary
kind

genre of

the broadest

I have

also asserted

that Aristotle's Poetics: The the

of

Poetry

of Philos

ophy

provides us with a concrete example of

reading that is most

attuned

to the form

and content of

the Poetics.
as a model or

The
of the

usefulness of

Davis's commentary

touchstone for studies

with a

Poetics is

perhaps

best illustrated

by

comparing it

book

of another

kind. With this in mind, the present section offers a critical assessment of Elizabeth Belfiore's Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion. I turn later to the
tion and
cific
main arguments of

Halliwell's Aristotle's Poetics

and

Lord's Educa
spe

Culture, in connection with which we will explore some of the implications of Davis's interpretation of katharsis and hamartia.
possible

While "it is

to miss the mark

[hamartanein] in

ways"

many
of

(Eth.

Nic. 1106b28-29), it is also true that we can leam much from Elizabeth Belfiore's Tragic Pleasures provides a good illustration
these points. Belfiore's book draws on many parts
and on a wide
of

our errors.

both

of

the Aristotelian corpus

variety

of ancient

texts in order to make the case that Aristotie

by which tragedy provides pleasure as intimately bound up its salutary effect on politically significant emotions and its provision of philosophical insight. The scope of Belfiore's approach and the breadth of her
viewed the process
with

scholarship

are

impressive,

as

is the

courage with which she attempts

to

pro

vide a precise explanation of

the

nature of

tragic katharsis. Yet her reading is

curiously flat and tends to oversimplify that which is inherently complex and ambiguous. This deficiency has much to do with the failure of Belfiore's inter
pretation to

live up to its
of

own commitment

to reading

Aristotle's

arguments

in

their

proper context.

The thesis

Tragic Pleasures is that Aristotle

sees

tragedy

as a means of

combating
and and

shameless
of

desires
philoi at

and aggressive emotions through

beneficial fear
respect,

thereby

producing

an emotional mean state of aidos

(shame,

reverence) toward

(kin, loved
Feast,"

ones,

or

friends). In the book's first initial plausibility tragedy in

in the

chapter, "The Gorgon

of

the

Belfiore

establishes the

her thesis

by

exploring the roots of She begins

Aristotie 's

conception of

Greek

myth and poetry.

with the

transformation,

represented

Aristotle
story
(the
of

on

Tragedy

369

aponegative, paralyzing terror (ekplexis) into positive, tropaic fear. On shields and temples, images of the Gorgon and the gorgoneion

Perseus,

of

severed

head

of

the

Gorgon)
and

have the

apotropaic

function

So, too, Belfiore

on
used

explains the

the jacket of the

as
an

book

painting in its frontispiece)

of a gorgoneion on a
as

averting evil. winecup (pictured

of

"a

symbol of apotropaic more

fear in

antidote

to shameless

revelry"

(p. 13). Still

suggestive

connection with

beautiful Pindar

aulos music

the nature of poetry is Athena's use, in Pindar's Pythian 12, of to imitate the ugly and terrifying wail of the Gorgon.

anticipates

Aristotle

by indicating
showing
at us

and order to

human life ugly

and

by

poetry gives the beautiful and beneficent

mimetic

that

"meaning
aspects of

painful"

what appears

the same time as it fulfills the apotropaic

function

of

"reminding

us of mortal

limits

and

thus

inspiring

us with

the

fear

of

wrongdoing"

(p. 19). In addition, the Eumenides

of

Aeschylus

exemplifies

the
an

general structure of tragic

katharsis
gives

as

Aristotle

understands

it, in

which

initial

shock of

pity

and

fear

way to pleasurable reflection accompanied

a suppliant of

by

an emotional mean state

(pp. 344 ff.). As

and emotional

Athena, Orestes is

relieved

by

means of a

ritual

ror caused

by

kin-murder"

katharsis from "the maddening ter that haunted him in the Libation Bearers. Over the
characters on stage as well as

course of

the

Eumenides,

the Athenian

the actual

Athenians in the

audience undergo an emotional experience similar to that of

of

Orestes: terror in the face

the Erinyes (who wore

aidos, "the fear of wrongdoing that prevents pollution The first chapter of Tragic Pleasures displays the that
are called

Gorgon masks) becomes and (p. 6).

anger"

sorts of

literary

abilities

for in reading tragedy. It is also the best part of the book, for Belfiore does not consistently bring to bear on the texts of Aristotle the sensi
to nuances
of

tivity

meaning
at

and context and

Feast."

the synthetic imagination

not always remember parts of which

she

displays in "The Gorgon Aristotle's

simply
out speak

the

She does be

that
not

writings are also complex

literary

wholes, the
severed

do

for themselves

and so cannot

from their
mind that

contexts with

distorting

their meaning. Nor does she

a philosophical virtue

expression

may be
of

in

keep dealing

in

ambiguity

of

with

the

richly
rob

ambiguous

implications

tragedy. These various tragic errors (in the

sense articulated

by

Davis)

obscure the

depths

of

Aristotle's thought

and

thereby

Belfiore's

argument of

its

potential strength.
of

Consider first Belfiore's discussion

man

Aristotle's

claim

in the Politics that

is

a political

animal,

an assertion nature

that is in her view crucial to understand

general.

ing
tal

his

conception of

human

in

She implies that the fundamen

be
either

sense of

"political"

in this

and other contexts must

biological
and

or

historical,
humans
tion

and she argues

for the former: like

are

bees,

wasps, ants,

cranes,

are political

"because they
and

living

things whose nature

it is to func
function"

community"

within a
such

thereby

to "contribute to a common
philia

(p.
and

78). Since

functioning
able

involves the

relationships

of

family

polis, Belfiore is

to link the

emotional power of

tragedy

with our political

370

Interpretation
"loss
of philoi or

nature:

harm to them

is, because

of our nature as political and

suffer"

philial animals, the most terrible and pitiable

thing humans

can

(p. 79).
to

In

support of

her biological interpretation

of our political

nature,

she adverts

several passages

in Aristotle's

History

of Animals

and quotes

in full Politics
mention

1253al-7

and

1253a23-30. In this way,

however,

ing

the material that connects these two passages

she entirely avoids from the Politics:

That is is

man

is

much more a political animal than as we

any kind

of

bee

or

any herd
and

animal

clear.

For,
has in

assert, nature does nothing in vain; and man alone among the

animals

speech.

The

voice

indeed indicates the

nature

painful or

pleasant,

hence
But

present

other animals as

well; for their

has

come this

far,

that

they have
just

a perception of the painful and pleasant and speech serves and

indicate these things to

each other. also the

to reveal the advantageous and the

harmful,

and

hence

the unjust. For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he

alone

has

a perception of good and

bad

and

just

and unjust and other

things [of this

sort]; and partnership in these things is

what makes a

household

and a

city \polis].

(Pol.

1253a7-18)16

Because

she cuts

two passages from the Politics out of their immediate context,

Belfiore fails to

perceive

Aristotle's

meaning.

If it is

our

basic biological

sim

ilarity
same

to

bees

and certain other animals

that makes us political, it cannot be this

biological similarity that

makes us

"much

political"

more

than these same

animals.17

Indeed,
since

to call other animals

"political"

is to

use

the term meta

phorically,

human beings

alone are capable of

the kind of partnership that

neither with

constitutes a polis. nor with animals.

Our

uniqueness

in this

regard

has to do

biology

history, but with Logos, however,

and so

the power of
serves

logos that

we alone

enjoy among the

to reveal matters of private as well as pub

lic concern,

amplifies

d'anthropos
monadic and
well as with

epamphoterizei

the essential ambiguity of human nature. Ho (Hist. An. 488a7): since man is simultaneously
concerned with

gregarious, simultaneously
the public weal,

his

private

interest in

as

he "plays
form
worth, it

double

game."

Logos therefore

cuts

two

ways: while

it

allows us to
of

relationships that are rooted not

also poses a constant

biology

but in

shared perceptions

threat to these

relationships as well as to

the

integrity

of

biological

kinship

groups.18

perspective of

In extending the term politikon zoion to other animals, we shift from the logos to the more inclusive perspective of biology and thereby

gloss over the problematic notice this shift

most

doubleness

of the political animal.

Belfiore fails to
which

because

she reads around the

very

passage

in

Aristotle

clearly

calls attention she wishes

to it. Since this passage has more than a little to do

with the

story

to

tell, her
and

account

falls

short of

the

mark.

Because it
nature,

fails

to explore the

ambiguity

tension that inheres in

our political

Tragic Pleasures

adequately explains why we humans persist in destroy ing our relationships of philia. For this reason as well, Belfiore passes over the important tragic theme of conflict between the natural philia that binds one to
never

Aristotle
the

on

Tragedy
One

--371

family
none.

and

the political
of

friendship

that holds together the city.

would she of

expect some

discussion

Sophocles'

Antigone in this connection, but

fers

Belfiore's inadequate treatment rious implications because

of

of man's political nature

weight

the unusual

has especially se that human nature in general

human

is

made

to bear in her argument. In her estimation, Aristotle held that the

lessons beings

of

tragedy
prone,

concern the mistakes and the

of

suffering to

which all

are

independently
This

the

various

types of

character

that individual

humans may
wished

possess.

view

follows from her insistence that Aristotle between

character and plot:

to

maintain a

rigid in

separation
moral

tragedy imi
of

tates actions, not the settled

man

dispositions

or characters arguments

(ithe)

the hu the

beings

who engage

such actions.

Belfiore's

in

support of

latter claim, however,

totle's
account.

betray

lack

of

sensitivity to the overall shape of Aris her

own

They
by

lead her to

criticize a straw man of of

making

and

ultimately Belfiore begins

and

pose grave problems

for her interpretation

the Poetics.

fear;

asserting that Aristotle thought tragedy should arouse pity hence tragedy should avoid the imitation of ethos, for the praise or

blame

evoked

by

ethos

(p. 85). She

cites as

"interfere^] with the tragic responses of pity and evidence 1453a4-10, where Aristotle states that we cannot

fear"

feel pity for a blameworthy man and that we feel fear for people like ourselves. This passage unquestionably establishes that a tragedy should convince its audi
ence

that its protagonist is morally

similar

to

them,

yet

it is hard to

see

how it

could produce such a conviction without on some

level representing

ethos.

If

the

idea is to

represent

the protagonist as

whatsoever, it is
a character.

our concern

unclear why an audience As Stephen A. White puts this point, "characters in fiction excite and sympathy only if they earn our Indeed, 1453a4-10
respect."19

having no significant moral qualities would identify with or care about such

fear necessarily pos not imply, as Bel does certainly fiore suggests, that we will generally feel less pity or fear for characters who evoke our praise or admiration than for those who do not (pp. 85-86). This

actually

underscores

the fact that the emotions

of

pity

and

sess an evaluative

dimension.20

This

passage

would mean that people

in

general
view

do

not regard themselves and those

square with what

like

themselves
observes

as

praiseworthy, a

that does not

Aristotle

is

a universal

human desire to

convince ourselves and others of our

own significant worth.

"Victory

is

sweet,"

he

writes

in the Rhetoric, "not just

of superi
and good
more."

to lovers

of

ority
of an

comes

victory but to everyone, for an to be, which all desire either a little

impression [phantasia]
or

"Honor

repute,"

in the sequel, "are among the sweetest things, on account impression [phantasian] coming to be for each that he is of such a sort as he
continues
[spoudaios]"

the morally serious

man

(1370b32-34;

1371a8-9).21

It follows from Belfiore's

character that
not

conviction

"plot

and

the

good and

regarding the separation of bad fortune between which it

with

plot

from do (p.

moves

[prohairesis]"

in

themselves have anything to do

[moral]

choice

372

Interpretation
must still explain

88). One
action"

Aristotle's

assertion at

1448al ff. that the "men in

distinguished on (prattontes) imitated in tragedy the level of ethos by virtue (arete) as opposed to vice (kakia; cf. 1448al6-18, 144%9-10), as well as his statement that tragedy is an imitation of a serious action (praxeds spoudaias: 1449b24; cf. 1451b5-6). Although all of the above
are spoudaioi and are

terms are
and

key

components of

Aristotle's
argues

moral

vocabulary in the Nicomachean

spoudaioi

Eudemian

Ethics, Belfiore
a

that their meaning in the present context

is

largely

social rather

than moral; thus the word

designates

"socially
so

fortunate"

individuals from

socially

superior class

(pp. 100-101). All the

connotations,
that

same,

she acknowledges
must

that

ethos and arete

have

moral

Aristotle
uals

be

understood

to endorse the view that socially superior

individ

have correspondingly excellent characters and virtues. In support of this claim, Belfiore asserts without the benefit of argument that in the Rhetoric and
the Poetics Aristotle

"tend[s]

to adopt more popular ethical

perspectives"

than

in his

other works

(p. 104). But because this

'moral' 'social'

popular perspective

involves "a
that his

qualities"

puzzling

mixture of maintain

and

(p. 106),
pp.

she

finds that Aris

totle cannot

the

strict

division between

character and plot

dramatic theory supposedly requires (see Here again, Belfiore seems to have arrived
ments out of

"Problems,"

103-7).

at

her

opinions

by

pulling

state

the particular contexts upon which their meaning depends. Two

are offered

passages good

from the Rhetoric

was

in defense

of the claim that

"external bad for

fortune

thought

by

Aristotle
of

and

his fellow Greeks to

make

tune

unlikely"

(p. 107). Yet in both The first

these passages Aristotle is characterizing

the attitudes of others.

are

passage

Belfiore quotes, "Those

not think

who are and

thought to be in

great good

fortune do

anything"

they

could suffer

(1382b35-1383al), is
tinues as follows: "on
rash.
...

excerpted

from the

beginning
are

of a sentence

that

con

account of which

they

So that it is necessary to make better for them to be afraid, that they are such as to Belfiore herself notes, tragic drama makes us realize that
suffer"

hubristic, contemptuous, and them feel, whenever it should be

suffer"

(1383al-9). As "such
as to as

we are

(pp.

349-50); it

therefore seems

likely

that Aristotle regards

tragedy

a means of

challenging precisely the popular view that she claims

assessment of

he

endorses.

Aristotle's
wealth

the relationship between external fortune and

charac

ter is stated clearly enough in Rhetoric 2.16: "And in sum, the character of

is that

of a mindless man

favored

by

prosperity"

(anoetou

eudaimonos:

1391al3-14).22

Since

plot

is In

supposed to exclude

ethos, the hamartia that

action cannot

motivates

the

change of

fortune imitated in
order yet at

the

dramatic

be

explained

in terms pity

of character.

"not [to] interfere

with

the emotional

responses of

and

fear,"

the same time to fulfill the requirement that the action

proceed

in

necessary

or probable manner

ically

neutral mistake
nature"

human

(1451a36-38), hamartia must be an eth "made necessary or probable by the constraints of "universals" (p. 166). Belfiore insists on (ta connecting the
that is

Aristotle

on

Tragedy

373

katholou)

with which

poetry deals,
type

which

ever sorts of

things

a certain

of man

Aristotle explicitly defines as "what [toi poidi] happens to do or say, either

probably or (1451b8-9), not with character but with human nature in general (pp. 117-18). She consequendy argues that hamartia is "an act done in ignorance, a non-culpable factual of the sort that anyone might make
necessarily"
error"

simply because one is human (p. 168). Her examples, however, hardly serve her case: hamartia, for instance, is surely not just "ignorance of what the
Ajax'

herds

are"

(p.

in the first
weakens

place.23

169) but has to do with his intention to slaughter the Greek army More important, Belfiore's view of hamartia considerably
for the
ethical and philosophical
explains significance

her

case

of tragedy.

While due to
such

she maintains us

that "hamartia

it "allows

to see

bad fortune
prone to

as a she

because why bad fortune necessary part of human nature, and not
does
nor not explain

occurs"

vice"

chance or

(p. 170),

why human any

nature as reason

is necessarily believe that tragedy

cal content of

hamartiai,
light

does

she give one

to

might shed

on this question.

The allegedly have

philosophi

tragedy
e.g.,

seems to

be just this: human beings

factual If this is the
can

are such as

to suffer,

because they
quences

sometimes make nonculpable

pp.

errors that

grave conse

(see,

349-50

and context).

core of

tragic

insight,

it is

also not clear aidos

of

how viewing tragic dramas

of

help

to habituate one to

feeling
from

in the face

the shameful. One wonders in the first place how

the deeds

the tragic protagonist can be genuinely shameful

if they follow

a nonculpable mistake

especially since,
baseness
the

as

makes

it

clear that the excellence or

on

of an

Belfiore admits, Aristotle action "is not intrinsic to it,

(p. 85
n.

but depends

the

agent"

ethical qualities of

4;

cf.

1449b38-

1450a3). More important, tragedy may make us "want to avoid shame ful deeds (p. 237), but tragic drama centers upon the occasional yet inevitable irrelevance of the wishes and inclinations of good men. If tragedy shows that in
certain circumstances great constraints of

doing"

hamartiai follow necessarily

or

human nature, why does it

produce a state of emotional

probably from the balance

potentially
we

characterized

by

shame rather than a sense of resignation about the of

terrible consequences

human fallibility?

Belfiore's Freudian
all

suggestion that

tragedy displays
of

shameless

deeds that

secretly

long

to commit (p.

344) is

little

help

in answering the latter

questions, since her account of hamartia rules out any connection between tragic misfortunes such as parricide, incest, and child murder and whatever
secret,
shameless

desires

one might suppose

the tragic
the

protagonist

to harbor.

And

although

Belfiore

wishes

to rest

some of

weight of she

her

account upon

aidos edge

in the

sense of reverent awe

before the gods,

fails

even

to

acknowl

Aristotle's
she states:

deeply

critical

attitude

toward traditional
passages

religious

beliefs. Aristotle

Thus

"While I any for the gods, he does accept many gods, piety, and ethics. See, for example, EN
am not aware of

in

which

writes of aidos

traditional

beliefs

about

the

1179a23-30"

(p. 348

n.

16). Yet

the

cited passage conflicts

provocatively

with

the

antitraditional

and

indeed

374

Interpretation
stance

Socratic
which

Aristotle

adopts

in

other passages

in the Nicomachean Ethics, in

he

equivocates on

the issue

of

polytheism, asserts that the god or gods

are active

only insofar

anthropomorphism

they engage in contemplation, and ridicules religious (1101M9-20, 1154b24-28, 1178b7 ff; cf. Plato, Rep.
as

377d-383c).

We may conclude this series of critical remarks on a more positive note. Tragic Pleasures sets forth a compelling outline of the depth and scope of the

Poetics,
of

and

the deficiencies of Belfiore's argument do not cast

doubt

upon

the

legitimacy

of

her

goal.

Instead,

these deficiencies

indirectly

serve to remind us

the tragic

form that Aristotle's treatises

share with

Platonic

dialogues,

form

that is characterized
reader

by

tensions on the surface of the text that provoke the

to search for some underlying meaning. Tragic Pleasures reminds us

"tragic"

that neither these surface tensions nor the

point can come

to

our attention

if the

deeper meaning toward text is viewed as

or

which

they

a series of

discrete

parts rather

than a

complex

whole,
that

if

we are

insensitive to the
a

dy
the

namics of philosophical persuasion

help

to structure such the

text. More

important, Belfiore's
Poetics
ing. How is
our

reflections on

tragedy

and on

central concepts of

suggest a range of

potentially fruitful
and

questions about

Aristotle's

mean

tendency
of

to corrupt the contexts of philia related to the prob

lematic doubleness
tia!

human nature,

particularly to the

phenomenon of

thumos or spiritedness? Is there a connection between thumos and tragic hamar

If human

nature

is the

ultimate source of

hamartia, is

there any relation

ship between hamartia and the different sorts of ethel What and how do we leam through the process of reflection stimulated by tragic pity and fear? What
role, if any, does

provoking do: to "suggest

mistakes

such

play in the audience's response to tragic drama? In questions, Belfiore has indeed accomplished what she set out to
aidos

some new ways of

worth

looking
(p.
5).M

at old

problems,

and make some

correcting"

that are

Stephen Halliwell

and

Carnes Lord

argue

in distinct

yet related ways

that

Aristotle

understands

tragic drama to

be

a vehicle of political education whose

ethical effects are

inseparable from the

tensions"

intelligibility

of

its

Halliwell'

action.
regards as

Aristotle's Poetics drives toward the

cult,
perhaps

articulation of what

he

"diffi

irresolvable,

between Aristotie's

ethical

theory

and

his

understanding of the requirements of tragic drama (p. 25), tensions that come fully into focus in connection with the problem of hamartia. In Education and

Culture, Lord
retical of

offers an account of

hamartia

that promises to resolve the theo

incoherence identified
and

by Halliwell,
we will

and

that begins to respond to

some

the questions that emerged from

our consideration of

Tragic Pleasures.
argumentation

In this

the next section

follow

out

the threads of

Aristotle identified
above.

on

Tragedy

375
of

As

we will

see, Halliwell's

explication of

the

intelligibility

tragic action opens

emphases

that
wish

up an interpretative space within which the concerns and link Lord's reading of the Poetics with that of Davis may emerge
to conclude my
ways
upon reflections on

clearly.

the

work of

these three authors

by
for

suggesting some further reflection Although it is

cited

in

which their

interpretations

provide

fertile

ground

the ethical

and philosophical relevance of tragedy.

in the

relatively new book, Aristotle's Poetics is already widely secondary literature on the Poetics. Its respectful reception is a just
a solid

measure of
which

Halliwell's
forth

scholarship
of

and

thorough,
and

sensible

argumentation,

is

set

here touch

upon

engaging only certain facets

with an

flexibility

subtlety

of expression.

can

Halliwell's

main argument. view of

Halliwell
advances

states at

the outset of his study that the

consistent with

in the Poetics is

his

claim

in

the

poetry Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics

that the end of the art of politics

arts

(politike)

encompasses

the ends of the other

(1094b6),

and

he

maintains

that the Poetics should

be

read as a part of
general a
well-

Aristotle's

philosophical oeuvre

(pp. 4, 27). The Poetics is in

set of rough

formed study (as

opposed

to a

notes)

and

is intended to be
students

theoretically
than a

prescriptive

account of

poetry for

philosophical

rather

practical

handbook for

poets on the construction of and

Although Halliwell explicitly opposes formalist of the Poetics, he indicates that his own study
counterthrusts of aestheticism and

poetry (pp. 37-38). aestheticist interpretations

the

will not embrace

didactic
the

moralism of the neoclassicist conception of art that

ultimately
of

provoked

formalism (p. 61).

mimesis, and

Like

Davis, Halliwell finds

The

that cognition lies at the heart

that the highest level

of mimetic pleasure

is the

pleasure associated with

learn

ing
and

and understanding.

pleasure proper to

tragedy is
instance

that arising

from pity

fear,

which

is in

rum perhaps the supreme

mimesis

of

the pleasure associ

are not

ated with

learning

through

(pp. 69 ff.).

Pity

responses to

suffering; it is

a crucial contention of
basis"

arbitrary Halliwell's that these emo

the
recognition

and

fear

tions "rest
and

upon a cognitive

in that they "are

and patterns of

aligned with

misfor

understanding
(in

of certain

types

suffering

or
of

(p.

77). The

arousal of

pity

and

fear

alignment

and

the "ethical
plays a vague

these emotions
role:

with reason

which process tragic

katharsis
upon

but important
of

pp.

184-201)
in the

thus depends critically

muthos or plot

the

intelligibility
muthos.

the

action repre

sented rooted

in the tragic

structure.

This intelligibility, in turn, is The

and patterns of suffer

causal and

logical

cohesion of

the

ing
are

and misfortune to which

Halliwell

refers arouse

pity

fear insofar

as

they

built into the

the actual

muthos as

the necessary or

probable structure of

its

action.

These

patterns are not

flect

for they re simply the products of poetic imagination, and general in tragedy in particu structure of human life. Poetry
than
sorts of things

lar is "more

philosophical

history

because it

more

clearly displays ta
will

katholou,

"the

which

certain

sorts of people

say

or

do,

necessity"

according to probability

or

(145 lb5, b8-9). In

order

to structure the

376

Interpretation in
a

muthos

dramatist maximally intelligible way, the tragic

understanding of the causes and only human nature in general but
motivations of

must possess

philosophical

human

action.

He

must

know

not

also

the

various ethe of

human

beings,

as well as the

of speeches and

relationship between these character types and the sorts deeds in which humans typically engage. Yet while "the order
art"

ing
its

of the work of

is "inseparable from the

the tragic stage.

universals which

ideally

furnish
every

content"

(p. 105), these

are on

universals are not as evident

in the

muddle of

day

life

as

they

Tragedy

therefore not only teaches us

about

the

world

through imitation
action

but

clarifies or purifies as
intelligibility"

it imitates, for it
than it ordinarily

"elevate[s]

human

to a higher level of
as well as

manifests and so

"heightens

reality"

generalizes]

(p. 106).

of tragedy, Halliwell writes, "is the representation of human pur (p. 140). But as the imitation of a serious praxis, for striving the muthos is also "the organised totality of a play's structure of that

The fabric

realisation"

pose

events"

"arises This

out of

the combination of purposive individual

actions"

raises a question

to which Halliwell returns repeatedly: "How to be consistent with the

(pp. 141, 143). is the em

of

phasis on action expected

inescapable factor

tragic

suffering!"

(pp. 144). In Halliwell's view, the

relationships

sketched above

between character, plot stmcture, and necessity and probability indicate that Aristotle places human agency at the center of tragic action in a way that mini
mizes

the role played

by

other causal

factors. The

question about

suffering may
the

therefore sphere of

be

rephrased as a question about

agency"

"the lines

of causation within

human

that lead toward suffering (p.

problem of

146). Halliwell has

accor

another reason

for posing the

emphasis upon

dance
is

with

his

suffering in just this way. In intelligibility, Aristotle recommends that "lacks

logos"

poetic
and so

plots exclude as much as possible the alogon, that which unintelligible

mean

(see the

references collected at p.

107,

n.

40). Halliwell takes

cannot result

this to

not

only that the tragic change of

reason,
also and neither always nor

fortune for the

from

chance events understood as things that are

fortuitous

or accidental most

happen "for

part"

no

in that they (Rhet.

1369a32-34), but
which

that it cannot result from tuche as "a source of causation

expectation,"

lies beyond human

comprehension or rational
religion

the sense

that this term bears within the framework of traditional Greek

(pp. 107,

209, 230).
The preceding reflections have some important implications. In the first place, they lead to the conclusion that Aristotelian tragedy excludes divine

agency insofar as such agency is mysterious ings. Aristotle thus rejects tragic ambiguity or
of ethos at

and unintelligible to

human be

comes
n.

the expense of

daimon (cf.

p.

165

down squarely on the side 32 and context). More gener

ally, "the
turns out

price of
.
.

Aristotle's

philosophical rapprochement with the tragic poets

since

to

be

secularisation,"

"it is

a consistent assumption of

the the

traditional religious

outlook with which

tragic myth is

impregnated that
best only
a

gods,

and other

forces

associated with

them,

represent at

partially

Aristotle
intelligible light
on

on

Tragedy
for

311

cause of

events"

(pp. 232-33). 25 In addition,

trouble
and

these

reflections shed

Aristotle's

preference in chapter 14 of the Poetics

tragedies of

averted suffering.
Euripides'

of

Scholars have long had Iphigenia in Tauris, Helen,

cannot
...

defining

tragedies of this sort;

Ion, for

example, Bernard Knox

has

really like in which tragedies in Indeed, praising hamartia does not result in disaster, Aristotle recommends a kind of drama that he states, "is comes close to his description of comedy: "For the
written:

"one

help

suspecting that

what everyone would

to call these plays

is

comedy."26

laughable,"

failing [hamartema] and ugliness (1449a34-35; cf. 1453a35-36, where he

some

that is painless and not

observes

destructive"

that the
good

pleasure

involved in

seeing
of

good characters move

from bad fortune to its

is "more

characteristic need not

comedy"

than of tragedy). Yet Halliwell shows that tragic

drama

actually
metic

display

suffering, but

can achieve

complex aim of

pleasure, producing

adequate perceptions and

judgments
(pp. 202

of

providing mi human action

and

in

relation

to the goal of eudaimonia or

"happiness"

ff.),

aligning
the

our emotions of

pity
as

and

fear

with

these

"lines

causation"

of

through which

judgments merely by human agency can lead to

prescription
...

illustrating
suffering.

Fur

thermore, insofar
tragedy,"

Poetics 14 is "a
possible

for the

avoidance of the

starkest

it is

to

regard

this chapter as

tragic

ideal"

that coheres well with the moral optimism

setting forth a "new implicit in Aristotle's

action

emphasis upon
cf. p.

the

intelligibility
optimism

of the stmcture of

human

(pp.

225, 228;

236). is
not unqualified.

Yet Aristotle's
nificant

feature
the

of

Halliwell's

approach to the

leads him
tion
of

to pose the problem of

hamartia

as a

our purposes, the most sig Poetics is the way in which it direct challenge to the presump

For

intelligibility
allows

of action upon which

Aristotle

rests

his

account of

tragedy. Halliwell

the

issue

of

hamartia to

emerge within a considera

tion of the paradoxical relationship between tragic suffering and the goodness "Tragedy," of the tragic protagonist. Aristotle writes, "is an imitation not of

human beings but

of actions

[praxeon]
and

and

and unhappiness consist

in action,

the

end

men are of a certain sort

according

to their

life, and happiness [eudaimonia] and [telos] is some action are but characters, happy or they
. .

the opposite according to their actions [tas that tragedy imitates is serious and complete

praxeis]"

(1450al6-20). The

praxis

(1449b24-25) because it is deci

sive with respect to the protagonist's success or

monia, the serious goal

ture

of

life

as a whole

failure in achieving eudai Eth. Eud. (cf. 1217a21-22; Eth. Nic.

seems

1097b20-21). At 1449b36-1450a4 Aristotle

and outcome of
an

directly
by

to

connect

the

na

tragic praxis with

character:

Since tragedy is
action,
and the

imitation

of an action, and

is

enacted

some men engaged

in

who must

be

of a certain sort

according to

character

[ethos]

and

thought sort,

[dianoia] for

it is through these that for

actions

we assert their actions are of a certain

factor

responsible

[aitia] is

by

nature

two, thought

and

character,

and all men

hit

or miss the mark

[tungchanousi kai apotungchanousi]

378

Interpretation
[since
all of

according to these
action.

this

is so,] the

muthos must

be the imitation

of

the

This is

passage

centered"

"agentmay be taken to confirm the main lines of Halliwell's tragic protagonist account of Aristotelian tragedy. But given that the and

a virtuous

morally
averted

serious

individual, how
Since

are

we

to understand

his

actual or

or

narrowly impede eudlaimonia (p.

causation

fall into the kind

206)?27

of misfortune

that can undermine

we cannot appeal

to random chance or
virtue and external

divine

in

order

to explain the "imbalance

between

status or what

fortune in
of

world"

the

that is displayed on the tragic stage (p.

203),

human agency can account for tragic swings of fortune? The concept of hamartia is meant to bridge the theoretical gap we have just identified between tragic instability and the requirement of intelligibility on the features
of

level
so.

the tragic

muthos.

According

to

Halliwell, it does

not succeed
term,"

in

doing

but rather "an Hamartia, he maintains, is not "a discrete, technical appositely flexible term of Greek moral vocabulary [used] to signify the area opened up in Aristotle's theory by the exclusion both of full moral guilt and of
mere subjection

to the irrational strokes of external

cover a range of meanings

adversity"

(p. 220). The

term may therefore

in between the

extremes of

fully

guilty action and purely fortuitous error (pp. 221-22). Yet while the notion of hamartia is intended to render intelligible the paradoxical coexistence in the
tragic protagonist
of

"essential

innocence"

moral

with

"active

casual

implica

tion in the suffering which is the upshot of the

refrains

[tragic]

plot"

(p. 220), Halliwell

He does
can

from attempting to clarify its function in this critical explanatory role. so because he does not believe that a satisfactory account of hamartia Thus
we are told that the

be

offered.

broad

range of meanings embraced conflict:

by

the term hamartia is in

fact

sign of

irresolvable theoretical
should

"the

inherent
of a

indeterminacy
within

of tragic

hamartia

be

seen

to

be

the consequence
notion of

tension

the

theory

of

tragedy itself (p. 222). Aristotle's

reflections on element

hamartia did but

not even arise

from his

the nature of human action

was conceived as an

necessitated

by

the negative

explanatory stopgap, "an implications of his drama is in

approach"

in Aristotle's theory (p. 221). In the last

incoherent.

analysis, Aristotie 's

account of tragic

a crucial respect

VI

Neither Belfiore

nor

Halliwell
the
of

can explain at

Aristotelian hamartia in

a satis
argues
regard.

factory

fashion. While
of

former

least

attempts to

do so, the latter is

that the dramatic

theory

the Poetics is simply unintelligible in this

The image
all

Aristotle
so

with which

Halliwell leaves
shows

us

deeply disappointing,
respects

the more

because Aristotle's Poetics

Poetics is both

that in other

the

argument of the

well-crafted and coherent. of

Yet it is precisely

Halliwell's

cogent

demonstration

Aristotle's

emphasis upon

intelligibility

Aristotle
that should make us slow to accept his claim
about

on

Tragedy

379
ha

the unintelligibility of
conclusion

martia, and therewith

suggests

of

the best tragic

plots.

Halliwell's

instead

that

further

reflection on
agrees with

Because Halliwell flexible term (see

kind
of

may be in order. T.C.W. Stinton that hamartia is

his

argument

broad

and

note

10), he
mark.

argues against

identifying it
not analyze

with

any
the

specific particu such an can

failure to hit the

of

Yet he

also

does

lar kinds
analysis

hamartiai that

are embraced

by

any Aristotle's theory.

the
view

of

Only

which would not

in itself

conflict with

that hamartia

cover a range of meanings

could suffice to establish that

seems

Aristotle's
that the

view of

hamartia is incoherent. Halliwell

combination

simply to

presume

paradoxical

in Aristotelian tragedy
presupposition

of virtue with

nonarbitrary
who

misfortune ad

mits of no resolution.

The latter
the

is

challenged

by Davis,

distinguishes between
epieikeia.

abstract virtue of

the tragic protagonist and the highest virtue of

It

is

challenged still more

pointedly
of

by

Lord in Education

and

account meshes with

that of Davis in

significant ways.

Both Lord

Culture, whose and Davis, in

fundamental

turn,

offer

interpretations

hamartia that

are consistent with the

requirement of

dramatic

intelligibility

identified

by

Halliwell.

It is

possible

illuminating
of the

here only to note some of the main conclusions of Lord's discussion of Aristotle's reflections on music in the final chapters
education of the citizens of

Politics. The

the best regime involves the

of the passions.

development
virtue,

of moral virtue through the

habituation
higher

Moral

however,

is to be the foundation

of a

education

primarily the development of phronesis or practical also of theoretical wisdom (pp. 39-40, 66). Indeed, chapter 17 of book 7 prepares the reader for the argument of book 8 by establishing that the inculca tion of moral virtue through habituation "is the necessary precondition of edu

ing

in reason, includ wisdom and for some

speaking"

cation rather than education

properly
as well as

(p. 43). In book

which

8, Aristotle
context em

turns to the

role

in

education of music
poetry"

(mousike),
"all forms
of or

in this

braces "most forms

"prelude"

proper"

of

of music

(p. 86).

Far from advancing an aestheticist view vides a (endosimon: 1339a 13)

tone for arguments against the common

music, AristoUe's discussion pro

"key-note"

(endosis)

that sets the

view that the end of music

is

pleasure with

(pp.

69-70, 85). At issue here is

(he
en tei scholei

the nature of "the leisure

associated

diagoge: 1338a21-22) of free citizens, which from Homer on is ordinarily understood to include banquets and music "designed to (p. 81). But 1339b42 ff. establishes cheer or delight rather than to
pastime"
edify"

"that
and

what

is

most and

fundamental in in
particular

music

is its capacity to
serious or

affect

the

character

the

soul,"

to teach men to judge and to enjoy "decent

'noble'

characters and noble actions"; this pastime

music,"

is "the truly

element of
-power'

understood"

properly in other words, "is

argues that the

(pp.

75,

82-84). "The fundamental

of

education"

(p. 83).
to

Lord

power

of music

educate

is

not

restricted

to the

380

Interpretation
and

young,
on

adults"

mature

indeed that Aristotle "is primarily interested in the effect of music (p. 83). Music or poetry causes men to "experience the
represented"

passions

that are
character and

(1340al2-13); in affecting
(p. 92). But if
ethos

the passions, "it af

strict sense of
with re

soul"

fects the
"moral
spect

the
sum of

in the

character"

is "the

fixed dispositions

or states

(hexeis)

vice"

to virtue and

(p. 95),
process

and

if the

ethos of a mature adult

has already

been formed through the

music affect a mature

habits solidify into hexeis, how can by character? Here Lord calls our attention to the broader
which required

conception of ethos
moral weakness or

that is

if

we are to understand

the phenomenon of

akrasia,

position which

by

passion

in the overcoming of a settled dis (Eth. Nic. 1145al5 ff.). This broad conception of ethos,
which consists

includes

characteristic passions that

reveals a space

have the

potential

to overcome even

good

dispositions,

in the

psyche within which music can act passions of adults are

upon the characters of mature adults.

Because the

formed
exces

but

not

test of
sive

completely determined early educations can be (p. 158)

even

by

their past education

for "not

even

the stric

expected can

to eradicate
extent

all

susceptibility to
shaped
soul"

passion"

they
for

to some

be

therefore possible
rhythms and tunes

adults
. .

to be "changed in
.

by music. It by listening

is
to

(metaballomen

ten psuchen:

1340a22-23).

play in the education of mature adults: it pro for the passions that is designed "to counter or therapy of moral forestall the development of the (p. 158), a habit

Tragedy has
kind

a special role to

vides a

of cathartic

'habit'

weakness"

that is

not

incurable (Eth. Nic. 1152a27-29). Lord's

connection

mention of cathartic

ther

apy in this

is based

upon

his

critical rejection of

the standard inter

pretation of

Aristotle's discussion

concerns the application

katharsis in Politics 8.7, particularly as of this passage to the problem of tragic katharsis in the
of

Poetics.
tions in

was advanced

According to this interpretation, which was widely accepted after it the katharsis of pity and fear Aristotle men by Jacob his definition of tragedy (Po. 1449b24-28) but discusses nowhere else
Bernays,28

in

the

Poetics is to be

understood as analogous

to the purgation or evacuation of

pathological enthusiasm

through sacred tunes. Lord offers many objections to

this view,

including

the following. While 1341b32-1342a27 concerns the ef

makes music

fects
the

of

tunes and

harmonies, Aristotle
not

it

clear

in the Poetics that the

effect of

tragedy does

depend

upon

its

its poetry and in particular of its discussion of katharsis in the Politics passage is
work of

plot"

but "is primarily if not entirely (p. 119). Furthermore, the

a general one and

is

not

in

tended to provide

an accurate

treatment of particulars (cf.

suggests

1341b30-32,

38-

40). Most important, Aristotle

pathological

that we must distinguish between

pathological pity and fear, and normal or healthy feel but he does not articulate the connections between the fear, pity different kinds of katharsis that might properly be applied to each of these distinct conditions (pp. 126 ff.). Since the standard interpretation does not

enthusiasm,
and

ings

of

make

these

distinctions, it "treat[s] pity

and

fear

as

passions which,

if

not

Aristotle
actually pathological, are in (p. 135). Pathological
able"

on

Tragedy

381

some

degree

abnormal and

enthusiasm

may

require

hence simply undesir to be treated by a process

of purgation or
could

evacuation, but "it is, to say the least, implausible that Aristotle have been satisfied to recommend a total purgation of passions which he

regarded as
city"

being

potentially beneficial both

katharsis through pity
purgation

to the individual and to the

(pp. 135-36). The

phrase ton toiouton pathematon

and

in the definition
passions of

of

tragedy, is therefore
sort,"

which speaks of a

fear "of

this

a genitive of
opposed

plausibly separation: "partial

of passions are to

most

understood as an objective genitive rather

than
as

thing"

to "complete purgation

[purification] of [evacuation] of a certain

purified

a certain

thing"

(p.

136).29

What kind
'pain'

be

by

tragic drama? Lord suggests that

ton toiouton pathematon refers to passions "associated with the experience of

desire,"

rather than of pleasure

and

specifically the

range of passions

encompassed

ships,"

by including

thumos and

"bearing

on men's

social and political relation

anger,

moral

indignation, jealousy,

and the

desire for honor

superiority (pp. 160-61, 164). This suggestion has a number of explana tory virtues. It coheres well with the notion that tragic drama educates by coun teracting moral weakness, and it gives tragedy an important role in civic
and
education.

It

also connects

Aristotle's

argument with

the actual practice of the the pas

tragedians, sions Lord

of tragic

since

the plots of many tragic

dramas

seem to turn upon

mentions.

Finally, it

allows

for

a plausible solution to the paradox

hamartia identified
notes, is

by

Halliwell.
problematic

Thumos, Lord
and to

no

less politically its

for Aristotle than it is

stand up for itself insofar as it mani

for Plato. Thumos is the fight for that fests itself in the love
political

element of the soul that causes

it to

which of

it

regards as

own.

Particularly

victory and honor, thumos is the independence. Yet these same passions can cause

"unbeatable"

root of
spirited

individuals

to behave savagely toward their

families,
that
at

their

friends,

and

their fellow citi

zens, especially
visible alludes to the

when

they believe

in Aristotle's discussion

they have been slighted. All of this is Politics 1327b38-1328al6, which in turn

internal ambiguity and tension of thumos as it is depicted in Plato's Republic (where difficulties arise in connection with making the auxilia ries
of

the best regime harsh toward the

citizens).

enemies of

the

regime yet gentle

to

their fellow
spiritedness

This fundamental ambiguity makes the phenomenon of (p. 164). It need hardly be added that the "profoundly
problematic"

problematic character of thumos provides a theme that runs throughout the

Greek

literary tradition and binds

History,
and

together such diverse

Euripides'

works as

Homer's Iliad,

Thucydides'

Sophocles'

Symposium,
may
add the

Alcibiades I
the internal

and

Medea, Plato's Republic, Ajax, Politics. To this list we Aristotle's and //,
a

Nicomachean Ethics,

book that

sketches and

in

various ways at

tempts to
who

address

instability

of the

megalopsuchos or great-souled

recognizes its inevitable inad man, paradoxically both longs for honor and right in suggesting that "the is Lord if ff.). 1123a34 Indeed, equacy (Eth. Nic.

382

Interpretation
soul provides no real support

human

for

spiritedne

moderate

(pp. 192-93

n.

16),

thumos could
life.30

be

seen as

an

inexhaustible

source of

tragic ambiguity

in

human

Lord turns to the Nicomachean Ethics in

with moral weakness

order

to connect tragic

hamartia

in

respect

to anger and the

other passions associated with

thumos.

The

following

observations of

may

serve

to amplify Lord's
"necessary"

discussion

(pp. 168 ff.). In book 7 between

of

the Nicomachean

Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes

to the
pleasures
of pleasure

unqualified moral weakness with regard

the

that

are

body and qualified moral weakness with regard to sources "choiceworthy according to themselves but admit of
of

excess"

(1147b23-

include victory, honor, and wealth (1147b30). Moral weakness in necessary pleasures is blamed as hamartia and as a kind of vice, while moral weakness in matters of thumos, honor, and so forth is not
25). Examples
the latter
vice

but hamartia only (1147b31-1148a4). Later, Aristotle goes so far as to say that such hamartia is not moral weakness at all; while hamartia is to be avoided, "moral weakness is not only something to be avoided but is also
"bad"

(1148b5-6). Just as the doctor or among the things worthy of actor is not unqualifiedly bad but is characterized by "something similar

blame"

"bad"

con analogy of "moral (1148b6 13). Aristotle's reference in this context to thumos acting sug cerning gests that tragedy may be a subtext of his discussion of qualified moral

[to vice]

analogy,"

by

so

too we speak

by

weakness"

weakness

in

general. weak

He

says

in

an earlier passage

that "one must understand

the morally

to speak in the manner of

makes a point of

actors"

(1147a22-23),
of

and

in the

present context

he

emphasizing that "those who, contrary to

reason,

are either overcome

good"

by

or pursue

something

the things that are

by

nature noble and

who
...

are not

in any

sense vicious.

Examples include "those

than they ought to be For these too are among

are more serious and zealous or

[spoudazontes]

concerning honor
the good
are

concerning
those

children and parents.

things,

and

who are serious and zealous mention of

praised"

(1148a27-32). Aristotle's

concerning these things the excesses of Niobe in the

these
observations

immediate

sequel

(1147b33)

confirms

the

relevance of

to the

characteristic themes of

tragedy.
understood as the

If tragic hamartia is
with thumos

kind

of

hamartia Aristotle

associates

(and the

good things

that may arouse

Nicomachean Ethics, it is possible to answer incoherence. The tragic protagonist is good, yet his downfall issues from his character in a causally intelligible manner. The unyielding indignation of Ajax
and

thumos) in book 7 of the Halliwell's charge of theoretical

the exclusive affection

of

Antigone

are the sorts of excesses

to

which

better
some
good

natures are prone. sense

Indeed,
the

the hamartia that leads to tragic misfortune in

follows from
so

protagonist's

being

too

devoted to

noble
and

and

things,
purpose moral

that the lines separating devotion from obsession

myopic which

firmness
this
view

of

from

failure

issues

inflexibility ineluctably

become blurred. Hamartia is

from the
character of the

on

"a

hero,"

and the

Aristotle
tragic fall "is at once wholly disproportionate to the hero's
and a

on

Tragedy

383

moral

imperfection

necessary

expression of

it"

(p. 171). Insofar

as

the

unambiguous

"demon

stration"

of the protagonist's
reflection"

cal

of

responsibility for his downfall this demonstration in the katharsis of

the audience
central
against a similar of

or

the "psychologi
related

passions

to

suscep

thumos works to

"fortify

to these
as

passions, it
understand

constitutes

"the

lesson

tragedy

Aristotle

appears

to

it"

(p. 173).
may
object to the characterization of

While

some

hamartia

as moral

failure

this description may

tagonist

be

appropriate

if

one

judges the

virtue of

the tragic pro

standpoint

from the highest

the epieikes;

standpoint.

Davis identified the highest

with that of

one could more

phronimos, the

individual

characterized

generally call it the standpoint of the by wise insight or phronesis. Phrone

sis, Aristotle makes clear in the Nicomachean

Ethics, is

not one virtue

many; it reciprocally presupposes

presupposition

all

of

the other moral virtues and

among is the

of comprehensive

and

authoritative

(kurios)
unity

moral

goodness

(1144b30-32;
virtues,
particulars of

1145al-2). Because it

consists

in

the

or

balance

of

the

phronesis

is

not one

sided; because it is

concerned with

the ultimate these

rea

action, it is

not abstract
phronimos

(1141M6, 1142a23-27). For

is
not susceptible

sons, Aristotle notes, the (1146a410). To be overly

to moral weakness

serious about certain noble and good

things, to

pour

too much of one's energy and zeal to mn the

with

into

the pursuit of some part of the

good, is

risk

of

losing

one's

balance. Without phronesis

even a soul endowed

extraordinary
that

natural powers

mighty body lose his balance because his

"see"

moves without vision

may come down with (1144bl0-12). The

a great

fall, like
does

phronimos

not

is genuinely synoptic; he can the good as a whole, both for himself and for human beings in general (1140b9-10). The phronimos could not be a tragic protagonist, for he could not
vision of the good

tragically fad
Lord's

to hit the mark (hamartanein).

of

account

the ethical and political

significance

of

tragedy, like

Davis's, turns upon the difference between ordinary human goodness and ex traordinary excellence. The clearest evidence that Aristotle makes such a dis
tinction on the level
of virtue

is

provided of

by

his differentiation between

and

citizen

courage,

which

is

rooted

in the love

honor

the fear of

dishonor,

and tme

courage,

which consists

in the love

of noble

deeds for their

own sake

(Eth. Nic.

1116al0

12, 17-19).

Ordinary

virtue

tends to

rest upon an abstract and over

simplified conception of what extremes

it is to be good,

a conception

that is

prone

to

because it
of

confuses a part of and

the good for the

whole.

If

we combine

the

insights
or of

Davis

Lord,

we

may say that the limitations of ordinary

and

virtue are a consequence of

both the intellectual

the

passionate parts of the

soul,

both the

self-assertive nature of passion and

the poetic distortions to

which thought role of more

broadly

With regard to the owing to its mimetic nature. whereas Lord speaks passion in tragic error, Davis speaks of nemesis manifestation of thuspecific is a thumos. of Nemesis, however,

is

susceptible

384

Interpretation
spirited self-assertion

mos; righteous indignation is a form of

in

which

thumos

is especially
totle

visible.

Finally, Lord is
to

more specific

than Davis

about what

Aris

While extraordinary virtue cannot be tragedy learned simply through viewing tragic drama, Lord suggests that the "therapy provided by tragedy is "the necessary accompaniment of an for the
expected
accomplish.
passions"

education

in 'practical

reason'"

(p. 158).

vn

Lord
nied

makes

it

clear

that the

education

in

practical reason

that

is

accompa
older

by

tragic

therapy is
an age
'mind'"

an education

for

mature

adults,

or

for those

than

twenty-one
velopment of

that Aristotle "regarded as crucially important for the de

(p. 47). The

previous stage of

education, the

one

"proper
the

to the period from puberty to

twenty-one,"

is

"primarily
of

an education of

desires (or

or of

the irrational part

soul"

of

the

(p. 46). Lord does not,

however,
aimed

consider arguments to the effect that the

also even

"lessons"

tragedy may be

primarily)

at

the young, a possibility strengthened

by

John Wink

ler's hypothesis that the

ephebes were

positioned,

literally

as well as

figura

tively, at the center of the tragic audience as well as the drama itself. If tragedy in various ways played a crucial role in readying young men to assume the responsibilities of citizenship, might it specifically have helped to prepare them for
an education

appropriate

to

adults

an

education

in

and

through

logos
com

rather

than habituation? If so, might Aristotle have viewed this pedagogical

preparation as an essential component of the

initiation

of ephebes

into the

munity

of adult citizens?

In the

present

section, I

wish

to explore both of these

questions.

According
sonable

to

Aristotle,

political

speech."

While the

power of

community is constituted by logos or "rea voicing feelings of pleasure and pain is

a

present

in

other animals as

well, logos designates

kind

of perception and reveals

verbal articulation that

is

peculiar to
and

human beings. Logos

also

the advan

tageous

and

the

harmful,
and

hence

the just and the unjust. "For it is

peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that

of good and

he

alone

has

a perception

bad

the just and the

what

unjust and other

things [of this sort]; and

polis"

partnership in these things is 1253al5-18).

It follows from this
presence
ward

makes

household

and

(Pol.

account that the political

in its

members of a certain

intellectual

and emotional

partnership depends on the disposition to

an

logos. While fundamental

the

conflict about the good and the

just is

integral

part of

any

political
more

community,31

such conflict must take place within

the horizons

of a

debate,
cause

at a common political

possibility of arriving, through public in regard to some sharable good. And be understanding koinonia subsists in deeds as well as speeches, citizens must

agreement about the

Aristotle

on

Tragedy

385

be sufficiently inclined to recognize the authority of reasonable speech as to be guided by it at least to some extent in their actions. There can be no politi community where logos is regarded merely in practice it has no persuasive power.
cal as

self-serving noise,

or where

logos
and

Aristotle indicates in the Nicomachean Ethics, however, that the openness to required by the political partnership is not naturally present in the young does
are

ship
the

develop automatically as they formed not by nature but by

not must

grow older.

The habits

of citizen

education.32

In particular, the

characters of

young

be trained to be

receptive to

the

voice of reason as well as

to

the

noble and

the just.

Yet

such

habituation

will not succeed

in

most

cases,

since and

"most people [hoi polhi]

punishments rather

are persuaded

noble"

by

than the
of even

necessity rather than (1180a4-5). Furthermore,

by

logos,
nature

impedes the full development brought up

the
character,
than

those few young

men who with

have been

well and whose characters

have "some

kinship

virtue,

loving

noble and

hating

the

base"

they
in

resemble

(1179b29-30): just because they are young in the morally weak in being guided by passion rather
makes no

by

logos (1095a4-9). "And it

character,"

difference

whether one

is young

in

age or

Aristotle

writes:

For the

deficiency

is

not a matter of

time, but

of

living
for

and

pursuing everything in

accordance with passion.

Knowledge is

unprofitable

such

individuals, just

as

for

the morally weak. But for those who act and fashion their desires in accordance
with

logos, knowing

about these things would

be very beneficial. (1095a6-ll)

Aristotle
said to should

provides a similar analysis

be both

passionate and

dogmatic.

in the Rhetoric, where the young are They are "such as to do whatever they

have
.

an appetite
.

vehemence

thing,
These

and

this

for"; "in everything, they err on the side of excess and and they think and confidently affirm that they know every is why they do everything to (1389a3-4, 1389b2-7).
excess"

qualities cannot

be

attributed

to bad upbringing,

since

it is

clear

that

Aristotle has in
men who

mind here specifically the best sort of youths young gentle have been habituated to love the noble and hate the base: whereas he

says elsewhere that the

fear,
the

and

to

refrain

many "are by nature disposed to obey not shame but from bad deeds not on account of their baseness but on

punishments"

account of
present context

"are

susceptible

(Eth. Nic. 1179M1-13), those of to shame; for they do

educated

whom

he

speaks

in

not yet understand

other sorts of noble

alone"

things, but have been

by

convention

[nomos]
to

(1389a28-29).
upshot of the passages cited above

The
about

is that the young have

much

leam

human nature, character, and action because they are inexperienced in life and guided by passion, but that precisely these youthful qualities close their
souls to philosophical

teaching

on these subjects.

To become
of

a mature

adult,

Aristotle indicates, is
with passion and

to move beyond the

condition

living

in

accordance

thinking

that one already knows everything one needs to know

386
about

Interpretation
life. It is to
embrace

in deed

and not

merely to

acknowledge on

an

abstract or

be wrong
youth

about

purely theoretical level the best way to act

thus seems to

the possibility that one

and

might sometimes

feel. The

most complete of a

transition

from

to

adulthood

involve the development

hexis

or settled

disposition critically to
character and

reflect upon

the nature and limitations of one's own

of

to

remain open

to the judgments
even

potentially

wiser

individuals.
cannot

The

characters of

the young
as

those on the verge of adulthood

be

they lack this essentially Socratic hexis. fully More than just the happiness of particular individuals is at stake here. In the
formed insofar
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle indicates in various ways the political relevance of the fully mature disposition described above. Most useful for our purposes is

his

account of moral

responsibility in
expect each

chapter

of

book 3. Aristotle

argues
of

here

that

it is
any

reasonable rate

to

to be open to the moral

are most

judgments

others,

or at

to those judgments that

to perceive.

While

well-raised youths will

tion just insofar as

they feel

shame

hence most easy fulfill this minimal expecta already before nomos, 3.5 sets the stage for a
evidence and

in

further

consideration of

the most mature natures.

point about moral

of

Aristotle leads up to the key the practice of lawgivers:

responsibility in

discussion

And they punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws which they ought to have known and could easily have known; and similarly also in other cases in
which

they believe

them to

offenders]

on the ground that

be ignorant through negligence, [they punish the it was in their power not to be ignorant. But perhaps is the
sort of person who

[one

might

assert] the
responsible

offender

is

careless.

But

men are

themselves

for

becoming

of such a sort through

living

remissly, and for

being

unjust or self-indulgent the ones by doing wrong and the others by Well then, to be ignorant that spending their time in drinking and such things. settled dispositions (hexeis) come into being from actively engaging in particular sorts of actions is the mark of one who is altogether without perception. (1113b34
. . .

1114al0)
In the sequel, Aristotle
unjust actions

compares

the individual

who

becomes

unjust through

to one who becomes sick through

dissolute living. Both have

are re

sponsible

for their conditions,

of

since either one could

initially

chosen

to

avoid the actions that produced

his his

condition.
actions.

Neither

can

reasonably

plead

ignorance

the

consequences of

In

brief,

the punishment

provided

by

law is justified This

by

the

expectation that citizens will not responsible

be utterly

unpercep-

tive and may therefore be held morally

argument

for

their actions.
which concerns

may

seem

to skirt the real

envisions the

issue, however,

the

evaluation of ends.

Aristotle

following

relativistic retort:

"All

men pursue

the

thing
[tes de

that appears good, but

phantasias ou

its
of

appearance

they have no sovereign power over kurioi], but whatever sort of man each is,
him"

this sort also

is

the end that appears to

(1 1 14a31-l 1 14bl). If I

am not

Aristotle
responsible

on

Tragedy

387

for my moral vision, how can I bear responsibility for actions un dertaken in accordance with this vision? It seems to follow that we are mistaken in praising virtue as well as blaming vice, since (1114bl2-13;cf. 1109b30-31). At first sight, Aristotle's answer to the latter
tory:
neither condition

is voluntary

argument appears unsatisfac

he

asserts

that one is

responsible

for his

actions even

if he is

not responsi

ble for his in

other

perception of the good

(11

14b20 21).

It is in the bad
moral vision.

man's

power,

words, not to act in

accordance with

his

But

what

is the
say,

alternative?

Is

the

bad

man not supposed

to

act at all?

Aristotle does

not

but

reflection reveals another possibility.

Aristotle's

relativistic opponent pre

supposes

that we have no control over our different perceptions of the good. It

not provide an effective means of

follows that logos does

comparing

and eval

uating these perceptions, since otherwise reflection in accordance with

would

logos

necessarily influence the appearence of a particular end as good or bad. This kind of moral relativism rules out political community as Aristotle under stands it (cf. Pol. 1253al5 18). Alternatively, Aristotle's guiding assumption
that
with political

community is

possible allows us

to explain why even a

person

innately

poor moral vision can

be held

accountable

for his

actions.

Just

as

individuals

reasonably be held responsible for being familiar with laws that are easily known by everyone and with the obvious facts about the formation of character, they can legitimately be expected to observe that certain sorts of ends
can

widely regarded as base or bad and to give The person who chooses to pursue an unjust
are

some weight to this observation.

because his
ous signs

moral vision might

that it

end is blameworthy not simply is defective, but because he failed to heed the obvi be. These signs, Aristotle suggests, should give one

pause.

Sustained

and significant

disapprobation does
at

not prove

that the end in

question
more

is unchoiceworthy, but it

least indicates that the

matter

deserves

thought.

Refraining
zenship,
and

from injustice is is
not

of course a minimum requirement of good citi

mark of a

in itself the

fully

mature

disposition. Further
seems

more, the

situation of

the unjust and morally unperceptive individual

of

to

be

worlds apart

from that
are

young

men who

have been

raised well.

Unlike the

former,
strained

the

latter

by

shame

already oriented toward morally good ends, and are con before nomos. Yet it should be noted that the dogmatism of
side of moral relativism: although the

the young is the

flip

adequacy

of one's

moral perceptions can

be

confirmed

only

by

critically comparing them with the

"think
and

different

perceptions of

others, those

who

confidently
verified

affirm

that

by hardly more inclined to be open to moral criticism than those who altogether deny the possibility of authoritative moral evaluation. One might still wonder why this dogmatism is significant. Why would moral criticism be needed by those who already aim at the proper ends? We may and unreceptive admit that even the best young men are governed by passion
they know
everything"

and who take

this

opinion

to be

the con

currence of nomos

are

388
to

Interpretation
what

logos, but

difference does this if their

passions

make

either

to themselves or to

the polis as a whole

by

and

large

point them

in the

right

direction? A preliminary answer to these questions emerges in the course of Aristotle's treatment in the Nicomachean Ethics of phronesis. The political community is simultaneously determined not
a moral

by

nomos

community in which the standard of action is properly but by the phronimos (1106b36-1107a2). Now Aris
man cannot

totle states explicitly that a young

reason which

is that phronesis is

concerned with

become phronimos, "and the particulars as well [as general truths]

,

become familiar from experience, (1142al4-15). Shame before nomos is

nomos

and a

young

man

is

experienced"

not

no substitute

for

phronesis.

For

one

thing,

is

abstract and general

in

comparison with

the concreteness and

particularity virtue is relative to many factors (1106b 14-23), written laws will often be insufficiently fine
actions

of phronesis.

Nomos

needs

to be

completed and

by

phronesis: moral

customs, conventions,

and

grained

to determine specific

in

complex situations.

particular

(1142a25),
must

and

is to be done (to prakton) is a because the young man does not himself possess
Because
what

phronesis, he act well in all

be

receptive

to the judgment of the phronimos

not

in he

order must

to

circumstances.33

If he is

in the first Hesiodic himself knows

a worthless

class

be

in the

second:

he

who

does

not

"himself know

everything"

should
nor

"hearken to
to

well,"

one who speaks

"but
to

whoever neither

hearkening

another

takes his

words

heart,

that one

is

man"

(1095M0-11).

Yet the young man is likely to ignore the advice of the phronimos just when he most needs it. In mentioning the susceptibility of the young to shame Aristotle indicates that nomos grasps the noble only incompletely or in part (Rhet. 1389a28-29). We may
surmise

that the

judgments

embodied

in

nomos some

times conflict with the dictates of phronesis, so that the young man's shame

before
The
ric

nomos

stiffened
ears

by

his

headstrong
may be

nature

will on occasion

actually Rheto
the
old

tend to close his

present

to wise

words.34

line

of reflection

extended

by

a consideration of

2.12-14, in
is to
to

which

Aristotle

contrasts the natures of

the young

and

with each other and with aim

those in the prime of life (hoi akmazontes). Since his

sorts of speeches suited to each age (1390a25-

help

us

determine the
of

27), Aristotle's description

need

leam

and

how they

might

the young promises to clarify both be taught. the character

of

what

they
Even

Aristotle
their

paints a rather attractive picture of

are on

the

young.

faults
in

the whole not unbecoming,

insofar

as

they bespeak
inclined

the seri

ousness with which

mean certain

they

pursue noble ends.

If they

are

to exceed the
not vice.

ways, it is because

of youthful zeal and

inexperience,

The outstanding characteristics of the young are appetite (epithumia) and spiritedness (thumos). Aristotle begins by stating that the young follow their
appetites and

have

no power over sexual

appetites are changeable and

desire in particular, but that their easily satisfied (1389a3-9). After this brief dis-

Aristotle
cussion of epithumia
account.

on

Tragedy
love

389
his

he

rums to

thumos,

which

stands

at

the

center of

In

introducing
of victory:

thumos Aristotle links it

with

anger, the

of

honor,

and the

love

[The young are] high-spirited [thumikoi] and sharp-spirited [oxuthumoi] and such as follow impulse, and are weaker than their thumos; for on account of the love of honor they do not put up with being belittled, but become angry if they should
to

believe that they have been done an injustice. And they are lovers of honor, but even more of victory for youth desires preeminence, and victory is a kind of
preeminence.

(1389a9-13)
the young courageous, for
as anger suppresses

Thumos
of

also make

fear,

and

fond

laughter, insofar
While the

"wit is insolence [hubris] that has been

educated"

(1389a26-27,
as good erosity.

1389M0-12).35

qualities mentioned above

ones,

they

are tempered

The young "choose to live they by character rather than by calculation, and calculation concerns the advantageous but virtue concerns the (1389a32-35). Because of their
noble"

may be found in bad characters as well in the young by moral virtue and naive gen do the noble rather than the advantageous; for

inexperience, they judge

gudeless, trusting,
sure
and

their neighbors
of care

men to be better than they really are. Hence they are inclined to pity others the latter because "they mea by their own lack of vice, so that they think they are

suffering"

unworthy
cause

(1389b9-10). In addition, the young

and are great-souled
of great
. .

courageous,

little for money, worthy

.

they

think themselves

things.

hope, (megalopsuchoi) be Finally, they are "fond of

are
of an eye

full

friends

and

fond

of companions

and as yet
friends"

toward the advantageous, not

even

their

judge nothing with (1389a35-1389b2).

In general, the young

trasts sharply
with

are graced

by

kind

of

the

slavish self-absorption of

charming idealism that con the old. The latter, Aristotle

writes,

[mikropsuchoi] on account of having been brought low by life, for they desire nothing great or extraordinary, but rather the things necessary for life. and they love themselves more than they ought to, for this is also a kind of smallness of soul. And they live with an eye toward the advantageous but not the noble more than they ought to, because they are fond of themselves. For the
are small-souled
. .

advantageous

is

good

for oneself, but the

and

noble

is

good without qualification.

And

they
in

are shameless rather than susceptible to shame:

the same way about the noble

which

because they do the advantageous, they think little

not
of

worry in
esteem

the

they
old

are

held. (1389b25-1390a3)
characters

In sum, the The

"have

that

are

things"

respect to the greatest number of

nature of

pretty much opposite to [the young] in (1389b 13- 15).

clearly in Aristotle's treat and most briefly he discusses last

the latter

opposition emerges most

ment of those

in the

prime of

life,

whom

390

Interpretation
character stands

because their
means not

in the

middle ground

between the
avoid

other two.

This
the

only that

mature men at

the

acme of

life

the

excesses of

young and the old, but that their character is a mixture of elements that are found in pure, unmixed, or unqualified form in the other two. Aristotle first mentions the intellectual disposition of hoi akmazontes, who "are
neither

extremely

confident

tioned in regard to

both,

neither

excessively fearful, but are well posi distrusting all, but instead judging tmsting
. . .

nor

nor

[krinontes] in
place to of

truth"

accordance with

the

this point, Aristotle

underscores

giving pride of the fact that the young lack the power

(1390a29-32).

By

independent judgment.

They lack

self-knowledge as well: while their under

standing is rooted in that they know

tributes their "excess

pistis or

trust alone,

they "think
which

and

everything"

a character

trait to

confidently affirm Aristotle strikingly at

in

everything"

(1389b5-7).

The

unqualified speech of the

noble.

age and devotion to the

characteristics as

young is matched by the purity of their cour While the young are inclined to regard these

the

whole of

virtue,

they

are

the

moderation and

devotion to the
set

advantageous

merely parts of it, no less than that is typical of the old. Men
moderation with courage and

in the

prime of

life

the standard

by

combining
the

by "living
alone, but
earlier of men

neither with an eye toward with an eye toward

both"

noble alone nor

the advantageous
as

(1390a33-1390bl). Just

Aristotle

spoke

the best of the young, he presents here a picture not of middle-aged

in

general adult.

but

of

the human perfection that

man

can

be

attained

only

by

mature

In particular, the
phronimos of

in the

prime

of

life bears

a close re

semblance

to the

the Nicomachean Ethics. "And speaking gener

ally,

whatever serviceable qualities youth and old age possess

separately, [those
fitting"

in the

prime of

life]

possess

together,

and of

the things in

which youth and old

age are excessive or

deficient, they grasp

hoi
akmazontes

the middle ground and the

(1390b6-9). If the
character of

is

a well-balanced or parts

unity, those

of

the

young

and

the

old are onesided

abstractions,

that take themselves to be

The young are ignorant not only of the their ignorance as well. They therefore require
wholes.
will work upon

complex

fabric

of

virtue, but

of

a concrete exhibition of

one that
self-

the passions as well as the intellect

the value of

conscious reflection.

Such

an exhibition would

have to

make plain the

limita

tions of virtue-as-purity, and in particular of uncompromising devotion to the

ends of

honor,

victory,

and strict

justice. It

would

have to
even

produce

the convic

tion that in the absence of comprehensive

good natures can go

judgment

those with morally

wrong,

perhaps

zealously pursuing some part of To produce this conviction without presupposing the openness to logos that it is rather than to seek to estab intended to foster, it would have to show in deed lish through
philosophical speech

just because they lose their balance by the good as if it were the whole of the good.

that it is best to live "neither

truth."

tmsting

nor

distrusting

all, but

judging

in

accordance with the

Aristotle Here is
see

on

Tragedy
Lord helps
"logic"

391
us to

where

tragedy

comes

in. The

work of

Halliwell

and

that

tragedy is

well positioned to address the educative task

outlined above. of

Tragedy dramatically displays

man

both the intelligible

structure or

hu
to

action,
or

including

the kinds of things

of

men of a certain character will tend

say The

do,

and

the consequences

failing

to think about the logic of

relation

action.

effectiveness of this

demonstration in

to the dispositions of the

young turns not upon the soundness of

whatever arguments

may be

embedded

in the dramatic action, but

that

rather upon the cathartic shock of self-recognition

soul of

tragedy

aims

to produce in the
not

the spectator

by

means of

fear. This logos

cf.

shock

is

itself

logos, but

the

psychological precondition

pity and for taking

Tragedy 1450M6-17) by providing

Its
effect seems of

seriously.36

"leads the

soul"

(psuchagogei: Poet. 1450a33-34;

this precondition, which

is

also the precondition

of phronesis.
"eye"

the soul of which

closely to resemble the turning of the soul and the Socrates speaks in explicating the image of the cave
susceptible
are

(Rep.

518c-d).
are

to tragic pedagogy because they are inclined to pity because they judge all by "They men to be good and better [than they really are] for they measure their neigh bors by their own lack of vice, so that they think they are unworthy of suffer

The young

particularly
pity.

nature prone

to feel

ing"

(1389b9-10). In

helping

to

interest

and engage

the young in tragic action,

their peculiarly philanthropic kind of pity (cf. Rhet.

space within which tragedy's

1390al8-20)
of

opens

up

lessons

about the

defectiveness in

ordinary

virtue

may

unfold.

Tragedy

especially

exploits arouse

the fact that fear is the

men regard

flip

side of

pity, in that "whatever things

arouse

fear in

to themselves,

pity

when

these things happen to

are not

others"

(Rhet. 1386a28-29). Because

the young

are

courageous, they

because they are dogmatic, they are score. But by arousing pity in the young for one who closely resembles them in character, tragedy indirectly produces the beneficial kind of fear that can spur
self-criticism.

inclined to feel fear for themselves; not inclined to listen to advice on this

The preceding

reflections

help

to

illuminate the

nature of

tragic katharsis.
a conception

Fear,

pity,

and all of the passions associated with thumos

involve
seek

of self-worth and own worth

the things

one

deserves. Lovers

of

honor

to confirm their
slighted

(Eth. Nic. 1095b26-29). Anger

arises when one

is

(Rhet.

1378a30-32). Indignation or nemesis is pain arising from the spectacle of un deserved good fortune, and jealousy is pain at the good fortune of those we judge to be like ourselves (Rhet. 1386b8-ll, 1387b22-25). If tragedy aims to
promote self-criticism,

it

arouses

pity

and

fear in

order

to call into

question

the

self-conception upon which these passions and others

like them

are

based. Ka

tharsis thus

seems

to be more than a

(partial)
the

purgation of

the passions, for it

a reflective

works through the passions upon their process that

cognitive core.

It initiates

may potentially

refocus all of

passions

that revolve around the this process may

measurement or assertion of self-worth.

The

ultimate result of

392
be

Interpretation
diminution
of passion as a reorientation of passion

not so much a objects.

an

toward

different

There is

important Platonic

antecedent

to this notion of katharsis. In

art"

one of two Plato's Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger identifies as "the kathartic branches of "the art of specifically, that branch in which the worse
separation,"

is

separated

from the better. The Stranger's

cover a range of

subsequent

divisions indicate that

and

katharsis may

meanings,

including bathing

combing,

purging the body of disease, and removing from the soul (through Socratic refutation) ignorance that takes itself to be knowledge (Soph. 226b-231b).
Leon Golden has
sense shown

that the

word

katharsis he has But

often

bears

an

intellectual

in

non-Platonic contexts as means

well,

and

argued that

in the Poetics ka

tharsis

"intellectual

clarification."37

tragic katharsis involves

clarification without

fluence to the intellect den 's interpretation that

central
cation,"

alone. even

one may acknowledge that restricting its operation or its in Martha Nussbaum observes in support of Gol medical and religious contexts words

in

the primary and

or

meaning but she

of

katharsis

and related

is

"clearing-up"

"clarifi

argues

that the work of clearing up is accomplished in

large

measure

by

the

emotions themselves:

Seeing
the

The Trojan Women

reminds an audience who

had

voted

for the

slaughter of

Mytilenians,

the enslavement of women and children

and whose second

thoughts were only

by

sheer

luck

effective

exactly

what

it is to lose

one's male

relatives, to be
self-

enslaved and

turned out of one's home.

all these

Forgetfulness, ignorance,
"cleared
up"

preoccupation, military passion

fear.38

things are obstacles

are

compatible with general goodness of experience of

character) that

(fully by the

sharp

pity

and

Tragedy

may introduce
the

new

feelings

of

fear

and

pity

where none

previously
Aristotle
at

existed, feelings

associated with

the recognition of ignorance about oneself and

"Perhaps,"

carelessness about one point

condition of one's own soul.

as

Socratically

suggests, "one

should not

anything that does not come from vice 1115al6 Nic. 17). By introducing or intensifying
general

fear poverty or and is not due to

sickness or
oneself

in

(Eth.

such emotions and

by

reveal

ing

the relative insignificance of other

fears, tragedy both

purifies and clarifies

pity and fear. John Winkler's study of the festivals of Athens finds in the

role played

by

the ephebes in the dramatic

the tragic choruses a

ephebic composition of

structural reflection of the pedagogical

intentions

of

tragic drama:

My

account

emphasizes

that the events and characters portrayed in

tragedy

are

meant polis

to be contemplated as lessons
vantage point of of the chorus

by

young

citizens

(or

better, by

the entire

from the

the young citizen), and therefore it makes the

watchful

scrutiny

structurally important

as a still center

from

which

the tragic turbulence is surveyed and evaluated.

p.

(Nothing

To Do

with

Dionysus?,

43)

Aristotle
These
remarks
or

on

Tragedy

393
In

fit

well with

the account

of

tragic pedagogy

sketched above.

assuming emulating bic choruses, the youthful

and

the paradigmatically
spectator

contemplative posture of

the ephe

is

compelled

to

suppress

his

restless

energy
this

to

adopt an attitude of reflective stillness.

The weighty
their

significance of

reflective attitude

is

amplified not

including

the sacred character of the

only by dramatic festivals,

the circumstances of performance

engulfing presence and watchfulness of thousands in the theater as a single political body but also
tor sees played out

frequency, and the of fellow-citizens, assembled

by

what

the

youthful specta

before his eyes, namely, the inexorable movement toward suffering of himself as he is accustomed to speak and act when he is not part of
a tragic chorus or a tragic audience.

vm

In my reading support a line of

tragic hamartia

of

them, the books by Davis, Belfiore, Halliwell, and Lord inquiry that leads to two general conclusions. First, while

is

human
tharsis

nature as

deeply rooted in the intellectual and emotional dimensions of such, highly spirited characters are especially prone to the
this term.

sorts of errors that come under the umbrella of

Second,
argued

tragic ka

is

a spur

to self-knowledge insofar as it provokes reflection upon the

nature and sources of

hamartia. In the

previous

section, I

in

addition

that the

demonstrative,

mimetic provocations of

tragedy may play

a cmcial role

both in preparing the young to listen with benefit to promoting the reflective disposition that is the basis How do these
essays? claims

philosophical

logoi

and

in

of responsible citizenship.
recent collection of

fare

when

held up to Amelie Rorty's

Essays

on

Aristotle's Poetics includes twenty-one

on topics

studies of the

Poetics

by

established

scholars,
nature of

action, the

anoia) to the general

are cited

(the unity of tragic tragic necessity, the relationship between ethos and di(the tragic consciousness). While some of these studies
specific

ranging from the

above,

most

have

not yet of

been limit
of

mentioned

in the

present essay.

case, the breadth

and

richness

Rorty's

collection merits a

long

In any discussion in

its

own

right. We

must therefore upon

our attention

to those essays that bear

most

immediately
above.

the
a

issues
he

hamartia

and

katharsis.
to katharsis
cannot

Jonathan Lear issues

set

direct

challenge argues

to the

general approach

forth

In

"Katharsis"

that "the

point of

katharsis

in
be

any

straightforward

"clearly

way be ethical distinguishes music which is

education,"

since
educative of

Politics 1341b32-1342al8
emotions and should
katharsis"

the

in ethical training from music which produces 319). Furthermore, Lear argues, Aristotle makes it clear that "education is for Because "the char cultivated youths, tragic katharsis is for educated, would be either education ethical acters of the audience have been formed
employed
adults."

(pp. 316,

394
futile

Interpretation
or

superfluous"; "a

virtuous

person

...

is in

education"

no need of

(pp. 319, 320). Lear's approach to katharsis is Self-Sufficiency: Plato 66 (where

cation and
"Aristophanes'

opposed on

both

by
. .

Nussbaum in
who cites

"Tragedy
Frogs

and

Aristotle

Fear

Pity,"

and
.

1063-

Aeschylus
Mean,"

observed

[that]

tragic poetry

is

edu

for

grown

men,

not

for children"),

and

by

Richard Janko in "From

education"

Catharsis to the Aristotelian

"the theater [can

who argues on

the basis of the Politics that

be]

regarded almost as a

345). It is important to
most

observe that

(pp. 282, the foundation for these counterclaims is

of adult

form

fully
to

articulated

by

Lear. Lear thus

avoids

by Lord, who is cited frequently by Janko but not at all directly confronting the most forceful counterargu
support

ments

passage

In attempting to in Politics 8, he is content to

views.

his

his interpretation

of the

katharsis
argument

criticize a portion of

Halliwell's

that rests upon the previous work of Lord (pp. 319-20).

not acknowledge

Furthermore, he does

Lord's

attempt

for

adults

by investigating
it
must on

up continuing education the relationship between tragic hamartia and moral

us

to

open

a sphere of

weakness.

In fact, Lear leaves

in the dark
(cf.

about

the

precise nature of

hamar

tia,

even though

the basis of his own argument be compatible with a

p.

fully

educated,

virtuous character

329).
and

The

nature of

hamartia is treated sensitively

Virtue,"

in depth

by Nancy

Sherman
and

in "Hamartia

and

whose account reinforces

the emphases of

Davis

Lord. Hamartia is
sometimes

"failure to

even the most

falls prey (pp. 188, 189). Sher man's discussion of the hamartia of Deianeira (pp. 189-92) illuminates the origination of this mistake in the intersection of decent but intense passion and
sometimes

only in hindsight), decent of persons

in principle, in optimal conditions (and is accessible to human light"; it is "a defect that
see what
to"

inherently

reasonable

but (under the circumstances)

her"

insufficiently

cautious re

flection. Understood in this way, "[Deianeira's] mistake has a human propor tion that dampens any tendency to reproach (p. 191). Sherman's approach
to

hamartia is

echoed

by

Amelie

Rorty
its

and

Aryeh

Kosman,
the

and all

three

of

these authors seem simultaneously to make room for cathartic

education and to call

into

question and

efficacy.

If

even

hamartia,

as

Sherman, Rorty,

Kosman

all agree and

therapy best can fall prey to as Davis's account of

or tragic

be taken to imply, tragic katharsis may potentially be educationally beneficial even for the most fully virtuous adults. But by the same token, it becomes unclear to what extent tragedy can actually help one to avoid hamartia.
the poetic nature of thought might also

Rorty's "The
proach to of the specific

Psychology
of

of

Aristotelian

Tragedy"

supports the general

and confirms

ap

the Poetics developed

by

Halliwell

important

elements

inquiry pursued by Davis and Lord. Her article is worth detail. Aristotle, Rorty insists, does not offer an "aesthetic of poetry (p. 2). As a philosophical analysis of actual kinds of poetry, the Poetics attempts to "save the At the same time, the "strongly
considering in
theory"

lines

some

phenomena."

Aristotle
mm"

on

Tragedy

395

normative

of of

tant

features
or

tragic

Aristotle's approach leads him to ignore some of the impor drama (p. 3). In particular, Aristotelian tragedy excludes

"Dionysian"

elements,

including

such

"demonic

or

divine

forces"

as might sin

gly

in combination (p. 3). "The

arouse

horror

or awe at their role

events

stress of ethos anthropo(i)

daimon

now

in shaping the course of falls firmly on one

side of the equation:

mines

it is

a person's character rather than

his daimon that deter

his

fate"

characters and

(p. 9). Yet tragedy reveals that the relationship between our our actions is less transparent and familiar to us than it first

seems

to be.

Rorty

develops this
and

point

in

way that

connects and amplifies

the

reflections of

Davis

Lord:
the

Sometimes, it is
act

the very energy and

arc of attention

vigor of our purposiveness

fact that

we

in

focused

that

blinds

or at

least blurs

what appears at

the

periphery of our intentions. requires intelligent desires

.
. .

The

successful enactment of

the strongest, most

a certain

kind

of

energy

which

is, is,

at

its best,

confident,

often

indignant

and sometimes
. . .

courageous; at
reveals that

its worst, it is
there
as

presumptuous and canker

disordering.

Tragedy

it were,

but

by

in the very heart of action. All action is formed by intelligence, to be sure; an intelligence directed to a relatively limited purpose. The gap of opacity, it the possibility
within

and with

of

ignorance

and

deflection,

always stands

between

even

the best general purposes and the particular actions that actualize and fulfill them.

Though it falls
accident of

the domain of the voluntary, the tragic hero's hamartia is an

his

excellence:

his

purposes and

energy

make

him

susceptible

to a kind

of waywardness

that arises from his character. (Pp.

7, 11)
She
argues that

Rorty
is

echoes

Davis in

other crucial respects as well.

tragedy

able to

display dramatically
as

the

limitations

of what we

take to be

perfection

precisely insofar
versions of what

it

presents us with
us."

"recognizably

enlarged and simplified we would

is best in

Tragic

characters are

"what

be if

we

us,"

could undergo an

alchemy,

a purification of the elements that compose

goes

including

"the intelligence that

andreia, the natural affections that go

great-heartedness"

into phronesis, the energy that into philia, the assurance that

goes goes

into

into

(p. 9). Like hamartia, katharsis involves more than the in as well as intellectual clarification. By tellect; it is "emotional intellectual attitudes "in their clarified and purified emotional and experiencing
rectification"

forms,"

the tragic

audience

is "able

to experience, however
and

briefly,

the kind of
can

psychological

functioning,
(p.

the balance

harmony
analysis

that

self-knowledge

bring

to

action"

15). Yet in the last

tragedy

reveals

the inac

cessibility

of complete self-knowledge.

It

remains

tme that "drama

is

twinned

action"

with ethics":

tragedy "reveals

the logical

structure of virtuous

by

"ana

lyzing
ing,"

the

role of phronesis

in realizing the general ends that

life"

constitute

thriv

and

it "promote[s]

a shared sense of civic

by

the

shared emotions of

"a

powerful ritual

uniting the audience in (pp. 16-17). But "be

cause

it is

undoes no accident that excellence sometimes

itself,

one of the

dark

396

Interpretation
of

lessons

tragedy is

that there are no

lessons to be learnt, in

order

to avoid

tragedy"

(p. 18).
suggestion

up in different ways Stephen White. In "Acting: Drama as the Mimesis of

The latter

is

picked

by

Kosman

and

by

Praxis,"

Kosman

argues

that

tragedy is

"pathology"

about

the

of

action, and specifically "the chance of the character and

rift between
the

actions understood as

the

expressions of

inten

tional choices
side

of moral agents and actions as events

in

an objective world out

. .

control of such

agents,

actions with a

life

of their own a

(p. 65). In
of

intriguing formulation, katharsis involves both tragic protagonist and a "sympathetic

his
the

"staged
of

purification"

the

purification"

the audience:

"through
. . .

ritualized

and

formalized in the

action of tragic

poetry,

we as audience are

enabled to participate
and

restorative capacities of

thus to heal the guilty sufferers of tragic

misaction"

human society to forgive (p. 68). And White

Tragedies,"

equally compelling essay, "Aristotle's Favorite Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus and Iphigenia Aristotle favors
argues

in

an

that

Euripides'

at

Tau

rus

because both highlight the

situations

noble responses of virtuous protagonists to moral

responsible"

misfortune, "bad

In the
again

studies

they are not strictly Kosman, and White Sherman, Rorty, by

which
philosophical

for

(p. 225).

we encounter once

the tension between

ambiguity fits

and political education with

which the present

essay began.
than

Rorty

asserts

that Aristotle understands

well with

fate in

terms of

ethos rather

daimon,

which

the notion of educating

individuals to

assume

the

responsibilities

of citizenship.

But her

analysis of

tragic drama stresses that the

action

nature of one's character and

becomes

fully

intelligible (if in

at

all) only in

retrospect.

its relationship to To the extent that

orientation

ethos remains opaque manded action as

and mysterious part

within the prospective

de

it must, Rorty implies, even for the most virtuous by individualit is itself daimonic. The alogon, it would seem, is after all not
wholly
of

Aristotelian tragedy, for it shows up as part It is in this partly intelligible guise, one might argue further, that Dionysus finds a place in Aristotle's tragic vision. Taken together, the most sensitive essays in the Rorty collection pose signif
excluded

from the

sphere of

the tragic logos of

ethos.

icant

problems

for the

account of tragic
might

pedagogy

set

forth in

section

VII. It

was argued

there that

tragedy

in

effect

help

to move the young from the

make

third Hesiodic class to the second, and so,

incidentally,
its

them

receptive

to

the

wisdom of

the Nicomachean

Ethics,

for those "like

who are

least

likely

to recognize

book that is paradoxically intended significance. The explicit aim of

us,
needed"

the Ethics is practical:

archers

knowledge
target,"

of the ultimate end of action will make

better able "to hit upon the thing possessing a life (1094a23-24; cf. 1103b26-29). Such knowledge is evidently most for the young because they very in hindsight,
structure of tragic
stand upon which

in

useful

the threshold of mature life. Yet the

drama, in
could

learning

comes

through suffering

and

implicitly

challenges the notion that anyone who

is

not

by

nature

already

receptive to

logos

be

made

to be open to it prior to the direct

Aristotle
experience of

on

Tragedy
do
this have

397
not

hamartia
an

and suffering.

It is tme that tragic

protagonists

have the

advantage of

having

viewed tragic

dramas, but

would

made

any difference to
moving inside
man who

spectator overcome

Oedipus? Tragic pedagogy demands that the his detachment from the dramatic action by imaginatively
or an
one might

Ajax

of

the tragic protagonist, and

insist that the young

objection.

is

prepared to

do

so

already
see no

possesses

the openness to logos that to this

tragedy is

supposed to also

foster. I

easy

response

Tragedy

directly
a

challenges the

efficacy

of

logos insofar

as

it

suggests

that the power of

foresight

to which Aristotle appeals in the Ethics may always

be defective. Would

tragedy
polis!

continue

young man who has fully understood this implication of to be eager to fulfill the roles required of a citizen of the

Would he
at

not

be inclined to turn away from the active,

political

life

and

(perhaps

best)

to philosophy or philosophic poetry, which

is

"political"

just

insofar
noble

it involves contemplating the spectacle of human life, including the modes of human striving, the defects in the various modes of striving and
as

the reasons

for

their

failure,

and the ways

in

which

humans may

respond

to

failure

and

more can about a

suffering and the knowledge that it brings? Here, at least, something be said. The essays by Kosman and White remind us that tragedy is
survives

nobility that templation. To trade young

man who

action
so old

suffering and that inheres in action, not in con for contemplation is to overlook this nobility. The

does

is

a grotesque

figure: he has
of

overshot

the midpoint of

maturity The political

and

become

before his

time.39

and philosophical

dimensions

tragic

drama, then,

are not

ultimately incompatible. On the contrary, the highest

rest upon an

political virtue seems

to

understanding

of

the ambiguity

of moral

responsibility that stands

at no

the heart of tragedy. While Lord

would not agree with

tragedy,"

Rorty

that "there are that the

lessons to be learnt, in order to avoid process of learning is never complete: "it

vides no real support

he hints

at one point

would seem

that the human soul pro

n.

for

spiritedness"

moderate

(pp. 192-93
regulative

16). Perhaps
of

tragedy

teaches that

phronesis

is,

as

which everyone must remain open

it were, a but which no is

ideal

virtue, to
claim
phro

one can

to possess.
nimos rest

Extraordinary

excellence

never a sure

authoritatively thing, because every

may turn out to be a spurious phronimos. Good citizenship would then upon humble openness to extraordinary virtue. Political education and ambiguity
would converge

philosophical

in the lessons

of

tragedy, insofar

as

genuine moral

satisfied with what

responsibility paradoxically involves is and an acceptance of what is, the former

the habits of individual and to bear full responsibility for
one's own

both a refusal to remain

attitude mani

festing
latter in

itself in

communal self-criticism and

the

a willingness

inevitable imper

fections.
Perhaps there is
room

here for

aidos as

well, insofar as humble

openness

implies

awe.

And

since

tragedy

shows

that we never successes,

fully

in

control of ourselves,

one's moral

fully understand or are including one's ability to

398

Interpretation
disposition
to
engage of reflective

cultivate a settled
well.

openness,

must

be

a source of awe as

The

power

in

a reflective quest of

for the
human
take

good

life,

as

Socrates
forces influ

suggests or

in the Republic's Myth

are not

Er,

seems

ultimately to be a
cannot

matter of

factors that

wholly

within

the

reach of

explanation and

ence.

Even the

most virtuous

human beings

full responsibility for

mark of virtue

their ability to act

shoulder
extent

responsibly.

At the

same

time, it is the

to

the burden

of misdeeds

that are not entirely one's own

paradoxical

doing. To the
acquits

that the Poetics confirms these

suggestions, it

Aris

totle of

insensitivity

to the ambiguity and tension at the heart of Greek tragedy.

NOTES

Vemant

points are developed in detail in three outstanding collections of essays: Jean-Pierre Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1988): Nothing To Do with Dionysus?: Athenian Drama in Its Social Context, ed. John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): and Greek Tragedy and Politi

These
and

cal

Theory,

ed

J. Peter Euben (Berkeley: discussion

of

University
recent

of

is

basically

a critical

five

books

on

California Press, 1986). The present essay Aristotle's Poetics: Elizabeth Belfiore,

pages

on Plot and Emotion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 408 $45.00; Michael Davis, Aristotle's Poetics: The Poetry of Philosophy (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 183 pages + xviii, cl. $55.00, pb. $19.95; Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 369 pages + ix, cl. $37.50; Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 226 pages, cl. $31.50; and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Poetics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 435 pages + xii, cl. $69.50,

Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle

+ xvi,
cl.

pb.

$19.95.
and

2. Simon Goldhill, "The Great Dionysia 129.

Ephebes'

Civic

Ideology,"

in Winkler

and

Zeitlin,

pp. 97-

in Winkler and Zeitlin, pp. Song: Tragoidia and 3. John J. Winkler, "The 20-62. Winkler argues that the Athenian dramatic festivals "were the occasion for elaborate sym
and that "a central reference point for bolic play on themes of proper and improper civic the notional learners of its lesson (paideia) about the these [tragic and comic] representations
behavior,"

Polis,"

trials of manhood

(andreia)
youths adult

were

the

young

men of

the

city"

(pp. 20-21). He

supports these ranks

of

claims with evidence

that the choral performers of

the

tragedy

were

drawn from the

the

ephebes, that for these

part of

the

training for

quasi-military rigors of choral dancing and singing constituted hoplite warfare, and that the remaining ephebes may have been

very center of the audience at the City Dionysia. Winkler argues further that these facets of the dramatic festivals must be considered in relation to the characteristically ephebic themes of tragedy. Tragic performance incorporates "a complex and finely controlled tension be
positioned at the

tween role and role-player, for the ephebes are cast in the most

'disciplined'

part of

the

tragedy

disciplined in the exacting demands of unison movement, subordinated to the more prominent while the actors, who actors, and characterized as social dependants (women, slaves, old men)
are no

longer ephebes,
on

perform a

experience"

of ephebic
Ideology"

tale showing the risks, the misfortunes, and sometimes the glory (p. 57). Cf. Simon Goldhill's reflections in "The Great Dionysia and Civic

the fact that "a great many of our extant plays are explicitly concerned with young times of

men at

the

key

4. Myth
sciousness,

and

taking up Tragedy, p. 29;

raises could

a role as a man cf. pp.

in

society"

(p. 124).
account of the tragic con

23-28. Vemant's historicist

able

however,
Aristotle

the question of why he is

to describe (and to this extent to under

stand)

what

not, namely, this tragic

of

consciousness.

This

question

is

sharpened

by

Vemant's

skillful

deconstruction

Aristotle's

account

in the Nicomachean Ethics

of man as a

Aristotle
responsible agent
Tragedy,"

on

Tragedy

399

("Intimations of the Will in Greek in Myth and Tragedy, pp. 49-84, the central part of which is reprinted in Rorty, pp. 40-48). Read in the light of his claim that "the tragic sense of responsibility emerges when human action becomes the object of reflection and
debate
and

while still not

p.

being

regarded as
of

Tragedy,

27), "Intimations
own

sufficiently autonomous to be fully the implies that Aristotle did not

Will"

(Myth
understand

the tragic

implications

of

his

thought.

5. Gerald Else
of

writes that

in Aristotle's
p.

"tragedy

in its

greatest

days

comported

things that were not dreamt

philosophy"

(Aristotle's Poetics: The

330-31
with pp.

Argument [Cambridge: Harvard

and

University

Press, 1963] 1951),

3
and

446;

cf. pp.

474-75),

Cedric Whitman

advances a similar

judgment in Sophocles: A
pp.

Study

33-35. Other
of

critical comments are cited

of Heroic Humanism (Cambridge: Harvard by Stephen G. Salkever,

Plato,"

University Press, "Tragedy and the

Education

the Demos:

Aristotle's Response

to

4. Pedro Lain

Entralgo, however,
(The

goes against the

in Euben, Greek Tragedy, p. 275 with nn. scholarly tide in arguing that Aristotle
the

understood

the tragic situation and "knew how to

tragedy"

scrutinize

tremendously

deep

historical

and

human Rather

problem of

and

Antiquity, ed. and trans. L. J. Therapy John M. Sharp [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970], p. 217). Cf. Martha
of the Word in Classical

Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), who asserts that Aristotle remains open to the teaching
of

tragedy

with regard

to the

6. In Aristotle's
S. H. Butcher "the Poetics
cites
moral office of

Theory
the

of

fragility of goodness (see esp. pp. 378-91). Poetry and Fine Art, 1895, 4th ed. (London: MacMillan, 1932),
and

Aristophanes, Plutarch,
poet"

(pp. 215 ff.). He then

Strabo in sketching the traditional Greek view of adds that "Aristotle's treatment of poetry in the
and

stands

in

complete contrast to this we

[ancient

criticism

traditional]

mode of

(p. 220).

as "a may trace back to the Poetics the modern conception of "fine free and independent activity of the mind, outside the domain both of religion and of politics, improvement." "Fine he adds, "sets having an end distinct from that of education or moral

According

to

Butcher,

art"

art,"

practical needs

aside; it does
argues

not seek

to affect the real world, to modify the

actual"

(pp. 1

15, 157).

Similarly, Else
spring"

that the poet aims above all at producing a beautiful work of art that will

provide aesthetic pleasure:

"Beauty is the root of Aristotle's theory, from which the other blossoms (Aristotle's Poetics, p. 284; cf. pp. 302-3). 7. Stephen Halliwell asserts that the world of Aristotelian tragedy is "remote from the sense of
hopeless,
the mysterious, and the opaque which colours much of the tragic
know"

the

myth

that we

(Aristotle's Poetics, p. 234). While Salkever admits that the lover of tragedy will be disappointed reduction of the vivacity and by "Aristotle's profundity we experience in reading or seeing the plays to a set of prosaic his account of the way in which Aristotle viewed tragedy as an
.

formulae,"

instrument
pp.

of

democratic
as

education entails that

"there is
it"

pleasure of

tragedy,

Aristotle

understands

('Tragedy

and

nothing grandly elevated about the the Education of the Demos,

pp.

274, 303).
378-83)
An of
and

8. Argument along these lines is provided by Else (Aristotle's Poetics, Ingram Bywater, who endorses a kind of limited aesfheticism in Aristotle
constitutes

by

on the

Poetry

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909). Bywater holds that the excitement of harmless "the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is

aesthetic pleasures

concerned

but

also asserts

that

tragedy has limited

men's souls

moral and political side

benefits:

while

"the

performance of

Tragedy

was

too occasional to have to

hearers,"

a marked and

abiding

effect on the moral character of the

it helped
emo

keep

"in health

and

tion (pp.

160-61;
aims

cf. pp.

155-56

not of course rule out a moral

by supplying an occasional cathartic release of 325-26). An aestheticist interpretation of katharsis does interpretation of hamartia: Butcher, for example, asserts both that
quietude"

with pp.

"fine

art"

in Aristotle's
spectator"

account at

"a

certain pleasurable

impression

produced upon

the

mind in

flaw"

of the

hearer

or

and

that hamartia may designate "some inherent

frailty

or

the

protagonist

(Aristotle's Theory, pp. 206, 321). 9. Interpretations that connect hamartia and katharsis in
Carnes Lord (in Education
and

this way include those of

Halliwell,
in

Poetics,"

Nussbaum,
Ancients

Culture),

and

Laurence

Berns,

"Aristotle's

and

Moderns,

ed.

Joseph

Cropsey

(New York: Basic Books,

and

1964). Exceptions include House (in Aristotle

s

Entralgo, Salkever,

Elizabeth Belfiore (in Tragic Pleasures),

Humphry

400

Interpretation

Poetics [London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1956]). While House argues that tragic katharsis is a kind of and that brings our emotional responses "closer to those of the good and wise he flatly asserts that "all serious modem Aris results in "an emotional balance and
"training''
equilibrium,"

man"

totelian scholarship agrees

[with

Bywater]

that

'hamartia'

means an error which

is derived
vein,

from 'ignorance Entralgo

sion and

of some material

fact

circumstance'"

or

(pp. 94, 110). In

a somewhat similar

understands

katharsis

as a

dianoetic,

emotional,
or

and physical transformation

accept

"from

confu

disorder to
of

enlightenment"

well-ordered
"error"

sophrosune, but seems to

the common

interpretation

hamartia

as an

that is "not morally

examined

ascribable"

(Therapy,

pp.

213,

236-

37). Belfiore's interpretation

Demos,"

similar argument will

be

below, in
details"

section

IV. Salkever
the

maintains

that

tragic katharsis plays a crucial role in democratic education, but explicitly

of

concurs with

Else's
of the

hamartia
n.

as a

"mistake

as

to certain

('Tragedy
Oedipus

and

Education

p.

297

55).
Sophocles' Tyrannus,"

10. Martin Ostwald, "Aristotle on Hamartia and Ernst Kapp (Hamburg: Marion von Schroeder, 1958), both
sides of

in Festschrift

pp.

93-108,
of we

cites representative studies on

this issue (p.

of

94,

nn.

and

6). To his list

Hamartia,"

those who support the prevalent

interpretation

hamartia

as a nonculpable mistake

in judgment

may

add

(along

with

Ostwald

himself) P.

Classical Quarterly 6 (1912): 266-72; Braam, "Aristotle's Use of Philological Quarterly 24, no.l (1945): Seymour M. Pitcher, "Aristotle's Good and Just Classical Quarterly 43 (1949): 47-56; and Catherine Lord, 1-11; I. M. Glanville, "Tragic
van
Heroes," Error,"

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (1969-70): 55-62. D. W. Lucas (in Aristotle: Poetics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968])

'Tragedy

Without Character: Poetics VI.

the majority, but

1450a24,"

also sides

with

acknowledges

as a

"difficult

problem"

the fact that in many

called a

tragedies "the

relevant character suffers

through a

fault

which could

indeed be

hamartia,
solid criti

but
tia

which

is

much more than a misapprehension about particular

facts"

(p. 305). Two

Classical
and

cisms of

the prevalent interpretation are T. C. W. Stinton's important philological study of hamar

Tragedy,"

in the Aristotelian corpus, "Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek 25 (1975): 221-54, and Philip Whaley Harsh, "Hamartia
the

Quarterly

n.s.

Again,"

Transactions
suggests

American Philological Association 76 (1945): 47-58. Harsh

moral

Proceedings of that the traditional dis

and argues that the

tinction between intellectual error and

confusion and

fault is "a false

dichotomy,"

disagreement

over

the meaning of hamartia has been exacerbated

evil"

by

"a tendency to

divide
11
.

all acts

into the too

simple alternatives of good and

(p. 51).

Plato

and

Like Lord, Halliwell also finds "a desire to draw as sharp a contrast as possible between to be one of the causes of "the misrepresentation of Aristotle's position as
Aristotle"
.

aestheticism"

some sort of

(Aristotle's Poetics,

p.

3).

12. Defenders
there are

of

the aestheticist approach might argue that these studies see connections where

none and

that their conclusions are tainted

construct a

by faulty

methodologies.

They

might partic

ularly insist that although one can certain of the ideas in the Poetics Poetics justifies discussion
of one's

by

superficially plausible account of the meaning of beginning as Lord does with other works, nothing in the

massive exception to this interpretative mle, however, is the katharsis in Politics 8.7 (1341b32-1342a27), which defenders of the aestheticist interpretation have long regarded as a key to the nature of tragic katharsis in the Poetics. Lord demonstrates that the standard interpretation of the Politics passage rests on aestheticist presupposi so.

doing

The

tions,
which

which cause readers

to overlook both the specifics of the passage and the context within
section

it

appears

(see

below,

VI).
I,"

13. Olof Gignon, "Aristoteles-Studien Museum Helveticum 9 (1952): 13, proval by Lord, Education and Culture, p. 25.
14. Ronna
tia committed

quoted with

ap

Burger,

"Nemesis,"

Graduate
of error

Faculty Philosophy Journal 13,

Aristotle's 1453a24-26).
of

no.

1 (1987): 74.
the hamar

15. Davis touches

on

this kind

in his discussion

remark about

by

the critics of

16. I have sity

of

used

Euripides (p. 73; cf. here the translation of Cames Lord, Aristotle: The Politics (Chicago: Univer
points of

Chicago Press, 1984). 17. This is one of the central

Animal,"

R.G. Mulgan, "Aristotle's Doctrine That Man is

an article

Political
reasons

(p. 77

n.

Hermes 102, 71).

no.

3 (1974): 438-45,

to which

Belfiore

refers

for

other

Aristotle
18. The issues
raised

on

Tragedy

401

here

are

Classical Republicanism

and the

treated in detail in Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Tragedies,"

Press, 1992),
20. In

19. Stephen A.

55-79; see esp. pp. 55-57 with the Aristotelian passages cited at p. 817, n. 3. in Rorty, Essays, p. 229. White, "Aristotle's Favorite addition to the essay by White cited above (n. 19), see Martha Nussbaum, 'Tragedy and
pp.
Pity,"

and Aristotle on Fear and in Rorty, Essays, 276, with Alexander Nehamas, "Pity and Fear in the Rhetoric and the pp. 296-97, and the remarks by Jonathan Lear quoted below in note 29.

Self-Sufficiency: Plato

esp. pp.

265-66, 274,

Poetics,"

in Rorty, Essays,

21. Belfiore
tragedy: it gives

offers two other reasons

for Aristotle's Plato's

charge

rejection of

the portrayal of character in the product of ignorant

Aristotle

an

answer to

that

tragedy is

imitators,
counter

there is a craft of producing plots but not of imitating ethe, and it allows him to Plato's accusation that tragedy incorporates false images of excellent ethe by appealing to
since

the fact that

chapter

"tragedy
the

does

not

imitate

ethos"

(pp. 85-86). The former

assertion

is

contradicted

by
to

15

of

of

books 2

and

Poetics, in which Aristotle 3 of the Rhetoric, which aim

be "of
a certain

discusses the imitation

at

of character, as well as much

order

showing

what

to say and how to say it in

assertion

make oneself appear to

sort"

(1377b24). The latter

is implausible its

on

its

face,

since

it forces

us to assume either that

Plato is

fundamentally

mistaken about

the objects of
nature.

tragic imitation or that Aristotle's defense of

tragedy involves

a radical transformation of

22. On the

153-57,

who

discussed in the preceding paragraphs cf. Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics, pp. links his criticisms of the social interpretation of ethical terms in the Poetics with a
matters which

rejection of

the separation between character and plot for

not explore

Belfiore

argues.

23. Belfiore does

explicable as moral of a settled

the possibility

posed

by

Carnes Lord

weakness,

i.e.,

as neither vice nor nonculpable

that hamartia may be ignorance but the overcoming

disposition

by

passion, especially (as in the case of

ated with thumos or spiritedness

view of

(Education
of

and

Culture,

pp.

Ajax) the group of passions associ 156-71). (She does not share Lord's

the essentially tragic

instability

Spiritedness through emotional

the

"blending"

thumos; compare her discussion of the moderation of [p. 342] with Lord's observation that "it would seem that

human
n.

soul provides no real support

for

spiritedness"

moderate

[Education

and

Culture,

pp.

192-93

16]. Lord's
more

view of thumos will

hamartia is
passion"

than a simple mistake of

be taken up below, in section VI.) That Deianeira's fact but rather "verges on acting in ignorance through
"Hamartia,"

is

same vein with

persuasively in "Hamartia and

argued

by Stinton,

p.

237.

Nancy

Sherman

argues

in the

Virtue,"

in Rorty, Essays,
not allowed me

where she connects

Deianeira's hamartia

her jealousy (pp. 189-92).

of space

24. The limitations her 312

view of
n.

have

to discuss

Belfiore's thorough treatment

comments and the

of
on

the issues relating to the interpretation of tragic katharsis. Alexander Nehamas

briefly

katharsis
not

as an allopathic process

in

"Pity

and

Fear in the Rhetoric

that "the Poetics

Poetics,"

p.

27. follow
without

25. It does

qualification,

however,
Part,'"

posits a

type of

tragedy

divine agency is to be (p. 233), since, as Dorothea Frede notes in "Neces the objection of unintelligibility would not sity, Chance, and 'What Happens for the Most hold against a tragedy in which the gods "are depicted as rational agents, as we find Apollo, Athena, and the Eumenides reason and act in (Rorty, Essays, p. 213).
excluded"

from

which

Aeschylus'

Eumenides"

26. Bernard Knox, "Euripidean in Word and Action: Essays on the Ancient Theater (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 250. 27. Halliwell's view that tragic eutuchia and dustuchia are limited to "the fabric of material
and social
status"

Comedy,"

(p. 207)

seems

to ignore that

which

Belfiore identifies
the

as

the most significant

dimension
external

of

tragic

misfortune:

the loss of loved

notes at

ones and

corruption and

destruction

of philia

relationships.

Friends, Aristotle
analysis of

Eth. Nic. 1169b9-10, "are thought to be the

greatest of

goods."

28.

Bernays'

the katharsis passage

ueber

(1341b32-1342a27) is
and

the portion

of

his Zwei Abhandlungen

die

aristotelische

most readily available in Theorie des Drama (Berlin, 1880;

first

published

Breslau, 1857)
in Articles

translated
on

by

Jonathan

Jennifer Barnes

as

"Aristotle
and

on

the

Tragedy,"

Effects

of

(London: Gerald Duckworth

and

Aristotle, vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, Company, 1979), pp. 154-65.

R. Sorabji

402

Interpretation
arguments against the standard
application

29. Lord's interpretation

of

Politics 1341b32-1342a27 to the

Belfiore (see Tragic Pleasures, p. 326) and Hal liwell (Aristotle's Poetics, p. 191); cf. Davis, Aristotle's Poetics, pp. 37-38. See in addition Jonathan Lear, in Rorty, Essays, who notes that the interpretation of tragic katharsis
of

tragic katharsis are accepted

by

"Katharsis,"

as purgation

is too

crude

to do justice to the cognitive dimension of the emotions of pity and fear

(on

which see also

the articles cited above in note 20): "An emotion

world.

is

an orientation

to the

But if

about

the

world one

is in

and an

purging an emotion. An to be of significant

30. The
of

emotion

is not merely a feeling, it merely a feeling, but also a belief attitude toward it, then it is hard to know what could be meant by is too complex and world-directed an item for the purgation model
an emotion requires not

value"

(p. 317).
the
megalopsuchos

problematic character of

implies that he is

not

in fact the

pinnacle

virtue,

as

Aristotle

might

be taken to

imply

(cf. Eth. Nic. 1123b26-1124a4). One

with

should com

pare

Aristotle's description

of megalopsuchia

in the Nicomachean Ethics 4.3

megalopsuchia

his description

of
of

the very different virtue of justice in 5.1. While

virtues"

is

said

to be "like some

kosmos

the

(1124al-2), justice is
(1

said to

be "virtue

most

complete, because it is the putting to use

the perfection of justice (11 37b8

(chresis)
it

virtue"

of complete

129b30 31).

Epieikeia, in turn, is
which

ff.). Perhaps the Nicomachean Ethics has the tragic form to

presents us with a spurious version of the
own

Davis

calls our

attention, in that

best that discloses the

suggestion
of

nature of

that which

is truly best

only in revealing its Matthew Oberrieder, Scholars Project

and

inadequacy. (This

who explores

the tragic form

has recently been pursued by my student the Nicomachean Ethics in an NEH Younger
Philosophy,"

in

an undergraduate

31. See Bernard Yack, 32. Those

only 33. Cf.
nomos.

"Community

honors thesis.) and Conflict in Aristotle's Political

Review

of Politics 47 (1985): 92-112.

endowed with goodness

by

"some divine

cause"

(Eth. Nic.

1179b22)

constitute the

possible exception

to this

claim.

Plato, Statesman 294a-297b on the authority and precision of phronesis in relation to In this dialogue the Eleatic Stranger identifies phronesis with the art of measurement "rela fitting,
and the

tive to the mean, and the

middle ground and

opportune, and the needful, and all things that dwell in the

away from the

extremes"

(284e6-8),

and at

300c2 he

calls the rule of

law

"second

sailing"

in

comparison with

the mle of phronesis without laws. Aristotle's account of

phronesis

is clearly indebted to these Platonic antecedents. 34. This inference is confirmed by Aristotle's distinction between tme courage and political courage in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.8. Whereas tme courage "chooses and endures because it is noble to do so or because it is base not to do (1116all-12), political courage is motivated by
so"

the prospect of punishment and

nomos.

disgrace for

cowardice and

honor for bravery, i.e.

by

shame

before

quoting passages from the Iliad that implicitly indicate its limitations. In these passages, Hektor and Diomedes imagine the ridicule they will face if they do not stand and fight (1116a21-26; cf. Iliad 22.100, 8.148-49). Shame makes Hektor
political courage

Aristotle illustrates

by

remain outside

the walls

of

Troy

to meet his death at the hands of

with

Achilles, but because Hektor is

truly

the champion of the Trojans he pays for his glory

courageous coward: seems to

the last hope of his community. The

individual

would

have

chosen the welfare of

of the

Aristotle be

notes at the

beginning
Hektor

his city even if it meant being called a Nicomachean Ethics that "the good of one's polis
individual]"

a greater and more perfect

whom

thing

to grasp and to save [than the good of an

(1094b8-9). Polydamas,
where

mentions

in the

passage quoted
quest

by Aristotle,
cf.

represents

the

prudent and more noble alternative

Hektor ignores in his

for

glory:

vant to

sound counsel as cowardice. This example young men, who are liable to be overly serious about honor (see below). 35. Cf. 1378b28-29, where Aristotle asserts that "the young and the wealthy

Hektor interprets Polydamas 's

Iliad 12.209-50, is especially rele

are

hubristic,
conspic

because they believe that in being insolent [hubrizontes] they achieve be kept in mind that Aristotle defines anger (orge) as "a desire accompanied
uous retribution

preeminence."

It

should also

by

pain

for

in

response

to

a conspicuous and undeserved slight

directed

against oneself or

those near to

one"

(1378a30-32).
of the significance of emotional shock of

36. Cf. Belfiore's discussion

(ekplexis

or

kataplexis) in
19-30

Greek literature
with pp.

as well as

in the thought

Plato

and

Aristotle {Tragic Pleasures,

esp. pp.

216-22).

Aristotle
37. Leon
sociation

on

Tragedy

403

Golden,

"Catharsis,"

Transactions

and

93 (1962): 51-60. See

to the

also

the related articles

Catharsis
pp.

Proceedings of the American Philological As by Golden cited by Richard Janko, "From

on

Aristotelian

Mean,"

38. Martha

in Rorty, Essays
and

Aristotle's
p.

Poetics,
cf.

p.

355

n.

24.

388-91. On the connection between Socratic

Nussbaum, "Tragedy

Self-Sufficiency,"

elenchos and

of Goodness, tragic katharsis compare Stephen G.

282;

The

Fragility

Salkever, 'Tragedy and the Education of Tragedy and Political Theory, pp. 283-85
39. I
owe

the Demos: Aristotle's Response to

with pp.

Plato,"

in Greek

300-301. helpful
comments on a talk

this observation to

Mary Nichols,

whose

I delivered

at

the American

Political Science Association in 1993 have improved

at the

the present paper. I would also

ing

like to thank my colleagues in the Philosophy Department discussion of the limits of tragic pedagogy.

University of Tulsa

for

a stimulat

Aristotle

on

Detective
at

Fiction1

Lecture delivered

Oxford,

March 5th, 1935

DOROTHY L. SAYERS

Some twenty-five

years ago,
should

it

was rather

the fashion among commentators to

admire a

deplore that Aristotle

have

so much
best."

inclined to
stress

kind

of

tragedy
rather

that was not, in their opinion, "the

All this
was

laid

upon

the plot, all this

hankering
inartistic?

after melodrama and surprise

it

not rather

unbecoming

Psychology

for its

own sake was assert

seemed almost

blasphemous to

that

just then coming to the fore, and it "they do not act in order to portray the
action."

characters;
not yet

they include

the characters for the sake of the

of

Indeed,

we are

free from the influence

story is that in
which

that school of thought for which the

particular

best kind it is

of

play

or

nothing

happens from

beginning

to end.
evident

Now,

to anyone who reads the Poetics with an unbiased mind,

much a student of

that Aristotie was not so

his

own

literature

as a prophet of
at

the future. He criticised the contemporary Greek theatre because it was,

that

readdy available, for his attention. But what, in his heart of hearts, he desired was a good detective story; and it was not his fault, poor man, that he lived some twenty centuries too early to revel in the Peripeties of Trent's Last
of popular entertainment presented

time,

the

most

widespread and

democratic form

Case

or

the

Discoveries

of

The Hound of the Baskervilles

objects themselves

He had
may be

stout

appetite
says

for the

gruesome.

"Though the

painful,"

the

he, "we delight to forms, for example,

horror
of

view

the most realistic representations of them in art,

of the

lowest

animals and of

dead

bodies."

The

crawl

The Speckled Band would, we infer, have pleased him no less than The Corpse in the Car, The Corpse in Cold Storage or The Body in the

ing

Silo. Yet he

was

no thriller

fan. "Of
worst.

actions,"

simple

plots

and

he

rightly
is
nei

observes, "the

episodic are nor

the

call a plot episodic when there

ther probability

have

approved of a

machine-gun attack
Common,2

He would not necessity in the sequence of the certain recent book which includes among its incidents a in Park Lane, an aeroplane dropping bombs on Barnes

episodes."

a gas attack

by

the C.I.D.

on a

West-End flat

and a pitched

battle

with assorted

artillery

on a yacht

in the Solent. He
effect when

maintained

that dreadful and

"unexpectedly,"

alarming

events produced their

best

they

occurred,

indeed,

but also, "in

of

another."

consequence of one

In

one phrase of the

he

sums

up
of

the whole essence

the detective story

proper.

Speaking

denouement

From

Dorothy

L. Sayers, Unpopular Opinions (New York: Harcourt, Brace

permission.

and

Company,

1947). Reprinted by
interpretation,

Spring 1995,

Vol. 22, No. 3

406

Interpretation
he
says:

the work,
not

"It is

also possible

to discover whether

some one

has done

or

done

something."

Yes, indeed.
a man of transcendent

Now, it is
under work

well

known that

genius, through working

difficulties
than a

and with

man of

inadequate tools, will do more useful and inspiring mediocre intellect with all the resources of the laboratory at
with no

his disposal. Thus Aristotle,

sordid complications of
methods

better

mysteries

for his study than the

murder-

the Agamemnon
arrow of

family,
above

no more scientific

than the poisoned

Philoctetes

or

the somewhat
with

improbable
so

medical properties of

Medea's cauldron;

all,

detective heroes
of gods

painfully
machine,

stereotyped and unsympathetic as yet contrived

the inhuman array

from the

to hammer out from these unpromising elements a the

so

ory

of

detective fiction

shrewd, all-embracing

and practical

that the Poetics

remains

the finest guide to the writing of such

fiction that

could

be put,

at

this

day, into the hands of an aspiring author. In what, then, does this guidance consist? From
the Detective
observes

the start

Aristotle

accepts

Story (tragedy being

acquired

as a

worthy

subject

for

serious

treatment.

"Tragedy,"

he

the

literary

form

which

the detective story took

in his

day), "also
substance.

magnitude"

that

"Discarding
point

short stories and a

is, it became important both in form and ludicrous diction, it assumed, though
dignity."

only up to

at a

late

stories and a
a

in its progress, a tone of ludicrous have characterised

diction"

am afraid

that

"short
genre

some varieties of

the

very late

point

indeed; it is true, however,

Aristotle
then goes on to
imitation"

great efforts at reform.

have recently been define tragedy in terms excel

that there
or representa
serious"

lently
tion

applicable to our

subject; 'The

(or presentment,

we will not quarrel over

the word) "of an action that is

it

will

be

admitted

that

murder

is

an action of a

tolerably

serious nature

"and

also

complete

in itself
ends

any loose
and

is

no proper

fear,

wherewith

since a detective story that leaves detective story at all "with incidents arousing pity to accomplish its catharsis of such
emotions."

that is

highly important,

has already been said and written on the vexed subject of the Is it true, as magistrates sometimes assert, that little boys go to the bad through reading detective stories? Or is it, as detective writers prefer to
much

Too

catharsis.

think

with

Aristotle,
valve

that in a nerve-ridden age the study of crime stories pro

vides a

safety

for the Of

bloodthirsty passions
forms
more of modem

that might otherwise lead us to

murder our spouses? makes virtue ex

all

fiction,

the

detective story
about

alone

hypothesi

interesting
a

than vice, the detective

error

more

be

loved than
that

the criminal.
.

But there is

"if

detective fiction leads

will not

literary
uncles

merit, the greater

tme:

going increase in crime, then the be the corresponding increase in

to an

dangerous

namely
the

greater

crime."3

Now,

this is simply

few

people can

by

the

literary
be

merits of

have been inspired to murder their Hamlet. On the contrary, where there is no
an

beauty

there

can

no

catharsis;

ill-written book, like

Let
us

an

ill-compounded it that, if
we

drug, only irritates the

system without purging.

then see to

Aristotle
excite evil

on

Detective Fiction

407

passions, it is

so

done

as to sublimate them at the same time

by

the

contemplation of emotional or

intellectual beauty. Thus far, then, concerning

Character. "A detective
story,"

the catharsis.

Aristotle

next

discusses Plot
was

and

we

gather,

"is impossible
years

charac

without action,

ago, the

tendency

but there may be one without for all detective stories to be of the
we get

A few

characterless or

"draught-board"

variety; to-day,
slender plot and a good

many

examples

deal

of morbid psychology.

exhibiting a rather Aristotle's warning, how

ever,

still

holds

good:

as regards one will

"One may string together a diction and thought, have

much

series of characteristic speeches of the utmost and yet

finish

fail to

produce

the true dramatic effect; but

better

success with a

story which, however inferior in these

respects, has

plot."

And

again:

"The first essential, the life

plot,
and the characters come

and

soul,

so to

speak, of the detective story, is the

second."

As

regards the

make-up

of

the plot, Aristotle is

again

firmly
ning

that it should have a

beginning,

a middle and an end.

very helpful. He says Herein the detec

which, begin

tive story is sharply distinguished from the kind

at the

of modem novel

end,

rambles

backwards

and and

forwards

without particular

direction

and ends on an

^determinate note,

for

no ascertainable reason except the

printing and paper for seven-and-sixpence. The detective story commonly begins with the murder; the middle is occupied with the detection of the crime and the various peripeties or reversals of fortune
publisher's refusal to provide more

arising
than
should

out of

this;

the end
can

is the

discovery

and execution of

the

murderer

which

nothing

be

of a convenient

very well be more final. Our critic adds that the work length. If it is too short, he says, our perception of it
might

becomes indistinct. (This is meiosis; he

perceived at

have

said

that it

will

not

be
on

all,

since the

library

subscriber will

flatly

refuse to

take it out,
still

the ground that "there isn't

enough

reading in it.") He objects, "one thousand

miles

more

strongly, to the
plot,"

work

that is

of vast size or of some

or

he

reminds

us, "must be

length, but

of a
of

"A story length to be taken in

Ulysses,4

long."

by

the

memory."

man might write a reader would not

but, if he did,
mind would

the

detective story be able to bear

and

the length of

all the scattered clues

in

from the first

chapter

to the

last,

the effect of the final

discovery

be lost. In practice, a length of from 80,000 to 120,000 words is desir in Aristotle's general able, if the book is to sell; and this is enough to allow,

formula,

of

misfortune
conveys a

"the hero's passing by a series of probable to happiness or from happiness to

warning:

or

necessary

stages

from

Later, however, he
beyond

very necessary

"A

writer often stretches out a plot

408

Interpretation
and

its capabilities,
unwise

is thus
a

incident."

obliged

to twist the
of plot

sequence of

It is

to

"write-up"

short-story type

to novel

length,

even

to fulfil a

publisher's contract.

The
not

next section of

the Poetics gives advice about the unity of the plot.

It is
says

necessary to tell he gives)

author

us

everything that ever befel the hero.

For example,
adapted

Aristotle,
stance

"in writing

about

Sherlock

Holmes"

(I have slightly

the in

"the

does

not

trouble to say where the hero was

born,

or whether

he

was

educated at which

Oxford

or

Cambridge,
they

nor

does he

enter

into details

about

incidents

though we know

occurred

are not relevant to the matter

such as the cases of

Vamberry

the Wine

Merchant,

the Aluminium

in hand, Crutch, Wilson

Worm."

the Notorious Canary-Trainer or Isadora Persano and the Remarkable

The story, he
"must

says

represent one

action,

a complete

whole,

with

its

several

incidents

so

closely

connected that the transposal or withdrawal of

any

one of

them will disjoin and

dislocate the

whole."

In

other

words, "murder

darlings"

your

or, if

you must write a purple pas

sage, take care to

omitted or

include in it
Marlowe's in The

some vital clue to the

solution,

which cannot

be

transposed to any
of

other part of

the

story.

Thus, in Trent's Last Case,

the

description

room conveys the

a member of

the O.U.D.S.

and

necessary clue that he has been is therefore to be presumed capable of acting a

Murder Case throws
needful

part; the

poker-game

Canary

light

on

the

murderer's
pares us

character;

the picture of

the

Shivering

Sands in The Moonstone in that spot;

pre

for the

discovery

of the paint-stained nightgown

and so

forth. But is
now comes the

important

question:

What kind

of plot are we to choose? and the

And this deceive

should

raises the great central opposition of the

Probable

Possible. It

possible

that two Negroes should co-exist, so much alike as not only to the eye, but to possess the same Bertillon measurements; that they
same

both bear the in the But if

an

Christian

and

surnames,

and that

they

should

both be

confined

same prison at the same

we are

time: it is possible,

since

occurred.5

to found a plot upon such a series of

appearance.

it actually coincidences it

will

have

improbable

It is
either

open to us to contrive stories

based

upon such

incidents in

real

life,

giving the characters their real names or otherwise calling upon the wit ness of history. Thus there have been books founded on the Bravo case, the

When

Crippen murder, the Penge tragedy, the case of W. H. Wallace, the facts are well known, the reader will accept the events
But it
often

and so on. as narrated.

turns out that the stories

so written appear

those that are wholly

invented;

and

it is

frequently

necessary

less convincing than to add inventions

Aristotle
to the
that,"

on

Detective Fiction

409
"So

known facts, in
says

order to make these tme events appear probable.

must not aim at a

Aristotle, "one
as

rigid

adherence

to the traditional
few."

stories,"

particularly

"even the known

cannot

stories are

known only to

Thus,
But

even where

the

possibility

be challenged, probability

should

be

studied. where

both

names and

incidents

are

invented, then, "a likely impossibil

should use

ity

is

possibility

always preferable

to

an

unconvincing
a man's

that the leaden

bullet buried in
after

body

It may be impossible be chemically recovered

of
scientific

from his

ashes

cremation;

but, by

skilful

language,
Cambridge

Dr. Austin Freeman

persuades us that

it is probable,

and

indeed inevitable.

Whereas,
behind

when an author seeks

to persuade us that a pleasant young

man of gentle

birth is

affronted

by being

asked

to take his place in a queue though physically possi

a taxi-driver or some such

person, the

incident,

ble,

offends

whose eternal patience amount

its improbability, being contrary to the English character, in arranging itself in orderly queues is well known to says Aristotle, "should never be made up of to genius. "The

by

story,"

improbable

incidents;
they

there should be nothing

of

the sort in

it."

Lest this

seem

too severe, he

suggests as a practical compromise

that "if such incidents are

unavoidable,

should

be kept

action."

outside

the
of

Thus, in
not we

the

Gloria Scott,
able,

while

the previous

history

Old Trevor is

story of The merely improb

this in
as

but, according

to the dates given,

impossible,

do
the

not notice plot.

reading, because the

regards the

episode stands outside the action of

Similarly,

characters, the impossible-probable is better than the

a

improbable-

possible; for (says Aristotle again) "if

scribed

detective

such as
should

Conan Doyle de be like that,

since

be

impossible,

the answer is that it is better he

on

the artist ought to improve

his

model."

In the
effect,
as

matter of scientific

detail, Aristotle is

all

for

accuracy.

If, he

says

in

you cannot attain your artistic end without some

impossible device (such

the

instantaneously
"If, however,

fatal

and undiscoverable poison),

then,

at a pinch, you

may be justified in using it:

the poetic end might have been as
well or

better

attained without

sacrifice of technical correctness

in

such matters, the

impossibility

is

not

to

be

justified,

since the

description

should

be, if it can, entirely free from

in the

error."

Thus, in Mr. John Rhode's The Corpse

tectable
gas

from the

wireless

set

is

more

Car, the emission of an unde justifiable, because scientifically

acid gas

feasible,
effective

than the same

author's release of

hydrocyanic (I

from

a rubber

hot- water

bottle in Poison for in

practice.

One,

a method which

am

told)

would not

be

Concerning
sal of

the three necessary

and

parts of a

detective

plot

peripety, or rever

fortune, discovery,
or painful

suffering

tions. On suffering,

we need not

Aristotle has many very just observa dwell long. Aristotle defines it as "action of a
as

destructive

nature,

such

murders,

tortures,

woundings

and the

410
like."

Interpretation
These
are common enough in the detective story, and the only remark to is that they ought always to help on the action in some way, and not in merely to harrow the feelings, still less to distract attention from a

be be

made
put

weakness

in the

plot.

reversal of

fortune may happen to

or

all or

who

is

frequently
body;

a man of vast wealth

any of the characters: the victim may be reduced to the status of a

to be dead after all, as we had

mere

dead

may, again, turn

out not

The wrongly suspected person, after undergoing great misfortunes, be saved from the condemned cell and restored to the arms of his be may trothed. The detective, after several errors of reasoning, may hit upon the right
supposed. solution. of

Such

peripeties

keep

terror,

compassion and so

the story moving and arouse alternating emotions forth in the reader. These events are best brought
some

about,

not

fortuitously, but by
of various or

hamartia
victim

or

defect in the

sufferer.

The
un-

defect may be
amiable

kinds. The

may

suffer on account of

his

through the error of marrying a wicked person, or through in foolishly engaging dubious finance, or through the mistake of possessing too much money. The innocent suspect may have been fool enough to quarrel with

character,

the victim,

or

to

bring

suspicion on

to shield somebody. The

some

detective

himself by suppressing evidence with intent suffers his worries and difficulties through
of

failure

of observation or

logic. All these kinds

defect

are

fruitful in the

production of peripety.

Aristotle
ment.

mentions many varieties of the discovery which forms the denoue This is usually the discovery, either of the identity of the murderer, or of

the

means

by

which

the crime was committed.

are

(1) indeed,

The
so

worst

kind
as

discoveries

made

by

the author

inartistic

to be scarcely permissible in the true

himself. These are, detective story:

they belong
is known, to

to the thriller. It

is, however,

possible,

where

the villain's

identity

story by showing made successively by villain and detective (Wilkie Collins in No Name; Austin Freeman in The Singing Bone).
make an agreeable

the moves and counter-moves

(2) The discovery by

of Mary

material signs and tokens

is very

common:

in The Trial
convic

Dugan the

discovery

that

a person

is left-handed leads to his

tion; in The Eye of Osiris the

the missing corpse is Potts fracture in both.

identity of the (supposed) Egyptian mummy with proved by the discovery of identical tooth-stoppings and a
is
also used:

(3) Discovery
murder-method

through memory

the production

of an airlock

in

thus, in Unnatural Death, the a main is discovered artery

in the
petrol-feed of a

to the

detective

by

his memory

of a similar air-lock

motor-cycle.

(4) Discovery
derer
was

through

in the house

at such a

reasoning is perhaps most common of all: the mur time, he is an electrician, he is tall and smokes
corresponds to all these

Sobranie cigarettes; only X

the murderer.

indications,

therefore X is

Aristotle

on

Detective Fiction

-411

(5) Aristotle's fifth

type

of

discovery through bad reasoning obscure, the text being

discovery is particularly interesting. He calls by the other party. The instance he adduces
mutilated and

it is

unknown. referring to a play But I think he really means to describe the discovery by bluff. Thus, the detec tive shows the suspect a weapon "If you are not the murderer, how do

apparently

saying,

you come not

to be in possession

weapon?"

of this
was

The

suspect replies:
"Indeed?"

"But that is

the weapon with which the crime

know?"

says the

de

tective, "and how do you This brings us to the very

those

remarkable passage which

in

which

Aristotle, by

one of

blinding flashes
into

of

insight

display
puts

to the critic of genius the very

whole craft of

core and centre of

writer

the writer's problem,

the

the detective
written

one master-word:

Paralogismos. That

word should

be

up in

letters

of gold on

the walls

of

every

mystery-monger's

study

at once

the guid

ing
his

star

by

which

he

sets

his

compass and

the jack-o'-lantern

by

which

he leads
which

readers

into the bog;

a

paralogism

the art of the false syllogism

for

Aristotle himself has

whole
"Homer,"

blunter

and more candid phrase.

Let

us examine the

paragraph, for it is of the utmost importance.

says

he

if he had lived in
example,
of such as

our own

day he
or

might

have

chosen

some more apposite

Father Knox
says

Mrs. Agatha
more

Christie,
than

but, thinking
other

no

doubt

Odysseus, he
the
art of

Homer

"Homer
in the

any

has taught the

rest of us

framing lies

right

way.6

mean

Whenever, if A is or happens, a consequent, B is or happens, men's notion is that, if the B is, the A also is but that is a false conclusion. Accordingly, if A is untrue, but there is something else, B, that on
the use of
paralogism.

the assumption
present are
us7

of

its truth follows

led

with

the B. Just because

on

in

our own minds

its consequent, then the right thing is to know the truth of the consequent, we to the erroneous inference of the truth of the
as
we

antecedent."

There

you

are, then; there is

your recipe

for detective fiction: the

art of

framing

lies. From be lead the

beginning

to end of your

book, it is

your whole aim and

object to

reader

believe the
where

real murderer

up the garden; to induce him to believe a lie. To to be innocent, to believe some harmless person to be
where

guilty; to believe the detective to be right

he is wrong
and

and mistaken

he is

right;
the

to believe the

false

alibi

to be sound, the

present

absent, the

dead

alive and

living dead;

to

believe, in short, anything

everything but

the truth.

The

art of

There is the
seduced

framing lies but mark! of framing lies in crux. Any fool can tell a lie, and any fool
is to tell the
truth

the right way

can

(os dei).
but the

believe

it;

right method

in

such a

way that the intelligent

writer

reader

is

into telling
to
all

the lie for himself. That the

himself

should

tell a flat

lie is contrary

the canons of detective art. Is

twenty

centuries ahead of

great modem

theory

of

fair-play

amazing that Aristotle, his time, should thus have struck out at a blow the to the reader? A is falsehood; B is truth. The

it

not

412

Interpretation
A
upon

writer must not give us

his

own

authority, for

what

he

says upon which

his

own

and

authority leave us to draw the false

at

we must

be

able

to believe. But he may tell us B

conclusion

is true

that A is tme also.

Thus,

the opening

of a

story, the

servant

Jones is heard to say to his

to the matter at
once."

master, Lord

Smith, "Very

good, my lord. I

will attend

The inference is that, if Jones

to
and

was speaking to Smith, Smith was also speaking Smith was alive and present at the time. But that Jones; that, therefore, is a false conclusion; the author has made no such assertion. Lord Smith may

be absent; he may be already dead; Jones may have been addressing the empty air, or some other person. Nor can we draw any safe conclusion about the attitude of Jones. If Jones is indeed present in the flesh, and not represented
merely

by

his

voice

in the form

of a gramophone record or similar

device (as

be the case), then he may be addressing some other party in the belief may that he is addressing Smith; he may have murdered Smith and be establishing his own alibi; or Smith may be the murderer and Jones his accomplice engaged in
well

establishing

an alibi

some experienced readers

for Smith. Nor, on the other hand, is it safe to conclude (as will) that because Smith is not heard to reply he is not
well

therefore present. For this may very

reader's own

be the Double Bluff, in

which

the

cunning is
to

exploited

to his downfall. The reader may argue thus:

not speak

Jones

spoke

Smith, but Smith did

employ this device

to Jones.

Many

authors

so as

to establish the

false inference that

Smith

was alive and present. conclude

I therefore

that Smith is absent or dead.

as

But this "all

syllogism

is

as

false

the

other.

"Many
the

authors"

is

not

the same

thing

as

times."

authors at all

It does

not exclude

some

time

imply
man

the truth in
this

such a manner

that it

possibility looks like

that an author may at

a

he.

A fine

example of

double bluff is found in Father Knox's The Viaduct

with

Murder. A
the reader

is found dead,

his face beaten into

man was

unrecognisable pulp.
and

Circumstantial
are

evidence suggests

that the dead the

X. The detectives

invited to

reason after

following

manner:

The dead
But he is

man

is thought to be X.
not

unrecognisable.

Therefore he is Therefore he is

X.

And,

since

else, namely Y. X is undoubtedly missing, X is probably

someone corpse turns out to upon the

the murderer.

But the disfigured

conclusions

be X

after

all;

so

that

all the

ingenious

founded

false

premise are

false

also.

Another variety following lines

A is the But in
a

of the paralogism

is found in

a syllogism

built

upon

the

obvious suspect.

detective story, the

obvious suspect

is

always

innocent.

Therefore A is innocent.

Aristotle
But for the
statement
pect

on

Detective Fiction

-413

middle neither

term

of this proposition

there is no

warrant whatever.

The

is

universally

true nor

logically

necessary.

The

obvious sus

is innocent
him
so.

more

frequently

than not, but nothing

compels

the

author

to

make

Nothing
vouched

in

detective story

need

be held to be true

unless

the

author

has

for it in his
came

own person.

Thus, if the

author says

Jones
then we

home

at

10

o'clock

are entitled

to assume that Jones did indeed come home at that time

author says

and no other.

But if

The

grandfather clock was

striking ten
as

when

Jones

reached

home

then we can feel no

compels
us

Jones'

certainty

to the time of
of the
clock.

arrival, for nothing

need we

to accept the

testimony

Nor

believe the

testimony

of

any

character

in the story,

unless

the author himself vouches

for

that character's integrity.

Thus, let
The butler's
truthful.

us suppose that

the butler gives evidence that Jones returned at ten. that he

employer asserts we

has

always

Are

therefore to believe the butler?

found the butler scrupulously By no means; for the employer

may be deceived, or may have deceived the butler, or may be backing up the butler's testimony for reasons of his own. But if the author himself says: "No one could possibly doubt that the butler
truth"

speaking the truthful witness, for the

was

then, I think, we must believe that the butler is a author himself has stated, on his own authority, that
the

doubt

was

impossible.

Remember, however, that author. Thus, in The Murder

tive's fidus Achates or (to
particular
use

telling the story is not necessarily the of Roger Ackroyd, the story is told by the detec
person

the

modem

to the general,

we

may be

seduced
all

term) his Watson. Arguing from the into concluding that, because the
Watsons
are good

original

Dr. Watson
this

was a good

man,

in

virtue of

their
no

Watsonity. But
means

is false reasoning, for

moral worth and

Watsonity are by
upon

having

his wife; but it would be an error to conclude that all men, when they sin, blame their wives though in fact they frequently do. There may be found rare men who, them and are none the less men on that wives, yet refrain from blaming inseparable. Thus, the first
man sinned and

laid the blame

account.

So, despite

the

existence

of a

first innocent Watson,

we

may

yet admit

the possibility of a guilty one; nor, when the Watson in Roger Ackroyd turns right to feel aggrieved against the out to be the murderer, has the reader any
author

for

she

has

vouched

only for the

man's

Watsonity

and

not

for his

moral worth.

This brings us, however, to the consideration of the characters, concerning point of view. He says that they whom Aristotle takes a very twentieth-century taken relatively, to mean that they be good. This, I suppose, must be
must

should,

even

the

meanest and wickedest

of

them, be

not

merely

monsters and

414

Interpretation
personages

caricatures, like the

in

low

farce, but
be

endued with some sort of

human

dignity,
point

so that we are enabled to take them seriously.

They

must also

be

appropriate: a

female, he says,

must not

represented as clever.

This is

delicate

would

he,

or would

he not, have

approved of

Miss Gladys

Mrs. Bradley? We may take it, however, that the diabolically cleverness should only be such as is appropriate to the sex and circumstances of the character it would be inappropriate that the elderly maiden sister of a

Mitchell's

clever

country
other

clever method

carry out or detect a murder by means of an intricate and knowable only to advanced chemical experts; and so with the characters. Thirdly, the characters must be like the reality (to omoion).
parson should about what

Scholars differ

Aristotle

means

by

this word.

Some think it means,

"conformable to tradition": that the

villainous
"Ha!"

villain

should and

by his

green

eyes, his

moustache

be easily recognisable as his manner of ejaculating

his dressing-gown
and

and after

the detective

the more ancient

his eccentricities, his models. But I do not agree

by

pipe and
with

them,

believe that

the

"realistic,"

word

means,

as we

imation in

speech and

say to-day, behaviour to

i.e.

with some moderate approx

such men and women as we see about us. realistic

For elsewhere, Aristotle takes the modem,

view,

as when

he says, for

instance,
derer,
on

that the plot ought not to turn on the

detection

and punishment of a

hopelessly

bad

man who

is

villainous

in

all

directions
an

at once

forger,

mur

adulterer, thief

like the bad baron in

a

that of an intermediate kind of person

which

Adelphi melodrama; but rather decent man with a bad kink in him

is the kind
more

of villain most approved

by

the

best

modem writers

in this his

kind. For the

the villain resembles an ordinary man, the more shall we

greater will suspects and

feel pity and horror at his crime and the detection. So, too, as regards the innocent
all such

be

our surprise at

the police;

characters,

a certain resemblance

to real life is on

in treating the whole to be

desired. Lastly, and most important and difficult of all, the characters must be consistent from first to last. Even though at the end we are to feel surprise on

discovering
beginning
apparently in his
is

the

identity
able to

of

the criminal, we ought not to feel

incredulity;

we

should rather

be

say to ourselves:

"Yes,

can see now

that from the

wits

this man had it

in him to

commit

murder, had I only had the

author."

to

interpret the indications furnished

amiable

by

the

Thus,

the villainy of the

father in The Copper Beeches is betrayed in the

slaughter of
consistent.

by

his

participa charac

tion ter

offspring's cmel enjoyment

flies,
of

and

the

seen

to be
of the

Inconsistency
indeed,

in the

characters

destroys
of

the
fan-

probability from

action, and,

amounts to a

breach

the rule

play, since we are entitled to believe that a character remains the

same person

beginning

to end of the story and nemo repente fuit turpissimus.

This discourse is already too long. Let me remind myself of Aristotle's own warning: "There are many writers who, after a good complication, fail to bring
off

the

denouement."

application

This is painfully tme to lectures and speeches upon

of

detective stories; it has

But

also some
ev-

whatever occasion.

indeed,

Aristotle

on

Detective Fiction

-415

erything that Aristotle says about writing and composition is pregnant with a fundamental truth, an inner lightness, that makes it applicable to all forms of literary art, from the most trivial to the most exalted. He had, as we say, the
root of the matter
work of art at all will

in him; and any writer who tries to make a detective story a do well if he writes it in such a way that Aristotle could
it.

have

enjoyed and approved

NOTES

Notes have been for this 1

ter,
.

numbered

consecutively
used

and

Greek

words

have been transliterated into English

printing. of

The translation

The Poetics

throughout this lecture is that of Professor Ingram Bywa

published

by

the Clarendon Press.

2. It is

perhaps

necessary to

remind readers

that this kind of

incident,

though

it has

since

become

quite

commonplace,

was unusual at

the date

(1935)

when this paper was

first

written.

4. I refer,
subject.

3. Editorial in The Author, spring, 1935. of course, to Mr. James Joyce's novel; 5. The
case of the two

not to

Homer's

poetical treatment of the

Will Wests, U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, 1903.

add on

6.
7.
first"

pseude

legein hos del.

prostheinai

[deil Bywater: "to

the

B."

Wharton: "it is

natural

to

pre-suppose

the

(i.e. the A). Whichever translation is preferred, the general sense is clear: if the author provides the consequent, the reader may be trusted to infer (falsely) the antecedent for himself.

Review Essays

Modern Man

and

Man Tout Court:

and

The Flight from Nature

Daniel J. Mahoney
Assumption College

the Modern Difference

Pierre Manent, La Cite de I'homme (Paris: In his

the
remarkable new

Fayard, 1994), 295

pp.

book, La Cite I'homme, Pierre Manent investigates

to what

question of man

in

relation

he

calls the modern

difference. He

presents a
order

penetrating

and

to address the question of man

faithful phenomenology of modem consciousness in in light of the modem modification or fundamental theoretical
relationship to in some
to make sense of modem con
real

transformation of human beings. He grapples with the

and practical sciousness.

dilemma confronting any

man remains a

effort

Modem

man, he retains some

man tout court

kind

of

("simply"). Yet, his nature appears to be unexplainable limbo or located at least in part in historical
man past.

suspended

an unavailable and

definitively
Modem
ences

then lives under the power or illusion of history. He experi

above all of

historical consciousness; he believes himself being; he feels and is dominated by the sentiment

to be a historical
modem

historicity. The
history"

difference is then essentially tied to

which remains of modem sophical

authority "authority virtually unchallenged in all the theoretical and political camps life. Manent's book is accordingly a profound, historical and philo
a new

of

an

investigation

and reflection on

the

modem

difference,
and the

on

the origin,
which

foundation

and work of that new

and coexists

authority,

history,

way in
with

it

transforms, deforms
stance,

with the old

human nature,

the sub

motives and ends of

human beings.
the problem of nature and

Manent takes up and right and history, and in Strauss.

renews

history,

of natural

doing
on

so

he builds

on the

pioneering
and

researches of

Leo

Drawing

widely
the

Strauss's

analyses

of the

quarrel

between

the an

cients and

the moderns, Manent delineates

of
modem

as

fairly

accurately

as possible a

phenomenology

difference.

And, like Strauss, he

any

recognizes

the

of

centrality the human

of the theological-political problem to

situation.

adequate comprehension

He treats the

theological-political problem

in

a manner

which

is indebted to but

finally

diverges from Strauss's approach, however. He

interpretation,

Spring 1995,

Vol. 22, No. 3

418
is

Interpretation
Christian
accounts of

more attuned to and sympathetic to the

nature, creation

and

law

and

to the place of Rome and all that it represents in the premodern the human things. Strauss attributed the

presentation of and contestation about

vitality tween Athens

of western civilization and

to the fundamental and irresolvable tension be

Jerusalem. For Manent, in contrast, the

invigorating

moral

and political tension which conflict and

defines

and sustains the

between

humility

and

the Imitatio Christi heralded

magnanimity by Thomas

vitality of the West is the between the heroes of Plutarch Kempis

between
greatness of

soul and

excellence.

humility before that which is divinely responsible for According to Manent, the city of man the city of
city"

every human
the

"history"

"atheistic

is

an effort to put an end to the tension and

dialectic between
of a natural or

greatness and created

humility,
as

to

literally

"flee"

any rigorous demands

order, to flee the

motives or contents of our nature.

elsewhere,1

Manent
the moral

is,

I have

argued

less

a partisan of of man

philosophy than

of

phenomena or moral contents

that the city

ignores,

transforms

and relegates nizes

to the private, idiosyncratic realm of civil society. But he recog the

revolution

that the democratic revolution

ways

described in different but

revolution which emanci

complementary pates the human

Tocqueville

by

Hegel

and

Tocqueville

the

will

calls

(Hegel) or the sovereignty of man over himself (what "popular sovereignty") does endlessly transform human be
history. Man becomes
most
modem

ings. It
the
put

gives man a

man, democratic

man.

As

work of

Tocqueville

powerfully elucidates, "the

principle of consent

in

work

by

the

will of

the

individual,
then

penetrates and reconstructs the rela

tionships which

seemed until

invariably

inscribed in the

eternal order of

human nature, for example, and eminently, the relations between parents and children, between man and woman, or in the eternal order of the world for
example,
and

eminently those
not one regime and social

religion"

which

constitute

(p. 230). 2 Modem

democracy,

the regime and social state whose generative principle is popular

sovereignty, is

bility

of

human

among many conforming to a permanent possi nature as in Aristotle's classification of regimes. It is

rather a new

irresistible

and

irreversible historical
is the
and

state

it is the "fated Aristotle's

circle"

of modem man.

political regimes.
which

Democracy Democracy

successor regime to

cycle of
within

aristocracy (the

retrospective

category

Tocqueville locates
humanities."

all premodern political and social

orders)

are

"like

two distinct

This

sentiment of
a

the

modem

difference,
must

of

democratic

or modem man as

the reflection of
ousness

"new

humanity,"

be

confronted with the utmost seri

if

one

is to do justice to the scrupulously

phenomena.

And Manent

is,

above

all,

interested in
sight

being

attentive to the phenomena as

they

come to

in

all

their complexity and

imprecision. A

genuine science of man and

society

must

transformation

do justice to the democratic revolution, to the seemingly endless of human life under the aegis and empire of the human will.

Modernity

understands

itself

as the emancipation or
of

triumph

of

the will, of

its
yet

liberation from the framework

human ends,

substance or

finality. And

Modern Man
Manent believes that
recognize what

and

Man Tout Court

419

a genuine

phenomenology
nature

of modem consciousness must

Horace recognized, that

will

despite the
the

most powerful ef
poet-

forts

of

the

human Charles
matin,

always

return,

and what

French Catholic
le journal
as

philosopher
nouveau

Peguy
et rien

articulated with characteristic n'est

beauty, "Homere
que perhaps old

est

ce

peut-etre

aussi

vieux

d'auas

jourd'hui."

("Homer is

new

this morning and nothing is

difference."3

today's newspaper.") A true science of man must give "voice to the sentiment
of our ems our

How can we mod community of nature above the modem remain faithful to the claims of human universality? How can we sustain

very

humanity

while

remaining faithful to the

or overcome

modem

difference,
in the

differ

ence which

threatens to erode

that very universality? Manent's

culminates paradoxical

book, his penetrating

and

researches and

analyses,

arresting claim: the modem experience and sentiment of history, the work of human sovereignty of the emancipated will is very real indeed, but the moral in fact, the most emphatic illu authority of history is a "methodical
illusion,"

sion

to which this
an

thinking

species

has

ever consented

(pp. 293-94).
of

The city many but it the illusion is derived from an is illusion, city, modem-man has made or constructed himself. It is a "sincere
productive of so results?

Can

illusion be

man, the

atheistic

upon which which

sentiment"

defines the judgment

consciousness of modem

times. Yet it

is

a sentiment that can

and

finally
can

provide no guidance about

how

men ought

to live

therefore no criteria of

about the inherent Tightness or

wrongness

of

human deeds. It

provide man
must

only with a negative and ultimately self-refuting criterion: we flee the law we are given by nature or God for a law that we have made And in the kind
name of

for

ourselves.

history

that he

has

made

servitude,

a new

for himself, for law and of limit. Modem man

perpetually flees the law tradition risk becoming a new kind of

modem man must

authority, every
of

claim of phusis and nomos: under

flee every heteronomy, every the protective dispensation

enemy"

history he must become the maker of himself.

new

in this
order

city of man, "the nature of man to become truly human, to be free or autonomous,
of

Under the authority of history, (p. 292). In is his principal

modem man

risks his

very humanity. In the first half

therewith

his book, Manent

the

shows

the artificial or constructed and

of

distorting

character of

modem consciousness

the

self.

It is

impossible completely or successfully to flee our nature and the dialectic of nature and law which is constitutive of our humanity and human dignity, but the effort to do so creates a new world, the modem world, which is neither Christian
to those
a closer nor

Greek,
at

where neither
which

magnanimity
the
on

nor

humility
are

rules.

Let

us turn

artful

fictions

have

constituted

modem

self-understanding, to
so conducive

look

that city based

largely

lies

which

to

strange,

efficacious and part of

awe-inspiring

works.

In the first
nent
History,"

his book,

entitled

"The Consciousness

of

the

Self,"

Ma
of

investigates the

three pillars of modem

View"

"The Sociological Point

of

consciousness, "The and "The System of

Authority

Economy."

In

420

Interpretation
and

order to comprehend each of these massive shapers modem

determinants

of the new

self-understanding clearly, Manent turns to the

origins of
eighteenth

these

perspectives

in the

serious

thought of the

seventeenth,

and nine

teenth centuries. He does so not only because the origins of phenomena

reveal their nature

help

to

but

also

because these

approaches which

form the

modem

consciousness of the
as natural as the

self,

approaches which we
were

take for granted, which seem

consciousness then mysterious

morning sun, is not the

of

the deliberate products of thought.

Modem
or a

result of an

inexorable

process of

history

dispensation

fate. It is

rather the

free

creation of a

human project,
in England

the result of a

new empire

governing

the souls of men.

The
and

consciousness of

becoming

modem was

first

experienced

France,

the vanguards of modernity, in the eighteenth century. It was there

that modem consciousness became self-conscious. Modem man

is defined

by

the overwhelming

sentiment of

living

under

the

Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu

reinforce
history."

gave shape and

authority of history. In The force to this sentiment, using

modem

the authority of philosophy and his own refined and subtle art to establish and

that

authority.

For

Montesquieu, "to become

also

is to live in

Manent

shows

the pivotal role of Montesquieu in constructing the

pillars of modem

consciousness, but he
the
results of

sympathetically

recounts

Montes
much

quieu's reservations about shape and pacious

the new modernity that he did

greatness of

to

define. Manent

appreciates

Montesquieu's

soul, his

ca

humanity

which could appreciate

the amplitude of human things in a

way that his epigones hardly began to approximate. Montesquieu established the authority of history, but he naive progressivist. He also established the authority of the
of

was no simple or sociological point

view,

inventing

the very notion of general

laws

and sociological parameters

which govern men gist.

(pp.

Manent

cannot

82-85, 90-94), but he was a philosopher not a sociolo help loving Montesquieu, but he holds Montesquieu re

sponsible for his works and that, of course, is how Montesquieu would want it. For Manent, Montesquieu "is decidedly the modem philosopher most capable of losing us as well as (p. 109). Let us turn to an examination of that saving
us"

subtle art
us.

by

which

Montesquieu is simultaneously
The Spirit of the Laws
represented moderate

capable of

losing

and

saving

Manent

shows that

moves

between the two

poles of

the old and the new: the ancient world of republican virtue and the new world
of commerce and

liberty,
is

by

England. Situated

somewhere

between

European monarchy, represented above all France. of there is the "sempiternal by And, that Montesquieu course, never ceased fighting because it is always a human possibility: despotism. Montesquieu's ambition is properly philosophical because he wished to under
old and new world
menace"

the

stand all the

forms

of

the human

world.

But he

finally

could not understand

those forms together. He

could not make a natural whole of

the

human

world

(pp. 18-19). Montesquieu's famous

classification of the nature and principles

Modern Man
of

and

Man Tout Court

421

regimes, the
which

republican regime which

is

moved

by

virtue, the European

whose principle

monarchy is fear, does

cannot

is

characterized

by honor,

and

the

despotism

not

include the

modem regime par

excellence, England. The

new

be

apprehended and comprehended

together with the old. Not only is

Montesquieu's

regime of

choice, the

modem regime of commerce and

liberty,
is
no

not comprehended

by

his

classification of

regimes, but
with

one of

those

old regimes

is

no

longer

human
to

possibility:

the ancient city

its

republican virtue

longer
great

available

modem men. nature

Montesquieu
strange and

paints this regime which

does

damage to human
virtue, is
a

in

farcical

strokes.

Montesquieu's

critique of the ancient republic

demanding
acter.

repressive

is twofold: this regime, founded on a cruelly of human nature; it is literally horrific in char

It is

not mutilate

strangely foreign thing unavailable to self-conscious men who will themselves for the sake of some tenuous notion of the good. There
order which

is

a new

human

has

substituted

for

and surpassed real evils

the old one,

an

order of commerce and

liberty

where

the flight from

has

replaced the

order where

the pursuit

of goods results

in

distorting
of

cmelties.

In

a careful analysis of the

opening books

The Spirit of the Laws, Manent

outlines

the

rhetorical

immense
the

consequences

a rhetorical strategy with strategy of this great work for the subsequent development of liberal societies. He which

shows the

intriguing
an

way in

Montesquieu's discussion
chimera or not

of virtue entails

elaboration of a

self-conscious

fiction. Montesquieu
in

literally
but
forms"

"invents"

idea

of virtue which
'Christian'

"envelops

only

ancient political virtue

also

the

'moral'

or

virtues

and, in general,

virtue

all

its

(p. 31). In creating this fiction Montesquieu draws

criticisms of classical political virtue or
on

the mutual reproaches and

virtue of

magnanimity, the
with

Sparta

and

Plutarch's heroes

and

Christian

humility

its

recognition of man's ultimate

dependence
ism
and

on an order of grace.

He draws

upon

Christianity's dividedness

"egalitarian"

critique of classical

politics, but he

also utilizes

the resources of classical

of the

hero
soul

statesmanship to ridicule the smallness and Christian humility. Montesquieu intensifies assimilating the two European
that he

formed

by

and radicalizes

the con
good

flict between the two

and ends

virtues and the two understandings of the

moral

human

by

traditions into a unitary and

"ascetic,"

This virtue may well it makes too be adrnirable, but it assuredly is not It is too human nature. in fact, and demands on our fragile Montesquieu, needy many
never-before-recognized synthesis
calls
"likable."

"virtue."

identifies the discipline

astery,
and

and asceticism of

the

classical

city

with

that of a mon

this

identification, contrary
not critique of virtue

to the

claims of several

contemporary
that term.

commentators, is

intended to be flattering.
is
a polemic

Montesquieu's

in the literal

sense of

He

sets out to show the repressive effects of the two great moral traditions of

Christian Europe. Manent eloquently shows, however, that Montesquieu does not for a minute believe that the new regime of commerce and liberty can

422

Interpretation
substitute

simply
times

for the

virtue which

had

culminated

in

so

many

great

if

some

perverse works.
"natural"

than a

Montesquieu, in the end, defense of the English

master

"historical"

makes more of a

"constitution."

He knows that

modem can

liberty
secure

can

teach men to

their social constitutions.

mores

He knows that it

human

ter

1)

and

dignity by softening by "curing men of

cannot provide

Machiavellianism"

ter 20). But it

the

real

(Spirit of the Laws, book 20, chap day by day (book 21, chap of a human life or do justice motives
moderate

to the ample capacities of our nature.

European monarchy

such as

France, less
English

"modem"

than

England, leaves
is

room

for

a refinement and cultiva

tion of taste and

soul which

largely

absent of

in

more

bourgeois England. The

liberty."

must always able

be

vigilant

in defense

their "extreme that

They

are

sleep."

"scarcely
"is

to
liberty"

Montesquieu

freely

admits

men are

happier Such

under

the "moderate
always

which characterizes the

French

monarchy.

liberty

menaced

by despotism,

'insult'

that

to human

nature,"

however.

Manent
If

writes:

one wishes

to banish
accept

it is necessary to
commerce and of

decisively the despotism which is the fatality of monarchy, being extremely free. One must accept the moral effects of
which are not nature.

liberty,

completely favorable to the

greatness or to

the

happiness

of man

in his

(P.

69)
of

Montesquieu formulates the

posed

position

"progressivist
unalloyed

sense"

good

as

op

to the

enlightenment vulgate with

its

faith in the

progress and

enlightenment of men.

For Montesquieu, the

regime of virtue or of

law

can

tmly
to
not

be

said

to be

against

"conform to
sought out

nature"

nature, but the regime or to be the "best

"found"

liberty
It is

cannot

truly be

said

regime."

a regime which

is

but instead

in the

modem

experience of of

Tacitus's Germans

"found"

liberty

in the forests

things, just as Europe. History has pro

vided an example of a regime which

regime cannot
quieu

be

said

successfully avoids despotism, but that to be "the best in the classical sense. Montes
regime"

has

a negative standard of

nature, the

worst regime whose sempiternal

possibility tions. But he

regime which

transcends the
recognizes

historical polarity between the old and new dispensa no "best There is merely that
regime."

"historical"

is

"found"

and not

"sought

out"

and which of

best avoids,

which

is

most vigilant against

the menacing insult

of classical

despotism (pp. 19-21). And de

spite

his

polemical

portrait

virtue,

Montesquieu,

that exquisite

painter of moral and political

types,

provides a

beautiful image

of noble

Epami

nondas

in book 4
condemn

equally
cause

Spirit of the Laws. In fact, Montesquieu does not the faces of European morality: He is finally more sympa
of the
men's all

thetic to

classical or pagan

it does

not

divide

magnanimity than he is to Christian humility be loyalties; it does not make him homeless, torn
these reasons Montesquieu
refused

between two bitter

be
end

worlds.

For

to go to the

in his

polemic against virtue.

replaced

by

the

authority

of

The authority of virtue could not simply history, because history could not provide any

Modern Man
new

and

Man Tout Court

vocation.

423

idea

of

man, his nature, his

possibilities and

his

Montesquieu

refuses
good

to countenance the thorough

jettisoning
of

of all

images

of virtue and the

life, for

example, "the

noble

image

Epaminondas."

The infinite
and political or part of

art of

Montesquieu, in
of ancient

the very process of

destroying

the intellectual
"imaginary"

authority
or

virtue, preserves

or rather

invents its

"aesthetic"

"historical"

authority,
education until the

which will remain

the principle of the best

European

1960s. (P.

43)
this aesthetic image

Manent
"save"

beautifully
us

reveals

Montesquieu's
reveals

effort to sustain

of the moral contents of

life. He

the ways in which Montesquieu can

by
of

softening

sustaining some real contents to our life besides the admirable mores brought about by the institutionalization of commerce. Mon very authority

tesquieu anticipated the

tory

of the

dehumanizing of history

consequences of the unadulterated vic

that

he did

so much to empower and clear

legitimize: those
tion wrought

consequences are communism.

by

emblematically Manent writes:

in the human devasta

This fiction

plays a real moral rule and

salutary
and

one.

In

fact, let
. .

us think

only

of what will

in Montesquieu's eyes, a necessary and happen in the East of Europe,

when modem

man, intoxicated and as if possessed

.

by

the sole

authority

of

History
and

the Future

completely

empties

his imagination
"x"

undertakes to

realize, to

cause to

exist, the

of a

images, New Man. (P. 43)

of all the old

But

what all

held together in the

things,"

soul of

Montesquieu,

a soul

"capable

of under

standing become the

could not

hold together in the from

world where

history

had
au

standard of moral and political

judgment. Even the

"aesthetic"

thority
tent

of virtue

is

under assault

a progressivism which will not rest con

until all

the reflections and manifestations of

which speak to us of our nature and therefore command a subverted.

Athens, Jerusalem and Rome, law, are thoroughly

must

Every

canon, every

law, every heteronomy

nature must outside of

be uprooted,
or else of

must

be

"deconstructed."

The flight from

be complete,
and

the dan

ger of
tion,"

domination

of man

by forces

himself, by

the forces
us at

"reac

remains potent.

Montesquieu truly risks

the

losing
of

saving

the same

time.

Montesquieu
painted and

could not control with such

trajectory

the very fiction that he had

In the world that Mon subtlety tesquieu helped design, there is little room for the prudence of his impressive soul. In the next generation Rousseau and his epigones, most notably and omi

designed

and prudence.

nously Robespierre, would use that fiction in ways which would have horrified Montesquieu. They formulated a new democratic and egalitarian version of Montesquieu's fictive
in the
pierre and the
virtue.

They

attacked

the

regime of commerce and

liberty
to
ac-

name of virtue and

Jacobin

"moment,"

citizenship (cf. Social Contract, virtue became truly

3, 15). With Robes

in
order

"cruel"

424

Interpretation
its
egalitarian

complish

transformation of the
and

world.

Rousseau,

of

course,

was

not an advocate of
reduce

despotism

terror,
to the

and one must avoid

status of an

the temptation to
advocate of
as an

this

profound philosopher
democracy."

ideological
saw

"totalitarian

Yet,

unlike

Montesquieu, he

cruelty

inte

gral element of political much

to expound.

life proper, of the very life of virtue which he did so This is one reason why he finally preferred the life of the
revolutionaries'

"solitary
appeal

walker"

to the civic life. In any case, as the French

to virtue shows,

history

played a cmel and of

ironic trick

on

the

intention,
even

both

audacious and

measured,

Montesquieu.
modem

Montesquieu, more than any other figure in more so than Rousseau, establishes the
profoundly
search
modem sentiment

European

history,

"authority"

of

history. He forms the

that the human experience of morality and poli

of together as a whole

tics can no longer be thought

through which men can

for the

goods of

their nature. He delineates the modem experience of

the succession and

incompatibility

of two

modem, and the consciousness of

being

modem

distinct humanities, the is henceforth the

ancient and

the

consciousness of

this division. When this consciousness is formulated explicitly and objectively it

concludes that the two contained and carried

distinct, incompatible
an element which

and successive

humanities law

are

by

is

neither nature nor

and which

is

the mother and sum of all the successions: History. (P.

71)
view."

Chapter 2 investigates the "sociological

that the newly emerged authority of
of the
"society"

point of

Manent

points out

history

was accompanied

by

a recognition

reality

of

which

dominates
no

all currents of political

thought in

the

nineteenth century.

Europeans

longer felt themselves to be

either natural

or political

animals,

finding
They

their motives for action in a realm of nature and

law

or

deliberating
and

together in the public space about questions of the "advan

experienced what

tageous

the

just."

Montesquieu

articulated

in book increas
or
of

19,

chapter

of

the Spirit of the Laws: many things govern men.

ingly

believed

that men are caused

choices.

deliberations historical

or reasonable

They by forces outside of their own souls They believed that men are products
new science of

and social processes. of

In the

society, sociology, the

social sciences aim

"desubstantialization"

human beings is
a

completed.

The

to formulate for the first time

ence of man exists

truly

"scientific"

science of science of

man, but the "sci

man"

only in refusing to be the

a means of

the nature of
phenomena

(p.

79). Its

Sociology

as

understanding

the

human

depends
nature.
non-

upon a

dogmatic

refusal to ask

"metaphysical"

questions about

human

public self-presentation

is that
Its

of agnosticism about all metaphysical or

"scientific"

questions.

But the human

effectual truth most

lies

elsewhere: social science

a

is

at

its deepest

core

"atheistic."

thoughtful architects believed that

recog
and

nition of a permanent

nature guided
of

by definitive

laws

and ends

accompanied

by

those concomitants

human nature,

choice and

chance, does

Modern Man
not allow

and

Man Tout Court

depends
upon

425
aboli

for

a genuine science of man.

Social

science

the

tion

of man understood as a

being

who

is

by

nature a moral and political animal.

This insight is certainly a radical and a discomforting one. It seems to chal lenge the principle of the mutual toleration of disciplines by definition accord
Of course, Manent is not ing to which no single perspective is in its narrow sense as a discussing sociology university discipline but rather as one of the distinguishing hallmarks of modem political consciousness. He turns to the study of what Peguy called the "method of the eminent partic of Durkheim and the social par scientists excellence. In Weber, ularly doing so, Manent fulfills Peguy 's great ambition to write the critique of "history and
cases,"

"privileged."

sociology in contradictory
"perspective"

times."

modem

Like Peguy, Manent

science

wishes

to explore the
and

un
self-

stated and problematic

assumptions, the underlying hubris

of society.

the

finally

character of the new

He

will not accept a

"methodology"

priori the sociological point of view as one

cause

or equally legitimate others. This perspective must be confronted head be on, among in it the modem difference is truly radicalized: as stated above the socio point of view

logical

has

no place

for

man as a prudent and

deliberative being.
ways.

It desubstantializes Durkheim 's

caused.

man

in two different but ultimately complementary

"objective"

In

positivistic or a

social

science,

man

is

not a cause

but

He is

being

whose

thought and action can be explained

by

a series of of

reductive and reciprocal

causes,

by

general

laws. Weber, "but

under

the influence
intelligence"

Nietzsche,
social

seems

to free himself from the confines of positivism. In Weberian

science,

man

is like

God

who

is

pure will

without

(p.

will

109). He sovereignly chooses the values, the gods and demons, dedicate his life. Despite their apparent opposition, both branches
to
or

which

he

of soci

ology deprive human beings of practical The only reason that survives is the
exempt

deliberative

reason.

reason of

the social scientist who

is

from the

circle of causation and

is able,

mirabile

dictu,

to decipher the

chain of causes that govern men or

to

recognize

in the

moral contents of
"values"

life, in
flow

the search for the good

from the mysterious fatum

In both its

life, (destiny)

the irrational but

of

efficacious

which

the

self.

objective and subjective

versions, sociology deprives human be

ings

of practical or
point

deliberative

reason.

It

establishes a radical

disjunction be

tween the

of the view of the actor and the point of view of the spectator
point of view of

(p. 79). The

member,

prescientific

the ordinary moral actor,

family
action

citizen or

statesman, a

point of view which

identifies human
any
of

with certain motives or reasons est.

for those actions, is

without

scientific

inter

The

prescientific moral and political

statesman

is

delusion

without

self-understanding foundation in scientific reason. Durkheim be

"fortuitous,"

the citizen and

lieved the heimian

products of

the human will are merely

are without real

"capricious,"

"contingent"

(p. 80).

They

efficacy

or causal capacity. Durk-

or objective social science

deprives

man of practical reason and con

centrates all reason

in the theoretical understanding

of

the

social scientist who

426

Interpretation
laws
and social relations that
man

understands the general

action of men.

determine the thought

of

and

"Society"

forms

independently

the moral will of real

individual actors,

and

the social

scientist observes and articulates

the chain of

social relations and causes. observation as opposed

Causation

and reason are reconnected and

in

scientific

to

practical reason

human

choice.

The ordinary properly

prescientific moral and political understood. understand

lives

of actors are

deprived
man

of reason

From the himself.

sociological

point of

view,

does

not and cannot

Weber's "methodological
science to

individualism"

is

an

impressive

effort

by

social

find

a place

for the human

wished

element

in this

circle of causation and

scientific reason. role

Weber

to

return

to the acting and to respect his

thinking individual
for the

in

the chain of causation.

"value"

He

"values."

wished

But the very

real moral
not arbi

notion of

is

a scientific construction and substitution

life

of

deliberating
choose a

individuals

and citizens.

Real human beings do

"values."

trarily

They

rather engage

in

a natural process of about

human

re

flection,
before it

dialogue,

however inchoate

or

undisciplined,

the

various

goods or ends of even

arbitrarily cuts off this begins. It thereby blesses or dignifies the action
their nature. the obstinate and the
self-serving.

Sociology

natural process

of the unthink

ing,

the

immoderate,
science

Social

then is not

truly

scientific

because it

cannot

do justice to the

moral and political phenomena and nomena moral give

the dialectical reasoning to which the phe

constitute

rise. These

phenomena

the prescientific

home,

the

framework,

of man and citizen. shows

Manent carefully

how the

rejection of

human nature,

of prescientific

common sense and pmdence and product of the effort to create a

deliberative reason, was the self-conscious science of man. Durkheim knew that Ariswas a science of

totelean political science,

because it

human nature, left

room

for

chance.

or worse

It therefore could, at best, provide guidance for the better conduct of human and political affairs (pp. 77-78). It could not pro

"artful"

certainty or precision that Durkheim, in contrast to Aristotle, believed to be the hallmark of a science of man. In a powerful illustration of the differ
vide the ences

between Aristotle's
Durkheim'

"imprecise"

science of

human nature,

chance

and

pmdence and

s science of

society, Manent delineates how

each can when

account

for that

crucial moral and political constellation called stood

"1940,"

Great Britain, seemingly against all odds, onslaught during the Battle of Britain.

up to the National Socialist

Aristotle,
chance.

as

did

"pre-sociological"

all

The

recognition of the

causality

of

recognition of the causal role of chance.

affirms a causality of is necessarily tied to a Manent's Aristotelian explanation of

social

science,
nature

human

Churchill

"1940"

and

deserves

lengthy

citation:

If, for

example,

one attributes

the English resistance in 1940 to the great soul of

"luck"

Churchill,

one attributes

it

at

the same time to chance: it was great

that a

Modern Man
man such as

and

Man Tout Court

of acting.

427
not

Churchill, found himself,

who

at that

moment, capable

It is

necessary, in order to understand

"1940",

to search for the cause of Churchill. It

is Churchill
final
cause.

is the

cause.

Human

nature

is

at the same time

first

cause and
and

Hence,
and

the effects that it produces are both

fully intelligible,

unnecessary,

in this sense, in fact, fortuitous. (P.

"1940,"

86)

sociological explanation of

statesmanship, the "great

cause of

soul"

of

in contrast, cannot allow the prudent Churchill to be a free and self-determining

the events of 1940. This would challenge the primacy of the social

whole, it

would leave room for the free play of human nature. It would chal lenge the very possibility of a rigorous science because it would restore a place and fecund efficacy to the point of view of the citizen and statesman. Sociology

must reduce the moral phenomena of

1940 to

a set of sociological causes.

It

might, for example, find the cause of Britain's civic virtue in 1940 in its com paratively rigid social structure which is more likely to preserve the virtues than

France's

more

divided

and anomie social structure.

But the rigid

social struc

ture of Great Britain cannot be the final cause of

Churchill's

greatness of soul

because it itself is the

and

result of prior causes.

Manent artfully

shows

the arbitrary

"explanation."

causes

nonexplanatory character is finally attributed to

character, the

of sociological causal a

series of

deterministic This

cause which substitutes

his

nature and vocation:

society.

cause

is is

vague and

for man, abstract, but the

scientific

honor,

of chance and the

human

social science's account of nothing.

causality is scrupulously avoided. Manent shows how general laws and causal relationships often explains
soul

of social science

maintained when a

It

establishes a set or series of

tors,

each of which explains and

mutually and reciprocally causal fac determines the other. One becomes the pris

oner of a causation.

brilliantly
It
appears

constructed, and arbitrarily

designed,
reason, the
of

scientistic circle of

that what ultimately matters is to save the primacy, the the point of
of
view

quasi-divine and creative character of scientific

of

the spectator.

It does

not

matter

what

causes

concatenation

human

things, it is
called
reason.

not

important to
as

establish

the exact contours of this causal horizon

society,

long
for

as man

is

not caused and

by

bis

nature or

his deliberative

Weber's

"values"

realm of

his morally arbitrary

pmdence, the
war

extreme substitute

moral and political

and politically of the gods, does

not threaten the scientific pretense.

Manent
cannot

shows

how

do justice to the things that Social

science

selves.

society causally related, to the things in them may, for example, be able to prove the causal relation
are

social science's emphasis on general

laws

of

ship between Christianity, monogamy and moderate monarchy and the causal relations between Islam, polygamy and political despotism as Montesquieu at
tempted to do in The Spirit of the Laws. But its
method

does

not allow

it to

ask

those

"Socratic"

"commonsensical"

prescientific or
religion?

or

questions

that

truly

mat

ter: What is the true that

most conforms

What is the familial

the
vocation or

and political organization

to the

nature or

the rights of man? (p.

96).

428

Interpretation

Social science, then, self-consciously substitutes a new universal, general laws, for the old universal, human nature. This substitution was begun by Montes quieu and vigorously and rather dogmatically completed by Durkheim. The
new science of

human

experience

sociology claimed that it could make sense in a way that the old science with its
nature could not.

of

the varieties of

recognition of

the

causal role of

human

It

can explain

nothing,

however,

about

the

only

question that

really
and

matters:

What is

man and

how

should

he live? In

the process, particularity

of

ceases

to provide access to the universal articulations

a mere reflection of anterior causes ex

human

experience general

becomes
ceases

plained

by

laws. It

to provide access to the

genuinely

universal

at the same time that

it

ceases

to

maintain great

its interest

or status as a particular. and the

Manent

shows

that

even

Weber's

work, The Protestant Ethic

impor Spirit of Capitalism, suffers from tance, the human seriousness of religion. For him it may, in fact, be the only question worthy of serious attention. But he relegates it to the realms of "na
this fatal
respects the

flaw. Weber

tional

character"

ologist,"

about

He must, as a or "soci scrupulously avoid asking the Socratic question, the what-is question, religion. How can Weber establish a causal relation between Protestant
and and

"culture"

"values."

"scientist"

ism

and capitalism when can

Science
in his

own

philosophically study the meaning of either? say nothing interesting about the motivation of Weber's researches serious soul, in his search for the truth about human things, nor his
cannot about

he

deepest fears
cation of man

the outcome of the

modem adventure:

namely the

petrifi

in

an

"iron

cage"

of

bureaucracy
stems

bereft

of genuine
part

individuality
the

or substance of soul.

Weber's

pathos

in large

from

fact that
philo

his

methodological asceticism conceals

his

generous soul and

cage"

his fertile

sophical mind.

His

greatness

is interned in the "iron

of social scientific

dogmatism.

Sociology, following its

things govern men.

Montesquieuan paternity,
a

It

recognizes

plurality

of

finally
human

reducible

to

one undefinable abstraction:

that many but this causes, plurality is society. But it does not include
recognizes men. realm

nature or reasonable

choice

Politics
of

itself,

as a realm of collective of

among those things which govern human self-determination, as the

as

pmdence, the "god

this world
unseizable

below,"

Burke eloquently

called

it, is

replaced and

by

society, that

kingdom

governed

by

nonhuman causes

human ones, namely, All of this is presided over the social scientist who in his supreme alone, by pride, understands the science behind the appearance of things. Manent truly establishes what Peguy had felt

by

"values."

nonrational

and sketched with unparalleled

intensity: sociology

abolishes man while godlike

deify

ing

theoretical observer

or spectator

by

attributing to him

knowledge for the

of

of causation.

Manent

discreetly

implies the
artist or

following

truth: the social scientist

in his

scientific pretension
world.

becomes

a creator of new gods and values

human

He becomes the
"society."

designer

of the social

whole,

the

abstraction called

Manent's

work suggests

that the point of view of

Modern Man

and

Man Tout Court

429

the actor, of the citizen and statesman, exists on the much more solid ground of
our

human

nature and

is the basis

of

any truly

"scientific"

comprehension of the

human In

world.

chapter

3, Manent
work of

turns to an analysis of "The System of

Economy"

as

delineated in the

Adam Smith, the father

of modem political economy.

Like Montesquieu, Smith attempted to understand the relationship between and movement from the old and the new human orders. Manent shows that Smith's
claim

to have successfully done

the

so

is

finally

deceptive. Smith improvement

"the desire

claimed
of

to have
soci
one's

found
eties

key

to understanding the progress and

human

in

a constitutive element of

human

nature:

of

bettering

condition"

are

incipient bourgeois.

(pp. 125-26). In this account, human beings at all times and places They are driven by a desire to improve their conditions
attention

through
of

detailed

to their

"interest."

Manent

provides a careful analysis

Theory of Moral Sentiments The Wealth of Nations as well as of the famous chapter in the latter entitled "How the Commerce of the Towns Contributed to the Improvement of the
and
Country,"

the discussions of the "invisible

hand"

in The

in

which

Smith

sketches the movement

from feudalism to

a commer

cial society.

Manent

shows the
of

difficulty
of

that Smith

has, despite

the claims of

his

official

teaching

interest,

unitary human order. ory is drawn in rich and generous colors. He is a proud figure whose imagina tion is driven by vanity and by the appreciation of the pleasures of wealth and
of a
greatness. men and

comprehending the old and the new as part Smith's account of the feudal proprietor in The The

This life

with

its

satisfactions and

beauty

captures

the imagination
entices

of as

induces them to
cultivate

strive

to better their

conditions.

It

them,

Smith writes, "to

monwealths,
and

the ground, build

and

houses,

to

found

cities and com

to

invent
life."

improve

all

the arts and sciences which ennoble

In the psychology of The Theory, "when we search and embellish human for utility, we are in fact searching for vanity and when we give way to vanity (p. 131). it is in fact beauty which carries us
along"

Yet Smith's
order

account of the movement

from the feudal to the

commercial

ments of

in The Wealth of Nations leaves behind the rich psychological develop The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The feudal proprietor is said to have

abandoned

his

power over men and resources

for the

sake of

luxury

goods such

as a pair of diamonds. This great figure abandons his way of life, his dignified repose and his political authority for the sake of frivolous and useless objects. In the account in the Wealth, the proprietor is driven by the most
"puerile,"

"vulgar"

"sordid"

and

Smith

writes

that a

vanity to barter away his power and authority (p. 134). fundamental revolution in human affairs with the greatest happiness
occurred and

consequences childish

for

public

because

an

"invisible

hand"

led the
of

vanity

of

the feudal lords to

coalesce

the

more reasonable

interestedness

merchants and artisans

into the development

of this
"history"

of commercial society.
own point of

Manent
view.

analyzes

the

inadequacy

from Smith's

His

history

is dependent

upon a caricature of

the human motivations of

430

Interpretation
abstracts

the feudal lord. It also remarkably

posed

from the

political constraints

im
life.

by

the emerging

modem state on the real

feudal authority

and

way

of

Manent
merce

shows that

Smith's

insight lies

elsewhere:

the new regime of com

revolutionary transformation of the imagination of men. Profit becomes the instrument and spirit of this world where men work not for

depends

upon a

the sake of

living

or

living

nobly but for the Homo

sake of work

itself (p. 156). Work

new

alone enables men

to

achieve those useful

things that their

transformed
of

imaginations
War
or

conceptualize.

oeconimocus no

longer dreams

Love

or

Glory. He

satisfies

his imagination in the

world of work and profits.

He

poetry of production and statistics. In the new market society profit is the indispensable means of coordinating the system of distribution and consumption. The attempt to replace it by a system of collec

is

guided

by

a new prosaic

tive property or authoritative planning "petrifies the network of social valences the necessary movements of the economic imagination (p. 155). and
paralyzes"

The

modem

economy,

without

those dynamic signals of imagination provided

museums."

by

money

and

profits, ossifies into a world of "industrial

But the It is
a

necessary choice for

severed

choice

for

capitalism

is

not

a somewhat narrowed and some

simply desiccated

a choice

for human
It is

nature.

nature.

a choice

for

man

from

important

contents of

his

nature.

recognized

this as his concerns, expressed in book

of

of

Smith himself may have the Wealth of Nations,

about

the

integrity

the human person and the vitality of martial virtue under a

of

complex system of

division
of

labor, intimate. One

not

possible criticism of emphasize

Man

ent's

rich treatment

Smith is that he does

the world that

sufficiently

Smith's

own reservations about

he did

so much to construct.

If Montes

quieu

is in

some real sense a political

sociologist, Smith is in

some sense a

political economist.

An important

motif of

Manent's book is the centrality

of

of the will

for

under

standing the project or enterprise of modernity. Nietzsche's reinterpretation of

the
an

human

world

in terms
and

the multiple effects of the "will to

power"

is

"exaggeration"

"generalization"

Nietzsche had

was so contemptuous

very "English (p. 251). It was Hobbes who had

of the power which ends
and

ideas"

of which

initially

re

duced human

nature to the

desire for

completed

this reduction

by deconstmcting
chapter

only in death. Locke desubstantializing human

mere constructs and
cache"

nature:

both the

moral and political phenomena will.

became

effects of the

human

In

of

his

work

"L'homme

("The

Hidden
tion"

man soul

Man") Manent brilliantly details the Lockean deconstruction of the hu in An Essay concerning Human Understanding. It is this "deconstruc
is the necessary underpinning and accompaniment of rights of man. It is difficult to do full
of

of the soul which

the new political order consecrated to the

justice to Manent's textured treatment

the movement of the
and

the Lockean moment in the

regime of nature

history

of

Christian West from the

autonomy.
of

to the regime of

sovereignty

human

But the

following

remarks must suffice to

convey the importance

Locke's

profound and

profoundly

significant attack

Modern Man
on

and

Man Tout Court

431

the very notion of the soul and

nonarbitrary

moral order.

Manent is acutely
elements of

aware of the

"constitutionalist"

comparatively sober,

moderate and refuses

Locke's

political

teaching, but he
or

to accept the

received pieties which

ignore Locke's
categories, like

stature as a serious
"Calvinism"

thinker

and which place

"natural In

law,"

which conform a

him into reassuring to the intellectual

historian's

or exegete's prejudices.
Power,"

detailed

and nuanced chapter

longest chapter, "On

the
cious and

of An

Essay

(book 2,

21),

reading Manent

of

the

shows

reinterpretation of

the human world which

project.

is

at

the heart of Locke's auda

"revolutionary"

At the
substance.

core of

An

Essay is

the intention to discredit the very notion of

idiom"

"Power"

provides understood

the "universal
under

previously been
guided

the

rubric

of a

for understanding what had self-moving human soul

by

natural or no

final

ends.

Power is

longer understood,
the passions and

as

Hobbes

understood

it, in

reference
all

to the

directing
power

role of

desires

of men.

Power "invades

the other

domains,"

however (p.

165). Manent

summarizes

the omnipresent role of

in the Lockean

universe:

A. Color

and odor are

only the

"power"

of

primary qualities, that is

of

"invisi

ble

particles

producing those sensations or effects that we call secondary

qualities."

B. "Substance is only the

perceive

power of

empirically,

without

producing a number of effects that we knowing in the least the nature of this 'sub-

another."

C. "The D.

will

is the
the

power of

preferring

one action

to

"Liberty is
the
will
dity."

realizing this preference; it has nothing to do with because it would be then the power of a power, which is an absur
power of

E.

"Understanding
Power,

is

power"

(p. 165).

which explains so rather with

of

things, but

many disparate things, deals not with the nature relations and effects. It is Locke's substitute for an
soul or substance.

unknowable and

inaccessible
repeat:

It is necessary to According to Locke we do not and cannot know what man is. But we do know that the moral notions which allow human beings to live together are constmctions and artifacts and that civil society itself has no
natural status.

Man is

"artist"

an

who produces

things that are not given to him that a moral abyss

by

nature.

Manent, in
of

a thorough

analysis,

shows

is

at

the

foundation
There

the Lockean understanding of the human world.

are no

innate

natural

ideas

of the good.

Man,

as

the famous formula

432

Interpretation

recounts

it, is

a tabula rasa.

Our

moral notions are

"mixed

modes"

rather

than

simple or
and are munity.

innate ideas.
to

socially

verified

They by

are constructed
"commodities,"

for the

sake of commodious
will of

living

by

the assent or

the com

According

Locke, fundamental

moral notions

such as murder are

arbitrary ideas constructed for the sake of individual and collective self-preser vation. There is no moral order independent of human artifice or will. Yet Locke's
man
state"

"renaturalizes"

political

teaching partially

human beings
the liberal
of and

and

the hu

world

on

the

by building the "high architecture of "puny base of the solitary animal in quest
of

democratic
"The

nourishment."

only teaching
tion of animal

nature, the only

uncontestable one

survival"

necessity:

(p. 178). It is

on

in any case, is the injunc this low but solid basis that

Locke
of

constructs

the moderate representative state dedicated to the protection the economy of rational, industrious and profitable la is built the superstructure of the modem regime of com

individual

rights and reed

bor. On this thin

merce and

liberty.
shows

Manent
damental

that at the

heart

of

Locke's

enterprise we can

find three fun

moral

propositions:

(1)
with

Man is the

being

who

fabricates his

notions;

(2)

Man is the

being

rights; (3)

Man is the

being

who works

(p. 191).

These three

notions are essential

ingredients

of modem political consciousness.

But they do not hold together in contemporary life and thought as they ef fortlessly do in Locke's audacious redefinition of man and society. Of these
three notions, only the
second can provide

the

foundation for

a real society.
material sub

Communism's

reduction of man

to economy, to work and the

revealed

structure of the social order

sort of even

"has

itself incapable

of

institution

or stable relation
where

to fear that
men

it

reigned

between men, the longest and

of

so much so
most

establishing any that one is able

ren

completely, it has

dered

definitively
or

incapable

fastening
world.

relations"

such

(pp. 192-93).
organi
"useful"

Likewise,
zation and

"culture"

"values"

cannot provide a sufficient

basis for the

the sustenance of the human

"critical"

They

are

preeminently
to
challenge

politically

as negative or

notions which allow men

the

pretension of

any

social order to conform to the nature or vocation of man.

But

they

society with real motives for action. Of Locke's three fundamental propositions about man, the notion
cannot provide men or

of

rights
know
with

alone can provide a about

foundation for

human

social order.

If

man

does

not

by others. As Marx astutely observed in On the Jewish Question, the representative regime of rights both and the "material and spiritual elements which form the content of
"annihilates"
"presupposes"

his nature, he anything rights that must be respected

can at

least know that he is that

equal

being

life

of state and of

birth. The liberal separation its general prohibition against any political embodiment society the human good and its subsequent general authorization of the moral con
of such as

individuals"

religion,

profession and

tents of life in the realm of civil society

uously

renaturalizes

human beings. Democratic

tenuous

and unfathomable

relationship to

simultaneously denatures and ten man has a real and abiding but man tout court (pp. 254-60).

Modern Man
Manent knows
soul and
more

and

Man Tout Court

of

433

that

Locke's

"revolutionary"

deconstruction
modem

the human
or rather

its

works

is

not the whole

truth about

metaphysics,

accurately, the modem attack on metaphysics. One might ask, What

the conservative reservations about the project of enlightenment
and

about

lib

eration

from tradition

and moral restraints?

Manent sympathetically

recounts

Hume's
rather

Locke's epistemology liberal-conservative ends. Hume

radicalization of
shows

at the service of conservative or

"deconstructs"

Locke's
a

substitute

for

substance, power, and

that it itself is

construction,

kind

of supersti
order

tion. He

utilizes

the weapons of skepticism against enlightenment

itself in
harmful

to defend that common

life

of custom and

tradition which nourishes and pro

one.

tects human nature. Hume

defends

a useful superstition against a

In the

process

he

reinvigorates

an older view of political

philosophy

which

links philosophy to civic moderation. Today, the Humean concept of the moral sense is all the rage among conservatives looking for an alternative to the reg
nant moral relativism.

(But the

same

conservatives, somewhat

incoherently

if

salutarily, find sustenance in Aristotle's world of substance, character and vir tue). Manent shows that Hume's salutary desire to find a nonarbitrary natural

foundation for morality in the

rates

moral sense

falters because it too radically

reason of

sepa

the

sentiment of

the moral actor from the the

moral

the theoretical specta

tor.

In Hume's
to

account

sentiments reason.

are

passions restores

devoid

of

any

connection

pmdence or

deliberative
a world

Hume

the moral life to

the natural world, but

it is

tomary foundations for

tended
or enlightenment

moral action

bereft of any rational as opposed to cus (pp. 207-8). Manent also shows the unin
than undermining Lockean

consequences of

Humean

skepticism: rather

dogmatism,

the posthumous fate of Humean skepticism has

been to

erode of

and undermine all those moral contents of

and

life

rooted

in the

traditions
qualified

Athens, Jerusalem

Rome. These

contents challenge the un

victory of the regime of rights and thereby humanize our democracies (pp. 209-10). Manent believes that it is in the United States, formerly the most

pmdent or sober manifestation of modem

democracy,

as

Tocqueville noted,
talk"

that the victory of

unqualified.

what

Mary

Anne Glendon has

called

"rights

is

most

In his treatment
tension between a

of

Locke Manent highlights

at

point

that he returns to

throughout his book: there is

the heart

of modem political consciousness a

rights
Both

man"

of

cultures."

revolutionary activism under the banner of the "scientific passivity under the name of the diversity of But this tension is, according to Manent, thoroughly intelligible.

"reforming

or

and

propositions

"equally
of

and

simultaneously issue from the

rejection of

the

'substantial'

definition

man."

autonomous

being
own

who makes

And they both affirm the thesis that man is the himself; they both affirm the triumph of the will.
affirm

Both

understand man

in his indetermination, both

(p. 213). Manent

the "general power of that

man over

his

humanity"

suggests

it is precisely this
phenomenon

double
of

and parallel negation and affirmation

"fellow-traveling"

that accounts
who

for the

the

Western intellectual

is

critical of

the slightest

434

Interpretation
of

defects
and

liberal in the

societies

but

waxes poetic about which rules

illiberal foreign
the name of

"cultures"

is indulgent toward the despotism

eighteenth

in

History.
were

Already
indignant foreign
the

century, certain

philosophes such as

Voltaire

about the slightest

and exotic

society but indulgent towards despotisms. As Tocqueville noted in The Old Regime and

injustice in their

own

Revolution,

the

philosophes were ambivalent

toward political liberty.

They

dreamed

rather about

the possibility of enlightened despotism even as

of

they de

nounced the

"tyranny"

the Old Regime: Le

plus ca change.

Manent

shows the pivotal theoretical and practical place of

Locke in the

modem affirmation of

the self,

an affirmation of of man.

the self which

is inseparable
of

from the
Will,"

"desubstantialization"

In

chapter

5,

"The Triumph

the

he

provides a
of

history
order.

of

that triumph in light of the theological-political

problem, in light
ance of

the specific problem that

Christianity

posed

to the govern

the

political

Manent develops the

profound

treatment of the

theological-political problem that he had already sketched in the Histoire intel-

lectuelle du
portrait of

liberalisme.4

In

doing
or

so, he

presents an original and of spiritual

the

"liberalism"

"pluralism"

and political goods

convincing in

Aristotle's
acted. good

political science against which modem political

He

shows

that Aristotle is

no partisan of a

philosophy had re dogmatic ideal of the common

but instead

an umpire who weighs and

able

human

goods

in his

own capacious soul.

balances seemingly incommensur He thereby shows that the incom

life
need not
moral

mensurability
give

of certain

"spiritual
of

masses"

or moral contents of or

rise
is

either to a
an

tyranny
abyss.

the good

to the perception that the

world

arbitrary
law

Aristotle's

model of

statesmanship
good, one

shows

that a

dynamic

and pluralistic conception of the common

without

which

unites nature and

denying

the complexity of nature,

of

is

available

carefully in

principle to men and societies.

But the founders law

was

modernity believed that

such a pmdent communion of nature and culminate

too

dangerous,
from

too

likely

to

in the

excesses of priestcraft and

the horrors

of civil war.

Instead

they

opted

for that twofold

the

general prohibition of opinion

of

power and gen

eral authorization of

moral contents

life in the

realm of civil

society
not

which characterizes the

dynamic

of modem
of

liberal democracy.

Manent is hopes

awed

by

the

audacity

this project, and he

knows that it is

altogether without real and

able

of a

enduring nobility. But he cannot share the admir Milton in his Areopagitica that men would use the general
pursuit of

authorization, the
nature, to credit,

happiness,

to

"sincerely"

pursue

the goods of their

to its eternal

pursue above all the truth

(pp. 256-58).

Liberalism,
regime.

allows

for the

pursuit of

the true and the good, and only the perverse fail

to recognize the

"Mdtonian"

possibilities

in the liberal

But

following
happiness
not

Tocqueville, Manent fears

while

that the authorization to pursue one's

of others

respecting

the

rights

risks

inexorably becoming
rights
of others.

right

to

pursue

the goods of

our nature and even an authorization not

to pursue them for

element of

fear that

such a pursuit will undermine the

A strong

Modern Man

and

Man Tout Court

within the private

435

creeping conformity, mediocrity and relativism lurks ble authorization of the moral contents of life in the
pungently and epigrammatically: the what Tocqueville called "democratic
despotism,"

seemingly no sphere. To put it leads to

the

naked public square

irresistibly
Nietzsche Manent's

to what

called

"last

man"

who

believes

that

he has "invented
human

happiness."

phenome

nology

of modem political consciousness points to

science"

the need for a Tocquevillian

"political

which protects

of unencumbered

human willfulness, from

liberty and greatness democracy defined

entitled

from the

effects

as the unlimited

triumph of the

will.5

The final
End
ence ends. of

chapter of

Manent's
in

work

is

"La fin de la

Nature"

"The

Nature."

Manent does
succeeded suggest that

not suggest that

has in fact But he does

freeing

man

modernity from his human

the modem

differ
its

nature and

modernity is defined by the effort to create a law which is completely detached from our nature and which is truly over the human world. Its perspective denies a natural order to the soul and any law or ends, any heteronomony, which comes outside of mankind's autono
"sovereign"

mous self-direction and creation.

In France today, the

collapse of a

the ideological
of

hegemony

of the various philosophy. work of a

rein-

Marxist Thinkers Kant

vulgates such as

has led to
Luc

revival

interest in

political

Ferry

and

Alain Renault have tried to find in the

moral and

and other

German idealists the

politics
and

intellectual

resources of

for

vigorated republican
"subject."

for

nonhistoricist

account which

the human
so

Manent does

not share the

Kantian inspiration

dominates
chapter

many

currents of non-Marxist thought

in France today. In his final

the

reasons

for this

refusal

to take the Kantian route followed

by

so

many

of

his

peers are made

justice to the arating Kant's

in
man's work

moral

abundantly clear. Despite his noble and salutary efforts to do life of man, Kant's formalistic ethics goes further in sep reason from his nature than previous currents of modem thought.
modernity's most noble effort

is

to create a law severed from the

requirements of nature or
modem man's project

human nature. It is the most morally sublime moment for creating that third city, the purely human city, the
Kant's
moral

city of man. Modem man,

including

agent, is neither magnanimous

nor

humble precisely because there is no order of nature or creation which he either manifests and reflects or is subordinate to. Modem man aims to be autonomous
or

self-creating;

a god.

is tempted to say in a polemical moment that he aims to be Yet his double negation of the order of nature and the order of grace
one

does

not entail an affirmation: modem man

flees the
Modem

old

laws,
what

the old hetero-

nomies, chimera,
the

and
an

he

pursues a

law

of

his

own making.

But

he

pursues

is

illusion,

kind

of nothingness.
ancient

man qua modem

man, as

being
will

released

from the

laws,
and

and

freed from the his

authoritative guid

ance of the moral contents of

life,

can

only

affirm

nothingness.

The

will can

only

itself:

modem

sovereignty

autonomy

are

literally

tautological in

436

Interpretation
The
will wills

character.

itself,

as

Hegel

affirmed.

But

where are

the motives of

human

action

to be found? As Tocqueville noted,

its

recognition of a conventions

than the

is partly natural fundamental equality among human beings is more true and pretensions of aristocracy. But at the deepest level the

democracy

democratic
must

"revolution"

threatens the excellences of our nature.

Democracy
religion,
a

be humanized

by

the contents of our nature:

by

an active

responsible patriotism and

by

the

rich

associative

life

of a

liberal

society.

As Manent shows, democracy is in many ways more natural than regimes which came before it. But democrats are paradoxically incapable of affirming
the very
racy.
"naturality"

of nature and

thereby

the

tmly

natural character of

democ

If one recognizes the naturality of nature, one has a nonarbitrary standard for relating human beings in their similarities and differences. The Greeks and the Christians have a different understanding of how to conjugate that simul taneous equality and inequality of human beings: for Christians, the Lord of

Creation became incarnate

as

not as a philosopher or as

the magnanimous

man

but

the

Suffering

Servant. This tension between the

greatness of soul which

order of moral

reflects the excellences of our nature and

humility
wishes

before the
to flee this

Creation

became insufferable for European he

wishes to

man.

He

ambiguity,

build the city of man (pp. 292-93). The modem project succeeds in its double negation, however. By itself it can affirm nothing. And even only here nature, through sinewy paths, returns. Christian humility cannot refute the
claims of

magnanimity precisely
more essential

because,
it."

as

St. Thomas Aquinas recognized,

"nature is his
nature

to man than grace": "man receives grace only because

is

capable of

receiving
the
relations who stressed that contraria tendere

Manent between

shows that the most modest and generous treatment of

and

humility
et

"magnanimitas
appear to go

magnanimity is that of St. Thomas, humilitas non sunt contraria quamvis in

and

videantur"

("magnaminimity
in contrary
created,
necessitous and

humility

are not

directions")
dependent

even as

character

contrary even though they he simultaneously affirmed the of man. Thomas provides a rea irreducible
and and eternal tension while mak

sonable model of a position which respects the

between

reason and

revelation, between magnanimity

humility,

ing that tension liveable for human beings (p. 286). Today both democratic ideology and the Christian religion which is often corrupted or transformed by that ideology unite in attacking pride in its political manifestations as a kind of
elitist or aristocratic atavism.
man

But

as

Manent

argues

in

another recent

work, if

is in

some real sense a political

writes:

animal, the

proper conclusions must

be

drawn. He
If
a man

is

a political animal and

and of course

on the

meaning

the reach one attributes to it

everything hinges on this proposition, then his moral and intellectual

life is necessarily dependent on the body politic in which he actualizes his nature; it is thus dependent even if the political institutions are so contrived as to make him

feel perfectly free. Then, he

acknowledges

his condition, he touches it, he

acts

Modern Man
according to it, in so far as he is truly in so far as he is an active member of
national

and

Man Tout Court

modern

437
age,
even

citizen,

which

means, in the
"rank,"

a nation.

And

national

self-affirmation,
or

pride, or, in De Gaulle's words,

"grandeur,"

preoccupation with

are not as such subjective manifestations open to the critique

that both Christian

against
since

religion and objective

ideology, however different their reasons, direct means for coming into contact with the real world,

pride,

they

are

this proud sizing

up

and rough

interplay

between bodies

politic gives us our

first

access to the

articulations of the

world.6

It

seems

to me that Manent continues the reasonable, modest and generous

attitude of
deur"

St. Thomas: the Christian

must

do justice to the

claims of

"gran

precisely because he must do justice to the reality of man as a zoon politikon. Attention to the "naturality of helps account for Manent's
nature"

solicitude

for

great political men such as

Aron

and

de Gaulle. It
who

also accounts so much

for his

deep

respect

for the

researches of

Leo

Strauss,

has done

to

illuminate the
city

character of

the

natural

world, to restore a

and man unencumbered

by

the

presuppositions of either end of

phenomenology the Christian

of

the

reli

gion or

democratic ideology. At the book Manent

announces

this emdite, wise, pmdent, yet

modest

that he will prepare another book on the rela

will

tions between

Rome.

Christianity and modernity: he Modernity began as a visceral polemic

be
possible without appears

investigate the

science of and yet

against

Christianity,

it

would not

the model of invisible mle or empire provided

Christianity. It
aped the

that in some paradoxical way the authority of

by history

concludes

invisible authority of the servants of the servants of God. Manent his magisterial work with some cautionary words to friends and al
will never understand more
Rome"

lies: "We
the

than the half of things

when we

ignore

science of

(p. 295).

NOTES

1. For
and

an overview and analysis of

Manent's

work as a

whole, see my essay "Modern

Liberty

the Moral Contents of Life: An Introduction to the Political Reflection of Pierre

on

Manent,"

Perspectives

Political Science

21,

no.

4 (1992),

pp.

193-200.
unless otherwise stated.

2. Quotations
tions are mine.

and references are

from La Cite de I'homme in Dibat,

All transla
177.

peut-etre"

This

3. Pierre Manent, "La verit6, article appeared in a special issue

philosophers.

no.

72 (novembre-d6cembre 1992),
work of

p.

of

Debat dedicated to the

the

new generation of

is indispensable for understanding Manent's intellectual itinerary de I'homme in his work as a whole. See especially his remarks on Raymond Aron (pp. 172, 174), Leo Strauss (pp. 172-73), Tocqueville and democratic despotism (pp. 173-74), the city of God and the terrestrial city (pp. 175-77) and on nature, history French
and

The

article

influences

as well as the place of La cite

(pp. 177-78). reedi4. Manent, Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme: Dix legons (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1978, new on the fall of 1994 in a series English in appeared in book tion Pluriel-Hachette, 1989). This political thought edited by Mark Lilla and Thomas Pavel for Princeton Uni French contemporary translated by Rebecca Balinski versity Press. See Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism,
moderne"

and

"la difference

(Princeton: Princeton

University Press,

1994).

438

Interpretation
can most

accurately be described as a phenomenology of modem political and in under interested in describing precisely the "modem standing its relationship to the permanent human situation. But as Raymond Aron said about Toc queville and Aristotle, Manent "judges in and by his His phenomenology therefore
consciousness.

5. Manent's book He is

difference"

most

description."

points

toward a political science which can provide guidance for reasonable action in response to
should remember

the problems and possibilities of democracy. We

that Tocqueville's remarkable the service of "a new political

phenomenology of democracy and democratic science for a world itself quite

new."

man was

ultimately

at

Action,"

6. Pierre Manent, "De Gaulle's Destiny: The Modern Nation speech delivered in Munich, November 1993, and to be
no.

as an

Object

of

Thought

and

published

in French in Pensie

Politique,

3, 1995.

Popular Government
Peter McNamara
Utah State

and

Effective Government

University

Harvey Flaumenhaft,
tion

The Effective Republic: Administration

and

Constitu

in the Thought of Alexander Hamilton (Durham: Duke 1992, x+ 314 pp., $34.50 cloth.

University Press,

Morton J. Frisch, Alexander Hamilton and the Political Order: An Inter pretation of His Political Thought and Practice (Lanham, MD: University Press
of

America, 1991),

xi+

118 pp., $28.00

cloth.

and

The Effective Republic, by Harvey Flaumenhaft, and Alexander Hamilton the Political Order, by Morton Frisch, two longtime students of Hamilton, particularly
useful and

are

timely
first

pieces of

work, for

they

allow us access

to

the thoughts of one of the

the

great theorists of

both

activist government and

American Presidency. Those

and

Flaumenhaft ilton's ideas,

readers with less sympathy for Hamilton than Frisch may draw different conclusions after considering Ham but they are certain to benefit from the exercise.

s book provides a rigorous and thought-provoking account of Hamilton's understanding of the relationship between the written Constitution of the Framers and what Hamilton saw as the necessity of an "efficacious ad Flaumenhaft's style is unusual. He has chosen to let us see the
ministration."

Flaumenhaft'

great most

debates
part, he

of the
uses

Founding

period through own

Hamilton's

eyes.

Indeed, for

the

Hamilton's
order

words, ranging far

political principles.

and wide over

Ham

ilton's
might

writings

in

to distil his

While this

approach
of mak

ing

annoy Hamilton

some

readers, it fulfills admirably Flaumenhaft's intention

the
author recede

our teacher and

265). Without

being

into the background (pp. 2, letting biography, the book does reflect the course of Hamilton's
and ends with

controversial career:

it begins

Hamilton

engaged

in the

struggle

for

liberty,
of

while the central part

deals

with

his thoughts

on administration.

In the first part, Flaumenhaft

the ends of
government as

attempts

to set out Hamilton's

well

as the

primary

means

understanding for securing those

the spirited

ends.

Flaumenhaft's Hamilton is antiquity because

of

a thorough modem who rejects

politics of

its inhumanity. The

purpose of politics

is

not

to

interpretation,

Spring 1995,

Vol. 22, No. 3

440

Interpretation
for the

provide an arena

display
are

of one's

virtue, but

rather

it is to

secure

the

natural rights of man.

These

best

secured

in

society

where citizens

devote
(pp.

themselves to

profits rather

than to politics, war, or religion and where the

gives

"polemic polity of 15-40, 71-72). In

of, say, a Pericles

spiritedness"

way to

"politics

administration"

of

order

to effect the purposes of government, the new politics

relies on the clever construction of

who was able

institutions
reduce

rather

than on the rhetorical

wills

feats

to

the many Athenian

to one will

(p. 70). Flaumenhaft's

presentation of

Hamilton's

views

is forceful

and well

docu

mented, but it is, perhaps, a little misleading in at least one important respect. Hamilton thought that many of his opponents exaggerated the extent to which enlightened modernity had transformed the character of political life. On the
critical question of the effect of commerce on

ample, Hamilton
peace would

was

far less

sanguine

international relations, for ex than his opponents that international

follow the

spread of commerce.

Thus,

when compared with

his

contemporaries rather than with ancient philosophers and

statesmen, Hamilton
the continuity
of

appears, to

a significant

extent, to

affirm rather than

deny

ancient with modem politics.

As to the

means of

securing the

natural

rights

of

man,

Flaumenhaft's Ham
for ensuring that For these ends to In
other
of the as the

ilton believes that

while popular representation

is

essential

the ends of government remain

popular, it is

not sufficient.

be

realized an

in

practice an

"efficacious
must

administration"

is

necessary.

words,

"effective

republic"

be

created.

This task is the focus

enemies portrayed

central part of

Flaumenhaft's book. Hamilton's party that

him

leader

of the

"monocratic"

sought to

subvert,
that

rather

than perfect,

popular government.

Hamilton,

to use

Flaumenhaft's words,

responded

by

ac

cusing them of advocating a

form

of government

affected popular work emphasis on

ings, for,

rather

than

truly effecting
points

popular works

(p. 70). Hamilton's

the necessity of an efficacious administration made him a controversial figure

as

Flaumenhaft

out,

what

is necessary to
and

effect popular ends

is,
to

often,

not popular

(p. 79). In the is

case of the

executive, for example, the

the chief
"unity"

key

an efficacious administration as explained of

"energy,"

ingredients
"maxims

of

energy,

in The Federalist, Number 72, are these ingredients sits well with what Hamilton
that

"duration."

and

Neither

called

of republican

jealousy"

hold that

power should

be
at

placed

periods of

time.

Flaumenhaft discusses

in many hands and for short length Hamilton's understanding of

and

how the What is his

new and

President

Constitution incorporated unity in the body of the Senate. Flaumenhaft's discussion

of

duration in

the office of the

makes

the

Presidency particularly relevant

only to check abuses the Wilsonian critique
the now
of

claim

that the separation

of powers serves not

power, but
the

also to energize government.

If correct,
which

of

Constitution's

separation of

powers,

underlies

dominant

Popular Government
progressive
conception.

and

Effective Government

441

understanding of the Presidency, is founded on an important mis Wilson believed that the separation of powers tends to frustrate
measures.

necessary policy
and even

In

order

to overcome

it,

President, Wilson taught,

the people,

must assume the role of national

leader; persuading

leading

them,

inspiring

them to support his program.

Flaumenhaft's in
practice

account of

Hamilton
rather

suggests that

the Wilsonian strategy

might

lead to less
into their
(p. 69).

than more energetic government.

government to

For

be

safe and

effective,

powers must

be

separated

kinds;
A
cause

there must be a

"diversification"

as well as a

division

of powers

simple

division
in

of power makes government neither safe nor effective

be

it

results

a power struggle either

among
as

separate

but

similar

institutions. This

struggle

will, in mm, lead

to paralysis or to anarchy. Paralysis cannot

be

a permanent state of affairs

rightly
an

"extra-constitutional"

Hamilton states, and as Flaumenhaft because, emphasizes, the public business must go forward. One possibility is that government that can truly govern will spring up, leav
government as a screen

ing

the formal

for the behind-the-scenes activity

alternatives or

of a

boss. If

instead,

paralysis gives

way to chaos, chaos will eventually give way

to a properly

to order imposed

by

a tyrant

(pp. 163, 192). The

process.

constructed constitutional government

are, then, the tyrant

the boss.
own

Diversification is
nature and ought to

not an

arbitrary

Each

power

has its

inherent
Ham-

be is

assigned

to a separate branch of government (p. 89).

What kind

of power

executive power?

Flaumenhaft draws

attention

to

Uton's important distinction between

which encompasses all more precise

"administration"

in the broadest
(pp.

sense

the operations of government, and administration in its

matters of

sense, meaning

"executive

detail"

69, 87). In

this

latter sense, administration is properly the preserve of the executive, because the factional bickering, compromises, and delays which are common to assem blies of representatives make them unsuitable for administering such details (p. 84). The
the
cause of good government of

tendency

the Continental Congress to

had been harmed, observes Hamilton, by engage itself in the details of ad

(p. 85-86). It ought, as any legislative body ought, to have con fined itself to generalities, that is to say, to making laws. The administration of
ministration

details
their

requires

the constant

attention of officers

who possess

the necessary

expertise,

sufficient

tenure of office, and who are

individually

accountable

for

performance.

It is

the responsibility of the chief executive officer to hold

subordinate officers responsible.

being

one

alone, is solely

accountable

It is his duty; it is also in his interest as he, for the performance of his officers. The
"responsibility"

in gov properly constructed, the home of ernment (pp. 96-98, 113-18, 285 n.5). Energy in the executive, argues Flau menhaft's Hamilton, does not involve any violation of the independence of the
executive

is,

when

legislative branch. While it tors, in

substance

might

involve

a sacrifice of
refrain

it

requires

only that Congress

the vanity of legisla from entering into the

442

Interpretation
of administration and retains

details

that Congress consult

executive ministers when conduct of

deliberating. Congress
accept or reject their

the right to inspect the to originate its own

ministers, to

plans,

and

plans

(p. 85-86).
that term (encom

In

order

to improve

administration

in the larger

sense of

judicial functions), the executive is given passing through a qualified veto a share in the legislative power, chiefly for reasons of self-defense, but also in order to check the momentary impulses of the legisla
the

legislative,

executive,

and

tive

branch or,

at

times,

even

the

people

(pp. 111-12). The job

of

the

execu

tive is to

resist and persist

(p. 117).
sense

According
only less
of

to Flaumenhaft's

Hamilton,

administration

in this broader
the Senate
a

is

also made more efficacious

numerous

by

the es

tablishment

of

body

not

than the

House,

but

having

the longest tenure

of office of

ernment

(pp. 133-57). Thus, the

executive

any lends energy

the elected parts of the gov

and

the Senate sta

bility

to governmental measures, both of which advance the cause of good

administration.

In the final

part of the

liberty. He
the

spells

out,

book, Flaumenhaft returns to Hamilton's concern for first, the grounds for Hamilton's opposition to Jeffer
was

son's attack on the

judiciary. Hamilton believed that it

and executive

the

independence

of

judiciary

from legislative

interference that

secured

the consti

tutional order in place,

havior"

is the

thereby making it a stable whole. A tenure of "good be key to judicial independence, and it was this security that
as

Hamilton judged

threatened

by

Jefferson's

attempt

to repeal the

Judiciary

Act (pp. 204-40). This story is well known, but two other aspects of Flaumen haft's account in this part of the book bear particular mention because they are

less familiar. Both

concern

Hamilton's had

argument

in The People

v.

Crosswell

(1804), in
seditious

which

Hamilton defended
paper

a newspaper editor against a charge of written

libel. Cros well's latter

on

that
and

Jefferson had hired

a pam

phleteer to attack the characters of

"traitor"

Washington

Adams, calling

the former a

and the

"hoary

headed

incendiary,"

Commenting
that "a

Hamilton's

oral argument

among other things. in the case, James Kent later

said

more able and eloquent argument was perhaps never

heard in any
argument.

court"

(p. 243). Flaumenhaft

while

stresses

two elements of

Hamilton's

First,

Hamilton is

not an advocate of

"the novel, the visionary, the

pestilential

doctrine
and

he argues that publishing the truth with good justifiable motives, even as regards high public officials, ought to be a defense against sedition, just as it was under the tme common law of England. The cause of liberty, he believes, would be greatly harmed if citizens were prevented from making legitimate criticisms of their government (pp. 242-44). Hamilton urged that as a general mle the common law must be understood as
of an unchecked

press,"

informing
meanors"

the United States Constitution so

of

as

to serve as a
and

barrier to
and

partisan misde

interpretations

such

terms

as

"habeas

corpus"

"crimes

(pp. 248-49). The

second

important

element of

Hamilton's

argument

Popular Government
is his defense
even more
of

and

Effective Government

443

the right to

jury

trials in criminal cases. In the United

to

States,

England, there are reasons judiciary. In England, the elected legislature

are

than in

fear the
the

creation of a partisan

and

hereditary
where

executive are

unlikely to unite in a conspiracy, but in the United

elected,
such a
cludes

States,

both branches

conspiracy is not beyond contemplation. Hamilton con that temporary citizen juries drawn by lot with the power to decide
questions of

important

law

and

fact

constitute an

important

popular check on

government

(pp. 246-49).

Throughout his
of

book, Flaumenhaft deftly

one example which notes

and

convincingly deals

with

many
wider

the

charges

that have hurt Hamilton's reputation as an American statesman. I

will mention

just

is

of some significance

for my

argument. a

Flaumenhaft

the differences between Madison's

and

recollection of

speech of

Hamilton's

at

the Constitutional Convention

that of others

present.

The differences
and

are

important

given

the charges made

by Jefferson,
the legis

Madison,
lature

their

followers that Hamilton favored the

corruption of

by

the

executive.

or citing Hume as is necessary for maintaining constitutional equilibrium in Great Britain. How ever, in Yates's more extensive notes, Hamilton cites Hume only to the effect

Madison has Hamilton, in his authority for the idea that executive

speech of

June

22, 1787,

"influence"

"corruption"

that there is always a

body

of patriotic members who will shake corrupt admin

istrations. Both
when a

accounts are perhaps omission of

accurate, but the difference is important

noted.

further

Madison's is

Madison does
members of

not

record,

as

Yates

does,

that Hamilton argued

for preventing

Congress from
argue against

simultaneously

holding
evaded.

executive offices.

Hamilton, it is tme, did

noted

following exclusionary proposal. Such exclusions, he important reason he mentioned immediately The more easily on June 22: it would constitute a substantial disincentive for public service, and 160this inconvenience must be balanced against any risk of cormption (pp.
a more rigorous

the

day,

are

61, 296
the

nn.

5,6). Thus, Madison's

was

account gives chief

the impression that promoting

executive

influence

Hamilton's

concern, whereas the real issue was

motives

for

public service.

After reading Flaumenhaft's book,

troversial and be so
misunderstood

one might

well-intentioned and profound a statesman as

be left wondering how such a Hamilton could become so con

the
capacities of

by

men of

Madison
on

and

Jefferson. The

reasons are made clearer

in Morton Frisch 's

period

short

book

Ham

ilton. Rather than look

places

at

the

Founding

through

Hamilton's eyes, Frisch

a number of

Hamilton

alongside

his

great contemporaries on the one

by developing
and,
on

comparisons

between Hamilton,

hand,

the other, Madison

444

Interpretation
will mention

and, especially, Jefferson. I

the course of

the

main points of comparison and

in

doing

so, I

will raise a question about

Flaumenhaft's

account of

Hamilton. When Frisch deals way into the

with

the

question of political

economy, he enters a
not

little

classical republican view of

Jefferson. (He does

discuss Mad
more

ison's
either

political

economy.) Frisch has Jefferson devoted to equality

excellence,
and as

than to

liberty
on

or

maintained

influence
-David

equality Jefferson. Hamilton, argues Frisch, was by contrast a "John Locke who was an unequivocal advocate of Hume limited government
man"

and civic spirit.

preferring an agrarian republic because it Frisch traces these views to Rousseau's

liberty. Hamilton, he continues, believed that the commercial spirit was a sub stitute for civic virtue and brought with it the added advantage of encouraging excellence and vigor in society (pp. x, 41-51). While this argument is in sig true, and widely accepted, it again seems to me a little mis leading. Rather than seeing the difference between Hamilton and Jefferson as reflecting a battle between the modem commercial spirit and classical civic
nificant respects

spirit, Frisch

might radical

have

pointed

to Jefferson's general agreement with the en

lightenment
matter,
view of
order and

Thomas Paine that governing is not a very complicated left to itself society is, for the most part, self-regulating. In this
melt away. of

politics, tensions between

tend to

great

rival because
of

liberty and equality and between liberty and Hamilton would, then, appear less modem than his his affirmation of the need for government superinten
Jefferson,
of

dence

the economy.
on

course,
more

saw

this superintendence as a
and

corrupting influence
government.

the people and,

immediately
and

directly,

on

the

second point of contrast

between Hamilton
their

his

great contemporaries

that Frisch brings

out concerns

different

understandings of

the nature of
saw

the Constitution. Like

stitution as an

broad powers, apportioning them to the various branches according to their inherent natures (pp. 21-32). A constitution, Hamilton believed, must reflect political reality. Jefferson, by
granted

Flaumenhaft, Frisch enabling document, in that it

argues

that Hamilton

the Con

contrast,
cise

saw on

the Constitution more as an

inhibiting document specifying

his
view

pre

limits

the power of government. As already noted, it was

that

easy and, therefore, not much of it was required. Furthermore, he believed that each generation has a right to frame its own constitution,
government was
which means

that the

current generation ought not undertake obligations

that

will constrain or

burden the future (pp.

33-39,

73). Madison thought that Ham

seemed to
as revealed

ilton's doctrine

of

liberal

construction was

dangerous because it
of

le

gitimate actions not

intended

by

the authors

the

Constitution

the Convention debates and, especially,

by

the

State

by Ratifying Conventions.

Hamilton was, he charged, trying to the government into a new form (pp. 63-64). Whether or not government is easy, Madison seems to say, we must strictly confine ourselves to what the parties to ratification thought was

"administer"

Popular Government
intended. While Frisch does
tions raised
not go

and

Effective Government
and

445
ques

into the historical

seems

interpretative
both
either
of

by

Madison's theory, he
view

to conclude that

the alterna
and

tives to Hamilton's

will,

almost

certainly, involve

frequent

embarrassing

incapacity

on

the part of government or

frequent
the

barrassing
correct

violations of

the fundamental law.

view

Thus,
is

and equally em Hamiltonian view is

for Frisch because it is the only

contrast and

that

compatible with

governing
views of

(pp. 31, 35,64). A final point of

developed
on
Frisch'

by

Frisch involves the

is

differing

Hamilton, Madison,
tive and legislative

Jefferson

the appropriate balance between execu

useful

power. view

s account which

because it highlights
enough

difficulty

in Hamilton's
who

is,

perhaps, not emphasized

a matter of mere

by

Flaumenhaft,

implies that it

would

be

vanity for Congress

to consult min
and

to refuse to acquiesce in an arrangement where

it

was expected

isters before acting (pp. 85-86). Yet this was saw matters. Whereas Hamilton envisaged the

not

how Jefferson

Madison

executive as a critical source of of

initiative in the system, they believed in the primacy conceiving 65-68, 76-77). Their
can
of the executive as

the legislative

essentially

ministerial

(Alexander

branch, Hamilton, pp.

of

reasons were many: concern

for the purity

the republi

form, fear

of executive

tyranny, and, perhaps,

to the task

a greater optimism that

the

legislative branch
of
another

was equal

of administration.

(Whether these two

themselves

men practiced what

they

preached when of

they became President

is,

course,

matter.) In October

1792, Jefferson

complained
branch."1

to Wash

ington that the "executive had

swallowed

up the legislative

Madison,

departing somewhat from his early views on the subject, argued in Congress that it was an improper delegation of legislative authority to ask the Treasury
for
reports
on

the subjects of loans and taxes. The reports of the

are not presented

Treasury

Secretary,
ner.

he complained,
report

in

an

impartial

and equitable man

They

the House of
constitutional

only one side of the argument, thereby depriving members of the "freedom of exercising their own understandings in a proper
manner."2

The legislative branch, Jefferson

independent"

and

Madison

con

if the executive branch ceased tended, could only be "pure and taking the initiative on policy (Alexander Hamilton, pp. 67-68). Frisch points out that, whereas Madison and Jefferson desired a strict division of powers to

keep
tion"

the

legislature "pure

independent,"

and

Hamilton 77).

envisaged a

"competi

between the branches (pp.

7, 29-30, 56, 67,

ni

This last difference between Hamilton important issue. Does

port?

and

his

rivals

leads

me to raise an

not an efficacious administration require popular

sup
was

The

effectiveness of

Washington's administration, Hamilton granted,

made possible

in large

part

by

the popularity of Washington (Effective

Repub-

446

Interpretation

lie,

pp.

247-48, 301

n.33; Alexander

Hamilton,

pp.

54-55). He was, Hamilton

that Hamilton saw that would

said, "an Aegis very essential to the early days of the republic as

me."

Flaumenhaft

mentions

an

opportunity to fix

policies

be

difficult to
the

change under the complex stmcture of government established

by

Constitution (pp. 110, 112). Thus Flaumenhaft implicitly grants that at least at that time the energy engendered by the separation of powers gave way
to a more potent

form

of energetic government.

Under Washington, the

execu

tive exercised so great an

influence

over the

legislative branch that there was,

mon-

perhaps,
archism.

kernel

of

truth to Jefferson's and Madison's strictures against

Jefferson

and

Madison
as

were

wrong,

however,

to see this executive

dominance
monarchy.

as permanent or

part of a

Such times

of executive

strategy to introduce an hereditary dominance are not likely to be ordinary

statesmanship.

times, but
of

Hamilton,

more

than most, believed that human affairs would con

tinue to see extraordinary times that called for

The importance

Washington himself for the

the "political
heresy"

success of

his

own administration also

extent of

leads

me

to wonder whether Flaumenhaft

with

understates

the

Hamilton's

agreement
are

which

holds that forms

administer

of government

less

important than the individuals

who

the government

(cf. Effective
often

Republic,
mentioned

p.

93). I

might

add

further that it is

likely
he

that

Hamilton's

"theoretic

doubts"

about

the viability of strictly republican gov

"competition"

ernment turned on

whether, in the
would

envisaged

between the

branches,

the executive

be

victorious

frequently

enough to ensure a good

administration.

political capital

In the terminology of today, Hamilton was willing to spend Washington's in order to administer the government effectively. There is,
a critical

however,
dent has

difference between Washington in it is both

and

those modem Presi

dents who have followed in the progressive tradition. The office of the Presi
a

dual

character

that

representative and executive.

It is

representative cusses so

in that

the people elect the

President.

Yet,

as

Flaumenhaft dis

well, it is

be

able to resist

essentially representative, because the President must the will of the people. The nature of the President's work is
not

executive.

The

progressive

understanding

of

that office threatens to collapse

its

dual

character

by

making the President into a simply popular representative. As

Presidents try to reach out to the public at large on a regular basis, they become less and less distinguishable from any other popular representative and are more
and more

likely

to be subject to the turbulent

fluctuations

of public opinion.

On

balance,
est

this is

likely

to make them less effective as administrators. The great

danger

with the progressive view

is that, in the

long

term,

populist govern

ment will

be

substituted

for

constitutional government.
was popular without
"reputation"

Washington, by
possible

contrast,

because he

possessed a a reputation as an

rather

ularity, and, specifically,

This was than, or in addition to, pop executive in war and politics. To
a populist.

being

Popular Government
understand this

and

Effective Government
description
of

447

better, it is

useful

to consider the

Washington

Hamilton
A

gives

in the Crosswell
bright
and pure as our

case.

character so

only

a source of

honor to

nation, giving glory to

General Washington's, [Hamilton] says, is not it; it is most useful also as

a model

a pattern of virtue to us and our

posterity, serving as

to be imitated.
and

Washington headed

our armies with perseverance and

success,

he

administered

our civil government unmoved

by

calumny

and

faction. A

popular spirit of

inquiry

his character; to spread the truth about his character was only to increase its utility as a model for imitation. Washington, unmoved by calumny, was unmoved as well by faction; he was thereby himself an impediment only
revealed the splendor of

to the baneful influence of the specific evil of republican government.

(Effective

Republic,
An

p.

247, Flaumenhaft's
be

paraphrase of

James Kent's notes) opinion, but there is

executive ought not to

about more

responsive to public

some

thing impressive
well popular of

the executive power that can make those who exercise it

or,

precisely,

respected.

An

executive can provide examples

his virtue, as his firmness, his decisiveness, and his accomplishments Hamilton calls it. The example of Washington indicates how a President might
make

his

reputation as an executive the core of

his

popularity.

He

won

the kind

of

popularity that facilitates rather than It

might

impedes

an energetic administration. prove oneself

be

said

that one requires

an

opportunity to
one can

before

one

can gain a reputation as an executive.

And, furthermore,
have that

that in an elective
opportunity.

system one must

become

popular

before

This is

tme,
upon

and perhaps more true

than it has ever been. The question really turns

life,

how that popularity is acquired. Flaumenhaft notes that late in Hamilton's with the Federalist party disintegrating around him, he began to reflect on
more popular measures so as with

the need to take

nians.

to compete

with

the Jefferso-

Hamilton debated
constitutional

his

colleagues

the balance that must be struck

effec much

propriety and being popular enough to govern tively. Hamilton confided to James Bayard that the Federalists relied too

between
on the

measures"

"rectitude

and

tion of popular favor

sures might
of

by

utility fair

of

their

but had "neglected the While mling

"irregular"

cultiva

and

justifiable

expedients.

out

"mea

unworthy,"

intrinsically
they
than
would

Hamilton

even granted that

measures

be justified; irregular in the

saw as

sense that

in

"more

sound and stable order

things"

be unnecessary (Effective Republic,

p.

199). We

might

infer that Hamilton

rather

fair, justifiable,

and

worthy

measures

that supported

undermined

the constitutional order, one purpose of which was to

government.

give

of stability and energy to the administration Federalist were directed towards the plight of the

These

remarks

Party

as a whole.

They

are,

however, just as applicable to executives. The distinction Hamilton drew between worthy and unworthy measures is all but unknown today. To suggest that it is important might even sound idealistic.

448

Interpretation
executive service ought

Yet those interested in

of

to be

careful

to acquire the

kind

popularity

which makes a good administration possible.

were

It is in their interest

to do so. If candidates and incumbents

to

consider more

carefully their ordinary times

interest,
would agems.

then it

would

be less
seeks

likely
in
a

that an ordinary man in

be tempted to take
A President
who

comfort

popularity

earned

through populist strat

to ingratiate himself

with

the public

is sure,

eventually, only to earn its

contempt.

NOTES

1. "Notes of a Conversation with George The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boyd et al., 24 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-90), 24:435. 2. November 21, 1792, The Papers of James Madison, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al., 16 vols. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1962-89), 14:415-16.

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