Mehmet Ali Birand in a class of his own Mehmet Ali Birand was the uncrowned king of Turkish journalism.

For all those who had the privilege of working with him, it was clear: No other Turkish journalist was and is able to present the same set of credentials as Birand. He had travelled the world, met the high and mighty and acquired in-depth knowledge of global affairs and European politics. In Turkey, he was the most respected and successful TV anchorman, holding on to firm beliefs he had about democracy and justice even when they caused him considerable personal and professional problems. In addition, he was a gentleman of good manners and humor. After I became chairman of the Turkey delegation to the European Parliament in 2002, I met him several times in Brussels and stanbul. He had of course been around much longer than I had, having started his career 40 years earlier in Brussels as the European correspondent of the Milliyet daily. Birand had witnessed the few ups and many downs in Turkish-EU relations in the 1980s and 1990s but had kept his strong conviction that Turkeys future should be within the EU. When he spoke of that dream, he combined irrefutable logic with passionate determination. I will never forget that cold and rainy night in Brussels in December of 2004 when the EU had to decide whether or not to start accession negotiations with Turkey. He had found himself a small space outside the main building where hundreds of journalists from all over the world were covering this extraordinary summit. After hours of deliberations and rumors about a last-moment failure, the final go-ahead came and we immediately went live on the air to comment on what a remarkable historic event it was for both of us, one that unleashed strong emotions. Shortly thereafter, I witnessed another side of Birand as we watched a Fenerbahe-Galatasaray match together from the Hrriyet skybox at kr Saracolu Stadium. When Fener supporters saw Birand, a diehard Galatasaray supporter, they began to shout at us, albeit mostly in a friendly manner. For a moment I was afraid that things would get out of hand, but Birand was in full control of the verbal confrontation, reacting with humor and elegance, visibly enjoying his status as a famous but sometimes controversial Turk. On other occasions when people recognized him, on the street or in a restaurant, I admired the way he responded, with a combination of professionalism and empathy and without ever becoming arrogant or dismissive. Even in friendly situations, Birand always remained the journalist, keen on uncovering untold stories or presenting an interesting debate on television. In the first few months of 2006, Kemal Kerinsiz, an ultranationalist lawyer who later became a major defendant in the Ergenekon trial, had tried to convince a public prosecutor to open a court case against me for insulting the Turkish military. In the end, that effort failed, but when I arrived in Turkey soon afterwards, Birand asked me to participate in one of his famous 32nd Day programs. He wanted me to discuss the appropriateness of my criticism of the military with Kerinsiz and smet Berkan, then editor-in-chief of the Radikal daily. I hesitated because I did not expect much from a shouting match with an extremist like Kerinsiz, but eventually Birand managed to convince me that it would be good for the further development of Turkish democracy if such an open confrontation between two opposing views was broadcasted. He also calculated that such a well publicized clash would be good for his shows ratings. At the end of the day, in my view, the exchange of views between Kerinsiz and I did not result in much, but Birands insistence showed how, as a TV journalist, he always tried to present fascinating content in an entertaining manner. I am sure that for a long time to come we will miss his views, his wit and his laughs. There is no better way for us to honor Birands memory and legacy than to keep on arguing for better democracy in Turkey, a solution of the Kurdish problem and Turkeys accession to the EU.

Nevi ahsna mnhasr bir kii: Mehmet Ali Birand

Mehmet Ali Birand, Trk gazeteciliinin tasz kralyd. Onunla alma ayrcalna sahip olmu herkes iin aikar olan bir ey vard: Birandn sunduu onca referansa sahip baka bir Trk gazeteci daha yoktu ve hl yok. Birand tm dnyay gezdi, en st dzey yetkililer ve en kudretli kiiliklerle tant ve hem kresel iler hem de Avrupa politikalaryla ilgili derinlemesine bilgi edindi. Trkiyede en tannan ve en sayg duyulan haber programcs ve sunucusuydu, bana kaydadeer miktarda kiisel ve mesleki sorun asa da, demokrasi ve adalete dair salam inancndan asla vazgemedi. laveten, adab muaeret kadar nktedanlkta da eline su dklmeyen bir centilmendi. 2002de Avrupa Parlamentosundaki Trkiye heyetinin bakan olmamn ardndan, kendisiyle Brksel ve stanbulda pek ok kez karlatm. Elbette o buralarda benden ok daha eskiydi, kariyerine 40 yl nce Milliyetin Avrupa muhabiri olarak Brkselde balamt. Birand, 1980 ve 90larda Trkiye-AB ilikilerinde pek az k ve pek ok inie tanklk etmesine ramen, Trkiyenin geleceinin ABde olmas gerektiine dair gl kanaatini korudu. Bu hayalinden bahsettiinde, kar konulamaz bir mantkla tutkulu bir kararll birletirirdi. Aralk 2004te ABnin Trkiye ile katlm mzakerelerini balatp balatmama kararn vermesinin gerektii o souk ve yamurlu geceyi asla unutmayacam. Birand, tm dnyadan yzlerce gazetecinin o sra d zirveyi takip ettii ana binann dnda kk bir yer bulmutu kendine. Son dakika baarszl olacana dair saatler sren tartma ve dedikodulardan sonra, en nihayetinde mzakerelerin balayaca iareti geldi. Derhal televizyonda canl yayna balanarak, bunun, her ikimiz iin de gl duygular sel gibi aktan byk bir tarihi olay olduuna dair yorumlar yaptk. Ksa bir sre sonra, kr Saracolu Stadnda Hrriyetin locasndan Fenerbahe-Galatasaray man birlikte izlerken, Birandn bir baka ynne tanklk ettim. Fener taraftarlar, iflah olmaz Galatasarayl Birandn statta olduunu fark edince, genelde dosta taklma eklinde olsa da bize barmaya balad. Bir an iin ilerin kontrolden kacandan korktum, ama Birand szl satamay tmyle kontrolne ald, akayla kark k biimde yantlar verdi, belli ki, mehur ve bazen de tartlan bir Trk olma stats houna gidiyordu. Baka vesilelerle insanlar onu sokakta ya da restoranda tandnda, buna, asla kstahlk ve kibir gstermeden profesyonellik ve empatinin bir karmyla karlk verme tarzna hep hayran kaldm. Birand, dost ilikilerinde bile, gizli tutulmu hikyeleri ortaya karma ve televizyonda ilgin bir tartma amaya can atan bir gazeteci olmay srdrd. 2006nn ilk aylarnda, bugn Ergenekon davasnn ba phelilerinden biri olan ar milliyeti avukat Kemal Kerinsiz, Trk ordusuna hakaret ettiim gerekesiyle bana kar bir savcy dava amaya ikna etmeye almt. Sonuta bu giriim baarszla urad, ama ben gndeme gelmesinden ksa sre sonra Trkiyeye dndmde, Birand mehur 32. Gn programna katlmam rica etti. Orduya ynelik eletirilerimin ne kadar yerinde olduunu Kerinsiz ve dnemin Radikal Genel Yayn Ynetmeni smet Berkan ile tartmam istiyordu. Bunun Kerinsiz gibi bir arlk ile barma mana dneceini dndmden ekiniyordum, ama sonunda Birand, iki kart gr arasnda ak bir kapmann televizyondan yaynlanmasnn, Trkiyenin demokrasisini daha ileri gtrmek asndan iyi olacana beni ikna etti. Tabii, pek ok habere vesile olacak bu dellonun, programnn izlenirlik oranlar asndan iyi olacan da hesap etmiti. Her ey olup bittikten sonra, bana sorarsanz, Kerinsiz ile aramdaki gr alveriinin kimseye pek faydas dokunmad. Ama Birandn srar, bir TV gazetecisi olarak, hep heyecan verici bir ierii elenceli bir tarzda sunmaya altn gsterdi. Onun grlerini, esprilerini ve kahkahalarn daha ok uzun zaman zleyeceimizden eminim. Birandn ansn ve mirasn onurlandrmamzn en iyi yolu, Trkiyede demokrasiyi, Krt sorununun zmn ve Trkiyenin AB yeliini savunmaya devam etmek olacak. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

One extra condition

Normally speaking, Cyprus only makes it to the headlines in the Turkish press when the Greek Cypriots have again used their veto rights inside the EU to block progress on Turkish accession to the union or when another round of talks to end the decades-long division of the island has failed once more. That might soon change, however, because Cyprus is rapidly becoming a hot topic for other reasons. Because Cypriot banks have suffered heavy losses through their massive exposure to the Greek economic crisis, the country has been forced to ask for a eurozone bailout. The troika of international lenders, made up of the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is looking at an aid package of 17 billion euros. Around 10 billion of that would go towards propping up the ailing Cypriot banking sector. The size of the bailout almost equals the annual Cypriot gross domestic product (GDP), but is just a small portion of the 150 billion euros of assets owned by the country's banks. To satisfy the conditions for the impending bailout, the Cypriot parliament has already adopted a 2013 budget which includes far-reaching austerity measures that are likely to result in a 3.5 percent shrinkage of the economy this year. Despite these initiatives, the IMF and several European countries are afraid Cyprus will not be able to shoulder the interest payments due on its debt and have therefore suggested a partial default involving private creditors before a bailout deal is concluded. Others are afraid that such a forced write-down, the second one after private creditors were pressured to do so last year with their Greek debt holdings, will severely undermine investor trust in the eurozone. That could potentially trigger a new crisis in the EU, and for that reason Cyprus' economic woes have made it to the top of the EU agenda. In addition, there is a growing feeling, especially in Germany, that aid to Cyprus might mainly benefit Russian oligarchs, who have parked enormous amounts of illegal money in bank accounts in Cyprus. In November of last year, a leaked report by the German foreign intelligence agency, the BND, revealed that Russians have deposited over 20 billion euros in Cypriot banks. These deposits will be guaranteed if European bailout money is paid to shore up the island's banks. The BND also accused Cyprus of still providing opportunities for money laundering because laws and regulations are not implemented properly. Cypriot authorities have also made it easy for rich Russians to obtain Cypriot citizenship, allowing 80 oligarchs to gain access to the entire EU in this way. The report was made public by the influential weekly Der Spiegel, which has not stopped writing on the topic since. This week's edition again lists the names of several Russian billionaires and their Cyprus-based companies used to evade taxes or launder illegal funds. The effects of all this negative publicity are becoming more visible every day despite a frantic campaign by the Cypriot government to appease all the concerns in Berlin. In order for German Chancellor Angela Merkel to agree on a Cypriot bailout deal, she needs a majority in the German parliament. Realizing that parliamentary elections are only eight months away, the opposition has already announced it will not support the controversial plan. To make matters worse, some of her own Christian Democratic lawmakers have shown reluctance to agree, and her liberal coalition partner, struggling to survive, has made similar threats. For obvious reasons, Merkel is not keen on risking her re-election because of some dirty business going on in the eastern Mediterranean. Under German pressure, an EU decision on the Cypriot bailout has again been postponed until after the presidential elections on the island in February. Merkel has been asking for wide-ranging economic reforms and privatizations before she would support a bailout. Other German policy makers have suggested Cyprus should also raise its corporate tax rates. Currently companies on the island subject to a very low 10 percent income tax are viewed with frustration and envy by several other EU member states. My suggestion would be to add another condition before agreeing on the aid package. Up until now, Cyprus has blocked an EU direct trade regulation that would allow Turkish Cypriots to trade directly with the rest of Europe, a measure that would give a boost to the economy of the whole island. The deal was promised by the EU in 2004 but could not be implemented because of Cypriot obstruction. The time has come to make it clear to the Greek Cypriots that the costs of their obstinacy have become too high.

Ekstra bir art Normalde Kbrs, Trk basnnn manetlerine, ancak Kbrsl Rumlar Trkiyenin AB ile yelik mzakerelerinde ilerlemeyi bloke etmek iin yine veto haklarn kullandnda ya da adadaki onlarca yllk blnmeyi sona erdirecek grmelerin yeni turu da baarszla uradnda kar. Ama bu durum yaknda deiebilir, zira Kbrs baka sebeplerden el yakan bir gndem maddesine dnyor. Yunanistandaki ekonomik krizden fena halde etkilenen Kbrs bankalar ar kayplara uradklarndan, lke, avro blgesi kurtarma paketi talep etmek zorunda kald. Avrupa Merkez Bankas (AMB), Avrupa Komisyonu ve IMFden oluan uluslararas balar troykas, 17 milyar avroluk bir yardm paketi zerinde alyor. Bunun yaklak 10 milyar can ekien bankaclk sektrn hayata dndrmeye ayrlacak. Kurtarma paketinin boyutu, neredeyse Kbrsn yllk GSYHsine eit, ama lke bankalarnn sahip olduu 150 milyar avroluk varlklarn sadece kk bir blmne denk geliyor. Oltada oynatlan kurtarma paketinin artlarn yerine getirebilmek iin Kbrs parlamentosu bu yl ekonominin yzde 3,5 orannda klmesiyle sonulanmas muhtemel ok geni kapsaml tasarruf nlemleri ieren 2013 btesini kabul etti bile. Bu giriimlere ramen, IMF ile pek ok Avrupa lkesi, Kbrsn borlarnn faiz demelerini kaldramayacandan korktuklarndan, kurtarma anlamas tamamlanmadan nce bor veren zel kii ve kurulular da ieren ksmi temerrt nerdi. Dierleri ise, geen yl zel alacakllarn Yunanistann borlarnn bir ksmn silmeleri ynnde baskya uramalarnn ardndan, ikinci bir zorla sildirmenin, yatrmclarn avro blgesine itimadna ar darbe indireceinden korkuyor. Bunun ABde yeni bir kriz tetikleme potansiyeli var, bu yzden de Kbrs ekonomisinin dert ve tasalar AB gndeminin tepesine oturdu. laveten, zellikle Almanyada olmak zere giderek byyen bir his var, o da, Kbrsa yardmn, asl, muazzam miktarlarda yasad paray Kbrs bankalarndaki hesaplara park etmi Rus oligarklara yarayaca. Kasm 2012de Alman d istihbarat servisi BNDden szan bir rapor, Ruslarn 20 milyar avroyu Kbrstaki bankalara yatrdn gzler nne serdi. Eer Avrupann kurtarma paras, adann bankalarna payanda koymak iin kullanlrsa, Rus hesaplar da salama alnm olacak. BND, Kbrs, yasa ve dzenlemeleri doru dzgn uygulamayarak, hl para aklama imkanlar sunmakla da suluyor. stelik Kbrsl yetkililerin zengin Ruslara Kbrs vatandalna kolay gei sunmas sayesinde 80 Rus oligark ABnin tamamna eriim salad. Raporu kamuoyunun bilgisine sunan Almanyann etkili dergisi Der Spiegel, o zamandan beri bu konuda yazmaya ara vermedi. Bu haftaki sayda, yine, ok sayda Rus milyarderin adlarnn ve onlarn vergiden kamak ya da yasad fonlar aklamak iin kulland Kbrs merkezli irketlerinin listesi yer alyor. Bu olumsuz yndeki yaymlarn etkisi, Kbrs hkmetinin Berlinde kopan grlty yattrmak iin lgnca abalamasna ramen, her geen gn daha grnr hale geliyor. Alman Babakan Angela Merkelin Kbrs kurtarma anlamasna olur verebilmek iin Alman parlamentosunda ounlua ihtiyac var. Parlamento seimlerinin sadece sekiz ay sonra yaplacann bilincindeki muhalefet, tartmal plan desteklemeyeceini imdiden ilan etti. leri daha da ktletirmek istercesine, Merkelin kendi Hristiyan Demokrat vekillerinden bazs da olur vermekte gnlsz davranrken, koalisyon hkmetinin kk orta Hr Demokratlar hayatta kalma mcadelesi iinde benzeri tehditler savuruyor. Tahmin edilebilecek sebeplerden, Merkel, Dou Akdenizde pis iler dnyor diye yeniden seilmesini riske sokmaya can atacak deil. Alman basks altndaki AB de, Kbrs kurtarmayla ilgili kararn ubatta Kbrsta yaplacak bakanlk seimlerine dek bir kez daha erteledi. Merkel kurtarmay desteklemek iin geni apl ekonomik reformlar ve zelletirmeler talep ediyor. Dier Alman politika yapclar, Kbrsn irket vergisi oranlarn ykseltmesini teklif etti. Bugn adadaki irketler, dier AB yesi lkelerin ounun gpta ve moral bozukluuyla bakt yzde 10 gibi ok dk bir gelir vergisine tabi.

Benim nerim, yardm paketine onay vermeden nce bir art daha eklemek. Bugne dek Kbrs, Kbrsl Trklerin Avrupann geri kalanyla dorudan ticaret yapmasna izin verecek AB dorudan ticaret dzenlemesini bloke etti, oysa yrrle sokulmas tm adann ekonomisini cotururdu. AB dorudan ticareti 2004te vaat etmi, ama Kbrsn engellemesi yznden hayata geirilememiti. Kbrsl Rumlara inatlklarnn bedelinin ok ar gelmeye baladn net biimde bildirmenin zaman oktan geldi.

Is Erdoan pushing his luck? What a week it was! I cant remember a similar outburst of excitement, hope and optimism, across the political spectrum, after it became clear that serious negotiations are being prepared between the Turkish state and jailed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah calan. Detailed plans popped up in the media, revealing different stages, each linked to specific conditions that have to be met before the process moves on to the next phase. Both sides made statements indicating that they were willing to go all the way, acknowledging the need to make compromises. The combination of transparency, cool-headed determination and willingness to give and take almost seemed too good to be true. After the first days of joy and enthusiasm about what appears to be a real breakthrough in a conflict that seemed to be stuck once again, some experienced observers started listing the potential problems and risks involved. Can calan still pretend to be in control of the entire PKK? How strong will be the resilience once the inevitable spoilers in both camps start to try and sabotage this extremely volatile balancing act? The first test in that respect came sooner than expected when three Kurdish female activists were found dead in Paris under very suspicious circumstances. Despite my inherent optimism, I agree with the calls for caution and restraint on the part of the bystanders and courage and composure on the side of the main players. What remains is of course the question: Why now? In trying to find an answer, Cengiz andar and others have pointed at the rapidly changing neighborhood in which an unresolved Kurdish problem is becoming a growing liability for Turkey. Others have underlined the importance of calans role in ending the recent hunger strikes and Erdoans calculation that this was the best time to make use of that momentum. I guess all these factors play a role. There is one question however that keeps haunting me: Why is Erdoan willing to take the risk of losing the nationalist vote that he supposedly needs to become the first directly elected president next year? Since the elections in 2011 up until one month ago, a consensus had developed among many analysts and columnists, including myself, that apparently the prime minister, an expert on opinion polls and voting patterns, had decided that, in order to win the presidency in 2014, he needed the votes of as many nationalist voters as possible. We all thought that was the reason behind some of his most conspicuous political moves last year: the, albeit failed, effort to strike a deal with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) on moving up the date for the local elections, his suggestion to maybe reintroduce the death penalty and, one should not forget, his very harsh language on the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the need to lift the immunity of some of the Kurdish parliamentarians. Every emotional outburst and calculated step seemed designed to send out a clear message to the substantial nationalist part of the electorate: vote for me in 2014. When this analysis is correct, it does not make sense to enter into a process that, one way or another, will not be received well by this targeted core presidential constituency. If the talks with calan fail, the attempt will be used against him. If everything works out fine, many nationalists will be angered by what they see as inexcusable concessions to terrorists. One possible explanation could be that the prime minister has changed his electoral assessments and has come to believe that winning the Kurdish vote in 2014 is even more important and will compensate for a partial loss of the nationalist vote.

That will only happen though when the negotiations produce a result that is acceptable to most Kurds. If they fail, resentment among the Kurds will be huge, as it was in 2009 after the unhappy end of the Kurdish Initiative, and Erdoan is in serious danger of losing both the nationalist and the Kurdish votes. Again, the question: Why would the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader take such a big risk, knowing that there is no guarantee that the present initiative will be successful? To be honest, I still dont know.

Erdoan ansn m zorluyor? Ne haftayd ama! Trk devleti ile hapisteki PKK lideri Abdullah calan arasnda ciddi mzakereler iin hazrlk yapld anlalnca, siyasi yelpazedeki heyecan, umut ve iyimserlik patlamasnn bir benzerini daha nce grdm hatrlamyorum. Hemen, medyada, srecin bir sonraki evresine geebilmek iin yerine getirilmesi gereken zel artlara bal eitli aamalar amlayan ayrntl planlar boy gsterdi. Her iki taraf da sonuna kadar gitmeye kararl olduklarna iaret eden aklamalar yapt, dn verilmesi gerektiini teslim etti. effaflk, serinkanl kararllk ve al-ver istekliliinin bu bileimi, neredeyse gerek olamayacak kadar gzeldi. Bir kez daha kmaza saplanm bu atmada gerek ilerleme gibi grnen admdan duyulan sevin ve heyecann ilk gnleri getikten sonra, baz grm geirmi gzlemciler, giriimin potansiyel sorunlarn ve risklerini sralamaya balad. calan sanki tm PKKy kontrol edebilirmi gibi yapmaya hl devam edebilir mi? Her iki tarafn iflah olmaz oyunbozanlar, bu son derece yanardner dengeleme eylemini snamaya ve sabote etmeye balaynca ne kadar gl bir diren gsterilebilecek? Bu balamda, Krt kadn aktivistin Pariste son derece pheli koullarda l bulunmalaryla birlikte ilk snav beklenenden nce geldi att. Doutan iyimser olmama ramen, hem izleyici koltuklarndakilerin ihtiyat ve itidal arlarna katlyorum hem de oyuncu kadrosunun cesaretini ve duruunu destekliyorum. Akllara u soru geliyor elbette: Neden imdi? Cengiz andar ve dierleri, yant bulmaya alrken, hzla deien blgede zlmemi kalan Krt sorununun Trkiye iin giderek byyen bir yke dntne dikkat ekti. Dierleri, son alk grevlerinin bitirilmesinde calann oynad roln nemini ve momentumu kullanmak iin bunun en iyi zaman olduuna dair Erdoann hesabnn altn izdi. Tahminimce tm bu etkenler bir rol oynad. Fakat peimi brakmayan bir soru var: Erdoan, gelecek yl ilk dorudan seilmi cumhurbakan olmas iin ihtiya duyduu varsaylan milliyeti oylar kaybetme riskini niye gze ald? 2011 seimlerinden bir ay ncesine dek, ilerinde benim de olduum pek ok analist ve ke yazar unda fikir birliine varmt: Kamuoyu yoklamalar ve oy dalm modelleri alannda uzmanlk sergileyen Babakan, 2014te cumhurbakanln kazanabilmesi iin mmkn olduunca ok milliyeti semenin oyuna ihtiya duyduuna hkmetmi olmal. Hepimiz dnmtk ki, geen ylki en gze batan siyasi manevralarnn bazsnn -yerel seimlerin tarihini erkene almak iin baarszlkla sonulanan MHP ile anlamaya varma abas, lm cezasn yeniden yrrle sokmann deerlendirilmesi nerisi ve tabii BDP ve baz Krt milletvekillerinin dokunulmazlklarnn kalkmas konusundaki ok sert syleminin- gerisinde bu sebep yatyor. Her duygusal patlama ve hesaplanm adm, semenin kayda deer milliyeti kesimine u net mesaj vermek iin tasarlanma benziyor: 2014te oyunuzu bana verin. Bu analiz doruysa, cumhurbakanl semeninin hedeflenen ekirdeinin u veya bu ekilde ho karlamayaca bir srece girmek akla manta uymaz. calan ile grmeler baarszla urarsa, byle bir ie girimi olmasn Erdoana kar kullanrlar. Her ey yolunda giderse, bu sefer de, pek ok milliyeti, terristlere yenilir yutulur yan olmayan dnler diye telakki ettikleri eylere fkelenecek.

Erdoann tavrnn olas bir aklamas, semenlerle ilgili deerlendirmelerini deitirmesi ve 2014te Krt oylarn kazanmann ok daha nem kazanarak milliyeti oylarn ksmi kaybn telafi edeceine inanmaya balamas olabilir. Ama bunun gerekleebilmesi iin nce mzakerelerden Krtlerin ou iin kabul edilebilir bir sonu kmas gerekir. Eer kmazsa, Krtler, 2009daki Krt almnn mutsuz sonla bitmesi sonrasndaki gibi fena halde hnlanr ve Erdoan, hem milliyeti hem de Krt oylarn kaybetmek gibi ciddi bir tehlikeyle yz yze gelir. Dn dola yine ayn soru: AKP lideri, imdiki giriimin baarl olacann bir garantisi bulunmadn bile bile niye byle byk bir risk alsn? Dorusu, hl bir fikrim yok.

Turkey-EU relations slowly warming up (2) In my previous article I explained why 2013 will be a year in which relations between Turkey and the EU will gradually improve. Today, I will try to clarify why this year we won't see the big breakthrough that some are predicting and so many supporters of Turkey's EU accession in Turkey and abroad are hoping for. The two main reasons are the upcoming elections in Germany and the ongoing uncertainties about the European economy. As we will see, these two factors are strongly interconnected. According to the plan, there will be elections for a new German parliament in September. For a long time, many observers, including myself, were hoping and expecting that the current conservative-liberal government of Angela Merkel might be replaced by a red-green coalition. That would be good news for Turkey because Merkel is known for her opposition to Turkey's EU membership, although that objection never led her to make the kind of extreme anti-Turkey statements that we know from former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Her policy on Turkey so far was characterized by a combination of promoting vague alternatives and allowing other European countries to actively frustrate Turkey's accession negotiations. That would all change with a new government of Social Democrats and Greens, two parties that support Turkey's EU accession and have shown in the past, in 2004 for instance, that they are willing to actively push for it inside the EU. Based on current opinion polls, however, the uncomforting conclusion must be that Merkel will, most probably, win a third term. The only change we will see is the replacement of her present coalition partner, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), by either the Social Democrats or, far less likely, the Greens. To the surprise of many, Merkel is still Germany's most popular politician, and her party, the Christian Democrats, is doing very well in the polls, scoring around 40 percent on average. That is amazing because most Germans don't like her policies and, for instance, adamantly reject every plan to save the euro that Merkel helped create. In a recent article, Olaf Storbeck, a columnist at Reuters Breakingviews, tried to explain that contradiction by underlining her consensus-oriented style, the lack of a credible alternative and the fact that till now Europe's economic woes have had no noticeable effect on the everyday life of ordinary Germans. Whatever the explanation, the fact that, as far as we can predict now, Merkel will continue to dominate German politics after the September elections has two major effects. One is that Germany's policies on Turkey's EU membership are not going to change drastically overnight. It will take time before a Social Democratic or Green foreign minister will have a chance to slowly change Germany's passive resistance into a more proactive and open-minded policy toward Turkey's EU perspectives. The second result of Merkel's hanging on to power despite strong opposition to her European plans will be extreme cautiousness on the part of the German chancellor with regard to further EU integration. Till the elections in September, nobody expects Merkel to push for a speedy introduction of more steps toward closer economic and political cooperation inside the eurozone. She will also not be willing to agree with a measure that, according to most analysts, is unavoidable: the writing off of a substantial part of Greece's debts in order to create at least some light at the end of what is still a dark tunnel. Merkel realizes very well that the price for such a Greek relief effort will, in one way or another, have to be paid by German taxpayers. Better not tell the electorate before the elections. As I see it, the German elections will not be the shining start of new Turkey-EU relations that many of us were expecting before. At least for another year, Merkel will have to focus on slowly convincing a skeptical German population that it is in Germany's long-term interest to save the Greeks (plus the Spaniards, the Italians and the Cypriots) and further integrate with

the rest of the eurozone. In the meantime, her willingness to radically change direction on Turkey will be minimal. These German constraints are not the only reason why I think we will have to wait a bit longer before a genuine restart of Turkey-EU relations is feasible. This year, Turkey will be preoccupied with a whole range of extremely challenging domestic issues. The first part of 2014 will be spent on the first direct presidential elections and, after that, Turkey will, most probably, have a new president and a new prime minister. All these political and personal changes will have a huge impact on Turkey's EU accession process as well, but we will only be able to witness these in the second half of 2014. Trkiye-AB ilikileri yava yava snyor (2) nceki makalemde niye 2013n Trkiye ile AB arasndaki ilikilerin aamal olarak dzelecei yl olacan aklamtm. Bugn de, bazlarnn ngrd ve Trkiyenin AB yeliinin hem Trkiyede hem de yurtdndaki bunca destekisinin umut ettii byk ilerlemeyi neden bu yl gremeyeceimizi izah etmeye alacam. Balca iki sebep, Almanyann seimlere gidecek olmas ve Avrupa ekonomisinde sregiden belirsizlikler. Greceimiz zere, bu iki etken birbirine sk skya bal. Plana gre, yeni Alman parlamentosu iin seimler eyllde dzenlenecek. Bir mddet, benim de aralarnda olduum ok sayda gzlemci, Angela Merkelin babakanlndaki muhafazakar-liberal hkmetin yerine krmz-yeil koalisyonunun gelebileceini umut etti ve bekledi. Bu Trkiye iin de iyi haber olurdu, zira Merkel Trkiyenin AB yeliine muhalefetiyle tannyor, her ne kadar bu itiraz, eski Fransa Cumhurbakan Nicolas Sarkozyden aina olduumuz ar Trkiye kart aklamalar yapmaya kadar varmasa da. Bugne dek, Merkelin Trkiye politikasnn karakteristiini, yelie mulak alternatifler sunma ile dier Avrupa lkelerini Trkiyenin mzakerelerini aktif biimde kstek olmaya tevik etmenin bileimi oluturdu. Trkiyenin AB yeliini destekleyen ve bunun iin ABde bastrmaya hazr olduklarn 2004te kantlam olan Sosyal Demokratlar ile Yeiller, yeni hkmeti kurabilecek olsayd, tm bunlar deiebilirdi. Gelgelelim son anketleri temel alnca, u rahatszlk verici sonuca varlyor: Merkel, byk ihtimalle, nc kez seilecek. Greceimiz tek deiiklik, halihazrdaki koalisyon ortann, yani liberal FDPnin yerine ya Sosyal Demokratlarn ya da daha az ihtimalle Yeillerin gelmesi olacak. Pek ok kiiyi artacak ekilde, Merkel hl Almanyann en popler siyasisi ve onun liderliindeki Hristiyan Demokratlar, anketlerde ortalama yzde 40 halk desteiyle ok iyi gidiyor. Bu da hayrete ayan bir durum, zira Almanlarn ou, onun politikalarndan holanmyor, mesela, Merkelin yardmyla oluturulan her avroyu kurtarma plann iddetle reddediyor. Reuters Breakingnewsn ke yazarlarndan Olaf Storbeck, geenlerde yaymlad bir makalede, Merkelin mutabakat ynelimli tarz, gvenilir bir alternatifinin olmamas ve Avrupann ekonomik dertlerinin sradan Almanlarn gnlk yaamna fark edilir etkide bulunmamas olgusunun altn izerek, bu elikiye aklama getirmeye alt. zah ne olursa olsun, gerek u ki, en uzun vadeli ngrlerimize gre, Merkelin eyll seimlerinden sonra da Alman siyasetine hkmetmeye devam etmesinin iki nemli etkisi olacak. ncelikle, Almanyann Trkiyenin AB yeliine dair politikalar bir gecede 180 derece deimeyecek. Almanyann pasif direniini yava yava Trkiyenin AB perspektifine dair daha proaktif ve ak grl politikaya dntrecek bir Sosyal Demokrat ya da Yeil Dileri Bakannn gelmesi zaman alacak. Merkelin Avrupa planlarna ynelik gl muhalefete ramen iktidar elinden karmamasnn ikinci sonucu, AB btnlemesinin daha ileriye gtrlmesi konusunda kendi hesabna ar temkinlilik gstermesi olacak. Eylldeki seimlere kadar, kimse, Merkelden, avro blgesinde daha yakn siyasi ve ekonomik ibirlii salayacak yeni admlarn hzla devreye sokulmas iin bastrmasn beklemesin. Kabul etmeye yanamayaca eylerden biri de, pek ok analiste gre kanlmaz olan bir nlem: Hl karanlk olan tnelin sonunda en azndan biraz k grnebilmesi iin Yunanistann borlarnn kaydadeer ksmn silmek. Merkel, Yunanllar kurtarmak iin bylesi bir giriimin bedelini u veya bu ekilde Alman vergi mkelleflerinin demek zorunda olduunun gayet farknda. En iyisi, bunu, seimlerden nce semene sylememek. Grebildiim kadaryla, Almanya seimi, pek oumuzun daha nce bekledii, yeni Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin parlak balangc olamayacak. En azndan bir yl daha, Merkel, pheci Alman nfusunu, Yunanllar (ilaveten talyanlar, spanyollar ve Kbrsllar) kurtarmann ve avro blgesinin geri kalanyla daha fazla btnlemenin, Almanyann uzun vadeli karna olduuna yava yava ikna etmeye odaklanacak. Bu arada Trkiye konusunda rotasn radikal biimde deitirme isteklilii dibe vuracak.

Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin itenlikle yeniden balamasnn, herkesin kaldraca bir ey olabilmesi iin biraz daha beklemek zorunda kalacamz dnmemin tek sebebi, bu Alman kstlamalar deil. Bu yl Trkiyenin gndemi, ok geni bir yelpazeye yaylan olaanst zorlu i meselelerle megul olacak. 2014n ilk yars, ilk kez dorudan cumhurbakan semenin telayla geecek ve bunun ardndan, byk ihtimalle, Trkiyenin yeni bir cumhurbakan ve babakan olacak. Tm bu siyasi ve kiisel deiimler, Trkiyenin ABye yelik srecine de muazzam etki yapacak, ama biz bunlar ancak 2014n ikinci yarsnda gzlemleyebileceiz.

Turkey-EU relations slowly warming up (1) Will 2013 be the year in which Turkey and the EU manage to normalize their relations and revitalize the ailing accession negotiations? Many pro-European intellectuals in Turkey have reached a point of utter despair after two years of inertia on both sides, crowned by the Cypriot EU presidency in the second half of 2013 that was marked by some of the worst exchanges of quips since the start of the talks in 2005. It has led some to the conclusion that Turkey-EU relations are beyond repair. Others have put all their hopes on the new French president, the upcoming presidential elections in Cyprus and an almost desperate belief that both Ankara and Brussels must, in the meantime, have understood that things cant go on like this and will therefore soon take the initiative to restart the whole process. Let me explain why I think 2013 will indeed be a year in which relations will improve and negotiations on some chapters will be opened. It will not be the year of the big breakthrough that will entirely open up Turkeys path to full EU membership, though. Firstly, lets touch on the hopeful signs from France and the potentially positive outcome of the Cypriot elections in February. It is true that Paris is considering unblocking two of the chapters previously blocked by former President Sarkozy. President Franois Hollande is expected to announce his decision during a planned visit to Turkey this spring. It will be an important symbolic break with five years of Turkey having been bashed by France and it will allow the actual opening of a new round of negotiations. The impact of the likely election of Nicos Anastasiades to the Cypriot presidency will not be immediately felt and is harder to assess. Unlike the majority of his countrymen, Anastasiades was a fervent defender of the Annan Plan in 2004 and although circumstances have changed, we may expect from him at least a sincere effort to reunite the island. Add to that his stated aim for Cyprus to join NATO as soon as possible -- a step that can only be taken with Turkeys approval -- and we are definitively entering a new phase in Turkey-Cyprus relations. However, no one should expect Anastasiades to rush into a compromise that is strongly opposed by his junior coalition partner. The new Cypriot president also knows very well that he needs time to convince a skeptical majority among the Greek Cypriots that a solution is possible. He will use 2013 to prepare the ground, not to take any controversial decisions. Maybe even more important than the new faces in Paris and Nicosia is the awareness in Ankara and Brussels that negotiations could be beneficial to both sides. Not only president Gl seems to realize that without an EU anchor, Turkey will have a hard time completing its process of democratization. With so many domestic challenges on the governments plate (new constitution, negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK], a new round of judicial reforms) a return, albeit cautiously, to normalcy in its relations with the EU could prove to be an asset and no longer a liability. Within the EU there are still some formidable obstacles that have to be removed and I will return to them in my next column. Still, even European skeptics on Turkeys EU accession cant any longer deny that the country has gained importance over the last couple of years. This is due, in the first place of course, to Turkeys growing economic strength that stands in sharp contrast to the EUs present problems and future expectations. Turkeys membership will not solve the EUs structural and economic problems but it will make some of them easier to handle. Also, Turkeys stance in the Syria crisis has not gone unnoticed in many European capitals. Whether it is Turkeys renewed commitment to NATO or the huge efforts in helping and housing Syrian refugees, Ankaras policies have brought it closer to the rest of Europe and have shown that working more closely together brings advantages to both. This realization has softened some of the still existing anti-Turkey views and that in itself will help make 2013 a year of slow recovery in Turkey-EU relations. Trkiye-AB ilikileri yava yava snyor (1)

2013, Trkiye ile ABnin ilikilerini normalletirmeyi ve can ekien katlm mzakerelerini yeniden canlandrmay baard yl olabilecek mi? Trkiyedeki Avrupa yanls entelektellerin ounluu, her iki tarafn iki yllk ataleti yznden mutlak umutsuzluk noktasna ulat. 2005te mzakerelerin balamasndan beri karlkl en sivri inelemelere sahne olan Kbrs Rum Ynetiminin 2012nin ikinci yarsndaki dnem bakanl da bu dneme tuz biber ekti. Bazs, Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin onarlamaz hale geldii sonucuna vard. Dierleri, umutlarn, yeni Fransa Cumhurbakanna, Kbrsta yaplacak bakanlk seimlerine ve bu arada Ankara ile Brkselin ilerin byle devam edemeyeceini ve ksa zaman iinde tm sreci yeniden balatmak iin inisiyatif almalar gerektiini anlayacana dair aresizce bir inanca balad. 2013n gerekten de ilikilerin dzelecei ve baz mzakere balklarnn alaca bir yl olacan dnyorum, nedenini aklamak isterim. Yine de, 2013, Trkiyenin ABye tam yelik yolunu tmyle aacak byk ilerleme yl olmayacak. nce, Fransann yollad mitvar iaretlere ve ubattaki Kbrs seimlerinin olumlu sonulanma potansiyeline bakalm. Parisin, eski Cumhurbakan Nicolas Sarkozynin bloke ettii balklardan ikisinden vetoyu kaldrmay deerlendirdii doru. Cumhurbakan Francois Hollanden kararn baharda Trkiyeye yapaca ziyarette aklamas bekleniyor. Bu, Fransann be yldr Trkiyeye kstek olma siyasetinden sembolik anlamda nemli bir kopu olacak ve yeni mzakere turlarnn gerekten balamasna imkn tanyacak. Kbrs cumhurbakanlna muhtemelen Nicos Anastasiadesin seilecek olmasnn etkisi ise hemen hissedilmeyecek ve bununla ilgili tahmin yapmas zor. Hemehrilerinin ounluundan farkl olarak, Anastasiades, 2004te Annan Plannn ateli bir savunucusuydu ve koullarn deimi olmasna ramen, ondan en azndan aday yeniden birletirmek iin iten bir aba gstermesini bekleyebiliriz. Buna kendisinin beyan ettii Kbrs mmkn olan en ksa zamanda NATO yesi yapma hedefini de eklersek ki, gereklemesi iin Trkiyenin onay gerekir, Trkiye-Kbrs ilikilerinde yeni bir evreye girdiimize phe yok. Ama kimse, Anastasiadesten, koalisyonun kk ortann iddetle kar kaca bir dn iin acele etmesini beklemesin. Yeni Kbrs Cumhurbakan, Kbrsl Rumlarn zmn mmkn olduuna pheyle bakan ounluunu ikna etmek iin zamana ihtiyac olduunu gayet iyi biliyor. 2013 tartma yaratacak kararlar almak iin deil, buna zemin hazrlamak iin kullanacaktr. Belki de, Paris ve Lefkoadaki yeni yzlerden daha nemli olan, Ankara ve Brkselin, mzakerelerin her iki tarafa da faydal olabileceinin bilincine ermesidir. AB apas olmadan Trkiyenin demokratikleme srecini tamamlamakta zorlanacann farknda gzken sadece Cumhurbakan Abdullah Gl deil. Hkmetin tepsisinde bu kadar ok meydan okuma (yeni anayasa, PKK ile grmeler, yeni yarg reformu paketleri) varken, ihtiyatl biimde de olsa, AB ile ilikilerinin normale dnmesi, ayak ba deil de kazan olabilir. AB iinde kaldrlmas gereken almas zor engeller hl var, gelecek yazmda onlara deineceim. Ama Trkiyenin AB yeliine pheyle bakan Avrupallar bile, lkenin son birka ylda nem kazandn inkr edemiyor. Bu elbette ncelikle ABnin hlihazrdaki sorunlar ve gelecek beklentileriyle taban tabana zt olan Trkiyenin byyen ekonomik gcnden kaynaklanyor. Trkiyenin yelii ABnin yapsal ekonomik sorunlarn zmez, ama bazlaryla ba etmesini kolaylatrabilir. Trkiyenin Suriye krizinde ald konum da Avrupa bakentlerinin ounun gznden kamad. Gerek Trkiyenin NATOya balln tazelemesi gerekse Suriyeli gmenlere yardm etme ve barnak salama ynndeki muazzam abalar, Ankarann politikalarn Avrupannkilere yaklatrd ve birlikte daha yakn temasla hareket etmenin her iki tarafa da avantaj saladn gsterdi. Bu farkndalk, hl var olan Trkiye kart grlerin bazlarn yumuatt ve 2013n Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin yavatan dzelme yl olmasna da kendiliinden yardm dokunacak.

My 2013 wish and fear list Columnists are not fortune-tellers. Whatever my colleagues and I are predicting these days about the new year is certainly based on experience and a proper analysis of dominant trends. But none of us should claim to be sure about what will happen in Turkey in 2013. Still, what would life be without hopes, expectations and anxieties? That's why I will try again to list my hopes and my fears for the coming year. I looked at my previous wish and fear list that was published on Jan. 1, 2012, and I have to admit that the outcome at the end of the year was much closer to my fears than to my hopes. The process of preparing a new constitution is going nowhere, a solution to the Kurdish problem is not in sight, there are still too many journalists in prison, and the judiciary remains a

battlefield between old and new elites. Conclusion: My hopes were set way too high, but my ability to predict undesirable developments is not that bad. So let me again tell you what I think should happen in 2013 and what I am afraid will happen. New constitution: I hope the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) comes to the conclusion that the only way out of the current deadlock is a historic compromise with the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition party. Together these two parties represent the new and the old elites. They should both be willing and able to introduce their main demands in a brand new constitution and come to an understanding on the points that separate them. But I am afraid that the ruling party, dominated by a prime minister with his eye on the presidency and the nationalist votes he thinks he needs to get there, will try to tempt the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) into supporting a half-baked, partly amended version of the present one. Kurdish problem: I hope the government continues with the introduction of reforms that openly deal with some of the main Kurdish nationalist demands like education in the mother tongue. That would make it easier to successfully finalize a new round of negotiations between the Turkish state and its main Kurdish interlocutors on a comprehensive end to all violence. Such a positive outcome will only happen when the two sides manage to overcome the resistance from spoilers in both camps that have no interest in a solution. But, I am afraid that the government, again not to lose the nationalist vote, will opt for an obscure mix of some ill-presented reforms and continued, very visible, repression. That will make it easy for the opponents of a deal to sabotage the talks and convince the nationalist hard-liners in both camps that the use of force is inevitable. Freedom of the press: I hope the government will soon accept the new package of legal reforms at hand that eliminates or changes some crucial articles in the Anti-Terror Law and the Turkish Penal Code. The result would be the release of hundreds of Kurdish activists and journalists from prison because the grounds for their arrest will be annulled. These reforms, which are long overdue, would also bring an end to one of the main flaws in the Turkish legal system: long pre-trial detention periods. Only these two effects combined will convince AK Party critics in Turkey and abroad that the ruling party is seriously interested in further democratization. But I am afraid that the fear of a nationalist backlash will lead the Cabinet into watering down the proposals from the justice minister. As a consequence, most of the 50 journalists still in prison will stay there, and Turkey will remain the bte noire of the international lobby for full press freedom. The positive thing about this list is that, realistically speaking, both my hopes and my fears could turn out to be justified. This government has shown in the past that it is capable of both groundbreaking reforms and old style business as usual politics -- sometimes confusingly, almost at the same time and on the same issue. The bad thing is that since the 2011 elections, the balance has tilted towards policies that are intended not to rock the boat full of Turkish nationalist voters. The upcoming 2014 elections and the ambitions of the prime minister would suggest that this trend will continue in 2013. At the end of this year my fears might again have been more realistic than my hopes. In my next column I will focus on what to expect from Turkey-EU relations in 2013. Will we see a serious restart of the stalled negotiations, as some predict, or will we have to wait for that until after the German elections this September? 2013teki dilek ve korku listem Ke yazarlar khin deildir. Ben ve meslektalarmn, bugnlerde yeni ylla ilgili yapt ngrler kesinlikle tecrbeye ve hkim eilimlerin doru drst analizine dayanyor. Ama hibirimiz 2013te Trkiyede neler olacandan emin konumamalyz. Lakin umutlar, beklentiler, kayglar olmadan yaam neye yarar? Bu yzden, bizi bekleyen ylla ilgili umutlarmz ve korkularmzn yeniden listesini yapmaya alacam. 1 Ocak 2012de yaymlanan nceki dilek ve korku listeme baktm ve kabul etmeliyim ki, yln sonunda kan sonu, umutlarmdan ziyade korkularma yaknd. Yeni anayasa hazrlama sreci hibir yere gitmiyor, Krt sorununun zm ufukta gzkmyor, hl hapiste ok fazla gazeteci var ve yarg eski sekinlerle yeni sekinler arasnda bir sava alan olmay srdryor. Sonu: Umutlarm ok yksek tutmuum ama istenmeyen gelimeleri ngrme becerim fena deilmi. O zaman, izninizle, 2013te olmas gerektiini dndklerimle olmasndan korktuklarm size yeniden aktaraym.

Yeni anayasa: Umarm AKP, hlihazrdaki dmlenmeden tek k yolunun, anamuhalefet partisi CHP ile tarih bir uzlamaya gitmek olduu sonucuna varr. Bu iki parti birlikte eski ve yeni elitleri temsil ediyorlar. Her ikisi de, yepyeni anayasaya balca taleplerini sokma ve ayrldklar konularda karlkl anlamaya varmaya istekli olmallar. Ama korkarm ki, gzn cumhurbakanlna dikmi bir Babakannn ve onun buraya ulamak iin ihtiyac olduuna inand milliyeti oylarn hkmettii iktidar partisi, yrrlkteki anayasann ksmen deitirilmi, yar pimi versiyonunu desteklemesi iin MHPyi cezbetmeye alacak. Krt sorunu: Umarm, hkmet, ana dilinde eitim gibi temel Krt milliyetisi taleplerin bazsn net biimde zecek ekilde reformlar yapmaya devam eder. Bu, Trk devleti ile balca Krt muhataplar arasnda iddete geni apl son vermeye ynelik mzakerelerin yeni bir turunu baarl biimde nihayete erdirmeye yardmc olur. Ama byle olumlu bir sonuca varlabilmesi iin ncelikle iki tarafn da kendi saflarndaki zmden kar olmayan oyunbozanlarn bileini bkmesi gerek. Ama korkarm hkmet, yine milliyeti oylar kaybetmeme kaygsyla, baz ereti reformlarn rtbas edici karmn ve sregiden, gze batan basky tercih edecek. Bu, olas anlamaya kar kanlarn, grmeleri sabote etmesini ve her iki saftaki milliyeti ahinleri g kullanmnn kanlmaz olduuna ikna etmesini kolaylatracak. Basn zgrl: Umarm, hkmet, Terrle Mcadele Yasas ve Ceza Kanununun baz kritik maddelerini kaldran ya da deitiren yeni yasal reform paketini tez zamanda kabul eder. Ve bunun sonucunda tutuklanma gerekeleri geersiz hale geleceinden yzlerce Krt aktivist ile gazeteci serbest braklr. Vakti oktan gelip gemi bu reformlar, Trk hukuk sisteminin ba kusurlarndan birine de nokta koyabilir: Yarglama ncesi uzun gzalt sreleri. Sadece bu iki etkenin birlemesi bile, Trkiye ve yurtdndaki AKP tenkitilerini, iktidar partisinin daha fazla demokratiklemeyle cidden ilgilendiine ikna edebilir. Ama korkarm, milliyeti geri tepmeden duyulan korku, kabineyi, adalet bakannn nerilerini sulandrmaya itecek. Bunun sonucunda, hl hapisteki 50 gazetecinin ou, demir parmaklklar ardnda tutulmaya devam edecek ve Trkiye, uluslararas tam basn zgrl lobisinin nefret ettii lke olarak kalacak. Bu listenin olumlu yan, gereki konumak gerekirse, hem umutlarmn hem de korkularmn hakl kabilecek olmas. Bu hkmet, gemite de gsterdi ki, hem r ac reformlar yapmaya hem de ileri eski tas eski hamam tarznda yrtmeye muktedir. Hem de bazen, kafa kartrc biimde, ayn zamanda ayn konu zerinde. Kt yan, 2011 seimlerinden beri dengenin, Trk milliyetisi semenlerle dolu sandal devirmeme politikalarndan yana dnmesi. Yaklaan 2014 seimleri ve Babakann hrslar, bu eilimin 2013te de sreceine iaret ediyor. Bu yln sonunda yine korkularm umutlarmdan daha gereki kabilir. Gelecek yazmda, 2013te AB-Trkiye ilikilerinden ne beklememiz gerektiine odaklanacam. Bazlarnn ngrd gibi bataa saplanan mzakerelerin ciddi biimde yeniden balamasn m greceiz yoksa bunun olmas iin eylldeki Alman genel seimlerinin gemesini mi bekleyeceiz?

Turkey beyond clichs In most articles on Turkey in the foreign press, journalists define the major fault line in Turkish society as the one between Kemalist secularists on the one hand and Islamists on the other. Depending on the personal views and preferences of the observer, Turkey is described either as a country in danger of losing its secular characteristics, slowly turning into a more Islamic nation, or as a state moving away from a semi-democracy under military and judicial tutelage towards a full democracy reflecting the views of the conservative majority of the population. This tendency to paint a portrait of Turkey full of popular clichs has been challenged in the past by open-minded analysts. The main objection against the simple secular-Islamist divide being the fact that most conservative Muslims in Turkey are not anti-secular but object to the dominant, rigid Kemalist interpretation of secularism. Instead, they promote another type of secularism that leaves more space for public manifestations of religion. There is good news for those in Turkey and abroad looking for more good arguments against the black and white pictures of Turkey that still pop up regularly in the media. I would strongly recommend them to read the new book by Jenny White called

Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks. White is an associate professor of anthropology at Boston University who has lived and worked in Turkey for many years. In her latest publication, White tries to show that Turkey is not divided between two competing monolithic blocs but is a country full of contradictions that is slowly trying to find a new definition of what it means to be Turkish. Her book is rich with anecdotes and observations based on years of talks with Turks from all walks of life. Her analysis is to the point and should stimulate both Turkish pundits and foreign reporters to look at the country in a different, more nuanced manner. Let me highlight two of books themes: the growing diversity among modern Muslims and the similarities between the old Kemalist nationalism and the revised Muslim version. White does a great job in describing the change of a coherent cultural tradition that makes up Turkish national identity into what she calls a bewildering variety of choices of values, practices, and modes of affiliation. Turkishness is being redefined in a variety of ways, and national identity, beyond certain core shared characteristics, has become a matter of choice. Modern Muslims want to construct their own views and lifestyles, combining parts of old Turkish traditions with elements picked from the international media or the global market place. Politically they switch pragmatically between liberal and conservative positions. According to White, political Islamism has been replaced by cultural Muslimhood, especially among Turkish youngsters who exhibit simultaneous layers of sometimes contradictory views and values and sport multiple labels. For the author it is clear that putting all Turkish Muslims into one box does not make sense at all. The reality on the ground is much more complicated and paradoxical than many self-declared secularists want to see and old-style Islamists dare to admit. White also successfully explains the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments often confusing vacillation between support for individual, cultural and minority rights and hard-nosed Turkey for the Turks nationalism. She compares the new Muslim nationalism with the old Kemalist variant and concludes that both share a belief in the superiority of Turkishness, including some basic assumptions on the role of women, a proneness to authoritarianism and a belief in the efficacy of social engineering. At the same time, White underlines: Muslim nationalists define Turkishness primarily as a Sunni Muslim identity, which is potentially inclusive of Kurds as fellow Muslims within the Turkish realm. In contrast, Kemalist nationalism excludes Kurds from the nation unless they reject their roots and become fictive Turks. These are only two examples of the original and thought-provoking way in which White depicts Turkey, a country in transition that deserves to be analyzed beyond journalistic platitudes. That is exactly what White has done. I hope her latest book will be read by many and will be translated into Turkish soon. Klielerin tesinde Trkiye D basnda Trkiye ile ilgili makalelerin ounda, gazeteciler, Trkiye toplumundaki en nemli fay hatt olarak Kemalist laikler ile slamclar arasndakini gsterir. Gzlemcinin kiisel grleri ve tercihlerine bal olarak, Trkiye ya laik karakteristiini kaybetme tehlikesi iinde yava yava daha slami bir millete dnen bir lke ya da ordu ve yargnn vesayetindeki bir yar demokrasiden nfusun muhafazakr ounluunun grlerini yanstan tam demokrasiye ynelen bir devlet olarak betimlenir. Trkiyenin popler klielerle dolu bir portresini izme eilimine, gemite, ak fikirli analistler meydan okudu. Basit laikslamc blnmesine kar ana itiraz, muhafazakr Mslmanlarn ounun laiklie deil de, laikliin Kemalistlere zg hkmedici, kat yorumuna kar kmalar olgusundan kaynaklanyor. Bunun yerine, dinin, kamusal alanda davurumuna daha fazla yer aan baka tipte laiklii destekliyorlar. Medyada hl dzenli olarak boy gsteren Trkiyenin siyah-beyaz resmedilmesine kar daha iyi savlar peinde olanlara, hem Trkiyede hem de yurtdndakilere, iyi haberlerim var. Onlara Jenny Whiten Muslim Nationalism and the new Turks (Mslman Milliyetilii ve Yeni Trkler) adl yeni kitabn okumalarn kuvvetle tavsiye ederim. White, Boston niversitesinde antropoloji doenti, Trkiyede uzun yllar yaam ve alm da. White, yaymlad son almada, aslnda, Trkiyenin, birbiriyle ekien iki yekpare kalp arasnda blnmediini, Trk olmann ne demek olduuna yava yava yeni bir tanm bulmaya alan, elikilerle dolu bir lke olduunu gstermeye alyor. Kitab, yllarca her kesimden Trklerle grp konumu olmasna dayanan anekdot ve gzlemlerle dolu. sabetli analizleri hem Trk uzmanlar hem de yabanc gazetecileri lkeye daha farkl, daha incelikli tarzda bakmaya tevik etmeli.

Kitabn iki temasna dikkat ekmek isterim: Modern Mslmanlar arasnda artan eitlilik ve eski Kemalist milliyetilik ile revize edilmi Mslman versiyonu arasndaki benzerlikler. White, kendi iinde uyumlu bir gelenein oluturduu Trk milli kimliindeki deiimi, dnm betimlerken harika i karyor: Deerler, tatbikler ve ballk biimleri arasnda artc bir tercih eitlilii. () Trk olmak ok eitli yollardan yeniden tanmlanyor ve ulusal kimlik, paylalan belli temel karakteristiklerin tesinde tercih meselesi haline geliyor. Modern Mslmanlar, eski Trk geleneklerini uluslararas medya ya da kresel piyasadan setikleri elerle birletirerek, kendi grlerini ve yaam biimlerini ina etmek istiyor. Siyaseten, muhafazakr ve liberal konumlar arasnda pragmatik biimde yer deitiriyorlar. Whitea gre, siyas slamcln yerini kltrel Mslmanlk ald, zellikle de bazen birbiriyle elien gr ve deer katmanlarn ezamanl tehir edebilen ve birok markayla gsteri yapan Trk genler arasnda. Yazar, tm Trk Mslmanlar tek bir sepete koymann manaszlnn gayet farknda. Sahadaki gereklik, kendini laik ilan edenlerin ounun grmeyi arzuladndan ve eski tarz slamclarn kabul etmeye yanaacandan ok daha karmak ve paradoksal. White, AKP hkmetinin bireysel, kltrel, aznlk haklarna destek ile dnsz Trkiye Trkler iindir milliyetilii arasnda kafa kartrc biimde bocalamasn da baarl biimde izah ediyor. Yeni Mslman milliyetilii eski Kemalist varyantyla kyaslayp her ikisinin de, kadnn rolyle ilgili baz temel varsaymlar, otoriter eilimler ve toplumsal mhendisliin etkinliine inanma dahil, Trkln stnl inancn paylat sonucuna varyor. White, ayn zamanda unun altn iziyor: Mslman milliyetiler, Trkl, ncelikle, Krtleri ve Trk lemi iindeki dier Mslman yoldalar kapsama potansiyeli bulunan Snni Mslman kimlii olarak tanmlyor. () Bunun tersine, Kemalist milliyetilik, kklerini reddedip kurmaca Trklere dnmezlerse Krtleri dlyor. Bunlar, Whiten, Trkiyeyi, zgn ve dnmeye kkrtc biimde tasvir ediinden sadece iki rnek. Gei srecindeki Trkiye, gazeteci basmakalplnn tesinde analiz edilmeyi hak ediyor. Whiten yapt tam da bu. Umarm son kitabnn ok okuru olur ve tez zamanda Trkeye evrilir.

Digital addiction It is the end of the year, so time to make New Year's resolutions. I am sure many readers of this column will shortly promise themselves or their partners to eat less, do more physical exercises or spend more time with the children. I wonder how many of you are planning to limit time spent on the Internet or to leave aside your smart phone more often. Let me try to explain why I think this would be a good intention. Before doing so, let me make it perfectly clear that I am a happy and frequent user of all kinds of digital gadgets that make life easier, especially if you need to communicate quickly or have easy access to information. I love my user-friendly Mac, I enjoy reading Dutch and American newspapers on my iPad and I always have my iPhone within reach. I am an active user of Twitter and I hate it when I miss out on too many messages because there is no functioning wireless network at a conference or in a hotel. Having said that, I realized over the last couple of months how difficult it is to write a book while online all the time. For me, reading my tweets and mails every hour or regularly checking some websites made it very hard to concentrate on reading academic literature and producing my own texts. It turned out I was not as good at multitasking as I thought I was. After I finished the book, I read an article by chance in the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad on an upcoming new report about the problematic side of social media and the rising popularity of the so-called Slow Tech movement. This is a growing group of technology designers and theorists pushing people to rethink how we approach technology. Instead of being obsessed with an overarching drive towards efficiency in our technology, Slow Tech thinkers advocate a more livable, mindful relationship between consumers and devices. It follows the slow food movement, which emphasizes the need to eat local, seasonal foods. The article listed 10 dangers associated with heavy social media use and presented people who had decided to stop using Facebook to avoid these dangers. The dangers included the tendency of digital addicts to be focused constantly on their phones or others gadgets. By doing this for a long time, these people are in danger of losing the normal human capacity to have a regular conversation or show interest in someone else. They are always afraid of missing out on some important piece of online news, and this overdose of information causes stress, irritation or even digital dementia. Surfing from one link

to the other 24 hours a day stimulates the short term memory but damages the part of our brain that we need for reflection and creativity. In a speech in May, Joe Kraus, a partner at Google Ventures, summarized Slow Tech thinking and tried to find out what we can do to counter the bad effects of intensive Internet and social media use. I was happy to read that numerous brainimaging studies have shown that the more you practice multitasking, the worse you get at it. The reason why that's the case, according to Kraus, is that when you practice distraction (which is what multitasking really is -- paying attention to something that distracted you from what you were originally paying attention to), you're training your brain to pay attention to distracting things. The more you train your brain to do so, the more you get distracted and the less able you are to even focus for brief periods of time on things like creative or contemplative thinking. Most people gain insight or develop new ideas when they are not constantly bombarded with new information, for instance when taking a shower. These gaps in time are far less numerous now than they were in the past. These days, whenever they have to wait, most people pull out their phone to watch the latest news or to send a quick text message. Apart from creating more gap time by putting aside your phone for some time each day, Kraus suggests actively training your long-term attention and mindfulness by going for a walk, meditating or reading a book. I took his advice and started reading Jenny White's new book Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks. Let's hope my potential digital addiction has not damaged my brain too much yet and I am still able to concentrate for a longer period on in-depth analysis and high-level theorizing. I will keep you informed. Dijital bamllk Yln sonu geldi att, demek ki yeni yl kararlar alma vakti geldi. Eminim, bu kenin okurlarndan pek ou, yaknda, kendilerine ya da anne-babalarna, daha az yeme, daha fazla beden egzersizi yapma ya da ocuklaryla daha fazla vakit geirme sz verecek. Merak ediyorum, kanz, internette geirdiiniz zaman snrlamay ya da akll telefonu daha sk kenara kaldrmay planlyor? Neden bunun hayrl bir eilim olacan dndm aklayaym. Aklamaya gemeden nce ilan etmem lazm ki, zellikle hzl iletiim kurmak ya da bilgiye abucak ulamak gerektiinde hayat kolaylatran her trden dijital zamazingonun mutlu ve sk kullancsym. Kullanc dostu Macimi seviyorum, Hollanda ve Amerikan gazetelerini iPadimde okumaktan keyif alyorum ve iPhoneum hep elimin altnda. Aktif bir Twitter kullancsym ve bir konferans salonunda ya da otelde kablosuz balant kurulamamas yznden ok fazla mesaj karmaktan nefret ederim. Bunlar saydktan sonra, tm zamann online geirirken kitap yazmann ne kadar zor olduunu son birka ayda kefettiimi belirtmeliyim. Benim amdan, her saat ba tweet ve e-postalarm okumak ya da baz web sitelerini dzenli olarak kontrol etmek, akademik literatr okumam ve kendi metinlerimi retmeye odaklanmam ok zorlatrd. Anlald ki, ayn anda ok i yapmakta sandm kadar iyi deilmiim. Kitab bitirdikten sonra, Hollandann NRC Handelsblad gazetesinde tesadfen bir makale okudum. Makale, sosyal medyann sorunlu ynleri ve Slow Tech (Yava Teknoloji) ad verilen hareketin artan poplaritesine dair yeni bir raporu ele alyordu. Saylar giderek artan teknoloji tasarmclar ve kuramclarnn oluturduu bu grup, insanlar, teknolojiye yaklamlarn yeniden dnmeye aryor. Slow Tech dnrleri, her eyi teknolojik etkinlikle ilikilendirme taknts yerine, tketicilerle cihazlar arasnda daha yaanlabilir, daha bilinli bir ilikiyi savunuyor. Yerel mahsulleri mevsiminde yeme gereini vurgulayan Slow Food (Yava Yemek) hareketinin izinden gidiyor. Makale, youn sosyal medya kullanmnn 10 tehlikesini sralyor ve Facebooktan kmaya karar veren kiileri tantyor. Tehlikeler arasnda, telefon ya da dier aletlere srekli odakl halde dijital baml olma eilimi var. Bu insanlar, uzun sre byle yaparak, bakalarna ilgi gsterme ve gndelik sohbetlere girmeye ynelik normal insan kapasitelerini kaybetme tehlikesiyle kar karya kalyor. Online haberlerin nemli bir parasn karma korkusuyla yayorlar hep ve ar dozda enformasyon alm stres, sinirlilik ve hatta dijital bunamaya yol ayor. Gnde 24 saat bir linkten dierine srf yapmak, ksa vadeli hafzay uyaryor, ama beynimizin derin dnme ve yaratclk iin gereksindiimiz blmne zarar veriyor. Google Venturesun ortaklarndan olan Joe Kraus, maysta yapt bir konumada, Slow Tech dncesini zetleyip youn internet ve sosyal medya kullanmnn kt etkilerini dengelemek iin neler yapabileceimizi sorgulad. ok sayda beyin grntleme almasna gre, ayn anda pek ok i yapmaya ne kadar ok kalkarsan, o kadar ok yzne gzne bulatrdn renmekten memnun oldum. Krausa baklrsa, kafan kartrmakla megulsen (ayn anda ok i yapmak tam da bu: asl itigal ettiin eyden dikkatini datan eye dikkatini vermek), beynine, dikkat datc eylere dikkatini yneltme

eitimi veriyorsun. Beynini byle yapmas iin ne kadar ok eitirsen, o kadar ok kafan karyor ve yaratc, derin dnme gerektiren eylere ksa sreliine bile odaklanma becerini kaybediyorsun. ou insan, srekli yeni enformasyon bombardman altnda olmadklar zamanlarda, mesela dua girdiklerinde, yeni fikirler gelitirir ya da bir meselenin iyzn anlar. Bu zaman aralklarnn says gemie gre artk ok azald. Bugnlerde ou insan, beklerken, son haberleri izlemek ya da abucak bir mesaj atmak iin hemen telefonlarna sarlyor. Kraus, her gn bir sreliine telefonu kenara kaldrarak daha fazla zaman aral yaratmann yan sra, uzun vadeli dikkat ve bilinliliin aktif eitimi iin yrye kma, meditasyon yapma ya da kitap okumay tavsiye ediyor. Nasihatine uydum ve Jenny Whiten Muslim Nationalism and New Turks (Mslman Milliyetilii ve Yeni Trkler) adndaki yeni kitabn okumaya baladm. Umalm ki, potansiyel dijital bamllm henz beynime ok fazla zarar vermemi olsun da derin analizlere ve yksek seviyede kuramsallatrmaya uzun sreliine odaklanmay hl becerebiliyor olaym. Sizi durumdan haberdar edeceim.

Why Turks open their own discos It remains one of the key questions in many European countries with considerable populations of migrants who mostly started to arrive 50 years ago: After all those years, are Dutch or German natives and migrants from countries like Turkey growing closer together socially and culturally? If they do, that is good news for the stability and cohesion of societies that are going through tough times economically. If they dont, these same states, split along ethnic or cultural fault lines, will have a hard time dealing with the challenges of the 21st century. Last week, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), a government agency that conducts research into the social aspects of all areas of government policy, published a report called Closer together? It describes the socio-cultural position of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands. Among the topics addressed are social contacts, religion, ties to the Netherlands, views on the position of women and opinions on ethical issues such as abortion and euthanasia. The social context of integration is also described: How accepted do migrants feel, and do they experience discrimination? Let me summarize the main conclusions: Dutch natives should stop looking inward, only at themselves, focusing all the time at the differences between them and the migrants. Migrants should break with the growing tendency to lock themselves in their own communities. Of the four largest migrant groups in the Netherlands, countries of origin being Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Antilles, the Turks, according to the report, form a relatively closed group with strong internal cohesion. They identify strongly with the origin group, and many of them maintain frequent contacts with friends and family in Turkey. Although their command of the Dutch language has improved in recent years, they are less proficient in Dutch than the Moroccan group. Many Turkish migrants are pessimistic about the social climate in the Netherlands. Religion is important, but Turkish Muslims are rather less strict than Moroccan Muslims and display less active religious behavior. Turkish migrants generally have more modern views than their Moroccan counterparts on the position of women. One of the authors of the study described a phenomenon he called the integration paradox: second and third generations are certainly better integrated, which means they also follow the debates in Dutch society on migration and integration much better than their parents or grand parents. The youngsters see and feel the ongoing discrimination by substantial parts of Dutch society, are more annoyed and frustrated by it and tend to start feeling more Turkish or Moroccan than one might expect from second or third generation migrants. What is interesting is the often different way Moroccans and Turks react to the prejudices and intolerance they experience. A classic example is the ill treatment of young male migrants by discos that dont want to let them in. While most Moroccans complain and sometimes look for a fight, Turks tend to establish their own discos. Reading the comprehensive study, it is clear the problem of integrating migrants in European societies is not going to disappear quickly. There is simply no easy fix that works for all migrants. In a reaction, Lodewijk Asscher, the experienced former Amsterdam alderman and now the new Dutch minister responsible for integration, underlined the huge differences within the migrant communities. On the one hand, there are the individual success stories from people like Ahmed Aboutaleb who came to the Netherlands as a 15 year old from Morocco and is now the mayor of Rotterdam. On the other, there is a

substantial group of Turks and Moroccans who still dont feel at home and are afraid that the current economic crisis will only lead to further strains on interethnic relations. It is true that treating migrants as a coherent group would be a mistake. But it will take time, a long time, before the majority of individual Turks and Moroccans will be able to use the opportunities offered to them and feel a respected part of societies in which many natives keep focusing on the differences that set them apart and not on the ties that bind together. Niye Trkler kendi diskolarn ayor? ou 50 yl nce gelmeye balayan kayda deer gmen nfusuna sahip pek ok Avrupa lkesinde hl nemini koruyan bir soru var: Bunca yldan sonra, Hollandal ya da Alman doanlar ile Trkiye gibi lkelerden gelen gmenler, toplumsal ve kltrel adan yaknlaarak birlikte byyebiliyor mu? Yant evetse, ekonomik adan zor zamanlardan geen toplumlarn istikrar ve birlik-beraberlii iin iyi haber. Eer deilse, ayn devletler, etnik veya kltrel fay hatlaryla blnm olarak, 21inci yzyln glkleriyle ba etmekte zorlanacak. Geen hafta hkmet politikalarnn her alandaki toplumsal yansmalarn aratran bir hkmet kurumu olan Hollanda Toplumsal Aratrma Enstits (SCP), Birlikte daha yakn? balkl bir rapor yaymlad. Rapor Hollandadaki Batl olmayan gmenlerin sosyo-kltrel konumunu ele alyor. ncelenen balklar arasnda toplumsal temaslar, din, Hollanda ile balar, kadnlarn konumuyla ilgili grler ve krtaj ya da tanazi gibi etik meselelere bak alar var. Entegrasyonun toplumsal balam da mercek altna alnyor: Gmenler kabul grdklerini hissediyor mu ve ayrmcla urama tecrbesinden geiyor mu? Varlan temel sonular zetleyeyim: Hollandann yerlileri kendi ilerine, sadece kendilerine bakmay ve hep gmenlerle aralarndaki farkllklara odaklanmay kesmeli. Gmenler de kendi cemaatlerine kapanma ynnde giderek artan eilimlerini brakmal. Hollandadaki drt byk gmen grubu (kken lkeleri Trkiye, Fas, Surinam ve Antiller olanlar) iinde, rapora gre, Trkler gl i birlii olan grece kapal bir grup oluturuyor. Kendilerini kken gruplaryla gl biimde zdeletiriyorlar ve ou Trkiyedeki aileleri, dostlaryla srekli temas koruyor. Son yllarda Hollanda diline daha hakim hale gelseler de, Fasl gruba kyasla Hollandacada daha az yetkinler. Pek ok Trkiyeli gmen, Hollandadaki toplumsal iklim konusunda karamsar. Din nemli ama Trkiyeli Mslmanlar Fasl Mslmanlar kadar kat kuralc ve din davranlarla megul deil. Kadnn konumu konusunda Fasl muadillerine kyasla genelde Trkiyeli gmenlerin daha modern grleri var. Aratrmann yazarlarndan biri, entegrasyon paradoksu dedii bir fenomeni aktaryor: kinci ve nc kuaklar kesinlikle daha iyi entegre olmu durumda, yani Hollanda toplumundaki g ve entegrasyon tartmalarn anne-babalarndan, bykanne-babalarndan daha iyi takip ediyorlar. Hollanda toplumunun nemli kesiminde sregiden ayrmcl gren ve hisseden genler, bundan rahatszlk duyup hayal krklna urayarak, ikinci ya da nc kuak gmenlerden beklenenden ok daha fazla kendilerini Trk ya da Fasl hissetmeye balyor. Fasllar ile Trkiyelilerin maruz kaldklar nyarglar ve hogrszle genelde farkl tarzda tepki vermeleri de ilgin. Klasik rnek, gen erkek gmenlerin kendilerini ieri almak istemeyen diskolarda kt muamele grmesi. Bu durumda Fasllarn ou ikyet eder ve bazen de kavga karmaya alrken, Trkler kendi diskolarn kurma yoluna gidiyor. Geni apl aratrmay okurken, anlyorsunuz ki, gmenlerin Avrupa toplumlarna entegrasyonu meselesi kolay kolay ortadan kalkmayacak. Tm gmenler iin geerli kolay bir zm yok. Grm geirmi eski Amsterdam ehir meclisi yesi ve imdi de Hollandann entegrasyondan sorumlu bakan Lodewijk Asscher, gmen topluluklar arasndaki muazzam farkllklarn altn iziyor. Bir yandan bireysel baar ykleri var, mesela 15 yandayken Fastan Hollandaya gelen Ahmed Aboutaleb bugn Rotterdam Belediye bakan. Dier yandan Trkiyelilerle Fasllarn byk ksm, hl kendilerini evlerinde hissetmiyor ve halihazrdaki ekonomik krizin etnik topluluklar arasndaki ilikileri daha da gereceinden korkuyor. Tamam, gmenlere kendi iinde uyumlu tek bir grup muamelesi yapmak yanl. Ama yerlilerin ou herkesi bir araya getiren balara deil, birbirinden ayran farkllklara odaklanmay srdrd mddete, Trkiyeli ve Fasl bireylerin ounluunun kendilerine sunulan frsatlar deerlendirmelerine ve kendilerini toplumun sayg gren bir paras olarak hissetmeleri zaman alacak, hem de ok zaman.

How to stop soldier suicides? In the last couple of weeks, there has been increased reporting about suicides among soldiers and officers within the Turkish army.

The attention in the media was triggered by statistics released by Ayhan Sefer stn, the head of the parliamentary Human Rights Investigation Commission during a special commission meeting at the end of November. The numbers showed that over the last 10 years, 934 privates committed suicide. That means that since 2002 the number of soldiers who have taken their own life exceeds the number of those who were killed in combat, 818. The shocking fact is that, on average, over the last 10 years, every four days a soldier or officer committed suicide. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) reacted quickly to the devastating figures, but the statement that was released can hardly be called a relief. After an internal investigation, the General Staff found out that in fact the number of suicides has dropped by 50 percent over the last 10 years. This can only lead to the alarming conclusion that before 2002, the numbers were even dramatically higher, and every second day a soldier took his own life. The General Staff claims the suicides are the result of family problems, personal relationships, drug addiction and financial difficulties in civilian life, rather than bad treatment in the army. This explanation is strongly challenged by analysts like Tolga Islam, the head of the Rights of Conscripts Initiative, the group that started this whole debate by publishing a report in mid October called Violations of the Rights of Conscripts in Turkey. In April 2011 the website www.askerhaklari.com was established as a civil initiative to provide support to victims of ill treatment and abuse during their military service and raise awareness and sensibility about the issue by making cases of ill treatment and abuse visible. The report is based on the applications that askerhaklari.com has received between April 2011 and April 2012. The report classifies the alleged cases of ill treatment according to their types, location and dates. It shows that the most frequent types of ill treatment are insults and beatings and that most of the complaints come from Ankara and Cyprus. According to the report there is a clear link between ill treatment and abuse on the one hand and suicide and permanent psychiatric or physical damage on the other. The Rights of Conscripts Initiative therefore calls on the Turkish government to ensure effective and timely investigation of allegations of ill treatment during military service by civilian prosecutors, not military ones. The activists also demand that the ombudsman law be fully applicable to all activities of the armed forces. Suicides and ill treatment during military service is not a typical Turkish problem. Last week, during a visit to Turkey, Bauke Snoep, former president of EUROMIL, the network of European organizations of military personnel, made it clear how often and intense the Council of Europe (CoE), of which Turkey is a founding member, has dealt with this issue in the past. One of the most important sets of recommendations was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in 2006, and after four years of foot dragging, taken on board by the member states, including Turkey. They have committed themselves to put the suggestions into practice and to complete a questionnaire on the implementation of the very tough European advice and guidance on how to treat conscripts and professional soldiers in a proper and civilized manner. According to Snoep, the demands from askerhaklari.com are fully in line with the guidelines of the CoE. The experienced activist for the rights of military personnel also advised the Turkish initiative to go beyond reporting and try to set up an association of ex-conscripts, strive for the appointment of independent counselors, seek contacts with politicians and associations of reserve officers and get in touch with EUROMIL which has easy access to the CoE institutions and could help push for an honest and timely completion of the aforementioned questionnaire by the Turkish government. Let's hope the issue of ill treatment and abuse of conscripts is not one of the many media hypes in Turkey without any proper follow-up. As long as Turkey has an army based on conscription and has not moved to a professional army, every year hundreds of thousands of Turkish men will have to serve and be subjected to military rules and commands. Is it too much to ask in a country that aspires to be an advanced democracy that these Turkish citizens be treated in a dignified way that will prevent them from taking their own lives? Asker intiharlar nasl durdurulur? Son haftalarda Trk ordusundaki askerler ve subaylar arasndaki intiharlara dair artan haberlere tank oluyoruz. Medyann bu konuya gsterdii dikkati tetikleyen, Meclis nsan Haklar Aratrma Komisyonu Bakan Ayhan Sefer stnn kasm sonunda zel bir komisyon toplantsnda aklad istatistik oldu. Rakamlar son on ylda 934 askerin intihar ettiini gsteriyordu. Bu da u anlama geliyor: 2002den bu yana kendi hayatna son veren askerlerin says, atmada lenlerden (818) fazla. oke edici gerek de u: Ortalama olarak, son on ylda her drt gnde bir asker veya subay intihar etmi.

Trk Silahl Kuvvetleri bu arpc rakamlara derhal cevap verdi, fakat yaymlanan aklamann yreklere su serptiini sylemek hayli zor. Bir i soruturmann ardndan, Genelkurmay intihar saysnn son on ylda yzde 50 azaldn tespit etti. Bundan olsa olsa u vahim sonu karlabilir: 2002den nce rakamlar ok daha fazlayd ve her iki gnde bir asker canna kyyordu. Genelkurmay intiharlarn, ordudaki kt muameleden ziyade, ailev sorunlarn, kiisel ilikilerin, uyuturucu bamllnn ve sivil hayattaki mal zorluklarn sonucu olduunu iddia ediyor. Asker Haklar nisiyatifi Bakan Tolga slam gibi analistler bu aklamaya kuvvetle kar kyor; sz konusu grup, kasm ortasnda Trkiyede Asker Haklar hlalleri adl bir rapor yaymlayarak btn bu tartmay balatmt. Nisan 2011de www.askerhaklari.com adl internet sitesi kuruldu; askerlik hizmeti srasnda kt muamele gren kurbanlara destek salamak ve kt muamele vakalarn grnr hale getirip konuyla ilgili farkndalk ve duyarllk yaratmak iin balatlan sivil bir giriim bu. Rapor, askerhaklari.coma Nisan 2011 ile Nisan 2012 arasnda yaplan bavurulara dayanyor. Rapor, kt muamele iddialarn trlerine, yerlerine ve tarihlerine gre snflandryor. En sk yaanan kt muamele trlerinin hakaret ve dayak olduunu, ikyetlerin byk ounluunun ise Ankara ve Kbrstan geldiini ortaya koyuyor. Rapora gre kt muamele ile intihar ve kalc psikiyatrik-fiziksel hasar arasnda bariz bir balant var. Asker Haklar nisiyatifi bu yzden Trk hkmetine askerlik hizmeti srasndaki kt muamele iddialarnn askeri deil sivil savclar tarafndan etkin ve zamannda soruturulmasn salama arsnda bulunuyor. Aktivistler ayrca Ombudsman Yasasnn Silahl Kuvvetlerin tm faaliyetlerine tam olarak uygulanabilir olmasn talep ediyor. Askerlik hizmeti srasndaki intiharlar ve kt muamele Trkiyeye mahsus bir sorun deil. Geen hafta Trkiyeye yapt bir ziyaret srasnda EUROMILin (Avrupa askeri personel rgtleri a) eski Bakan Bauke Snoep, Trkiyenin de kurucu yesi olduu Avrupa Konseyinin gemite bu meseleyle ne kadar sk ve youn olarak itigal ettiini aka dile getirdi. En nemli tavsiye paketlerinden biri 2006da Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenterler Meclisi (PACE) tarafndan kabul edildi ve 4 yllk ayak srmenin ardndan, Trkiye de dahil, ye devletler tarafndan benimsendi. lkeler, nerileri hayata geirmeyi; erlere ve profesyonel askerlere dzgn ve medeni bir ekilde nasl muamele edileceine dair bu son derece kat tavsiyelerin ve klavuzun uygulanmasna ynelik bir aratrmay tamamlama taahhdnde bulundu. Snoepe gre, askerhaklari.comun talepleri Avrupa Konseyinin ilkeleriyle tam bir uyum iinde. Asker personelin haklar iin mcadele eden tecrbeli aktivistin Trkiyedeki bu giriime bir tavsiyesi de uydu: Rapor hazrlamann tesine gemek ve eski askerlerden oluan bir rgtlenme oluturmaya almak, bamsz savclarn atanmas iin gayret gstermek, siyasetiler ve yedek subay dernekleriyle balant kurmaya abalamak ve Avrupa Konseyi kurumlarna rahata ulaabilen ve Trk hkmetinin yukarda sz edilen aratrmay drste ve zamannda tamamlamas ynndeki taleplere yardmc olabilecek olan EUROMIL ile irtibatta kalmak. Umalm ki askerlere ynelik kt muamele meselesi, Trkiyedeki doru dzgn takipisi olunmayan pek ok medya hezeyanndan biri olmasn. Trkiye zorunlu askerlie dayanan bir orduya sahip olduka ve profesyonel bir orduya doru ilerlemedike, her yl yz binlerce Trk erkei askerlik hizmeti yapmak ve asker kurallarla emirlere riayet etmek zorunda olacak. leri demokrasi olmay arzulayan bir lkede bu Trk vatandalarnn kendi canlarna kymalarn nleyecek ekilde insan muamele grmesini istemek ok mu?

EU: more powers but no clear vision Last Friday EU leaders got together for their regular end-of-the-year summit and to discuss two blueprints for the future of the EU. The papers focus on the political and institutional consequences of the euro troubles. In order to get out of that crisis and prevent a new one, leaders at previous meetings decided to opt for more structural and more binding cooperation between eurozone countries on economic and financial matters. As always, there are profoundly diverging views inside the EU on what that would actually mean in practice. Some countries argue that a real economic union, in which member states will have to accept European control and influence on their national budgets, is only acceptable if it is accompanied by a political union. That sounds logical: If EU institutions can have a decisive say on the way member states spend their taxes, then these institutions should be part of a system with the same sort of checks and balances that we know at the national level. In one way or another, this will lead to a more federal system with a clear division of competences between the European level and the national level and, preferably, full democratic control on both.

Other member states are, sometimes reluctantly, willing to accept more supervision from Brussels on their economies because they realize it is the only way to save the euro. At the same time, they are afraid to hand over too much of their power to Brussels authorities, whom they and their electorates dont trust and certainly dont really like. As in the past, the EU needs time to find a compromise between these two opposing views and that is why the meeting in Brussels was undoubtedly very useful, though final decisions on the future shape of the EU were not taken. The authors of the discussion papers, EU Council President Herman van Rompuy and EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, will have to go back to the drawing board and come up with a new version that will hopefully bring the two sides in the debate a few inches closer to a compromise next time around. The real European breakthrough last week did not come from the heads of government but from their ministers of finance, who managed to strike a deal on placing eurozone banks under a single supervisor. From 2014 onwards, the 150 largest banks in the eurozone, holding more than 30 billion euro in assets each, will fall under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank. That may not seem a big thing, but actually, it is. Till now each bank in the EU was checked and monitored by its own national regulator. That also meant that if a bank got into trouble, it was the responsibility of the national government concerned to offer assistance. Because many of these banks had become too big to fail, several governments over the last couple of years were obliged to spend billions of euros to save them. It is the main reason why Ireland and Spain are currently in such poor economic shape. These countries had to lend the money to bail out their banks on the capital markets. They now need European help to be able to pay back all these loans. To prevent other countries from going bankrupt as well because their banks are failing, a new system will be set up at the European level to supervise the most important banks, prevent them from making lethal mistakes but also, if necessary, help them out financially. Last weeks deal is only one part of the plans for a full banking union. Next year the ministers will switch their attention to other elements such as mechanisms to wind down banks that are too bad to save. The hesitations of the leaders and the decisions of the finance ministers sum up the state of the EU at the end of this turbulent year: Nobody knows how the bigger picture will look in the future, but in the meantime, the union, step by step, is acquiring more powers. I am not so sure whether this split can be stretched much further. AB: Daha fazla g ama mulak vizyon AB liderleri, geen cuma, geleneksel yl sonu zirvesi ve Birliin geleceiyle ilgili iki tasla grmek iin topland. Taslak belgelerin odanda avroyla ilgili sorunlarn siyasi ve kurumsal sonular vard. Bu krizden kmak ve bir yenisini nlemek amacyla, nceki toplantlarda liderler, avro blgesi lkeleri arasnda ekonomik ve mali alanda daha yapsal ve daha balayc ibirliini tercih etmeyi kararlatrmt. Bunun aslnda pratikte ne anlama geldii konusunda ise her zaman olduu gibi ABde derinden ayran grler var. Baz lkeler, ye devletlerin milli bteleri zerinde Avrupann kontrol ve etkisine raz gelecekleri gerek bir ekonomik birliin ancak siyasi birlik eliinde kabul edilebilir olacan savunuyor. Gayet mantkl gibi: ye devletlerin vergileri nasl harcad konusunda AB kurumlarnn son sz syleme yetkisi olacaksa, o zaman bu kurumlarn, ulusal dzeyde bildiimiz trden denetleme ve dengeleme sisteminin bir paras olmas gerekir. yle ya da byle, bu, Avrupa dzeyi ile ulusal dzey arasnda net bir yetki ayrm olan daha federal bir sisteme ve tercihen, her ikisi zerinde de tam demokratik kontrole yol aacak. Dier ye devletler, bazen gnlsz de olsa, ekonomilerinin Brkselin daha fazla gzetimi altna girmesine raz, nk avroyu kurtarmann tek yolunun bu olduunun farkndalar. Ama ayn zamanda hem kendilerinin hem de semenlerinin gvenmedii ve kesinlikle hazzetmedii Brkseldeki yetkililere, ellerindeki yetkinin byk ksmn devretmekten korkuyorlar. Gemite olduu gibi bugn de, ABnin bu iki zt gr arasnda bir uzlama bulabilmek iin zamana ihtiyac var. Bu yzden phesiz ki ok faydal geen Brkseldeki toplantda, ABnin gelecekteki ekline dair nihai kararlar alnamad. Tartmaya alan belgeleri kaleme alan AB Konseyi Bakan Herman van Rompuy ve Avrupa Komisyonu Bakan Jose Manuel

Barrosonun, ilk giriimden sonu alamamalarnn ardndan tekrar kollar svayp, yeni bir versiyonla ortaya kmalar gerekecek. Umalm da, ikinci deneme, tartmann iki tarafn biraz daha birbirine yaklatrsn bir dahaki sefere. Geen hafta Avrupa asndan gerek ilerleme, hkmet bakanlarndan deil, avro blgesi bankalarn tek bir spervizrn denetimi altna sokma anlamasn kotaran maliye bakanlarndan geldi. 2014ten itibaren, avro blgesinin, her biri 30 milyar avroluk varl elinde tutan en byk 150 bankas, Avrupa Merkez Bankasnn dorudan gzetim ve denetimine girecek. lk bakta byk bir olay gibi gzkmeyebilir ama aslnda yle. Bugne dek ABdeki her banka kendi ulusal dzenleyicisinin kontrol ve gzetimi altndayd. Bu ayn zamanda, ba belaya giren bir bankaya yardm etmenin, ilgili ulusal hkmetin sorumluluu olmas anlamna geliyordu. Bu bankalarn ou, iflaslarna izin verilemeyecek kadar byk olduundan, son yllarda bir dizi hkmet, onlar kurtarmak iin milyarlarca avro harcamak zorunda kald. rlanda ile spanyann ekonomik durumlarnn halen bylesine kt olmasnn ba sebebi de bu. Bu lkeler, sermaye piyasasnda bankalarn kurtarmak iin borlanmaya mecbur oldu. imdi tm bu borlar geri deyebilmek iin Avrupann yardmna muhtalar. Bankalar yznden baka lkelerin de iflas noktasna gelmesini nleyebilmek iin Avrupa dzeyinde yeni bir sistem kurulacak. Buna gre, Avrupa Merkez Bankas en nemli bankalar gzetimi altnda tutacak, onlarn lmcl hatalar yapmasna engel olacak, ama gerekirse de mali yardm elini uzatacak. Geen haftaki anlama, tam bankaclk birlii kurma plannn paras olmakla kalmyor. Gelecek yl, bakanlar, dikkatlerini kurtarlamayacak kadar kt durumdaki bankalarn defterlerini drecek bir mekanizma oluturma gibi baka unsurlara yneltecek. Liderlerin tereddtleri ve maliye bakanlarnn kararlar, bu inili kl yln sonunda ABnin iinde bulunduu durumu zetliyor: Kimse gelecekte byk resmin neye benzeyeceini bilmiyor, ama bu arada birlik adm adm daha fazla g elde ediyor. Birlikteki bu ayrmalar daha ne kadar esneme kaldrr, bilmiyorum.

Are all Turks Kemalists? A few weeks ago I was having lunch with a Turkish friend who could best be described as a typical example of the new elite in this country: pious, well educated, confident and culturally conservative but economically liberal. He has always voted for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), but during our conversation he expressed his growing unease with the policies of the party and the behavior of the prime minister. When I asked him for an explanation, he told me, Dont forget; deep down we Turks are all Kemalists. When I looked puzzled, he clarified what he meant. As a result of decades of education based on the principles of the founder of the republic, even those Turks who have never identified with Kemalism and would most probably describe themselves as conservatives are infected with a particular understanding of society and politics in which strong leaders with authoritarian tendencies are accepted as a precondition for progress and development. Although he definitively did not like the bossy attitudes recently displayed by AKP leaders, he was not surprised at all. According to him, this is what you get after 80 years of indoctrination. I had to think of my friend last week when I read hsan Das pointed criticism of Prime Minister Erdoans condemnation of the TV series Muhteem Yzyl (The Magnificent Century). According to Da, it looks like a disease was passed from the Kemalists to the conservatives: making choices that people are supposed to make. The Kemalists did not like democracy. They feared that people would not elect the right people in government -- the right people being the Kemalists themselves. Now the conservatives do not like the freedom to choose, fearing that the people would not choose the right moral values, thus preaching morality -- the morality that they uphold. Da speaks out strongly and convincingly against this tendency to create a new society via the state apparatus. He calls these attempts at social engineering unacceptable because they do not give birth to democracy but to an authoritarian form of government. A similar argument was made this week by Steven A. Cook from the American Council on Foreign Relations. The only difference is that Cook was not talking about Turkey but about Egypt. Cook was trying to find an explanation for the deadlock in Egyptian politics after President Mohammed Morsis decision to grant himself absolute power above any court and to rush the passing of a new draft constitution dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Cook believes that the MB, like the Free Officers who came to power in 1952 and produced Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and [Hosni] Mubarak, are what the Yale anthropologist James Scott calls high modernists. They think of themselves as a vanguard that is uniquely qualified

to rebuild Egypt and realize its seemingly endless quest for modernization. In Scotts view, high modernism is an elitist ideology imposed by officials who imagine that they know better than local people do about how to arrange their lives. These modernizers can be secular, but they can also be religious. As Cook sees it, the MB has used religion to advance a political agenda. He fears that Morsi, like Mubarak before him, thinks that the Egyptian people gave him and his party a mandate to rule with little regard for those who might disagree. It is interesting to read all these efforts to find common origins for the actions and attitudes of political actors with, at face value, radically different backgrounds and ideologies. The danger, however, is that one ends up with a static interpretation of history in which deep, structural characteristics to any given society produce standard policies independent of personal choices or changing circumstances. I agree with Da, Cook and my friend that as a result of long-established political cultures, it is no coincidence that Erdoan and Morsi are inclined to act in the same way as their predecessors-but-ideological-opponents Mustafa Kemal Atatrk and Nasser would have done. I also believe societies can develop, learn from previous mistakes and change deeply rooted practices. Many Turks definitively have well-developed Kemalist tendencies. It will take at least another generation to grow out of these bad habits. In Egypt, it will probably take two. Tm Trkler Kemalist mi? Birka hafta nce bir Trk arkadamla le yemei yiyordum, kendisi en iyi ekilde bu lkedeki yeni sekinlerin tipik rnei diye nitelenebilir: Dindar, iyi eitimli, kendinden emin, kltrel adan muhafazakr ama ekonomik adan liberal. Hep AKPye oy vermi ama sohbetimiz srasnda partinin politikalar ve Babakann davranlarndan giderek artan rahatszln dile getirdi. Kendisinden bir izah istediimde, bana Unutma, biz Trkler, hepimiz alttan alta Kemalistiz. dedi. akn akn baknca, ne demek istediine aklk getirdi. On yllardr Cumhuriyetin kurucusunun ilkelerine dayal eitimden getikten sonra, kendilerini asla Kemalizm ile tanmlamayp byk ihtimalle muhafazakr diye niteleyen Trkler bile, toplum ve siyasete ynelik belli bir anlaya yakalanyor. Bu anlaya gre otoriter eilimli liderler ilerleme ve gelimenin n art kabul ediliyor. Arkadam, son dnemde AKP liderlerinin sergiledii patronluk taslayan tavrlardan hi hazzetmese de, bu hallerine hi amam. Ona gre, 80 yllk beyin ykamadan sonra olup olaca bu. Geen hafta Babakan Erdoann Muhteem Yzyl dizisini knamasna ynelik hsan Dann isabetli eletirisini okurken, aklma arkadam geldi. Daya gre, Hastalk Kemalistlerden muhafazakrlara gemi gibi: Halkn yapmas gereken tercihleri onlar yapyor. () Kemalistler demokrasiyi sevmezdi. Halkn hkmete doru insanlar getirmeyeceinden korkarlard, elbette doru insanlar Kemalistlerin kendisiydi. imdi de muhafazakrlar tercih zgrln sevmiyor, zira halkn doru ahlak deerleri semeyeceinden korkuyor, dolaysyla ahlak kendi savunduklar ahlak- vazediyorlar. Da, devlet aygtn kullanarak yeni bir toplum yaratma eilimi aleyhinde dndklerini gl ve ikna edici ekilde sylyor. Bu toplum mhendislii giriimlerini kabul edilemez buluyor, nk demokrasi deil otoriter hkmet biimi douruyor. Benzer bir sav, bu hafta Amerikan D likiler Konseyinden Steven A. Cook ortaya koydu. Tek farkla ki, Cook Trkiyeden deil, Msrdan bahsediyordu. Cumhurbakan Mursinin kendisine her trl yarg kontrolnn zerinde mutlak yetki bahetme ve Mslman Kardelerin (MK) tahakkmnde hazrlanan yeni anayasa taslan alelacele referanduma gtrme karar zerine Msr siyasetinin kilitlenmesine izah getirmeye alyordu. Cooka gre 1952de iktidara gelip Cemal Abdl Nasr, Enver Sedat, Hsn Mbareki reten Hr Subaylar gibi, MK de, Yale niversitesi antropolou James Scottun tabiriyle yksek modernist. () Kendilerini, Msr yeniden ina etmeye tek bana ehil nc kuvvet sanyorlar ve bunun sonu gzkmeyen bir modernleme seferberlii gerektirdiini fark ediyorlar. Scottun bak asndan, yksek modernizm, insan yaamlarnn nasl dzenleneceini yerel halktan daha iyi bildiklerini tahayyl eden yetkililerin dayatt elitist bir ideoloji. Bu modernletiriciler laik de olabilir dinci de. Cook, MKnin siyas gndemini ilerletmek iin dini kullandn dnyor. Selefi Mbarek gibi Mursinin de, halkn kendisiyle partisine farkl dnenleri kaale almadan ynetme yetkisi verdiine inanmasndan korkuyor. Grnte radikal biimde farkl arka plan ve ideolojileri olan siyas aktrlerin eylemleri ve tutumlar iin ortak kkenler bulmaya ynelik tm bu abalar okumak ilgin oluyor. Lakin ele alnan her toplumun derin, yapsal karakteristiklerinin kiisel tercihler ya da deien artlardan bamsz standart politikalar retmesine ynelik tarihin statik bir yorumuyla kalakalma tehlikesi de var.

Erdoan ve Mursinin hem selefleri hem de ideolojik kartlar olan Atatrk ve Nasr gibi hareket etmeye meyletmelerinin bir tesadf olmad, uzun zamandr sistemlemi siyas kltrlerin sonucu olduu konusunda Dal, Cook ve arkadamla hemfikirim. Ayn zamanda toplumlarn geliebileceine, gemi hatalarndan ders karabileceine ve derinlere kk salm uygulamalar deitirebileceine inanyorum. Pek ok Trkn artk oturmu, kemiklemi Kemalist refleksleri var kesinlikle. Bu kt alkanlklardan kurtulmak iin en az bir neslin gemesi gerekecek. Msrda muhtemelen iki neslin

How not to make a new constitution Both Turkey and Egypt are in the process of drafting and adopting a new constitution. In Turkey a special committee composed of three representatives of each of the four parties represented in Parliament has been tasked with writing a draft version that will be discussed and voted on in Parliament and most probably be put before a referendum later on. As the end of the year is approaching, few observers are optimistic that this procedure will produce anything substantial. Most fear that the unanimity rule will block any progress and therefore the ruling party will soon be asked the question: What now? Drop the whole project, an option I hope most Justice and Development Party (AKP) leaders will reject as being unacceptable? Try to make a compromise with the main opposition party, the option I would personally prefer? Or go at it alone, try to get some support in Parliament and bring it to referendum as basically an AKP constitution, the option I fear has the best chance of being accepted? One important argument against that last scenario can be derived from recent developments in Egypt. That country is going through a very bumpy transition process of trying to adopt a new constitution while parliament has been shut down, the judiciary is constantly putting up road blocks, the president recently published a decree that gives him unlimited powers, be it temporarily, and a constituent assembly that decided last week to push through a draft constitution without proper debate after most opposition members had walked out. The Egyptians will be asked to vote on the draft in a referendum on Dec. 15. Before we come to the lessons learned for Turkey, a few words on the controversial presidential decision. On Nov. 22, President Mohammed Morsi issued a decree granting himself absolute authority until the new constitution is adopted, robbing the courts of any oversight of the transition process. He described it as a pre-emptive strike, claiming that the Supreme Constitutional Court that had earlier dissolved parliament and the first constituent assembly was poised to close down the current one just before a draft constitution was published. Morsi was also afraid that, on top of that, the court was about to overturn the president's earlier decree that removed the military's control over Egypt's political system. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) put it, These steps would have comprehensively muddled the picture, done away with the full panoply of representative bodies, ignored the popular will expressed in the March 2011 referendum, blocked the course of institution-building, indefinitely delayed the writing of a constitution and left a perilous question mark on the country's future. Other informed observers also admit that there was a serious chance of the whole transition process being derailed by the court and therefore there is some sympathy for the president's decision not to sit back and let it happen. But all pundits agree that the president's decree was, to use the ICG formulation, the wrong answer to a real problem. The result is a deeply divided society with on the one hand the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its supporters, confident that they represent the majority of the population, but at the same time convinced that the judicial establishment and other remnants of the Mubarak regime are still out to get them. On the other side of the deepening divide, we find a badly organized and ideologically incoherent opposition afraid that there is a new pharaoh in town who will use his unrestricted authority to dominate Egypt in the decade to come and force his Islamic views upon the rest of the country. Sounds familiar to everybody following many of the overheated debates in Turkey, doesn't it? To make matters even worse, one contentious decision was followed by another. After months of bickering, most liberals, leftists and other opponents of the MB in the constituent assembly walked out in protest over what they described as the MB's unwillingness to negotiate on the draft constitution. Nevertheless, the document was rushed to completion last week by the MB majority. There are divergent views on the content of the draft, also among domestic and foreign critics of the MB. What matters more at this point, however, is the way it was done, overruling all legitimate concerns and in fact forcing the

Egyptians on Dec. 15 to accept MB dominance. One humble piece of advice to the AKP: Please don't repeat these mistakes in Turkey. With society already deeply divided, the only way forward in the making of the country's permanent governing framework, the constitution, should be one of cooperation and compromise, not of decrees and domination Nasl yeni anayasa yaplmaz? Hem Trkiye hem de Msr, yeni anayasa tasars hazrlama ve benimseme srecinde. Trkiyede, Mecliste temsil edilen drt partiden er vekilin oluturduu zel komisyon, yeni anayasay yazmakla grevlendirildi; taslak Mecliste tartlp oylandktan sonra byk ihtimalle referanduma sunulacak. Lakin yln sonu yaklarken, bu yntemle tatmin edici bir ey retilebileceine iyimser bakan gzlemcilerin says olduka az. ounluk, oybirlii kuralnn her trl ilerlemeyi ksteklemesinden ve dolaysyla iktidar partisinin tez zamanda u soruyla kar karya kalmasndan korkuyor: imdi ne olacak? AKP liderlerinin ounun kabul edilemez diyerek reddedeceini umduum bir seenek olarak, bu projeden tamamen vazgeilir mi? Ya da benim kiisel olarak tercih edeceim seenek olarak, anamuhalefet partisiyle uzlamaya allr m? Yahut korktuum gibi kabul edilme ans en yksek seenek olarak, iktidar tek bana hareket etmeye kalkar, Meclisten belli bir destek almaya alr ve temelde bir AKP anayasasn referanduma gtrr m? Son senaryoya kar, Msrdaki yeni gelimelerden nemli bir sav karlabilir. Engebelerle dolu bir gei srecinde bulunan Msrda, Meclis kapalyken yeni bir anayasa kabul edilmeye allyor, yarg yola srekli engeller dyor, cumhurbakan, geici olduu iddiasyla, kendisine snrsz yetki tanyan kararname yaymlyor, anayasa kurucu meclisi, daha doru dzgn tartlmamken ve muhalif yeler boykottayken, tasla geirip referandum yolunu ayor. 15 Aralkta dzenlenecek referandumda Msrllar taslak hakknda oylarn kullanacak. Trkiye iin karlacak derslere gelmeden nce, tartmal bakanlk kararna dair bir ift laf edeyim. 22 Kasmda, yeni anayasa kabul edilene dek, kendine mutlak yetki tanyan bir kararname karan Cumhurbakan Mursi, gei srecini denetleme yetkisini de mahkemelerin elinden ald. Bu manevrasn nleyici saldr diye niteleyerek, daha nce parlamentoyu ve ilk kurucu meclisi feshetmi olan Yksek Anayasa Mahkemesinin, taslak yaymlanmadan evvel bu kurucu meclisi de feshetmeye hazrlandn iddia etti. Mursi, bundan da ok, ordunun Msrn siyasi sistemi zerindeki hakimiyetini kaldran daha nceki kararnamesinin Yksek Anayasa Mahkemesi tarafndan geri evrilmesinden korkuyordu. Uluslararas Kriz Grubunun (UKG) ifade ettii gibi, O admlar atlsayd, iler daha fena karr, halkn temsil edildii organlar tam takm ortadan kaldrlr, Mart 2011 referandumunda dile getirilen halk iradesi grmezden gelinir, kurum inas sreci engellenir, anayasa yazm sreci sresiz ertelenir ve bylece lkenin geleceine dair tehlikeli bir soru iareti oluurdu. Dier bilgili gzlemciler de kabul ediyor ki, tm gei srecinin Anayasa Mahkemesi tarafndan raydan karlmas ynnde ciddi bir tehlike bulunduundan, Cumhurbakannn kollarn kavuturup bunlara seyirci kalmama karar bir miktar sempati topluyor. Ancak tm uzmanlar, bakanlk kararnamesinin, UKGnin tabiriyle gerek bir soruna verilmi yanl bir cevap olduunda hemfikir. Zira derinden blnm bir topluma yol ayor. Bir yanda, hem nfusun ounluunu temsil ettiklerinden emin olup hem de yarg sistemiyle Mbarek rejiminin dier kalntlarnn hl pelerinde olduuna inanan Mslman Kardeler (MK) ile yandalar var. Derinleen blnmenin dier tarafnda, kt rgtlenmi ve ideolojik adan uyumsuz bir muhalefet buluyoruz ki, onlar da, snrsz yetkisini gelecek on ylda Msra hkmetmek ve slami grlerini lkenin geri kalanna dayatmak iin kullanacak yeni bir firavunun peyda olduundan korkuyor. Trkiyedeki ar hararetli tartmalarn ounu takip edenlere tandk geliyor, deil mi? leri daha da ktletirmek istercesine, kavga grlt koparan kararlar birbirini takip ediyor. Aylar sren az dalandan sonra, Anayasa Hazrlk Komisyonundaki ou liberal, solcu ve MKnin dier muhalifleri, MKnin anayasa taslan mzakere isteksizliini gereke gsterip protesto iin oturumlar terk etti. Buna ramen, taslak belge, geen hafta MKnin ounluu tarafndan alelacele tamama erdirildi. Taslan ieriiyle ilgili grler muhtelif, MKnin ierdeki ve dardaki eletirmenleri arasnda da. Ama bu noktada asl nemli olan, nasl kotarld, tm meru endielerin zerine basarak aslnda Msrllara 15 Aralkta MK tahakkmn kabul dayatmas AKPye naizane bir tavsiye: Ltfen, bu hatalar Trkiyede tekrarlamayn. Zaten toplum derinden blnmken, lkenin kalc ynetim erevesini izen anayasann yaplmasnda ilerleme kaydetmenin tek yolu, kararname ve tahakkm deil, ibirlii ve uzlama olmal.

Turkey should stop refusing help Turkeys efforts to host more than 120,000 Syrian refugees and provide them with shelter and food have been praised by all relevant international organizations. People who have visited the camps were impressed by the overall first class facilities offered to those who had to flee their country as a result of the murderous civil war taking place there. The solidarity and hospitality shown by Turkey to its neighbors in need has been exemplary. There is, however, also a more troubling side to this success story. I was alerted to that a week ago when I read remarks made by Cemil iek, the speaker of the Turkish Parliament. He harshly criticized the indifference of the international community in responding to the humanitarian needs of the refugees, claiming that Turkey had to deal with this huge problem all on its own. The money that Turkey has spent so far is over $400 million. Those who are up in arms when two whales die in the North Pole remain unmoved, while here tens of thousands are dying. Since the beginning of 2012, we have stated that we could accept aid for the survival of these people. To this very moment, no remarkable aid has arrived, iek said. If true, this would indeed be shocking and Turkey would have every right to be furious. But is the picture painted by iek a correct one? The answer is no. Firstly, till mid November, over 550 million euros ($690 million) of international humanitarian assistance have been spent on the Syrian crisis. More than half of that amount, 288 million euros, was mobilized by EU member states and the European Commission. That money was spent in Syria to help Syrias internally displaced persons (IDPs), including the most vulnerable Palestinian refugees. More than half of the European contribution was distributed between neighboring countries, with most of the money going to Jordan and Lebanon, which have a more limited capacity to host refugees and do not have Turkeys resources. So either Mr. iek was not well informed or he deliberately but unjustly tried to create the impression that only the Turks are willing to put their money where their mouth is. There is a second reason why Mr. ieks remarks fall wide of the mark and that is the lack of effective cooperation between Turkey and national and international nongovernmental organizations and specialized UN organizations like the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With only one exception, Turkish and international NGOs have no access to the Syrian refugee camps in Turkey. Last week, three prominent intellectuals called on the Turkish government to change its policy and allow humanitarian relief agencies to help the Syrian refugees. The letter was signed by Lord Anthony Giddens, former director of the prestigious London School of Economics; Dr. Hany El Banna, board member of the Center for Interfaith Action on Global Poverty (CIFA); and Professor Fuat Keyman, director of the stanbul Policy Center (IPC). The letter starts by underlining the worldwide admiration that Turkey has deservedly earned for meeting its international obligations. But with the numbers of those seeking shelter still growing and the winter season approaching, the authors are convinced that the time has come for Turkey to invite and accept the financial and technical support of the international community. Like Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey should enable specialist organizations with a long track record of impartial and neutral action like the UNHCR to come into the country and support Turkeys efforts with their technical skills and resources. The fact that, for instance, until now the UNHCR has not been allowed to fully implement its activities in Turkey is the main reason why the EU has not been able to increase its support to Turkeys humanitarian efforts. Turkey has requested assistance in cash, but according to EU regulations, the EU can only deliver humanitarian aid through partners such as the UNHCR or the Red Cross/Red Crescent. By not enabling these organizations to freely operate in and outside the camps in Turkey, the government is in effect blocking additional assistance by the EU. Lets hope the Turkish authorities, including Mr. iek, take the open letter seriously and accept the extended hand of the international community. Trkiye, yardm almay reddetmeye son vermeli Trkiyenin 120 binden fazla Suriyeli snmacy arlama, onlara barnak ve yiyecek salama abalar, konuyla ilgili tm uluslararas kurulular tarafndan vld. Kanl i sava sebebiyle lkelerini terk etmek zorunda kalanlara sunulan tmyle birinci snf tesisler, kamplar ziyaret edenlerin takdirini kazand. Trkiyenin muhta komularna gsterdii dayanma ve konukseverlik, rnek nitelikte olageldi.

Ama bu baar hikyesinin rahatsz edici bir yn de var. TBMM Bakan Cemil iekin geen hafta okuduum aklamalar, bende alarm zilleri aldrd. Uluslararas toplumun snmaclarn ihtiyalarn karlamay umursamamasn sert bir dille eletiren iek, Trkiyenin bu devasa sorunla tek bana uramak zorunda kaldn ileri sryordu. Trkiyenin imdiye kadar harcad para 400 milyon dolarn zerindedir. Kutuplarda skm iki balina iin ayaa kalkanlar, burada on binler hayatn kaybediyor, kl kprdamyor. () Biz 2012den bu yana, bu insanlarn hayatn srdrebilmesi bakmndan yardm alabileceimizi ifade ettik. u ana kadar die dokunur yardm ok gelmedi. diyordu iek. Doruysa, hakikaten oke edici ve Trkiyenin fkelenmeye her trl hakk var. Ama iekin izdii resim gerekle rtyor mu? Yant hayr. ncelikle, Suriye krizi iin kasm ay ortasna dek yaplan uluslararas insan yardm 550 milyon Avroyu geti. Bu miktarn yarsndan fazlasna tekabl eden 288 milyon Avroyu, AB yesi lkeler ile Avrupa Komisyonu seferber etti. Bu para, en savunmasz konumdaki Filistinli mlteciler dahil, yerlerinden olan ama Suriye iinde kalmay srdren insanlara yardm iin kullanld. Avrupann katksnn yarsndan fazlas, Suriyeye komu lkeler arasnda paylatrlrken, parann ou, Trkiyenin kaynaklarna sahip olmayan ve snmac arlama kapasitesi daha kstl olan rdn ve Lbnana gitti. Dolaysyla ya Sayn iek yeterince bilgilendirilmemi ya da kasten ama adaletsizce, yardm vaatlerini yerine getirenlerin sadece Trkler olduu izlenimi yaratmaya alyor. iekin aklamalarnn hedefi tutturamamasnn ikinci sebebi de, Trkiyenin, ulusal ve uluslararas sivil toplum rgtleri ve BM Mlteciler Yksek Komiserlii (UNHCR) gibi uzman BM rgtleriyle etkin ibirliine girmemesi. Trkiyedeki Suriyeli snmac kamplarna, tek bir istisna hari, Trk ve uluslararas sivil toplum rgtlerinin eriimi yok. Geen hafta saygn entelektel, Trk hkmetine, politikasn deitirmesi ve insan yardm rgtlerinin Suriyeli snmaclara yardm etmesine izin vermesi iin ar yapt. Mektupta prestijli London School of Economicsin eski bakan Lord Anthony Giddens, Kresel Yoksullua Kar Dinleraras Eylem Merkezinin (CIFA) ynetim kurulu yesi Dr. Hany el Banna ve stanbul Politikalar Merkezi Direktr profesr Fuat Keymann imzas var. Mektup, Trkiyenin, uluslararas ykmllklerini yerine getirerek dnyann hayranln hakkyla kazand vurgusuyla balyor. Ama snma arayndakilerin says artmaya devam eder ve k yaklarken, mektubu kaleme alan l, Trkiyenin uluslararas toplumun mal ve teknik desteini davet ve kabul etme vaktinin geldiine dikkat ekiyor. rdn ve Lbnan gibi, Trkiye de, UNHCR gibi tarafsz icraata dayanan uzun sicili olan uzman kurumlarn gelip teknik beceri ve kaynaklaryla Trkiyenin abalarna destek olmasna imkn tanmal. Mesela, UNHCRnin olaan faaliyetlerini Trkiyede tam manasyla yerine getirmesine bugne dek izin verilmemesi olgusu, ABnin, Trkiyenin insan abalarna desteini artramamasnn temel sebebi. Trkiye nakit para yardm talep etti, fakat AB dzenlemelerine gre, birlik sadece UNHCR veya Kzlha/Kzlay gibi ortaklar araclyla insan yardm ulatrabiliyor. Bu rgtlere Trkiyedeki kamplarn iinde ve dnda serbeste alma imkn vermeyerek, aslnda, hkmet, ABnin ilave yardmn bloke ediyor. Umalm da, Sayn iek dahil Trk yetkililer, bu ak mektubu ciddiye alsn ve uluslararas toplumun uzatt eli kabul etsin.

Turkey's Patriot games What to make of the stationing of the NATO surface-to-air Patriot system near Turkey's border with Syria? The Patriot air defense missiles are designed to intercept enemy aircraft or missiles and the Turkish government has requested NATO deploy them along Turkey's long border with Syria because Ankara does not want to take any risk with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad fighting for its survival. Only Germany, the Netherlands and the US have the advanced Patriot model that Turkey wants for the interception of Syrian ballistic missiles. Even if NATO quickly approves Turkey's request, it will take weeks before the missiles are operational because the systems can only be transported by ship and it will take time to link the Patriots into Turkey's existing air defense network. On top of that, the German government needs to ask for parliamentary permission and the Dutch cabinet wants to do so as well in order to create maximum domestic support for the mission. Both parliaments are likely to agree but will attach great

importance to the exclusively defensive nature of the deployment. Germany and the Netherlands don't want their systems to be used to enforce a no-fly zone in Syria, a plan Turkey has been pushing for strongly during the last couple of months. It is one of the reasons why in the last few days both NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the Turkish army have repeatedly stressed that the Patriots will only be used if Turkey comes under attack. It is interesting to see how NATO is trying to convince the Germans and the Dutch that the missiles will be under NATO command. At the same time, spokespersons for the Turkish government are doing their utmost to create the impression that, as Justice and Development Party (AKP) Deputy Chairman Hseyin Celik put it, Turkey is holding the trigger. That is definitely not the case for two obvious reasons. In theory, NATO's command structure is in charge, in which Turkish officials will play a role but not the decisive one. Even more importantly, in practice a decision to launch a Patriot missile against an incoming hostile plane or missile will have to be taken within a few minutes, giving a lot of responsibility to the military officers actually operating the complex Patriot systems on the ground. These are German and Dutch specialists, not Turks. In the last few days, another surprising aspect of the Patriot deal has been highlighted: the commercial one. For some time now, the Turkish government and the army have been contemplating buying their own anti-ballistic missile system. At the moment there are four candidates left: a Chinese company, a French-Italian consortium, a Russian arms manufacturer and the American Raytheon and Lockheed Martin combination. The costs could run up to 3 billion euros and that is why the Turkish authorities are hesitant and the potential contractors anxious to get into pole position. The big story here is not, as the Turkish daily Yeni afak suggested, the opposition of the Russian government against the deployment of Patriot missiles because it would damage the commercial chances of the Russian contender. It is the fact, as reported by the Dutch daily De Volkskrant last week, that the Patriot system is made by Raytheon/Lockheed Martin and the stationing of these NATO missiles will now most probably seriously increase the possibility that the Turkish government will eventually buy the same system in the future. Back to the strategic and security aspects of the Patriots. Exactly one month ago, Franois Heisbourg, an influential analyst at the Foundation for Strategic Research, a Paris-based think tank, wrote an article in The Washington Post in which he presented the arguments for an intervention in Syria to tilt the balance in favor of the rebel forces. Heisbourg: In military terms, this would be achieved by establishing a 50-mile no-fly zone along the Turkish-Syrian border. No allied aircraft would need to fly in Syrian airspace, as air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles fired from Turkish airspace and territory would have the necessary range to shoot down Syrian bombers or helicopters in the exclusion zone. I am sure this proposal was read with a lot of interest by the Turkish government and the Syrian armed opposition suffering from ongoing aerial bombardments by the Assad air force. At the moment this scenario is politically not feasible and the deployment of the Patriots should be seen as a symbolic gesture by NATO, showing its commitment to the defense of Turkey by strengthening deterrence. In the midterm, however, the Heisbourg plan might become a realistic option if Turkey is again hit by Syrian shells or bombs. In that case, it would be very convenient to have the indispensible surface-to-air missile system already in place. Turkey's Patriot games have only started.

Trkiyenin Patriot Gamesi* NATOnun karadan havaya Patriot sisteminin Trkiyenin Suriye snr yaknna konulandrlacak olmasn neye yormal? Patriot hava savunma fzeleri, dman uak ya da fzelerinin yolunu kesmek zere tasarlanmtr. Trk hkmeti, Suriye ile uzun snr boyunca bunlarn konulandrlmasn NATOdan talep etti, zira Ankara, hayatta kalma mcadelesi veren Esed rejimiyle riske girmek istemiyor. Trkiyenin Suriyenin balistik fzelerini havada engellemek iin istedii ileri model Patriota ise sadece Almanya, Hollanda ve ABD sahip. Trkiyenin talebini NATO alelacele onaylasa bile, fzeler ancak haftalar sonra operasyonel hale gelebilir, nk sistemler sadece gemilerle naklediliyor ve Patriotlar Trkiyenin halihazrdaki hava savunma ana balamak da zaman alacak. stelik hepsinden nce Alman hkmetinin parlamentodan izin karabilmesi lazm, Hollanda hkmeti de bu misyona en yksek dzeyde i destek toplamak iin parlamentoya gitmek istiyor. Byk ihtimalle iki parlamento da onay verecek ama bunu yaparken konulandrmann savunma amal olmasna zel nem atfedecek. Almanya ile Hollanda, sistemlerinin, son aylarda Trkiyenin gereklemesi iin kuvvetle bastrd bir plan olan Suriyeye uua yasak blge dayatmasnda kullanlmasn istemiyor. Hem NATO Genel Sekreteri Anders Fogh Rasmussenin hem de Trk ordusunun, Patriotlarn sadece Trkiye saldrya urarsa kullanlacan son gnlerde srarla vurgulamasnn sebeplerinden biri bu. Almanlarla Hollandallar, fzelerin ttifak komutas altnda olacana ikna edebilmek iin NATOnun nasl rpndn izlemek epey ilgin. Ama ayn zamanda Trk hkmetinin szcleri, AKP Genel Bakan Yardmcs Hseyin elikin dile getirdii gibi, Tetik Trkiyede olacak izlenimi yaratmak iin ellerinden geleni yapyor. Byle bir ey, iki bariz sebepten mmkn deil. Teoride, dizginler NATO komuta yapsndadr, Trk subaylarn bu yapda bir rol vardr ama karar verici rol deil. Daha da nemlisi, pratikte, yaklaan dman ua ya da fzesine Patriot fzesi gnderme kararnn birka dakika iinde alnmas gerekir, bu da, asl sorumluluu karmak Patriot sistemlerini altran sahadaki asker yetkililere ykler. Bu sorumluluun verildii kiiler Alman ve Hollandal uzmanlardr, Trkler deil. Son gnlerde Patriot anlamasnn bir baka, srpriz yn ortaya kt: Ticari cephe. Bir sredir, Trk hkmeti ile ordusu, kendi anti balistik fze sistemlerini satn almay lp biiyor. imdilik drt satc aday var: Bir in irketi, bir Fransz-talyan konsorsiyumu, bir Rus silah imalats ve Amerikan Raytheon-Lockheed Martin ortakl. Fatura 3 milyar avroyu bulabileceinden tr, Trk yetkililer tereddt ederken, potansiyel ihaleye giriciler en n pozisyonu kapmak iin can atyor. Buradaki asl hikye, Yeni afak gazetesinin ileri srd gibi, Rus hkmetinin kendi irketinin ticar ansna zarar verecei gerekesiyle Patriot konulandrlmasna muhalefet etmesi deil. Geen hafta Hollanda gazetesi De Volkskrant gerei yazd: Patriot sistemi Raytheon/Lockheed Martin yapmdr. Dolaysyla NATO, Trkiyeye bu Amerikan fzelerini konulandracak ve en nihayetinde Trk hkmetinin gelecekte ayn sistemleri satn alma ihtimali ciddi biimde kuvvetlenecek. Patriotlarn stratejik ve gvenlik tarafna dnersek, Paris merkezli dnce kuruluu Stratejik Aratrma Vakfnn etkili analisti Francois Heisbourg, tam bir ay nce Washington Post gazetesinde bir makale yaymlad. Makalesinde, dengenin Suriyeli isyanclardan yana dnmesi iin asker mdahale gerektiine dair savlarn sralad. Heisbourg unlar diyordu: Asker bakmdan, bunu, Trkiye-Suriye snrna 80 kilometrelik uua yasak blge kurarak, baarabilirsiniz. Suriye hava sahasnda mttefik uaklarnn umasna gerek kalmaz, zira Trk hava sahas ve topraklarndan frlatlacak havadan havaya ve karadan havaya fzelerin, dlama blgesinde Suriye bombardman uaklar ya da helikopterlerini vurmak iin gereken menzili olacaktr. Eminim, bu neri, Trk hkmeti ve Esedin sregiden hava bombardmanlarndan ok eken Suriye silahl muhalefeti tarafndan byk ilgiyle okunmutur. imdilik bu senaryo siyaseten uygulanabilir deil ve NATOnun Patriotlar konulandrmas da sembolik bir jest olarak grlmeli, caydrcl glendirme yoluyla Trkiyenin savunmasna bir ballk gsterisi. Gel gelelim, orta vadede, Trkiyeye yine Suriyeden top mermileri veya bombalar isabet ederse, Heisbourg plan gereki bir seenek haline gelebilir. O durumda, olmazsa olmaz karadan havaya fze sisteminin yerli yerini alm olmas, pek mnasip kaacaktr. Trkiyenin Patriot Gamesi* daha yeni balad. *Patriot Games, 1992 tarihli, Philip Noyceun ynettii ve Harrison Fordun barolnde oynad bir Amerikan filmi. Trkiyede Tehlikeli Oyunlar adyla gsterildi. ngilizce patriot vatansever, games oyunlar anlamna geliyor.

Does Morsis rise mean Erdoans fall? In the international press, last weeks Gaza cease-fire deal has been analyzed as a major victory for Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi who is seen as the main architect of the agreement.

Reuters called it a bravura diplomatic performance by the former Muslim Brotherhood leader. According to the Associated Press: Morsi emerged as a major regional player. He won the trust of the US and Israel, which once worried over the rise of an Islamist leader in Egypt, but throughout the week-long Gaza crisis saw him as the figure most able to deliver a deal with Gazas Hamas rulers. Both leading press agencies quote US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton who thanked President Morsi for his personal leadership to de-escalate the situation in Gaza and end the violence. In an ironic twist of history, one day after the Gaza deal, the much-praised Morsi, citing the need to break the deadlock in Egypts stalled transition from dictatorship to democracy, issued a decree granting himself broad powers that will be free of judicial oversight. Liberal opponents have labeled the resulting institutional set up as an absolute presidential tyranny and have called for demonstrations against what they see as a serious setback for last years revolution against Hosni Mubarak. Whatever the outcome of this domestic fight will be, in the short term Morsi is seen by many as the big winner in the Gaza crisis. Who then is considered to be the big loser? According to several analysts, that title goes to Turkey in general and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan in particular. In the New York Times, Turkish and foreign pundits agreed that last week Turkey found that it had to take a back seat to Egypt on the stage of high diplomacy. Turkey is no longer seen as a regional power broker and finds itself shut out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The main reason? Turkeys uncompromising stance on Israel and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leaders extremely harsh words on Israel, described by Erdoan as a terrorist state guilty of ethnic cleansing. It has made him popular on the Arab streets, and I guess it goes down well with many Turks as well. The result however is that Turkey has lost its seat at the negotiation table because it is no longer perceived as an honest broker in conflicts in which Israel is involved. In a vitriolic piece on the Foreign Policy website, Steven A. Cook, a senior fellow at the prestigious US Council on Foreign Relations, bluntly stated that Erdoans repeated Israel bashing has pushed Turkey to the sidelines and made it once again a mere observer of regional events. Cook underlines that given Ankaras goals under the AK Party, cooling relations with Israel was a reasonable position to take, but the Turks seemed to have the spirit of the converted. They embraced the principles, themes, and language of anti-Israeli sentiment so common in the Arab world, but without any nuance that would allow them to continue to play in the Arab-Israeli game. The Egyptians, Jordanians, Qatari, and even Saudi governments, for example, have a long history of engaging in very public criticism of Israel, but have always managed to keep lines of communication open to manage regional crises and look out for their interests. Not so the Turks who seemed to relish burning bridges with the Israelis. Cook may be overdoing his vilifying but he definitively has a point. The Turkish government did its utmost to portray the Gaza deal as a common effort of Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. Spokespersons stressed the perfect relations between Cairo and Ankara, symbolized by dozens of agreements concluded last week. That is probably all true. Still, perceptions are extremely important in international relations. Most observers agree that, at least for the moment, Egypt under Morsi has replaced Turkey as the main regional actor. That is partly an inevitable result of the Arab Awakening. It is also due, however, to

Turkeys decision to cut all ties with Israel. Is anybody in Ankara ready to tell the prime minister that his inflammatory rhetoric has proven to be counterproductive and will take Turkey nowhere?

An alternative EU membership There is a growing feeling inside the European Union that it is becoming increasingly difficult to have each member state agree on a future shape of the EU that fits all. There are two main reasons for this mood in Brussels and several capitals. One is the almost inevitable conclusion that it will be impossible to keep the UK on board when the rest of the member states continue on their road toward a more federal EU. To get out of the current euro crisis and in order to prevent a recurrence, a large majority of EU member states is willing to establish a banking union, followed by a fiscal union and some sort of economic governance at the EU level that will seriously limit the economic sovereignty of eurozone countries. In London, both main parties have already made it clear they will do everything they can to keep the UK out of this more integrated EU. The Czech Republic has voiced its doubts about the new direction as well, and it is not so obvious what countries like Sweden and Denmark that have not joined the eurozone will do. It seems that as a result of the creation of a more federal eurozone, a two-speed Europe is taking shape. At the core, a group that shares the same currency and is therefore obliged to move in the direction of a full economic and political union. Outside of this dominant nucleus, we find several EU member states that want to keep their own banknotes and are not willing to give up other major parts of their national competencies. The second reason for the present European discomfort is the possibility that as a consequence of these moves toward a federal political union, the minimum threshold for countries that want to join the EU will become mroe difficult. The Turkish government has already announced that it still wants to join the EU but not the eurozone. In other words, Turkey wants to stay out of the core group. Candidate countries from the Balkans will most probably, even if they wanted to, not be able to meet the necessary criteria for eurozone membership. Until recently, the debate about how to deal with this situation was mainly held at a theoretical level among academics and political analysts. Not any longer. This week the European Parliament will adopt a report on the future of EU enlargement that comes up with an answer to this question. The report offers an overall positive assessment of the previous new members' entry and is in favor of taking in more countries that fulfill the criteria in the future. Still, in a key paragraph, the Parliament recognizes that: not all European states will choose to seek full membership, and that some which do seek it will not fulfill the accession criteria; and recommends, therefore, that at the next general revision of the Treaties, without prejudice to any ongoing enlargement negotiations, Parliament should initiate a discussion on the introduction of a new category of associate membership to the Union. The wording was amended in the report by Andrew Duff, a British liberal MEP and a specialist on constitutional affairs. In a recent booklet on the future structure of the EU, Duff introduced the concept of associate membership to cope with an

unavoidable British veto against further financial and political integration of the EU. According to Duff, the UK needs the option of a parking place short of the federal destination because otherwise the Brits will leave the EU. The new associate status could also suit other countries, EU member states and non-members, that, for different reasons, do not to join the federal core. Why is this search for a more sophisticated multi-tier arrangement inside the EU important for Turkey? Duff suggests that the associate membership could prove to be an attractive springboard to full membership for countries like Serbia and a satisfactory permanent accommodation for others such as Turkey. In a recent debate in Brussels, Duff emphasized that the new status should not be compared with the infamous privileged partnership offered to Turkey by France and Germany. As Duff sees it, Turkey would not be singled out but join a bigger group of like-minded countries. I am sure we will see much more of this debate in the near future. The EU is rapidly turning into an organization with multiple layers and dimensions. Turkey is well advised to follow that transformation closely. If Duff gets his way, and that is a big if, I am convinced that the associate membership will be a game changer for Turkey in its relations with the EU. Alternatif AB yelii Avrupa Birliinde, birliin gelecekteki eklini herkese uyacak ekilde biimlendirmenin ve buna her bir ye devletin onayn almann giderek zorlatna dair giderek byyen bir his var. Bu haleti ruhiye, Brksel ve bir dizi bakentin zerine iki temel sebepten kt. lki, dier yeler daha federal bir AB rotasnda ilerlerken, Britanyann bu gemiyi terk etmesinin kanlmazl. Halihazrdaki avro krizinden kmak ve tekerrrn nlemek iin AB yesi devletlerin byk ounluu, bankaclk birlii, bunu izleyecek mali birlik ve AB dzeyinde bir tr ekonomi ynetimi oluturmaya istekli. Bu da avro blgesi lkelerinin ekonomik egemenliini ciddi biimde snrlayacak. Londrada her iki ana parti, Britanyay, daha btnlemi ABnin dnda tutmak iin ellerinden geleni yapacaklarn net biimde ifade etti. ek Cumhuriyeti de bu yeni ynelimle ilgili phelerini dile getirdi ve avro kuana katlmam sve, Danimarka gibi lkelerin ne yapaca da soru iareti. yle gzkyor ki, daha federal bir avro blgesi yaratlmasnn sonucu olarak, iki vitesli bir Avrupa hasl oluyor. ekirdek, ayn para birimini paylaan ve dolaysyla tam siyasi-ekonomik birlik istikametinde hareket etmeye ykml olan grup. Bu baat ekirdein d kabuunda, kendi para birimlerini terk etmek ve ulusal yetkilerinin byk blmnden vazgemek istemeyen bir dizi lke var. Avrupay saran huzursuzluun ikinci sebebi, siyasi birlie ynelik hamlelerin sonucu olarak, ABye girmek isteyen lkeler iin eiin ykselmesi. Trk hkmeti hl ABye katlmak istediini ama avro blgesine katlma niyetinin olmadn imdiden aklad. Balkanlardaki aday lkeler, byk ihtimalle, isteseler bile, avro yelii iin gerekli kriterleri tutturamazlar. Bu durumla nasl ba edilecei tartmas, ksa sre ncesine dek, genelde akademisyenler ve siyasi analistler arasnda kuramsal dzeyde yrtlyordu. Artk yle deil. Bu hafta Avrupa Parlamentosu, ABnin gelecekteki genilemesini ele alrken bu soruya yant getiren bir raporu kabul edecek. Rapor, gemiteki ye katlmlaryla ilgili tmden olumlu deerlendirme yaparken, kriterleri yerine getirdikleri takdirde gelecekte baka yelerin de alnmasn destekliyor. Yine de, kilit paragrafta yle diyor: Avrupa Parlamentosu farkndadr ki, tm Avrupa devletleri tam yelii tercih etmeyecek ve tam yelik isteyenlerden bazs da katlm kriterlerini yerine getirmeyecek. Bu yzden tavsiye eder ki, bundan sonraki anlamalarn genel gzden geirilmesi srasnda, srmekte olan genileme mzakerelerinin hibirine nyargyla bakmadan, Parlamento, birlie ksmi yelik diye yeni bir kategorinin sunumu hakknda tartma balatsn. Rapordaki ifadeler, Britanyal liberal parlamenter ve anayasa almalar uzman Andrew Duff tarafndan deitirildi. Geenlerde ABnin gelecekteki mimarisine dair datlan brorde, Duff, ABnin daha sk mali ve siyasi btnlemesine kar Britanyann kanlmaz vetosunun stesinden gelmek iin ksmi yelik kavramn ortaya att. Duffa gre, Londrann federal istikamete varmadan nce park edecek bir yere ihtiyac var, aksi takdirde Britanyallar AByi terk edecek.

Yeni ksmi stat, farkl sebeplerden, federal ekirdei katlmamay tercih edecek AB yesi olan ve olmayan dier lkelere de uyabilir. ABde ok katmanllk iin daha sofistike bir dzenleme arayna klmas, Trkiye iin niye nemli? Duff, ksmi yeliin, Srbistan gibi lkeler iin tam yelie cezbedici bir atlama tahtas, Trkiye gibi dier lkeler iinse tatmin edici bir kalc konum olabileceini ileri sryor. Brkseldeki son tartmalarda, Duff, yeni statnn, Fransa ile Almanyann Trkiyeye teklif ettii kt hretli imtiyazl ortaklk ile kyaslanmamas gerektiinin altn izdi. Onun mantna gre, Trkiye tek bana ayr bir yere konulmayacak, bilakis, kendiyle ayn zihniyetteki lkelerin oluturduu daha byk bir gruba katlacak. Yakn gelecekte bu konunun daha ok tartlacan greceimizden eminim. AB, hzla, ok katmanl ve ok boyutlu bir rgte dnyor. Trkiyenin yapaca en akllca i, bu dnm yakndan takip etmek. Byk bir eer erhi derek, eer Duff istediini yaptrrsa, eminim ki, ksmi yelik, Trkiyenin AB ile ilikileri asndan oyunun gidiatn deitirici bir etken olacak.

Dutch-Turkish relations after the party is over The party celebrating the 400th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Turkey is almost over. Since the beginning of this year an impressive number of events have been organized, both in Holland and in Turkey, to strengthen special relations between the two countries and to boost bilateral relations. This weekend we can witness one of the last special occasions, when the Netherlands is welcomed as guest of honor at the 31st International stanbul Book Fair. New books translated from Dutch to Turkish will be presented, Dutch author Henk Boom will sign copies of his book on Suleiman the Magnificent and the most prominent Dutch expert on Turkish history, Erik Jan Zrcher, will take part in a panel discussion. Last weekend, the Crown Prince of the Netherlands and his wife visited stanbul to attend one of the closing activities, a splendid performance of the world-famous Royal Concertgebouw Orchestra at the Halic Congress Center. A few days before the royal visit, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte headed a mission of 80 Dutch companies to Turkey, all looking for business opportunities in the fastest-growing economy in Europe. Mid-October, the mayors of Amsterdam and Rotterdam led a big trade mission to stanbul with the same goal. These last few visits and events summarize pretty well the two core components of this years celebrations: to explore and improve economic partnerships and to use cultural exchange to create better understanding between the two countries and their populations. I vividly remember the skepticism among many pundits in both countries when the preparations began for the party. The Dutch government, they thought, would not be able to pull it off because of the active resistance of Mr. Geert Wilders, whose party at the time supported the ruling coalition and whose anti-Turkish sentiment is well known. In Turkey, many believed there was hardly any interest in this Dutch pet project, neither from the Recep Tayyip Erdoan government, tired of European hypocrisy, nor from a large part of the population, more interested in the elimination of cumbersome visa requirements. Moreover, many expected only a small elite of the usual suspects to participate in the bulk of the planned activities. After nine months, in which hundreds of small and large events were organized all over Turkey and the Netherlands, I guess even the biggest cynics have to admit they were wrong. There was massive interest in the Rembrandt exhibition at the Sakp

Sabanc Museum, and hundreds of thousands of visitors to the Floriade home and garden show in the south of the Netherlands saw and admired the Turkish pavilion. Turkish artists performed in Dutch theaters, Turkish movies were shown in Dutch cinemas and vice versa. Bilingual childrens books were published, and Dutch and Turkish youngsters found out that they like the same DJs. Dozens of companies understood that both nations have much to gain by combining forces. Many contacts that have been established this year will bear fruit in the years to come, whether in renewable energy or urban development. Does that mean that everything is fine now and there is nothing to work on any more? Of course not. The visa problem is still there, and the new Dutch government is not planning to give in to legitimate Turkish demands in the near future. The stalemate in negotiations between Turkey and the EU will continue to cast a shadow over all bilateral relations between Turkey and any EU member state. Misperceptions and prejudices on both sides are not going to disappear automatically. Dutch Islamophobes and Turkish Europhobes will continue to look for confirmation of their twisted worldviews. On the other hand, we should not underestimate the long-term effects of better knowledge and more understanding on ordinary Turkish and Dutch citizens. This year was a golden opportunity for many to see that while they may be different in some ways, they have many things in common as well. Lets not wait another 400 years before we organize a new party. Parti bittikten sonra Hollanda-Trkiye ilikileri Hollanda ile Trkiye arasndaki diplomatik ilikilerin 400'nc yln kutlayan parti bitti bitiyor. Yln bandan beri, iki lke arasndaki zel ilikileri glendirmek ve ikili ilikileri canlandrmak iin hem Hollanda hem de Trkiye'de nemli sayda etkinlik dzenlendi. Bu hafta sonu balayan 31. stanbul Kitap Fuar'nda Hollanda'nn onur konuu lke olarak arlanmasyla son zel etkinliklerden birine tanklk edeceiz. Hollandacadan Trkeye evrilmi yeni kitaplar tantlacak, Hollandal yazar Henk Boom Muhteem Sleyman hakkndaki kitabn imzalayacak ve Hollanda'nn en nde gelen Trk tarihi uzman Erik Jan Zrcher bir panel tartmasna katlacak. Geen hafta sonu Hollanda Veliaht Prensi ile ei, kapan faaliyetlerinden biri vesilesiyle, dnyaca nl Royal Concertgebouw Orkestras'nn Hali Kongre Merkezi'ndeki muhteem konseri iin stanbul'a geldi. Kraliyet ziyaretinden birka gn nce, Hollanda Babakan Mark Rutte, hepsi de Avrupa'nn en hzl byyen ekonomisinde i frsatlar arayan 80 irketle birlikte Trkiye'ye karma yapt. Amsterdam ve Rotterdam belediye bakanlar, ayn amala ekim ortasnda stanbul'a yaplan byk bir ticaret karmasna nclk etmiti. Bu son birka ziyaret ve etkinlik, bu ylki kutlamalarn iki temel esini ok gzel zetliyor: Ekonomik ortaklk frsatlar aratrmak ve gelitirmek, kltrel alverii iki lke ve halklar arasnda karlkl anlay gelitirmek iin kullanmak. Parti hazrlklar baladnda, her iki lkedeki ok bilmilerin pheci yaklamn gayet net hatrlyorum: Trk kart hisleri herkesin malumu olan ve o srada partisiyle iktidardaki koalisyona destek veren Geert Wilders'in aktif direnii yznden Hollanda hkmeti bu iin altndan kalkamayacakt. Trkiye'de de pek ok kii, bu Hollanda projesine bir lks gzyle bakyor, ne Avrupa'nn ikiyzllnden usanm Erdoan hkmetinin ne de asl klfetli vize taleplerinin kaldrlmasyla ilgilenen halkn geni kesimlerinin ilgi gstereceine inanyordu. Planlanan faaliyetlerin ouna sadece olaan pheli konumundaki kk bir elit grubun katlmasn bekleyen oktu. Trkiye ve Hollanda apnda yzlerce irili ufakl etkinliin dzenlendii dokuz aydan sonra, sanrm, kiniklerin en nde gidenleri bile yanldklarn kabul etmeli. Sabanc Mzesi'ndeki Rembrandt sergisi youn ilgi grrken, Hollanda'nn gneyindeki Floriade iek ve Bahe Fuar'nda Trk pavyonunu yz binlerce ziyareti gezdi. Trkiyeli sanatlar Hollanda tiyatrolarnda oyunlarn sergiledi, Trk filmleri Hollanda sinemalarnda gsterildi ve tam tersi. ki dilli ocuk kitaplar yaymland. Hollandal ve Trkiyeli genler ayn DJ'lerden holandklarn kefetti. Onlarca irket, Hollandallarn da Trklerin de glerini birletirdiklerinde kazanacaklar ok ey olduunu anlad. Bu yl kurulan pek ok yaknlk, ister yenilenebilir enerji ister kentsel geliim hakknda olsun, meyvelerini gelecek yllarda verecek.

Bu, artk her eyin yoluna girdii ve zerinde allacak bir ey kalmad anlamna m geliyor? Elbette, hayr. Vize sorunu hl yerli yerinde duruyor ve yeni Hollanda hkmetinin Trkiye'nin meru taleplerini ksa vadede kabul etmek gibi bir plan yok. Trkiye ile AB arasndaki mzakerelerin tkanmas, Trkiye ile her AB yesi arasndaki ikili ilikiye glge etmeyi srdrecek. Her iki tarafta yanl anlamalar ve nyarglar, otomatik olarak ortadan kalkacak deil. Hollandal slamofobikler ve Trk Avrupafobikler, kendi arpk dnya grlerine tasdik aramaya devam edecek. Dier yandan, sradan Trkiye ve Hollanda vatandalarn daha iyi tanyp bilmenin ve daha ok anlamann uzun vadeli etkilerini kmsemememiz lazm. Pek ounun, baz alardan farkl olsalar da ok sayda ortak ynlerinin bulunduunu fark etmesi iin bu yl altn bir frsatt. Hadi, gelin, yeni bir parti dzenlemek iin 400 yl daha beklemeyelim.

Arguments against the death penalty While there is a global trend toward abolition of the death penalty, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan has recently suggested on several occasions that Turkey should consider bringing back capital punishment 10 years after it was abolished. For obvious reasons, everybody has started to speculate on the timing of Erdoans remarks. Are they part of his campaign for the presidency in 2014 in which he tries to lure nationalist voters who are strongly supportive of reintroducing the death penalty? Is it one of his well-known diversionary tactics at a moment when his government is under strong pressure to respond to the death fasts of hundreds of Kurdish prisoners? Or, just the opposite, is he trying to sugarcoat an upcoming, inevitable compromise on the hunger strikes that will not go down well with the nationalist part of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) electorate? Whatever the reasons for Erdoans call, lets look at the substance of the matter, and that is the suggestion that Turkey needs capital punishment to be able to deal with terrorism and murders. Let me share with you why I believe the prime minister is fundamentally wrong in his assessment. 1. There is the classic argument against the death penalty based on ethics and moral principles. It was pointedly expressed by Coretta Scott King, the widow of the murdered black US civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr.: An evil deed is not redeemed by an evil deed of retaliation. Justice is never advanced in the taking of a human life. Morality is never upheld by a legalized murder. 2. Experience in the US, the only democracy on the list of countries with the highest number of executions in 2011, shows how arbitrary, unfair and unjust the death penalty system is. Its application largely depends on how much money defendants have, the skill of their attorneys, the race of the victim and where the crime took place. People of color are far more likely to be executed than white people, especially if the victim is white. There is no reason to think that the system would work better in Turkey. 3. Capital punishment is not a deterrent to capital crimes. In the US, Texas and Oklahoma have historically executed the highest number of death row inmates. Yet, their state murder rates increased, and both have murder rates higher than the national average. For politically motivated terrorists the death penalty is a futile threat because they usually act in the name of an ideology that honors its martyrs.

4. Does Turkey really want to join China, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the three countries that accounted for the vast majority of executions in 2011? In his speeches the prime minister referred to China, Russia and the US. In 2011 China indeed executed more people than the rest of the world put together, but should that horrible record set an example for Turkey? The Russian moratorium on the death penalty, established in 1999, was continued in 2011, and in the US one-third of the states have already abolished capital punishment, and there is a growing movement against the death penalty in other states. 5. Only 10 days ago, the same prime minister stated in Berlin that EU accession is still a strategic goal for Turkey. One has to assume that he knows that joining the EU is incompatible with reintroducing the death penalty for the simple reason that the prohibition of the death penalty is one of the key provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. On top of that, as the EU Commission subtly underlined in its reaction to Erdoans plans, Turkey has ratified two protocols to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that provide for the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances. In other words: Why would Turkey consider reintroducing a penalty that is cruel and inhumane, whose application turns out to be discriminatory and not effective in reducing violent crime or terrorism? Why should Turkey give up on its EU membership perspectives for this reason, withdraw its signature under existing treaties and join the ranks of the worlds worst human rights violators? My call on the prime minister: Stop playing around with this nasty and unrealistic idea and concentrate on solving the most urgent problem facing you: How to prevent the death of hundreds of Turkish citizens? lm cezasna kar savlar lm cezasnn kaldrlmas ynnde kresel bir eilim varken, Babakan Recep Tayyip Erdoan, son gnlerde, pek ok vesileyle, Trkiyenin 10 yl nce kaldrd lm cezasn geri getirmeyi ele almay ortaya att. Malum sebeplerden, herkes Erdoann aklamalarnn zamanlamasyla ilgili speklasyona balad. Acaba bu, lm cezasnn tekrar yrrle konulmasn kuvvetle destekleyen milliyetilerin oylarn cezbetmeye alt 2014 cumhurbakanl kampanyasnn bir paras m? Tam da hkmeti hapisteki yzlerce Krtn alk grevlerine are aramas ynnde gl bask altndayken, kendisinin mehur dikkati baka yne ekme taktiklerinden biri mi? Ya da, tam tersi, alk grevlerine verilmesi kanlmaz dn, bunu sindirmekte zorlanacak AKP semeninin milliyeti kesimi iin ekerle kaplamaya m alyor? Erdoan bu ary her ne sebepten yapm olursa olsun, gerekesine, yani Trkiyenin terrizm ve cinayetlerle baa kabilmek iin lm cezasna ihtiyac olduu nerisine bakalm. Babakann bu deerlendirmesinin temelden yanl olduuna neden inandm sizinle paylaaym. lm cezasna kar etik ve ahlaki ilkeler temelli klasik savn ana fikrini, ldrlen siyah Amerikal sivil haklar savunucusu Martin Luther Kingin dul ei Coretta Scott King yle zetlemitir: Bir er eylemi, misilleme olarak bir baka er eylemiyle telafi edilemez. nsan ldrerek asla adalet yerine getirilemez. Yasal cinayetle ahlak tesis edilemez.

2011in en ok idam gerekletiren lkeler listesindeki tek demokrasi olan ABDde, lm cezas sisteminin ne kadar keyfi, hileli ve adaletsiz olduu tecrbeyle sabit. Uygulama, byk oranda, sanklarn ne kadar paras olduu, avukatlarn ne kadar becerikli olduu, kurbann rk ve suun nerede ilendiine bal. Beyaz rktan olmayanlarn olanlara kyasla idam edilme oran ok daha yksek, hele de kurban beyazsa. Bu sistemin Trkiyede daha iyi ileyeceini dnmek iin bir sebep yok. damn, ar sulardan caydrc zellii yok. ABDde Teksas ve Oklahoma, oldum olas, lm mahkmlarnn en ok idam edildii yerlerdir. Yine de bu eyaletlerin cinayet oranlar artm ve ulusal ortalamay gemitir. Siyasi itkilerle hareket eden terristler iin de lm cezas beyhude bir tehdittir, nk onlar bu yolda can kayplarn onurlandran bir ideoloji adna eylem yaparlar. Trkiye in, ran ve Suudi Arabistann, yani 2011deki idamlarn byk ounluunun msebbibi olan bu lkenin saflarna katlmay gerekten istiyor mu? Babakan konumalarnda in, Rusya ve ABDye atfta bulundu. in, 2011de, dnyann geri kalanndaki idamlarn toplamndan daha fazla insan infaz etti. Trkiyenin kendine rnek alaca bu korkun rekor mu olmaldr? Rusyann 1999da lm cezasna getirdii moratoryum ise sryor. ABDde de eyaletlerin te biri lm cezasn kaldrd ve dier eyaletlerde lm cezas kart hareket giderek byyor. Ayn Babakan, sadece 10 gn nce, Berlinde AB yeliinin hl Trkiye iin stratejik hedef olduunu beyan etmiti. En basitinden, lm cezasnn yasaklanmas AB Temel Haklar artnn kilit maddelerinden biri olduundan, yeniden yrrle koymann ABye girmekle badamayacan Erdoann bildiini varsaymak durumundayz. Hepsinden nce, Avrupa Komisyonunun Erdoann planlarna verdii tepkide incelikle altn izdii gibi, her artta lm cezasnn kaldrlmasn beraberinde getiren Avrupa nsan Haklar ve Temel zgrlklerin Korunmas Szlemesinin iki protokoln de Trkiye onaylamtr. Baka deyile: Zalim ve insanlk d, uygulamada ayrmc olan ve iddet sular ile terrizmi azaltmada etkinlii olmayan bir cezay yeniden yrrle koymay Trkiye niye ele alsn ki? Trkiye niye bu yzden AB yelii perspektifinden vazgesin, var olan anlamalarn altndan imzasn eksin ve dnyann en berbat insan haklar ihlalcilerinin saflarna katlsn? Babakana arm u: Bu irkin ve gereki olmayan fikirle oynamay brakn ve kar karya kaldnz en acil sorunu zmeye odaklann: Yzlerce Trk vatandann lmn nasl nleyeceksiniz?

To date or not to date Having spent some days in Brussels last week, I experienced again how difficult it is for Turkey and the European Union to create a stimulating environment that pushes both to do their utmost to make the accession process work. The most recent example of a missed opportunity was the reaction of EU officials to the remarks of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan on 2023 as the target date for Turkeys EU accession. When he was in Berlin last week, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader underlined his ongoing commitment to Turkeys full membership of the EU. He also warned the EU that Turkey cant wait for ever. If Turkey is not a member by 2023, the centennial of the Turkish Republic, the accession process should be considered a failure. I agree with the prime

minister. At the same time, 2023 is only a realistic target date when and if Turkey and the EU manage to re-launch negotiations, in 2014 at the latest. The reactions in Brussels to the mention of 2023 were predictable and not really helpful, showing once more how easily a potentially constructive move by one side is neutralized by the other. In the European Commission and the European Parliament, alarm bells rang when Erdoan came up with a date. Let me explain why. The EU is still struggling with the fallout from the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Most Europeans agree that these two countries became members too soon, not having finished necessary reforms in the judiciary, making it almost impossible now to fight corruption and organized crime in an effective way. The accepted wisdom in Brussels is that the reason for this failure it the fact that the EU gave both countries a date for accession prematurely. Once the two Balkan countries knew that they would be in regardless come 2007, the reform process slowed down or stopped. For understandable reasons, the EU drew some lessons from this mistake, and came to the conclusion that mentioning a date of accession to a candidate country was the best guarantee that reforms would not continue and that the country involved would become an EU member despite the fact it was not yet ready. Never again would the EU give a date to a country during accession negotiations. One could see this reflex in the reaction of EU Commissioner for Enlargement Stephan Fle and several European politicians to the 2023 suggestion. Fle said a debate over the date distracts attention from essential matters and creates a risk that Turkey will only focus on the date, rather than the many obstacles the country still has to overcome before accession becomes a realistic prospect. Others implicitly referred to the typical Turkish tendency to postpone difficult decisions to the very last moment and rely on its famous capacity for improvisation when time is running out. The EU wants Turkey to keep on reforming continuously and, even more importantly, implement all these changes so everybody can see whether or not they work. One has to agree that this is a valid point. Turkey has a long way to go before it will be ready for membership. Fixing Turkeys EU accession for 2023 could indeed lead to a situation in which everybody sits back and waits. My problem with Fles reaction is that he did not try to translate Erdoans new adherence to Turkeys EU accession into stimulus for a new wave of reforms. Why not accept 2023 as a highly symbolic domestic target date that has the potential to revitalize the current accession process in Turkey, which is stalled because politicians and citizens alike see no light at the end of the tunnel? Of course, a target date is not a guaranteed date of accession, and it is indeed the task of Fle and other European leaders to keep on pushing Turkey to deliver and not to delay. Still, with a little bit of imagination and creativity, EU officials could have used this moment to reconnect with the prime minister and many other Turks. Unfortunately, that chance was wasted.

Randevu vermek ya da vermemek*

Geen hafta Brkselde birka gn geirirken, katlm srecinin ilemesi iin elden geleni fazlasyla yapmaya itecek tevik edici bir ortam yaratmann hem Trkiye hem de Avrupa Birlii asndan ne kadar g olduunu bir kez daha tecrbe ettim. Frsat tepmenin son rnei de, Babakan Tayyip Erdoann 2023 Trkiyenin AB yelii iin hedef tarih ilan etmesine AB yetkililerinin verdii tepkiydi. AKP lideri, geen haftaki Berlin ziyaretinde, Trkiyenin ABye tam yelik hedefine kiisel ballnn srdn teyit etti. Ayn zamanda Trkiyenin sonsuza dek beklemeyeceine dair AByi uyard: Trkiye Cumhuriyeti 100nc kurulu ylnda ye olmayacaksa, katlm sreci baarszlk olarak deerlendirilmelidir. Bu konuda Babakana katlyorum. Ancak 2023 hedef tarih yapmann gereki olabilmesi iin Trkiye ile ABnin en ge 2014te mzakereleri yeniden balatabilmesi gerekir. 2023 mhletine Brkselde gsterilen tepkiler, tahmin edilebilir ve srece faydas dokunmayan trdendi, bir tarafn potansiyel yapclktaki manevrasnn dier tarafa etkisiz hale getirilmesinin ne kadar kolay olduunu bir kez daha kantlad. Erdoan bir tarih ortaya atnca, Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa Parlamentosunda alarm zilleri alverdi. zninizle, sebebini aklayaym. AB, Romanya ile Bulgaristann 2007deki yeliklerinin beraberinde getirdii sorunlarla urayor hl. Avrupallarn ou, bu iki lkenin yeliinin aceleye getirildiinde hemfikir, onlarn gerekli yarg reformlarn tamamlamadan yelii, bugn yolsuzluk ve organize sula etkin mcadeleyi imknszlatryor. Brkseldeki genel kanya gre, baarszln sebebi, her iki lkeye yelik tarihinin erkenden verilmi olmas. ki Balkan lkesi her halkarda 2007de ye olacaklarn kavradnda, reform sreci durma noktasna geldi ya da hz kesti. Anlalr sebeplerden, bu hatasndan baz dersler karan AB, bir aday lkenin reformlar srdrmemesinin ve hazr olmadan birlie girmesinin en garantili yolunun, yelik tarihi vermek olduu sonucuna vard. AB, bir daha asla, mzakereler srasnda aday lkeye tarih vermeyecek. 2023 atfna, Avrupa Komisyonunun genilemeden sorumlu yesi Stefan Fle ve eitli Avrupal siyasetilerin gsterdikleri tepkilerde bu refleksi grebilirsiniz. Fle, tarih tartmasnn, dikkati, asli meselelerden saptrdn ve Trkiyenin, katlmn gereki bir olaslk haline gelebilmesi iin stesinden gelmesi gereken ok sayda engel yerine sadece tarihe odaklanmas riskini yarattn syledi. Dierleri, st kapal biimde, Trklerin zor kararlar son ana dek erteleme ve zaman tkendiinde mehur doalama kapasitelerine sarlma ynndeki tipik eilimlerine gnderme yapt. AB, Trkiyenin reformlar kesintisiz srdrmesini ve daha nemlisi, tm bu deiiklikleri hayata geirmesini istiyor ki, ie yarayp yaramadklarn herkes grebilsin. Bunun geerli bir nokta olduunu kabul etmek lazm. Trkiyenin yelie hazr olmak iin gidecek uzun bir yolu var. AB yeliini 2023 diye tayin etmek gerekten de herkesin yaslanp bekledii bir duruma yol aabilir. Flenin tepkisinin beni rahatsz eden yan ise Erdoann Trkiyenin katlmna ballk teyidini, yeni reform dalgas iin bir tetikleyiciye evirmeyi denememi olmas. Neden 2023, Trkiyede siyasiler kadar vatandalar da tnelin ucunda k grmediinden duran katlm srecini canlandrma potansiyeli bulunan sembolik bir ulusal hedef olarak kabul etmeyelim? Elbette hedef tarih, garantili katlm tarihi deildir ve Trkiyeyi devlerini gecikmeden zamannda teslim etmeye itmek de, aslna bakarsanz, Fle ve dier Avrupal liderlerin grevidir. te, AB yetkilileri, birazck hayal gc ve yaratcla bavurarak, bu andan, Babakan ve Trklerin ounluuyla yeniden temas salamak iin faydalanabilirdi. Maalesef o ans heba edildi.

Which EU to join? Looking at recent speeches of the prime minister and the chief negotiator, one gets the impression that the European Union is making a modest comeback in Turkey. On a trip to Germany last week, Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader Recep Tayyip Erdoan confirmed that EU accession is still Turkey's strategic goal. For good reasons, he blamed the EU for not doing its part in making this possible, and for the first time announced a sort of unofficial deadline: 2023. I agree with Erdoan, in the sense that if and when Turkey is not able to become a member by its centennial, the whole accession process is doomed. In order to get in before 2023, both Turkey and the EU will have to engage in a serious restart, in 2014 at the latest. That was probably also the reason why Egemen Ba, the person responsible for such new dynamism on the Turkish side, said in an interview that he expected a meaningful push from the EU in 2013, after the crippling Greek Cypriot EU presidency

comes to an end. I am not so sure whether next year is the most appropriate one for the start of what one could call the second part of Turkey's EU negotiations under AKP rule, after the first successful term from 2002 till 2005. The EU will still be obsessed with trying to get out of the economic and political crisis it is confronted with, and in the run-up to the German elections in September 2013 one should not expect a substantial change in Berlin's position on Turkey's EU membership. Still, the visit of Franois Hollande to Turkey in the beginning of 2013 could be the beginning of a more constructive phase in EU-Turkey relations. The French president, who does not share the ideological Turkophobia of his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy, is expected to announce the end of the French blockade of several chapters in the technical negotiations. That would be a highly important symbolic step in the right direction that would allow Turkey and the EU to start talking on some key issues. But we will need a new German government and some major breakthroughs in the internal EU struggle for a new institutional framework to prevent another crisis in the eurozone in order to be able to shift to a higher gear in the negotiations in 2014. A remarkable element in Erdoan's remarks on Europe in Berlin was his announcement that when Turkey becomes an EU member, it will not join the eurozone but keep the lira. He quoted British politicians and experts who had apparently been able to convince the prime minister and his advisers that Turkey should look for a British position in the EU: focus on the internal market, stick to its own currency and try to keep out of those European policies that are considered not in its own interests. That prospect touches on some of the key discussions in today's EU: How should a more integrated union be organized, both economically and politically, and will it be possible in the future to be a member of the EU without participating in the core group of countries that share a common currency and all the institutional arrangements that go with it? The UK, Sweden and Denmark have already opted for that position, in what is often called the second tier of the EU framework. It may well be that some of the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe will come to the same conclusion after witnessing the current euro crisis and the solutions that are being discussed. Joining the eurozone brings a lot of advantages, but it also means that countries have to give up large parts of their economic and financial sovereignty. I would be very happy if the words of Erdoan and Ba meant that Turkey would start discussing the real questions for every present and future member of the EU. What kind of further integration do we want, and what would be the benefits, the risks and the disadvantages of each model? It makes much more sense for Turkey to play a role in that debate than to stand on the sidelines, complaining about the bad treatment it is getting and missing out on the real decisions to be made about the union it apparently still wants to join one day. Hangi ABye katlm? Babakan ile ba mzakerecinin son konumalarna bakarak, ABnin Trkiyede mtevaz bir geri dn yapt izlenimine kaplabilirsiniz. AKP lideri Recep Tayyip Erdoan, geen haftaki Almanya ziyaretinde, AB yeliinin hl Trkiyenin stratejik hedefi olduunu teyit etti. Hakl olarak, AByi, yelii mmkn klmak iin stne deni yapmamakla sulad ve ilk kez bir tr gayri resmi mhlet aklad: 2023. Erdoann, Trkiye kuruluunun 100nc ylnda hl ye olamad takdirde tm katlm srecinin kmeye mahkum olduu grne katlyorum. 2023ten nce katlm iinse hem AB hem de Trkiyenin en ge 2014te ciddi bir yeniden balangca soyunmas art.

Trk tarafnn yeni dinamizm gstermesinden sorumlu yetkili konumundaki Egemen Ban, bir rportajda, mzakereleri fel eden Kbrsn AB dnem bakanlnn bitmesinin ardndan, 2013te ABden anlaml bir atak beklediini sylemesi de muhtemelen bu yzden. AKP iktidarndaki Trkiyenin AB ile mzakerelerde 2002-2005 arasndaki ilk baarl dneminden sonra, deyim yerindeyse ikinci dnemi balatmak iin 2013n en mnasip tarihin olduundan pheliyim. Zira AB gelecek yl da siyasi ve ekonomik krizden kma abasndan baka ey dnemez olacak, stelik Eyll 2013te genel seime hazrlanan Almanyann, Trkiyenin AB yeliine yaklamn deitirmesi beklenemez. Yine de Franois Hollanden Trkiyeye 2013n banda dzenleyecei ziyaret, AB-Trkiye ilikilerinde daha yapc bir evrenin balangc olabilir. Selefi Nicolas Sarkozynin ideolojik Trkiye fobisini paylamayan Fransa Cumhurbakannn, teknik mzakerelerin pek ok bal zerindeki Fransz blokajnn kalktn duyurmas bekleniyor. Bu, doru ynde ok nemli bir sembolik adm olur ve AB ile Trkiyenin baz anahtar meseleleri grmeye balamasna imkan salar. Ama 2014te mzakerelerde vites artrabilmek iin nce yeni Alman hkmetinin kurulmas ve Euro blgesinde bir kriz daha kmasn nlemek iin gereken yeni kurumsal ereve yznden AB iinde kopan mcadelede byk ilerlemeler kaydedilmesi gerekir. Erdoann Berlinde yapt Avrupaya dair bir dier dikkate ayan aklama da, Trkiyenin AB yesi olursa, Euro kuana katlmayp liray tutacan duyurmasyd. Babakan, kendisiyle danmanlarn ABde ngiliz konumunu benimsemeye ikna etmie benzeyen Britanyal siyasiler ve uzmanlarla gr alverilerini de aktard: pazara odaklan, kendi para birimini brakma, lkenin karna addedilmeyen Avrupa politikalarnn dnda kalmaya al. Bu gr, bugn ABde sregiden kilit tartmalarn bazsna dokunuyor: Daha btnlemi bir birlik hem ekonomik hem siyasi adan nasl rgtlenmeli? Ortak para birimi ve bununla balantl tm kurumsal dzenlemeleri paylaan lkelerin ekirdek grubuna katlmadan AB yesi olmak gelecekte mmkn m? Britanya, sve ve Danimarka, genelde AB yaplanmasnn ikinci ligi diye tabir edilen bu seenei imdiden tercih etmi durumda. Orta ve Dou Avrupadan baz taze yelerin de halihazrdaki Euro krizine ve nerilen zmlere tanklk ettikten sonra, ayn sonuca varmas muhtemel. Euro blgesine katlmak, beraberinde getirdii avantajlarn yan sra lkelerin ekonomik ve mali egemenliklerinden byk lde vazgemeleri anlamna geliyor. Erdoan ile Ban szleri, ABnin her mevcut ve gelecek yesinin kar karya geldii gerek sorular Trkiyenin de tartmaya balad anlamna geliyorsa, ok mutlu olurum. Ne trden daha fazla btnleme istiyoruz, her bir btnleme modelinin yararlar, riskleri, mahzurlar neler? Kenarda durup kendisine yaplan kt muameleden ikayet ederken, grne gre bir gn katlmay hl arzu ettii birlikle ilgili gerek karar alma srecini karmak yerine, bu tartmada bir rol oynamak, Trkiye asndan ok daha manal olacaktr.

Most US states dont swing There are only a few days to go before we know who will be the next president of the United States: Barack Obama or Mitt Romney. The race is much tighter than many would have predicted six months ago. In most national opinion polls the difference between the two candidates is negligible. The point, however, is that forecasting the national popular vote is not that important because the US president is not elected by a majority of voters countrywide but by the majority in the electoral college. Each of the 50 states in the US has a particular number of votes in that body, based on the number of inhabitants of that state. In a winner-takes-all system, the most successful candidate in each state gets all the electoral votes assigned to that state. In order to become the next president, Obama or Romney needs to obtain 270 of these electoral votes. Both Obama and Romney will get most of their votes from states in which we already know which candidate they will support. Nobody expects any surprises in that majority of states, which means that Obama has a slight advantage in secure, more or less guaranteed votes. The difference is made by around 10 so-called swing states where the outcome is not clear yet. The most important ones are

Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and North Carolina. Because Obama and Romney each have a clear lead in the polls in two of them, there is growing speculation that the most crucial swing state will be Ohio, worth 18 electoral votes. The Economist Intelligence Unit bases its forecast of a narrow victory for Obama on the calculation that the incumbent will most likely win Ohio. The pro-Obama New York Times and Washington Post have come to the same conclusion. As The Economist explains, that means in the end the outcome of the US presidential election could be decided by whether and how much the people of Ohio appreciate the bail-out deal for automakers GM and Chrysler that Obama offered in 2009. By providing transitional financing, the federal government allowed these two industrial giants to restructure their liabilities and become viable again. It is believed the deal saved 1 million jobs in the wider car industry, many of them in Ohio. At the time, Mr. Romney opposed public financing and opted for very uncertain private sector funding that might have resulted in the liquidation of both companies. As The Economist puts it: If Mr. Obama can profit from that policy measure to secure reelection, it will have paid off in political as well as economic terms. The remarkable thing about the US presidential election, now as in the past, is that nobody pays much attention to how big states with many electoral votes like California, New York or Texas vote because the result is known beforehand. On the famous electoral map of the US, we already know how most of the states will be colored, blue (Democrat) or red (Republican), because they have been colored the same way for decades. In a fascinating article in The New York Times, Steven Pinker, professor of psychology at Harvard University, tried to explain why the outcome in so many states is so predictable. Northeastern and most coastal states will vote, Pinker points out, for the candidate who is more closely aligned with international cooperation and engagement, secularism and science, gun control, individual freedom in culture and sexuality, and a greater role for the government in protecting the environment and ensuring economic equality. The southern and western desert and mountain states in between will vote for the candidate who endorses an aggressive military, a role for religion in public life, laissez-faire economic policies, private ownership of guns and relaxed conditions for using them, less regulation and taxation and a valorization of the traditional family. These opposing ideologies are, according to Pinker, not only rooted in different conceptions of human nature but are also related to geography as a result. The North Ideology and geography cluster because, as a result of the westward move of the settlers in early US history, the North and the coasts are extensions of a European, government-driven civilizing process and the South and West preserved the culture of honor that emerged in the anarchic territories of the growing country... It will be the swing states that will determine who the new president of the US will be. But only by looking at the eternal blue and red states on the electoral map can we really understand this fascinating but deeply divided country. ABD eyaletlerinin ounun rengi belli ABDnin gelecek bakannn kim olacan Barack Obama m yoksa Mitt Romney mi- renmemize birka gn kald. Yar alt ay nce ngrlenden ok daha baa ba geiyor. ou ankette iki aday arasndaki fark, gzard edilebilir kklkte. Gelgelelim ulusal oylama sonucunu nceden tahmin etmenin bir nemi yok, zira ABD Bakan lke apndaki semen ounluuyla deil, seiciler kurulu tarafndan seilir. ABDdeki 50 eyaletin her birinin nfusuna oranla bu kurulda belli sayda yesi vardr. Kazanan hepsini alr sistemi uyarnca, her eyalette birinci kan aday, o eyalete tahsis edilen seici kurul yelerinin oylarn da toplar. Obama ya da Romneynin gelecek bakan olabilmek iin seici kurul oylarnn 270ini elde etmesi lazm. Hem Obama hem de Romneynin oy kapasitesinin ou, hangi aday destekledii oktan belli eyaletlere dayanyor. Eyaletlerin ounluu tercihini yapm durumda ve seim gn srpriz karmalar beklenmiyor. Demek oluyor ki, Obamann az ok garanti oylar asndan kk bir avantaj var.

Fark, Amerikallarn salncak diye tabir ettii ekimeli seim blgesi konumundaki 10 kadar eyalet yaratacak. Ne sonu kacann belli olmad bu eyaletlerin banda Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan ve Kuzey Carolina geliyor. Bunlarn ikisinde anketler Obama ve Romneyyi nde gsterdiinden, en kilit salncak eyaletin, 18 seici kurul yesine sahip Ohio olaca speklasyonu byyor. The Economist dergisinin stihbarat Birimi (EIU), Obamann byk ihtimalle Ohioyu kazanarak, seimden klpay muzaffer kaca tahminini yapyor. Obama yanls New York Times ve Washington Post gazeteleri de ayn sonuca varyor. The Economistin bu olaslkla ilgili yorumu yle: En nihayetinde ABD bakanlk seiminin sonucunu, Obamann 2009da otomobil reticileri GM ve Chryslera sunduu kurtarma paketinin, Ohio ahalisi tarafndan ne kadar takdir edildii belirleyecek. Federal hkmet, geici mali destek salayarak, iki sanayi devinin borlarn yeniden yaplandrmasn ve hayata geri dnmesini salamt. Bu anlamann, geni apl otomobil sanayiinde ou Ohioda bulunan 1 milyon ii kurtardna inanlyor. O dnemde Romney, kamu finansmanna kar km ve tmden belirsiz zel sektr fonlamasna destek vermiti ki, bu, her iki irketin de tasfiyesine yol aabilirdi. The Economistin belirttii gibi: Obamann yeniden seilmeyi garantilemesine o zaman ald nlemin faydas dokunursa, anlama ekonomik olduu kadar siyasi adan da borlarn geri demi olacak. Gemite olduu gibi imdi de, ABD bakanlk seiminin fevkalade yan, Kaliforniya, New York, Teksas gibi ok sayda seici kurul yesine sahip byk eyaletleri kimsenin kaale almamas, nk buralardaki sonu nceden belli. ABDnin mehur seim haritasnda, eyaletlerin ounun hangi renge brneceini biliyoruz, Demokrat ise mavi, Cumhuriyeti ise krmz, nk on yllardr o renkteler. Harvard niversitesi psikoloji profesr Steven Pinker, The New York Timestaki harikulade makalesinde, neden pek ok eyalette sonucun ngrlebilir olduunu aklamaya alyor. Pinkern iaret ettii gibi, Kuzeydou ve ou ky eyaletleri uluslararas ibirlii ve angajman, laiklik ve bilim, silah kontrol, kltr ve cinsellikte bireysel zgrlk, evrenin korunmas ve ekonomik eitliin salanmasnda federal hkmetin rolyle en yakndan ilintili aday her kimse, ona oy verir. Tam tersine, Gney, Bat l ve dalk eyaletleri de Askeri girikenlii, kamusal yaamda dinin roln, serbest piyasa ekonomisini, bireyin silah mlkiyetini ve rahata kullanmasn, daha az dzenleme ve vergiyi, geleneksel ailenin yceltilmesini destekleyen adaya oy verir. Pinkera gre, bu zt ideolojiler sadece insan doasna dair farkl anlay ve kavraylardan kaynaklanmyor. deoloji ve corafya i ie geiyor, zira ABDnin kurulu dnemlerinde yerleimcilerin batya gnn bir sonucu olarak, Kuzey ve kylar, Avrupai, hkmet gdml uygarlama srecinin uzants oldu Gney ve Bat ise byyen lkenin anarik blgelerinde doan ve buralarn uygarlk gleri olan kilise, aile ve ar muhafazakarlk tarafndan ekillendirilen namuseref kltrn korudu. Evet, yeni ABD bakannn kim olacan, salncak eyaletler belirleyecek. Ama ancak seim haritasnn ebediyen mavi ve krmz eyaletlerine bakarsak, bu byleyici fakat derinden blnm lkeyi gerekten anlayabiliriz.

calan should call off the hunger strikes I have always had a problem with hunger strikes. First of all, there is the humanitarian side of it. Being confronted with people willing to sacrifice their own lives is heartbreaking, irrespective of whether you agree with their reasons for doing so or not. You see human beings suffering, family members giving support to their loved ones but at the same time hoping the selfcastigation will come to an end sooner rather than later. Then there is the political side, albeit with a clear distinction between two different bases on which to start a hunger strike. One is the personal fear of ill-treatment, torture or even death if a certain situation is not changed. That was, for instance, the case of asylum seekers who took refuge in Dutch churches on several occasions in the past after the authorities had decided they had to return to their countries of origin. Some of them were fearful about what might happen to them upon their return, and embarked on a hunger strike to put pressure on the Dutch government to give them another chance to stay. One could easily understand each person's individual motivation, based on a clear and immediate threat to his or her life. There is a second category in which I often find it much harder to sympathize with the motives of the hunger strikers. These are the mass events involving hundreds of people who start a hunger strike to reach one or more specific political goals. Most of the time there is a particular group or organization that has pushed or forced some of its members or sympathizers into the hunger strike as the ultimate lever to get things done. Usually my problem is not with the demands but with the

ruthless exploitation of individual lives by a cynical and calculating leadership. It is clear this is what we are talking about in the current collective hunger strike of hundreds of Kurdish inmates. They are demanding major improvements in the prison conditions of jailed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah calan, the right to receive education in their mother tongue and the possibility of addressing a court in Kurdish. Again, my problem is not with the demands. The Turkish state should find a way to allow Kurdish children to be educated in their mother tongue alongside Turkish, the language they need in order to be successful in this country. Kurdish defendants should be able to make their case in court in the language they know best. Finally, calan should be treated in a decent manner, in line with standards adopted by the Council of Europe, of which Turkey is a founding member. Protracted solitary confinement is not part of these benchmarks. What makes me angry is that the PKK is forcing hundreds of its members in prison to put their lives in danger to pressure Turkish authorities to comply with these demands. Firstly, the PKK leadership knows very well that there are other ways of achieving these aims. The government has already indicated that they are willing to allow Kurdish to be spoken in court, and things are also moving on the issue of education in the mother tongue. True, not fast or determined enough, but does that provide sufficient reason to sacrifice the life of even one Kurdish activist? And yes, we should discuss the prison conditions of calan, although it is far from obvious whether it's always the authorities blocking access to him or whether the PKK leader himself is refusing to meet with his lawyers or family members. We should also not be nave, and realize that calan and his connections to the outside world are part of a complicated and obscure internal struggle within the PKK for leadership and the power to negotiate with the Turkish state. Very important indeed, but not a legitimate reason by any means to deliberately send PKK foot soldiers out to die. What makes me even more furious is the conviction that the PKK leadership fully realizes that the Turkish government, even if it wanted to, could never give in to these kinds of blackmailing tactics. No government ever could, because if they did so on this occasion, next week others would start their own hunger strike to force the hand of the authorities on another issue. In conclusion, these hunger strikes are both inhumane and counterproductive. Does that mean that we should look away and accept that some poor manipulated guys will die? No, we should not, and the government should not. These hunger strikers are Turkish citizens and the Turkish state has an obligation to do whatever it can to save their lives. In this case: to see how they can speed up the reforms already initiated and look again into calan's situation on mral. These gestures may not convince the majority of hunger strikers to stop. The only person who could accomplish that is calan. He should step forward now and declare that he does not want anybody to kill themselves for goals that can be achieved in other ways as well. calan alk grevlerini sona erdirmeli Alk grevleriyle hep bir sorunum olmutur. nce insani adan.

Bunu yapma sebeplerini kabul edip etmemenizden bamsz olarak, canlarn feda etmeye hazr insanlarla yzlemenin yrek paralayan bir yan var. nsanlarn ac ektiini, ailelerin sevdiklerine destek verirken ayn zamanda bu kendine zarar vermenin bir an nce bitmesini umduklarn grrsnz. Sonra siyasi adan. Alk grevi balatma nedenlerinin iki farkl tr arasnda net bir ayrm yapalm. Biri, belli bir durumun ya da gidiatn deimemesi halinde kt muamele, ikence ve hatta lmle sonulanmasndan duyulan kiisel korkudur. Bunun bir rneini, Hollandada yetkililerin memleketlerine geri gnderilmeleri karar verdii pek ok vakada, kiliselere snan iltica talepileri sergilemitir. Bazs dnte balarna gelebilecekler karsnda dehete dm ve Hollanda hkmetine kendilerine kalma ans vermesi iin bask yapmak amacyla alk grevi balatmtr. Yaam kaamayaca net bir tehdit altna giren bireyin motivasyonunu anlamak kolaydr. Alk grevcilerinin gdlerine yaknlk duymakta zorlandm ikinci bir kategori de var: Bir ya da daha fazla zgl siyasi amala yzlerce insann alk grevi balatt byk apl olaylar. ounlukla, bunlarn gerisinde, isteklerine ulamak iin yelerinin ya da sempatizanlarnn bir ksmn alk grevlerini nihai ara olarak kullanmaya zorlayan belli bir grup ya da rgt bulunur. Benim sorunum genelde taleplerle deil de, umursamaz ve hesap liderliin bireylerin yaamlarn acmaszca smrmesiyle. u anda hapisteki yzlerce Krtn toplu alk grevinin, bu kategoriye girdii aikr. PKK lideri Abdullah calann hapis artlarnda ciddi boyutlarda dzelme, anadillerinde eitim hakk ve mahkemelerde Krte savunma imkn talep ediyorlar. Tekrarlyorum, savunduklaryla ilgili bir sorunum yok. Krt ocuklarnn bu lkede baarl olmak iin ihtiyalar olan Trkenin yan sra kendi anadillerini de renmelerinin bir yolunu Trk devleti bulmal. Krt sanklar, mahkemelerde kendilerini en ok hakim olduklar dilde savunabilmeli. Ve son olarak, calana, Trkiyenin yesi olduu Avrupa Konseyinin benimsedii standartlar uyarnca iyi niyetli muamele edilmeli. Uzun sreli tecrit hapsi, bu kstaslara dahil deildir. Beni asl kzdran, Trk yetkilileri bu talepleri yerine getirmeye zorlamak iin PKKnn hapisteki yzlerce yesinin hayatn tehlikeye atmas. lkin, PKK liderlii, bu amalara ulamann baka yollar da olduunu gayet iyi biliyor. Trk hkmeti, mahkemelerde Krte konuulmasna izin vermeye istekli olduunun iaretini vermiti. Anadilde eitim konusunda da ilerleme var. Evet, yeterince hzl ve kararl deil, ama bu, tek bir Krt eylemcinin bile hayatn feda etmesi iin yeterli sebep midir? Ve evet, calann hapis koullarn tartmalyz, eriimi engelleyenlerin hep Trk yetkililer mi olduu yoksa avukatlar ve aile yeleriyle grmeyi bizzat PKK liderinin mi reddettii hi mi hi net olmasa bile. Ayn zamanda naiflii brakp calan ve d dnyayla balantlarnn, PKK iinde liderlik ve Trk hkmetiyle mzakere yetkisi konularnda karmak ve dardan anlalmas g bir iktidar savana girdiklerini de idrak etmeliyiz. Bunlar nemli meseleler, ama hibiri bile bile PKK piyadelerini lme gndermek iin meru sebepler deil. Beni daha da fkelendiren, Trk hkmetinin bu trden antaj taktikleri karsnda istese bile pes etmeyeceini PKK liderliinin gayet iyi bildiinden emin olmam. Hangi hkmet olsa boyun emez, nk bir kez eerse, gelecek hafta baka bir konuda yetkilileri keye sktrmak iin dierleri de alk grevine balar. Kssadan hisse: Bu alk grevleri hem insanlk d hem de kendine zarar vermekten baka bir sonu verecee benzemiyor. Peki, bu, bamz baka yne evirip baz maniple edilmi insancazlarn lecek olmasn kabullenmemiz anlamna m geliyor? Hayr, byle yapmamalyz, hkmet de yapmamal. Bu alk grevcileri Trk vatandadr ve Trk hkmeti de onlarn canlarn kurtarmak iin ne gerekiyorsa yapmakla ykmldr. Hkmet, bu vakada, balatt reformlar nasl hzlandracana ve calann mraldaki durumuna yeniden bakmaldr. Bu jestler, alk grevlerini brakmaya ounluu ikna iin yeterli olmayabilir. Bunu baarabilecek tek kii calandr. calan imdi bir adm ne atmal ve baka yntemlerle de ulalabilecek amalar iin kimsenin kendisini ldrmesini istemediini ilan etmelidir.

A blow to Turkey's soft power Last week the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) published a detailed report on Turkey's press freedom crisis with the alarmist subtitle The Dark Days of Jailing Journalists and Criminalizing Dissent. Main conclusion: The government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan has waged one of the world's biggest crackdowns on press freedom in recent history. Much has been said about the report since, and most of it was quite predictable. Critics of the government used it as another building block in their anti-Justice and Development Party (AK Party) wall, while circles close to the ruling party tried to

present the CPJ findings as ill-founded and one-sided. After having bashed the EU Commission Progress Report just before, most AK Party leaders probably thought that smacking one distressing report per month was the limit, and they chose to ignore the damning conclusions. As far as I know, no minister or MP has publicly thrown the CPJ assessment in the garbage bin yet. To be honest, part of the criticism on the report is justified. What particularly disturbs me is the easy way in which the OdaTV suspects get away with their side of the story. Why did the CPJ people not talk to others who could have told them that according to many reliable sources these guys are not innocent and intimidated journalists but ultranationalist firebrands who were willing to go very far in undermining a democratically elected government they did not like through unlawful actions that the CPJ should not be defending? Another example of sloppy reporting is the description of the Tuncay zkan case, where there is reference to his lawyers taking the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) but no mention of the fact that the Strasbourg court has already ruled on this complaint and found that there were good reasons to arrest and detain zkan. By not analyzing the deep ideological divisions within the Turkish judiciary, the report is also not able to explain how it is possible that thousands of court cases have been opened against journalists reporting on the Ergenekon case when the government, according to the CPJ authors, is so keen on promoting this trial. An uninformed reader of the report would also easily get the impression that the disappointing outcome of the Hrant Dink trial was due to ill-intended government interference. The lawyers in this case and most observers, however, are convinced it's the link with the wider Ergenekon trial and the unwillingness to touch these connections that caused this depressing result. Having said that, the fact remains that dozens of journalists are in prison, self-censorship is on the rise and government pressure has become part of daily life in the media. For good reasons the CPJ highlights how many of these phenomena are directly linked to the non-solution of the Kurdish problem. Seventy percent of the imprisoned journalists are Kurds who have been arrested as part of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) operations or because they reported on events in the Southeast. The legal base for their incarceration is the vaguely worded and widely interpreted Counterterrorism Law (TMK). Unfortunately, changes to the law will not be suggested by the government as long as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) keeps staging its terrorist activities. The same applies to the other structural deficiency underlined in the report: indefinite pre-trial detention. The minister of justice has already formulated a new package of reforms that would deal with this old problem, but the government is not willing to bring it to Parliament because the AK Party is afraid of being perceived as giving in to Kurdish demands. Being stuck in its dealings with the Kurdish problem therefore also means that the government has condemned itself to inaction in getting rid of the two most important root causes of the current desolate situation with regard to media freedom. Cynics have already concluded that the government apparently no longer cares whether the CPJ or the EU disapprove of its actions. That might be true for some AK Party leaders. I am sure others are feeling more uncomfortable with each new report, realizing that Turkey is gradually losing its attraction. Not only with democrats in Europe but also with many of the new leaders in the Arab world who know very well that, in the long run, suppressing legitimate ethnic or religious demands and press freedom will take their countries nowhere. After years of putting lots of energy and efforts in building up its soft

power in the region and beyond, Turkey is in serious danger of spoiling many of those gains when it remains unable and unwilling to solve the domestic problems that undermine its long-term economic and democratic stability Trkiyenin yumuak gcne darbe Geen hafta Gazetecileri Koruma Komitesi (CPJ), Gazetecilerin hapsedildii ve muhalefetin su sayld karanlk gnler gibi alarm veren bir altbalk eliinde, Trkiyede basn zgrlnn krizde olduuna dair ayrntl bir rapor yaymlad. Temel hkm: Babakan Tayyip Erdoann hkmeti, yakn tarihte basn zgrlne kar dzenlenmi dnyann en byk saldrlarndan birini yrtyor. Rapor yaymlandndan beri hakknda ok ey sylendi, ou gayet ngrlebilir. Hkmeti eletirenler, AKP kart duvarlarnda yeni bir yap ta olarak kulland, iktidar partisine yakn evreler aslsz ve tarafl diye sundu. Hemen ncesinde zaten Avrupa Komisyonunun lerleme Raporunun yumruunu yemi olan AKP liderlerinin ou, ayda bir kere sinir bozucu bir raporla tokatlanmann yeterli olduunu dnd muhtemelen ve mahkm edici varglar grmezden gelmeyi tercih etti. Benim bildiim kadaryla, CPJ raporunu kamuoyu nnde p kutusuna atan bakan ya da milletvekili henz kmad. Drst olmak gerekirse, rapordaki eletirilerin bir ksm hakl. Beni zellikle rahatsz eden yan ise OdaTV zanllarn, hikyenin onlardan taraf anlatmyla kurtarmak gibi bir kolaycla kamas. CPJ ekibi, bunlarn, pek ok gvenilir kaynaa gre, masum ve bask gren gazeteciler deil, demokratik yoldan seilmi hkmete srf holanmadklar iin yasad eylemlerle zarar vermede ok ileri gitmeye istekli ar milliyeti provokatrler olduunu anlatabilecek baka insanlarla niye konumad? CPJ bu yasadl savunmamalyd. Rapordaki bir baka batan savmaclk rnei de, Tuncay zkan vakasnda avukatlarn davay AHMye gtrdnn aktarlmas, ancak Strasbourgdaki mahkemenin ikyetle ilgili kararn verip zkann tutuklanmas iin geerli sebepler olduuna hkmettiinin anlmamas. Rapor, Trk yargsndaki derin ideolojik blnmeleri analiz etmediinden, CPJye gre hkmet Ergenekon davasn tevik etmeye bu kadar meraklyken, Ergenekon hakknda yazan gazetecilere binlerce dava almasnn nasl mmkn olduunu aklayamyor. Raporun yeterli bilgi donanm olmayan okurlar, Hrant Dink davasnn hayal krkl veren biimde sonulanmasnn, dorudan hkmetin kt niyetli mdahalesinden kaynakland izlenimine kaplabilir kolaylkla. Oysa davann avukatlar ve gzlemcilerin ounluu, moral bozucu sonucun, daha geni Ergenekon davas ile balantdan ve bu balantlara dokunma isteksizliinden kaynaklandna ikna olmu vaziyette. Bunlar syledikten sonra, onlarca gazetecinin hapiste, otosansrn ykselite olmas ve hkmet basksnn medyada gndelik hayatn paras haline gelmesi olgusunun aynen devam ettiini belirteyim. Hakl olarak, CPJ, bu fenomenlerin pek ounun, Krt sorununun zmsz braklmasyla dorudan balantl olduuna k tutuyor. Hapisteki gazetecilerin yzde 70ini, KCK operasyonlar kapsamnda ya da Gneydoudaki olaylar haber yaptklar iin tutuklanan Krtler oluturuyor. Hapsedilmelerinin hukuki mesnedi, mulak kaleme alnm ve her trl yoruma ak terrle mcadele yasas. Maalesef, PKK terrist faaliyetlerde bulunmay srdrdke, hkmet, yasay deitirmeyi nermeyecek. Raporun altn izdii dier yapsal eksiklik sresiz tutukluluk- iin de ayns geerli. Adalet Bakan bu kadim sorunla baa kmak iin yeni bir reform paketi hazrlam bulunuyor, ama hkmet paketi Meclise sunmaya istekli deil, zira AKP, Krt taleplerine boyun eer alglanmaktan korkuyor. Krt sorununa yaklamnda kmaza saplanmak, ayn zamanda, hkmeti, medya zgrlyle ilgili halihazrdaki perian durumun en nemli iki temel sebebinden kurtulma konusunda eylemsizlie mahkm ediyor. Bazlar, CPJ ya da AB tarafndan eylemlerinin onaylanmamasnn, anlalan, hkmetin umurunda olmad sonucuna oktan ulat. Bu, baz AKP liderleri iin doru olabilir. Geri kalanlarn ise her yeni raporla kendilerini daha rahatsz hissettiinden, Trkiyenin giderek cazibesini yitirdiinin farkna vardndan eminim. Sadece Avrupal demokratlar deil, meru etnik ve dini taleplerle basn zgrln bastrmann uzun vadede lkelerine bir ey kazandrmayacann bilincinde olan Arap leminin yeni liderleri nezdinde de Blgesinde ve tesinde yumuak gcn ina etmek iin yllarca byk enerji ve aba sarf ettikten sonra, Trkiye, uzun vadeli ekonomik ve siyasi istikrarna zarar veren i sorunlarn zmede beceriksiz ve isteksiz kald mddete, bu kazanmlarn ounu heba etmeye dnk ciddi bir tehlikeyle kar karya.

Turkey should not do what Turks want on Syria A few days ago, the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) published the results of a public opinion

survey on the role that Turkey should play in a post-Assad Syria. The survey was undertaken during the month of September, so just before Syrian shells hit the town of Akakale, killing five Turkish nationals, in the beginning of October. Half of the 1,500 people who were polled want Turkey to remain uninvolved or impartial in Syria after the end of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime. Only 18 percent support Turkey in a potential role as mediator among the parties of the conflict, although it is not quite clear which parties we are talking about after Assad has left the scene. It is obvious, however, that the current policies of the Turkish government do not reflect the wishes of the Turkish population as expressed in this poll. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu have made it clear from the start of the conflict that they want Turkey to play an active role in trying to end the Syrian drama that has cost so many lives. Next to the humanitarian reasons for doing so, there is also the calculation made in Ankara that being on the right side of history will serve Turkey's long-term interests in Syria and the rest of the region. The question is whether the Turkish government should be blamed for doing basically the opposite of what a majority of Turks want them to do in Syria. In the past, Erdoan and Davutolu have on several occasions been attacked for their Syria policy -- according to me, often for the wrong reasons. As the jewel in the crown of the famous zero problems with neighbors policy, Turkey's opening up to Syria after 2002 was a wise and clever thing to do not only because it served the economic interests of the Anatolian business class but also because having good relations with neighbors in itself is a worthy goal to strive for in such a volatile region. What should have been denounced much stronger then by the Turkish public was the fact that the abominable human rights record of the Assad regime had been swept under the rug by a government that was proud to present itself as the big defender of more democracy for all. Once large parts of the Syrian population no longer accepted the Assad dictatorship, Turkey made the right choice in trying to convince the Syrian president to introduce reforms in order to stop the uprising. It soon turned out, though, that Ankara's perception of its sway over Assad was not matched by his willingness to listen and give in to Turkish demands. It became clear that Turkey is not the regional power broker Erdoan and Davutolu want it to be, and they both felt personally offended because they had told the US and Europe otherwise. After they became disillusioned with Assad, it made sense to support and influence the Syrian opposition, thinking the civil war would be over soon and expecting to shortly restore good relations with a friendly new post-Assad government. Criticism should be directed at the wrong analysis made -- there is no quick fix -- but Turkey was not the only country to make that mistake. The Turkish government did use some of the harshest rhetoric in voicing its disgust, however, and early on repeatedly asked for permission to establish safe havens or a no-fly zone, only to discover that Ankara was totally isolated internationally in these demands. Again, the criticism should be pointed at the miscalculation, not at the requests themselves, which are only logical coming from a country that is flooded with refugees and bears the brunt of the continued fighting just across the border. Frustrated with its solitary position and having made a new assessment of the position of the other main players, Turkey has now opted for another scenario in which there is room for dialogue with Russia and Iran, the countries backing Assad. Turkey has also given full support to UN and Arab League envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi to try and reach a ceasefire over the

bayram (religious holiday). By doing so, the Turkish government seems to be moving closer to the positions echoed by a majority in the EDAM poll. Personally, I hope that Ankara, while being more realistic, sticks to its policy of trying to remove Assad from power as soon as possible and to influence the outcome of the complicated transition process that will follow. The government should not give in to the call to fully back off despite the fact that most Turks would apparently like that. yi Bayramlar to all of you. Trkiye Trklerin istedii eyi yapmamal Ekonomi ve D Politika Aratrmalar Merkezi EDAM, birka gn nce, Esed sonras Suriyede Trkiyenin oynamas gereken role dair sorular ynelttii kamuoyu aratrmasnn sonularn aklad. Anket eyll aynda yaplm, yani ekim banda Suriye havan toplarnn Akakaleyi vurup be Trk vatandan ldrmesinden nce. Ankete katlan 1500 kiinin yars, Esed rejiminden sonra Trkiyenin Suriyede mdahil olmamasn ya da tarafsz kalmasn istiyor. Trkiyenin atan taraflar arasnda potansiyel arabulucu rolne sadece yzde 18 orannda destek kt, geri Esed sahneyi terk ettikten sonra meydann hangi taraflara kalaca henz belli deil. Belli olan bir ey var, Trk hkmetinin yrrlkteki politikalar, Trk halknn bu ankette dile getirdii istekleri yerine getirmiyor. Babakan Erdoan ile Dileri Bakan Davutolu, atma baladndan beri net biimde gsterdi ki, pek ok cana mal olan Suriye dramnn sona ermesinde Trkiyenin faal rol oynamasn istiyorlar. Bunu icap ettiren insani sebeplere, Ankarann, tarihin doru tarafnda olmann Trkiyenin Suriye ve blgedeki uzun vadeli karlarna hizmet edecei hesab elik ediyor. Asl soru u: Trklerin kendisinden Suriyede istediinin tam tersini yapt iin Trk hkmeti sulanmal m? Erdoan ile Davuto-luna gemite pek ok vesileyle Suriye politikalar yznden saldrld. Bana gre, genelde yanl sebeplerden. Mehur komularla sfr sorun politikasnn tacndaki elmas olarak, Trkiyenin 2002den sonra Suriyeye almas, yaplabilecek en bilgece ve akllca ilerdendi. Hem Anadolu i leminin karlarna hizmet ettiinden hem de bylesine kolay alevlenen bir blgede komularla iyi ilikilere sahip olmann kendi bana emek harcanmaya deer bir hedef olmasndan. O zaman daha yksek sesle eletirilmesi gereken, kendini herkes iin daha fazla demokrasinin byk savunucusu olarak sunan bir hkmetin, Esedin feci insan haklar sicilini halnn altna sprmesiydi. Ancak Suriye nfusunun geni kesimleri Esed diktatrln kabullenmez hale geldikten sonra, Trkiye hkmeti, Suriye Devlet Bakann, ayaklanmay durdurmak iin reformlar hayata geirmeye iknaya alarak doru tercihi yapt. Ancak Ankarann Esed zerindeki nfuzuna dair algs Esedin Trk taleplerini dinleme ve onlara uyma istekliliiyle uyumaynca, sert kayaya tosland ksa srede anlald. Trkiyenin Erdoan ile Davutolunun arzu ettii blgesel siyasi g olmad ortaya karken, her ikisi de Avrupa ile ABDye tam tersini sylediinden kiisel olarak alnd. Erdoan ile Davutolunun Esedden hayal krklna uramasnn ardndan, Suriye muhalefetini desteklemek ve etkilemek manal geldi, tabii ksa srede i savan bitecei ve Esed sonrasnn yeni ve dost hkmetiyle iyi ilikiler tesis edilecei beklentisiyle. Eletiriler buradaki yanl analize yneltilmeli, zira kestirme zm yoktu, ama bu hataya den tek lke Trkiye deildi. Tiksintisini dile getirmek iin en hain sylemlerden rnekler sunan Trk hkmeti, gvenli ya da uua yasak blge kurulmas talebini ok erkenden, defalarca dile getirdi. Gel gr ki, bunu talep eden tek lke olarak uluslararas alanda tmden yalnz kald. Yine, eletiriler bu yanl hesab hedef almal, mlteci aknna urayan ve snrnda sregiden savan ceremesini eken bir lkeden gelmesi asndan kendi iinde mantkl talepleri deil. Kendi yalnz konumundan hsrana urayan ve dier balca oyuncularn konumunu yeniden deerlendiren Trkiye, bir baka senaryoyu tercih ederek, Esedi destekleyen ran ve Rusya gibi lkelerle diyaloa alan at. BM ve Arap Birliinin Suriye Temsilcisi El-Ahdar el-brahimiye de bayramda atekesin salanmas iin tam destek verdi. Trk hkmeti, byle yaparak, EDAM anketinde ounluun aksettirdii konuma daha yaklam gzkyor. Kiisel olarak, umarm ki, Ankara, bir yandan daha gereki olurken, Esedi mmkn olduunca abuk iktidardan gnderme ve bunu takip edecek karmak gei srecinin sonucunu etkileme politikasna sadk kalr. Trk hkmeti, Trklerin ounluunun bunu istemesi gibi bir olguya ramen, Suriyede tmden geri durma arlarna teslim olmamal.

Overcoming Eurocentrism Last weekend I was asked to speak on a panel at the stanbul World Forum on the legacy and impact of Eurocentrism on constructing the past and the present. To be honest, I felt slightly uncomfortable when the organizers approached me because I was the only speaker in that debate who could be considered the product of a 100 percent European education -- in my case, as a historian. With Eurocentrism under attack, where would that leave me? I guess the reason I was invited despite these obvious Eurocentric qualifications was the fact that as a member of the European Parliament, I worked a lot on Turkey and the Balkans. First on Eurocentrism itself: the practice of viewing the world from a European perspective. It is a way of looking at the rest of the world rooted in the times that Europe was the dominant economic and political power in the world, especially in the 19th and first half of the 20th century. What disturbs most people living outside Europe is not only the colonialism and imperialism that went hand-in-hand with this particular worldview but also the inherent tendency to show the superiority of Western customs and beliefs. Eurocentrism was a popular term among the non-European left in the 1970s and 1980s to denounce Western-led capitalist development in peripheral parts of the world. Nowadays, it regularly pops up in the discourse of young, self-conscious Muslim intellectuals who see Eurocentrism as part of the problematic and often negative Western approach to Islam and the Muslim world. Part of the Eurocentric view of history that I am familiar with is the inclination to consider the history of Europe as the history of the world, largely ignoring developments on other continents that did not have an immediate impact on Europe. For some time, a debate has been going on among historians in Europe whether or not it makes sense to rewrite existing history books for students and replace the focus on European history with one that reflects important past events elsewhere as well and does not shy away from showing the detrimental role Europe often played in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Some Europeans consider these efforts to erase Eurocentrism from modern historiography purely as an example of political correctness they firmly reject. Others are more positive but are afraid for artificial constructions that desperately try to combine several different perspectives, in the end producing a sort of sterile and sanitized history that nobody feels enthusiastic about. One of the issues raised by the organizers of my panel was the need to create just such a post-Eurocentric just memory. Fortunately, there are some good examples of rewriting history with the best of intentions. After the Balkan wars of the 1990s, historians from all Balkan countries, plus Greece and Turkey, sat together and produced a new history of the Balkans in which events were explained from the point of view of both the oppressor and the oppressed, seen from Belgrade and from Sarajevo, full of memories from the ones that had to leave and those who could finally establish their own country. On an academic level, it was quite a success. The problem started when this balanced and more just version of history had to be introduced into the school books of all countries involved. Many governments did not like it at all because this new interpretation totally undermined the recently established national myths upon which these new states were based, full of heroes and villains and few shades of gray. It is only one of the problems with rewriting history. Another is the readiness, also in Turkey, to go from one extreme to the other and, under the banner of fighting Eurocentrism, to write Europe out of the history of the 21st century and present it as a

lost and doomed continent. Personally, I think it does not make sense to replace one distorted version of history, the Eurocentric one, with another one that is equally biased. In my view, the wish to write off Europe is an act of revenge and frustration by some of the self-proclaimed victims of Eurocentrism. It is not a reflection of the new multi-polar world system in which Europe will still play an important role, economically, culturally and, if it gets its act together, politically. In trying to overcome Eurocentrism and create a more just memory, we should repair the mistakes of history, not repeat them. Avrupa merkezcilii amak Geen hafta sonu stanbul World Forumdaki bir panelde, gemii ve bugn kurmada Avrupa merkezciliin miras ve etkisi hakknda konumam istendi. Drst olmak gerekirse, organizatrler bana yaklatnda kendimi biraz rahatsz hissettim, nk panelde benim durumumda tarihi olarak- yzde yz Avrupa eitiminin rn addedilebilecek tek konumac bendim. Avrupa merkezcilik saldr altna alnacaksa, bu beni nereye koyard? Sanrm, bariz Avrupa merkezci niteliklerime ramen davet edilmemin sebebi, Avrupa Parlamentosunun bir yesi olarak Trkiye ve Balkanlarda ok alm olmam. ncelikle Avrupa merkezcilik, dnyay Avrupa merkezli bir perspektiften grmektir. Avrupann dnyadaki hakim ekonomik ve siyasi g olduu zamanlar -zellikle 19uncu yzyl ve 20nci yzyln ilk yars- temel alarak dnyann geri kalanna bakma biimidir. Avrupann dnda yaayan insanlar, bu bak asyla el ele yryen smrgecilik ve emperyalizm kadar Bat gelenek ve inanlarnn stnln gstermek ynnde miras alnan eilimden de rahatsz. 1970 ve 80lerde Avrupal olmayan solcular, dnyann evre blgelerinde Bat liderliindeki kapitalizmi knarken Avrupa merkezcilik terimini sk sk kullanrd. Bugnlerde gen, kendinden emin Mslman entelektellerin syleminde sk sk karmza kyor, sorunun bir paras ve Batnn slam ve Mslman alemine olumsuz yaklamnn kkeni olarak. Benim aina olduum tarihe Avrupa merkezci adan bakmann bir paras, Avrupa tarihini dnyann tarihi olarak grme, Avrupa zerinde hemen etkisi olmayan dier ktalardaki gelimeleri byk oranda grmezden gelme eilimidir. Bir sredir Avrupadaki tarihiler yle bir tartma yrtyor: renciler iin tarih kitaplarn yeniden yazmak, Avrupa tarihine odaklanmak yerine baka yerlerdeki gemiin nemli olaylarn da yanstmak ve Avrupann Asya, Afrika ve Latin Amerikada oynad zararl rol gstermekten ekinmemek anlaml m? Baz Avrupallar, bu Avrupa merkezcilii modern tarih yazclndan silme abasn, kesinlikle reddettikleri siyasi doruculuun dik ls addediyor. Dierleri, daha olumlu baksa da, birbirinden farkl perspektifleri umutsuzca bir araya getirmeye alan yapay yaplar kurulmasndan, sonuta kimseyi heyecanlandrmayan bir nevi steril tarihler retilmesinden korkuyor. Panel organizatrlerinin gndeme getirdii meselelerden biri, tam da, Avrupa merkezcilik sonras byle bir adil hafza yaratma ihtiyacyd. Neyse ki, iyi niyetlerle tarihi yeniden yazmann baz iyi rnekleri var. 1990lardaki Balkan savalarnn ardndan, tm Balkan lkelerine ilaveten Yunanistan ve Trkiyeden tarihiler, hep birlikte oturup yeni bir Balkan tarihi retti. Yeni tarihte olaylar hem zalimin hem ezilenin, hem Belgradn hem Saraybosnann gznden anlatld, hem gmek zorunda kalanlar hem de nihayet lkelerini kurabilenlerin anlaryla dolu olarak. Akademik dzeyde epey baarl oldu. Sorun, tarihin daha dengeli ve adil versiyonunu, mdahil tm lkelerin ders kitaplarna sokma srasnda kt. Pek ok hkmet hi hazzetmedi, zira yeni yorum, yeni kurulan devletlerin temel ald yeni oluturulan, sadece kahramanlarla canilerin olduu, gri tonun bulunmad ulusal mitleri tmden hie sayyordu. Bu, tarihi yeniden yazmann sorunlarndan sadece biri. Dieri, Trkiyede olduu gibi, bir ar utan br ar uca sramaya hazr olma hali: Avrupa merkezcilikle mcadele ad altnda, Avrupay 21inci yzyl tarihinden kararak kayp ve lme mahkum bir kta olarak sunmak. Tarihin arptlm (Avrupa merkezci) versiyonunu, en az o kadar tarafl baka versiyonla deitirmek bana manal gelmiyor. Bana gre, Avrupay tarihten silip atma istei, kendilerini Avrupa merkezciliin kurban ilan edenlerin hrsn karma, intikam alma eyleminden ibaret. Avrupann ekonomik, kltrel ve kendini toparlarsa siyasi adan hl nemli roller oynayaca yeni ok kutuplu dnya sisteminin bir yansmas deil kesinlikle. Avrupa merkezciliin stesinden gelmeye ve daha adil bir hafza yaratmaya alrken, tarihin hatalarn onarmalyz, tekrarlamamalyz.

Does the EU deserve the Nobel Peace Prize?

I first heard about the Nobel Committee's decision to award the 2012 Peace Prize to the European Union when, minutes after the news broke, somebody asked my opinion in a Q&A session with a group of Dutch visitors to stanbul. At first I thought it was a joke. When it turned out to be true, I labeled the bestowment ridiculous. I was deeply disappointed that, again, an institution was being rewarded and not one of the many real persons struggling hard to bring peace to their part of the world or fighting injustice and tyranny, often putting their own lives in danger. In the run-up to this year's nomination, there was speculation that Gene Sharp would perhaps get the prize. Sharp is one of the leading theorists on non-violence and is credited with inspiring peaceful protests across the globe, from Cairo to Beijing. Otherwise, it would be the brave people of the Moscow-based human rights organization Memorial, who had already received the Hrant Dink Award some time ago. Or it could have been the Mexican bishop fighting organized crime and drug lords in his country, torn by extreme violence. Or, for that matter, it could have been Helmut Kohl, the former German chancellor and architect of the EU and a united Germany. But why would it be the EU, an amorphous and complicated institution? I soon discovered that this opinion left me in danger of ending up on the same side of the argument as diehard Europhobes and Euroskeptics. They used the nomination to once again lash out at the organization they hate and despise. To be honest, some of their comments were quite humorous. Dutch populist Geert Wilders, of all people, tweeted: What's next? An Oscar for Herman van Rompuy? Van Rompuy is the chairman of the European Council and infamous for this lack of charisma. Other, more nuanced critics noted that it seemed Brussels was being rewarded for its accomplishments in the past at the very moment that it is provoking civil strife in countries hit hard by the euro crisis. Others made a comparison to the Oscars' lifetime achievements awards, given to those staring mortality in the face. As one commentator put it, The big question for the EU is whether there's any life in the old actor yet. I started to doubt my spontaneous repudiation when I read the careful assessments by people like Paul Taylor, Reuters' Brussels correspondent, and Jan Techau, head of the Carnegie Europe think tank. Both made the point that the Peace Prize could function as a morale boost for an organization, Taylor said, that has only recently had a near-death experience and is still not entirely sure that it is out of danger. By highlighting the EU's central achievements of securing peace on a warscarred continent, the Nobel judges may give the 27-nation bloc back a sense of purpose that its day-to-day practitioners often seem to have lost. Along the same lines, Techau called the prize an encouragement to the EU to continue its peacegenerating integration work and an appeal to Europe to finally become a serious strategic player in the world. I could not agree more with both Taylor and Techau. There were indeed good reasons to reward the EU for what it had done in the past to promote peace and democracy, especially in Southern and Eastern Europe. Maybe the timing was not as awkward as I had originally thought. Precisely because it is going through tough times, the EU might make use of the morale boost provided by the Norwegian judges to reinvent itself as a stabilizing force in Europe and beyond. Fine. However, some friction remained that was directly related to the phrase used by the Nobel Committee in its press release to praise the EU for strengthening the process of reconciliation in the Balkans and for advancing democracy and human rights in Turkey. Again, this would have been a good point five years ago. Since then, most EU countries seem to have given up on EU enlargement, causing strong disenchantment and disappointment in this part of Europe. Maybe that explains my continuing ambivalent feelings about this prize. If the EU is not willing or able to breathe new life into

its negotiations with Turkey and the countries of the Balkans, the Peace Prize will remain a symbol of past glories. Only by completing the accession and integration process it has started with Turkey and the Balkans, thereby enlarging the European zone of peace and stability, can the EU show that it got the message from Oslo right. AB, Nobel Bar dln hak ediyor mu? Geen cuma stanbulu ziyaret eden bir grup Hollandal ile soru cevap toplants yapyordum ki, ilerinden biri Nobel Komitesinin 2012 Bar dln ABye verme kararyla ilgili grm sordu. Bylece haberin patlamasndan birka dakika sonra karardan haberim oldu. Ama nce aka sandm. Gerek olduunu idrak edince, samaln dik alas tepkisini verdim. dln, hayatlarn tehlikeye atarak adaletsizlik ve zorbalkla savaan, dnyann kendi yaadklar blgelerine bar getirmek iin zorlu mcadeleler veren gerek insanlara deil de, yine bir kuruma verilmesi karsnda hayal krkl iindeydim. Bu ylki aday gsterme srecinde, dln Gene Sharpa gidebilecei speklasyonu yaplyordu. Sharp, iddete bavurmakszn rgtlenmenin ba teorisyenlerinden biridir ve Kahireden Pekine kresel apta bar protesto gsterilerinin esin kayna kabul edilmektedir. Bir sre nce Hrant Dink dln alm olan Moskova merkezli insan haklar rgt Memorialn cesur insanlarnn da ad geiyordu. Ya da iddet dngsnn parampara ettii Meksikada organize su ve uyuturucu baronlaryla mcadele eden piskopos. Yahut, illa Avrupaya gidecekse, AB ve birleik Almanyann mimar olan eski Alman anslyesi Helmut Kohl. Fakat neden tam teekkl etmemi, arapsa halindeki AB? Lakin hemen fark ettim ki, bu reddiyemle, kendimi iflah olmaz AB kartlar ve AB fobiklerle ayn safta bulmam iten deildi. Onlar, dl zerinden nefret ettikleri ve hakir grdkleri rgte bir kez daha szl saldr dzenleme frsatn karmyordu. Geert Wilders, Srada ne var. Herman van Rompuya Oscar? diye tweetledi. Van Rompuy, Avrupa Konseyi Bakandr ve karizmadan nasibini almam olmasyla mehurdur. Daha dzeyli eletiri getirenler, Brkselin gemi baarlar iin dllendirilmi olmas gerektiine, zira u sra avro krizinin fena vurduu lkelerde i kargaa yaratmaktan baka ie yaramadna dikkat ekti. Bazs, dl, lm deindekilere verilen mr boyu baar Oscaryla kyaslad. Bir yorumcunun ta gediine koyduu gibi: Yal aktrde can kald m, AB iin btn mesele ite bu. Reutersin Brksel muhabiri Paul Taylor ve dnce kuruluu Carnegie Europen Bakan Jan Techau gibilerinin dikkatli deerlendirmelerini okuduumda, anlk tepkimden phe duymaya baladm. Her ikisi de, Nobel dlnn rgte moral coku verebilecei zerinde duruyordu. Taylor yle diyordu: AB ksa sre nce lmden dnd ve komadan kt hl kesin deil. Nobel yarglar, ABnin savalarla yaralanm bir ktada bar gvenceye alan merkezi baarsn vurgulayarak, 27 lkeli bloa, gnlk icraclarnn kaybetmie benzedii ama hissini geri kazandrabilir. Ayn izgide giden Techau, dl, ABnin bar reten btnleme almasn srdrmesine ynelik bir tevik diye niteledi. Taylor ve Techau ile tmyle hemfikirim. ABnin zellikle Gney ve Dou Avrupada bar ve demokrasiyi tevik eden gemi icraatlarn dllendirmek iin geerli sebepler var gerekten de. Belki zamanlama benim bata dndm kadar tuhaf deil. Tam da zor zamanlardan getiinden, AB, Norveli yarglarn verdii moral cokuyu kullanarak, Avrupa ve tesinde istikrar getiren bir g olarak kendini yeniden icat edebilir. Buraya kadar ho. Ama baz atlaklar kalacaktr. Bunlar, Nobel Komitesinin, basn aklamasnda, ABnin Balkanlarda uzlama srecini glendirmesi ve Trkiyede demokrasi ve insan haklarn ilerletmesini vd ifadelerle dorudan balantl. Be yl nce yaplsayd, iyi tespit diye selamlanrd. Ama o zamandan beri AB lkelerinin ou genilemeden vazgemi gzkerek, Avrupann bu ksmnda byk hayal krkl ve inan kaybna yol at. Herhalde bu durum, dlle ilgili sregiden eliik hislerimi aklyor. AB, Trkiye ve Balkan lkeleriyle mzakerelerine hayat pc verme istei ya da kabiliyetine sahip deilse, Bar dl gemi zaferlerin bir simgesi olarak kalr. Ancak ve ancak Trkiye ve Balkan lkeleriyle balatt katlm ve btnleme srecini tamamlayarak ve bylelikle Avrupann bar ve istikrar kuan genileterek, AB, Oslonun gnderdii mesaj doru anladn gsterebilir

Turkish conservatism 2.0 Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the parliamentary elections in 2002, one year after the terrorist attacks on the US by radical Islamists, for many years the question most asked by Europeans about Turkey was: Will the country become more Islamic?

I cant remember exactly when, but it must have been a couple of years ago when gradually that question was replaced by another: Is Turkey becoming more conservative? The fear that Turkey might become a second Iran or Saudi Arabia under AKP rule melted away after it became clear, as most informed observers had already predicted, that Islam was an important source of inspiration for many leading politicians, but not the principle guiding their policies. Nowadays, it is only the extreme Islamophobes in Europe and in Turkey who still believe that Recep Tayyip Erdoan is a wolf in sheeps clothing, determined to transform Turkey into a Shariah state. Among many superficial followers of Turkey in Europe, the fear of political Islam has thus been replaced by the concern that Turkey is slowly turning into a more conservative and intolerant country, a place that is run by conservative democrats who feel increasingly emboldened to promote conservative values on abortion, the appropriate number of children Turkish women should raise and other issues that feature prominently on the wish list of cultural conservatives in Turkey -- as well as in other European countries. In politics this unease has gained ground especially among social democrats, liberals and Greens, the three main anti-conservative political families that happen to also be the biggest supporters of Turkeys eventual accession to the EU. A growing number of these friends of Turkey have started to realize that bringing in such a huge conservative country might tilt the political balance inside the EU into an undesired direction, endangering or undermining the liberal values they cherish. In that sense, the perception of Turkey as a bulwark of conservatism is potentially more detrimental to Turkeys chances of ever becoming an EU member than the scenario of an Islamic Turkey that could easily be dismissed as unrealistic and paranoid. Most open-minded Turkey watchers in Europe have responded to this fear of rising conservatism by explaining that Turkey is not becoming more conservative, but that since the end of the 1990s, conservatives have gained the upper hand in politics, in business and in the media. In other words: There are not more conservative Turks now than in 1990 and the ones that have always defined themselves as conservative are not becoming more extreme but they are simply more powerful and visible than before. Turkey has become more democratic in the sense that the conservative majority that was always there has gained more influence in Parliament and in society as a whole. Many European liberals and leftists have only started to understand that as a result of a process they wholeheartedly support, the democratization of Turkey, the cultural and ideological balances in Turkey have shifted in favor of the conservative majority which supports a system of values that seems, on first sight, to clash with the one uniting most European democrats. The big question is: Is Turkeys conservatism really incompatible with European liberal values? For optimists like myself who are against considering conservatism and liberalism as two monolithic, unchangeable blocs and who believe that in the long run the two can coexist, there was good news last week. A recent survey conducted by Professor Hakan Ylmaz from Boazii University and supported by the Open Society Foundation revealed that conservatism in Turkey, both politically and socially, has become more moderate and mainstream. There is a long list of indicators for this rise of a more mild and individualistic version of Turkish conservatism. Let me mention a few findings of the report, compared with the results of similar research done in 2006: Uneasy feelings about uncovered women or people consuming alcohol have dropped considerably; most Turks define themselves as religious but fewer people pray five times a day or fast during Ramadan; almost 90 percent believe that being a good Muslim and secular

at the same time is possible. Professor Ylmaz explained these changes by referring to rapid urbanization, increasing wealth and the opportunities offered by social media for individuals to express themselves. Ylmaz expects these trends to continue in the years to come. My cautious conclusion: In Turkey, conservatism is indeed more influential and visible than before. At the same time Turkish conservatives have become more moderate and are slowly moving closer to a sort of average European interpretation of religion and tolerance for other lifestyles. That is good news for democrats of all persuasions, in Turkey and in Europe. Trk muhafazakarl 2.0 ABD radikal slamclarn saldrsna uradktan bir yl sonra, 2002deki genel seimleri AKP kazannca, yllar boyu Avrupallarn Trkiye hakknda en ok sorduu soru u oldu: lke daha m slamileecek? Tam ne zaman olduunu hatrlayamyorum, ama birka yl nce olmal, bu sorunun yerini yava yava baka bir soru ald: Trkiye daha m muhafazakarlayor? Trkiyenin AKP ynetimi altnda ikinci bir ran ya da Suudi Arabistan haline gelebilecei korkusu, en bilgili gzlemcilerin oktan ngrd gibi, siyasi liderlerin ounun slam politikalarnn ba rehberi deil de esin kayna yaptnn anlalmasyla eridi gitti. Bugnlerde sadece Avrupa ve Trkiyedeki ar slamofobikler, Erdoann Trkiyeyi eriat devletine evirmekte kararl, kuzu postunda bir kurt olduuna inanyor hl. Avrupada Trkiyenin ok saydaki yzeysel takipisi arasnda siyasi slam korkusunun yerini, bylece, Trkiyenin yava yava daha muhafazakar ve daha hogrsz bir lkeye dnmekte olduu endiesi ald. Trkiyenin krtaj, Trk kadnlarnn yetitirmesi gereken ocuk says ve benzeri meselelerde muhafazakar deerleri benimsetmek iin fena gaza gelmi muhafazakar demokratlar tarafndan ynetildii endiesi ki, bunlar, Trkiye kadar baka Avrupa lkelerinde de kltrel muhafazakarlarn dilek listesinin ban eker. Bu siyaseten rahatszlk, zellikle sosyal demokratlar, liberaller ve yeiller nezdinde zemin kazand; bunlar, muhafazakar kart ana siyasi aile olduu kadar Trkiyenin eninde sonunda ABye katlmasnn da en byk destekileridir. Trkiyenin giderek daha fazla sayda dostu ayrdna varmaya balad ki, bu kadar byk bir muhafazakar lkeyi ieri almak, ABdeki siyasi dengeyi istemedikleri ynde bozabilir, aziz kabul ettikleri deerleri tehlikeye sokabilir ya da baltalayabilir. Bu balamda, Trkiyenin muhafazakarln kalesi olarak alglanmas, bir gn AB yesi olma ihtimaline, gereki deil, paranoyak olduu gerekesiyle kolayca yol verilebilen slamc Trkiye senaryosundan ok daha fazla zarar verir. Avrupadaki en ak fikirli Trkiye takipileri, ykselen muhafazakarlktan duyulan bu korkuya yant olarak, Trkiyenin daha muhafazakarlamad, ancak 1990larn sonundan beri muhafazakarlarn siyaset, i alemi ve medyada dizginleri ele geirdii aklamasn getiriyor. Bir baka deyile: Muhafazakar Trklerin says 1990dakinden daha fazla deil, kendini her zaman muhafazakar olarak tanmlam olanlar da ar ulara meyletmi deil, sadece gemie nazaran daha gl ve grnrler, o kadar. Hep burada olan muhafazakar ounluun Mecliste ve toplumda bir btn olarak daha fazla nfuz kazanmas balamnda, Trkiye daha demokratikleti. Pek ok Avrupal liberal ve solcu daha yeni anlamaya balyor ki, tm kalpleriyle destekledikleri Trkiyenin demokratiklemesi srecinin bir sonucu olarak, Trkiyedeki kltrel ve ideolojik dengeler, ilk bakta ou Avrupal demokrat birletiren deerler sistemiyle atr gzken bir sistemi destekleyen muhafazakar ounluktan yana deiti. Asl soru u: Trkiyenin muhafazakarl Avrupann liberal deerlerine gerekten zt m? Muhafazakarlk ile liberalizmi iki yekpare, deimez blok olarak deerlendirmeye kar kan ve uzun vadede ikisinin birlikte yaayabileceine inanan benim gibi iyimserler, geen hafta iyi haberler ald. Ak Toplum Vakfnn desteiyle Boazii niversitesinden profesr Hakan Ylmazn yrtt bir anket ortaya koydu ki, Trkiyede hem siyasi hem de toplumsal adan muhafazakarlk daha lml ve anaakm hale geldi. Trk muhafazakarlnn bu daha mutedil ve bireyci versiyonunun ykseliine dair gstergeler, uzun bir liste oluturuyor. 2006daki benzeri bir aratrmann sonularyla karlatrarak bu raporun bulgularndan birkan aktaraym: rtnmeyen kadnlar ve alkol tketiminden rahatszlk kaydadeer dzeyde azald; Trklerin ou kendini dindar diye tanmlyor, ancak daha az sayda insan gnde be vakit namaz klyor ya da Ramazanda oru tutuyor; neredeyse yzde 90 hem iyi bir Mslman hem de laik olmann mmkn olduuna inanyor. Profesr Ylmaz, bu deiimi hzl ehirleme, artan refah ve sosyal medyann bireylere kendilerini ifade etmeleri iin sunduu frsatlara balyor. Ylmaz, eilimin gelecek yllarda da srmesini bekliyor. Benim vardm temkinli sonu u: Trkiyede muhafazakarlk gerekten de gemie gre daha etkili ve grnr. Ayn zamanda Trk muhafazakarlar daha lml hale geldi ve Avrupann din ile dier yaam biimlerine hogr konusunda

ortalama yorumuna yava yava daha yaklayorlar. Bu hem Trkiyede hem de Avrupada her mezhepten demokrat iin iyi haber.

Dont blame the doctor This week the European Commission will publish its annual progress report on Turkey. As before, it will be a detailed list of all relevant developments in politics, society and the economy. By publishing this overview the Brussels-based institution in charge of handling the day-to-day negotiating process with all candidate countries makes it clear where Turkey has been making progress in meeting EU standards and on which issues more work needs to be done. I am sure many Turks will react to the report the way they would do when a doctor whom they asked to perform a comprehensive health check comes up with results they dont like. They will complain about the attitude of the physician who comes across as arrogant and pedantic. Some will underline the good elements in the medical assessment and will be silent on the parts that embarrass them. They fully realize, however, that last year similar exhortations to introduce changes that would improve their overall health were left untouched. Others will angrily put the medical evaluation aside and announce that they will start looking for another hospital. A few hot heads will throw the report out of the window and declare that they are sick and tired of this annual ritual. It is their body, they will claim, and they are entitled to do with it as they please. All outsiders should stop interfering. Better be autonomous and sick than subservient and in good shape. Replace the doctor with the European Commission and the patient with Turkey and you will be surprised about the similarities. All these evasive reactions leave one question unanswered: Does the commission report present a true picture of Turkey? After reading this years version, I think it does. I know there are many in Turkey who believe the European Commission must necessarily be wrong in its analysis because the goal of EU accession has drifted so far away. My advice to them would be to go through the paper and judge for themselves. When you really want to learn more about Turkeys overall situation, forget about all the fancy papers from domestic and foreign think tanks or the partisan judgments by government and opposition politicians alike. The commission prose is far from juicy, sweeping statements are absent and the near obsession with objectivity often makes for uneasy reading, but these obstacles should not distract from the fact that some of the best Turkey specialists are based in Brussels. Many of them have been following the country for more than 10 years, know all the details of every sensitive dossier and, one should never forget, are genuinely committed to Turkeys accession to the EU as a full member. On the other hand, they also realize that this will only happen when Turkey is willing to accept advice and fair criticism. No candidate country, especially the big ones, likes being told what to do. But deep down all of them knew in the past that most of the time the commission report presented an honest and evenhanded assessment of their progress or lack thereof. In the not so distant past, Egemen Ba, Turkeys chief negotiator with the EU, used to say that the European Commission plays the same role as the dietician he was visiting then in order to lose some weight. Both tell you the things you already know: which reforms to initiate and implement or, in the case of the doctor, which fat and greasy food to not eat anymore. Countries are like humans: Most of the time they know what is best for them, but they dont like to be told by someone else.

So when reading about the progress report this week, it is only natural to reflect on Turkeys EU accession process and the opportunities missed because of shortsightedness on both sides. What went wrong in Brussels and in Ankara and what can be done to get out of the present deadlock: Mistakes in the report should be mentioned and if needed corrected. One example: While rightly criticizing several shortcomings in the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon trials, the report also finds that they tend to contribute to the polarization of Turkish politics. What is the logic behind this remark? Does it mean that past crimes should not be brought before a court because part of the opposition still supports the perpetrators? But dont blame the European Commission for presenting a national health check report indicating that Turkey still has quite a long way to go before it can be labeled a healthy, first-class democracy. That well-founded conclusion should not come as a surprise to anybody. Suu hekimde arama Bu hafta Avrupa Komisyonu, Trkiye ile ilgili yllk ilerleme raporunu yaymlayacak. Daha ncekiler gibi bu rapor da, siyaset, toplum ve ekonomideki tm alakal gelimelerin ayrntl bir listesi niteliinde olacak. Tm aday lkelerle mzakere srecini gn gnne yrtmekle ykml Brksel merkezli kurum, byle bir genel bak yaymlayarak, AB standartlarn karlamak iin Trkiyenin nerelerde ilerleme kaydettiini ve nerelerde daha fazla almas gerektiini gzler nne seriyor. Pek ok Trkn, geni apl salk kontrolnden gemek iin kapsn aldklar doktorun holanmadklar sonular aklamasna gsterdikleri tepkiyi, rapora da gstereceinden eminim. Tp adamnn kstah ve ukala gelen tavrndan ikyet edecekler. Bazs tbbi deerlendirmedeki olumlu unsurlarn altn izerken kendilerini utandran blmler hakknda susacak. Ancak geen yl genel saln dzelmesi iin getirilmesi gereken deiikliklerle ilgili iddetle yaplan tavsiyelerin hi deimediinin tmyle farknda olacaklar. Dierleri, tbbi deerlendirmeyi kzgnlkla kenara kaldracak ve baka bir hastane aramaya balayacaklarn duyuracak. Birka asabi kimse, raporu pencereden dar atacak ve hasta olsalar bile bu yllk ritelden usandklarn baracak. Bu benim bedenim, ne istersem yaparm, diyecekler. Dardan tm mdahaleler durmal. Formda ama bakalarnn ua olmaktansa, hasta ama bana buyruk olmak yedir. Doktorun yerine Avrupa Komisyonunu, hastann yerine Trkiyeyi koyarsanz, benzerliklere aarsnz. Tm bu yan izen tepkiler, bir soruyu yantsz brakyor: Komisyonun raporu Trkiyenin doru bir fotorafn ekiyor mu? Bu ylkini okuduktan sonra kanaatim, evet, ekiyor. Trkiyede pek ok kiinin, AB yelii hedefinden fena halde kopulduu iin Avrupa Komisyonunun analizlerinin illa yanl olmas gerektiine inandn biliyorum. Onlara tavsiyem, belgeyi gzden geirmeleri ve kendi kendilerine yargya varmalar. Trkiyenin genel durumu hakknda daha fazla ey renmeyi gerekten istiyorsanz, ierdeki ve dardaki dnce kurulularnn ssl psl raporlarn da, hem hkmetin hem muhalefetin tarafl hkmlerini de unutun. Komisyonun dzyazs cezbedici olmaktan uzaktr, cokulu ifadeler iermez ve neredeyse takntl boyuttaki nesnellii okunmasn zorlatrr, ama bu engellerin perdelememesi gereken bir olgu var ki, en iyi Trkiye uzmanlarnn bir blm Brkselde bulunur. Bunlarn ou, Trkiyeyi 10 yldan uzun bir sredir takip eder, her hassas dosyann tm ayrntlarn bilir ve asla unutulmamal ki, Trkiyenin ABye tam ye olarak katlmna gnlden baldr. Dier yandan, bunun ancak Trkiyenin tavsiyeleri ve adil eletirileri kabul etmesiyle mmkn olacann da farkndadrlar. Hibir aday lke, hele de bykse, ne yapacann kendisine sylenmesinden holanmaz. Ama gemite hepsi de iten ie bilmitir ki, Komisyon raporu, ilerleme kaydedip kaydetmediklerine dair drst ve yansz bir deerlendirme sunmutur ounlukla. O kadar da uzak olmayan bir gemite, Bamzakereci Egemen Ba, Avrupa Komisyonunun, o dnem kilo vermek iin gittii diyetisyenle ayn rol oynadn sylerdi. Her ikisi de size zaten bildiiniz eyleri anlatr: Komisyon ise hangi reformlar balatmal ve hayata geirmelisiniz, doktorsa hangi imanlatc ve yal gdalar yemeyi brakmalsnz. lkeler de insanlar gibidir: ou zaman kendileri iin en iyisinin ne olduunu bilirler, ama bunu bakasnn sylemesinden hazzetmezler.

Dolaysyla bu hafta ilerleme raporunu okurken, Trkiyenin ABye katlm sreci ve her iki tarafn miyopluundan tr karlan frsatlar hakknda derin dncelere dalmaktan daha doal bir ey olamaz. Brksel ve Ankarada ters giden neydi ve halihazrdaki krdm zmek iin neler yaplabilir? Rapordaki hatalar dile getirilmeli ve gerekirse dzeltilmeli. Bir rnek: Rapor, Ergenekon ve Balyoz davalarndaki muhtelif ihmalleri hakl biimde eletirirken, bunlarn Trk siyasetinin kutuplamasna katkda bulunma eilimini bulguluyor. imdi bu mtalaann gerisindeki mantk ne? Muhalefetin bir ksm su ilemi kimseleri hl destekledii iin gemi sular mahkeme nne gelmemeli, demeye mi getiriyor? Ne olursa olsun, Trkiyenin salkl, birinci snf demokrasi olarak etiketlenmesi iin daha ok yol kat etmesi gerektiine iaret eden ulusal salk kontrol raporu takdim ediyor diye Avrupa Komisyonunu sulamayn. Rapordaki salam temelli muhakeme, kimse iin srpriz olmamal.

Engin eber and the end of impunity Last week an stanbul court sentenced two prison guards and a warden to life imprisonment in the case of Engin eber, who was tortured to death while in custody in 2008. Several other prison officials and police officers received jail sentences of two to four years. The eber case is considered by many in Turkey and abroad as a landmark case because acts of torture by law enforcement officers have seldom been brought to justice. International human rights organizations see the trial as a key test for the Turkish justice system. As Amnesty International put it before the verdict: The choice is between allowing the injustice of the past to persist or dealing a blow to impunity for torture and providing justice for Engin eber. eber was taken into custody on Sept. 28, 2008 on the grounds that he had participated in a press meeting and had distributed a left-wing magazine. He was tortured by police in prison and died on Oct. 10, 2008. Expert reports confirmed that torture was the cause of his death. A suit was filed against tens of suspects, and four of them were sentenced to life imprisonment in June 2010 on the charge of murder by torture. In September 2011 an appeals court overturned that verdict on procedural grounds and sent the case back to the lower court in Bakrky. Last weeks ruling confirmed the earlier convictions but reduced one life sentence to two-and-a-half years in prison. In 2003 the then new Justice and Development Party (AKP) government declared a commitment to end torture in Turkey. The zero tolerance for torture policy was seen by many as one of the most important and tangible reforms that Turkey was undertaking in order to comply with EU human rights criteria. The initial reports about the success of the new approach were one of the reasons why the EU at the end of 2004 concluded that Turkey was sufficiently meeting the political criteria for accession and that therefore negotiations could start in October 2005. On the AKPs list of accomplishments in its first few years in power is the ending of torture in police cells and prisons, which figures as one of the most concrete reforms the party has made to date. At the time, Turkish and international human rights organizations agreed that the number of reported torture cases had gone down since 2003, especially in prisons, but warned that only an end to the system of impunity for police officers and prison officials would eradicate torture fully. That is why the outcome of the eber case was seen as crucial by all relevant organizations. Over the last couple of years, doubts had set in as to whether the original favorable outcome of the anti-torture reforms in the beginning of the 2000s was being continued. In

its 2011 World Report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded that in 2010 torture and ill-treatment in detention was less common but that police ill-treatment remained a problem, particularly during street checks, demonstrations and arrests. HRW stressed that impunity remained a formidable problem in Turkey. Two weeks ago the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) published its annual report for the year 2011 and stated that law enforcement officials had subjected over 700 prisoners to torture and ill-treatment. That figure represents an increase in the frequency of such human rights violations. So how should we assess the ruling in the eber case? Is it proof that finally all the problems are over and nobody will get away with torture in this country anymore? We should be careful. I agree with the eber familys lawyer when he said the verdict is a significant step in preventing torture because it does not only punish the police officers who committed the actual torture but also their superior, who failed to stop them when he could. That sends out an extremely powerful message to all law enforcement officials: You are guilty not only when you commit an act of torture yourself, but also when you dont act to stop somebody else from doing so. Lets hope this approach is confirmed in the future appeals procedure. Does this mean that from now on everything will be fine in each and every police cell and prison? Of course not. We should not be nave and think that thousands of police officers and prison officials have completely changed their old mentality and attitudes. But they know now that there is a reasonable chance that they will get caught when they misbehave and run the risk of being punished severely. Impunity has been dealt a blow. Engin eber ve cezadan muafiyetin bitii Geen hafta stanbuldaki bir ar ceza mahkemesi, 2008de gzaltndayken ikenceyle ldrlen Engin eberin davasnda, iki gardiyan ile cezaevi ikinci mdrn mebbet hapse arptrd. Birka hapishane yetkilisi ve polis memuruna da iki-drt yl aras hapis verildi. Kanun uygulayc yetkililerin ikence eylemleri nadiren adalet karsna karldndan, Engin eber davas, Trkiye ve yurtdndaki pek ok kii tarafndan bir dnm noktas addediliyor. Uluslararas insan haklar rgtleri, davay, Trk adalet sistemi asndan kilit nemde bir snav olarak gryor. Uluslararas Af rgtnn hkm aklanmadan nce belirttii gibi: Gemiin adaletsizliinin srmesine izin vermek ile ikencenin cezasz kalna darbe indirmek ve Engin eber iin adaletin yerini bulmasn salamak arasnda bir tercih yaplacak. eber, bir basn aklamasna katlp solcu bir dergi datt gerekesiyle 28 Eyll 2008de gzaltna alnmt. Hem karakolda hem de hapishanede ikenceden geirildi ve 10 Ekim 2008de ld. lm sebebinin ikence olduunu uzman raporlar da dorulad. 10 zanl hakknda dava ald ve Haziran 2010da drdne ikenceyle adam ldrmekten mebbet hapis cezas verildi. Eyll 2011de Yargtay usule dair sebeplerden karar bozdu ve davay Bakrkydeki alt mahkemeye geri gnderdi. Geen hafta verilen hkm, nceki mahkumiyetleri teyit ederken, bir mebbeti 2,5 yl hapis cezasna evirdi. AKP hkmeti, 2003te daha yeni iktidara gelmiken, Trkiyede ikenceyi bitirme kararlln beyan etmiti. kenceye sfr hogr politikas, pek ok kiinin gznde, AB insan haklar kriterlerine uymak iin Trkiyenin giritii en nemli ve somut sonular olan reformlardan biriydi. Balarda yeni yaklamn baarl olduunun rapor edilmesi, ABnin 2004n sonunda Trkiyenin katlm iin siyasi kriterleri yeterince karlad ve bu yzden Ekim 2005te yelik mzakerelerinin balayabileceine hkmetmesinin sebeplerinden biriydi. Yapsal bir fenomen olarak polisin elinde ve hapishanede ikenceyi bitirmek, AKP iktidarnn ilk birka yllk baar listesinde en hayata geirilmi maddelerden biridir. O dnemde Trk ve uluslararas insan haklar rgtleri, 2003ten beri zellikle hapishanelerde bildirilen ikence vakalarnn azaldnda hemfikir olmakla birlikte, ancak polis ve hapishane yetkililerinin cezasz kalmas sistemi sona erdirilirse ikencenin tmyle ortadan kaldrlabilecei uyars yapyordu.

Bu yzden eber davasnn sonucu, ilgili rgtlerin gznde hayati nem tayordu. Son birka ylda, ikence kart reformlarn bataki gibi memnun edici sonular vermeyi srdrp srdrmediine dair pheler domutu. nsan Haklar zleme rgt (HRW), 2011 dnya raporunda, 2010da Trkiyede gzaltnda ikence ve kt muamele yaygnlnn azald, ancak polisin zellikle yol evirme, gsteri ve tutuklamalarda kt muamelesinin sorun olmay srdrd sonucuna varmt. HRW, ceza muafiyetinin, Trkiyede ba edilemez bir sorun olarak kaldn vurgulamt. Trkiye nsan Haklar Vakf (TIHV) da, iki hafta nce yaymlad yllk raporunda, kanun uygulayc yetkililerin 700n zerinde tutukluya kt muamele ve ikence ettiini bildirdi. Bu say, bu trden insan haklar ihlallerinin sklnda bir arta iaret ediyor. Peki, yleyse, eber davasndan kan karara ne deer bimeliyiz? Nihayet tm sorunlarn halledildiinin ve lkede ikencenin kimsenin yanna kr kalmayacann bir kant m? Temkinli olmalyz. eber ailesinin avukatnn grne katlyorum: kence eden polisler kadar onlar durdurabilecekken bunu yapmayan stlerinin de cezalandrlmas asndan, karar, ikenceyi nlemede kayda deer bir adm. Bu, kanunu uygulayc yetkililerin tmne son derece gl bir mesaj veriyor: Kendiniz ikence yaparken sulu olduunuz kadar ikence yapan bir bakasn durdurmadnzda da sulusunuz. Bu yaklamn, gelecekteki temyiz srecinde de teyit edilmesini umalm. Bu, bundan byle her polis hcresi ve her hapishanede her eyin yolunda gidecei anlamna m geliyor? Elbette hayr. Binlerce polis ve gardiyann eski zihniyet ve tavrlarn tmyle deitirdiini dnecek kadar naif olmamalyz. Ama onlar artk biliyor ki, yanl davrandklarnda yakalanmalar ve ar biimde cezalandrlmalar makul bir ihtimal. Cezasz braklmaya ar darbe indirildi.

European dream not over yet The long-awaited and highly publicized speech by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan at the Justice and Development Party (AKP) congress last Sunday has led to much speculation. Most observers agree that the speech did not bring much new and was mainly an already well-known celebration of 10 years of AKP successes and an unsolicited application for the post of president in 2014. In their comments, many experts focus on the issues that were not mentioned by the AKP leader. There seems to be almost a consensus about the fact that Erdoan, by not referring to the EU at the party congress, has practically buried Turkeys accession dossier and the countrys European dream has come to an end. Let me explain why I am surprised by this reading of Erdoans speech. Firstly, despite all the fuss about presenting an AKP vision for 2023, Sundays speech was first and foremost Erdoans personal bid for past and future greatness. His talk was not at all about what Turkey should look like in 2023. It was a clever effort to play on the emotions and opinions of the people who have to vote for him in 2014. That is why the speech was full of achievements that appeal to a wider audience, Islamic references and, be it moderate, nationalistic undertones. It should not have come as a surprise that the parts dedicated to foreign policy focused on the immediate problems in Syria and Turkeys relations with Israel and the wider Muslim world. These are the topics that matter now with the potential Erdoan electorate. The EU does not fit into that category because it is not very popular at the moment and because the prime minister knows very well that is not going to change soon. Why mention the EU when it will not bring you one extra vote in 2014? For that same reason, there was no mention of the US and China. Does that mean that Turkey will not spend any energy in the next couple of years in building good relations with both leading world powers? Of course not. It is simply an indication of the calculation by the AKP leader that referring to these very important ties will not bring him any new religious or nationalist votes in two years time. Secondly, experts argue that the profile of the foreign guests is another sign of Turkeys increasing interest in the Middle East, thereby distancing itself from the EU. I do not want to sound cynical, but let me try to put things into perspective. In line

with my previous remark on the deliberate omissions from his speech, Erdoan knows very well that Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal is much more popular among his voters than any of the European leaders. On top of that, European prime ministers usually do not attend congresses of other parties abroad unless they have a very strong personal relationship with the leader of that party. Looking at Erdoans personal affinity with European leaders, whom could you realistically have expected to attend? Maybe Silvio Berlusconi volunteered but I am sure the Turkish prime minister kindly convinced the former Italian leader, deeply entangled in various scandals, not to show up in Ankara. Again, the list of foreign guests last Sunday is a reaction to the wish to show to a receptive audience as many foreign supporters of Erdoans candidacy as possible. Not a list of foreign policy priorities of Turkey. Finally, I guess all of us have to get used to a situation in which Erdoan is preparing more for his own future than presenting an AKP view for the next decade. One day after the party congress, we might witness a different vision for Turkeys future, presented by Abdullah Gl, one of the other AKP founding members. In his speech before the Turkish Parliament, Gl did not hesitate to contradict his old comrade in arms Erdoan on some crucial points. The Turkish president called on Parliament to keep on working on EU-oriented reforms and once again give priority to EU harmonization laws. I am sure this emphasis on the ongoing importance of preparing for Turkeys future membership of the EU was not a coincidence. Gl presented an alternative AKP view in line with the comprehensive and detailed AKP vision paper that was distributed at the AKP congress in Ankara. Maybe from now on we should all focus more on the speeches of Gl, the only realistic candidate to succeed Erdoan as prime minister in 2014, and attach less importance to the words of the person who wants to become the new president and officially kicked of his election campaign last Sunday. Avrupa ryas henz bitmedi Babakan Tayyip Erdoan'n geen pazar AKP kongresinde yapt uzun zamandr beklenen ve geni yank bulan konumas, pek ok speklasyona yol at. Gzlemcilerin ou, konumann pek yeni bir ey iermedii ve daha ok AKP'nin 10 yllk baarlarnn bildik kutlamas ile 2014'teki bakanlk makamna ynelik talep edilmemi bir arz olduunda hemfikir. Pek ok uzman, yorumlarnda, AKP liderinin anmad meselelere odakland. Erdoan'n parti kongresinde AB'ye atfta bulunmayarak Trkiye'nin yelik dosyasn pratikte gmd ve lkenin AB ryasnn sona erdii konusunda neredeyse sz birlii edildi. zninizle, Erdoan'n konumasnn bu ekilde okunmasna neden atm aklayaym. lkin, 2023 iin AKP vizyonu sunumuyla ilgili onca velveleye karn, konuma, her eyden nce Erdoan'n gemi ve gelecee dair byklk ilanyd. Konumas hi de Trkiye'nin 2023'te nasl gzkmesi gerektiiyle ilgili deildi. 2014'te kendisine oy vermesi beklenen insanlarn duygularna ve grlerine oynamaya ynelik zekice bir abayd. Bu yzden konuma, daha geni apta dinleyiciye hitap eden baarlar, slami referanslar ve lml da olsa milliyeti tonlamalarla doluydu. D politikaya ayrlan blmn, Suriye'deki acil sorunlar ve Trkiye'nin hem srail hem de geni Mslman lemiyle ilikilerine odaklanmasnda da aacak bir ey yok. Erdoan'n potansiyel semenini u sra alakadar eden meseleler bunlar. AB bu kategoriye uymuyor, zira u sra pek popler olmad gibi bu durumun yakn zamanda deimeyeceini Babakan da biliyor. 2014'te size ekstra oy getirmeyecekse AB'yi niye anasnz? Ayn sebepten ABD ile in'in de ad gemedi. Bu, Trkiye'nin gelecek birka ylda dnyann en nde gelen iki gcyle iyi ilikiler kurmak iin enerji harcamayaca anlamna m geliyor? Elbette hayr. Sadece AKP liderinin, bu ok nemli ilikilere atfta bulunmann, kendisine gelecek iki ylda yeni bir dinci ya da milliyeti oy kazandrmayaca hesabndan kaynaklanyor. kinci olarak, uzmanlara gre, yabanc misafirlerin profili, Trkiye'nin Ortadou'ya ilgisi artarken, Avrupa'dan uzaklatnn bir baka gstergesi. Alayc gzkmek istemem, ama izninizle her eyi bir perspektife oturtaym. Tpk bence baz konular konumaya kasten almamasndaki gibi, Erdoan, semenleri arasnda Hamas lideri Halid Meal'in herhangi bir Avrupa

liderinden ok daha popler olduunun farknda. Zaten Avrupal babakanlarn, sz konusu parti lideriyle ok gl kiisel ilikileri yoksa, yurtdnda baka partilerin kongresine gitmek gibi bir alkanl yoktur. Erdoan'n Avrupal liderlerle kiisel yaknlna bakp, kimin katlmasn beklerdiniz? Belki Silvio Berlusconi gnll olmutur, ama eminim, Trkiye Babakan, grtlana kadar skandallara batm eski talya liderini Ankara'da boy gstermemesi iin kibar ekilde ikna etmitir. Tekrarlyorum, geen pazarki misafir listesi, alc dinleyiciye, Erdoan'n adaylna mmkn olduu kadar ok yabanc desteki gsterme refleksinden ibaretti. Trkiye'nin d politika nceliklerinin listesi deildi. Son olarak, tahminimce, Erdoan'n, AKP'nin gelecek 10 ylla ilgili grn sunmaktan ok, kendi geleceiyle ilgili hazrlk yapmas durumuna hepimiz almalyz. Parti kongresinin ertesi gn, AKP'nin bir dier kurucusu olan Cumhurbakan Abdullah Gl'n sunduu Trkiye'nin geleceiyle ilgili farkl bir vizyona tanklk ettik. Gl, Meclis'e hitabnda, baz elzem noktalarda eski silah arkada Erdoan ile elimekten ekinmedi. Cumhurbakan, Meclis'e AB ynelimli reformlar zerinde almaya devam etme ve AB'yle uyum yasalarna tekrar ncelik verme ars yapt. Trkiye'nin gelecekteki AB yeliine hazrlanmann hl nemini koruduuna yaplan bu vurgunun, bir tesadf olmadna eminim. Gl, Ankara'daki parti kongresinde datlan geni apl ve ayrntl AKP vizyon belgesine karlk alternatif bir AKP gr sundu. Belki bugnden itibaren hepimiz, 2014'te Erdoan'n yerine babakan olmak iin tek gereki aday konumundaki Gl'n konumalarna ok daha fazla odaklanmalyz ve yeni cumhurbakan olma isteiyle seim kampanyasn geen pazar resmen balatan ahsn szlerine daha az nem atfetmeliyiz.

Fighting hate speech instead of blasphemy The angry and sometimes violent reactions in the Muslim world to the provocative movie clip The Innocence of Muslims has led to a new round of debates on blasphemy and freedom of expression. In Turkey, only a few people took to the streets to protest the clip, and although most people condemned the insult to their beliefs, they spoke out clearly against the irresponsible, aggressive actions by individual Muslims claiming to defend Islam. In order to prevent similar inflammatory incidents in the future, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan has called for an initiative to include measures against attacks on religion in national and international legislation. The idea was discussed in the corridors of the UN General Assembly in New York last week, and also in other countries a debate has started on the desirability of laws to punish blasphemy and the classical tension between that kind of legislation and freedom of expression. In the Netherlands, a clear and consistent view was put forward by Rob Vreeken, a journalist with the daily De Volkskrant who was recently awarded the European Journalist Award for Excellence in Journalism for his reporting on Muslim women. Vreeken is an experienced journalist who has traveled the Muslim world, knows the sensitivities of both Muslims and secular Westerners on this issue and, most importantly, has expressed an opinion that, according to me, is shared by most Europeans. Vreeken stresses the point that we are not starting this debate from scratch. Since 1999, Muslim majority countries like Pakistan have tried to put blasphemy on the agenda of the UN Human Right Council (UNHRC). With the rise of Islamophobia in many Western countries, the push to fight blasphemy has gained strength. But without much success till now, and Vreeken explains why. The basis for the global debate on blasphemy is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that has been signed and ratified by many states, including Turkey. It commits its signatories to respecting the civil and political rights of individuals, including, among others, freedom of religion (Article 20) and freedom of speech (Article 19). The key question

is, of course, how these two articles relate and what that implies for the present discussion on forbidding blasphemy. The ICCPR is monitored by the UN Human Rights Committee (OHCHR), a separate body to the UNHRC which consists of respected jurists who are tasked with interpreting the covenant. On the relation between Articles 19 and 20, they did so in July 2011. In General Comment No. 34 UN legal experts concluded that international law protects the rights of believers, not those of religions. Only individuals have human rights. Based on that premise, the committee concluded that forbidding a lack of respect for a particular religion is not compatible with the ICCPR and that punishing blasphemy goes against the freedom of expression. To complicate things, however, Comment 34 also says that there can be one exception to this general rule, and that is when blasphemy propagates feelings of hatred that incite discrimination or violence. The difficult question is obviously at what point showing disrespect becomes stirring up hatred. According to Vreeken, the wording of Comment 34 makes it clear that absolute priority should be given to freedom of expression, and that only in extraordinary cases may that right be violated. His conclusion is that therefore the current efforts of Erdoan and others dont stand a big chance at the UN level. Things might be different at the national level. In the Netherlands, both blasphemy and inciting hatred are punishable by law. Vreeken suggests deleting the Dutch article on blasphemy, which has anyway not been used since 1968, and focusing on the other article that penalizes insulting or inciting hatred against people on the basis of their race, religion, philosophy of life, sexual preference or handicap. In principle I agree with his point of view. The problem will always remain, however, how to interpret this article. When extreme-right wing populist Geert Wilders was brought before a court last year, accused of inciting hatred against Muslims because of his constant Islam bashing, the judges ruled, in my opinion erroneously, that his words were covered by the freedom of expression. What should be the lessons learned for Turkey where neither blasphemy nor inciting hatred are dealt with in the penal code? My suggestion would be to concentrate on the last, although I fully realize how easily such an article could be misused in a judicial system and culture where concepts like impartiality, tolerance and freedom of expression are not deeply rooted Dine hakaret yerine nefret sylemine kar savaalm Mslman leminin 'Mslmanlarn Masumiyeti' adl provokatif film klibine gsterdii kzgn ve zaman zaman iddet dolu tepki, dine kfr ve ifade zgrl hakkndaki tartmalarn yeni bir dngsn balatt. Klibi protesto iin Trkiye'de az sayda insan sokaklara dkld, pek ok kii, inanlarna hakareti knamakla birlikte, Mslman bireylerin slam' koruma iddiasyla sorumsuzca sergiledii saldrgan hareketlere net biimde kar kt. Babakan Tayyip Erdoan, gelecekte benzeri kkrtc vakalar nlemek amacyla, ulusal ve uluslararas yasalara 'dine saldrya' kar nlemler konulmas ars yapt. Bu fikir geen hafta New York'taki BM Genel Kurulu koridorlarnda tartlrken, baka lkelerde de dine kfr cezalandran yasalarn istenirlii ve bu trden yasalar ile ifade zgrl arasndaki klasik gerilim yeniden tartmaya ald. Hollanda'da en net ve tutarl gr, Rob Vreeken'den geldi. De Volkskrant'ta alan bir gazeteci olan Vreeken, bir sre nce Mslman kadnlarla ilgili haberleriyle Avrupa Gazetecilik stn Baar dl'ne layk grlmt. Mslman dnyasn gezmi deneyimli bir gazeteci olan Vreeken, bu meseleyle ilgili hem Mslmanlarn hem de laik Batllarn hassasiyetlerini biliyor, en nemlisi de, bana gre, Avrupallarn ou tarafndan paylalan bir gr dile getiriyor.

Vreeken, bu tartmaya sfrdan balamadmz vurguluyor. 1999'dan beri Pakistan gibi nfusunun ounluu Mslman olan lkeler, dine hakareti BM nsan Haklar Konseyi'nin gndemine sokmaya alyor. Pek ok Bat lkesinde slamofobi'nin ykselie gemesine mukabil dine hakaretle mcadele edilmesi ynndeki basn da artyor. Ama bugne dek pek baar elde edilemedi. Nedenlerini Vreeken izah ediyor. Dine kfrle ilgili kresel tartma iin Kiisel ve Siyasi Haklar Uluslararas Szlemesi (ICCPR) temel tekil ediyor. Trkiye dahil pek ok devletin imzalad ve onaylad szleme, imzaclarn, din zgrl (madde 20) ve ifade zgrl (madde 19) dahil kiisel ve siyasi haklara sayg gstermekle ykml klyor. Elbette kilit soru, sz konusu iki maddeyi nasl ilikilendirileceimiz ve bunun dine hakareti yasaklamakla ilgili sregiden tartma asndan ne anlama gelecei. ICCPR'nin icras, BM'de nsan Haklar Konseyi'nden ayr bir organ olan ve szlemeyi yorumlamakla grevli saygn hukukulardan oluan nsan Haklar Komitesi tarafndan gzlemleniyor. Nitekim Temmuz 2011'de BM'nin uzmanlar 19'uncu ve 20'nci madde arasndaki ilikiyi yorumladlar. '34 numaral genel yorum'da, uluslararas hukukun, dinlerin deil, inananlarn haklarn koruduu sonucuna vardlar. Yani sadece bireylerin insan haklar var. Bu ncle dayanarak, komite, belli bir dine saygszl yasaklamann ICCPR'yle badamayaca ve dine kfr cezalandrmann ifade zgrlne aykr olaca sonucuna ulat. Ancak ileri daha da kartracak ekilde, 34'nc yorum, bu genel kuraln bir istisnas olabilecei, bunun da, dine kfrn, ayrmclk ya da iddet kkrtan boyutta nefret duygular yaymas olduunu sylyor. Zorlu soru u: Saygszlk gstermek ne zaman nefreti krkler? Vreeken'e gre, 34'nc yorumda kullanlan ifadeler net ekilde gsteriyor ki, ifade zgrlne mutlak ncelik verilmesi gerekiyor ve bu hak sadece olaanst durumlarda ihlal edilebiliyor. Bu varg, Erdoan ve dierlerinin abalarna BM dzeyinde pek fazla ans tanmyor. Ulusal dzeyde iler farkl olabilir. Hollanda'da dine kfr de nefret kkrtcl da yasalara gre cezalandrlabilir. Vreeken'in nerisi, zaten 1968'den beri kullanlmayan dine kfr maddesinin iptal edilmesi ve onun yerine, engellilii, cinsel tercihi, yaam felsefesi, dini ve rkna bakarak insanlara hakaret edilmesi ya da nefret ynlendirilmesini cezalandran maddeye odaklanlmas. lkesel olarak bu bak asna katlyorum. Lakin bu maddenin nasl yorumlanaca, daimi bir sorun olacaktr. Geen yl ar sac-poplist Geert Wilders mahkemeye karldnda, slam' srekli olarak gnah keisi gstermek suretiyle Mslmanlara kar nefret kkrtmakla sulanyordu, gelgelelim yarglar, bana gre yanl ekilde, szlerinin ifade zgrl kapsamna girdiine hkmetti. Ceza Kanunu'nda dine hakarete yer veren ama nefret kkrtcln henz anmayan Trkiye, tm bunlardan ne ders karmal? Benim nerim ikincisine odaklanmak olur, her ne kadar, tarafszlk, hogr ve ifade zgrl gibi kavramlarn derinden kk salmad bir yarg sistemi ve kltrde, byle bir maddenin ktye kullanlmasnn ok kolay olduunun tmyle farknda olsam da...

It happened Since the verdict in the Sledgehammer trial last Friday, the public relations war on how to interpret the ruling is in full swing. Is it, as this paper has been saying, a historic step in Turkey's democratization process? Should it be seen as a miscarriage of justice, based on fake documents and inspired by feelings of vengeance, as other media outlets want us to believe? Or should we be careful not to jump to conclusions and wait until the judges have published their arguments? In Turkey, it is very easy to learn about all the different points of view. Columnists and editors from all newspapers and TV channels have come forward with their often very outspoken assessments. In Europe and the US it's much harder for people to get a real good picture of the significance of the Sledgehammer case. Correspondents wrote and spoke about it briefly and, depending on their own analysis, mainly stressed the facts or went into the speculations and discussions surrounding the trial. The big problem is that 99 percent of the Europeans and Americans lack the basic background information to be able to make sense of this court case. Most only vaguely remember the history of previous coups in Turkey, and nobody has heard of etin Doan, one of the main suspects in this case, whom many Turks remember as one of the architects of the Feb. 28, 1997 post-modern coup. Only a few informed Westerners fully

understand the ideological mindset of the old guard in the Turkish army that considered intervening in politics not only as a right but as an obligation. It should not come as a surprise that, given this absence of informed news consumers, it is relatively easy to manipulate public opinion in Europe and the US. That is exactly what has been happening since the start of the trial in 2010. As Emre Uslu pointedly concluded in his column, the defendants and their spokespersons have not done a good enough job in defending their clients in court, but they have done an excellent job in convincing the Western media and public opinion that the Sledgehammer case is part of the battle between Islamists and secularists in Turkey and that the secular and democratic character of the republic is under threat. The most tireless and committed advocate of one of the key suspects was and is Dani Rodrik, etin Doan's son-in-law and a respected Harvard University professor with a huge network in Western media and among opinion leaders. Since the start of the trial, Rodrik has written numerous articles in which he has kept on hammering one idea into his readers' heads: This coup plot is fabricated, and everybody who claims otherwise does not know the facts or has fallen into the trap set by the Glen movement, the biggest supporter of this and other trials. His main argument: The CDs that contain all of the Sledgehammer documents are fake and were produced later. One has to give it to Rodrik: He has managed to convince many in Washington and Brussels that something was fundamentally wrong with this trial. During the last year, for instance, the perception among members of the European Parliament markedly changed after Rodrik and other family members of the defendants paid them a visit. And then there was Hilmi zkk. The former chief of General Staff at the time of the disputed 2003 seminar who first testified and last weekend spoke out on the ruling of the court. He acknowledged that he was informed about the meeting and that he warned the generals involved that the seminar, which according to Doan and Rodrik was no more than a get-together to test the army's plans against a particular contingency scenario, went beyond its purpose. Knowing the mindset of his subordinates, it was clear to zkk that these were not just war games but serious plans to intimidate the new Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government that most officers deeply distrusted or despised. After the trial ended, zkk expressed his sadness and sorrow about the fate of his former colleagues but stated that the trial was not unfair. He also said: I wish no such thing had ever happened. But it happened. My question to Rodrik and the people that trust his judgment: Is zkk a closet Glenist or has he put his finger on the sore spot? For me the heart of the matter is this: There were several high ranking officers in 2003 who were looking for approval for their coup plans but did not get it. Forget about manipulated CDs and procedural mistakes. They will be dealt with in the appeal procedure and, if necessary, corrected. If Rodrik's allegations are true, even partly, the responsible prosecutors and judges should bear the brunt for their misbehavior. But that does not mean that etin Doan and others did not try to undermine a democratically elected government in 2003. That happened, and those responsible should be punished. Bunlar yaand Geen cuma Balyoz davasnda karar aklanr aklanmaz, nasl yorumlanacana dair tam gaz bir halkla ilikiler sava balad. Bu gazetenin dedii gibi, Trkiye'nin demokratikleme srecinde tarihi bir adm m atld? Yoksa dier medya organlarnn bizi inandrmak istedii gibi, intikam duygularndan kaynaklanan ve sahte belgelere dayanan bir adaletsizlik miydi? Ya da

ihtiyatl olmamz ve yarglar gerekeli karar aklayana dek abuk hkmlere varmamamz m gerekirdi? Trkiye'de tm farkl bak alarn bir rpda renebiliyorsunuz. Gazete ve televizyon kanallar ke yazarlar ve editrlerin genelde ak szl deerlendirmelerinden geilmiyor. Avrupa ve ABD'deki insanlar iinse Balyoz davasnn nemini anlamak ok daha zor. Muhabirler bu konuda ksa haberyorumlar geiyor ve kendi analizleri dorultusunda ya olgulara vurgu yapyor ya da davann evresinde dnen tartma ve speklasyonlara giriyor. Asl sorun, Avrupallarla Amerikallarn yzde 99'unun, bu davaya mana atfetmelerini salayacak temel arka plan bilgilerinden yoksun olmas. ou, Trkiye'nin darbe tarihesini hayal meyal hatrlyor ve bu davann ba zanllarndan biri olup pek ok Trk'n 28 ubat 1997 postmodern darbesinin mimarlarndan biri olarak tand etin Doan'n adn duymu deil. Siyasete karmay sadece hak deil grev olarak da belleyen Trk ordusunun eski tfeklerinin ideolojik zihniyetini tam olarak anlayan bilgili Batl says son derece az. Dolaysyla, bilgili haber tketicilerinin eksikliinin ekildii Avrupa ve ABD'de kamuoyu grn maniple etmenin grece kolay olmas artc deil. 2010'da davann balamasndan beri olan biten tam da bu. Emre Uslu'nun ke yazs, bu duruma iaret ediyor: Savunma makam ve szcleri, mvekkillerini savunmada yeterince iyi i karamad, ama Bat medyas ile kamuoyunu Balyoz davasnn Trkiye'deki slamc-laik savann bir paras olduuna ve cumhuriyetin laikdemokratik karakterinin tehdit altnda bulunduuna ikna etmekte mkemmel i kard. Kilit zanllardan birinin en ylmaz ve yorulmaz avukat, etin Doan'n damad Dani Rodrik. Harvard niversitesi'nin saygn profesrlerinden Rodrik, Bat medyas ve kanaat nderleri arasndaki muazzam aa hakim bir isim. Dava baladndan beri ok sayda makale kaleme alan Rodrik, okurlarnn kafasna tek bir fikri akt durdu: Bu darbe komplosu uydurmadr ve bunun tersini iddia edenler ya olgular bilmiyordur ya da bu ve benzeri davalarn en byk destekisi olan Glen hareketinin kurduu tuzaa dmtr. Rodrik'in ba sav u: Balyoz belgelerinin bulunduu tm CD'ler sahte ve sonradan retildi. Rodrik'in hakkn teslim etmek lazm: Bu davada bir eylerin temelden yanl olduuna dair Washington ve Brksel'de pek ok kiiyi ikna etmeyi baard. rnein geen yl Avrupa Parlamentosu yeleri, Rodrik ve dier davallarn akrabalar tarafndan ziyaret edildikten sonra, kanaatlerini deitirdi. Gelelim Hilmi zkk'e. 2003'teki tartmal seminer srasnda grevde bulunan eski Genelkurmay Bakan, nce tanklk etti ve sonra geen haftasonu kararla ilgili grn aka dile getirdi. zkk, toplantdan haberdar olduunu, Doan ve Rodrik'e gre ordunun beklenmedik olay senaryolarna kar planlarn snad bir toplantdan tesi olmayan seminerle ilgili generalleri 'amac atklarna' dair uyardn kabul etti. Astlarnn zihniyetini bilen zkk iin, bunlarn sade harp oyunlar deil de, ou subayn derin bir gvensizlik ya da hor grme besledii AKP hkmetini sindirmeye ynelik ciddi planlar olduu aikard. Dava bittikten sonra, zkk eski silah arkadalarnn akbetinden duyduu znty dile getirdi, ama "Adil yarglama olmad diyemem" vurgusu yapt. "Bunlar keke olmasayd diye dnyoruz, ne yapalm, bunlar yaand" ifadesini de kulland. Rodrik ve onun muhakemesine gvenen insanlara sorum u: zkk gizli bir Glenci midir yoksa meselenin bam teline mi basmtr? Benim iin meselenin z u: 2003'te bir dizi st dzey subay, darbe planlarna onay almann peindeydi ama o onay alamad. Maniple edilen CD'leri ve yarglama yntemine ait hatalar bo verin. Bunlarla temyiz srecinde uralr ve gerekirse dzeltilir. Rodrik'in sulamalar ksmen de olsa doruysa, sorumlu savc ve yarglar hatalarnn ceremesini ekmelidir. Ama tm bunlar, etin Doan ve dierlerinin demokratik olarak seilmi hkmetin 2003'te kuyusunu kazmaya almad anlamna gelmez. Bunlar yaand ve sorumlular cezalandrlmal.

In the making: the Kosovar national football team Most of the time, Kosovo makes it to the news when there is a problem with Serbia or with the Kosovar Serbs living in the practically autonomous north of the country. Belgrade has no intention to recognize Kosovos independence and officially considers it to still be an integral part of Serbia. The ethnic Serbs that make up the majority of the population north of the river Ibar show no sign of giving up their resistance to the efforts of the authorities in Pristina to establish full sovereignty in that part of Kosovo as well. Nothing seems to be moving and only die-hard Balkan observers are able to detect some minor potential changes to the status quo. Last week the Kosovars got the opportunity to celebrate their independence for the second time. In February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Since then, 89 states, including 22 EU member states, the US and Turkey, have

recognized it. One of the conditions set by the EU and the US was the establishment of an International Steering Group (ISG) that would monitor the young republics performance, especially in the field of democracy and human rights. It meant that Kosovo got its independence but it was internationally supervised. That supervision ended last Monday after the 25 states making up the ISG announced that Kosovo had fulfilled all the relevant conditions. The move was enthusiastically welcomed by the government of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, which organized two days of festivities. The reaction of Belgrade was predictable. For the Serbs nothing has changed. They accept neither the supervised nor unsupervised independence of Kosovo. Pressure on Serbia to change its obstructionist attitude has been growing, however, since the country has applied for EU membership. Senior EU officials, backed by an outspoken German government, have suggested that recognition of Kosovos independence may be a precondition for Serbia joining the EU. In October the European Commission will present its annual report on Serbias EU progress and in the Serbian press there is already speculation that the commission is not impressed by Serbias integration efforts. Brussels is therefore probably not going to recommend to the EU member states to start the EU accession talks at the end of this year that Belgrade is hoping for. We will see who is going to blink first, but a quick start of the EU negotiations does not seem very likely. This means that hopes for a breakthrough in Serbian-Kosovar relations should be put on the backburner as well. Are we back to square one again? Not entirely. In a beautiful article in The New York Times a few days ago, James Montague presented a ray of hope by telling the story of the Kosovo Football Federation and their attempts to get support for the formal recognition of a Kosovar national team. The reporter follows two officials in Switzerland, where the home team is preparing for a World Cup qualifying match against Albania. Of the 22 players lined up for the game, nine were born in or had roots in Kosovo. Six of them play for Albania and it does not come as a big surprise that they are quite willing to change the Albanian jersey for a Kosovar one if the opportunity arises. The fascinating part is on the three Swiss-Kosovar players, of whom the most well known is Xherdan Shaqiri, a talented 20-year-old midfielder playing for Bayern Munich. The Kosovar officials are trying to convince Shaqiri and his two colleagues to sign a petition asking UEFA, European footballs governing body, to be more flexible and allow a Kosovar national team to play against other states despite the fact that the country is not a member of the UN yet. Membership is an official requirement and countries like Spain and Russia that do not recognize Kosovos independence have been able to block Kosovos football dreams using that argument. But the isolation may not be permanent. In May, Sepp Blatter, the Swiss president of the world football association FIFA, announced that Kosovo would be allowed to play noncompetitive matches against other countries. It is seen by many as the first step toward full membership. The Kosovar football officials want to use the momentum and push UEFA to follow suit. That might take some time, but it is clear that there could be a light at the end of the tunnel. It may be on the football pitch that Kosovo will first break the deadlock. Shaqiri and his two fellow Swiss-Kosovar internationals got the message and signed the petition. Yapm aamasnda: Kosova milli futbol takm Kosova, Srbistan ya da lkenin kuzeyinde pratikte zerk yaayan Kosoval Srplarla arasnda sorun ktnda haber olur genelde. Belgrad, bamszln tanmaya niyetli olmad Kosova'y, hl resmen Srbistan'n ayrlmaz paras addediyor.

Ibar Nehri'nin kuzeyinde nfusun ounluunu oluturan etnik Srplar, Pritine'deki yetkililerin, Kosova'nn bu blmnde de tam egemenlik salama abalarna direnmekten vazgeme emaresi gstermiyor. Hibir ilerleme kaydedilemezken, sadece iflah olmaz Balkan gzlemcileri statkoda baz kk potansiyel deiiklikler saptayabiliyor. Geen hafta Kosovallar, bamszlklarn ikinci kez kutlama frsat buldu. Kosova, ubat 2008'de Srbistan'dan bamszln ilan etmiti. O zamandan beri aralarnda 22 AB yesi lke, Trkiye ve ABD'nin de bulunduu 89 devlet Kosova'y tand. AB ve ABD'nin tanma koullarndan biri, gen cumhuriyetin zellikle demokrasi ve insan haklar alannda performansn gzlemleyecek Uluslararas Ynlendirme Grubu'nun (UYG) kurulmasyd. Bu, Kosova'nn bamsz, ama uluslararas gzetim-denetim altnda olaca anlamna geliyordu. Bu denetim, UYG'yi oluturan 25 devletin, Kosova'nn ilgili tm koullar yerine getirdiini duyurmasnn ardndan, geen pazartesi sona erdi. Karar cokuyla karlayan Haim Taci'nin babakanlndaki hkmet, iki gn kutlama etkinlikleri dzenledi. Belgrad'n tepkisini tahmin edersiniz. Srplar asndan deien bir ey yok. Kosova'nn ne denetlenen ne de denetlenmeyen bamszln kabul ediyorlar. Gelgelelim AB yeliine bavurduundan beri, Srbistan'a Nuh deyip peygamber demeyen tavrn deitirmesi iin basklar artyor. Akszl Alman hkmeti tarafndan desteklenen st dzey Alman yetkililer, Kosova'nn bamszln tanmann, Srbistan'n yeliinin nart yaplmasn nerdi. Avrupa Komisyonu, ekimde Srbistan ile ilgili ilerleme raporunu aklayacak. Komisyon'un Srbistan'n entegrasyon abalarndan tatmin olmadna dair speklasyonlar, imdiden Srp basnnda kyor. Dolaysyla Brksel, Belgrad'n umutlarn boa karacak ve AB yelerine yl sonunda Srbistan ile yelik mzakerelerine balanmas ynnde bir tavsiyede bulunmayacak byk ihtimalle. lk gz krpan kim olacak, greceiz, ama AB mzakerelerinin abucak balamas pek olas gzkmyor. Bu, Srbistan-Kosova ilikilerinde dzelme umudunun daha geri plana atlmas anlamna geliyor ayn zamanda. Baladmz yere geri mi dndk? Tam deil. Birka gn nce New York Times'ta yaymlanan gzel makalesinde, James Montague, Kosova Futbol Federasyonu kurma ve Kosova milli takmnn resmen tannmasna destek toplama giriimlerinin hikyesini anlatarak bir nebze umut sundu. Muhabir, 11 Eyll'de Dnya Kupas elemelerinde Arnavutluk'u arlayan svire'ye giden iki Kosoval yetkiliye elik etmi. Ma gn sahaya kan 22 futbolcudan 9'u ya Kosova doumlu ya da Kosova kkenli. Bunlardan Arnavutluk iin oynayan 6'snn, frsat doarsa, Arnavutluk formasn karp Kosova'nnkini giymeleri byk bir srpriz olmaz. En ilgi eken ise Kosova asll svireli futbolcu arasnda en mehuru olan Xherdan Shaqiri. 20 yandaki yetenekli orta saha oyuncusu Shaqiri, Bayern Mnih'te top koturuyor. Kosoval yetkililer, Shaqiri ile iki mili takm arkadan, Avrupa futbolunu yneten UEFA'ya verilecek dilekeyi imzalamaya ikna etmeye alt. Dilekede, UEFA'dan, daha esnek davranmas ve lkenin henz BM yesi olmamasna ramen, Kosova milli takmnn dier milli takmlarla ma yapmasna izin vermesi talep ediliyor. Bir federasyonun UEFA yesi olmasnn resmi artlarndan biri, lkenin BM yesi olmas. Kosova'nn bamszln tanmayan spanya ve Rusya, bu sava bavurarak, Kosova'nn futbol ryasn engelleyebilir. Yine de futbol tecridinin kalclamamas mmkn. Maysta Uluslararas Futbol Federasyonlar Birlii FIFA'nn svireli Bakan Sepp Blatter, Kosova'nn baka lkelere kar dostluk malar oynamasna izin verilebileceini duyurdu. Bu, pek oklarnca, tam yelie ilk adm olarak yorumland. Kosoval futbol yetkilileri, bu ivmeyi kullanarak, UEFA'ya, FIFA'nn izinden gitmesi iin bask yapyor. Bu zaman alabilir, ama tnelin ucunda n gzktne phe yok. Kosova dmnn zlecei ilk yer futbol sahas olabilir. Shaqiri ve Kosova asll svireli iki takm arkada da, bu me Organize provokasyonlar Bir sre nce You Tube'a gnderilen 'Mslmanlarn masumiyeti' adl video klip hakknda ok ey yazld ve sylendi. ki haftadan ksa sre nce daha geni bir izleyici kitlesine ulaan filmin fragman, tm Mslman lemini saran ve 20 kiinin canna mal olan iddetli protestolar tetikledi. stisnasz izleyen herkes, ksa filmi, tek amac alabildiine ok mmini kkrtmak olan, Mslmanlara hakarete ynelik amatrce bir giriim olarak eletirdi. Fanatik Mslmanlarn Bat kart sloganlar atarak yrd, filmle hibir ilgisi olmayan masum insanlarn ldrld, malmlklerinin yakld sahneler, Salman Rdi'nin 'eytan Ayetleri' roman ve Danimarka'da yaymlanan Hz. Muhammed karikatrlerine ynelik Mslmanlarn daha nceki fke davurumlarn hatrlatt pek ok kiiye. Saylarn kyaslanacak gibi olmamasna -bu kez hemen hemen bir avu protestocu sokaklara dkld- ve pek ok Mslman liderin iddeti knamasna ramen, Avrupa ve ABD'de ounluun algs gemitekinden farksz: Mslmanlar kana susam ve hogrden nasibini almam mahluklar. Yapmcs ve ynetmeniyle ilgili ilk belirsizliklerin kalkmasnn ardndan ulalan ayrntlar gsteriyor ki, filmin yaplmasnn ve bu zamanlamayla datma sokulmasnn tek sebebi, nceden retilmi malum klieleri pekitirmek. Baka bir balam

olduu yalan sylenerek ekimlerine balanan, maniple edilen ve slam kart zehir zemberek bir manifestoya dntrlen filmi bir Amerikan B filmi ynetmenine ektiren yapmc Naboula Basseley Naboula. Kendisi Kaliforniya'da yaayan ve su sicili bulunan bir Kpti Hristiyan. Klip, aslnda YouTube'a birka ay nce konuldu, ama gerisindeki hasta zihinlerin umduu dikkati ekemedi. Bu durum, ABD'de yaayan slam kart kt hretli bir Kpti eylemci olan Morris Sadek'in mdahalesiyle deiti. Yln balarnda provokatif faaliyetleri yznden Msr vatandalndan karlan Sadek, 4 Eyll'de telefon ap Msrl bir gazeteciyi rezil videonun varlndan haberdar etti. Bundan sonra olanlar McClatchy haber sitesinden renebilirsiniz. Gazeteci, klibin Msrl Mslmanlar ile Hristiyanlar arasndaki gerilimi trmandrabilecei uyars yapan ksa bir makale kaleme ald. gn sonra film, popler bir Selefi kanalnda gsterildi ve ardndan ultra Ortodoks Selefi liderler 11 Eyll'de protesto ars yapmaya balad. Potansiyel tehlikenin hemen farkna varan ABD Bykelilii, filmde hibir ABD'li yetkilinin dahli olmadn vurgulamakla birlikte Selefilere zr dileyen arlar yapt. Ama bir ie yaramad ve sembolizm dolu bir gn olan 11 Eyll'de protestocular ABD eliliini istila etti. Tm bunlar yerel apta bir kavga grlt olarak kalabilirdi, eer saatler sonra Bingazi'deki ABD konsolosluu saldrya urayp Bykeli Chris Stevens ile Amerikal daha ldrlmeseydi... Ksa srede anlald ki, katiller protestocu deil, baskn, profesyonel biimde planlanm ve protestolar klf olarak kullanan terristler tarafndan dzenlenmi. Sonradan rendik ki, Usame bin Ladin'in lmnn ardndan El-Kaide liderliini stlenen Msrl Ayman Zevahiri, elilik saldrsndan bir gn nce, 10 Eyll'de bir video yaynlayp, Msr ve Libya halkna mer Abdul Rahman'n serbest braklmas iin savamalar ars yapm. Kr eyh, 1993'teki Dnya Ticaret rgt'ne terr saldrsyla balantsndan tr ABD'de hapis yatyor. Zevahiri, ayn videoda, El-Kaide ideolou Ebu Yahya el-Libi'nin haziranda Amerikan insansz uaklarnn saldrsnda ldn de dorulurken, intikamnn alnmas ars yapyor. Dolaysyla Kahire protestolarnda barol ElKaide liderinin kardei Muhammed Zevahiri'nin oynamasna ve Bingazi'de Amerikallarn ldrlmesinin sorumluluunu ElKaide balantl bir rgtn stlenmesine amamak lazm. Tm bu balantlar gsteriyor ki, Mslman lemindeki Amerikan kart protestolar, bir baka kazara provokasyona kendiliinden gelien tepkiler deil. slamofobik propagandann tetikledii kendine zarar veren Mslman fkesinin yeni bir patlamas, seim ncesi dnemde Amerikan hedeflerine iyi planlanm terr saldrlar ve radikal slamclarn Msr ile Libya'nn lml hkmetlerini itibarszlatrp istikrarszlatrma abalarnn zehirli bir karmna tanklk ediyoruz bugn. Tek amac Mslmanlarla dnyann geri kalan arasndaki uurumu bytmek olan arlklarn kurduu bu tuzaklara dmek istemeyen Mslman saysnn dnya apnda arttn grmek ise cesaret veriyor. saj alm olmal ki, dilekeyi imzalad.

Organized provocations Much has been said and written about the video clip Innocence of Muslims that was posted on YouTube at some point in time. After it became known to a wider audience less than two weeks ago, the trailer for the movie sparked violent protests all over the Muslim world that have killed almost 20 people. With no exception, everybody who has seen the short movie has criticized it as an amateurish attempt to insult Muslims, made with the sole purpose of provoking as many believers as possible. The scenes of fanatic Muslims marching and shouting anti-Western slogans, innocent people with no connection to the movie being killed and properties being burned reminds many of previous expressions of Muslim rage against Salman Rushdie's novel "The Satanic Verses" and the Danish Mohammed cartoons. Although the numbers cannot be compared -this time around only a handful of protesters have taken to the streets -- and many Muslim leaders have condemned the violence, the perception of many in Europe and the US is exactly the same as before: Muslims are bloodthirsty and intolerant

creatures. After an initial lack of clarity about the producers and makers of the movie, more details have come out which show that strengthening these prefabricated clichs is the only reason why it was made in the first place and why it was distributed at this moment in time. The film was produced under a false pretext and was later manipulated and dubbed into a vitriolic antiIslam manifesto by an American director of B-movies under the guidance of Naboula Basseley Naboula, a Coptic Christian with a criminal record living in California. The clip was posted on YouTube some months ago but did not get the attention that the sick minds behind it were hoping for. That changed after another Coptic Christian and notorious anti-Islam activist living in the US, Morris Sadek, who earlier this year lost his Egyptian citizenship as a result of his provocative activities, called an Egyptian journalist on Sept. 4 to inform him about the existence of the infamous clip. On the McClatchy news website one can read what happened next. The journalist wrote a short article warning that the short movie could fuel tension between Egyptian Muslims and Christians. Three days later the clip was shown by a popular Salafist TV station, and soon after ultraorthodox Salafist leaders started to call for protests on Sept. 11. The US Embassy soon realized the potential danger and called on the Salafists to apologize for the movie although they stressed that there was no involvement from the US authorities at all. It did not help and on Sept. 11, a day full of symbolism, demonstrators set upon the US Embassy. The whole thing might have remained a local row had not hours later the US Consulate in Benghazi been attacked and Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans killed. It became clear soon that the murderers were not demonstrators and that the professionally planned raid was carried out by terrorists who had used the protests as a cover. Since then we have learned that one day before, on Sept. 10, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian successor to Osama binladen as leader of al-Qaeda, sent out a video calling upon the Libyan and Egyptian population to fight for the release of Omar Abdul Rahman, the blind sheikh who is in prison in the US because of his links with the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. In the same video Zawahiri also admitted that Abu Yahya al-Libi, the al-Qaeda ideologue, had been killed by a US drone in June and that his death called for revenge. It should come as no surprise that a leading role during the Cairo demonstrations was played by Mohammed al-Zawahiri, the brother of the al-Qaeda leader, and that in the meantime the killing of the Americans in Benghazi has been claimed by an organization affiliated with al-Qaeda. All these connections show that the anti-American protests in the Muslim world are not a spontaneous reaction to another accidental anti-Islamic provocation. What we are witnessing today is the result of a poisonous mix of Islamophobic propaganda to trigger a new round of self-defeating Muslim anger, well planned terrorist attacks on American targets in a pre-election period and efforts by radical Islamists to destabilize and discredit moderate governments in Egypt and Libya. It is encouraging to see that a growing number of Muslims worldwide seem no longer willing to fall into these traps set by extremists whose only goal is to widen the gap between Muslims and the rest of the world. Organize provokasyonlar Bir sre nce You Tube'a gnderilen 'Mslmanlarn masumiyeti' adl video klip hakknda ok ey yazld ve sylendi. ki haftadan ksa sre nce daha geni bir izleyici kitlesine ulaan filmin fragman, tm Mslman lemini saran ve 20 kiinin canna mal olan iddetli protestolar tetikledi. stisnasz izleyen herkes, ksa filmi, tek amac alabildiine ok mmini kkrtmak olan, Mslmanlara hakarete ynelik amatrce bir giriim olarak eletirdi.

Fanatik Mslmanlarn Bat kart sloganlar atarak yrd, filmle hibir ilgisi olmayan masum insanlarn ldrld, malmlklerinin yakld sahneler, Salman Rdi'nin 'eytan Ayetleri' roman ve Danimarka'da yaymlanan Hz. Muhammed karikatrlerine ynelik Mslmanlarn daha nceki fke davurumlarn hatrlatt pek ok kiiye. Saylarn kyaslanacak gibi olmamasna -bu kez hemen hemen bir avu protestocu sokaklara dkld- ve pek ok Mslman liderin iddeti knamasna ramen, Avrupa ve ABD'de ounluun algs gemitekinden farksz: Mslmanlar kana susam ve hogrden nasibini almam mahluklar. Yapmcs ve ynetmeniyle ilgili ilk belirsizliklerin kalkmasnn ardndan ulalan ayrntlar gsteriyor ki, filmin yaplmasnn ve bu zamanlamayla datma sokulmasnn tek sebebi, nceden retilmi malum klieleri pekitirmek. Baka bir balam olduu yalan sylenerek ekimlerine balanan, maniple edilen ve slam kart zehir zemberek bir manifestoya dntrlen filmi bir Amerikan B filmi ynetmenine ektiren yapmc Naboula Basseley Naboula. Kendisi Kaliforniya'da yaayan ve su sicili bulunan bir Kpti Hristiyan. Klip, aslnda YouTube'a birka ay nce konuldu, ama gerisindeki hasta zihinlerin umduu dikkati ekemedi. Bu durum, ABD'de yaayan slam kart kt hretli bir Kpti eylemci olan Morris Sadek'in mdahalesiyle deiti. Yln balarnda provokatif faaliyetleri yznden Msr vatandalndan karlan Sadek, 4 Eyll'de telefon ap Msrl bir gazeteciyi rezil videonun varlndan haberdar etti. Bundan sonra olanlar McClatchy haber sitesinden renebilirsiniz. Gazeteci, klibin Msrl Mslmanlar ile Hristiyanlar arasndaki gerilimi trmandrabilecei uyars yapan ksa bir makale kaleme ald. gn sonra film, popler bir Selefi kanalnda gsterildi ve ardndan ultra Ortodoks Selefi liderler 11 Eyll'de protesto ars yapmaya balad. Potansiyel tehlikenin hemen farkna varan ABD Bykelilii, filmde hibir ABD'li yetkilinin dahli olmadn vurgulamakla birlikte Selefilere zr dileyen arlar yapt. Ama bir ie yaramad ve sembolizm dolu bir gn olan 11 Eyll'de protestocular ABD eliliini istila etti. Tm bunlar yerel apta bir kavga grlt olarak kalabilirdi, eer saatler sonra Bingazi'deki ABD konsolosluu saldrya urayp Bykeli Chris Stevens ile Amerikal daha ldrlmeseydi... Ksa srede anlald ki, katiller protestocu deil, baskn, profesyonel biimde planlanm ve protestolar klf olarak kullanan terristler tarafndan dzenlenmi. Sonradan rendik ki, Usame bin Ladin'in lmnn ardndan El-Kaide liderliini stlenen Msrl Ayman Zevahiri, elilik saldrsndan bir gn nce, 10 Eyll'de bir video yaynlayp, Msr ve Libya halkna mer Abdul Rahman'n serbest braklmas iin savamalar ars yapm. Kr eyh, 1993'teki Dnya Ticaret rgt'ne terr saldrsyla balantsndan tr ABD'de hapis yatyor. Zevahiri, ayn videoda, El-Kaide ideolou Ebu Yahya el-Libi'nin haziranda Amerikan insansz uaklarnn saldrsnda ldn de dorulurken, intikamnn alnmas ars yapyor. Dolaysyla Kahire protestolarnda barol ElKaide liderinin kardei Muhammed Zevahiri'nin oynamasna ve Bingazi'de Amerikallarn ldrlmesinin sorumluluunu ElKaide balantl bir rgtn stlenmesine amamak lazm. Tm bu balantlar gsteriyor ki, Mslman lemindeki Amerikan kart protestolar, bir baka kazara provokasyona kendiliinden gelien tepkiler deil. slamofobik propagandann tetikledii kendine zarar veren Mslman fkesinin yeni bir patlamas, seim ncesi dnemde Amerikan hedeflerine iyi planlanm terr saldrlar ve radikal slamclarn Msr ile Libya'nn lml hkmetlerini itibarszlatrp istikrarszlatrma abalarnn zehirli bir karmna tanklk ediyoruz bugn. Tek amac Mslmanlarla dnyann geri kalan arasndaki uurumu bytmek olan arlklarn kurduu bu tuzaklara dmek istemeyen Mslman saysnn dnya apnda arttn grmek ise cesaret veriyor.

Stepping back from the abyss On the Kurdish problem, all alarm bells are ringing, but it seems the authorities are not listening or don't understand what the warnings are all about. Since the summer of 2011, Turkey has experienced the worst fighting between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the state in over a decade. Hundreds of people have been killed on both sides. Terrorist attacks on civilian targets are slowly creating an atmosphere that reminds many of the 1990s, when Turkey went through a cycle of terror, violence and massive human rights violations.

Although everybody knows and acknowledges that military action and repressive measures will not solve the underlying problem, what we hear from the government and nationalist media these days is a repetition of the angry and aggressive rhetoric that failed to bring the conflict to an end 20 years ago. Let me use two recent examples to make my point that when dealing with the Kurdish problem, Turkey has started to repeat the tragic mistakes of the past. Last weekend, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan gave several speeches in which he referred to the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). He more or less instructed the judiciary to initiate a case against some BDP deputies for openly demonstrating their affinity with members of the terrorist PKK. The goal would be to lift the parliamentary immunity of these deputies, considered by many as the first step towards the wholesale closure of the party. With one stone Erdoan managed to kill two birds: independence of the judiciary and Kurdish political representation. A spokesperson for the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) tried to save the situation by saying that they were already dealing with the case and that Erdoan's remark was probably a slip of the tongue, because the HSYK does not take instructions from the government. He is fully right on the last point, but I am not sure whether the government would agree with this interpretation of the separation of powers. Let me put it carefully: Appearances are against the prime minister. The second error was opening the path, both legally and psychologically, to a BDP closure. In the past, all predecessors of the party have been closed down. It only played into the hands of radical Kurdish nationalists, who believe that the Kurds have no democratic means of reaching their goals. It totally undermined the position of those Kurds looking for a political solution. This suggestion also contradicts another speech the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader made last weekend in which he called on the BDP deputies to set a clear course for their work in Parliament and distance themselves from the PKK in the mountains. The prime minister definitively has a point there. But how attractive is this parliamentary option, when at the same time there is a real danger that deputies will be arrested and the party will be closed? On top of that, Erdoan's promise that BDP politicians looking for a solution in Parliament will find interlocutors to sit with at the same table sounds rather hollow. If the prime minister really has something to offer the BDP, why does he keep on postponing and placing conditions on his meetings with them? If the government truly believes the BDP is part of the solution, why then have thousands of local BDP representatives and activists been arrested? In a new report published this week, the International Crisis Group (ICG) lists the elements of a realistic solution. They sound familiar because they have been mentioned so many times before. Even in the absence of a cease-fire, the ICG calls on the Turkish government to address the legitimate and broadly supported demands of Kurdish society for mother-language education, the lowering of the 10 percent electoral threshold, more decentralized local government and removal of discriminatory ethnic bias in the Constitution and laws. Also, the Counterterrorism Law (TMK) and other legislation should be changed to end the detention and prosecution of peaceful Kurdish activists. The ICG believes that Prime Minister Erdoan is still capable of convincing public opinion that Turkey has no other option than to go down this road. The burning question, however, is whether he is still willing to do so. The most frustrating problem nowadays in Turkey is the widening gap between the kind of rational and logical steps the ICG is promoting and the heated rhetoric of politicians and parts of the media. Nationalist passions and the inability to learn from

the failed policies of the past have brought Turkey close to a new round of violent, dead-end clashes. Who has the courage and the vision to step back from the abyss? Cehennemin kapsndan dnmek Krt sorunuyla ilgili tm alarm zilleri alyor ama yetkililer duymuyor ya da uyarlarn neyle ilgili olduunu anlamyor gibi gzkyor. 2011 yazndan beri, Trkiye, PKK ile devlet arasnda 10 ksur yln en iddetli atmalarn yayor. Her iki taraftan yzlerce kii ld. Sivil hedeflere ynelik terr saldrlarnn yava yava yaratt atmosfer, ou insana, Trkiye'nin terr, iddet ve youn insan haklar ihlalleri dngsnden getii 1990'lar hatrlatyor. Askeri eylemler ve baskc nlemlerin dipte yatan sorunlar zmeyeceini herkesin bilmesine ve kabul etmesine ramen, bugnlerde hkmetten ve milliyeti medyadan duyduklarmz, 20 yl nce ihtilaf bitirmeyi baaramam kzgn ve saldrgan sylemin bir tekrarndan ibaret. zninizle, Trkiye'nin Krt sorunuyla urarken gemiin trajik hatalarn tekrarlamaya balad grm serimlemek iin son gnlerden iki rnek vereyim. Geen hafta sonu Babakan Tayyip Erdoan, Krt yanls Bar ve Demokrasi Partisi'ni (BDP) ele ald bir dizi konuma yapt. Terrist Krdistan i Partisi'nin (PKK) yeleriyle muhabbetlerini aka sergiledikleri gerekesiyle baz BDP parlamenterlerine dava almas iin yargya neredeyse talimat verdi. Ama bu milletvekillerinin parlamento dokunulmazln kaldrmakt ki, bu, pek oklarnca tm partinin kapatlmas yolunda ilk adm olarak deerlendirildi. Erdoan bir tala iki ku ldrd: Yarg bamszl ve Krtlerin siyasi temsili. Hakim ve Savclar Yksek Kurulu (HSYK) szcs, durumu kurtarmak iin, bu vakayla zaten ilgilendiklerini, Erdoan'n aklamalarnn dil srmesi olmas gerektiini, zira HSYK'nn hkmetten emir almadn syledi. HSYK'nn hkmetten emir almamas gerektiine tmyle katlyorum, ancak glerin ayrl ilkesinin byle yorumlanmasna hkmetin raz geleceinden pheliyim. tinayla ifade edeyim: Grnm Babakan'a kar. kinci hata, hem yasal hem de psikolojik olarak BDP'nin kapatlmasnn yolunu amakt. Gemite partinin tm selefleri kapatlmt. Bu, sadece, Krtlerin amalarna ulamak iin ellerinde demokratik aralar bulunmadna inanan radikal Krt milliyetilerinin iine yarad. Siyasi zm arayan Krtlerin konumuna kknden darbe indirdi. Byle bir neride bulunmak, yine geen hafta sonu AKP liderinin BDP vekillerine Meclis'teki almalarndan yana net tercihte bulunmalar ve dadaki PKK ile aralarna mesafe koymalar ars yapt dier konumasyla eliiyor. Babakan, bu arsnda kesinlikle hakl. Ama milletvekillerinin tutuklanp partinin kapatlmas ynnde gerek bir tehlike varken, Meclis seenei ne kadar cazip olabilir ki? Hepsinden nemlisi: Erdoan'n, Meclis'te zm arayan BDP'li siyasilerin ayn masada oturacaklar muhataplar bulacaklar vaadi, kutsal bir sz gibi tnlyor. Madem Babakan'n BDP'ye sunaca bir eyi gerekten var, niye onlarla grmelerini srekli artlar getirerek erteleyip duruyor? Madem hkmet BDP'nin zmn bir paras olduuna gerekten inanyor, o zaman niye binlerce BDP yerel yetkilisi ve aktivisti hapiste? Bu hafta yaymlanan yeni bir raporda, Uluslararas Kriz Grubu (ICG), gereki bir zmn unsurlarnn listesini yapt. Daha nce defalarca dile getirildikleri iin kulaa pek aina geliyorlar. ICG, ortada atekes olmasa da, hkmete, Krt toplumunun anadilinde eitim, yzde 10'luk seim barajnn kaldrlmas, yerel ynetimlerin daha ademi merkeziletirilmesi ve anayasa ile yasalarn ayrmc etnik nyarglardan arndrlmasna dair geni destek toplayan meru taleplerine kulak vermesi ars yapyor. Bar Krt aktivistlerin gzaltna alnarak yarglanmasn sona erdirmek iin terrle mcadele yasas ve dier mevzuatn da deitirilmesi gerekiyor. ICG, Babakan Erdoan'n Trkiye'nin bu yola girmekten baka aresinin olmadna kamuoyunu ikna etmeye hl muktedir olduuna inanyor. Gelgelelim, cevab asl merak edilen soru, bunu yapmay hl isteyip istemedii? Bugnlerde Trkiye'de en moral bozucu sorun, ICG'nin tevik ettii rasyonel ve mantkl trden admlar ile siyasilerin ve ksmen medyann hararetlenen sylemi arasndaki uurumun iyice genilemesi. Milliyeti tutkular ve gemiin baarszla uram politikalarndan ders almadaki beceriksizlik, Trkiye'yi iddetli, sonu olmayan atmalarn yeni bir turuna iyice yaklatrd. Cehennem uurumundan geri adm atacak cesaret ve vizyon kimde var?

Dutch populism and its limits

This Wednesday the Dutch will vote in early elections that were made necessary after Prime Minister Mark Ruttes coalition government of Liberals and Christian Democrats fell in April. Rutte was forced to hand in his governments resignation after Geert Wilders, the leader of the extreme-right populist Freedom Party, which supported the government in parliament, refused to agree on budget cuts that the Netherlands has to implement to comply with EU monetary and financial standards. Until two weeks ago, it looked as if the big winner on Sept. 12 would be another populist party, the radical-left and Eurosceptic Socialist Party. That prospect raised a lot of eyebrows, in the Netherlands and in the rest of Europe. Would a new government led by the radical-left walk away from the unpopular austerity measures agreed upon by European leaders to save the euro? Now, some days before the elections, opinion polls show a different picture. If the predictions on this weeks voting behavior are correct, the race for top spot is no longer between the Liberal Party of Prime Minister Rutte and the Socialist Party. The Liberals are still doing okay with around 22 percent of the votes. But to the surprise of many, the Socialist Party has been overtaken by the center-left, pro-European Labor Party that is closing in on the Liberals with 20 percent. Although many voters are still undecided, it looks as if the new Dutch government will be headed either by the incumbent Rutte or by the new Social Democratic leader Diederik Samsom. The left-wing populists seem to have lost their momentum. What happened? As in most European countries, but unlike Turkey, in the run-up to the elections Dutch party leaders discuss their plans and ideas in a series of highly publicized televised election debates. In the first one, two weeks ago, the young and talented Samsom, a former Greenpeace activist, did very well and the leader of the Socialist Party performed badly. Immediately after, the polls started changing with voters rewarding Samson for his performance during the debate and punishing his main competitor on the left. Since then, after several other debates along the same lines, we have been witnessing a remarkable comeback of the Social Democrats who were down to 10 percent only six months ago. The scary thing about this spectacular development, according to some critics, is the huge influence of television debates and opinion polls. It looks as if many Dutch voters prefer debating skills to policy platforms. Polls seem to be able to produce their own reality, creating self-fulfilling prophesies in which the virtual winner is able to attract even more votes and the party that does not do well according to the pollsters is doomed because nobody wants to vote for a potential loser. Critics definitively have a point there. But it would be too easy to blame the rise of the Social Democrats and the relapse of the Socialists only on the polling companies or the volatility among the electorate. Policies do play a role here as well. In the election campaign the future of the EU and the euro, contrary to previous national elections, are key issues. Many voters dont like the idea of Europe interfering with their pensions or health care and are reluctant to surrender more sovereignty to Brussels or spend more money on saving the Greek economy. At the same time, most Dutch instinctively know that radical steps like leaving the EU, as Mr. Wilders is proposing, or going back on promises made, as the Socialist Party suggested, are either totally unrealistic or will create enormous problems in Europe from which the Netherlands as a trading nation will suffer as well. That is why anti-European populist rhetoric, be it from the right or the left, was quite popular some time ago. But on Sept. 12 it will be for real. Most people know that it does matter which kind of government will be formed after the elections. With only

a few days to go, a stable number of voters on the right seem to prefer the critical but pragmatic approach of the Liberals to the provocations of Mr. Wilders. On the left, many realize that the Netherlands cant afford populist experiments and support is growing for the realistic proposals of Mr. Samsom. Whoever comes out as number one on Wednesday, the most likely scenario after the elections will be a cabinet of proEuropean center parties. The populists on the right and the left will continue with their rambling anti-European statements that go down well with 25 percent of the electorate but have disqualified them with the rest. Hollanda poplizmi ve snrlar Hollandallar, Mark Rutte'nin babakanlndaki Liberal-Hristiyan Demokrat koalisyon hkmetinin nisanda dmesinin ardndan yaplmas icap eden erken seimler iin bu aramba sanda gidiyor. Sebebi, parlamentoda hkmeti destekleyen ar sac-poplist zgrlk Partisi'nin lideri Geert Wilders'in, AB'nin finans ve bte standartlarna uymak iin Hollanda'nn uygulamas gereken bte kesintilerinde uzlamay reddetmesi. Babakan Rutte, bu yzden hkmetin istifasn vermek zorunda kalmt. ki hafta ncesine dek, 12 Eyll'n asl kazanan, bir dier poplist parti, radikal solcu-AB'ye muhalif Sosyalist Parti olacaa benziyordu. Bu gidiat, hem Hollanda hem de Avrupa'da genelde honutsuzlukla karland: Ya radikal solun kuraca bir hkmet, AB liderlerinin avroyu kurtarmak iin zerinde uzlat ama halkn tepki duyduu tasarruf nlemlerini terk ederse? Ama artk seime gnler kala, anketler farkl bir manzara iziyor. Semen tavryla ilgili bu hafta yaplan ngrler doruysa, birincilik yar Rutte'nin Liberal Partisi ile Sosyalist Parti arasnda gemeyecek. Liberaller yaklak yzde 22 orannda oyla hl salam gidiyor. Ama pek ok kiiyi artacak ekilde, Sosyalist Parti, merkez solcu-AB yanls i Partisi tarafndan geildi. i Partisi yzde 20 orannda oyla Liberalleri yakalamaya bile yaklat. Pek ok semen hl kararsz olsa da, yeni Hollanda hkmetine ya koltuktaki Rutte ya da Sosyal Demokrat lider Diederik Samsom babakanlk edecee benziyor. Solcu poplistler hz kaybetmi gzkyor. Peki, ne oldu? Trkiye'nin tersine, pek ok Avrupa lkesinde olduu gibi Hollanda'da da, kampanya srecinde parti liderleri planlarn ve fikirlerini televizyonda mnazara programlarnda tartarak geni kitlelere ulatrr. ki hafta nceki ilk mnazara programnda, eski bir Greenpeace aktivisti olan gen ve yetenekli Samsom ok iyi, Sosyalist Parti lideri ok kt performans kard. Ardndan anketler, semenlerin tartma performanslar iin Samsom'u dllendirmesi ve soldaki ba rakibini cezalandrmasyla deimeye balad. O zamandan beri, takip eden mnazaralarn ardndan, daha alt ay nce oy oran yzde 10'a vurmu Sosyal Demokratlarn dikkat ekici geri dnne tanklk ediyoruz. Bu arpc gelime deerlendirilirken, televizyon mnazaralar ve kamuoyu yoklamalarnn bylesine byk tesir brakmasnn korkutucu olduu eletirisi de yaplyor. Sanki Hollandal semenlerin ounluu, sergilenen tartma becerisini sunulan siyasi programa tercih eder gzkyor. Anketler de kendi gerekliklerini retiyor, kendini gerekletiren kehanetler yaratyor. Zira sanal galip daha da ok oy ekiyor, anketlerde iyi gitmeyen parti ise yenilgiye mahkm oluyor, nk kimse potansiyel bir kaybedene oy vermek istemiyor. Bu eletirilerde kesinlikle hakl bir yan var. Ama Sosyal Demokratlarn ykseliinden ve Sosyalistlerin geriye dnden sadece kamuoyu yoklama irketlerini ve semenlerin yanardnerliini sorumlu tutmak fazla kolayclk olur. Bunda politikalar da bir o kadar rol oynuyor. Daha nceki ulusal seimlerden farkl olarak, bu kampanyada, AB ile avronun gelecei en kilit mesele. Pek ok semen, Avrupa'nn emeklilik ya da salk sistemlerine mdahale etmesi fikrinden holanmyor ve Brksel'e daha fazla egemenlik devretmeye ya da Yunan ekonomisini kurtarmak iin daha fazla para vermeye yanamyor. Ama ayn zamanda, Hollandallarn ou igdsel olarak biliyor ki, Wilders'in savunduu AB'den ayrlma gibi radikal admlar atmak ya da Sosyalist Parti'nin nerdii gibi daha nce verilmi szlerden dnmek, ya gereklikten tmyle kopmak ya da Avrupa'da Hollanda'nn da ticaret yapan bir lke olarak acsn ekecei muazzam sorunlar yaratmak demek. Bu yzden, ister sadan, ister soldan gelsin, Avrupa kart poplist sylem, bir sre ncesine dek ok tutuyordu. Ama 12 Eyll'de gerekten benimsenecek mi, greceiz. Pek ok insan, seimden sonra ne tr bir hkmetin kurulacann nemli olduunu biliyor. Seime birka gn kala, sabit sayda sac semen, Liberallerin ciddi ama pragmatik yaklamn, Wilders'in provokasyonlarna tercih eder gzkyor. Pek ok solcu da, Hollanda'nn poplist deneyleri kaldracak halinin olmadn ve Samsom'un gereki nerilerine destein arttn fark ediyor.

aramba gn sandktan kim birinci karsa ksn, seim sonras iin en olas senaryo, AB yanls merkez partilerin kabineyi oluturmas. Hem sa hem de soldaki poplistler ise semenlerin yzde 25'ine hitap eden ama geri kalan tarafndan diskalifiye edilen Avrupa kart atp tutmalarna devam edecek.

Turkey could beat the Netherlands This Friday, Turkey will be playing its first qualifying match for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. The opponents are group favorite the Netherlands, finalist against Spain in the last edition of the global football tournament in South Africa two years ago. Normally speaking, in an away game against the Netherlands, Turkey would be the clear underdog. This time, however, things look different and I truly believe the chances for a Turkish surprise have never been better. That is, to be fair, mainly due to the poor situation of the home team. One year ago Holland was the proud number one on the FIFA World Rankings list. Now, after four consecutive defeats, the Dutch find themselves at number 15. Most people will remember the disastrous European Championship last June where, for the first time in football history, the Netherlands lost all of its three matches. The only game since this utter failure, a friendly against Belgium three weeks ago, was also lost 4-2. What went wrong? After hundreds of hours of talking before and behind the scenes and many square meters of writing spent on this question, I guess still nobody really knows. Yes, of course, there was a lack of willingness among the big names to put their inflated egos aside and subordinate their own interests to those of the national team. Players like Wesley Sneijder, Robin van Persie and Arjen Robben have become global brands, known and applauded all over the world for their skills. Apparently, that makes it difficult to accept that sometimes even big stars have to sacrifice some of their own prestige in order to make the national team play better. Still, the question remains, for instance, how to explain the flop of a player like Van Persie, top scorer and best player in the Premier League who plays like a nervous beginner in the national team. Whatever the reasons for the recent downhill glide, there is not much time to keep on contemplating. Bert van Marwijk, the most successful national coach ever, resigned and the Dutch Football Federation nominated a new one, Louis van Gaal, known for his successes as a club trainer with Ajax, Barcelona and Bayern Mnich. Respected by 50 percent of the Dutch for his knowledge and experience, loathed by the other half for his arrogance and pedantic performance. Van Gaal was coach of the Dutch national team before in 2001 but failed miserably when he did not manage to qualify for the 2002 World Cup. Knowing his personality, he will want to take revenge and show that he can be a great national coach as well. He will have to do that with a daring combination of veteran players and talented youngsters. His problem is that many of the old guard are not in good shape and the newcomers lack experience. This makes the present team extremely vulnerable, especially in defense. Up front, Van Gaal can always rely on a brilliant flash from Sneijder or Robben but previous matches showed that clever tactics and pace can create insurmountable problems for the back four and the defensive midfield players. A surprise result in Amsterdam depends of course also on the Turkish team. There I am more positive than in the last couple of years. If all players are fit, the combination of swift forwards Burak and Umut, the creativity of Nuri and Arda and the

controlling capacities of Selcuk and Mehmet Topal could create huge problems for every team. When Turkey on Friday manages to prevent a goal till half-time, they could profit from the creeping feeling of uncertainty and doubt that will start hampering the Dutch in the second half. Putting things in perspective, even a Dutch win on Friday does not mean the end of the world for Turkey. As always, group winners will qualify directly for the 2014 World Cup. But the best runners-up will have a second chance to make it to Brazil. Turkey's biggest competitor for second place in the group is probably Romania. In the past Turkey focused too much on the big games against the favorites and lost points against smaller teams. After the Netherlands, Estonia will be the next opponent on Tuesday. A win then is as important as a surprise result on Friday. I have to admit, as a Dutchman I want my national to team to play in Brazil in 2014. As someone living in stanbul, I hope Turkey manages to qualify as well. Let's hope both teams do well and the final decision on who is number one and who is number two will only be made at the last game in this group, in October of 2013, Turkey-Netherlands. Trkiye, Hollanda'y yenebilir Trkiye, 2014'te Brezilya'nn ev sahipliinde yaplacak Dnya Kupas yolunda ilk eleme grubu man bugn oynayacak. Karsnda, kresel futbol turnuvasnn iki yl nce Gney Afrika'daki son nshasnda spanya ile finale km, grubun favorisi Hollanda var. Normalde, Hollanda'ya kar bir deplasman manda, Trkiye, kaybetmesi beklenilen taraftr. Ama bu sefer iler biraz farkl gzkyor ve ben de Trkiye'nin daha nce hi olmad kadar srpriz yapma ansnn bulunduuna gerekten inanyorum. Drst olmak gerekirse, bu, ev sahibi takmn perian halinden kaynaklanyor. Hollanda, daha bir yl nce FIFA dnya sralamasnn gururlu bir yesiydi. Ama st ste drt yenilgiden sonra kendini 15'inci srada buldu. Hazirandaki Avrupa ampiyonas felaketi hl akllarda: Hollanda futbol tarihinde ilk kez gruptaki mann hepsini kaybetti. Bu dibe vurmann ardndan sadece bir ma oynad: Belika ile dostluk manda da 4-2 yenildi. Peki, nerede yanl yapld? Bu soru hakknda kamera arkasnda ve nnde yzlerce saat konuulduktan ve metrekarelerce yaz yazldktan sonra, sanrm, hl kimse gerekten yant bilmiyor. Evet, elbette, byk isimler, imi egolarndan vazgemeye ve ulusal karlar kendi karlarnn zerine koymaya yanamad. Wesley Sneijder, Robin van Persie ve Arjen Robben gibi oyuncular, yetenekleri sayesinde, dnyann her yerinde tannan ve alklanan kresel markalar haline gelmiti. Anlalan bu durum, bazen byk yldzlarn bile milli takmn daha iyi oynamasn salamak iin prestijlerinden dn vermesi gerektiini kabullenmeyi zorlatrd. Ama hl yantlanmam sorular var, mesela, Van Persie gibi Premier League'in en iyi futbolcusu ve gol kralnn milli takm formasn ilk kez giymiesine tedirgin oynamasn nasl aklayacaz? Bu yoku aa kayn nedenleri ne olursa olsun, uzun uzun dnecek vakit yok. Milli takmn bugne deinki en baarl teknik direktr konumundaki Bert van Marwijk istifa etti ve greve Hollanda Futbol Federasyonu tarafndan Ajax, Barcelona, Bayern Munich gibi kulplerde elde ettii baarlarla tannan Louis van Gaal getirildi. Hollandallarn yars, bilgisi ve tecrbesi sebebiyle kendisine sayg duyar, dier yars kibri ve mkemmeliyetilii yznden kendisinden nefret eder. Van Gaal, daha nce 2001'de de milli takmn bana gemiti, ama 2002 Dnya Kupas'na gidilmesini salayamayarak fena halde baarsz olmutu. Kiiliini bildiimizden, intikam almay ve milli takmda da byk bir ko olduunu kantlamay isteyeceinden emin olabiliriz. Ama bunu emektar oyuncularla gen yeteneklerin cretkr bir karmyla yapmak zorunda. Eski tfeklerin formda olmamas, nevzuhur edenlerin ise tecrbesiz olmas bal bana bir sorun. Bu, halihazrdaki takm zellikle savunmada yara almaya ak hale getiriyor. Van Gaal n cephede Sneijder ya da Robben'in ani parlak klarna her zaman gvenebilir, ama nceki malar gsterdi ki, zekice taktikler ve hzl klar, arka drtl ve orta sahann savunmaclar asndan baa klamaz sorunlar yaratyor. Amsterdam'da srpriz sonu kp kmamas, elbette Trk takmna da bal. Trk takmna son birka yldakinden daha olumlu bakyorum. Tm oyuncular formda olursa, Burak ve Umut gibi hzl forvetlerin, Nuri ve Arda'nn yaratclnn, Seluk

ve Mehmet Topal'n kontrol etme kapasitesinin bir araya gelmesi her takm iin byk sorunlar yaratr. Trk takm, ilk yarda gol yememeyi baarrsa, ikinci yarda Hollandallarn zerlerine kecek belirsizlik ve phe duygusuyla ellerinin ayaklarnn birbirine dolamasndan faydalanabilir. Belli bir perspektiften baklrsa, Hollanda kazansa bile, bu, Trkiye iin dnyann sonu olmaz. Her zaman olduu gibi, grup birincileri 2014 Brezilya'ya dorudan gidecek. Ama en iyi ikincilere, Brezilya yolunda ikinci bir ans sunulacak. Grup ikincilii iin Trkiye'nin ba rakibi muhtemelen Romanya olacak. Gemite Trkiye, favorilere kar byk malara fazla odaklanp daha kk takmlar karsnda puan kaybetmiti. Trkiye, Hollanda'dan sonra Estonya ile karlaacak. Sal gnk ikinci ma kazanmak, bugn srpriz sonu elde etmek kadar nemli. tiraf etmeliyim ki, bir Hollandal olarak, kendi milli takmmn 2014'te Brezilya'da oynamasn istiyorum. stanbul'da yaayan biri olarak, Trkiye'nin de elemeleri gemesini mit ediyorum. Umalm, iki takm da iyi i karsn ve kimin birinci, kimin ikinci geleceiyle ilgili nihai hkm, gruptaki son karlamada, Ekim 2013'teki Trkiye-Hollanda manda verilsin. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Evaluating the AKP It cant be accidental. Last week I was about to finish one of the key chapters in a book on Turkey I am writing with my wife. The book will be published in Dutch this autumn and tries to explain how present day Turkey works and why Turks think and act the way they do. The first part of the section I wanted to conclude a few days ago is about Islam and secularism; the second part deals with the ruling party. In it we try to answer the kinds of questions that always pop up in Dutch debates on the Justice and Development Party (AKP): What kind of party is it? Are they Islamists or not? How do we evaluate their performance? While trying to formulate convincing responses that will enlighten interested readers in the Netherlands with little background knowledge about Turkey, I could not stop myself from reading several articles about the AKP written by seasoned and wellinformed Turkish columnists. I would describe all of them as critical minds who supported many of the AKPs policies in the past, some voting for the party in consecutive elections. Their overall judgment on the AKP in the year 2012 is extremely negative. Still recognizing many of the positive steps taken by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and his party in the years between 2002 and 2010, all heavily criticize the AKP for having abandoned the reform path that made them so attractive in those years. What they see is a party that seems to be settling for the status quo, making deals with the old establishment in the army and the bureaucracy. The most clear and recent examples of that mindset are the inability and unwillingness to explain what happened in Uludere at the end of last year when dozens of innocent people were mistakenly killed by real bombings, the muddy compromise on the match fixing scandal and of course, most of all, the return to securitybased strategies in dealing with the Kurdish problem. After almost 10 years in power, the AKP, according to the critics, looks like a party lacking vision, ideas and the appetite to continue with the reforms that are necessary to make Turkey a first class democracy, one of the stated goals of the prime minister in the past. The explanations for this regression differ. Columnist Cengiz Aktar is afraid that the ineradicable nationalist virus has also lethally infected the ruling party. hsan Ylmaz pointedly described the partys disappointing performance as the ANAPization of the AKP, referring to Turgut zals Motherland Party (ANAP) that after having been in power for some time in the 1980s, lost its zeal and enthusiasm. The division they all make is between the first few good years of AKP rule and the last couple of bad years. It reminded me, by the way, of an old debate among leftist intellectuals about Karl Marx. In order to assess his contribution to history, some

created a split between the Young Marx and the Old Marx. In his first books and pamphlets Marx presented himself as an idealist philosopher, focusing on freedom and liberation from alienation. Non-dogmatic socialists liked that first, humanist phase. In the second part of his life Marx stressed the economic and social laws of capitalism that would inevitably lead to a socialist revolution. That determinism did not go down very well with his more liberal-minded fans but was quite popular among diehard communists. Will the AKP also go down in history as a party that started off brilliantly but somehow went astray? Or should we reject this deterministic logic and look for the cures that could prevent such a descent into a basement filled with broken promises and missed opportunities? Aktar remains an optimist and believes that too many taboos have already been broken and that the AKP will not be able to put the genie back into the bottle again. Markar Esayan thinks the AKP is a pragmatic party and will be clever enough to make a turn back to democratic reform before it is too late. After having read all those comments, I was even more confused about what to write to my countrymen. I agree with most of the praise for the first AKP years, and I definitively share the disenchantment with their most recent showing. My main worry is about the probability of a U-turn, knowing that the taste of power, even if shared, is hard to resist and realizing that a real alternative is not yet in sight. When our book is published, you will find out whether and if yes, how we managed to overcome our doubts and objections. AKP'yi deerlendirmeden geirmek Bu tesadf olamaz. Eimle birlikte Trkiye hakknda yazdmz kitabn geen hafta kilit blmlerinden birini bitirmek zereydim. Bu sonbahar Hollandaca yaymlanacak kitap, gnmz Trkiye'sinin nasl ilediini, Trklerin niye byle dndkleri ve davrandklarn aklamaya alyor. Birka gn nce bitirmek istediim ksmn ilk blm slam ve laiklikle ilgili, ikinci blm de iktidar partisini ele alyor. O blmde, Hollanda'da AKP ile ilgili tartmalarda hep ortaya atlan trden sorulara yant vermeye alyoruz: AKP nasl bir partidir? slamclar m, deiller mi? Performanslar nasl deerlendirilmeli? Hollanda'da Trkiye'ye dair bilgisi yzeysel ama ilgisi ok okurlar aydnlatacak ikna edici yantlar formle etmeye alrken, grm geirmi ve bilgi hazinesi geni Trk ke yazarlarnn AKP hakknda kaleme aldklar ok sayda makaleyi okumaktan kendimi alamadm. Hepsini, gemite AKP'nin pek ok politikasn desteklemi, hatta bazs pe pee seimlerde AKP'ye oy atm eletirel zihinler diye niteleyebilirim. 2012 ylna geldiimizde ise AKP ile ilgili genel yarglar olaanst olumsuz. Erdoan ile partisinin 2002 ile 2010 yllar arasnda att olumlu admlarn hakkn teslim etseler de, AKP'yi, o dnemde ylesine ekici hale getiren reform yolunu brakt iin ar biimde eletiriyorlar. Artk AKP'yi statkoya raz gelen, ordu ve brokrasi gibi gemiin egemen evreleriyle uzlaan bir parti olarak gryorlar. Bu zihniyetin en yeni ve net rnekleri, geen yln sonunda hava bombardmanyla yanllkla onlarca masum insann ldrld Uludere'de olan bitenleri aklama isteksizlii, ike skandalndaki kirli taviz ve elbette, hepsinden nemlisi, Krt sorunuyla urarken gvenlik temelli stratejilere geri dnlmesi. AKP, iktidarda 10 yldan sonra, babakann gemite koyduu hedeflerden biri olan Trkiye'yi birinci snf demokrasi yapmaya ynelik reformlar devam ettirmek iin vizyon, fikir ve hevesten yoksun bir parti haline gelmekle eletiriliyor. Bu gerilemeye getirilen izahatlar birbirinden farkl. Cengiz Aktar, bir trl kk kaznamayan milliyetilik virsnn iktidar partisine de lmcl biimde bulam olmasndan korkuyor. hsan Ylmaz, hayal krklna uratan performans 'AKP'nin ANAP'lamas' diye niteleyerek, Turgut zal'n liderliindeki Anavatan Partisi'nin 1980'leri iktidarda geirdikten sonra azim ve cokusunu kaybetmesi rneini veriyor. Ama hepsi de, AKP'nin ilk iyi yllar ile sonraki kt yllar arasnda bir ayrm yapyor. Bu da, bana, solcu entelekteller arasnda Karl Marx hakkndaki eski bir tartmay hatrlatyor. Karl Marx'n tarihe yapt katkya deer bierken, kimileri, Gen Marx ile Yal Marx diye bir ayrm yaratmt. Marx, ilk kitap ve makalelerinde kendini yabanclamaktan kurtulmaya ve zgrlemeye odaklanm idealist bir filozof olarak sunar. Dogmac olmayan sosyalistler onun bu ilk, hmanist evresini sever. Marx, yaamnn ikinci blmnde ise kapitalizmin ekonomik ve toplumsal kurallarn, bunlarn kanlmaz olarak

sosyalist devrime gtreceini vurgulamtr. Bu belirlenimcilik, daha liberal grl hayranlarnn pek houna gitmese de, tutucu komnistler arasnda epey poplerdi. AKP de, ok parlak balayan ama bir ekilde kt yola den bir parti olarak m geecek tarihe? Ya da bu belirlenimci mant reddedip, tutulmayan szler ve karlan frsatlarla dolu izbelie d nlemenin arelerini mi aramalyz? yimserliini koruyan Aktar, ok fazla tabunun ykldna ve artk AKP'nin cini ieye geri sokmay baaramayacana inanyor. Markar Esayan, AKP'nin, pragmatik ve ok ge olmadan demokratik reformlara geri dnecek kadar akll olduunu dnyor. Tm bu yorumlar okuduktan sonra, memleketlilerime ne yazacam konusunda kafam iyice kart. AKP'nin ilk yllarna dzlen vglerin ouna katlyorum ve son yllardaki performansyla ilgili hayal krkln kesinlikle paylayorum. Benim asl endiem U dn ihtimaliyle ilgili, nk bir kez tattktan sonra iktidarn keyfine direnmek gtr ve ufukta da gerek bir alternatif gzkmemektedir. Kitabmz yaymlandnda, phelerimizin ve itirazlarmzn stesinden gelip gelemediimizi, geldiysek de bunu nasl yaptmz reneceksiniz. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Europe in for a rough autumn ride The holiday season is over, also in European politics. From now on, we are about to see a frantic few weeks in eurozone crisis management. The stakes are high. France and Germany fastened their seat belts and decided to set up a joint policymaking body that should formulate common responses to the challenges ahead. That is good news because without substantial coordination between the two biggest players inside the EU, the eurozone has no chance of moving forward. What are the events to look forward to in the next couple of weeks? The European Central Bank (ECB) is expected to announce shortly that it wants to buy up sovereign bonds from struggling economies such as Spain and Italy in order to limit these countries' borrowing costs. In Germany there is strong resistance to these plans from bankers and politicians. They claim that intervention in the bond markets goes beyond the ECB's mandate and would amount to, as Bundesbank President Jens Weidman put it in Der Spiegel, state financing via the printing press. Chancellor Angela Merkel has not clearly spoken out on the ECB plans yet, but everybody is curious how the new FrenchGerman task force will square the views of Berlin and Paris on this highly controversial issue. An alternative for ECB action would be to beef up the powers of the newly created EU bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that has powers to intervene in the bond market written into its mandate. The problem is that the status of the ESM is still subject to legal debate, which leads us to the second important date on Europe's autumn agenda. Sept. 12 is an important day for the EU for two reasons. First, the German Constitutional Court will rule on whether the ESM is compatible with the country's constitution. Several plaintiffs representing almost the entire political spectrum think it is not and have taken the case to court. According to eminent economist Hans-Werner Sinn, Most observers believe that the court is unlikely to oppose the ESM treaty, though many expect the judges to demand certain amendments or to ask Germany's president to make his signature subject to certain qualifications. If Sinn is right, it will take at least a few more months for the ESM to be able to start its activities. Such a delay would, to put it mildly, not create the kind of confidence in the financial markets that the eurozone is desperately looking for. On that same day, Dutch voters will go to the polls and elect a new parliament. At the moment, two parties are clearly ahead in the opinion polls: the Eurosceptic Socialist Party and the Liberal Party of Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who has made it clear that he is against all proposals that give more powers

to European institutions. That does not bode well for any plan to give the ESM a more prominent role. Nor does this Dutch intransigence make it very likely that at the end of this year Merkel will get her way on drafting a new EU treaty. The German chancellor is of the opinion, and in my view correctly so, that the EU needs a new legal base to allow European institutions to monitor and, if necessary, correct the budgets of the member states. Finally, there is of course Greece. Officially, no decision will be made until mid October, when the EU leaders meet. Specialists of the European Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will spend the entire month of September auditing the books in Athens. On the basis of their report, the EU will have to make up its mind. Will the Greek government be able to convince their colleagues that the austerity measures are solid as a rock and therefore EU assistance should continue and Greece can stay in the eurozone? Or will the EU leaders conclude that, unfortunately, Greece is a lost cause. All over Europe plans are being made in case a Greek exit becomes inevitable. The uncomfortable conclusion of all these scenarios is that nobody really knows for sure what will happen next. Many fear that after a Grexit EU member states will see even less money repaid than if they would negotiate a reasonable debt restructuring and keep Greece in the euro. One bit of advice for all those in Turkey who think that all of this does not matter to Turkey because the Turkish economy is robust enough and will not be influenced by a paralyzed ECB, a divided EU or a Grexit: dream on. Avrupa'nn sonbaharda bana alacak belalardan ka yok Tatil mevsimi sona erdi, Avrupa siyasetinde de... Bundan byle avro blgesi krizinin ynetimiyle hercmer lgn haftalar geireceiz. Byk menfaatlerle ilgili yksek riskler sz konusu. Emniyet kemerlerini sklatran Fransa ile Almanya, kendilerini bekleyen meydan okumalara verecekleri mterek tepkiyi formle edecek ortak politika retme organ kurmaya karar verdi. Bu iyi haber, zira AB'nin en byk iki oyuncusu arasnda geni kapsaml ibirlii olmakszn, avro blgesinin sorunlarn stesinden gelmesinin ihtimali yok. Peki, gelecek haftalarn drt gzle beklenen olaylar neler? Avrupa Merkez Bankas'nn (AMB,) spanya ve talya gibi zordaki ekonomilerin borlanma masraflarn azaltmak iin devlet tahvillerini bizzat satn almay istediini ksa sre iinde aklamas bekleniyor. Almanya'da siyasiler ve bankalar bu planlara sk direni gsteriyor. Tahvil piyasasna mdahalenin, AMB'nin yetkilerinin tesine tatn ve Alman Merkez Bankas (Bundesbank) Bakan Jens Weidmann'n Der Spiegel dergisine syledii gibi 'devleti finanse etmek iin para basma' anlamna geleceini iddia ediyorlar. Babakan Angela Merkel, AMB planlaryla ilgili henz net tavr koymad. Herkesin merak ettii ise, yeni Fransz-Alman grev gcnn bu son derece tartmal mesele hakknda Paris ile Berlin'in grlerini nasl badatraca? AMB'nin harekete gemesinin alternatifi, yeni kurulan AB kurtarma fonunun, yani Avrupa stikrar Mekanizmas'nn (AM) glerini artrmak olabilir, zira AM'nin yetkileri arasnda tahvil piyasasna mdahale de var. Tek sorun, AM'nin statsnn hala yasal tartma konusu olmas ki, bu, bizi, Avrupa'nn sonbahar gndemindeki ikinci nemli tarihe gtryor. 12 Eyll AB iin iki sebepten nemli bir tarih. lkin, Alman Anayasa Mahkemesi, AM'nin Alman anayasasyla uyumlu olup olmadyla ilgili kararn aklayacak. Zira Alman siyaset yelpazesinin neredeyse tamamndan temsilciler, uyumlu olmad gerekesiyle AM anlamasna kar Anayasa Mahkemesi'nde dava amt. Saygn ekonomist Hans Werner Sinn, ''Gzlemcilerin ounluu, mahkemenin AM anlamasna kar kacan sanmyor, ancak pek ok kiinin beklentisi, yarglarn belli deiiklikler talep etmesi ya da Almanya Cumhurbakan'ndan anlamay belli artlarn yerine getirilmesi balaycl koyarak imzalamasn istemesi.'' diyor. Sinn haklysa, AM'nin faaliyetlerine balamas en az birka ay daha gecikir. Byle bir gecikme, en hafif ifadeyle, finans piyasalarnda avro blgesinin umutsuzca arzulad gveni tesis etmez. Ayn gn Hollandal semenler de sanda gidip yeni bir parlamento seecek. u an iin anketlerde iki parti net biimde nde: AB phecisi Sosyalist Parti ve Avrupa kurumlarna daha fazla yetki veren tm tekliflere kar olduunu ilan eden Babakan Rutte'nin Liberal Partisi. Bu manzara, AM'ye daha nemli roller bien planlar iin hi hayra alamet deil. Hollandallarn uzlamaz hali de, Merkel'in yl sonunda yeni AB anlamas taslan hazrlama plan iin... Alman Babakan,

bence hakl olarak, Avrupa kurumlarnn ye lkelerin btelerini denetlemesine ve gerekirse dzeltmesine izin verecek ekilde AB'nin yeni bir yasal temele ihtiyac olduu grnde. Ve elbette son olarak Yunanistan var. Resmi olarak, AB liderlerinin toplanaca ekim ortasna dek karar alnmayacak. Avrupa Komisyonu, AMB ve IMF uzmanlar eyll aynn tamamn Atina'da hesap defterlerini denetleyerek geirecek. AB, onlarn hazrlayaca raporu temel alarak kararn verecek. Yunan hkmeti, kemer skma nlemlerinin kaya gibi salam olduuna, bu yzden AB yardmnn devam etmesi gerektiine ve Atina'nn avro blgesinde kalabileceine muadillerini ikna etmeyi baarabilecek mi? Ya da AB liderleri maalesef Yunanistan'n oktan kaybedilmi bir dava olduuna m hkmedecek? Avrupa'nn tamam, Yunanistan'n avrodan kmas kanlmaz olursa diye planlar yapyor. Tm bu senaryolarn vard rahatsz edici sonu, bundan sonra ne olacan kimsenin kesinkes kestirememesi. Pek ok kii, Yunanistan'n borlar makul biimde yeniden yaplandrlp avro blgesinde kalmas salanmaz da avrodan kna gz yumulursa, AB yesi lkelere daha da az geri deme yaplacandan korkuyor. Trkiye'de oturup btn bunlarn Trkiye'yi ilgilendirmediini, nk Trk ekonomisinin fel olmu bir AMB, blnm bir AB ve Yunan kndan etkilenmeyecek kadar gl olduunu dnenlere de bir tavsiye: Ancak ryanzda grrsnz.

Irans dirty fingerprints The deadly Aug. 20 bombing in Gaziantep is still sending shockwaves through the country and the region as a whole. In Turkey, a new round of debate on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its strategy has begun, closely linked to the developments in Syria, especially the emergence of autonomous Kurdish areas along the Turkish-Syrian border. Many suspect a link between the Bashar al-Assad regime, keen to punish Turkey for its strong support of the Syrian opposition, and the PKK, which may have been acting in Gaziantep as a subcontractor for Damascus. However, it is not only Syria under suspicion. Deputy Prime Minister Blent Arn has admitted that Iran is also considered a potential source that could have had a hand in such an attack. In general, I am put off by these kinds of efforts to locate the source of problems abroad. It reminds me of the automatic reflex of autocratic regimes under pressure: to cover up their own mistakes and responsibilities and try to unite the country behind a common aversion to outside powers, aiming to split the country or harm its interests. In this particular case, however, I am not so sure. This is only partially related to a report in the Daily Telegraph last week in which Western intelligence sources alleged that Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has given orders to Irans Revolutionary Guards to send a warning to several countries, including Turkey, that are actively trying to push Syrian dictator Assad out of power. Iran, as we all know, is one of Assads key allies. Most of the time, the disclosure of this sort of information is well planned, and it may not have been a coincidence that the news of Irans intention to launch terrorist attacks in specific countries was published on the same day Arn referred to potential Iranian involvement in the Gaziantep attack. The problem with the story about Khameneis orders is that it could be true. In a long and well-argued article printed in American magazine The National Interest last week, Ray Takeyh, Iran specialist and senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, made the point that Irans foreign policy is still -- or, better, again -- being guided by the same old ideological fervor that looks for confrontation in order to strengthen the position of Irans revolutionary elite at home.

Takeyh goes back to the days of Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1980s and, based on several concrete examples, shows that Irans leader deliberately fostered tensions with neighbors or outside powers to show that the Islamic Republic was in danger and that only strict obedience to the harsh rules set by the clerical elite could save the country. According to Khomeini, integration of Iran in the international community was not in the interests of Irans ruling theocrats because it would undermine Irans Islamic culture. Better to isolate the country and keep the revolutionary flame burning than to stick to international treaty obligations or give in to Western sensibilities. That all changed under his successors Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami, who both, as Takeyh puts it, tried to transcend Khomeinis divisive legacy and replace ideological antagonisms with policies rooted in pragmatism and self-interest. Irans conservatives, under the leadership of the new supreme leader Ali Khamenei, resisted these changes strongly, and got a chance to subvert Khatamis agenda when he failed to deliver on some of his promises, and after George W. Bush put Iran on his axis-of-evil list in 2002, thereby dealing a lethal blow to Tehrans reformers. In 2005 and 2009, the presidential elections were won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the representative of a new generation of pious young men, often called the New Right, that brought to the scene, in Takeyhs words, a combustible mix of Islamist ideology, strident nationalism and a deep suspicion of the West. The new leadership sees Khomeini as their role model, including his foreign policies of self-assertion and defiance, because they realize that a revitalized strategy of confrontation might be the only way for the governing elite to survive and resist pushes for change coming from the majority of the Iranian public, which does not share the ideological passion of Khomeinis heirs. Takeyh is convinced that, in order to hold on to power, the new revolutionary diehards have returned to the old recipe of overturning the regional order and challenging the existing international system. If Takeyh is right, as I think he is, we should not be surprised to see more of Irans dirty fingerprints on future explosive events in the region. ran'n kirli parmak izleri Gaziantep'te 20 Austos'taki lmcl bombal saldr, lkeye ve blgenin tamamna ok dalgalar yayyor hl. Trkiye'de, Suriye'deki gelimeler, zellikle de Trkiye-Suriye snrnda yeni bir zerk Krt blgesinin domas ile balantl olarak PKK ve stratejisi hakknda yeni bir tartma raundu balad. Pek ok kii, Suriye muhalefetine gl destei sebebiyle Trkiye'yi cezalandrmaya can atan Esed rejimi ile Gaziantep'te am'n taeronu gibi davranm olabilecek PKK arasnda bir balantdan pheleniyor. Ama phe altnda olan sadece am deil. Babakan Yardmcs Blent Arn, ran' 'bylesi bir saldrda parma olabilecek potansiyel bir kaynak' olarak ele aldklarn aa vurdu. Sorunlarn kaynan darda arayan bu trden abalarndan genelde hazzetmem. Bana otokratik rejimlerin otomatik refleksini, yani kendi hata ve sorumluluklarn rtbas iin halk, lkeyi blmeyi ya da karlarna zarar vermeyi amalayan d glere ynelik ortak nefrette birletirme abasn hatrlatr. Gelgelelim bu mnferit vakada o kadar emin deilim. Bu grm, ksmen, geen hafta Daily Telegraph gazetesinde kan bir habere dayanyor. Haberde Batl istihbarat kaynaklar iddia ediyor ki, ran dini lideri Ayetullah Ali Hamaney, Suriye diktatr Bear Esed'i devirmek iin aktif biimde alan Trkiye dahil bir dizi lkeye uyar gndermesi iin Devrim Muhafzlarna emir vermi. Hepimizin bildii gibi ran Esed'in kilit mttefiklerinden biri. ou zaman bu trden ifaatlar ok iyi planlanr ve Tahran'n belli baz lkelere terr saldr

dzenleme niyetiyle ilgili haberin, Arn'n Gaziantep saldrsnda potansiyel ran balantsndan sz ettii gn yaymlanmas tesadf olmayabilir. Hamaney'in emirlerine dair haberde bir sorun var, o da doru olmas ihtimali. Geen hafta Amerikan dergisi National Interest'te D likiler Konseyi Ortadou almalar'nn zellikle ran konusunda kdemli uzman Ray Takeyh'in uzun ve iyi savlanm bir makalesi yaymland. Takeyh, ran d politikasna hl, daha dorusu yeniden, ieride ran devriminin sekin snfnn konumunu glendirmek iin ihtilaf arayan o eski ideolojik ateliliin rehberlik ettii zerinde duruyor. ran slam devrimi lideri Ayetullah Humeyni'yle geen 1980'leri hatrlatan Takeyh, baz somut rneklere dayanarak, ran liderinin, slam Cumhuriyeti'nin tehlikede olduunu ve lkeyi sadece mollalarn koyduu hain kurallara sk skya uymann kurtaracan gstermek iin komular veya d glerle kasten gerilim kardn gzler nne seriyor. Humeyni'ye gre, ran'n uluslararas toplumla btnlemesi iktidardaki teokratik snfn karna olmazd, zira ran'n slami kltrne zarar verirdi. Uluslararas anlamalarn ykmllklerine bal kalmak ya da Bat'nn hassasiyetlerine dn vermektense, lkeyi tecrit edip devrimci atei yanar tutmak daha iyiydi. Tm bunlar Ali Ekber Haimi Rafsancani ve Muhammed Hatemi'nin cumhurbakanlklar dnemlerinde deiti, Takeyh'in belirttii gibi, her ikisi de, 'Humeyni'nin blc mirasn amak, ideolojik dmanlklarn yerine pragmatizm ve bireysel karlar koymak' iin urat. ranl muhafazakarlar ise, yeni dini lider Ayetullah Ali Hamaney'in nderliinde buna gl biimde direndi. Hatemi'nin vaatlerinin byk ksmn yerine getirmesi engellenirken, 2002'de dnemin ABD Bakan George W. Bush da ran' er ekseni listesine koydu. Bylece muhafazakarlar, Hatemi'nin programn devirme frsat bulurken, reformculara da lmcl darbe indirdi. 2005 ve 2009 cumhurbakanl seimlerini Mahmud Ahmedinejad kazand, kendisi genellikle 'Yeni Sa' diye adlandrlan yeni nesil sofu genlerin temsilcisidir, bunlar, Takeyh'in deyiiyle, beraberlerinde ortama, 'slami ideoloji, yaygarac milliyetilik ve Bat'ya kar derin pheciliin abuk alev alan bir karmn' getirdi. Yeni liderlik, kendini dayatma ve kafa tutmaya dayal d politikas dahil Humeyni'yi idol olarak belledi, zira iktidardaki sekinlerin ayakta kalmas ve Humeyni'nin haleflerinin ideolojik tutkularn paylamayan kamuoyu ounluundan gelen deiim basksna direnmenin tek yolunun, ihtilaf stratejisinin yeniden canlandrlmas olabileceini fark etti. Takeyh kani olmu ki, iktidara sk sk sarlmaya alan yeni devrimci tutucular, blgesel dzeni altst etmenin ve var olan uluslararas sisteme meydan okumann yazld o eski reeteyi yeniden tatbik etmekle megul. Benim dndm gibi Takeyh haklysa, blgede gelecekteki patlayc olaylarda ran'n kirli parmak izlerinden daha ok grmeye amamalyz.

Is Turkey getting too close to the Syrian fire? On Monday, Stratfor, an influential but also controversial global intelligence company, distributed an article about the implications of an expanded Turkish role in Syria. According to the report, Ankara for weeks has been preparing the public for more Turkish involvement in the conflict that is ripping apart its southern neighbor. The Stratfor analyst warns that more Turkish action inside Syria could trigger a backlash from Syria and Iran. One option for Damascus and Tehran would be to use their good contacts with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and stimulate the Kurdish terrorists to intensify their attacks on targets in Turkey. Later that same day, a car bomb killed nine people, including three children, in Gaziantep, close to Turkey's border with Syria. The PKK quickly announced that they had nothing to do with the explosion. That is no final proof of their innocence because in similar situations in the past it turned out that autonomous PKK-affiliated groups like the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) were responsible. It does indicate that the PKK does not want to be associated with the killings that took place during Bayram, or the holiday that marks the end of Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims. So far nobody has claimed responsibility for the attack and if there is any kind of Syrian or Iranian involvement, probably no one ever will. Did Stratfor have prior knowledge of the Gaziantep bombing? Of course not. Their article underlined certain potential consequences of Turkey's strong support for the Syrian opposition and its intentions to step up its efforts. Others have made

the link before. Stratfor may, however, be correct in its analysis of a heightened risk for Turkey as the civil war in Syria drags on. In that respect, it is interesting to see what will happen with Turkey's call on the United Nations to create a safe or buffer zone within Syria to accommodate a growing number of refugees. According to Turkey's foreign minister, Ahmet Davutolu, Turkey is already hosting almost 70,000 Syrians and will run out of space if that number surpasses 100,000. The idea of buffer zones inside Syria is not a new one. Turkey has been pushing for them for months. In the spring reports were published claiming that Turkey had already discreetly started preparations for such a zone, sending 500 specialized soldiers to the region to look at possible options. A few days ago Davutolu again discussed the issue with his US colleague, Hillary Clinton, when she visited stanbul to coordinate Turkish-American initiatives in Syria. After the meeting, US Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone called for some caution as he stressed that there are still serious legal and practical obstacles. It was not clear, though, whether the ambassador was referring to the idea of buffer zones or to a no-fly zone, an issue that was also discussed. Whatever the official statements, the reality on the ground appears to be already much messier. In July, Deborah Amos, an American journalist, reported on the NPR website about a refugee camp on the Turkish-Syrian border and quoted a Syrian rebel who was moving easily between Syria and Turkey: Actually we have a buffer zone now. I mean, it's not declared by the Turkish government. People transport arms freely. The Turks are closing their eyes. We bring our wounded people here; we go back and forth and nobody bothers us at all. Other media reports seem to confirm the existence of a large area along the Turkish-Syrian border, most of it on Turkish soil, where people, aid and weapons move into Syria without the Turkish authorities interfering and, maybe even more important, without the Syrians trying to prevent such a free flow. It is a clear indication that most of the border areas are no longer controlled by Damascus. Of course, this is more of a gray zone than an officially declared buffer zone on Syrian soil, the request put forward by Davutolu. Looking at the well-known Russian and Chinese position on territorial integrity, it looks highly unlikely that the UN Security Council will react positively to Turkey's suggestion. Ankara must be fully aware of this, so the question arises: What will Turkey do next? Muddle on with a de facto open border that allows the Syrian opposition to move freely but puts the burden of the refugees solely on Turkish shoulders? Or ask for American and European assistance in occupying Syrian lands to spread the costs and risks of new refugee flows, knowing that doing so could further trigger the wrath of both Syria and Iran with all the far-reaching and unpleasant consequences that might entail? Trkiye Suriye ateine ok mu fazla yaklat? Etkili ama ayn zamanda tartmal kresel istihbarat irketi Stratfor, pazartesi gn, Trkiye'nin Suriye'deki rolnn apnn genilemesinin olas sonularyla ilgili bir makale yaymlad. Rapora gre, Ankara, gney komusunu parampara eden atmaya Trkiye'nin daha ok mdahil olmasna kamuoyunu hazrlamakla megul haftalardr. Stratfor analisti, Trkiye'nin Suriye'nin iinde daha fazla eylemde bulunmasnn, Suriye ve

ran'dan ters tepki grmesine yol aaca uyars yapyor. am ile Tahran'n seeneklerinden biri, PKK ile iyi balantlarn kullanarak, Krt terristleri Trkiye'deki hedeflere ynelik saldrlarn younlatrmaya sevk etmek olabilir. Ayn gnn ilerleyen saatlerinde, Trkiye'nin Suriye snr yaknndaki Gaziantep kentinde bomba ykl bir aracn patlamas sonucu, ocuk dokuz kii ld. PKK hemen patlamayla bir ilgisinin olmadn duyurdu. Bu, masumiyetleri iin kesin kant oluturmaz, zira gemite benzeri durumlarda zgrlk ahinleri gibi PKK ile balantl zerk gruplarn sorumlu olduu ortaya kmt. Ama PKK'nn bayramda ilenen katliamla ilikilendirilmeyi istemediine iaret eder. imdilik saldrnn sorumluluunu stlenen kmad, Suriye veya ran'n herhangi bir rol olup olmadn muhtemelen hibir zaman bilemeyeceiz. Stratfor'un Gaziantep'teki saldrdan nceden haberi var myd? Elbette hayr. Makale, Trkiye'nin Suriye muhalefetine verdii gl destein ve abalarn artrma niyetlerinin belli potansiyel sonularnn altn iziyor. Bakalar da daha nce bu balanty kurmutu. Bununla birlikte Stratfor'un, Suriye'deki i sava iddetlendike Trkiye'nin risk tasnn ykseldii analizi isabetli olabilir. Bu balamda, artan sayda mlteciye barnak salamak iin Suriye iinde gvenli blge ya da tampon blge oluturulmas ynnde Trkiye'nin Birlemi Milletler'e yapt arnn nasl sonulanacan grmek ilgin olacak. Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu'na gre, halihazrda neredeyse 70 bin Suriyeliyi arlayan Trkiye'nin, bu say 100 bini geerse, kimseyi alacak yeri kalmayacak. Suriye iinde tampon blge oluturulmas yeni bir fikir deil. Bahar aylarnda yaymlanan haberlerde, Trkiye'nin, 500 zel kuvvet askerini olas seenekleri belirlemeleri iin blgeye gndererek, tampon blge hazrlklarna gizliden balad iddia edilmiti. Davutolu, birka gn nce, Suriye'deki Trk-Amerikan giriimlerini koordine etmek iin stanbul'u ziyaret eden ABD'li muhatab Hillary Clinton ile meseleyi tekrar ele ald. Grmenin ardndan, ABD'nin Ankara Bykelisi Francis Ricciardone, hl ciddi yasal ve pratik engeller olduunu belirterek itidal ars yapt. Ama bykeli, tampon blgeye mi yoksa bir baka tartma konusu olan uua yasak blgeye mi atf yaptn mulak brakt. Resmi aklamalar ne olursa olsun, sahadaki gereklik ok daha kark gzkyor. Temmuzda Amerikal gazeteci Deborah Amos NPR web sitesine Trkiye-Suriye snrndaki bir mlteci kampyla ilgili getii haberde, Suriye ile Trkiye arasnda kolaylkla gidip gelen bir isyancnn u szlerini aktard: "Aslnda artk bir tampon blgemiz var. Tabii Trk hkmeti tarafndan resmen ilan edilmedi. zgrce silah nakliyat yapabiliyoruz. Trkler buna gz yumuyor. Yarallarmz buraya getiriyoruz, kendimiz gidip geliyoruz, kimse bize bir ey sormuyor.'' Dier medya haberleri de, Trkiye-Suriye snr boyunca byk blm Trkiye topraklarnda kalan byle byk bir blgenin varln teyit ediyor. Haberlere gre, insanlar, yardmlar ve silahlar, Trk yetkililerin mdahalesi olmadan ama daha da nemlisi Suriyeli yetkililerin serbest ak engelleme abalaryla karlamadan, Suriye'ye tanyor. Yani snr blgelerinin ou, artk am tarafndan kontrol edilmiyor. Elbette bu, Davutolu'nun talep ettii gibi Suriye topraklarnda resmen ilan edilmi bir tampon blgeden ziyade bir gri blge. Rusya ile in'in toprak btnlyle ilgili malum pozisyonu sebebiyle BM Gvenlik Konseyi'nin Trkiye'nin nerisine olumlu yant vermesi olas gzkmyor. Ankara'nn da bunun tmyle bilincinde olmas gerektiinden, u soru ortaya kyor: Trkiye bundan sonra ne yapacak? Suriye muhalefetinin serbeste hareket etmesini salayan ama mltecilerin ykn tmyle Trkiye'nin omuzlarna ykan 'de facto' ak bir snrla idare mi edecek? Ya da yeni mlteci dalgasnn risklerini ve masraflarn yaymak zere Suriye topraklarn igal etmek iin Amerika ve Avrupa'nn desteini mi isteyecek, hem de, bunu yaparak, Suriye ile ran'n ok geni kapsaml ve naho sonular beraberinde getirecek gazabn daha da ok stne ekeceini bile bile.

The optimism of Serdar Gzbyk This weekend we will see the kick-off of the new football season in Turkey. As always, millions of Turkish soccer fans are speculating on which team has the best chance of winning the Sper Lig title this time around. Not surprisingly, it will most probably be a race between Galatasaray and Fenerbahe again. Being a Fener fan myself, I have to admit that the Lions were quite successful on the transfer market with the acquisition of Burak Ylmaz, by far the most prolific goal-scoring forward playing in Turkey at the moment. The Yellow Canaries bought Dirk Kuyt, and although I

have always been a big fan of Kuyt, I wonder whether he will be a match for Burak. Whatever the case, we will soon see which team made the best deals. It is only natural that when talking football, all the attention goes to the players and, to a lesser extent, the coaches. However, without good referees every football league would soon face tremendous problems both in and outside the stadiums. Turkey is lucky to have some outstanding referees, Cneyt akr being the most prominent of them. In the Netherlands, the football season started last week. In a few weeks, the best player of last season will be announced and decorated. We already know who will receive the Golden Card for being the best Dutch referee in the previous year: Serdar Gzbyk. In the last couple of months, for understandable reasons, Gzbyk has received a lot of attention in the Dutch media. Being 26 years of age, he is easily the youngest referee in the Dutch league, and the youngest ever Dutch referee nominated for European matches. As his name clearly indicates, he is of Turkish origin, although few Dutch realize that his family name (Big Eye) seems to have foreordained a career as a referee. Apart from his achievements on the pitch, one of the other reasons for all the media attention is of course the fact that his success seems to belie all the prejudices about and among Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. About his roots and the obstacles facing many Dutch Turks, Gzbyk has always been very outspoken. In a four-page interview with one of the leading Dutch newspapers, he recently said: When I grew up, the dominant feeling around me was that being a Turk or a Moroccan or someone from Surinam it would be impossible to achieve anything in the Netherlands. The only thing I heard from my friends was that they were rejected and could not find a job, even if they had a university degree. Everybody always told me: A Turk never got anywhere in Dutch football. The special thing was that I did manage, proving all these fixed opinions wrong. I never had the experience of obstacles being put in my way. I got promoted every year. I am convinced that if you work hard, opportunities will present themselves. You can create them yourself if you stop hanging around in the same old circles where hardly anyone speaks Dutch, creating a big distance between yourself and Dutch culture. It is easy to say that you did not get a job because your name is Ahmet or Mohamed. But my father always told me that the same happens to guys with a very Dutch first name. My parents always warned me against this kind of prejudice and self-pity. They told my brothers and me to be proud of our Turkish roots but at the same time work hard to adapt to Dutch culture. We live here, these are the rules. Gzbyk has set up a company called Sport Connecting Us, through which he tries to inspire and motivate other migrants, pushing them to follow their dreams and ambitions in sports and in life. The young referee is a role model for many Turks in the Netherlands, showing them that it is possible to be successful if they believe in themselves. The good thing about Gzbyk and his positivity is that he offers powerful arguments against the idea among many Turks living abroad that racism and discrimination will always hold them back. The problem is that Gzbyk seems to think that these obstacles do not exist because he himself was not hindered by them. The truth is that Dutch or German Turks can become successful referees or politicians while at the same time in the same place others are still faced with discrimination

and racism that prevents them from doing the things they would want to do. Maybe the man with the sharp view should develop a slightly better eye for these dual tracks. Serdar Gzbyk'n iyimserlii Bu hafta sonu Trkiye'de yeni futbol sezonu balyor. Her zamanki gibi, milyonlarca futbol fanatii, Sper Lig ampiyonluunu kazanmak iin kimin daha ansl olduunu tartmakla megul u sralarda. Yarn yine Galatasaray ile Fenerbahe arasnda gemesi, srpriz olmayacak. Bir Fener taraftar olarak, itiraf etmeliyim ki, Aslanlar, u anda Trkiye'nin ak ara en ok gol reten forveti konumundaki Burak Ylmaz' alarak transfer piyasasnda baya baarl oldu. Sar Kanaryalar Dirk Kuyt' ald, her zaman Kuyt'n byk bir hayran olmama ramen Burak'la boy lp lemeyeceini merak ediyorum. Her halkarda, en doru transferi hangi takmn yapt tez zamanda belli olacak. Futboldan konuurken, dikkatimizi nce futbolculara sonra teknik direktrlere yneltmemiz gayet doal. Gelgelelim iyi hakemler olmasa, her futbol ligi stadyumlarn iinde ve dnda devasa sorunlarla karlar. Trkiye, en nde geleni Cneyt akr olmak zere kayda deer sayda sekin hakeminin bulunmas sayesinde ansl. Hollanda'da futbol sezonu geen hafta balad. Geen sezonun en iyi futbolcusu birka hafta iinde aklanacak ve dllendirilecek. Geen yln en iyi Hollandal hakemine verilecek Altn Kart dlnn kime gideceini ise imdiden biliyoruz: Serdar Gzbyk. Tahmin edilebilecek sebeplerden, Serdar Gzbyk son birka ayda Hollanda medyasnn ilgi oda oldu. 26 yandaki Gzbyk, hem Hollanda ligindeki en gen hakem hem de Avrupa malarna atanan en gen Hollandal hakem. Adndan anlald zere kendisi Trkiye kkenli, hakemlik kariyerinin adeta soyadna yazlm olduunun ise pek az Hollandal farknda. Medya ilgisinin sebeplerinden biri de, sahadaki baarlarnn yan sra hayatta geldii noktann da, Hollanda'da Trk gmenler hakknda ve arasnda sregiden nyarglarla elimesi. Kkenleri ve Hollandal Trklerin karlat engeller sorulduunda, Gzbyk hep ak szl olmutur. Geenlerde Hollanda'nn en nde gelen gazetelerinden birine verdii drt sayfalk mlakatta diyor ki: ''Ben byrken, evremdeki hakim duygu, bir Trk, Fasl veya Surinamlnn Hollanda'da en ufak bir baar kazanmasnn imknsz olduuydu. Arkadalarmdan tek duyduum, niversite diplomalar olsa bile her yerden reddedildikleri ve i bulamadklaryd. Herkes bana hep unu sylyordu: Bir Trk, Hollanda futbolunda hibir yere gelemez. Benim baarmam zel bir ey oldu, tm bu sabit fikirlerin yanlln kantlad. Yoluma engel karlmas gibi bir tecrbe yaamadm. Bilakis her yl terfi ettirildim. Sk alrsanz, frsat kaplarnn alacana kani oldum. Kendinizle Hollanda kltr arasna byk mesafe koyan, kimsenin Flamanca konumad eski evrelere taklmay brakrsanz, kendi frsatlarnz kendiniz yaratrsnz. Adnz Ahmet ya da Muhammed diye ie alnmadnz sylemek kolay. Babam hep bana adlar gayet Hollandal kiilerin de ie girmekte zorlandn hatrlatrd. Ailem bu tr nyarglara ve kendine acmaya kaplmamam iin beni her zaman uyard. Bana ve erkek kardelerime, Trk kkenlerimizle gurur duymamz ama ayn zamanda Hollanda kltrne uyum salamamz iin sk almamz tembihlediler. Burada yayoruz, burann kurallarna uymalyz, dediler.'' 'Bizi birbirimize balayan spor' adnda bir irket kuran Gzbyk, bylelikle dier gmenlere esin kayna olmaya, onlar motive etmeye, hem sporda hem de hayatta hayallerinin peinden komaya cesaretlendirmeye alyor. Gen hakem Hollanda'daki pek ok Trk iin bir rol modeli, kendilerine inanrlarsa baarl olma imknlarnn bulunduunu gsteren en iyi rnek. Gzbyk ve onun olumlu bak asnn en iyi yan, yurtdnda yaayan pek ok Trk'n paylat rklk ve ayrmcln kendilerine hep elme takaca fikrine kar gl savlar getirmesi. Lakin yle bir sorun var ki, Gzbyk kendisine rastgelmedi diye byle engellerin hi var olmadn sanyor. Gerek u ki, Almanyal ya da Hollandal Trkler siyaseti ya da futbol hakemi olarak baar kazanabilir, ama ayn zamanda ve ayn yerde dierleri, istedikleri eyleri yapmalarn engelleyen rklk ve ayrmclkla hl cebelleiyor. Belki de bu keskin grl adam, bir yandan ykseltirken dier yandan aa eken ift ynl yollara kar gzn daha ak tutmal.

Olympic lessons for stanbul The 2012 Summer Olympics are over. The athletes have gone home and worldwide sports analysts are trying to make sense

of the successes and failures of their national Olympic teams. Which methods worked in creating Olympic champions? But also: What did we do wrong that could explain the discouraging results in London? My guess is that Turkish officials will spend more time on the last question. Although at the last moment Asli Cakir Alptekin and Gamze Bulut saved Turkeys' face with their impressive domination of the 1,500 meters and Servet Tazegl and Nur Tatar did the same on the taekwondo canvas, overall Turkey's performance in London was disappointing. The country ended up on the list of populous and important states like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico that were outperformed by considerably smaller countries such as Hungary, the Netherlands and New Zealand. In the case of Brazil and Turkey, the lessons learned have a wider significance. In 2016 the Olympics will be held in Rio de Janeiro and four years later stanbul might be the venue. One year ago Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan officially announced Turkey's candidacy. In September 2013 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) will decide whether it will be stanbul, Madrid or Tokyo. stanbul has tried several times before but this time its chances seem to be high and only the Japanese capital could spoil Turkey's bid. However, the Olympic circus may come to the Bosporus in 2020 but if Turkey performs as unsatisfactorily sportively then as it did in the last three weeks, the benefits for the guest country will be limited. Compare that to London 2012. Almost till the start of the Games, there was a widespread feeling in the UK that most probably things would go wrong with the organization and security and that, again, the British athletes would not be able to excel and would end up with just a couple of gold medals. Now, after three weeks of smooth functioning and without major problems with transport, accommodations or safety, the Brits are proud of their country. The main reason apart from the relief that everything worked out as planned? The extraordinary results of Team GB. British athletes won an incredible 65 medals including 29 gold ones and ended up in third place after the two giants the US and China. Reading the British newspapers the day after the Games, one gets the impression of a nation that rediscovered its pride and self esteem after decades of decay, sportive failures and race riots. As The Independent daily put it, The Union Jack has been rescued from the old connotations of vanished empire and has become a vibrant, colorful symbol of contemporary British identity. The London Olympics are an excellent example of what shared success can do to a country's morale. Skeptics will say the effect is temporary and will soon be eclipsed by the present economic crisis. Still, the UK has not felt better for a long time and nobody can take that positive feeling away. Could the same happen in stanbul and Turkey in 2020? To imitate the London euphoria, at least two things need to happen. Firstly, the Turkish government should be honest and tell the country that hosting the 2020 Olympics will be a costly affair. As all its predecessors did, the Turkish Olympic bid book contains the same cloaked terms that hide the financial truth. After each and every Games, the conclusion of impartial research is that the costs were much higher, most profits went to the IOC and tourists did not show up in such big numbers as were expected. The total costs in London will probably be around 18 billion euros. If Turkey wants to organize the 2020 Olympics, it better put 20-25 billion euros aside for that. Secondly, sportive successes along British 2012 lines will only happen if Turkey is willing to follow the example of the UK and other countries that have set up a national sports policy that produces results. UK athletes did not win their gold medals only because of the enthusiasm of the crowds in the stadiums. In the last four years UK Sport, the coordinating body, spent 340 million euros that it got from the National Lottery on training and facilitating promising athletes in a number of selected disciplines with gold medal prospects. Building stadiums, airports and bridges will not be enough to make 2020 a resounding success. Better sooner than later,

Turkey should start enabling its athletes to fully focus on their sportive careers, paying them a decent salary and providing them with the best facilities and coaches. Is Turkey able and willing to do so? stanbul iin Olimpiyat dersleri 2012 Yaz Olimpiyat Oyunlar bitti. Atletler evlerine dnerken, dnya apnda spor analistleri de milli Olimpiyat takmlarnn baar ve baarszlklarn anlamlandrmaya alyor. Olimpiyat ampiyonlar yaratmakta hangi yntemler ie yarad? Ama ayn zamanda: Londra'daki evk krc sonular aklayabilecek apta neyi yanl yaptk? Tahminimce, Trk yetkililer ikinci soruya daha fazla zaman harcayacak. Asl akr Alptekin ile Gamze Bulut'un 1500 metredeki etkileyici hakimiyetleriyle Trkiye'nin itibarn son dakikada kurtarmasna ve Servet Tazegl ile Nur Tatar'n aynsn tekvando minderinde yapmasna ramen, Trkiye'nin Londra'daki genel performans hayal krklyd. Brezilya, Arjantin ve Meksika gibi kalabalk ve nemli olmalarna ramen Macaristan, Hollanda ve Yeni Zelanda gibi grece kk lkelere geilen devletlerle ayn listede buldu Trkiye kendini. Brezilya ve Trkiye asndan karlacak dersler daha byk nem arz ediyor. 2016 Olimpiyat Rio de Janeiro'da yaplacak ve drt yl sonraki sahne de stanbul olabilir. Trkiye'nin adayl bir yl nce Babakan Erdoan tarafndan resmen akland. stanbul mu, Madrid mi, Tokyo mu olacana, Uluslararas Olimpiyat Komitesi Eyll 2013'te karar verecek. stanbul daha nce defalarca aday olmutu, ama bu kez ans yksek gzkyor, sadece Japonya bakenti Trkiye'nin hevesini kursanda brakabilir. Baka deyile: Olimpiyat sirki 2020'de Boazii'ne gelebilir, ama Trkiye son haftadaki kadar sportif adan tatmin etmeyen performans sergilerse, evsahipliinin faydasn gremez. Londra 2012 ile bir kyas yapalm. Neredeyse Olimpiyat Oyunlar'nn balamasna dein, Birleik Krallk'ta yaygn hissiyat, byk ihtimalle organizasyonla gvenliin kt gidecei, yine Britanyal atletlerin baar gsteremeyecei ve bir ift altn madalyadan teye geemeyecei ynndeydi. Ancak organizasyonun tkr tkr yrd, ulatrma, konaklama ve gvenlikle ilgili byk sorunlarn yaanmad haftann ardndan, Britanyallar lkeleriyle gurur duyuyor. Her eyin planland gibi gitmesinin verdii rahatl ayr tutarsak, bunun asl sebebi ne? Elbette Byk Britanya (GB) Takm'nn ald olaanst sonular. Britanyal atletler, inanlmaz biimde, 29'u altn olmak zere 65 madalya kazand ve ABD ile in gibi iki devin arkasndan nc sray ald. Oyunlarn ertesi gn Britanya gazetelerini okurken, onlarca yllk k, sportif baarszlk ve rk isyanlarnn ardndan gururunu ve zsaygsn yeniden kefeden bir ulus izlenimi ediniyorsunuz. The Independent gazetesinin belirttii gibi, "Union Jack (Birleik Krallk bayra) yitip giden imparatorlukla ilgili kalplam armlardan kurtarld ve ada Britanyal kimliinin canl ve renkli bir simgesine dnt.'' Londra Olimpiyat, paylalan baarnn, bir lkenin moraline neler yapabileceinin drt drtlk rnei. pheciler, bunun geici bir etki olduunu ve halihazrdaki ekonomik kriz tarafndan tez zamanda geersiz klnacan syleyecektir. Yine de Britanyallar uzun zamandr kendilerini hi bu kadar iyi hissetmemiti ve bu olumlu duyguyu kimse onlardan geri alamaz. Ayns 2020'de stanbul ve Trkiye'de de gerekleebilir mi? Londra cokusunu tekrarlayabilmek iin en az iki eyin olmas lazm: lkin, Trk hkmeti, halka, 2020 Olimpiyat'na evsahipliinin pahalya patlayacan drste sylemeli. Tm selefleri gibi Trkiye'nin adayla bavuru dosyas da mali hakikati perdeleyen rtl terimlerle dolu. Her olimpiyattan sonra tarafsz aratrmalarn vard sonu hep ayn: Masraflarn ngrlenden ok daha kabark, krn byk blm Uluslararas Olimpiyat Komitesi'ne gitti ve beklendii kadar ok turist gelmedi. Londra'nn toplam masraf muhtemelen 18 milyar Avro civarnda kacak. Trkiye, 2020'yi organize etmek istiyorsa, bunun iin bir kenara 20-25 milyar Avro ayrmakla iyi eder. kincisi, Trkiye ancak sonu veren ulusal spor politikalar yrrle koyan Birleik Krallk ve dier lkelerin yolundan gitmeye istekliyse, Britanyallarn 2012'deki dzeyine kout sportif baarlar elde edebilir. Birleik Krallk atletleri altn madalyalar srf stadyumlar dolduran kalabalklarn tezahratlar sayesinde kazanmad. Son drt ylda koordinasyon organ 'Birleik Krallk Spor', Ulusal Loto'dan ald 340 milyon Avro'yu altn madalya perspektifi sunan disiplinleri belirleyip bunlarn gelecek vaat eden atletlerini eitmeye ve olanaklarn artrmaya harcad. Stadyumlar, havaalanlar ve kprler ina etmek 2020'yi dillere destan bir baar yapmaya yetmez. Trkiye, daha fazla gecikmeden, atletlerinin tmyle spor kariyerlerine odaklanmalarn salamaya, onlara makul bir maa demeye, en iyi tesis ve kolar nlerine sermeye balarsa, iyi eder. Trkiye'nin bunu yapma kabiliyeti ve istei var m?

Can Greece change?

Ever since Greece had to ask for financial assistance from the European Union, the focus in much of the European media has been on the structural problems facing the country: Hardly any industry able to compete on European export markets; a level of state and private expenditure based on cheap loans and not on real productive capacities; ineffective state institutions burdened by thousands of redundant civil servants who got their jobs from politicians trying to buy votes; a long tradition of massive tax evasion and shrewd tactics to cheat the authorities in Athens and Brussels. On the op-ed pages of Dutch newspapers, concerned citizens, often with personal ties to Greece or Greeks, have been discussing among each other whether one can trust the Greek promises to correct past mistakes and improve on their policies and behavior. Most contributors to the debate have little faith in Greeces capacity to radically embark on a new course and make the calculation that it will take at least one generation to catch up with the rest of Europe on issues like productivity and fiscal discipline. They refer to a revealing interview with the head of the Greek tax authority who recently calculated that the Greek state misses out on 45 billon euros of tax incomes annually. If only half of that money were paid, Greece would not have to ask the rest of the eurozone for help. Many critics are afraid that Greece will not be able to stick to the tough financial rules imposed by the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and will soon have to leave the eurozone and start from scratch with a new drachma. They fear Athens inability to reform in the short rum will cost the Netherlands and other major lenders billons of euros in lost loans. A minority of positive-minded Europeans feel that the Greeks are being judged too harshly and that a lot of the criticism is based on prejudices about lazy southerners and Mediterranean culture. To be honest, much of the debate on the capacity of the Greeks to change their mentality and way of organizing things is not very stimulating. The skeptics tend to focus solely on the enormity of the challenges facing the Greeks; the optimists often look a bit nave, believing almost desperately in the possibilities of a radical and rapid Greek metamorphosis. In the end it will, of course, mainly depend on what the Greeks themselves think and do. For that reason I was happy to read a blog post by Judy Dempsey last week on the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dempsey is a seasoned reporter who worked as the diplomatic correspondent for the Financial Times in Brussels and is now a columnist for the International Herald Tribune and editor-in-chief of Strategic Europe, one of the most interesting blogs on Europe and the EU. In her article, Dempsey highlights an initiative by Theodor Pangalos, a former deputy prime minister of Greece and a life-long controversial politician. Pangalos has set up a special website called Mazi ta Fagami, literally translated as We ate up everything together. On the website he calls on Greeks to stop blaming others for their problems. It was the Greeks, Pangalos claims, who squandered billions of EU money and it was the Greek politicians and civil servants who got Greece into this catastrophic financial mess. The website is a huge success. Many Greeks use it to tell their own personal stories about the bribes they had to pay for almost every service. As Dempsey puts it: Its an astonishing account about what Greeks have tolerated over the decades. It also gives a fascinating and depressing picture into the level of systematic corruption and fraud within the civil service. Despite all the examples of deceit and swindling that probably present only the tip of the iceberg, Dempsey concludes on a positive note: Pangolos website is rendering the country a tremendously important service: It is helping to encourage a grass roots movement of citizens who, burdened by the austerity measures, are no longer prepared to remain silent over the

bribery and corruption. The IMF and the EU have also put pressure on several ministries to conduct scrupulous audits. So if a strong civil society movement can emerge as a result of Mazi ta Fagami, then perhaps Greece has a real chance in making a break with the past. If Pangalos website takes off, maybe even a country like Greece can change. Yunanistan deiebilir mi? Yunanistan Avrupa Birlii'nden mali yardm istemek zorunda kaldndan beri, Avrupa medyasnn pek ok organ bu lkenin cebelletii yapsal sorunlara odakland: Avrupa ihracat piyasasnda rekabet edebilecek doru dzgn bir sanayisi yok, devlet dahil herkes gerek retim kapasitesine deil, ucuz kredilere srtn dayayarak harcama yapyor, oy satn almaya alan siyasiler tarafndan ie yerletirilen binlerce lzumsuz memurun ykn tayan devlet kurumlar hibir ie yaramyor, geni apta vergi karmak ve Atina ile Brksel'deki yetkilileri kandrmak iin kurnaz taktiklere bavurmak gelenek halini alm. Hollanda gazetelerinin yorum sayfalarnda, genelde Yunanistan veya Yunanllarla kiisel balar olan endieli vatandalar, kendi aralarnda, Yunanistan'n gemi hatalarn dzeltme, siyaset ve davranlarn deitirme vaatlerine gvenilip gvenilemeyeceini tartmakla megul. Bu tartmaya katkda bulunanlarn ounun, Atina'nn radikal biimde yeni bir yola girebileceine ve retkenlik, mali disiplin gibi alanlarda Avrupa'nn geri kalanna yetimek iin en az bir nesil gemesi gerektiini hazmedebileceine inanc yok. Geenlerde bir mlakatta Yunan vergi kurumu bakannn son hesaplara gre devletten 45 milyar avro vergi karldn sylemesine atf yapyorlar. Bu parann yars bile denseydi, Yunanistan avro blgesinin geri kalanndan yardm istemek zorunda kalmazd, diyorlar. Bu tenkitleri yneltenlerin ounun korkusu, Yunanistan'n IMF ile AB'nin dayatt sk mali kurallara riayet edemeyecei, ksa sre iinde avro blgesini terk etmek ve yeni bir drahmiyle ie sfrdan balamak zorunda kalaca. Atina'nn ksa vadede kendini reformdan geirememesinin bedelini, Hollanda ve dier byk bor vericilerin dn verdikleri milyarlarca avroyu kaybederek demesinden korkuyorlar. Olumlu bakan Avrupallar ise aznlkta. Onlar, Yunanllarn insafszca yarglandn ve eletirilerin ounun tembel gneyliler ve Akdeniz kltryle ilgili nyarglara dayandn hissediyor. Drst olmak gerekirse, zihniyet ve ileri organize etme yntemlerini deitirme kapasitesiyle ilgili tartmalarn ou Yunanllar gayrete getirecek trden deil. phecilerin ou Yunanllarn karlat meydan okumalarn ktcl devasalna odaklanyor sadece, iyimserler ise radikal ve hzl bir Yunan metamorfozuna inanmak isteyerek biraz naif gzkyor. Sonuta, gidiat, en ok, Yunanllarn kendileri iin ne dndne ve ne yaptna bal. Bu yzden geen hafta dnce kuruluu Carnegie Endowment'n web sitesinde yaymlanan Judy Dempsey'nin blogunu okumaktan mutlu oldum. Grm geirmi bir haberci olan Dempsey, Financial Times'n Brksel'deki diplomatik muhabirliinin ardndan imdi International Herald Tribune'n ke yazar, ayn zamanda Avrupa ve AB hakkndaki en ilgin bloglardan biri olan 'Strategic Europe'un (Stratejik Avrupa) yayn ynetmeni. Dempsey, makalesinde, hayat boyunca tartmal bir siyaseti olagelmi eski Yunan babakan yardmcs Teodor Pangalos'un bir giriimine ayna tutuyor. Pangalos, tam evirisi ''Her eyi birlikte yedik'' olabilecek 'Mazi ta Fagami' adnda zel bir web sitesi kurmu. Siteden Yunanllara kendi sorunlar iin bakalarn sulamay brakmalar ars yapyor. Pangalos'un iddias, milyarlarca avroluk AB parasn har vurup harman savuranlar Yunanllardr ve lkeyi mali bat felaketine sokanlar da Yunan siyasetilerle memurlardr. Web sitesi byk baar kazanm durumda. Yunanllar, siteye girip hemen her hizmet iin rvet demek zorunda kaldklar gnlere dair kiisel hikyelerini anlatyor. Dempsey'nin belirttii gibi, ''Bu, Yunanllarn on yllardr nelere tahamml edegeldiklerine dair artc bir hesaplama. Memuriyette dnen dolaplar ve sistematik yolsuzluun ok ilgi ekici ve bir o kadar da sinir bozucu manzarasn sunuyor. Muhtemelen buzdann sadece ucunu oluturan tm bu ktye kullanma ve dolandrclk rneklerine ramen, Dempsey yazsn olumlu bir tonda bitiriyor: "Pangalos'un web sitesi lkeye muazzam nemli bir hizmette bulunuyor. Kemer skma nlemlerinin yk altnda ezilirken artk rvet ve yolsuzluk karsnda sessiz kalmamaya kararl vatandalar, tabandan bir halk hareketine tevik ediyor. IMF ile AB de pek ok bakanla titiz denetimler yapmalar iin bask uyguluyor. Eer 'Mazi ta Fagami'nin meyvesi olarak gl bir sivil toplum hareketi doarsa, Yunanistan'n gemi defterleri kapatp yeni bir sayfa amak iin gerek bir ans olabilir... Pangalos'un sitesi i yapyorsa, belki Yunanistan gibi bir lke bile deiebilir.''

Pride and prejudice What do Mo Farah, Jessica Ennis and Ranomi Kromowidjojo have in common? The most obvious answer is of course that last weekend they all won a gold medal at the London Olympics. Farah won the men's 10,000 meters, Ennis became the Olympic heptathlon champion and Kromowidjojo was the fastest swimmer in the 50 meters freestyle after she had already won the 100 meters freestyle two days before. But these three outstanding athletes share something else as well. They all personify the multicultural character of modern Britain and the Netherlands, the countries they represent at the Olympics. Farah was born in Somalia and moved to the UK at the age of 8 to join his father who was born in England. Farah's parents met after his father went on holiday to Somalia. The young Farah struggled at school because he barely spoke a word of English when he arrived but overcame these obstacles when his teachers recognized his athletic talents. Ennis and Kromowidjojo are both children from so-called mixed marriages. Ennis' father originally comes from Jamaica; the Dutch swimmer's father is of Javanese Surinamese origin. Does it matter that all three have black or colored skin and defy the classic image of the red-haired Briton and the blond Dutch? According to many it does. In the daily London Evening Standard, Ian Birrell wrote an almost ecstatic article under the title Mo Farah has sent a message of hope to all migrants. My guess is that Birrell expresses the view of many liberal and open-minded Brits when he makes the point that last weekend's nationwide joy over Farah's and Ennis' accomplishments in the Olympic stadium, seems to show that Britain, finally, is coming to grips with itself as a complex nation with multiple identities and mashed-up culture where one in eight people are foreign-born. The author focuses on Farah because especially Somalis suffer many of the worst barbs against immigrants. Birrell: Now there is a success story showing the real face of his community: A friendly, family man and devout Muslim whose fierce determination overcame huge hurdles on his long journey to the Olympic podium. Asked afterwards if he would run for Somalia, he gave a sharp put-down: Look mate, this is my country'. The author expresses the hope that the legacy of these Olympics to Britain could be that the country feels comfortable with itself as a multicultural society. These athletes are the visible tip of the immigrant iceberg. Just as Team GB benefits from Britain's openness to migration, so does the nation. The same forces that drive these athletes to victory lie behind successes in other areas, from arts and business to medicine and science. They even explain the host city's success, saved from decades of decline by an influx of newcomers. Birrell's article is a sympathetic plea in favor of migration and the multicultural society that results from that. A welcome voice of reason and optimism in times when racism and discrimination still have such a negative effect on the lives of so many migrants, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. When assessing the impact of the sports victories of Farah, Ennis and Kromowidjojo on society as a whole, I think we should make a difference between two phenomena. One is the pride these successes stir up in the migrant communities that associate themselves with these athletes. On

Facebook for example, many Surinam people were full of joy because our girl Ranomi was the queen of the Olympic swimming pool. I am sure Somalis all over the world and Jamaicans in the UK were as proud of their representatives. These feelings are important in strengthening the self-confidence of communities that, still, often feel themselves secondclass citizens in their adopted homelands. The other potential effect is the softening of prejudices against migrants among white Brits and Dutch. There I am slightly more skeptical about the short-term positive results. In the Netherlands we have had Ruud Gullit, Frank Rijkaard and a whole range of other black or colored football players who have won the sympathies of many Dutch. Still, racism and discrimination exist in the Netherlands and xenophobic parties manage to attract 15-20 percent of the votes at elections. It would be nave to think that, overnight, black athletes would be able to completely erase these white prejudices. One could hope, however, that Farah, Ennis and Kromowidjojo have shown at least to some skeptical Brits and Dutch that migration and multiculturalism can produce outcomes even they have to admit they are proud of. Gurur ve nyarg Mo Farah, Jessica Ennis, Ranomi Kromowidjojo'nun ortak yn ne? Elbette en bariz yant, her nn de geen hafta sonu Londra Olimpiyatlar'nda altn madalya kazanm olmas. Farah erkekler 10 bin metreyi kazand, Ennis Olimpiyat heptatlon ampiyonu oldu, Kromowidjojo kadnlar 100 metre serbesti kazanmasndan iki gn sonra 50 metre serbestte en hzl yzc oldu. Ama bu sekin atletin paylat bir ortak yn daha var: Temsil ettikleri modern Britanya ve Hollanda'nn ok kltrl karakterini simgeliyorlar. Farah, Somali'de domu ve sekiz yandayken, ngiltere doumlu babasnn yannda kalmak iin Britanya'ya tanm. Farah'n babasnn annesi ile tanmas, Somali'ye tatile gitmesine dayanyor. Ama kk Farah Britanya'ya vardnda sadece birka kelime ngilizce bildiinden okulda ok zorlanm, ancak retmenlerinin atletik yeteneklerini kefetmesiyle bu engellerin stesinden gelebilmi. Ennis ve Kromowidjojo, 'farkl rklarn evlilii' denilen birlikteliklerden olan ocuklar. Ennis'in babas aslen Jamaika'dan geliyor, Hollandal yzcnn babas ise Cava Surinam kkenli. Her nn de siyah ya da renkli teninin olmasnn, kzl kafa Britanyal ve sarn Hollandal klasik imajna kafa tutmalarnn bir nemi var m? Pek ouna gre var. London Evening Standard gazetesinde Ian Birrell, 'Mo Farah tm gmenlere umut mesaj gnderdi' balkl, neredeyse esrik bir makale kaleme ald. Birrell, Farah ve Ennis'in Olimpiyat Stadyumu'ndaki baarlarnn lke apnda kutlanmasnn, her sekiz kiiden birinin yabanc lkede doduu Britanya'nn ok kimlikli ve kark kltrl bir ulus olmasyla nihayet yzlemesinin gstergesi olduuna iaret ediyordu. Kanmca, Birrell, pek ok liberal ve ak grl Britanyalnn grn dile getiriyor. Yazarn Farah'a odaklanmas, gmenlere ynelik aalamalarn en ktlerine zellikle Somalililerin maruz kalmasndan. Birrell yle diyor: ''imdi onun geldii topluluun gerek yzn gsteren bir baar hikyesi var: Dost canls, aile babas, mmin bir Mslman, tutkulu kararll sayesinde Olimpiyat podyumuna giden uzun yolda karsna kan devasa engelleri at. Zaferinin ardndan Somali iin yarp yarmayaca sorulduunda net biimde kestirip att: 'Bak dostum, buras benim lkem.''' Yazarn umudu, Olimpiyat'tan geriye kalan mirasn, lkenin ok kltrl bir toplum olduu gereiyle rahat etmeye balamas. "Bu atletler, gmen buzdann grnr zirvesi. Nasl Byk Britanya (GB) takm Britanya'nn ge ak olmasndan faydalanyorsa, ulus da aynen yle faydalanyor. Bu atletleri zafere gtren gler, sanattan i alemine, tptan bilim dnyasna baka alanlardaki baarlarn gerisindeki gler ayn zamanda. Srekli yeni gelen akn sayesinde, ev sahibi ehrin on yllardr dten korunarak baarya ulamasn bile aklyor.'' Birrell'in makalesi, gmenlerden ve onlarn yol at ok kltrl toplumdan yana bir savunma. Britanya ve Avrupa'nn geri kalannda rklk ve ayrmclk bu kadar ok gmenin yaam zerinde hl bylesine olumsuz etki yaparken, bu akln ve iyimserliin sesini memnuniyetle karlamalyz. Farah, Ennis ve Kromowidjojo'nun sportif zaferlerinin toplum zerinde brakaca izi bir btn olarak deerlendirirken, iki fenomen arasnda ayrm gzetmeliyiz. Biri, kendilerini bu atletlerle balantlandran gmen topluluklarn, onlarn elde ettii baarlardan duyduu gurur. rnein Facebook'ta pek ok Surinaml, 'kzmz' Ranomi'nin Olimpik havuzun kraliesi olmasnn neesiyle comutu. Eminim ki, tm dnyadaki Somalililer ve Britanya'daki Jamaikallar da 'temsilcileriyle' bir o kadar gururluydular. Evlat edinildikleri vatanda kendilerini genelde ikinci snf vatanda hisseden topluluklarn zgvenini glendirmek asndan bu hisler nemli.

Dier potansiyel etkisi de, beyaz Britanyallar ve Hollandallar arasnda gmenlere ynelik nyarglar yumuatmas. Bu noktada ksa vadeli etkiler konusunda biraz daha pheciyim. Hollanda'da Ruud Gullit, Frank Rijkaard ve daha pek ok siyah ya da renkli futbolcumuz olmutu ve pek ok Hollandalnn sempatisini kazanmlard. Ama Hollanda'da hl rklk ve ayrmclk hkm sryor ve yabanc dman partiler seimlerde oylarn yzde 15-20'sini topluyor. Siyah atletlerin beyazlarn nyarglarn bir gecede tmyle silebileceklerini dnmek naiflik olur. Yine de umabiliriz ki, en azndan Farah, Ennis ve Kromowidjojo, g ve ok kltrlln, baz pheci Britanyal ve Hollandallara onlarn bile gurur duyduklarn itiraf edecekleri sonular retebileceini gsterdi.

Dont give up on politics in Syria Kofi Annan announced his resignation as the special envoy of the UN and Arab League for Syria on Thursday. In an opinion article that was published that same day on the website of the Financial Times, Annan explained his frustration with the absence of a united international community that could effectively and actively support a peaceful transition to a new legitimate Syrian government. In his article, Annan made three other relevant points that I sincerely hope will be taken seriously by those who were addressed. Firstly, he praised the Syrian protesters for their courage to keep on marching in the face of escalating violence by the government. He also concluded, however, that the opposition did not manage to bridge Syrias communal divisions and that this opportunity was finally lost when violence on all sides increased. Secondly, he called on those countries supporting the anti-Assad forces, including Turkey, to put pressure on the opposition to embrace a fully inclusive political process that will include communities and institutions currently associated with the government. Lastly, and I feel most importantly, Annan, despite his frustrations, again underlined the need for a political solution that includes all main players. He said: Military means alone will not end the crisis. Similarly, a political agenda that is neither inclusive nor comprehensive will fail. The distribution of force and the divisions in Syrian society are such that only a serious negotiated political transition can hope to end the repressive rule of the past and avoid a future descent into a vengeful sectarian war. The day before Annan resigned, Julien Barnes-Dacey, senior policy fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), wrote an article with the title that I am using for this column: Dont give up on politics in Syria. In it he rejects the tendency to shift attention and support from diplomacy that has failed to armed opposition that seems to be the only way to get rid of the Assad regime. Barnes-Dacey is afraid that the result will be an even deeper civil war that will push the country towards collapse. He suggests Turkey and other countries weaken their reliance on the discredited Syrian National Council (SNC) and give greater importance to the internal voices of the opposition who better represent the uprising and who have also shown greater willingness to reach common accord and compromise. That same day, Aug. 1, the International Crisis Group (ICG) published a new report on Syria that I would like to recommend to everybody who is interested in the internal dynamics of Syrian society since the start of the conflict. The report is based on a large number of interviews with Syrians who strongly oppose the present regime but also with those who are sitting on the fence or are still, often reluctantly, supportive of the Assad government. The report offers an impressive account of a remarkable, vibrant civil society that has rediscovered a sense of solidarity and pride. At the same time, one reads harrowing stories about growing sectarianism and fundamentalism and an Alawite community that feels it has no option but to kill or be killed. The gulf between pro-opposition and pro-regime constituencies has grown exponentially, and the ICG warns of the danger of sectarian reprisals and indiscriminate killings, of which we already saw some gruesome examples last week. The

report concludes that nothing should be expected from a regime that has morphed into a militia fighting a naked struggle for collective survival. That means, according to the ICG, the burden falls on the opposition to do what at the moment seems an improbable undertaking: seriously address the phenomena of retaliatory violence, sectarian killings and creeping fundamentalism within its ranks; rethink its goal of total regime eradication and instead focus on rehabilitating existing institutions; profoundly reassess relations with the Alawite community; and come up with forward looking proposals on transitional justice, accountability and amnesty. The Annan and ECFR articles and the ICG report have a lot in common. All stress the danger, both for the Syrian opposition and the international community, of putting all their cards on a military overthrow of the Assad regime. They underscore the need not to give up on negotiated political solutions, difficult as that may be for the moment. Their main warning is related to the deep divisions in Syrian society that have to be overcome in order to prevent total chaos post-Assad, first and foremost by the opposition, which needs the ongoing support of outside sponsors to succeed in that Herculean task.

The perverse effects of tax evasion (2) In my previous article, I referred to a recently published report on tax evasion by well-to-do individuals and businesses and the enormous amounts of money involved. Globally, at least $21 trillion is hidden in tax havens, and that enables the owners and controllers of wealth, as the Tax Justice Network (TJN) put it, to escape their responsibilities to the societies on which they and their wealth depend. A second study, also commissioned by the TJN, showed that by not taking these assets in offshore banks and the income they produce into consideration, all studies on economic inequality fail to present the correct picture. Inequality is even worse than we tend to believe, and these extreme imbalances between the rich and the poor have a very negative effect on social cohesion and the possibilities for economic growth. At the end of my previous column, I asked the rhetorical question: What is new? Has there not always been enormous inequality in all societies? Is this a fact of life, whether one likes it or not, accepted by most people in the end as an unavoidable side effect of capitalism? Why would this new form of inequality, tax evasion, have a different effect on society than previous tricks by the super rich? Most probably the impact of this kind of information on the extravagant behavior of the economic elite is smallest in societies where the economy has been growing strongly in the last decade and is expected to do so in the foreseeable future. In emerging economies such as China, Brazil and Turkey, the gap between the rich and the poor has never been as big as it is nowadays. Still, many poor and middle-class people are willing to accept this inequality because, overall, society as a whole has been growing together. It appears that the pie has been growing thanks to the contributions of the rich and therefore also the slices of the pie for the poor and those in the middle are now larger than they were in the past. So, why complain if almost everybody is profiting from the economic boom? Yes, there will be protests from the left and the trade unions against the uneven and often unfair distribution of the new wealth but, especially in conservative societies like Turkey, these will not have a decisive effect on government policies. On the contrary, in the US and Europe we are talking about a totally different ball game. As Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz

and many others have stated, in the last decade in America all of the benefits of growth have gone to the top. The US has the highest level of inequality of any of the advanced countries and the resistance against it is growing. The Occupy movement may have failed as a social movement because it did not manage to escape from the margins, but their core message was supported by a majority of Americans. They agree that it is not acceptable for the top 1 percent of US income earners to capture 93 percent of income growth and that it is morally and politically indefensible to save big banks with public money but allow them to continue to pay huge bonuses to executives who have failed miserably. It is no coincidence that the presumptive Republican nominee for president, multi-millionaire and notorious tax evader Mitt Romney, has a big problem because he keeps refusing to publicize his tax records. In most European countries, in order to get out of the euro crisis, people are currently being asked to give up part of their income and their privileges. A growing number of angry citizens have been unwilling to do so when they learn that bankers still get away with rewards paid from tax revenues. How will one convince middle class families to accept wage cuts if they read the TJN report on tax evasion? After decades of affluence, many Europeans will have to take a step back economically, and most of them realize that it's probably inevitable. However, this will only be accepted by a majority if there are no big exceptions for the elite. The problem is that, until now, this sentiment has mainly been voiced by populist parties whose solutions don't work (close the borders) or are counter-productive (leave the EU). The moment has arrived for center-right and center-left politicians to show they understand that stable societies and productive economies cannot be built and maintained when the people and businesses that profit most are unwilling to contribute their fair share. To accept tax evasion and extreme inequality is a political choice that can and should be firmly rejected. Vergi karmann meum etkileri-2 nceki makalemde, hali vakti yerinde bireylerle ticari kurulularn kard vergi ve ortada dnen muazzam parayla ilgili ksa sre nce yaymlanan bir rapora atfta bulunmutum. Kresel olarak en az 21 trilyon dolar vergi cennetlerinde saklanyor ve bu sayede, Vergi Adaleti A'nn (TJN) dikkat ektii gibi, servete sahip olanlar ve serveti kontrol edenler, 'kendilerinin ve servetlerinin baml olduu toplumlara sorumluluklarn yerine getirmekten kayor'. Yine TJN'nin yaptrd ikinci bir aratrma, bu offshore bankalardaki varlklar ve elde edilen gelirleri hesaba katmadan, ekonomik eitsizlik hakknda yaplan onca almann doru bir tablo ortaya koymasnn olanakszln kantlyordu. Eitsizlik bizim inanmak istediimizden daha vahim bir noktada ve zenginle yoksul arasndaki bu ar dengesizlik, toplumsal huzuru ve ekonomik byme olaslklarn ok olumsuz etkiliyor. Ke yazmn sonunda u retorik soruyu sormutum: Bunda yeni olan ne? Her zaman tm toplumlarda muazzam eitsizlik olmad m? Yaamn bu olgusu, ister beenin ister beenmeyin, sonunda ou insan tarafndan kapitalizmin kanlmaz bir yan etkisi olarak kabullenilmedi mi? Bu yeni eitsizlik biiminin -vergi karmann- niye toplum zerinde sper zenginlerin nceki numaralarndan farkl bir etkisi olsun ki? Ekonomik sekinlerin mfrit davranlar hakknda bu tr enformasyonu, byk ihtimalle, en az umursayacaklar, ekonomisi son 10 ylda gl biimde byyen ve ngrlebilir gelecekte byle devam etmesi beklenen toplumlar. in, Brezilya,

Trkiye gibi byk g olma yolundaki ekonomilerde zengin ile yoksul arasndaki uurum daha nce hi olmad kadar byd. Ama yoksul ve orta snflardan pek ok insan, bu eitsizlii kabullenmeye hl raz, nk genel grnmde toplum bir btn olarak birlikte byyor. Zenginlerin katks sayesinde pasta geniliyor, bu sayede pastann yoksullara ve ortadakilere ayrlan dilimleri de gemie gre daha bykm gibi gzkyor. Ekonomik patlamadan neredeyse herkes krl kyorsa niye ikyet edelim? Evet, yeni refahn eit ve adil olmayan biimde datlmas sol ve sendikalar tarafndan protesto edilecektir, ama zellikle de Trkiye gibi muhafazakr toplumlarda bunun hkmet politikalar zerinde belirleyici etkisi olmayacaktr. Buna karlk, ABD ve Avrupa'da bambaka bir durum sz konusu. Ekonomi dalnda Nobel dll Joseph Stiglitz ve daha pek ounun belirttii gibi, son 10 ylda Amerika'da ekonomik bymeden sadece en tepedekiler kr etti. Gelimi lkeler arasndaki en yksek eitsizlik ABD'de ve buna kar direni giderek byyor. Occupy (gal) Hareketi marjinallikten kurtulamad iin toplumsal bir harekete dnmeyi baaramam olabilir, ama temel mesajn Amerikallarn ounluu destekliyor. u konularda hemfikirler: ABD'de gelir artnn yzde 93'n en zengin yzde 1'in gasbetmesi kabul edilemez ve kamunun parasyla kurtarlan byk bankalarn, rezaletlere imza atm yneticilerine dudak uuklatc primler demeyi srdrmesine izin verilmesi ne ahlaken ne siyaseten savunulabilir. Cumhuriyeti Parti'nin bakan aday olan, vergi karmasyla mehur multimilyoner Mitt Romney'nin vergi kaytlarn kamuoyuna aklamay reddettiinden bann armas tesadf deil. Pek ok Avrupa lkesinde, avro krizinden kmak iin halkn gelirlerinin bir ksmn ve ayrcalklarn feda etmesi isteniyor. Artan sayda fkeli vatanda, bankerlerin hl vergi mkelleflerinin parasyla dllendirilmekte olduunu rendike, buna yanamyor. Orta snf aileleri, TJN'nin vergi karma raporunu okumalarndan sonra, maa indirimini kabul etmeye nasl ikna edersiniz? Bolluk iinde geen on yllarn ardndan, pek ok Avrupal ekonomik adan geri adm atmak zorunda kalacak ve ou da bunun kanlmaz olduunun farknda. Ama byle bir ey, ancak elitler iin byk istisnalar olmayacaksa, ounluk tarafndan kabul edilir. Sorun, bugne kadar bu hissiyat dile getirenlerin genelde poplist partiler olmas ki, onlarn nerdii zmler (snrlarn kapatlmas gibi) ya ilemez ya da (AB'den klmas gibi) zarar verir. Merkez sa ve merkez soldaki siyasilerin, en ok kr eden insanlar ve ticari kurulularn zerlerine den katky yapmaya yanamadklar mddete, istikrarl toplumlar ve retken ekonomilerin kurulamayaca ve srdrlemeyeceini anladklarn gstermelerinin vakti geldi. Vergi karlmas ve ar eitsizlik, kesinkes reddedilebilecek ve reddedilmesi gereken siyasi bir tercihtir. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

The perverse effects of tax evasion (1) Last week a report prepared by James Henry, former chief economist at consulting firm McKinsey, revealed that the global super-rich have at least $21 trillion hidden in tax havens like Luxemburg or the Cayman Islands. In case youve forgotten, a trillion is 1,000 billion. That money is put beyond the reach of local tax authorities. Part of that staggering amount is the $158 billion stored in offshore bank accounts by Turkeys wealthiest individuals and businesses. As a result of this tax evading behavior, Turkey and other countries involved lose billions of tax revenues that most states desperately need to make ends meet. The study was commissioned by the Tax Justice Network (TJN), an organization that promotes transparency in international finance and opposes secrecy. On its website the TJN explains why: We promote tax compliance and we oppose tax evasion, tax avoidance and all the mechanisms that enable owners and controllers of wealth to escape their responsibilities

to the societies on which they and their wealth depend. The TJN is especially keen on fighting tax havens that allow big companies and wealthy individuals to benefit from the onshore benefits of tax -- like good infrastructure, education and the rule of law -- while using the offshore world to escape their responsibilities to pay for it. The rest of us shoulder the burden. As most of you probably do, I knew tax havens existed and was aware of the fact that some very rich people made use of these facilities to pay less or no tax at home. I had no clue how much money was involved and how sophisticated the infrastructure is that designs and operates the offshore sector. Henrys report was a real eye-opener for me, not only because of the incredibly vast amounts of money involved. Henrys focus on what he calls a black hole in the world economy also reveals that tax dodging is not run by shady, no-name banks located in sultry islands, but by the worlds largest private banks, law firms and accounting firms headquartered in First World capitals like London, New York and Geneva. The three private banks handling the most assets offshore are UBS, Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs. Detailed analysis of these banks, Henry subtly underlines, shows that the leaders are the very same ones that have figured so prominently in government bailouts and other recent financial chicanery. For good reasons, Henrys report on tax evasion got some attention in the media worldwide. Accompanying his groundbreaking research was another study by the TJN, titled Inequality: You Dont Know the Half of It, which got little coverage. That is very unfortunate because the authors convincingly make the point that in many countries economic inequality has reached extreme proportions, far worse than we have understood until now. One of the reasons is directly linked to Henrys report: In all studies into inequality, the hidden assets in offshore banks and the income they produce are not counted in the statistics. I will not bother you with all the figures underpinning that conclusion. Two basic propositions in the report should, however, be highlighted: One is the growing acceptance of the correlation between income equality and a range of social and economic problems such as life expectancy, mental illness and drug abuse as well as social mobility and levels of education. Other studies have shown that inequality is strongly associated with political instability. In other words: Extreme economic inequality is bad for moral, social and economic reasons and when that inequality is even worse than we realized, that is extra bad. The second idea from the TJN study worth remembering is the conclusion that inequality is a political choice: A choice about how much inequality in outcomes a society is willing to tolerate, according to its beliefs about how important that may be to provide incentives, and how much damage it may do to social cohesion, economic growth and so on. There is no right answer and each society needs to determine how much inequality it wants to tolerate. Cynics might say that there is nothing new here. There has always been inequality in every society and the rich always managed to get away with immoral behavior. These questions were and still are part of the classic quarrels between the right and the left, between the employers and the trade unions and between the rich countries and the developing world. I believe, however, that we are entering a new phase in which these traditional differences will no longer be grudgingly accepted, not within countries and not between states. More about that in my next column. Vergi karmann meum etkileri

Geen hafta McKinsey danmanlk firmasnn eski ba ekonomisti James Henry tarafndan hazrlanan bir rapor, kresel sper zenginlerin Lksemburg ya da Cayman Adalar gibi vergi cennetlerinde en az 21 trilyon dolar sakladn gzler nne serdi. Unutmusanz hatrlataym, bir trilyon eittir 1.000 milyar. Sz konusu para, yerel vergi yetkililerinin eriiminin tesinde. Bu afallatc miktarn bir ksmn, Trkiye'nin en zengin bireyleri ve iadamlarnn offshore banka hesaplarnda istifledikleri 158 milyar dolar oluturuyor. Bu vergi karma davrannn sonucu olarak, Trkiye ve dier ilgili lkeler, pek ok devletin iki yakasn bir araya getirmek iin umutsuzca ihtiya duyduu milyarlarca dolarlk vergi gelirini kaybediyor. Aratrmay, uluslararas finansta effafl tevik edip gizlilie kar kan bir rgt olan Vergi Adaleti A (TJN) sipari etmi. TJN, web sitesinde bunun sebebini yle aklyor: "Vergiye riayeti tevik ediyoruz. Vergi karmaya, vergiden kanmaya ve servete sahip olan, kontrol eden kiilerin servetlerinin dayand topluma kar sorumluluklarndan kamasna imkn tanyan tm mekanizmalara kar kyoruz.'' TJN zellikle vergi cennetleriyle mcadelede kararl. nk vergi cennetleri, "Bir yandan iyi altyap, eitim ve hukukun stnl gibi verginin onshore faydalarndan yararlanan byk irketlerle zengin bireylerin, dier yandan bunlarn bedelini deme sorumluluundan offshore dnyasn kullanarak kamasn salyor. Geri kalanlarmz yk srtlanyor.'' Pek ounuz gibi ben de vergi cennetlerinin var olduunu biliyordum ve baz ok zengin insanlarn bunlar kullanarak evlerinde ya hi vergi demedikleri ya da az dedikleri gereinin farkndaydm. Ama ka para dnd ve offshore sektrn tasarmlayp ileten altyapnn ne kadar sofistike olduuna dair en ufak fikrim yoktu. Henry'nin raporu sayesinde gzlerim ald. Srf muazzam miktarda para dndnden deil. Henry'nin 'dnya ekonomisindeki kara delik' dedii eye odaklanmasyla, vergi kaaklnn, egzotik adalarda ad bile olmayan kanunsuz bankalar tarafndan deil de, merkezleri Londra, New York, Cenevre gibi Birinci Dnya bakentlerinde bulunan dnyann en byk zel bankalar, hukuk ve muhasebe firmalar tarafndan yrtld kantlanyor. En ok offshore varlk ileten bankalar UBS, Credit Suisse ve Goldman Sachs. Henry'nin zekice vurgulad gibi, bu bankalarn detayl analizi gsteriyor ki, bunlar ayn zamanda hkmetin kurtarma paketlerinden faydalanma ve son dnemde imza atlan dier mali sahtekrlklarda da lider konumundalar. Hakl sebeplerden, Henry'nin vergi karma raporuna medya dnya apnda ilgi gsterdi. Bu r ac rapora elik eden TJN'nin 'Eitsizlik: Yarsndan bile haberiniz yok' balkl almas ise ayn ilgiyi grmedi. ok yazk, nk yazarlar, pek ok lkede ekonomik eitsizliin ar, bugne dek bizim sandmzdan ok daha vahim boyutlara ulatn ortaya koyuyor. Bunun sebeplerinden biri dorudan Henry'nin raporuyla balantl: Eitsizlikle ilgili aratrmalarn hibirinde, offshore bankalardaki gizli varlklar ve bunlarn getirdii gelir istatistiklere konulmuyor. Bu sonucu destekleyen rakamlarla sizi skmayacam. Ancak rapordaki iki temel sav vurgulanmal: Birincisi, gelir eitsizlii ile mr beklentisi, akl hastalklar, uyuturucu kullanm kadar sosyal hareketlilik ve eitim dzeyi gibi bir dizi toplumsal ve ekonomik sorun arasnda balant olduu giderek daha ok kabul gryor. Dier aratrmalar, eitsizliin siyasi istikrarszlkla gl biimde balantl olduunu gstermiti. Bir baka deyile, ar ekonomik eitsizlik, ahlaki, toplumsal ve ekonomik sebeplerden ktdr ve eitsizlik bizim fark ettiimizden bile ktyse, bu ekstradan ktdr. TJN aratrmasnn anmaya deer ikinci fikri, eitsizliin 'siyasi bir tercih' olduu sonucu: "Bir toplumun sonu olarak ne kadar eitsizlii ho grmeye istekli olduuyla ilgili bir tercihtir. Toplumun inanlarna gre tevik salamann ne kadar nemli olduuyla ilgilidir ve sosyal huzura, ekonomik bymeye ve bunun gibi durumlara ne kadar zarar verebileceiyle ilgilidir.'' Bunun doru bir yant yok ve her toplumun ne kadar eitsizlii kaldrabileceine kendisinin karar vermesi gerek. Kinikler, bunda yeni bir ey olmadn syleyecektir. Her zaman her toplumda eitsizlik vardr ve ahlaksz davranlar zenginlerin yanna hep kr kalr. Bu sorular gemite olduu gibi imdi de sa ile sol, iverenler ile sendikalar, zengin lkeler ile gelimekte olan dnya arasndaki kapmann bir paras olmay srdryor. Ama artk bu geleneksel ayrmlar istemeye istemeye de olsa kabul etmeyi brakacamz, lkeler ve devletler arasnda bile braklaca yeni bir evreye girdiimize inanyorum. Bunu da gelecek ke yazmda anlatacam.

Bashar al-Assad and the 5 percent rule The bombing in Damascus last week that killed the Syrian minister of defense and the brother-in-law of President Bashar alAssad will probably go down in the history of the Syrian conflict as the decisive moment that proved to many Syrians that Assad was losing. I say probably because the jury is still out on the direct and indirect effects of the successful attack on the inner circle of the Assad regime. It looks like the Syrian dictator has decided to try and turn the tide with one more wave of extreme violence against the centers of resistance. He has also warned other countries not to try to profit from last week's backlash by threatening to use chemical and biological weapons against possible external intervening forces. The uncertainty about the significance of the bombing, however, is not related to the unlikely scenario of chemical warfare. The most important indicator regarding the impact of the killing of some of Assad's inner circle last week will be the number of people who are switching sides, and the composition of that group, in what amounts to a full-blown civil war in Syria. The Economist last week reported on the growing number of Christian Syrians who no longer believe Assad will be able to protect their interests. Other information coming from Aleppo, the commercial center of the country, suggests that the local merchant class is also about to switch its loyalties. Every day dozens of soldiers and a handful of officers decide to defect and join their colleagues in Turkey and parts of Syria already under the control of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In a very interesting short article on the website Political Violence @ a Glance, Will H. Moore, a professor from the department of political science at Florida State University, tries to explain what is currently happening in Syria. He uses the work of two American academics who have been conducting extensive research into collective action, popular resistance and the reaction of armed forces used by regimes under pressure. In the 1990s, Mark Irving Lichbach came up with the 5 percent rule, suggesting that states cannot survive if 5 percent of the population engages in active collective action against it. His conclusions were based on popular revolutions in Iran (1979), the Philippines (1986) and Eastern Europe (1989). In all these cases, unarmed citizens took to the streets in large numbers, sometimes exceeding the 5 percent of supporters Lichbach claims would normally become actively involved in such a cause. The challenged regimes ordered the mass targeting of these citizens, and the moment the military refused to follow orders, fell. Moore combines these older findings with the recent dissertation of Jacqueline DeMerrit, Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing, in which she tries to find out under what conditions security forces are willing to kill civilians and carry out other human rights violations, and under what conditions they are not. Her conclusion is that external monitoring of their activities plays a key role in the decision to obey orders or otherwise. When soldiers and police officers realize that civilian deaths will have a huge impact on their own lives and liberties because they will be held responsible, they tend to refuse to engage in such activities, or defect. That is why the work of organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch is so important. By purchasing satellite images, they closely watch events in Syria, thereby letting everyone know that indisputable evidence of targeting is on the public record. Based on DeMerrit's work, Moore further argues that in Syria the willingness of soldiers and police members to use violence against unarmed civilians will drop as monitoring rises. Let me finish with Moore's conclusion because, in my view, it perfectly summarizes the situation in Syria: The calculations

that the agents of coercion throughout Syria are making today, I suspect, are thus producing different odds. To be sure, there are those with sufficient blood on their hands and other ties to Assad's rule that they will not defect until they are safely in a prison cell. But there are tens of thousands of others, and if I had to place a wager, I would bet that more and more of them are going to conclude that Assad will lose. Let the mass shirking begin, and I suspect it will be only days or at most weeks before we see the key act of insubordination that will collapse Syria's current regime. Bear Esed ve yzde 5 kural Geen hafta Suriye Savunma Bakan ve Devlet Bakan Bear Esed'in kaynbiraderinin ld am'daki bombal saldr, Suriye'de yaanan ihtilafn tarihine, Esed'in ok sayda Suriyeliyi kaybettiini gstermesi asndan bir dnm noktas olarak geecek muhtemelen. Muhtemelen diyorum, nk bu baarl saldrnn Esed rejiminin yakn evresine dorudan ve dolayl etkileri hl kestirilemiyor. yle grnyor ki, Suriye diktatr direniin merkezine ynelik daha da vahim bir iddet dalgasyla durumu kendi lehine evirmeyi deneyecek. Esed ayrca muhtemel d g mdahalelerine kar kimyasal ve biyolojik silah kullanma tehdidinde bulunarak, dier lkeleri geen haftaki ar darbeden yarar salamaya almamalar konusunda uyard. te yandan bombal saldrnn tarihsel nemiyle ilgili belirsizliin, pek muhtemel grnmeyen kimyasal sava senaryosuyla ilgisi yok. Geen hafta Esed'in yakn evresinden baz kiilerin ldrlmesinin yaratt etkinin en nemli iareti, Suriye'de topyekn i savaa ynelik gidiat dahilinde saf deitiren insanlarn says ve bileimi olacak. The Economist, geen hafta Esed'in artk kendi karlarn koruyamayacana inanan Hristiyan Suriyelilerin saysnn arttn yazd. lkenin ticar merkezi olan Halep'ten gelen haberler, yerel tccar snfnn da saf deitirmek zere olduu ynnde. Her gn onlarca asker ve subay firar edip Trkiye'de ve zgr Suriye Ordusu'nun kontrolndeki Suriye topraklarnda bulunan meslektalarna katlmaya karar veriyor. 'Political Violance @ a Glance' adl internet sitesindeki olduka ilgin bir ksa makalede, Florida State niversitesi Siyaset Bilimi Fakltesi'nden profesr Will H. Moore, halihazrda Suriye'de neler olduunu aklamaya alyor. Moore, ortak eylem, halk direnii ve bask altndaki rejimler tarafndan kullanlan silahl kuvvetlerin tepkisine dair kapsaml aratrma yrtm olan iki Amerikal akademisyenin almalarndan faydalanm. 1990'larda Mark Irving Lichbach, halkn yzde beinin devlete kar aktif kolektif eyleme itirak etmeleri halinde devletlerin yaayamayacan ne sren yzde 5 kuraln ortaya att. Vard sonularn dayana, ran (1979), Filipinler (1986) ve Dou Avrupa'daki (1989) halk devrimleriydi. Lichbach'a gre btn bu rneklerde silahsz vatandalar byk kitleler halinde sokaklara dklrken, saylar da, normal koullarda belli bir davaya aktif olarak katlan yzde 5'lik kesimi zaman zaman at. Rejimler yzde 5 aldnda bu vatandalarn kitlesel olarak hedef alnmalar talimatn verdi ve ordu bunu yapmay reddettii anda da devrildiler. Moore, bu daha eski bulgular Jacqueline DeMerrit'in, gvenlik glerinin hangi koullarda sivilleri ldrmeye ve her trden insan haklar ihlallerine girimeye gnll olup olmadklarn ortaya koymaya alt 'lm halesi: Hkmet Eliyle Cinayetin Stratejik Mant' adl yeni incelemesiyle harmanlyor. DeMerrit'in vard sonu u: Eylemlerinin dardan gzlemlenmesi, gvenlik glerinin emirlere uyma kararlarnda kilit rol oynuyor. Askerler ve polisler sivil lmlerin, sorumlu tutulacaklar iin kendi yaamlar ve zgrlkleri zerinde ciddi etkisi olacan fark ettiklerinde, itaat etmemek ya da firar etmek eiliminde oluyor. Uluslararas Af rgt ve nsan Haklar zleme rgt gibi kurulularn almalar bu yzden ziyadesiyle nemli. Bu rgtler uydu grntlerini ele geirerek Suriye'de ne olup bittiini yakndan izliyor, bylece ayrm gzetmeden hedef almann su gtrmez kantlarnn kayda geirildiini herkesin bilmesini salyorlar. Moore, ayrca, DeMerrit'in almalarn temel alarak,

gzlemler arttka Suriye'de askerin ve polisin silahsz sivillere kar g kullanma isteinin azalacan savunuyor. Moore'un vard sonula bitirmek isterim, zira bana gre Suriye'deki durumu mkemmel bir ekilde zetliyor: "Suriye'nin drt bir yanndaki bask aygtlarnn halihazrda yapt hesaplar, bence bu yzden farkl tuhaflklar retiyor. Elleri kana batm olanlar ve Esed rejimine bal olan dierleri, gvenli bir ekilde cezaevi hcresine konulana dek saf deitirmeyecekler. Ama baka on binlerce insan var ve bahse girerim ki, ok daha fazlas Esed'in kaybedecei sonucuna varacak. Hele bir kitlesel itaatsizlikler balasn, bence mevcut Suriye rejimini kertecek olan esas bakaldr eylemine tank olmamz sadece gnler ya da en fazla haftalar alacak."

The EU cant deal with an inside job When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, everybody in Brussels knew there were still serious shortcomings in key areas such as judicial reform, the fight against corruption and, in the case of Bulgaria, tackling organized crime. In order to accommodate these concerns in several member states and in the European Parliament, a new monitoring instrument was installed called the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). Each year the European Commission (EC) would report on the progress made and whether or not the benchmarks that were set for both countries were satisfactorily fulfilled. The hope then was that these public assessments would push both countries to comply with EU standards as soon as possible. Part of the familiar carrot and stick approach was the right of the EU to use so-called special safeguards in case there was no or insufficient progress. The EU, for instance, had the right to freeze payments of EU funds, a potential financial punishment that, everybody hoped, would have a positive effect on Bucharest and Sofia. In the first couple of years, improvements were slow and partial and because the administrative capacity to absorb the substantial EU funds was sometimes lacking, Brussels decided on a few occasions to use its power to cut financing. However, as was agreed in the accession treaties, after three years the option to use safeguard measures expired. The EC kept producing reports on both countries in 2010 and 2011 because grave problems still existed. The problem was that the easiest and clearest instrument to indicate the lack of progress, to stop transferring money, was no longer available. Last week, five years after Romania and Bulgaria became EU members, the EC published a new report on both countries. Some months ago, many expected these evaluations to be the last ones, also because the two Balkan countries were fed up with their exceptional position and tired of being lectured by the EC about their flaws all the time. One thing is clear after last week: These were not the last reports. The one on Bulgaria underlined the still extremely problematic role of Bulgarian organized crime, both domestically and in the rest of Europe, and the inadequate way of dealing with that phenomenon by the Bulgarian authorities. The next assessment will be at the end of 2013. The report on Romania was even tougher. That was due to a large extent to some recent, very controversial moves by Victor Ponta, Romanias prime minister. In his bid to unseat the center-right President Traian Basescu, the center-left Ponta, according to the spot-on summary of the European Voice, replaced the speakers of both houses of parliament, sacked the ombudsman, changed the rules for the referendum on Basescus removal, curbed the powers of the constitutional court and

grabbed control over the publication of legal acts. The ECs deep concern about Pontas power grab was expressed in the report by using harsh phrases about the Romanian government such as raises serious doubts about the commitment to the respect of rule of law or the understanding of the meaning of the rule of law in a pluralist democratic system and indications of manipulations and threats which affect institutions, members of the judiciary and eventually have a serious impact on society as a whole. The message is clear: This cant go on like this. The next monitoring report on Romania is already scheduled for the end of this year. Ponta reacted immediately by promising that his government will do everything to address the EUs concerns. The fundamental problem for the EU is: What if he does not? In theory, EU institutions could trigger Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty, which can be used in the event of a serious and persistent breach of freedom, democracy, human rights and other EU values. One could debate whether Romania has reached that stage yet. On top of that, it remains to be seen whether other EU member states would be willing to use this nuclear option against one of their colleagues. Former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbn have gotten have gotten away with similar abuses of power. So why should Victor Ponta worry this time? The row about Romanias shaky road to full democracy has again exposed one of the structural weaknesses of the EU. While the union can be very tough on candidate states like Turkey when core European values at are stake, the EU still has not found an effective way of dealing with similar violations when they are perpetrated by some of its own members. AB, kendi iindeki sulularla baa kamyor Romanya ve Bulgaristan'n, 2007'de AB'ye katldklarnda, yarg reformu, yolsuzlukla mcadele ve Bulgaristan zelinde organize suun stesinden gelme gibi kilit alanlarda hl ciddi eksiklikleri olduunu, Brksel'de herkes biliyordu. Pek ok ye lke ve Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun bu konudaki endielerine are bulmak iin birlii ve Teyit Mekanizmas (TM) adnda yeni bir denetim arac kuruldu. Avrupa Komisyonu, her yl sz konusu iki lkenin kaydettii ilerlemeyle ilgili, konulan temel ltleri tatmin edici biimde yerine getirip getirmediklerine dair rapor hazrlamakla grevlendirildi. Kamuoyuna ak bu deerlendirmelerin, mmkn olduunca abuk AB standartlarn yerine getirmeleri iin iki lkeyi kamlayaca umuluyordu. Yeterli ya da hi ilerleme olmamas halinde, AB'nin 'zel koruma nlemlerine' bavurma hakkn sakl tutmas, havu-sopa taktiinin bir parasyd. Mesela AB'nin bu iki lkeye AB fonlarndan yaplan demeleri dondurma hakk vard; herkes bu mali cezalandrma potansiyelinin Bkre ve Sofya zerinde olumlu etki yaratmasn umuyordu. lk birka yl ilerleme yava ve ksmi oldu ve nemli AB fonlarn zmseyecek idari kapasite eksik kaldndan, Brksel birka vakada finansman kesme gcn kullanma karar ald. Gelgelelim, katlm anlamalarnda uzlald zere, yl getikten sonra, zel koruma nlemlerine bavurma seeneinin sresi doldu. Vahim sorunlar hl devam ettiinden, Avrupa Komisyonu 2010 ve 2011'de rapor hazrlamay srdrd. Ama asl sorun, ilerleme kaydedilmediini gstermenin en basit ve net aracnn -para transferini durdurmann- artk el altnda olmamasyd. Geen hafta, Romanya ile Bulgaristan'n AB yesi olmasndan be yl sonra, Avrupa Komisyonu yeni raporunu yaymlad. Birka ay nce, pek ok kii artk deerlendirme srecinin sonuna gelinmesini bekliyordu. Bunda, her iki lkenin istisnai konumda tutulmak ve srekli olarak iledikleri ayplarla ilgili Komisyon'dan fra yemekten usanmalarnn da pay vard.

Ama geen hafta bir ey ok net ortaya kt: Bunlar son raporlar olmayacak. Zira Bulgaristan raporu, Bulgar su rgtlerinin hem ierde hem de Avrupa'nn geri kalannda hl ar sorunlu rol oynadnn, Bulgar yetkililerin bu fenomenle gerektii gibi uramadnn altn iziyor. Bundan sonraki deerlendirme 2013 sonunda yaymlanacak. Romanya raporu bundan bile sert. Sebep, byk lde, Romanya Babakan Viktor Ponta'nn son dnemdeki ok tartmal hamleleri. Ponta, merkez sac Devlet Bakan Traian Basescu'yu koltuundan etmek iin, EuropeanVoice'un (Avrupa'nn Sesi) zetlemesine gre, 'parlamentonun alt ve st kanatlarnn bakanlarn deitirdi, ombudsman kovdu, Basescu'yu gndermeye ynelik referandumun kurallarn deitirdi, anayasa mahkemesinin yetkilerini kstlad, yasal ilemlerin yaymlanmasnn kontroln ele geirdi.' Ponta'nn iktidar gasbyla ilgili Komisyon'un derin endiesi, raporda Romanya hkmeti hakknda kullanlan ok sert szlerle dile getirildi: "Hukukun stnlne sayg gstermeye bal olduu ve oulcu demokratik sistemde hukukun stnlnn anlamn idrak ettiine dair ciddi pheler var... Kurumlar, yarg mensuplarn etkileyen ve sonuta bir btn olarak toplumda ciddi iz brakan maniplasyon ve tehditlerin gstergeleri var." Mesaj net: Bu byle devam etmez. Nitekim Romanya'ya yeni rapor iin bu yln sonuna tarih kesildi. Ponta derhal karlk verdi, hkmetinin AB'yi endielendiren sorunlar zmek iin elinden gelen her eyi yapacan vaat etti. AB iin asl sorun u: Ya yapmazsa? Kuramsal olarak, AB, zgrlk, insan haklar, demokrasi ve dier AB deerlerinin 'vahim ve srarl biimde ihlali' halinde devreye sokulan Lizbon Anlamas'nn 7. maddesini iletebilir. Romanya'nn bu noktaya ulap ulamad tartlabilir. Ama ondan nemlisi, dier AB yesi lkelerin ilerinden birine kar 'nkleer seenei' kullanmaya istekli olup olmayaca. Bunu yaayp greceiz. Gemite benzer ekilde iktidar ktye kullanma, talya Babakan Silvio Berlusconi ve Macaristan Babakan Viktor Orban'n yanna kr kalmt. imdi Viktor Ponta niye telaa kaplsn ki? Romanya'nn tam demokrasiye giden sallantl yoluyla ilgili kavga grlt, AB'nin yapsal zayflklarndan bir yenisini daha gzler nne serdi. En temel Avrupa deerleri sz konusu olduunda Trkiye gibi aday lkelere kar ok kat davranabilen AB, kendi yelerinden bazlarnn benzeri ihlallere imza atmas haliyle ba etmenin etkin bir yolunu henz bulamad.

Breaking: Another brick in the visa wall removed One should be careful these days when labeling something breaking. Every day I receive at least five tweets that start with the words breaking news and continue with the announcement of a special event or a spectacular occasion that should definitively not go unnoticed. The result of so many breaking moments per day is that the really special ones dont get the attention they deserve. So forgive me for suggesting that a letter sent last Friday to the Dutch parliament by the minister responsible for migration and integration should indeed be interpreted as a groundbreaking development. In the letter, the minister reacts to a ruling of the Dutch Raad van State (RvS), the Council of State, highest advisory body to the government, of March 14, 2012. In that judgment, the RvS ruled that the Netherlands does not have the right to impose visa requirements on Turkish service providers and self-employed Turks who want to go to the Netherlands. The RvS used the same arguments that have been used before by other courts in EU member states and by the European Court of Justice. All refer to the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement between Turkey and the EU, which entered into force in 1973. Part of that protocol is a so-called standstill clause that prohibits visa requirements for Turkish citizens for a number of EU member states that did not require such a visa at the time the protocol came into force. In other words, if the Netherlands did not require Turks to apply for a visa in 1973, they are not entitled to ask for one now. Despite this legal prohibition, many countries did introduce visa requirements after 1973. According to a growing number of European courts,

this practice is illegal and should be stopped. These rulings have been highlighted many times by the Turkish government to make the argument against the present visa regime. Till now, however, no breaking results could be presented. The Dutch government, in line with other EU countries, always reacted by saying that these court rulings dealt with individual cases that would not have an effect on their overall visa policy. Now, for the first time, the Dutch government has acknowledged that the RvS ruling means that the Netherlands has to change its visa policy for Turkish service providers and self-employed individuals who want to go to the Netherlands to offer their services and wish to stay no longer than three months. From Aug. 15 onwards, Turkish businesspeople who can prove they work for a service provider or are self-employed will be able, if they so wish, to go to the Dutch consulate and get proof of their status, making it easy for them to pass customs after arrival in the Netherlands. This is a profound change of policy that can rightfully be called breaking. It raises two further questions, one practical and one principled. The short-term problem will be how to determine who is an entrepreneur and who is not. In Turkey, it is relatively easy to start your own business. I am not quite sure whether the Dutch authorities have realized the problems that might arise if huge numbers of Turks present themselves as new, self-employed businessmen or women. The second issue is of a more theoretical nature, but could prove to be the real cliffhanger. Several German courts have already established that one cannot draw a distinction between providers and recipients of services. That would mean that not only Turkish service providers should be allowed to travel visa free, but that the same should apply to Turkish tourists who want to go to Germany to enjoy certain services. In order to get some clarity on this extremely important and sensitive issue, a German court has asked the European Court of Justice to make a so-called preliminary ruling in a case initiated by Leyla Ecem Demirkan. She claims that Turks who want to visit their families in Germany for a period of no longer than three months should be considered potential recipients of services in Germany, and should therefore be treated in the same way as service providers: no visa requirement. If the court in Luxemburg agrees with that interpretation, one should use the word BREAKING in the articles covering this ruling because it would have implications for all Turks traveling to any EU member state. For most observers the conclusion is already clear: The present EU visa policy for Turks will have to change. The only question is when and how. Son dakika: Vize duvarndan bir tula daha ekildi Bugnlerde bir olay 'fla' gelime diye nitelerken dikkatli olmal. 'Fla haber' diye balayan ve kesinlikle farkna varlmas gereken zel bir durum ya da arpc bir olayn duyurusuyla devam eden en az be tweet alyorum her gn. Gnde bu kadar ok 'fla' ann sonucu, gerekten zel vakalarn hak ettikleri dikkati ekememesi oluyor. O yzden, geen cuma Hollanda'da g ve entegrasyondan sorumlu bakann parlamentoya gnderdii mektubun aslnda 'r aan fla gelime' diye yorumlanmas gerektiini sylememi mazur grn. Bakan, mektupta, Hollanda'da hkmetin dant en yksek organ olan Raad van State (RvS), yani Devlet Konseyi'nin 14 Mart 2012 tarihli kararna karlk veriyor.

O kararda, RvS, Hollanda'nn lkeye gelmek isteyen Trk hizmet salayclar ya da serbest meslek sahiplerine vize artlar dayatma hakknn olmadna hkmetmiti. RvS, kararn, AB yesi dier devletlerin mahkemelerinin ve Avrupa Adalet Divan'nn daha nce kulland savlara dayandrmt. Bunlarn hepsi, Trkiye ile AB arasnda 1973'te yrrle giren Ankara Anlamas Ek Protokol'ne atf yapyor. Protokoln 'askya alma maddesi' denilen blm, protokol yrrle girdii srada byle bir vize talep etmeyen AB yesi devletleri, Trk vatandalarndan vize talep etmekten men ediyor. Baka deyile: Hollanda 1973'te Trklerden vize talep etmiyorduysa, daha sonra talep etmeye hakk yok. Bu yasal maniye ramen, pek ok lke 1973'ten sonra vize uygulamasn yrrle soktu. Saylar giderek artan Avrupa mahkemelerine gre, bu yasad uygulamann durdurulmas art. Trk hkmeti halihazrdaki vize rejimine kar karken ne srd savlarda pek ok kez bu kararlara vurgu yapt. Ama bugne dek fla bir sonu elde edilemedi. Dier Avrupa lkeleri gibi Hollanda hkmeti de sz konusu mahkeme kararlarnn bireysel davalarla ilgili olduunu, kendi vize politikalarnn btnn etkilemeyeceini savundu. Ama imdi ilk kez Hollanda hkmeti, RvS kararnn vize politikasnn deitirilmesi gerektii anlamna geldiini kabul ediyor. Bu deiiklik, Hollanda'ya hizmet sunmak iin gelmek isteyen ama 3 aydan fazla kalmak istemeyen Trk hizmet salayclar ve serbest meslek sahipleri iin geerli. 15 Austos'tan itibaren bir hizmet salaycda altn ya da serbest meslek erbab olduunu kantlayan Trk iadamlar ve ikadnlar, isterlerse Hollanda konsolosluuna gidebilir ve Hollanda'ya vardklarnda gmrkten geilerini kolaylatracak ekilde bu statleri iin onay alabilirler. Bu, hakl olarak 'fla' diye nitelenebilecek derinden bir politika deiiklii. Ama biri pratikte dieri ilkesel olarak iki yeni soru ortaya karyor. Ksa vadeli sorun, kimin giriimci olduu, kimin olmadnn nasl belirlenecei... Trkiye'de kendi iini kurmak olduka kolay. Hollandal yetkililerin, iini gcn yeni kurmu iadam ya da ikadn olarak kendini sunan Trklerin saysnda patlama yaanrsa, kabilecek sorunlarn ne kadar farknda olduundan pheliyim. kincisi, doas gerei kuramsal bir mesele, ama sonunda asl grlt bundan kopabilir. Baz Alman mahkemeleri, hizmet salayclar ile alclar arasnda ayrm gdlemeyeceine hkmetmi bulunuyor. Bu, vizesiz seyahat izninin sadece Trk hizmet salayclarna deil, belli hizmetlerden yararlanmak iin Almanya'ya gelmek isteyen Trk turistlere de uygulanmas anlamna gelir. Bu son derece nemli ve hassas meseleyi bir nebze olsun akla kavuturabilmek iin bir Alman mahkemesi, Avrupa Adalet Divan'ndan, Leyla Ecem Demirkan'n at davada nkarar vermesini istedi. Demirkan'n sav, Almanya'daki ailelerini 3 aydan uzun olmamak kaydyla ziyaret etmek isteyen Trklerin, Almanya'daki hizmetlerin potansiyel alclar olarak kabul edilmesi ve dolaysyla hizmet salayclarla ayn muameleyi grmesi gerektii: Yani onlardan vize talep edilmemeli. Eer Lksemburg'daki mahkeme bu yorumla ayn gr beyan ederse, yaplacak haberlere 'FLA' bal atlmal, nk bunun AB yesi herhangi bir lkeye seyahat eden Trklerin tamam asndan karmlar olacaktr. ou gzlemci iin kacak sonu imdiden belli: AB'nin Trklere ynelik halihazrdaki vize politikas deimek zorunda. Tek soru var: Ne zaman ve nasl?

Will Putin listen to Erdoan? This Wednesday Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan together with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu will fly to Moscow for a one-day visit. They are planning to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the situation in Syria in general and the downed Turkish jet in particular. On the last issue, one can only hope that the Russians are willing to fully share their information on what happened to the fighter jet. It is clear that both the Russians and the Americans know more about the incident, but with each passing day the

jet crash is becoming more embarrassing for the Turkish government. Either the government still doesnt really know what happened, which means that Turkish intelligence is not up to par and Turkeys friends in Moscow and Washington, at least until now, have kept their data for themselves, or Erdoan and Davutolu do know in the meantime what took place but have a big problem in squaring their initial remarks (based on apparently wrong information provided by the Turkish army and intelligence services) with the reality they discovered later on. Of course the Moscow visit is not only about the lost Turkish fighter jet. The Turkish leaders will also try to convince Putin that the time has come for the Russians to give up their support for Bashar al-Assads regime. Last Friday, during a meeting of the Friends of Syria, Davutolu declared that the international community should increase the pressure on the Syrian regime and those who support that regime. The most prominent backing for Assad comes from Russia and China. Will the pressure work? Will Russia be willing to give up on its red lines on a new UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that is currently being negotiated in New York? The UNSC has to pass a resolution by July 20, two days after Erdoans visit to Moscow, because the 90-day mandate for the nearly 300 unarmed UN monitors in Syria runs out. Western countries have demanded further sanctions against Assad under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Russia and China are firmly against this. Will Putin take Erdoans support for tougher measures seriously? Forget about it, says Michael Ignatieff, a prominent Canadian author, academic and former politician known for his sometimes provocative defense of liberal values in foreign policy. Last week, Ignatieff wrote a strongly worded blog on the website of the New York Review of Books in which he basically advanced the thesis that the Syrian conflict has triggered a more fundamental confrontation between Western democracies on the one hand and Russia and China on the other. Ignatieff describes the two post-communist countries as authoritarian states that will support tyrannies like Syria wherever it is in their interest to do so. According to the Canadian author, Russia and China dont see conflicts like the one in Syria through the prism of international peace and human rights like the US, the EU and Turkey do and will therefore not hesitate to keep supporting Assad. Conclusion: Forget about Russian or Chinese help in the creation of a post-Assad transition. Moscow and Beijing are simply not interested and believe that history is on their side. They see the West as weak and in crisis and believe that in the end they will win this battle for dominance because their power is not limited by domestic democratic checks and balances. One could argue about some of the sweeping statements made by Ignatieff and the lack of any criticism on America and Europe regarding their past dealings with dictators in the Middle East and elsewhere. But he does have a point when it is about Russian intransigence. How long should the other UNSC members wait for the Russians to come on board? Was Kofi Annan right when he tried to save his plan for Syria by attempting to secure Chinese and Iranian support? According to some analysts, the end game in Syria has started and the question is not if but when Assad will have to go. As the tragedy in Syria is unfolding, those countries supporting the Syrian opposition, like Turkey, should seriously consider whether they really expect any constructive contribution from Moscow and Beijing -- both now and after Assads palace has gone up in flames. Putin, Erdoan' dinleyecek mi? Bu aramba Babakan Tayyip Erdoan, Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu ile birlikte Moskova'ya gnbirlik ziyaret

dzenleyecek. Plan, Rusya Devlet Bakan Vladimir Putin ile grerek genelde Suriye'deki durumu, zelde den Trk jetini ele almak.kinci konuyla ilgili olarak, Ruslarn jetin bana gelenlerle ilgili enformasyonu tmyle paylamasn umalm. Ruslarla Amerikallarn olayla ilgili ok ey bildikleri aikar, ama sava uann d Trk hkmeti asndan her geen gn daha utandrc bir hal alyor. Ya Trk hkmeti ne olduunu hl gerekten bilmiyor ki, bu, Trk istihbaratnn yeterli dzeyde olmad ve Trkiye'nin hem Moskova hem de Washington'daki dostlarnn ellerindeki verileri en azndan imdiye dek kendilerine saklad anlamna geliyor. Ya da Erdoan ile Davutolu aradan geen zamanda ne olup bittiini rendi, gelgelelim (Trk ordusu ve istihbaratnn grne gre yanl enformasyonuna dayandrdklar) ilk aklamalaryla daha sonra kefettikleri gereklii birbirine uydurmakta byk zorluk ekiyor. Elbette Moskova ziyaretinin tek konusu kaybedilen Trk sava ua deil. Ayn zamanda, Trk liderler, Ruslarn Esed rejimine destei kesmesinin vaktinin geldiine dair Putin'i iknaya alacak. Geen cuma dzenlenen Suriye'nin Dostlar toplantsnda, Davutolu, "Uluslararas toplum, hem Suriye rejimine hem de bu rejimi destekleyenlere kar basky artrmal.'' diye konutu. Esed'e en nemli destek Rusya ve in'den geliyor. Bask ie yarayacak m? Rusya, bugnlerde New York'ta mzakere edilen yeni BM Gvenlik Konseyi (BMGK) karar tasarsnda 'krmz izgilerinden' vazgemeye yanaacak m? BM, Suriye'deki 300 silahsz gzlemcisinin 90 gnlk grev sresinin dolaca 20 Temmuz itibaryla, yani Erdoan'n Moskova ziyaretinden iki gn sonra, bir karar karmak zorunda. Batl lkeler BM tznn 7. blm uyarnca Suriye'ye kar ek yaptrmlar talep ediyor. Rusya ile in ise buna kesinlikle kar. Erdoan'n daha sert nlemlere verdii destei Putin ciddiye alacak m? "Bunu unutun," diyor Michael Ignatieff. nde gelen Kanadal yazar, akademisyen ve d politikada liberal deerleri bazen provokatif biimde savunmasyla tannan eski bir siyaseti olan Ignatieff, geen hafta New York Review of Books'un web sitesinde sert sluplu bir blog yaymlad. Yazsnda, Suriye atmasnn, bat demokrasileri ile Rusya ve in arasndaki ok daha temel bir ztlamay tetikledii tezini daha da ilerletti. Ignatieff, otoriter devletler olarak niteledii iki eski komnist lkenin Suriye gibi zorba rejimleri karlarna uyduu iin desteklediini yazd. Kanadal yazara gre Rusya ve in, Suriye'deki gibi atmalar, ABD, AB ve Trkiye gibi demokrasi ve insan haklarnn prizmasndan grmyorlar. O nedenle Esed rejimini desteklemeyi srdryorlar. Kssadan hisse: Esed sonras gei dneminin hazrlanmasnda Ruslar ya da inlilerden herhangi bir yardm almay aklnzdan karn. Moskova ile Pekin, bunu kesinlikle karlarna uygun bulmuyor ve tarihin de kendi yanlarnda olduuna inanyor. Bat'y zayf ve krizde gryorlar, kendi gleri ierdeki demokratik kontrol ve denge mekanizmalaryla kstlanmadndan eninde sonunda bu tahakkm mcadelesini kazanacaklarna inanyorlar. Ignatieff'in fazla genelleyici ifadelerinin bazsn ve Amerika ile Avrupa'nn Ortadou ve dier yerlerdeki diktatrlerle gemi mnasebetlerine hibir zeletiri getirmemesini tartmaya aabilirsiniz. Ama konu Rusya'nn uzlamazlna geldiinde, hakllk payn teslim etmek lazm. BMGK'nin dier yeleri, Ruslarn aralarna katlmasn daha ne kadar beklemeli? Kofi Annan, Suriye plann kurtarmak iin in ve ran'n desteini garantiye almaya kalkmakta hakl myd? Suriye'de son elin oynandn syleyen baz analistlere gre, asl soru, 'Esed'in gitmek zorunda kalp kalmayaca deil, ne zaman gidecei?' Suriye'deki trajedi katlanarak byrken, Trkiye gibi Suriye muhalefetini destekleyen lkeler, gerekten Moskova ve Pekin'den yapc katk bekleyip beklemediklerini ciddi biimde gzden geirmeli. Hem imdi hem de Esed'in saray yanp kl olduktan sonra...

Geert Wilders: Islamophobe turned Europhobe For years, Geert Wilders, the blond-haired Dutch radical right populist, was known for his extremely negative views on Islam and Muslims. According to Wilders, Islam was not a religion but the most dangerous ideology around that threatened to overthrow, in the

long run, the liberal society and the values that he cherished. Most of his speeches, in the Netherlands and abroad, focused on the danger of Islam and a few years ago he made an amateurish but widely publicized short movie, Fatwa, in which he inextricably linked Islam to terrorism. For most friends and foes, Wilders was the textbook representative of the new Islamophobia in Europe and the US, building on the fear of Islam after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to label all Muslims as potential violent challengers to the West. In circles of European and American right-wing extremists, Wilders became a cult figure who bravely defied all the threats against him. It was no coincidence that Anders Breivik, the Norwegian mass murderer, referred to Wilders several times in his anti-Islamic manifesto. In the Netherlands, Wilders did well in the 2010 parliamentary elections. He got 15 percent of the vote and his party, the Freedom Party, decided to support the minority government of Liberals and Christian Democrats. Within a few years, Wilders had managed to escape the political margins and position himself as a power broker in Dutch politics. That all came to an abrupt end in April of this year when he refused to support the budget cuts necessary for the Netherlands to meet eurozone deficit targets. Elections for a new parliament are set for Sept. 12, but it seems that Wilders has overplayed his hand because none of the other parties are keen on involving his party in a new coalition government. Furthermore, the centerright parties are fed up with his inflammatory rhetoric and his unwillingness to take responsibility for unpopular austerity measures. In a surprising move Wilders recently announced that for him the key issue in the election campaign will not be the danger of Islam but the future of the EU. Already over the last couple of months one could see this change of strategy coming. Even his biggest opponents agree that Wilders is a smart tactician and there were two main reasons why this populist at heart realized that the time had come to select a new enemy. In all the opinion polls and according to a growing number of research data, there was a growing gap between Wilders' obsession with Islam and the preoccupations of his electorate. For most of his voters, Islam and Muslims are simply not a political priority. Many of his followers even think Wilders is overdoing his Islam-bashing. They support him because they hate all the other politicians and have the impression that only Wilders is voicing their concerns against a political elite that is perceived as too soft on immigration, crime and the loss of national identity. That last argument is linked to the second motive behind Wilders' change of mind: the growing resistance against European interference with the way the Dutch economy and welfare state are organized. In order to solve the euro crisis, European leaders have decided to give EU institutions a bigger say on issues that many Dutch people consider should be decided by their nationally elected politicians. A substantial part of the Dutch electorate is reluctant to give Brussels, presented by euro critics as an anonymous bureaucracy, more power although many realize deep down that most probably there is no other option available. It is this doubt and skepticism about the EU that populists from the right (Wilders) and the left (the booming Socialist Party) want to exploit at the next elections. Does his goodbye, at least temporarily, to Islam-bashing make Geert Wilders a more acceptable politician? Of course not. He remains a clever opportunist who will do anything to gather the votes of dissatisfied voters, whatever it takes. It is a signal though to all those in Turkey who thought that in the last couple of years a majority of Europeans were infected by an incurable disease called Islamophobia. It is true that hate and violence against Muslims in Europe has been on the

rise. All democrats should continue to fight this trend among a fanatical minority. But it would be a big mistake to think that most Europeans condone this negative development. Wilders' turn to Europhobia also shows that even among populist voters, Islamophobia seems to be a passing tendency and not the deeply rooted conviction many in this country feared it was. Geert Wilders: slamofobi Avrofobi'ye dnt Hollandal, boyal sar sal, radikal sac poplist Geert Wilders, slam ve Mslmanlarla ilgili ar olumsuz grleriyle tannr yllardr. Wilders'e gre, slam, bir din deil de, kendisinin aziz bildii deerleri ve liberal toplumu uzun vadede ykmakla tehdit ederek kol gezen en tehlikeli ideolojidir. Hollanda ve yurtdnda verdii konumalarn ou, slam tehlikesine odakldr. Birka yl nce amatrce ektii ama geni yank bulan ksa filmi Fetva'da, slam' ayrlmaz biimde terrle balantlandrmt. 11 Eyll terr saldrlar sonras tm Mslmanlara potansiyel olarak Bat'ya iddetle meydan okuma etiketi yaptran slam korkusu zerine ina edilen yeni slamofobinin adeta ders kitabdr Wilders, hem dostlarnn hem de dmanlarnn gznde. Avrupal ve Amerikal sa kanat arlk evrelerde, Wilders, kendisine ynelik tehditlere cesurca kar koyan bir klt figr halini almtr. Norveli toplu katliamc Anders Breivik'in slam kart manifestosunda Wilders'e defalarca atf yapmas tesadf deildir. Hollanda'da Wilders, 2010 genel seimlerinde iyi i kard. Oylarn yzde 15'ini ald ve liderliindeki zgrlk Partisi, Liberallerle Hristiyan Demokratlarn aznlk hkmetini desteklemeye karar verdi. Wilders, birka yl iinde, siyas marjinallikten kurtulup Hollanda siyasetinin kudret simsar konumuna yerleti. Ama nisan aynda Hollanda'nn AB mal kriterlerini karlayabilmesi iin gerekli bte kesintilerini desteklemeyi reddetmesiyle tm bunlar aniden sona erdi. Yeni parlamento iin 12 Eyll'de seime gidilecek, ama bu kez Wilders fazla ileri gitmie benziyor, zira kendisini yeni koalisyon hkmetine katmaya dier partilerin hibiri yanamyor. Merkez sa partiler bile, onun kkrtc syleminden ve halkn istemedii tasarruf nlemleri iin elini tan altna koymamasndan bkt. Wilders, geenlerde srpriz bir manevrayla, seim kampanyasnda ele alaca kilit meselenin, slam tehlikesi deil de AB'nin gelecei olacan duyurdu. Haddizatnda son aylarda byle bir strateji deiikliinin gelecei belliydi. En sk muhalifleri bile, Wilders'in akll bir taktisyen olduunda ve bu poplistin yeni bir dman seme vaktinin geldiini tm varlyla fark etmesinin iki sebebi bulunduunda hemfikir. Tm anketler ve giderek artan sayda aratrma verisi gsteriyor ki, Wilders'in slam takntsyla semenlerinin kaygs arasndaki uurum byyor. Semenlerinin ou iin slam ve Mslmanlk siyas ncelik olmaktan kt. Hatta taraftarlarnn ou, Wilders'in slam tacizinde arya katn dnyor. Wilders'i destekliyorlar, nk dier tm siyasilerden nefret ediyor ve g, su, ulusal kimliin kayb gibi konularda ok yumuak olarak alglanan siyas elitlere kar kendi endielerini sadece onun dile getirdiine inanyorlar. Son sav, Wilders'in zihniyet deiikliinin gerisindeki ikinci gdyle balantl: Hollanda ekonomisi ve refah devletinin nasl dzenlendiine Avrupa'nn mdahale etmesine kar byyen direni. Avrupal liderler, Avro krizini zmek iin baz konularda AB kurumlarna daha byk yetki vermeyi kararlatrd. Ama bunlar, Hollandallara gre, ulusal dzeyde seilmi siyasiler tarafndan karar verilmesi gereken meseleler. Her ne kadar pek ou elde baka seenek bulunmadn iten ie fark etse de, Hollandal semenlerin kayda deer ksm, AB tenkitileri tarafndan anonim brokrasi diye sunulan 'Brksel'e daha fazla yetki vermeye isteksiz. Hem sadan (Wilders) hem de soldan (patlama yapan Sosyalist Parti) poplistlerin gelecek seimlerde istismar etmeyi istedikleri ey, tam da bu AB zerinde toplanan phe bulutlar. Peki, slam tacizine geici de olsa veda etmesi, Geert Wilders'i daha kabul edilebilir bir siyas yapar m? Elbette hayr. Kendisi, rahatsz semenlerin oylarn toplamak iin bedeli ne olursa olsun her eyi yapabilecek akll bir frsat hl. Ama yine de bu, son yllarda Avrupallarn ouna slamofobi adnda tedavisi olmayan bir hastaln bulatn dnen Trkiye'deki herkes iin bir iaret. Avrupa'da Mslmanlara kar nefret ve iddetin trmana gemi olduu doru. Tm demokratlar fanatik bir aznlk arasndaki bu eilimle mcadele etmeyi srdrmeli. Ama Avrupallarn ounun bu olumsuz gelimeyi tasvip ettiini dnmek byk hata olur. Wilders'in Avrofobi'ye dn, poplist semenler arasnda bile slamofobi'nin geici bir eilim gibi gzkt ve Trkiye'dekilerin korktuu kadar derine kk salm bir inan olmadnn gstergesi.

Bad customs and good habits Two weeks ago I experienced, almost simultaneously, some of the good and the bad sides of Turkey, its institutions and its people. It all happened within a couple of days at the same spot. The scene of the action was the customs area in Erenky on the Anatolian side of stanbul. The reason why I spent almost two full days there was the fact that we wanted to bring some of our belongings from the Netherlands to Turkey. Three years ago, my wife and I moved from Brussels to stanbul. We decided to rent a small apartment in the Netherlands that we could use when we would be there to visit family and friends, keep up my contacts in Brussels or participate in meetings and conferences. After three years, the conclusion was that we spent relatively few days in the apartment and that the costs outnumbered the advantages of having our own place to stay. So we terminated the rental contract, gave some of our stuff to my sister and packed the rest. We found a Dutch-Turkish company to transport the goods to Turkey and were advised by the very helpful Turkish consul general in Rotterdam on which procedures to follow. Everything went fine until the truck arrived in Erenky. We should have realized that things would never be easy with Turkish customs. Three years ago, we had to wait almost a month before we could get our belongings from the customs depot. This time we were hoping for a more smooth procedure because all in all it wasnt much that we wanted to bring in, and we had prepared all the paper work in perfect order. When we arrived in Erenky, all the bad memories from 2009 came back to haunt us. For those who have never been there, the customs area is a huge place filled with warehouses, trucks and hundreds of men running around with piles of paper. Most of them are private customs agents that you need to make sense of all the procedures you have to go through in order to get your stuff back. We were lucky this time because the two guys working for us were both sympathetic and efficient. The transport company had asked their small firm to take care of us and that is what they did. We walked from one office window to another, each time trying to understand which paper was apparently missing or which stamp we had to get on which form. As we experienced three years before, we seemed to have ended up in a place run by anonymous bureaucrats who can decide whatever they want. Nobody really understands, but everybody is forced to obey their rules. Its the kind of place inspired by Kafkas writings on suffocating buildings filled with faceless state servants whose behavior is dictated by unfathomable arbitrariness. While waiting for another round of door knocking, our agents compared the Turkish customs procedures with the ones they knew from the rest of Europe. They complained about the total lack of transparency and predictability. Each time they had to improvise because nobody knew how the rules would be interpreted this time around. Of course, they made a living out of this constant adaptation but agreed that modern state institutions should not be based on capriciousness and the inimitable behavior of its civil servants. We also found out that our intermediaries only received part of the extra money that we had to pay to complete the customs procedures. The rest went into unknown pockets. Our agents were convinced: Only Turkeys accession to the EU would force the country to change the present corrupt system. Then, all of a sudden, someone recognized me from my times in the European Parliament. He offered us tea and coffee and volunteered to help us solve our problems. Amazingly, within a few hours, all of our forms were approved and stamped. Our

savior went around the corridors and talked to his contacts. The result: We got VIP treatment at the customs depot and at the end of the second day our stuff was loaded on a truck and moved out. In Erenky, a tradition of bureaucratic opaqueness exists side by side with a culture of deeply human readiness to help based on personal relations. Lets hope that while modernizing Turkey manages to root out the bad customs but is able to stick to the good habits that distinguish this country from so many other European nations. Kt gmrk* ve iyi detler ki hafta nce Trkiye'nin baz iyi ve kt taraflarn, kurumlarn ve insanlarn hemen hemen ezamanl tecrbe ettim. Hepsi birka gn iinde ayn yerde oldu. Olay yeri, stanbul Anadolu yakasndaki Erenky Gmrk Mdrl'yd. Hollanda'daki eyalarmzn bir ksmn Trkiye'ye getirtmek istememiz, neredeyse iki gnn tamamn orada geirmemizle sonuland. yl nce eimle birlikte Brksel'den stanbul'a tandk. Bu arada aile ve dostlar ziyaret etmek, Brksel'deki temaslarm devam ettirmek ve toplantlarla konferanslara katlmak iin Hollanda'da kk bir daire kiralamaya karar verdik. Aradan yl getikten sonra, o dairede grece az kaldmz ve kalacak kendi yerimizin olmasnn masraflarnn avantajlarn atn idrak ettik. Dolaysyla kira szlemesini sona erdirdik, eyalarmzn bir ksmn kz kardeime verdik ve geri kalann topladk. Eyalar Trkiye'ye tamas iin bir Hollandal-Trk irket bulduk. Her ey yolunda gitti, ta ki kamyon Erenky'e varana dek. Trk gmrnde ilerin asla kolay yrmeyeceini batan bilmemiz gerekirdi. yl nce eyalarmz gmrk deposundan karabilmek iin neredeyse bir ay beklemitik. Bu kez hepi topu ok az ey sokmak istediimizden ve istenen tm evraklar mkemmel dzende hazrladmzdan, ilemlerin daha az przle tamamlanmasn umuyorduk. Ama Erenky'e gittiimizde, 2009'un tm kt hatralar yeniden canland. Oraya hi gitmemiler iin syleyeyim; Erenky gmrk alan antrepolar, kamyonlar, ellerinde kt kalabalyla etrafta kouan yzlerce adamla dolu devasa bir yer. Bunlarn ou gmrk acentelerinin personeli ve eyalarnz alabilmek iin tamamlamanz gereken tm ilemleri onlara belletmeniz gerekiyor. Bu kez anslydk, nk bizim iin alan iki adam hem sempatik hem faaldi. Nakliye irketi, kendisine bal daha kk firmadan bizimle ilgilenmesini istemiti, onlar da bunun gereini yerine getiriyordu. Bir ofis penceresinden dierine gidiyor, her seferinde hangi kdn eksik olduunu ya da hangi formun zerine hangi damgay bastracamz anlamaya alyorduk. yl nce olduu gibi, yine canlarnn ektiine karar veren anonim brokratlar tarafndan ynetilen bir yere dme benziyorduk. Onlarn kurallarn kimse anlayamyordu ama herkes boyun emek zorundayd. Kafka'nn akl sr ermez keyfiliin dayatt davranlar iindeki suratsz devlet memurlaryla dolu boucu binalar hakkndaki yazlarndan esinlenmi trden bir yerdi. Yeni bir kap tklatma turunu beklerken, acentecilerimiz Trkiye'deki gmrk ilemlerini bildikleri kadaryla Avrupa'dakilerle kyaslad. effaflktan tmyle yoksunluktan ve ngrlemezlikten ikyet ettiler. Her yeni seferde kurallarn nasl yorumlanacan kimse bilmediinden srekli doalama almak zorundaydlar. Elbette bu srekli kendilerini duruma uyarlama halinden ekmeklerini kazanyorlard, ama modern devlet kurumlarnn deikenlii ve memurlarnn bana buyruk davranlarn temel alamayacanda hemfikirdiler. Bu arada gmrk ilemlerini tamamlamak iin deyeceimiz ekstra parann sadece bir ksmnn araclarmza kalacan da rendik. Geri kalan, mehul ceplere girecekti. Araclarmz kesin emindi: Trkiye'yi bu yolsuz sistemi deitirmeye mecbur brakabilecek tek bir ey vard, o da AB yelii... Sonra birdenbire, Avrupa Parlamento-su'ndaki gnlerimden beni tanyan biri kverdi. Bize ay ve kahve ikram edip sorunlarmz zmek iin gnll oldu. nanlmaz biimde, birka saat iinde, tm formlarmz onaylanm ve damgalanmt. Kurtarcmz koridorlarda dolap tandklaryla konutu. Sonu: Gmrk deposunda VIP muamelesi grdk ve ikinci gnn sonunda eyalarmz kamyona ykleyip kardk. Erenky'de brokratik saydamszlk gelenei ile kiisel ilikiler temelinde insani yardma itenlikle hazr olma kltr birlikte var oluyor. Umalm, Trkiye, modernleirken, kt gmr* ortadan kaldrsn, ama bu lkeyi pek ok Avrupa lkesinden ayran iyi detlerine bal kalsn. *Yazar, bir dil oyunu yapyor. Kelimenin ngilizce karl olan 'customs', hem gmrk hem

de det, adap, gelenek anlamlarna geliyor.

And the winner is For understandable reasons, the Spanish victory over Italy in the final of the European football championship got far more attention than the successes of both countries at the EU summit two days before. Most soccer fans were happy to have witnessed a superb game by the Spanish team that in previous matches had not lived up to the high expectations and often got lost in an endless passing game without much passion or adventure. On Sunday, the Spaniards showed, finally, that they are a unique squad that will go down in football history for their unparalleled technical capabilities and their capacity to outplay and overpower every opponent when it really matters. The Italians were badly beaten but their unexpected presence in the finals made up for most of the pain and disgrace they had to suffer that night. Two days previously, at a summit of EU leaders, Spain and Italy had done their utmost to combine forces and get a result that would save both the political future of their prime ministers and their ailing economies. The perception immediately after the Brussels meeting was that Italian leader Mario Monti and his Spanish colleague Mariano Rajoy had done very well and had been able, in football terms, to defeat German Chancellor Angela Merkel. By threatening to veto European growth plans, the Italian and Spanish prime minister were able to get important concessions from countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. Rajoy was happy because, in the future, insolvent Spanish banks can be directly recapitalized by eurozone bailout funds. That is good news for the Spanish state that will not be directly involved anymore in these expensive operations and will therefore be able to lower its own borrowing costs. On his return, Monti was welcomed as the savior of the Italian economy because he managed to extract from his reluctant European colleagues the promise that, when needed, the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will be allowed to buy sovereign bonds from eurozone countries like Italy that are faced with unsustainable high interest rates on the financial markets. The general impression in Rome after the weekend: Unfortunately Pirlo and Balotelli could not make it on the pitch, but at least Monti saved the day for Italy. Is it true that Spain was the big winner last weekend and Italy, with the exception of some diehard football fans, could feel satisfied as well? As often happens in the aftermath of European summits, close reading and interpretation of the texts shows that the jury is still out. Observers agree that the European Council took some very significant decisions to address the short-term crisis. By centralizing the supervision of the eurozone's banks under the European Central Bank (ECB), the often delaying influence of national supervisory authorities and politicians is weakened. That is good news because Europe needs more financial and monetary coherence among EU member states using the common currency. The same applies to the future capacity of the ESM to directly help fragile banks and struggling national economies. But, as Andrew Duff, a prominent member of the European Parliament and strong supporter of further integration, put it: Despite the progress made last week, much detailed work remains to be done -- and rapidly. The financial crisis is still with us, in modified form. Greece is still virtually bankrupt. The size of the ESM firewall, with a maximum lending capacity of 500 billion euros, is almost certainly too small for the challenge of a hostile marketplace. And the entry into force of the fiscal

compact treaty and the ESM yet depends on ratification by many national parliaments and on evading hostile action in constitutional courts. Did Merkel really suffer such a big defeat last weekend? In the German parliament she defended her concession by underlining that the new, strong role for the ECB fits perfectly with German plans for more political integration. She also stressed that the new banking supervision system and the ESM's assistance for banks will require a consensus decision by member states. Analysts agree with Merkel that allowing the ESM to buy government bonds to reduce countries' borrowing is merely applying an already existing instrument and not the big revolutionary breakthrough that Monti claims it to be. In the months to come we will see how last weekend's decisions will work out in practice in Italy, Spain and the rest of the EU. Until then, one should be careful in naming winners and losers. Playing football is not the same as saving a currency. Ve kazanan aklyoruz... Anlalr sebeplerden, Avrupa Futbol ampiyonas'nn finalinde spanya'nn talya karsnda kazand zafer, her iki lkenin cuma gn AB zirvesinde imza attklar baardan ok daha byk ilgi ekti. nceki malarda yksek beklentileri karlayamayan ve genelde tutku ya da maceraya atlmakszn bitimsiz bir pas trafiinde kaybolan spanyol takmnn finaldeki muhteem oyununa tanklk etmek pek ok futbolseveri mutlu etti. spanyollar, emsalsiz teknik becerileri ve gerekten nemli olduunda her rakipten daha iyi oynama ve ste kma kapasiteleriyle futbol tarihine geecek ei benzeri bulunmayan bir ekip olduklarn pazar gn nihayet ele gne kantlad. talyanlar fena yenilse de, beklenmedik ekilde finalde boy gstermeleri, o gece ektikleri ac ve kk drlmeyi byk lde telafi etti. ki gn ncesindeki AB liderler zirvesinde ise, spanya ile talya glerini birletirip hem babakanlarnn siyas geleceini hem de can ekien ekonomilerini kurtaracak bir sonu elde etmek iin ellerinden gelenin tesini yapt. Brksel'deki toplantnn ardndan ilk izlenim, talya Babakan Mario Monti ile spanya Babakan Mariano Rajoy'un ok iyi i kard ve futbol terimleriyle konuursak, Alman Babakan Angela Merkel'i yenilgiye uratt ynndeydi. talya ve spanya liderleri, AB'nin byme planlarn veto etme tehdidiyle Almanya, Hollanda, Finlandiya gibi lkelere nemli dnler verdirmeyi becerdi. Rajoy mutlu, zira gelecekte batk spanyol bankalarna dorudan Avro Blgesi kurtarma fonlarndan sermaye salanacak. Pahal kurtarma operasyonlarna artk dorudan mdahil olmayacak ve bu sayede kendi borlanma masraflarn drebilecek spanyol devleti iin iyi haber. Monti de talya'ya dnnde ekonominin kurtarcs olarak karland, zira gnlsz Avrupal muadillerinden nemli bir vaat kopard. Yeni kurulan Avrupa stikrar Mekanizmas'nn (AM), finans piyasalarna srdrlemez ykseklikte faiz oranlaryla borlanan talya gibi Avro kua lkelerinin devlet tahvillerini ihtiya olduunda satn almasna izin verildi. Hafta sonunun ardndan Roma'daki genel izlenim yle: Maalesef Pirlo ile Balotelli yeil sahada iin sonunu getiremedi, ama en azndan Monti talya iin gn kurtard. Peki, hafta sonundan spanya'nn muzaffer kt ve iflah olmaz futbol fanatikleri hari tutulursa, talya'nn da kendini tatmin olmu hissedebilecei doru mudur? Avrupa zirvelerinin ertesinde sklkla olduu gibi, belgeleri mercek altna tutup yorumlarsak, henz nihai hkmn verilmediini grrz. Gzlemciler, Avrupa Konseyi'nin ksa vadeli krizi zmek iin baz ok nemli kararlar aldn doruluyor. Avro Blgesi bankalarn Avrupa Merkez Bankas'nn (AMB) gzetiminde merkeziletirmek suretiyle ulusal denetim yetkilileri ve siyasilerin genelde geciktirici yndeki etkileri zayflatld. Ortak para birimini kullanan AB yesi devletler arasnda daha byk mal ve parasal uyum gerektiinden, bu, iyi bir haber. Ayn ey, krlgan bankalara ve hayat memat mcadelesindeki ulusal ekonomilere dorudan yardm konusunda AM'nin mstakbel kapasitesi iin de geerli. Ama Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun nde gelen yesi ve daha gl btnlemenin hararetli savunucusu Andrew Duff'n dile getirdii gibi, ''Geen hafta kaydedilen ilerlemeye ramen, daha yaplmas gereken epey ayrntl i var -hem de hemen. Biimsel deiiklie uram olsa da, mal krizle birlikte yayoruz hl. Yunanistan'n ilan edilmemi iflas sryor. (...)

Maksimum 500 milyar dolarlk bor verme kapasitesiyle AM'nin koruma duvarnn boyutu, dman mal piyasa ortamnn meydan okumalarna kar kesinlikle ok kk apl. Mal sklatrma anlamas ile AM'nin yrrle girmesi de ulusal parlamentolarn onayna ve anayasa mahkemelerinin dmanca engellemelerinden kanmaya bal.'' Merkel hafta sonu hezimete urad m gerekten? Kendisi, Alman parlamentosunda verdii dnleri savunurken, AMB'ye biilen yeni ve gl roln, Almanya'nn AB'de daha fazla siyas btnleme planlarna tastamam uyduunu vurgulad. Yeni banka gzetim sisteminin ve AM'nin bankalara yardmnn ye lkelerin ortak kararn gerektirdiinin altn izdi. Analistler, lkelerin borlanmasnn azalmas iin hkmet tahvillerinin AM tarafndan satn alnmasna izin verilmesinin, Monti'nin iddia ettii gibi byk devrimci ilerleme deil de, halihazrda var olan bir enstrmana bavurulmas olduu konusunda Merkel ile hemfikir. Geen hafta sonu alnan kararlarn spanya, talya ve AB'nin geri kalannda somut olarak nasl ilediini gelecek aylarda greceiz. O zamana dek kazanan ve kaybeden diye etiketlerken dikkatli olmalyz. Futbol oynamakla bir para birimini kurtarmak ayn ey deil.

Bra Ersanl and the Turkish paradox Last week an important article on Turkey was published on the website of Foreign Affairs, the most prestigious American magazine on foreign policy. The authors are Michael J. Koplow, a Ph.D. candidate, and Steven A. Cook, an influential Council on Foreign Relations fellow. The title of their short piece is The Turkish Paradox. It is a significant contribution to the debate on Turkey because it reflects a growing consensus among informed Turkey watchers in the US and Europe. I am not talking here about the many unreliable and misinformed publications that have appeared in several US and European media outlets in the past couple of months suggesting that Turkey has become a police state where every critic one day ends up in prison. Cook has been following developments in Turkey for many years and is known for his balanced if sometimes provoking writings on the region. His most recent article is not a quick shot but based on long-lasting observations and a clear sympathy for Turkeys efforts to overcome its undemocratic past. According to Koplow and Cook, the problem with analyzing Turkey is that the country simultaneously embraces and abuses democracy. The authors praise the long list of reforms that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has introduced during the past decade and that have allowed for greater participation of citizens in civic life. At the same time, they criticize the pressure on the media and the scores of arrests without proper evidence that have limited the ability of society to contest governmental power. Their conclusion is pertinent: Turkey has become more open in some ways and more closed in others. An autocratic slide will undermine its international standing, built largely on its democratization. Should Turkeys liberalization falter, the country may quickly lose its influence -- suggesting that there are consequences to having it both ways. One of the problematic developments Koplow and Cook refer to in their article is the arrest of thousands of people suspected of having links with the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). Of course, the two American observers dont know the details of all these cases. But their impression, shared by most of their colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic, is that the large majority of these arrests are either based on flimsy evidence or on dubious articles in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and Anti-Terror Law that dont distinguish between people who actively support the use of violence by the Kurdistan Workers

Party (PKK) and those who reject terror but sympathize with some or all of the political goals of the Kurdish nationalist movement. This week we will be witnessing another example of this negative trend that undermines Turkeys appropriate fight against terrorism and compromises the democratic progress that has been made. One of the suspects in the KCK trial that will start on Monday is Marmara University professor Bra Ersanl. She is charged with leading an illegal organization and is facing a prison sentence of maximum 22 years. Her crime? She gave lessons at the Political Academy of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and was a member of the partys Constitutional Commission. Among other things, she is accused of carrying out the instructions of PKK leader Abdullah calan. In a recent article in daily Radikal, Ersanl showed how the socalled evidence in her file mainly consists of a collection of reshuffled personal notes. Many friends and colleagues have underlined the point that Ersanl has rejected violence throughout her life and, as respected writer pek alilar put it, It is an absurd claim by the states justice system that she participated in an organization which takes power from violence. Ersanls case is only one of many that will be dealt with this week, but it has drawn a lot of attention and indignation all over the world because it so clearly lacks any credibility. Even outsiders can see that her arrest is part of the governments efforts to intimidate all those who empathize with the Kurdish movement and not based on sound proof that convincingly links Ersanl to terrorist activities. Ersanls arrest and imprisonment are emblematic of the Turkish paradox. One can only hope that all those in Turkey who want the process of democratization to continue realize in time that cases like the one against Ersanl have one effect only: They fatally weaken the trust, both in Turkey and abroad, that this government is still committed to introducing more democracy and strengthening the rule of law. Bra Ersanl ve Trk paradoksu Geen hafta Amerika'nn en prestijli d politika dergisi Foreign Affairs'in internet sitesinde Trkiye ile ilgili nemli bir makale yaymland. Doktora aday Michael J. Koplow ve Dilikiler Konseyi'nin etkili isimlerinden Steven A. Cook tarafndan kaleme alnan bu ksa yaz, 'Trk Paradoksu' baln tayor ve Trkiye hakkndaki tartmaya nemli katkda bulunuyor. Zira ABD ve Avrupa'daki bilgili Trkiye gzlemcileri arasnda giderek yaylan bir gr birliini yanstyor. Trkiye'nin her eletirenin sonunda hapsi boylad bir polis devletine dntne dair son aylarda ok sayda Amerikan ve Avrupa medya organnda kan gvenilmez ve yanl ynlendirici yaynlardan sz etmiyorum burada. Cook, Trkiye'deki gelimeleri ok uzun zamandr takip ediyor ve blgeyle ilgili bazen provoke edici olsa da genelde dengeli yazlaryla tannyor. Son makalesi, bir arpc ekim deil, bilakis uzun sreli gzlemlere ve Trkiye'nin anti demokratik gemiini ama abalarna ynelik net sempatiye dayanyor. Koplow ve Cook'a gre, Trkiye'yi analiz ederken karlalan sorun, lkenin hem demokrasiyi kucaklamas hem de ktye kullanmas. Yazarlar, iktidardaki AKP'nin son 10 ylda topluma sunduu ve vatandalarn sivil yaama daha fazla katlmn salayan reformlarn uzun listesini vyor. Ayn zamanda toplumun iktidarn gcne itiraz etme kapasitesini kerten ok sayda tutuklamay ve medyaya ynelik basky eletiriyorlar. Buna mnasip kardklar sonu u: "Trkiye baz alardan daha ak, baz alardan daha kapal hale geldi. Otokrasiye kaymas, byk lde demokratikleme zerine ina edilen uluslararas itibarna zarar verir. Trkiye'nin liberallemesi sekteye urarsa, nfuzu da hzla kaybolup gider. Yani birbirinin zdd iki eyi ayn anda yapmann bir bedeli olacaktr." Koplow ile Cook'un makalelerinde atfta bulunduklar sorunlu gelimelerden biri, Krdistan Topluluklar Birlii (KCK) ile balantlar olduklar phesiyle binlerce kiinin tutuklanmas. Elbette iki Amerikal gzlemci, bu davalarn tm ayrntlarn

bilmiyor. Ama edindikleri izlenim ki, Atlantik'in her iki yakasndan meslektalarnn ou tarafndan paylalyor, bu tutuklamalarn byk ounluunun uyduruk kantlara ya da Trk Ceza Kanunu ve Terrle Mcadele Yasas'nn aibeli maddelerine dayand. Bu maddeler, PKK'nn iddet kullanmn faal biimde destekleyenler ile iddeti reddeden ama Krt milliyeti hareketinin baz ya da tm siyasi hedeflerine sempati besleyenler arasnda hibir ayrm gtmyor. Bu hafta, Trkiye'nin doru biimde terrle mcadele etmesini baltalayan ve kaydedilen demokratik ilerlemeden dn verdiren bu olumsuz eilimin bir baka rneine tank olacaz. Pazartesi balayacak KCK davasnn zanllarndan biri, Marmara niversitesi profesrlerinden Bra Ersanl. Kendisi 'yasad rgt liderliiyle' sulanyor ve hakknda 22 yla varan hapis cezas isteniyor. Peki ne su ilemi? Ersanl, BDP'nin Siyasi Akademisi'nde dersler veriyordu ve partinin anayasa komisyonunun yesiydi. Hakkndaki ithamlardan biri de, PKK lideri Abdullah calan'n emirlerini yerine getirmek. Ersanl, geenlerde Radikal gazetesinde yaymlanan makalesiyle, dosyasndaki szde kantlarn, aslnda kiisel notlarnn sras karman orman hale getirilmi bir derlemesi olduunu gsterdi. Pek ok dostu ve meslekta, Ersanl'nn hayat boyunca iddeti reddettiinin altn izdi ve saygn yazar pek allar bunu, "Onun gcn iddetten alan bir rgte katlmas, devletin yarg sisteminin absrt bir iddiasdr." diye dile getirdi. Ersanl'nnki bu hafta grlecek pek ok davadan sadece biri, ama btn dnyadan epeyce dikkat ve fkeyi zerine ekti, nk hibir inandrclnn olmad apak ortada. Tutuklanmasnn, hkmetin Krt hareketiyle empati kuran herkesin gzn korkutma abasnn bir paras olduunu ve Ersanl'nn terrist faaliyetlerle balants olduuna ikna edecek salam kantlara dayanmadn, meselenin en dndakiler bile grebiliyor. Ersanl'nn tutuklanp hapse atlmas, Trk paradoksunun simgesidir. Umarz, Trkiye'de demokratikleme srecinin devamn isteyen herkes, bir gn farkna varr ki, Ersanl aleyhindeki gibisinden davalar tek bir etki gsterir: Bu hkmetin daha fazla demokrasi getirme ve hukukun stnln glendirmeye hl ballk duyduuna dair hem Trkiye'de hem de yurtdndaki gveni lmcl dzeyde zayflatr.

From prison to presidency This column is not about the possible next career move of Recep Tayyip Erdoan, the Turkish prime minister who spent a couple of months in prison in the 1990s and, according to many, has set himself a new target: the Turkish presidency in 2014. Its about Mohamed Morsi, the new Egyptian president and the first Islamist elected as head of an Arab state. Mr. Morsi also spent some time in prison, although not very long, in 2008 and 2011. Now he is the man who is expected to bring a deeply divided country back together again, strike a deal with the armed forces, revitalize the ailing economy and carefully reformulate Egypts position in several regional conflicts. It is a clich to say that the challenges facing the new president are huge. Many are afraid he wont manage. Because he simply does not have the required capacities and charisma to do so or because the military wont let him. In an unflattering portrait, the Brookings Institutions Shadi Hamid described Mr. Morsi as an unlikely accident of history, the substitute candidate after the more appealing Muslim Brotherhood (MB) contender Khairat El Shater was disqualified from the presidential race. The new president is seen by Hamid and many others as someone without a particularly distinctive set of views, a MB loyalist and efficient operator behind the scenes. Not a leader able and willing to build consensus. Speculation about Mr. Morsis abilities will probably go on for some time, but the graduate of the University of Southern California does not have much time to prove that he is the right man in the right place

at the right time. The first immediate hurdle to take is where Mr. Morsi should be sworn in as president. Normally, that place would be the Peoples Assembly, the Egyptian parliament. The problem is that the assembly, dominated by the MB, has recently been dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). According to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), that means that the oath will have to be taken in front of the SCC. Until now Mr. Morsi has refused to do so because he correctly interprets the change of venue as giving in to the judicial coup that has deprived the country of its newly elected legislature. According to many MB leaders and non-MB activists, insisting on taking the oath before parliament would also send the message to the SCAF that Mr. Morsi rejects the constitutional amendments presented by the military right after the presidential elections, which strip the president of many of his powers. The oath taking place is only one, be it highly symbolic, of the confrontations ahead. Mr. Morsi does not only need to fight off the military without raising tensions too high. He also has to show that he wants to be an inclusive president and not a partisan enforcer of the MBs vision of Egypt. He has to reach out to the liberals and leftists who voted for him in the second round of the presidential elections because they were prepared to do everything to prevent the other candidate, Mr. Shafik, the last prime minister under Hosni Mubarak, from reinstating the old regime. Mr. Morsi has already indicated that he wants women and Christian Copts in the new government, two groups that fear the Islamic agenda that Mr. Morsi has always stood for. History is asking a lot from Mr. Morsi. As one observer put it: He has to reinvent himself to become a leader with a clear vision. The latest news from Cairo suggests that the new president realizes the enormous obstacles in front of him and the need to overcome some of them quickly. On Monday, the Al-Shorouk newspaper reported that the future government will be led by a politician who is not a member of the MB. One of the apparent candidates is Mohamed ElBaradei, well respected in the West and by Egyptian liberals. There are speculations that Mr. Morsi wants to involve two former presidential candidates, the left populist Hamdeen Sabahi and the Muslim liberal Abdul Moneim Aboul-Futouh, in his plans for the cabinet and the policies that should be implemented. A few weeks ago Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, the head of the Tunisian Islamist party and a leading figure among Arab Islamists, advised Mr. Morsi to share power with other pro-reform forces because it would be his only way to take on the old regime and the military. Lets hope the new Egyptian president got the message and acts accordingly. Hapishaneden devlet bakanlna Bu ke yazs, 1990'larda birka ay hapis yatm ve pek oklarna gre kendine 2014'te cumhurbakan olma hedefi koymu Trkiye Babakan Recep Tayyip Erdoan'n bundan sonraki olas kariyer hamlesiyle ilgili deil. Muhammed Mursi'yle ilgili; kendisi yeni Msr Devlet Bakan ve bir Arap devletinin bakan seilen ilk slamc. Mursi, ok uzun olmasa da, 2008 ve 2011'de bir sre hapiste kald. imdi, ondan, derinden blnm bir lkede yeniden birlikberaberlii salamas, silahl kuvvetlerle anlamaya varmas, can ekien ekonomiyi canlandrmas ve ok sayda blgesel ihtilafta Msr'n konumunu yeniden formle etmesi bekleniyor. Yeni devlet bakann devasa meydan okumalar bekliyor demek klie kaar. Pek ok kii, Mursi'nin bunlarn altndan kalkamayacandan korkuyor. Gerekeleri, ya onda bunlar yapacak kapasite ve

karizmann bulunmamas ya da ordunun bunlar yapmasna izin vermeyecek olmas. Brookings Enstits'nden Shadi Hamid, kaleme ald yerici portrede, Mursi'yi 'tarihin ihtimal verilmeyen kazas' diye niteledi. Ne de olsa, Mursi, Mslman Kardeler'in (MK) albenili aday olan ama devlet bakanl seiminden diskalifiye edilen Hayrat el atr'n bir nevi yedeiydi. Yeni devlet bakan, Hamid ve dier pek oklar tarafndan, belirgin bak asna sahip olmayan, MK mridi, sadece perde arkasnda etkili bir piyon olarak grlyor. Uzla salama becerisi ve iradesine sahip bir lider olarak grlmyor. Sayn Mursi'nin kabiliyetleriyle ilgili speklasyonlar muhtemelen bir mddet daha srecek. Ama Gney Kaliforniya niversitesi'nin bu mezununun, doru zamanda doru yerde doru adam olduunu kantlamak iin nnde fazla zaman yok. lk kriz, Sayn Mursi'nin devlet bakan olarak nerede yemin edeceinde yaanacak. Normalde bu yerin halk meclisi, yani Msr parlamentosu olmas gerekir. Ama sorun u ki, MK'nin hakimiyetindeki meclis, geenlerde Anayasa Mahkemesi tarafndan feshedildi. Silahl Kuvvetler Yksek Konseyi'ne gre, bu, Anayasa Mahkemesi nnde yemin etmek zorunda olmak demek. Sayn Mursi, bunu, lkeyi yeni seilmi milletvekillerinden mahrum brakan yarg darbesine boyun emek anlamnda doru yorumlad ve u ana dek yemin mekannda deiiklii reddetti. Pek ok MK liderine ve MK'den olmayan aktivistlere gre, meclis nnde yemin etmekte srar etmekle, ayn zamanda Silahl Kuvvetler Yksek Konseyi'ne u mesaj veriliyor: Mursi, bakanlk seiminin hemen ardndan ordu tarafndan devreye sokulan ve devlet bakannn yetkilerinin ounu gasbeden anayasal deiiklikleri reddediyor. Lakin yemin treninin yeri, en sembolii olsa da, Mursi'yi bekleyen pek ok ztlamadan sadece biri. Mursi'nin, orduyla mcadele ederken, gerilimi fazla trmandrmamaya zen gstermesi gerek. Ama bu da yetmez. MK'nin Msr vizyonunun yanda dayatcs deil de, herkesi kapsayc bir devlet bakan olmak istediini gstermek mecburiyetinde. Dier adayn, yani Hsn Mbarek'in eski babakan Ahmet efik'in eski rejimi yeniden tesis etmesini nlemek iin her eyi yapmaya hazr olan ve bu yzden seimin ikinci turunda kendisine oy veren liberaller ve solculara da elini uzatmal. Mursi, kendisinin hep savunageldii slami gndemden korkan kadnlarla Hristiyan Kptileri yeni hkmette grmek istediini imdiden belirtti. Tarih Mursi'den ok ey istiyor. Bir gzlemcinin tespit ettii gibi: Kendini yeniden icat edip daha nce hi olmad o net durua sahip ulusal lider kiiliine dnmek zorunda. Kahire'den gelen en son haberler, yeni devlet bakannn nndeki muazzam engellerin ve bazlarn abucak ama gereinin farknda olduuna iaret ediyor. Pazartesi gn el oruk gazetesi, mstakbel hkmete MK yesi olmayan bir siyasinin babakanlk edeceini yazd. ne kan adaylardan biri, hem Bat'da hem de Msrl liberaller nezdinde byk sayg gren Muhammed el Baradey. Mursi'nin, bakanlk seiminin ilk turunda elenen adaylardan solcu poplist Hamdin Sabahi ile Mslman liberal Abdulmunim Ebul Futuh'u kurulacak kabine ve uygulanacak politikalara dahil etmeyi planladna dair speklasyonlar da var. Tunus'taki slamc partinin lideri ve slamc Araplar arasnda nde gelen bir kiilik olan eyh Raid Gannui, birka hafta nce Mursi'ye, iktidar dier reform yanls glerle paylamasn tavsiye ederken, onun eski rejim ve orduyla baa kmasnn tek yolunun bu olduunu belirtti. Umalm, yeni Msr Devlet Bakan mesaj alm olsun ve ona gre hareket etsin.

Turkey not out of the woods on visa yet Last week the member states of the European Union invited the European Commission, the Brussels-based institution that deals with the day-to-day running of the EU, to take steps towards visa liberalization with Turkey. The commission will probably publish an Action Plan this autumn showing how this procedure will be organized, what Turkey is supposed to do and what the EU is offering, when and under which conditions. The move was hailed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu as a historic step. In the media it was claimed that the process is expected to be concluded in a period of two to three years and will allow 75 million Turks to freely travel to countries in the EU soon.

I do not want to spoil the party, but I am afraid some prudence is called for. First, on the present visa regime: There is no doubt that the system that is now in place for Turkish citizens to get a visa for Schengen zone countries is humiliating and deeply flawed. From a political point of view, it is impossible to defend the ongoing restrictions for Turkish citizens, while at the same time the EU has reached agreements for visa-free travel with other countries, for instance in the Balkans, with which is has not even started accession negotiations. On top of that comes a growing pile of jurisprudence from courts in the EU and its member states stating that the current visa requirements must be considered to be in conflict with the provisions of the 1973 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. In other words: Asking Turks for a visa is both politically and legally unacceptable. The only reason why this malpractice continues is the deeply rooted fear that the EU will be flooded by Turks who will come and not go back. The recent rise of right-wing populism has only made it more difficult for EU politicians to do what, on rational grounds, they should be doing: treating Turkey in the same way as other countries have been treated in the past and gradually allow Turks to travel to the EU without a visa. Is last weeks agreement the belated recognition of this obligation by the EU? That would be jumping to conclusions. As an old English proverb puts it: Dont halloo till you are out of the wood. Turkey is not there yet, definitely not within two or three years. The positive news is indeed that for the first time the term visa liberalization has been used in an EU document that deals with Turkey. Till now other, vague phrases were invented to shy away from the inevitable conclusion that Turkey should be put on the regular EU visa track. Reading last weeks EU conclusions though, one cannot but wonder when the promise is going to materialize. There is talk of a gradual and long-term perspective and, more importantly, on progress that is conditioned on an effective and consistent implementation by Turkey of the so-called readmission agreement that forces the country to accept Turkish nationals and later on third-country nationals who have entered EU territory illegally from Turkey and are sent back. The problem with last weeks deal is that it involves a lot of pretending. The EU pretends to treat Turkey in a fair way but has put in place so many conditions that it will be quite easy for reluctant member states to slow down and frustrate real progress. Turkey on the other hand pretends that it will only sign, ratify and implement the readmission agreement when the EU has started to produce effective visa exemptions. In Ankara the dominant belief is that the pro-Turkey court rulings inside the EU will eventually force the EU to become more flexible. Therefore, Turkey can wait and see and does not need to move itself in a substantial way. The good thing about last weeks agreement is that the wording and, to a certain extent, the mood has changed. The people responsible for implementing the deal inside the European Commission have the intention to make it a success. Still, the problem is with some EU countries that will only give in when all delaying tactics have been exhausted. In the meantime, Turkish politicians should be careful not to promise too much, and Turkish citizens should push their representatives to act

on their part of the deal and not postpone the necessary measures that Turkey has to put into effect anyway Trkiye vize konusunda henz dze km deil Geen hafta Avrupa Birlii (AB) yesi lkeler, birliin gnlk idaresiyle grevli Brksel merkezli kurum olan Avrupa Komisyonu'nu, Trkiye'ye ynelik vize uygulamasnn serbestletirilmesi dorultusunda admlar atmaya davet etti. Muhtemelen bu sonbaharda Komisyon, sz konusu prosedrn nasl organize edileceini, Trkiye'nin ne yapmas gerektiini ve AB'nin ne zaman, hangi koullar altnda, ne nereceini gsteren bir eylem plan yaynlayacak. Bu gelime Trkiye Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu tarafndan 'tarihi bir adm' olarak selamland. Medyada ise srecin iki- yllk bir dnem dahilinde sonulanmasnn beklendii ve ok gemeden 75 milyon Trk'n AB yesi lkelere zgrce seyahat etmesine imkan verecei iddias yer ald. Bu enlik havasn bozmak istemem, fakat korkarm ki biraz ihtiyatl olmak lazm. Mevcut vize sisteminden balayalm: u an Trkiye vatandalarnn Schengen blgesi lkelerine seyahat etmek iin vize almasn zorunlu klan sistemin kk drc ve son derece kusurlu olduuna hi kuku yok. Siyasi bak asndan, AB bir yandan baka lkelerle (szgelimi daha yelik mzakerelerine bile balamam olan Balkan lkeleriyle) vizesiz seyahat anlamalar yaparken, Trkiye vatandalar iin sregiden kstlamalar savunmann imkan yok. Bunun da tesinde, AB'deki ve ye lkelerdeki mahkemelerin, mevcut vize zorunluluklarnn 1973 tarihli Ankara Anlamas'nn Ek Protokol'nn hkmlerine aykr saylmas gerektiine dair ald ok sayda karar sz konusu. Dier bir deyile: Trklerden vize istemek hem siyasi hem hukuki olarak kabul edilemez. Bu yanl uygulamann devam etmesinin yegane sebebi, AB'nin gelip geri dnmeyecek Trklerin aknna urayacana dair kk derinlere uzanan korku. Ar sac poplizmin son dnemdeki ykselii, AB siyasetilerinin mantk gerei yapmalar gereken eyi yapmasn, yani Trkiye'ye gemite dier lkelere nasl davrandysa yle davranmasn ve Trklerin AB'ye vizesiz seyahat etmesinin nn adm adm amasn olsa olsa daha da zorlatrm durumda. Geen haftalardaki anlama, AB'nin bu ykmlln ge de olsa kabul etmesi anlamna m geliyor? Bu soruya mspet cevap vermek, aceleci davranmak olur. Eski bir ngiliz atasznn de dedii gibi: "Dze kana kadar sevinmeyin." Trkiye henz o noktada deil, iki veya yl zarfnda olmayaca da muhakkak. Asl iyi haber ise u: Trkiye ile ilgili bir AB belgesinde ilk kez 'vize serbestisi' kavram kullanld. Bugne kadar Trkiye'nin normal AB vize rejimine dahil edilmesi gerektiine dair kanlmaz neticeden ark etmek adna baka, mulak ifadeler icat ediliyordu. Bununla birlikte AB'nin geen hafta ortaya koyduu sonular okuduunda insan bu szn ne zaman hayata geirileceini sormaktan kendisini alamyor. "Aamal ve uzun vadeli bir perspektif"ten ve daha da nemlisi, ilerlemenin Trkiye'nin geri kabul ad verilen anlamay etkin ve tutarl uygulamas artna bal olduundan dem vuruluyor. Sz konusu anlama Trkiye'nin AB topraklarna Trkiye'den yasa d yollarla giren ve geri gnderilen Trk vatandalarn ve bilahare nc lke vatandalarn kabul etmesini zorunlu klyor. Geen haftaki anlamann sorunu, bin dereden su getirmesi. AB Trkiye'ye adil davranyormu gibi yapyor, fakat o kadar ok art ne sryor ki, gnlsz ye lkelerin gerek ilerlemeyi yavalatmasn ve sekteye uratmasn fazlasyla kolaylatryor. Dier yandan Trkiye de geri kabul anlamasn ancak AB etkin vize muafiyetleri koymaya baladnda imzalayaca, onaylayaca ve uygulayaca bahanesine snyor. Ankara'daki hakim kanaat u: AB dahilindeki Trkiye yanls mahkeme kararlar eninde sonunda AB'yi daha esnek davranmak zorunda brakacak. Bu yzden Trkiye bekleyip grebilir ve kendi bana die dokunur admlar atmasna gerek yok. Geen haftaki anlamann iyi taraf, ifadenin ve belli bir dzeye kadar, ruh halinin deimi olmas. Avrupa Komisyonu iinde anlamay uygulamakla sorumlu insanlar bunu baarya ulatrma niyetinde. Yine de baz AB lkeleriyle ilgili sorun u: Btn oyalama taktikleri tkendiinde pes edecekler. Bu arada Trk siyasetiler ok fazla sz vermemek konusunda dikkatli olmal ve Trkiye vatandalar da temsilcilerine, anlamann kendi paylarna den ksm uyarnca hareket etmeleri ve Trkiye'nin

her halkarda hayata geirmesi gereken zorunlu nlemleri ertelememeleri konusunda bask yapmal.

The Turkeyfication of Egypt Since the start of the Arab Awakening in the spring of 2011 there has been a lot of talk about Turkey as a model, especially for the populations of Tunisia and Egypt looking for more democracy in a Muslim majority setting. The discussion among analysts and observers focuses on the question of whether the term model is the most appropriate manner of expressing the influence of Turkey on the post-revolutionary Arab world. Most agree that the words example and inspiration probably better reflect the way Turkey is seen by many liberal democrats and reform-minded Islamists in Tunis and Cairo: a secular republic, run by post-Islamists; an economic success story with growing soft-power in the region. Leaving aside Tunisia for the moment, we can indeed witness a series of events in Egypt over the last couple of days that resemble similar developments in Turkey during the last decades. The irony is that we are not talking about steps towards more democracy but about steps back, reinforcing an already strong regime of military and judiciary tutelage. The Turkish model being introduced these days in Egypt is the old version that Turkey itself has been trying to get rid of since 2002. In what many in Egypt and abroad consider to be, in effect, a coup dtat by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), the following decisions were made just before and after the presidential elections of last weekend. They sound all too familiar to anyone who knows the basics of the 1980 coup in Turkey and its aftermath. Parliament, dominated by Islamist parties, was dissolved by the SCC. SCAF published an addendum to the temporary military-authored Constitutional Declaration of March 2011, granting itself more powers and whittling down those of the newly elected president. It is still not clear who that will be, but there is a good chance that the elections were won by Muslim Brotherhood (MB) candidate Mohammed Morsi. SCAF is about to appoint a constituent assembly to draft a full-blown new constitution, taking away this prerogative from the disbanded parliament. A new National Defense Council has been formed, dominated by the military, which nullifies the influence of civilian politicians on all matters related to the armed forces. At the moment of writing this column, an administrative court in Cairo is looking into the possibility of dissolving the MB. This is a toxic mix of elements of the Sept. 12, 1980 and Feb. 28, 1997 military coups in Turkey and efforts by the Turkish Constitutional Court to close down the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2008. I am sure that we will see massive demonstrations in the next couple of days that will bring together the MB with the 2011

Tahrir revolutionaries, two groups that strongly dislike each other but are united in their resistance against the military power grab. Last year, some skeptical analysts were already predicting that the Egyptian army would never voluntarily give up its huge powers and would do its utmost to stick to some sort of Mubarakism without Mubarak. The latest developments seem to prove that point. It is extremely important how the outside world will react to the prospect of continued military authoritarianism. In the past both the US and the EU would in all likelihood protest against the overruling of democratic demands but, in the end, accept military rule in the interests of stability. Nick Witney of the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) has called on the EU to stand up against the military coup this time and stop its participation in the efforts to assemble the billions of dollars in assistance that Egypt needs to pay its bills. Witney: There can be no macroeconomic aid package until a roadmap for a quick transition to democratic, civilian rule has been re-established -- and one that, this time, is not open to military subversion. Similar calls have been made on the Obama administration, which is supporting the Egyptian military with billions of dollars. It will be interesting to see how the Turkish government will react. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and his AKP colleagues know all too well how bad it feels when the military and the judiciary, representing the old regime, are trying to impose their will on democratically elected politicians. There should be no doubt in Ankara that democrats and reformers in Egypt, be they secular or religious, are looking at Turkey to see whether the ruling party will push for the same agenda abroad as it did in Turkey. No military tutelage at home. No military tutelage in the world. Msr'n Trkiyelemesi 2011 ilkbaharnda Arap Uyan'nn balamasndan bu yana Trkiye'nin, bilhassa demokrasi arayndaki Mslman ounluklu Tunus ve Msr halklar iin model tekil edip etmeyeceine dair epey sz sylendi. Analistler ve gzlemciler arasndaki tartma, "model" kavramnn Trkiye'nin devrim sonras Arap dnyas zerindeki etkisine dair en uygun ifade ekli olup olmadna odakland. ou "rnek" ve "ilham" kelimelerinin, Tunus ve Kahire'deki pek ok liberal demokratn ve reform yanls slamcnn Trkiye'ye bak tarzn (post-slamclar tarafndan ynetilen laik bir cumhuriyet, blgede arln giderek hissettiren yumuak gcyle bir ekonomik baar hikyesi) muhtemelen daha iyi yanstt konusunda hemfikir. imdilik Tunus'u bir kenara brakrsak, Msr'da son birka gndr tank olduunuz bir dizi olayn, Trkiye'de on be-yirmi ylda yaanan gelimeleri andrdn grebiliyoruz. in ironik taraf, daha fazla demokrasiye ynelik admlardan deil, zaten gl olan ordu ve yarg vesayeti rejimini destekleyen geriye doru admlardan sz ediyor olmamz. Bugnlerde Msr'da takdim edilen Trkiye modeli, bizzat Trkiye'nin 2002'den beri kurtulmaya alt eski versiyon. Msr'da ve darda pek oklarnn fiilen Silahl Kuvvetler Yksek Konseyi (SKYK) ve Yksek Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin (YAM) gerekletirdii bir darbe olarak grd srete, yani geen hafta sonu dzenlenen devlet bakanl seiminin ncesinde ve sonrasnda, aada sayacam kararlar alnd. Trkiye'deki 1980 asker darbesinin dayanaklarn ve sonrasn bilen herkese ziyadesiyle aina gelen kararlar bunlar... slamc partilerin arlkta olduu meclis YAM tarafndan lavedildi. SKYK, askeriyenin yazd Mart 2011 tarihli geici Anayasa Deklarasyonu'na bir ek yaynlayarak yetki alann geniletti ve

yeni seilen devlet bakannn yetki alann ise daraltt. Henz kesin sonu belli deil, fakat bakanlk seimini ok byk ihtimalle Mslman Kardeler'in (MK) aday Muhammed Mursi kazand. SKYK sfrdan yeni bir anayasa hazrlamas iin bir danma meclisi atamaya hazrlanyor, bylece bu hakk lavedilen meclisten devralm oluyor. Ordunun baskn olduu yeni bir Milli Savunma Konseyi oluturuluyor, bylece sivil siyasetilerin silahl kuvvetlerle ilgili btn meseleler zerinde etkisi ortadan kaldrlyor. Bu yaz yazld sralarda Kahire'deki bir idare mahkemesi, MK'yi lavetmenin yollarn aratryordu. Trkiye'de 12 Eyll 1980 ve 28 ubat 1997'deki asker darbelerin ve Trk Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin 2008'deki AKP'yi kapatma abalarnn oluturduu zehirli karm da buydu. Gelecek gnlerde MK'yi 2011'deki Tahrir devrimcileriyle yan yana getirecek kitlesel gsterilere tank olacamzdan hi kukum yok; bu iki kesim birbirinden hi hazzetmiyor, fakat ordunun iktidar gasbetmesine kar direnite bir araya geliyorlar. Geen yl baz kukucu analistler Msr ordusunun muazzam yetkilerini asla kendi gnlyle teslim etmeyecei ve bir tr Mbareksiz Mbarekilie sarlmak iin elinden geleni ardna koymayacana dair tahminlerde bulunmutu. Son gelimeler, onlar hakl karm grnyor. D dnyann, asker basknn srmesi ihtimaline nasl tepki verecei son derece nemli. Gemite gerek ABD gerekse AB ok byk ihtimalle demokratik taleplerin bastrlmasn protesto eder, fakat neticede "istikrar" uruna asker ynetimi kabul ederdi. Avrupa D likiler Konseyi'nden Nick Witney, bu kez AB'ye asker darbeye kar ayaa kalkmas ve Msr'n borlarn demesi iin ihtiya duyduu milyarlarca dolarlk yardm toplama abalarndan elini eteini ekmesi arsnda bulundu. Witney unu sylyordu: "Demokratik, sivil ynetime hzl gei iin yeniden ve bu kez ordunun yoldan karmasna ak olmayan bir yol haritas belirlenene dek, hibir makroekonomik yardm paketi olamaz." Msr ordusuna milyarlarca dolarlk destek veren Obama ynetiminden de benzer arlar geldi. Trk hkmetinin nasl tepki vereceini grmek de ilgin olacak. Babakan Erdoan ve AKP'deki mesaidalar eski rejimi temsil eden ordu ve yargnn, demokratik yoldan seilmi siyasetilere iradesini dayatma gayretinin ne kadar berbat bir his olduunu gayet iyi biliyor. Ankara'da u konuda hibir kuku ve tereddt olmamal: ster laik ister dinci olsun Msr'daki demokratlar ve reformcular, iktidar partisinin Trkiye'de yrtt politikann aynsn darda da savunup savunmayacan grmek iin Trkiye'ye bakyor. Yurtta asker vesayete hayr, cihanda asker vesayete hayr.

Judicial coup in Egypt After my last column on the dilemma facing Greek voters this weekend, I want to also write about the impossible choice that has to be made by the Egyptian electorate. In the second round of the first post-revolutionary presidential elections, there are two options left -- both highly unattractive to many Egyptians. The first candidate is Ahmed Shafik, the last prime minister under the previous, ousted President Hosni Mubarak, who is seen by liberals, leftists and Islamists as a representative of the old regime who is backed by the army. Many fear that as president Shafik will do everything to destroy the achievements of the revolution that toppled Mubarak last year. The other candidate is Mohamed Mursi, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), whose political wing currently occupies almost half of the seats in the recently elected parliament. His candidacy is controversial because the same liberals and leftists, as well as a big part of the old establishment, are afraid that with the MB in charge of both parliament and the presidency, Egypts future will be dominated by political Islamists who are not known for their tolerance of

other ideologies and lifestyles. So the Egyptians face a dilemma that is as big as the one that Greeks are struggling with: Vote for Shafik and run the risk of returning to a Mubarak-style authoritarianism with the armed forces in an untouchable position, or vote for Mursi and possibly turn Egypt into a country run by uncompromising religious radicals. Last Thursday, Egypts Supreme Constitutional Court, a panel of judges appointed by Mubarak, made two rulings that have added yet another perspective to the elections. A political exclusion law that banned those from the last two Mubarak cabinets from running for office was found to be unconstitutional, thereby saving Shafiks candidacy. Although many observers dont like the military establishments favored candidate, they can live with the courts conclusion. If Shafik had been forced to step down two days before this weekends elections, it would have created chaos and a situation of political limbo would have been extremely difficult to handle. The courts second ruling has seriously derailed the transition process. The electoral law, on which the November-December 2011 parliamentary elections were based, had set aside a third of the seats for candidates who were unaligned with any political parties. In the end, because many of these independents were found to have been backed by parties, the court declared that the parties had subverted the intent of the law and subsequently invalidated the entire elected parliament. It ordered parliament to be dissolved and new elections to be held. Unsurprisingly, the MB, the winner of the parliamentary elections, was furious. Mr. Mursi called on the army, seen by many as the main force behind this controversial decision, not to allow the hyenas of darkness to come back. One of the leaders of last years revolution admitted that he and his colleagues had been naive in trusting the generals. The roots of the ruling elite, he said, as quoted by The New York Times, were much deeper and darker than they initially thought. Foreign observers judged the courts rulings harshly. Nathan Brown, an American specialist on Egypts judiciary who had earlier warned about the malfunctioning of the Egyptian legal system, concluded: What was beginning to look like a coup in slow motion is no longer moving in slow motion. Marc Lynch, an influential analyst and blogger, tweeted: So basically thats it for Egypts epic screw-up of a transition. No parliament, no constitution, [a] divisive presidential election. In an interesting comment, Juan Cole, another informed American blogger, compared the latest developments in Egypt to the events in Turkey on Feb. 28, 1997, when the army overthrew Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and his party because they were considered to be a fundamentalist threat to Turkish secularism. I would also add that there are similarities with the situation in Turkey before 2009 as well, when the Turkish Constitutional Court and the army did their utmost to frustrate efforts by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to reform the country, thereby undermining the power base of both institutions representing the old Turkish elite. I agree with Cole that ultimately, as in Turkey, the Egyptian deep state will not be able to put the genie back in the bottle. What they can do is slow down and thwart the process of democratization and modernization. That is what happened last week.

The Greek dilemma What to do this Sunday when you are an angry Greek citizen, suffering the consequences of one of the worst economic crises in this part of the world? You are supposed to cast your vote in the second national elections in six weeks because the previous one did not produce a workable majority government. On the one hand, you dont want to support the two mainstream parties, the Conservatives and the Socialists, which you hold responsible for the present mess. On the other, you want Greece to stay in the eurozone so you are not sure whether or not to vote for Alexis Tsipras, the radical left leader who has promised to reverse all the harsh austerity measures that the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have forced upon the country. As a reaction, both institutions have underlined that Greece cant have its cake and eat it too. When and if Athens does not stick to the present bailout terms, the country will not receive the billons of euros that are part of this deal and will be forced to leave the euro. The problem for most Greek voters is not only that they will have to choose between emotional self-gratification and rational calculation. When looking for advice among analysts and economic specialists, they will find very unattractive worst-case scenarios for either option. In case reason prevails and the old established parties, with the help of some small ones, manage to gain a majority in the Greek parliament -- which wants to abide by the present agreements -- many observers predict a decade of ongoing budget cuts, economic contraction and rigid supervision by foreign bankers and bureaucrats. Even then, it is far from sure whether Greece will manage to pay off all its debts and be able to structurally reform its economy. So why stay in the eurozone if it means continued hardships with no guarantee for relief in the end? This uncertainty has made many Greeks and a growing number of outside commentators sympathetic to the views of Tsipras, who is topping some of the polls. Leftist economics like his program of total debt cancelation, increased corporate taxes and bank nationalizations. Personally, I think Tsipras proposals have the nostalgic charm of old-fashioned leftist hobby-horses but stand no chance at all of being implemented, not even partially. I believe even Tsipras realizes that. He knows very well that his attraction is not based on the feasibility of his ideas. His biggest trump card is the belief that Greece is too big to fail, and that Germany and the rest of the EU will never pull the plug on Greece because the risk to itself is just too high. In Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution fellow Thomas Wright has convincingly described Tsiprass strategy as a re-run of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the nuclear policy of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Because both countries had nuclear weapons in their hands, neither side would activate them because they knew it could lead to their own destruction. In this analogy, exit from the euro is the nuclear weapon that Germany is never going to use since it realizes that it could lead to an economic cataclysm that would drag everyone else down. Therefore, Tsipras thinks he can do everything he wants -- short of exit from the euro. I agree with Wright that Tsipras is making a mistake by thinking there are no limits and Germany will accept everything he asks for to prevent a disorderly Greek exit. During the last couple of months, preparations for a Grexit have been made in Berlin and Brussels. Serious and influential economists such as Daniel Gros of the Centre for European Policy Studies have already indicated that such an exit is feasible and that after a decade of adjustment, Greece will even be able to pay its

debts. On top of that, in the midst of severe budget cuts at home, political leaders and huge majorities among the electorate in most European countries are simply not willing to be blackmailed into a situation in which they have to keep on paying for Greeks when they are reluctant to do their bit to get out of this crisis. My advice to the puzzled Greek voter: Dont bet on the revolutionary charisma of Tsipras and his MAD strategy. The EU is willing to renegotiate on some of the conditions of the Greek bailout deal that have proven to be counter-productive. Not to give Greece a blank check.

Now were talking Finally, last week the leaders of the two main parties in Parliament met to discuss the biggest problem facing this country: the Kurdish question. Republican Peoples Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kldarolu took the initiative and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, responded positively and invited the head of the main opposition party for a talk at the AKP headquarters. For European observers with little knowledge of Turkish politics, this seems to be the most logical thing to happen. In most parliamentary democracies, in situations like this, with a persistent problem that keeps occupying the national agenda but for which none of the political parties has been able to find a lasting solution, it is obvious that the opposition will try to force the government to be more active and the ruling party will react favorably to these initiatives because they know they need to create a broad consensus to break the deadlock. Not so in Turkey. At least not until last week. We could make a long list of previous attempts to come up with a solution for the Kurdish question by then ruling parties that were frustrated and fatally undermined by the then opposition. The latest example being the Kurdish initiative of the AKP in 2009 that was lambasted by then CHP leader Deniz Baykal as an effort to split the country and give in to terrorist demands. Because the AKP was not courageous enough to carry on with the plans, another possibility to get rid of Turkish national problem number one was missed. This time around, things seem to have changed, and Turkeys political actors are performing in a way that looks familiar to everyone accustomed to democratic systems based on finding compromises among key players. Lets hope President Abdullah Gl is right when he called the meeting between Kldarolu and Erdoan proof that Turkey is a country that is capable of solving its problems through consensus. The reactions of most commentators were positive, and many hope that, at last, a new and modernized Turkey is able to unite across ideological borders. In order for that to happen though, I suggest that all the main players involved make some extra efforts. CHP leader Kldarolu owes everybody an explanation for the timing and especially the reasons behind his initiative. His proposal is strong on general considerations and procedures but does not mention any concrete measures. Three years ago his predecessor opposed all elements of a likely resolution. Has the CHP changed its opinion on these basics, and if yes,

why? Are there no longer any red lines? These kinds of clarifications are necessary at the start of the process to prevent unpleasant surprises during undoubtedly difficult and sensitive talks among political opponents. Prime Minister Erdoan should be clearer on his willingness to return to the kind of reforms that seem to have been deleted from his nationalist-conservative agenda since the last elections. On the Kurdish question, the AKP has resorted to old style security-based policies like massive arrests of Kurdish activists, local politicians and journalists. In order to convince skeptical Kurdish politicians to join the initiative, the ruling party should do its utmost to at least suspend the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) operations. If nothing changes on the ground, the Social Consensus Commission, which has been suggested, will soon look like a cover-up for unchanged repressive policies that will make a final solution even more difficult. Both the CHP and the AKP should be clear that they will not allow their plans to be hijacked by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Looking for consensus is fine and worthy of praise, but it is an illusion to think that a party based on uncompromising resistance against any substantial reform will all of a sudden radically change its position. For understandable reasons, the MHP wont, and therefore, they should not be put in a position to frustrate this potential breakthrough. The same applies, by the way, for the parliamentary commission looking for a consensus on a new constitution. It is easy to be cynical about last weeks meeting and see it as a clever but unsubstantiated move by the CHP to outmaneuver the MHP in the constitutional process and an easy escape for the prime minister from the Uludere disaster he got himself into. The more positive scenario is that both the CHP and the AKP have understood that Turkey has come to a point where both parties need to act to prevent the country from being stuck with a problem that, if kept unresolved, will stop any further democratic progress.

Will Germany have the upper hand? This is not an article about the ongoing euro crisis in which Germany plays a pivotal role. There is no doubt in anybody's mind that Berlin will dominate the drafting of new plans to regain the confidence of financial markets and European citizens and save, if not the Greek, at least the Spanish economy from going bankrupt. At the moment, the EU institutions in Brussels are working on what seem to be ambitious plans to further coordinate the financial and economic policies of the eurozone countries. At the end of the month, EU leaders will have to decide whether or not they agree with these new integration steps that are necessary to save the euro but are not very popular with large parts of their electorate. Nothing will be adopted then that does not have the blessing of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. So this column is not about Germany's economic and political hegemony, loathed by some but accepted by all. It is about the German national football team. In the 1980s and 1990s German soccer dominated Europe and the rest of the world. West Germany won the European Championships in 1980, a united Germany won the World Cup in 1990 and again beat all European competitors in 1996. In between, the Mannschaft, as the team is called at home and known abroad, ended in second place in three other

tournaments. Their successes did not make the German football team very popular. Their performance was never spectacular but based on discipline, hard work, good organization and the ability never to give up. Some players were outstanding and sympathetic like Jrgen Klinsmann, but many other German stars like Lothar Matthus and Andreas Mller were seen as arrogant posers. The rest of Europe grudgingly accepted German superiority but deep down hated their efficiency. Much like the present appreciation of Merkel and her preference for austerity measures. Since 1996 the antipathy towards the German national team has slowly died down, but that was mainly due to the fact that the Germans were not as successful anymore. They won silver medals in 2002 and 2008 but failed to win any major title. During the World Cup in South Africa in 2010, one could see for the first time some admiration for what seems to be an exciting new generation of football players that does not resemble their unappealing predecessors. In the semifinals, Spain proved to be too big an obstacle, but their victory over Lionel Messi's Argentina in the quarterfinals was impressive and showed the rest of the world that these days German football can be both effective and attractive. Now, in the run-up to the European Championships that kick off this Friday, the appreciation for the German national squad has reached new heights. According to most analysts and bookmakers, Germany, together with Spain and the Netherlands, is one of the favorites to win the title. For me, they are the number one candidate. The Spaniards are missing some key players as a result of injuries (Carles Puyol and David Villa), while others are tired after a long season for Barcelona and Real Madrid and lack the ultimate motivation to win this time after they won both the European and the World Cup in 2008 and 2010. The Dutch, I am afraid, are too vulnerable in defense, and some of their attacking stars (Wesley Sneijder, Arjen Robben) are not in perfect shape as they were two years ago. But the role of favorites does not only belong to the Germans because the others will probably fail. German coach Joachim Lw has managed to introduce a style of playing that is based on an inviting combination of technical and tactical skills, not coincidentally personified by players such as Mesut zil, Sami Khedira and Jrome Boateng. All three new Germans, not only because of their personal family background but also for their ability to add appeal and allure to the old German qualities of physical strength and a winner's mentality. In a special edition on the German national team last weekend, the liberal Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad made the point that we should learn not to hate but to enjoy German soccer. A few years ago such an appeal would have been considered inappropriate and undeserved. Now many Europeans have to admit that they are looking forward to the matches of zil and his colleagues. Times have changed. Maybe Merkel could learn from the soccer experience and add some charm and unpredictability to her performance. Or is that asking too much?

Irresponsible polarization on abortion

I am sure Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan won himself an honorable mention last week in the Handbook on the Best Ways to Frustrate a Debate when he likened abortion to murder and claimed that every abortion is an Uludere. In this column I do not want to go into the motives behind this extraordinary emotional and blunt outburst, although I tend to agree with observers like Yavuz Baydar who consider the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leaders remarks on abortion as part of a wider shift away from democratic conservatism towards a poisonous nationalist conservatism. I also do not want to spend too many words on the Uludere comparison, which I find extremely offensive and insensitive. I want to focus on Erdoans effort to make abortion a controversial issue in Turkey. Nobody should be surprised that the leader of a conservative party criticizes abortion. In many countries, including those with a liberal law on abortion, conservative or Christian Democrat parties have always tried to water down or block legislation that would give women the power to decide. Most of the time, these attempts focus on reducing the time limit or on introducing mechanisms that force women to reconsider their choice. In countries like Ireland, Portugal, Malta and Poland abortion is illegal or only permitted in exceptional cases. Even in the Netherlands, considered to be one of the most liberal countries on this issue, laws to regulate abortion have without exception been controversial, and anti-abortion politicians have often succeeded in amending relevant regulations. One example comes from the Netherlands, where abortion performed by a certified clinic or hospital is allowed at any point between conception and viability. Every woman who wants to have an abortion is obliged to think again for five days. This waiting period was a clear conservative demand intended to prevent rash decisions and allow alternative options to be taken into account. Other countries have introduced similar obstacles that limit the full and immediate power of women to decide. Whether one agrees with these restrictions or not, they were the result of long and often heated discussions in which all arguments were presented and pro-life and pro-choice supporters had a chance to convince those looking for a balanced approach on such a sensitive topic. One can forget about such a sensible and level-headed debate in Turkey after the prime minister basically accused those who do not agree with him of being murderers. It is the best way to eliminate any discussion before it has even started. Erdoans rude words also showed his lack of interest in the research done into the effects of different abortion policies. A recent publication, for instance, showed that while abortion in the Netherlands is legal, safe, available and free, it is also extremely rare compared to other countries. According to the authors, the explanation for the low abortion rate is the legal sale of contraceptives and the availability of affordable contraceptive pills. They conclude, When contraceptives are legal, women are less likely to experience a pregnancy and less likely to experience their pregnancy as unintended. Other reports make it clear why the words of the prime minister were not only harmful but also irresponsible. Research by the World Health Organization (WHO) shows that almost half of all abortions worldwide take place in unsafe conditions and that one in eight women who undergoes an unsafe abortion dies. By declaring abortion almost totally illegal, the government is pushing thousands of girls and women into backstreet abortions. Rich women will have the option to go abroad and have a safe abortion. Poor women wont have that choice and will again start jumping from stairs or resorting to knitting needles. The leader of a civilized nation should think twice before he knowingly promotes such lethal policies. The tragedy of Erdoans remarks on abortion, Cesarean births and the need for Turkish women to have at least three

children is that he is trying to fight the consequences of his own successful economic policies. As in all other countries, families in Turkey who are better off tend to have fewer children. Women who are better educated want to decide for themselves how many children they will have. Trying to stop these trends is picking a fight that will cause serious harm but one which the AKP leader in the end is never going to win. His harsh remarks may be good for political profiling, but they are not going to change inevitable realities in the new Turkey he himself has created.

EU: No big bang but a messy compromise The ongoing political uncertainty in Greece, the alarming economic news that keeps pouring out of Spain and the inability of the key players in Europe to unite behind a common approach have led to a profound debate among academic analysts and journalistic observers about the future of the European Union. As the cover story of The Economist put it last week: Is the EU heading for break-up or a super state? As I explained in my previous column, all these questions about the fundamental challenges faced by the EU touch upon current debates among globalization and European integration specialists. Many agree with the hypothesis that the EU has come to a point where it will have to choose between democracy, further integration and national sovereignty. According to the advocates of this political trilemma theory, the EU cant have it all. It can combine two of the three but never have all three simultaneously and in full. In the terms of The Economist: Break-up would mean the end of the integration process and would restore the classic superiority of the nation state and national democracy. On the other hand, a European super state would mean full integration with the accompanying transfer of democratic checks and balances to the European level at the expense of the sovereignty and institutions of the nation state. Putting options forward in such a blunt manner makes good headlines of course and it stimulates easy answers by politicians who seek to profit from alarmist calls to make a quick and decisive decision. In several European countries we can witness the rise of populist parties, on the right and on the left, that try to combine their old hostility towards Islam and migration with updated strong criticism of the EU and further integration. They want to return to the strong and protective nation state and do not believe that democracy can work on a supranational level. Their political opponents consist of the old conservative and social democratic parties which were traditionally staunchly pro-European, and modern liberal and green parties that have accepted the need for further integration and are willing to experiment with democracy beyond the nation state. The problem for the anti-populists is that their answers, at least for the moment, are not very convincing. As Stefan Lehne, former European top diplomat and now visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, put it: The pro-Europeans still have not found the right concepts to save the euro without losing the European electorate. As The Economist itself concluded, the options are not black and white and the best solution will probably be situated in the vast gray area in between. The influential weekly proposed a sort of federalism lite to save the euro that includes some forms of further integration like a eurozone-wide system of bank supervision and a limited mutualization of debt. It explicitly argued against transferring everything to the EU level. In an interesting blog, US-based Professor Peter Lindseth comes to a similar conclusion. He agrees with those who foresee neither a break-up nor a firm step in the direction of fully fledged integration, but expect the EU to muddle through. A majority of Europeans simply do not want to give up on the EU or a common currency but they are also skeptical about giving too

much power to Brussels and leaving all democratic control to the European Parliament. In Lindseths words: No doubt the balance between the functional demands of integration and the national forms of democracy will be, as it always has been, a difficult one to strike. But striking that balance is a necessary consequence of the significant, but still ultimately limited, power of the European idea in relation to ideas of democracy that, for better or worse, remain wedded to the nation state. In my words: We are waiting for European leaders to come up with a solution to the present euro crisis that recognizes the inevitables: 1. The wish to save the euro and therefore the need for further, limited or otherwise, integration on economic and fiscal issues. 2. The desire to uphold nation state sovereignty in as many other policy fields as possible. 3. The necessity to develop a new mix of national and supranational forms of democracy that wins over skeptical European citizens and establishes effective checks and balances at the same time. In other words, dont believe the prophets of the final choice and prepare for a messy European compromise. That is the essence of the EU, whether some academics or populists like it or not.

Europe cant have it all. Or can it? The front-page headline of a leading Dutch newspaper said it all last week: Parliament caught in between crisis and electorate. The cover story referred to a debate in the Dutch parliament on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the new financial firewall that should protect the eurozone from July 1 onwards by allocating 500 billion euro for the future rescue of struggling economies. Supporters of the ESM argued that the Dutch parliament basically had no choice and should vote in favor in order to save the euro. Right-wing and left-wing populists strongly opposed the new fund because they are convinced that the contribution of the Netherlands to the eurozone trust is a waste of billions of taxpayers money. Moreover, they hate the loss of national sovereignty involved because the Netherlands will lose its veto on some crucial spending decisions. Some years ago, the Eurosceptics would represent between 10 and 20 percent of the electorate. These days, almost 40 percent of the parliamentarians will vote against the ESM and opinion polls show that their views are shared by a majority of the Dutch voters. Combined with the situation in Greece where a majority of the electorate supports parties that are willing to put the countrys membership of the eurozone at serious risk, the mood in several EU member states seems to swing against the solutions that many citizens feel are forced upon them. They are frustrated, as The Economist brilliantly put it, with a crisis they didnt create and austerity they dont want. A growing number of commentators all over Europe have labeled the booming aversion to the plans to rescue the euro a revolt of the European citizens against the EU. Many academics familiar with the literature on globalization and European integration are not surprised at all. Some of them have been predicting this crisis for a long time. They refer to the so-called political trilemma theory that was popularized by Turkish economist Dani Rodrik. Most readers of this newspaper probably know Rodrik as a slightly paranoid critic of the

Glen movement, but the respected Harvard professor is known outside Turkey for his influential interventions in the international debate on globalization. In his latest book, The Globalization Paradox, Rodrik claims that we cannot have unrestricted globalization, democracy and national self-determination all at once. If we want hyperglobalization and democracy, we need to give up on the nation state. If we must keep the nation state and want hyperglobalization too, then we must forget about democracy. And if we want to combine democracy with the nation state, then it is bye-bye deep globalization. His political trilemma theory has become a very popular tool to analyze the effects of globalization. Some EU specialists have copied Rodriks approach and replaced hyperglobalization with European economic integration. They have been making the point for some time now: In Europe, too, you cant have it all. Either you give up on further integration to save national sovereignty and nation-based democracy as we know it. Or, if you want to push forward with additional European competences, there are two options: You have to develop new forms of democracy on a European level and accept that the nation state will lose significance or you stick to the national governments as key players in Europe to the detriment of national and European parliamentary democracy. According to these academics, what we are witnessing in Europe is a realignment of politics along new lines, with the EU as the dividing issue. On the one hand, we see parties that accept the inevitability of further economic integration and the diminished role of the nation state and are willing to experiment with democracy on a supra-national level. On the other hand, we see the rise of populist parties that defend national sovereignty and democracy and are willing to put a hold on a further transfer of power to the EU. Are these observations correct? Are Rodrik and his European disciples right when they claim that, one way or the other, saving the euro through closer cooperation is not compatible with full democracy and national sovereignty old style? Does Europe have to make a choice between the three key concepts? Or are European politicians capable of dealing with this trilemma in ways that dont fit in neat theoretical concepts? Are typical European compromises available that can prove both the populists and the academics wrong? More about that in my next column.

Vote like an Egyptian On Thursday night we will finally know who the Egyptians prefer as their new president and successor to the ousted Hosni Mubarak. That's to say, we will find out which two candidates will make it to the second round on June 16 and 17 because, according to opinion polls, no candidate will get the required majority in the first round. The prediction that nobody will pass the 50 percent hurdle this week is the only point on which all polls agree. For the rest, there is a remarkable divergence among pollsters on which presidential candidate is doing OK and which one is not. It reflects the lack of polling experience in a country where, as the Egypt Independent put it, over the past 60 years, the only use for public opinion polling ahead of presidential elections would have been to predict how high in the ninetieth percentile the incumbent's win would be. Those days are definitively over. Still, many flaws can be found in the methodology used by local institutions conducting polls in Egypt. Combined with a highly volatile public opinion that shifts from one preference to another within a couple of days, it remains quite a challenge to predict who is going to win. Most polls indicate a successful outcome for Amr Moussa, a former foreign minister and Arab League chief, and Abdel

Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who was expelled from the Brotherhood after he decided to run for president on his own. These two men appeared last week in an unprecedented television debate that continued for hours, and although it did not bring a clear advantage to either of them, it did show millions of Egyptians that things have changed and that discussions can be held out in the open. The dark horses in this race seem to be Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister under Mubarak, and the official Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi, who lacks charisma but can profit from the movement's formidable election machinery. For sure, the most intriguing candidate is Aboul Fotouh. He presents himself as a liberal Islamist who has moved away from the Muslim Brotherhood's dominant conservative strand and claims he can satisfy the needs of both pious Muslims and young liberals. He is supported not only by people like Google executive Wael Ghonim, one of the figureheads of the antiMubarak revolution last year, but also by hard-line Salafi groups. His political adviser is a Marxist professor, his media adviser a liberal journalist and his economic adviser a Christian academic. In a sympathetic portrait, Brookings fellow Shadi Hamid called him A Man for All Seasons, backed by liberals who think he is more liberal than he actually is and conservatives who hope he's more conservative than he sometimes appears to be. Others, not convinced by his big-tent approach, have accused Aboul Fotouh of trying to be all things to all people. As informed American blogger Juan Cole put it, speaking like a fundamentalist to the Salafis and like a liberal to the Coptic Christians and secularists. It is surprising to see how quickly the huge appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood has dwindled. In the parliamentary elections a few months ago they took almost half of the seats. Now many Egyptians are disappointed with their performance in parliament and with their tactics that are seen as shifty and secretive. There is a widespread sentiment that it would not be wise to give the Muslim Brotherhood the control of both the presidency and parliament. This remarkable shift is an indication of the fact that the support for the Muslim Brotherhood in December was not for ideological or religious reasons but simply because the Brotherhood was better organized and untainted by corruption. In this presidential election many voters are looking for other qualities like personal charisma and the ability to pursue an autonomous political line. I agree with observers like Arab and Turkey political expert Steven Cook, who consider these changing calculations as a sign of growing political maturity in Egypt. The country is still in the middle of a messy transition. At the same time, it is also experiencing a more open political environment in which neither the army nor the Muslim Brotherhood are able to impose their worldview on Egyptian society. As some of you probably guessed, the headline of this column refers to the 1986 hit single Walk Like an Egyptian by The Bangles. The song was written after seeing people on a ferry walking awkwardly to keep their balance, which reminded the writer of figures in ancient Egyptian reliefs. This week, the Egyptians are trying to find a new political balance. Let's see where their walk leads them to this time.

Are you serious: more Europe? In the run-up to new Greek elections on June 17 and with Greek citizens withdrawing billions of euros from their domestic

bank accounts and transferring them abroad, many commentators have started a new round of speculation on the possibility off a Greek exit from the eurozone. The scenario seems inevitable when the elections again produce a parliamentary majority that refuses to implement the bailout deal that was concluded by the previous Greek government. If Greece is not willing to live up to its side of the bargain, it seems likely that the EU and the IMF will do the same and will stop transferring money to Athens. Very soon the Greek state would go bankrupt, and chaos would reign. Dont be surprised to see this nightmare script being highlighted by European politicians and analysts in the next couple of weeks, if only to put pressure on the Greek electorate to change preferences and give their vote to parties that are willing to stick to the deal. If and when the Greeks decide to defy all the warnings and threats and will be forced to reintroduce the drachma, observers strongly disagree on the consequences of this financial and political shock for the rest of the eurozone and the EU. Some believe the other euro countries are well prepared, and the damage can still be estimated. Others are afraid that Spain and Italy will be next. All the new instruments and rescue funds would not be sufficient to cope with the financial fall out of a crisis in these two main European economies. On top of that, many fear that a monetary meltdown will be the beginning of the end for the EU in its present form. With so many doomsday scenarios being contemplated, it was heartening to hear some strong deviant voices last week. First, Wolfgang Schuble, Germanys finance minister, made a passionate plea for closer European integration. Schuble is known for his pro-European views, and he used the occasion of the prestigious Charlemagne Prize award ceremony to live up to his reputation. He is considered to be the most important minister in Angela Merkels government, an experienced insider in Berlin and Brussels and the architect behind many of the current efforts to save the euro. According to Schuble, the financial crisis proves that the existence of a common currency requires a much greater pooling of important parts of economic and financial policy by the eurozone states. We must create a political union now, he said. At the same time, We must strengthen the democratic legitimacy of Europe. One way of doing so, would be to give a face to European political union with a directly elected EU president. Candidates would be presented by all the parties represented in the European Parliament. Arguing against the skepticism that seems to be overtaking Europe, he said, We must have the ambition to do more than simply protect the status quo. The same day, two other old European hands came to the same conclusion. Kemal Dervi and Javier Solana share a long history of holding key positions in leading European and global institutions. Both work now at Brookings, the most influential American think tank. In a long article that will be published shortly in Europes World, they present a solution for the Greek crisis that would tackle the acute problems but would also lead to a structural adjustment within the eurozone that should prevent similar calamities in the future. Dervi and Solana add to their recipe for recovery the same ingredient as Schuble did in his speech: the need for more integration and harmonization, particularly in fiscal policies and financial sector supervision and regulation. They realize that further European integration may not be very popular because it means giving up power in matters close to the core of the nation state. That will not be a trivial exercise and is why Europe is at the crossroads. Either it moves ahead with greater sharing of sovereignty, or it may well disintegrate. Key to success is that this sharing has to take place through transfers of sovereignty to accountable institutions. That means, according to the authors, strengthening common European structures and creating a decision making process that is not dominated by one of two

powerful member states. Schuble, Dervi and Solana are right: The EU is and will continue to be an experiment which, as with all experiments, entails a degree of uncertainty. Lets hope that these old foxes manage to convince a hesitant European population that the future needs more Europe and not less.

The discouraging sight of football wars Ever since childhood I have been a big football fan. I was 12 years old when Feyenoord won the European Cup, the predecessor of the Champions League, on May 6, 1970, my sister's birthday. Since then I have been a passionate supporter of the team from Rotterdam. That was not always easy, to put it mildly. During the last four decades, Feyenoord was outshone by archrivals Ajax and PSV Eindhoven. Changing club allegiance, though, has never been an option. Once a Feyenoord supporter, always a Feyenoord supporter. Ten years ago, in May 2002, that unconditional backing was finally rewarded when Feyenoord won the UEFA Cup, mainly because of the leadership and free kicks of Pierre van Hooijdonk. After 2002, a dark period of sportive and financial decay set in, culminating in a humiliating 10th place in last year's Dutch league. This season's second place was therefore a gift from heaven. After the last away game, 30,000 diehard fans came to the Feyenoord stadium to welcome their heroes and celebrated the number two position as if the team had won the championship. How different was the reaction to the second place of my other favorite team, Fenerbahe. Since Pierre van Hooijdonk switched from Feyenoord to Fenerbahe, I have been a loyal supporter of the Kadky team. Over the years, I was lucky to witness some great games against Galatasaray at the kr Saracolu Stadium, and I will never forget the 2-1 victory over Chelsea in the quarterfinals of the Champions League in 2008. Fenerbahe did much better than Feyenoord over the last couple of years but got into trouble because of some infamous off-pitch events. The club is the focal point of the ongoing match-fixing scandal and Chairman Aziz Yldrm is still in prison pending trial. Fenerbahe was forced to withdraw from this season's Champions League and as a result had to sell some of its best players, like Diego Lugano, Andre Santos and Mamadou Niang. Taking all these obstacles into consideration, I think the team performed optimally and was only outstripped, not surprisingly, by Galatasaray, which profited from its non-implication in the match-fixing case and, especially, from the arrival of legendary coach Fatih Terim and crucial players such as Fernando Muslera, Seluk nan, Emmanuel Eboue and Johan Elmander. I know it's always difficult to concede defeat, but sometimes you have to. This season, Galatasaray, overall, was the better team and simply deserved to win the title. For that reason I was deeply saddened and ashamed to see the supporters of my team creating such incredible chaos and havoc after the final match last Saturday. We could talk for hours about the reasons behind their misbehavior: the frustration with the court case, the incarceration of Aziz Yldrm and the clashes with the police on trial days. These may all be true, but none of them presents any excuse for the objectionable acts that we witnessed: throwing stadium chairs and petrol bombs at the police. No football club is served by such violent behavior of its fans, and therefore I was happy to see that one day later Fenerbahe congratulated Galatasaray with their 18th league title and

condemned the post-match riots. Putting the blame on irresponsible fans is one thing. But there are at least two other culprits that should learn the lessons from what happened in and around the stadium. One is the Turkish Football Federation (TFF). It gave in to commercial pressures to organize this Super Final, an experiment that failed miserably and made the incomprehensible mistake of organizing the handing of the league trophy to the Galatasaray team on the pitch of the Fenerbahe stadium. That was an incitement that would have caused serious problems in every country where two teams have such a record of eternal enmity. Finally, the police showed again that they are better in crowd provocation than in crowd control. Before and after the match, they used pepper spray as if it was some new brand of eau de toilette. Even more disconcerting is the fact that despite being caught on camera, most of the violent perpetrators will get away with their despicable behavior. In the UK or the Netherlands, these hooligans would be banned for life and would never be able to enter a stadium again. In Turkey, breaking the rules by so-called football fans seems to have no consequences. It is sad to see such a beautiful sport damaged by a combination of fanaticism, commercial blinding and the incompetence of security officials.

Being proud of your roots When I was asked to deliver one of the keynote addresses at the opening of the European Weekend School (EWS) last Thursday, I had to think twice. The EWS is an international certificate program that is organized annually by the Center for European Studies Students Forum at Boazii University. It is an occasion for students from Turkey and other European countries to meet and discuss issues that are related to European integration. This years topic was EUs Chronic Dilemma: Migration. A whole range of knowledgeable academics and policy makers had been asked to present their views. Which point should I make in my kickoff speech? It was not difficult to find lots of interesting, often repulsive, articles on the scapegoating of migrants by right-wing populists in Europe. With pleasure I read a book called Who says its a failure? on the gap between the perception of a failed integration of migrants in the Netherlands and the reality of thousands of successful new Dutch citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent. After a while, I decided that what I wanted to communicate to the students at Boazii should not be based solely on articles and books or my experiences as a member of the European Parliament. Of course, over the years these had helped to deepen and nuance my views. But the fundamentals were shaped much earlier, during my years at primary school in a small city in the south of the Netherlands. A few years before I was born, my parents moved from one part of the Netherlands to another. No big deal except for the fact that all of a sudden they found themselves being a religious minority. Both of my parents were born and raised as

Protestants in a small village. They spoke with a very particular Dutch accent that was not understood in other parts of the country. Because my father could get a job there, they moved to a city where the majority was Catholic and could only smile about their strange dialect. It is hard to imagine now but in those days, the mid 1950s, Protestants and Catholics lived their own separate lives within well-defined borders. Each had their own schools, trade union and political party. Shopping was done at a grocery store of a co-religionist, marriages between people of different beliefs hardly happened. From cradle to grave, the life of all believers was organized in such a way that they never had to mix with fellow countrymen who went to another church. It was therefore logical that my parents send me to the only Protestant school on the other side of town despite the fact that there were plenty of other, Catholic schools closer to our house. From day one, my father, a pious but practical man, made it clear what the basics were: My education would be within the Protestant pillar of society, but my future would most probably be in the wider world. For that reason, I was allowed to cross the sectarian line and make friends with everybody, Protestant and Catholic. At home I could speak my parents dialect, but on the street and at school I should speak impeccable Dutch because that would make it easier to climb the social ladder. There was one thing my father kept reminding me and my sister of: Go out in the big world, but never forget where you came from. Be proud of your roots and never be afraid to speak out your opinion even if you are in a minority position. Mind you, this was long before social scientists started the debate on integration and assimilation. My parents clearly pushed the first, but strongly objected to the second. In many ways, my private experiences cannot be compared with the often-traumatic migration of millions to a far away country they dont know. Still, I am sure that, later in life, the basics of my youth made me understand better the preference of migrants, while trying to integrate in Dutch society, to stick to their national traditions and their language. I have never understood the growing obsession among native Dutch with giving up ones cultural and linguistic heritage as the only way for migrants to become real citizens. Trying to cope with migration has never been easy. Not in Turkey, not in Europe. Neither for the ones who moved, nor for the ones who were forced to live with the newcomers. But it helps if early on someone tells you about the importance of sticking to your roots. I hope the students got the message.

Are the extremists taking over Europe? After the elections in France and Greece, some commentators have come to the conclusion that the center of political gravity in Europe is shifting to the extremes, on the right and on the left. One of the explanations for this worrisome trend is the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment. On Al Jazeeras website, Muhammad Abdul Bari, the former secretary-general of the Muslim Council of Britain, called Islamophobia Europes new political disease and observed that anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and extreme-right parties seemed to be cashing in on economic

hardship and austerity measures. He also expressed his fear that in the future anti-Muslim bigotry will move closer to the mainstream. In The Washington Post, renowned columnist Anne Applebaum wrote that in each of the recent elections in Europe the center was defeated by the extremes. Applebaum said: But as I look across Europe, I dont know what to call the wave of discontent, as most of the parties on the outlying right or left now have more in common with one another than they do with anyone in the center. Generally speaking, they are anti-European, anti-globalization and anti-immigration. Above all, they are anti-austerity: they hate the budget cuts that they believe were imposed on their national governments by outsiders in the international bond market and by their own membership in the euro zone. Let me explain why I think many of these comments got it wrong. It is definitively true that we have witnessed some very alarming election results, especially in Greece. I am personally disgusted by the entry into the Greek parliament of an openly fascist party, Golden Dawn, which uses Nazi symbols, wants to kick out migrants from Greece and has been involved in violent clashes. They received 7 percent of the vote. The real winners of the Greek elections were the radical-left parties that got more than 25 percent. One should be careful not to put all these winners in one big extremist bowl. Both the fascists and the leftists oppose the bailout plans dictated by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But there the similarities stop. The problem with the leftists is not their bashing of the two mainstream parties that got Greece into this mess or their aversion to the corruption in both center parties. They are correct on these points. The difficulty is that the radical left is not willing to find a way out of the present problems, by for instance coming up with adjustments to the austerity plans that could be accepted by the rest of the EU. The election of Franois Hollande in France, known for his support of refocusing the European plans on economic growth, could be helpful but only if the Greeks manage to find a compromise among themselves that satisfies the protesters but does not ruin Greeces claims to outside help. Back to the rise of Islamophobia in Europe. It is undeniably true that in the last couple of years 15 to 20 percent of the electorate in several European countries has voted for populist radical-right parties that regularly resort to Islam-bashing. The latest example being the 18 percent vote for the rejuvenated Front National of Marine Le Pen in the first round of the French presidential elections. But it is interesting to see that Islamophobia eventually turned out to be a losing ticket in these elections. In the run-up to last Sundays second round, Nicolas Sarkozy tried to attract these extremist voters by pandering to the discourse of Le Pen, copying her anti-immigrant rhetoric and blaming the Socialists for being soft on Muslim fundamentalism. As a result, centrist Franois Bayrou, who got 9 percent in the first round, announced that he was going to vote for Hollande, the socialist contender, because he hated Sarkozys betrayal of traditional French values. It was probably this 3-4 percent represented by part of the moderate Bayrou electorate that delivered victory to Hollande. As American commentator Juan Cole put it on his website Informed Comment: Sarkozy, by embracing the noxious language of hatred of immigrants and fear-mongering about secular Socialists spreading Muslim theocracy in the villages of France, failed to convince the hard right to vote for him but managed to alienate the center. Most important lessons: 1. Think twice before equating the radical right and left. They do have some things in common but differ on many other points, 2. Islamophobia is attractive to a minority of the European electorate but the majority rejects it

Angry French and Greek voters This weekend, much of the political focus in Europe will be on Paris and Athens. In France, voters will head to the polls for the second round of presidential elections. Socialist contender Francois Hollande won the first round, and all polls suggest that he will remain ahead of the incumbent president, Nicolas Sarkozy, and seal a victory on Sunday. In Greece, we are in for a less predictable outcome. Many Greek voters are extremely angry with the two big parties, the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), that have dominated Greek politics for decades. Both parties reluctantly support the highly unpopular harsh austerity measures dictated by the EU. Furious Greeks want to punish the traditional politicians they hold responsible for the present economic and social crisis and seem to be inclined to turn to small parties that reject the European bailout. The big question is whether the ND or the socialist PASOK will manage to win enough seats to govern without having to rely on one of the smaller parties. In European capitals, many fear a scenario in which the elections will not produce a workable majority that will help Greece remain inside the eurozone. A blocked Greek parliament that rejects the austerity program would create a chaotic situation that could trigger a wider crisis in Europe and reopen the debate on the viability of the common currency. But even if this worst case scenario is avoided, many analysts have started to speculate on the impact of a new French president and a fragile Greek government on the rest of Europe. During the election campaign, Hollande has made it very clear that he wants to renegotiate the fiscal treaty that was agreed by 25 European governments. ND leader Antonis Samaras also wants changes to the present bailout plans, and PASOKs Evangelos Venizelos has proposed to spread the pain over three years instead of two. The French and Greek push for changes to the tough austerity measures comes on top of Spanish requests for more flexibility in the face of a disastrous economic recession and an unemployment rate of 25 percent. According to EU observers, European electorates, one by one, are revolting against a policy that is seen as counterproductive. Forced to cut budgets and raise taxes, eurozone economies are pushed into a downward spiral that produces more deficits and debts and leads to negative growth. How long can Berlin and Brussels, seen as the two main driving forces behind the disliked and controversial policies, continue to force others to stick to these plans? As Mr. Hollande put it bluntly, Its not for Germany to decide for the rest of Europe. It seems the German government and several European institutions have gotten the message that they have to come up with additional proposals that put the emphasis on economic growth. Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, has already called for a growth pact in parallel to the fiscal pact and Herman van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, wants to convene an extra meeting of the EU member states shortly to discuss the best ways to boost growth. Even Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, has changed tone and has stressed that Europe needs both budgetary discipline and measures to promote jobs and growth. Will it be enough to bring Mr. Hollande on board and prevent him from seeking renegotiation of the fiscal treaty? Will the new European enthusiasm for growth promotion be able to water down the anti-Europeanism in Greece and will it help the Spaniards to survive? Much will depend on what exactly the new additional plans will entail. As The Economist put it, Calling for growth is like advocating world peace: Everybody agrees that it is a good thing, but nobody agrees how to do it. Does it mean, as Mr. Draghi and Mrs. Merkel have suggested, making labor markets more flexible, encouraging entrepreneurship and removing

barriers to the EUs single market? Or is Mr. Hollande right when he calls for common European project bonds to finance infrastructure and a redirection of EU regional funds to create more jobs? I believe The Economist is right in predicting that all this frenzy about growth will eventually lead to the conclusion that the choice is not really between austerity and growth, but over the timing and speed of deficit-cutting and the right mix of structural reforms. Lets hope the outcome of this weekends elections, especially the one in Greece, does not make this new, sensible blend impossible.

The Dutch miracle One week ago, the Dutch government had to step down because it lost its majority in parliament. The coalition, led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte, consisted of conservative Liberals and Christian Democrats but was backed by the Freedom Party of extreme-right populist Geert Wilders. He pulled the plug last weekend because he refused to accept budget cuts that are necessary to bring the Dutch budget deficit for 2013 in line with European norms. The fall of the Rutte government set off alarm bells in the Netherlands but also in the rest of Europe. At home, many were afraid that in the run-up to new elections in September, the country would face months of political paralysis. That would make it impossible to present a budget for next year that would be acceptable for the European Commission that is carefully monitoring all EU countries to see whether they live up to the tough standards established to overcome the crisis in the eurozone. Many analysts were afraid that the Netherlands might be downgraded by the rating agencies and lose its favorable AAA rating. In other European capitals, especially in Brussels and Berlin, the collapse of the government led to speculation that the Dutch might be moving away from their close understanding with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the need for fiscal discipline. As The New York Times put it: The Dutch surprise came in the same weekend as the first round-round victory in France of the Socialist Francois Hollande (known for his opposition to the German/Dutch push for more austerity), leading commentators to joke that Mrs. [Angela] Merkel has two nightmares, Holland and Hollande. Would the combination of Dutch impossibility and French unwillingness be the beginning of the end of the European plans to save the euro? We will only know what is going to happen in Paris after May 6, the second round of the French presidential elections. In the Netherlands, things took a surprising turn. After 48 hours of hectic negotiations, Rutte and his Finance Minister Jan Kees de Jager were able to present a budget deal reducing the 2013 deficit to 3 percent, as mandated by eurozone ministers last year, which is supported by a new majority in the Dutch parliament. Apart from the two old governing parties, three smaller parties have agreed to the new budget plans: the left liberal D66, the Greens and the progressive Christian Union. The five parties make up an odd coalition but they have been here before. In 2011 these same five parties agreed to send police trainers to Afghanistan after Mr. Wilders refused to support this mission. They have been known since as the Kunduz coalition. It was not easy, especially for the Greens, to sign up to a budget proposal that includes higher value-added taxes and a freeze on public sector wages. What they got in return were long postponed reforms in the labor and housing markets and a revision of old plans on health, education and development-aid cuts. All five parties had to compromise on key elements of

their electoral platforms. They were only willing to do so because they knew that not doing so would cause major problems for the country and could damage the credibility of the Netherlands for a long time to come. They had to set aside their differences and concentrate on a package of budget cuts and reforms that was acceptable for all of them. Most observers agree that the miraculous budget deal is the ultimate example of the Dutch consensus-building tradition. The remarkable budget agreement among the center-right and center-left parties was, not surprisingly, heavily criticized by the populist parties on the right and on the left. They blame the EU for imposing these cuts and their colleagues for giving in to that pressure. Both hope to profit from their Brussels bashing at the ballot box in September. The intense debate on the 2013 budget highlighted one of the classic dilemmas in politics: to agree with an only partially satisfying compromise in order to move on or to refuse such a deal and remain on the sidelines with clean but empty hands. I am sure we will see more of these hard choices when the Turkish Parliament will have to decide on the new constitution shortly. Again, the options will be the same: find a compromise because the country needs one or stress your own red lines and let others do the dirty work of finding a solution. Lets hope we will soon witness a Turkish miracle, too.

The revenge of Abdullah Gl Last week President Abdullah Gl visited the Netherlands to mark the official start of the celebrations of 400 years of Turkish-Dutch trade and diplomatic relations. The visit got a lot of attention in the media and was considered successful by most observers. The Dutch government did their utmost to show respect for the new economic and diplomatic powerhouse called Turkey, the queen spent several days with the president and offered an impressive state banquet, and I am sure many useful contacts were established between business people from both countries. But there was always this dark cloud hanging over the three-day event: the vocal objections against close Dutch-Turkish ties by Geert Wilders, the leader of the extreme-right Freedom Party that supports the center-right government of Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Before and during the visit, Mr. Wilders, as expected, did his utmost to irritate the Turkish delegation by scolding and insulting them, creating an uncomfortable feeling among both the Turkish guests and the Dutch hosts. The real surprises started the moment President Gl left the Netherlands on Thursday after having visited the most southern region of the country, Limburg. During that trip, the queen and the president met with the regional government that consists of the Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the Christian Democrats and the Freedom Party. The two representatives of Mr. Wilders party decided in the end to join the dinner although they first refused to do so because of the presence of President Gl. Their ambivalent behavior created a lot of resentment among their colleagues from other parties and a row inside their own party. One day later on Friday, the Christian Democrats in Limburg all of a sudden announced that they were fed up with this kind of maneuvering by Mr. Wilders regional mouthpieces. Their tomfoolery had damaged the image of the region and offended the visitors from Turkey. Without further ado, the Freedom Party was kicked out of the regional government, the only one in which the populists were represented anyway. One day later, their farewell to power went into overdrive when Mr. Wilders unexpectedly walked out of negotiations intended

to formulate budget cuts that are necessary to meet European budget deficit standards. It meant the governing coalition had lost its majority in parliament and on Monday Prime Minister Rutte was forced to tender his resignation. Within two days, Mr. Wilders lost his place at the table, both regionally and nationally. It has created an extremely complicated situation in the Netherlands. New elections are unavoidable, be it in June or after the summer holidays, in September. But in the meantime, the Netherlands are still expected to present a draft budget to the European Commission in Brussels shortly that indicates which budget cuts and reforms the Netherlands are planning to introduce to be able to stay below the maximum 3 percent budget deficit in 2013. The irony is that it was the Netherlands -together with Germany -- that pushed for this very tough and inflexible European standard some months ago, having in mind struggling southern eurozone member states such as Italy and Spain. Now the Dutch are in danger of falling into their own trap. How to comply with the criteria for a sound 2013 budget when there is no majority in parliament willing to support such a proposal until after elections and the establishment of a new government? Back to President Gls visit and the remarkable sequence of events that followed his stay in the Netherlands. During the weekend, several Dutch anti-Wilders columnists and bloggers made a link between Mr. Wilders provocations of the Turkish president and his fall from grace. Many thanked Gl for his visit and expressed their hope that he would come back soon because they appreciated the political fall-out of this visit very much. Apparently, one visit of his arch enemy was enough to create insurmountable problems for Mr. Wilders. Others referred to the poisonous impact of Turkey on Mr. Wilders career. Firstly, he left the VVD in 2004 to form his own party because he strongly disagreed with the liberal pro-Turkish EU membership position. Secondly, his efforts to spoil the 400 years of Turkish-Dutch relations celebrations completely backfired. It was not Gl who was damaged, but it was Wilders himself who was seriously injured. Some would call it divine justice. Finally, with a strong humoristic undertone, one well-known commentator concluded that one should not mess around with the Turks. You see what happens when you do. Mr. Wilders downfall can be perceived as the ultimate revenge of Abdullah Gl.

What about the new French president? Unless French opinion polls all got it totally wrong, this weekend will be the beginning of the end for Nicolas Sarkozy, the incumbent French president. He will most probably manage to survive the first round on Sunday, together with his main challenger, the Socialist candidate Franois Hollande, but the gap between the two has been growing over the last couple of weeks. Not one poll has indicated that Mr. Sarkozy will be able to win the second round against Mr. Hollande on May 6. The reasons for Sarkozys upcoming defeat are clear. Its the economy and his personality. Since coming to power in 2007, Sarkozy has not been able to deliver on most of his promises. Unemployment and the national debt have gone up, and Frances trade balance is negative. Together with his center-right colleague from Germany, Ms. Merkel, Sarkozy was very active in saving the euro, but the impression that most French citizens got was that Ms. Merkel called the shots, and Mr.

Sarkozy was forced to go along. During the campaign the close alliance between the two most important European leaders, symbolized by the abbreviation Merkozy, was stressed less and less because Sarkozys strategists found out that German leadership does not go down well with chauvinistic French voters. But it is not just failed politics or strategic mistakes that could explain Mr. Sarkozys bad performance. Most French simply dont like him. They were shocked by some of his vulgar behavior, especially in the first years of his presidency, and they got fed up with his hyperactivity, jumping from one subject to another, leaving behind many people in confusion and incomprehension. It is not a coincidence that Mr. Hollande is doing so well in the polls because he is the perfect nonSarkozy. He is dull, not very charismatic and vague on many of his plans for the future. But that is exactly what many French voters seem to want in 2012. They prefer a decent, slightly old-fashioned Mr. Normal who promises to protect France against the negative effects of globalization to a hot-tempered Mr. Speedy who has an ambiguous agenda that includes the need for unpopular reforms of a stagnating economy. So the bets are that Hollande will be the new French president. Does it matter to Turkey? For obvious reasons it does. We have all been able to witness the anti-Turkey Sarkozy show since 2007. For the French president bashing Turkey was not only a convenient way of attracting right-wing votes. Sarkozy has a profound ideological aversion against Turkeys European credentials. Against the advice of many diplomats and the CEOs of big French companies, he kept feeling the need to lash out at Turkey once in a while. Sarkozy turned France into one of the most outspoken critics of Turkeys EU membership and that is definitively one of the reasons why, for the moment, the accession negotiations are stuck. Nobody expects Mr. Hollande to act in the same way. During the election campaign, in which Turkey is not a big issue, he continued with the cautious approach he has been advocating for a long time. He said that, currently, Turkey was not able to meet the relevant EU conditions and was therefore not ready to join the EU in the next five years. One can agree or disagree with that but the point is that he did not use the familiar arguments that we know from Sarkozy and other anti-Turkey fundamentalists. Hollande did not claim that Turkey was not European and would therefore never be able to join the EU. It was simply not ready yet. Looking back, we can see that Hollande was never very outspoken on Turkeys EU membership. He was never decidedly in favor, he was never strongly against. His most constant point of criticism of Turkey has always been the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide claims. Hollande has always passionately defended the opinions of the Armenian diaspora and was one of the driving forces behind the efforts to criminalize genocide denial. If he becomes the new president, Turkey is in for a tough ride on that particular dossier. At the same time, one of his closest advisers and candidate foreign minister, Pierre Moscovici, has already indicated that a new French government would unblock the five negotiating chapters that have been frozen by Mr. Sarkozy. That would create a new momentum in Turkey-EU relations. Nobody should expect miracles from Mr. Hollandes presidency, but it would be very helpful if the fanatical Turkey bashing coming from Paris would stop and be replaced by a more rational approach.

The merchant and the preacher This week President Abdullah Gl is paying an official three-day visit to the Netherlands. It is considered to be the real start of the celebrations of 400 years of Turkish-Dutch relations. Some events have already begun, such as the big Rembrandt exhibition at the Sakip Sabanci Museum. But Gl's trip has brought this special year to the attention of most Dutch people as well. All major Dutch newspapers published an interview with the president, and the main TV news network spoke with Gl as well. I am sure that during this week his visits to several parts of the country will be widely covered, too. One of his stopovers, Floriade -- an international flower exhibition which is organized every 10 years -- is also politically interesting, and not because of Dutch-Turkish competition over who is most successful in branding the tulip as the country's main symbol. This year's Floriade is being staged in the southern town of Venlo, hometown of Geert Wilders, the extremeright populist whose Freedom Party is supporting the present center-right government. Mr. Wilders is known for his blunt anti-Islam pronouncements and his strong resistance against Turkey's EU membership. A few months ago he called on the Dutch government to skip president Gl's visit altogether because, according to the political maverick, there is nothing to celebrate and Turkey is rapidly becoming an Islamic fundamentalist country. For obvious reasons Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte did not give in to this provocative demand. On Thursday President Gl will be in Venlo, and many observers are wondering whether Mr. Wilders will use this opportunity to demonstrate again that he is vehemently opposed to everything Turkish. In most newspaper interviews President Gl was posed a question on Mr. Wilders and his views on Turkey. In his responses, the former foreign minister showed how capable he is at combining charm with political cleverness. He said he knew Mr. Wilders' controversial opinions on Turkey and that nobody should be surprised that he strongly disagreed. At the same time, Gl underlined that different views are part and parcel of politics in a democracy and that Mr. Wilders is welcome to visit Turkey and see with his own eyes how wrong his extreme judgments are. In one stroke, Gl positioned himself as a person open to dialogue, as opposed to Mr. Wilders, who is not interested in discussing but just wants to bash and to bully. At the heart of President Gl's mission and of the celebrations of 400 years of the Turkish-Dutch relationship in general lies the importance of trade in past, present and future relations between the two countries. It's perfectly in line with the classic self-image of the Dutch, who like to see themselves as a centuries-old trading nation that, at the same time, does not shy away from regularly telling the rest of the world how it should behave on issues related to democracy and human rights. In short: the merchant and the preacher. There has always been tension between these two self-perceptions. In the past, the business community often accused the Dutch left of moralizing too much, thereby damaging the chances of Dutch companies abroad in countries such as China, where human rights are still a big problem. Dutch firms do not like to be hampered in their ambitions. This week we could witness an interesting swap of roles. According to a report by ING Bank, the Netherlands will be missing out on 4 billion euros of exports to Turkey in the next couple of years because Dutch entrepreneurs misunderstand Turkey. They have the impression that doing business in

Turkey is still very difficult. ING Bank stresses the many changes that have taken place in Turkey lately which have made it much easier to set up a company here. But there is more to this story than just missed opportunities because of a lack of proper information. The hesitations in the business community reflect a growing skepticism among Dutch center-right politicians about Turkey and its chances of entering the EU. Mr. Wilders' Turkey-bashing has had an impact on the governing Christian-Democrats and conservative Liberals. Over the last couple of years, Turkey has been perceived by a growing number of right-wing pundits as a problem and a threat, not as an opportunity. The ING warning is a timely intervention in the Dutch debate on Turkey, in which populist overtones are starting to have a negative impact on Dutch trade relations. Apparently, the merchants have had enough of this now and are telling the populist preacher and his followers to back off. Tacir ve vaiz Cumhurbakan Gl, bu hafta Hollanda'ya gnlk resmi ziyaret dzenliyor. Bu ziyaret, Trk-Hollanda ilikilerinin 400. yl kutlamalarnn asl balangc olarak deerlendiriliyor. Sakp Sabanc Mzesi'ndeki byk Rembrandt sergisi gibi baz etkinlikler oktan balad. Gl'n gezisi sayesinde de Hollanda halknn ounluunun dikkati bu zel yla yneldi. Hollanda ana akm gazetelerinin tamam Cumhurbakan ile mlakat yaymlad ve ana akm televizyon haber bltenleri de Gl ile konutu. Eminim ki, bu hafta boyunca Gl'n lkenin eitli blgelerine ziyareti de geni apl haberlere konu olacaktr. Gl'n durak yerlerinden biri olan Floriade adndaki, 10 ylda bir dzenlenen uluslararas iek sergisi, siyasi adan da ilgiye deer. Laleyi lkenin ba simgesi olarak markalatrma konusunda kimin daha baarl olduuna dair Hollanda-Trkiye rekabetinden tr deil. Floriade, bu yl lkenin gneyindeki Venlo'da dzenleniyor, yani lideri olduu zgrlk Partisi ile mevcut merkez sa hkmeti destekleyen ar sac poplist Geert Wilders'in memleketinde. Wilders, slam kart pervasz beyanlar ve Trkiye'nin AB yeliine kuvvetli direnii ile tannyor. Kendisi birka ay nce Hollanda hkmetine Cumhurbakan Gl'n ziyaretinin toptan iptal edilmesi ars yapt, zira uyumsuz siyasetiye gre kutlayacak bir ey yok ve Trkiye hzla slamc kktendinci bir lke haline geliyor. Malum sebeplerden Hollanda Babakan Rutte, bu provokatr talebe boyun emedi. Cumhurbakan Gl, perembe gn Venlo'da olacak ve pek ok gzlemci, Wilders'in bunu frsat bilip bir kez daha Trk olan her eye iddetle kar olduunu gsterip gstermeyeceini merak ediyor. Gazete mlakatlarnn ounda Gl'e, Wilders ve onun Trkiye hakkndaki grlerine dair soru yneltildi. Eski dileri bakan, verdii karlklarla siyasi ferasetle cazibeyi kaynatrmakta ne kadar becerikli olduunu gsterdi. Wilders'in Trkiye ile ilgili tartmal grlerini bildiini ve kendisinin kesinlikle ayn fikirde olmamasnn kimseyi artmamas gerektiini syledi. Ayn zamanda bir demokraside farkl grlerin siyasetin ayrlmaz paras olduunu, Wilders'in Trkiye'yi ziyaretinin memnuniyetle karlanacan, bylelikle ar yarglarnn ne kadar yanl olduunu kendi gzleriyle greceini vurgulad. Gl, bir rpda, kendini, tartmakla ilgilenmeyip sadece taciz ve kabadaylk etmek isteyen Wilders'in tersine diyaloa ak bir kii olarak konumlandrd. Gl'n misyonunun ve 400 yln kutlanmasnn merkezinde, iki lke arasndaki ilikilerin gemi, bugn ve geleceinde ticaretin nemi yatyor. Bu da Hollandallarn klasik zimgesiyle gayet uyumlu. Zira Hollandallar kendilerini, dnyann geri kalanna demokrasi ve insan haklar konularnda nasl davranmalar gerektiini dzenli olarak sylemekten ekinmeyen asrlk bir ticaret ulusu olarak grmekten holanr. Ksacas: Tacir ve vaiz. Bu iki zalg arasnda her daim bir gerilim olageldi. Gemite i alemi, Hollanda Solu'nu ok fazla ahlak dersi verirken Hollanda irketlerinin yurtdndaki anslarna zarar vermekle sulad. Bu lkelerden biri olan in'de insan haklar hl byk sorun, ama Hollanda firmalar da hrslarnn dizginlenmesinden holanmyor. Bu hafta ilgin bir rol deiimine tanklk edebiliriz. ING Bankas'nn raporuna gre, gelecek birka ylda Hollanda, Trkiye'ye 4 milyar Avro'luk ihracat frsatn karacak, zira Hollandal giriimciler Trkiye'yi yanl anlyor. Onlarn izlenimi Trkiye'de i yapmann hl ok zor olduu ynnde. ING Bankas ise son dnemde Trkiye'de bir irket kurulmasn son derece kolaylatran pek ok deiim meydana

geldiini vurguluyor. Doru dzgn bilgi eksikliinden tr, bu hikyenin karlan frsatlardan te veheleri var. aleminin ekingenlii, Hollandal merkez sa siyasilerin Trkiye ve AB'ye girme ansyla ilgili artan pheciliini yanstyor. Wilders'in Trkiye'yi tacizi, hkmetteki Hristiyan Demokratlar ile muhafazakr Liberaller zerinde tesirli. Son birka yldr Trkiye, sa kanattan giderek artan sayda uzman tarafndan artk frsat deil de sorun ve tehdit olarak alglanyor. ING'nin uyars, poplist seslerin Hollanda'nn ticari ilikilerini olumsuz etkilemeye balad Trkiye ile ilgili tartmaya zamannda bir mdahale. Anlalan, tacirin canna o kadar tak etmi ki, artk poplist vaiz ile mritlerine glge etmeyin diyor.

Annans Syria plan is the only game in town Faced with the brutalities of the Assad regime and horrified by the thousands of Syrian citizens killed, a considerable number of Turkish and foreign commentators have made clear that they cant stand it anymore. They called on their governments to do whatever it takes to stop the massacres, if necessary to intervene militarily. Also in this newspaper, respected colleagues have made the argument in favor of armed intervention. They do not believe that any other option will be effective and from the beginning did not have any faith in the present mission of the UN and the Arab League led by Kofi Annan. Some of the skeptics even went as far as claiming that the proposed cease-fire only played into the hands of the Syrian dictatorship. Besides, many of the Annan plan opponents thought it would never work anyway. Let me explain why I strongly disagree with those who claim that military intervention in Syria is the only way to stop the killing. Of course, I fully understand the frustration with the Russian and Chinese refusal to back tougher UN resolutions. And yes, I experience the same moral dilemma of being a witness to horrific events and not being able to stop them immediately. On previous occasions like in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya I was in favor of armed intervention. Still, in this particular case, I am convinced that diplomacy is the only way to prevent further bloodshed. In a blog for the Middle East Channel and Foreign Policy magazine, Michael Wahid Hanna, a fellow and program officer at the Century Foundation, listed all the arguments in favor of continued diplomatic action. Like Hanna I realize that the present plan might fail. At the time of writing, the Syrian army did stop most of its hostilities but has not redeployed its troops and heavy weapons from population centers. The situation in all contested cities is still extremely fragile, and even small incidents could spark a new round of fighting. There is talk about sending UN observers to Syria shortly, but how quickly a full-blown mission could be in place is unclear. There is no guarantee that this mission will be able to do better than the Arab League one that failed miserably a few months ago. Despite all these uncertainties, Hanna argues that this kind of diplomacy is the only way forward simply because there are no alternatives. Firstly, no country or alliance is willing to deploy troops in Syria. Suggesting otherwise is creating illusions among the Syrian opposition and its supporters. Secondly, such an unlikely intervention would most probably lead to more civilian casualties. The Assad regime will desperately fight for its survival and will be supported by Russia, Iran and Iraq and a substantial part of the Syrian population that deeply fears the post-Assad era. The result will be a civil war in which a disorganized and fragmented opposition backed by Arab Sunni countries is in no position to stop revenge killings along sectarian lines. It would be the worst-case scenario for Syria.

Hanna also does not believe that despite all the sharpened rhetoric, Turkey will opt for unilateral military action in Syria. I sincerely hope he is right. Personally, I think that last weeks reference by Prime Minister Recp Tayyip Erdoan to Article 5 of the NATO treaty that considers an attack on one NATO member an attack on all, was a mistake. Yes, Syrian soldiers fired into Turkish territory, and that should be condemned. But to invoke the possibility of a NATO military response was overdoing things. It kept the illusion alive that NATO would be willing to intervene one day, which it definitively is not. On top of that, it also suggested that the Turkish government no longer really believes in diplomatic solutions and is preparing for military action, which it should not for the reasons mentioned above. The Turkish opposition parties reacted strongly to the governments warmongering. Some of their remarks were to the point. Why has there been no proper debate in Parliament on Turkeys policy regarding Syria? Why doesnt the government use its supposed good relations with Iran and Russia to talk them into a more constructive attitude towards the UN/Arab League initiative and more forceful pressure on Assad to stick to his promise to implement all six points of the Annan plan? My advice to the Turkish government: Stop talking war with Syria and start making the Annan plan work because it is the only game in town.

The responsibility to prevent military recklessness in Syria At the time of writing this article, it appears that the Syrian cease-fire agreement brokered by Kofi Annan is not going to work out. From the start, many were skeptical about President Assad's promise to start withdrawing his heavy weapons and troops from populated areas on Tuesday, one of the key elements of the plan. Many calculated that the Syrian government only agreed to meet the UN-imposed deadline in order to buy time to be able to continue its bloody crackdown of the rebellion. Things started to look even more hopeless over the weekend when Assad insisted he wanted written guarantees that rebel groups would first lay down their weapons, which they swiftly refused to do. Where to go from here? Turkey's Deputy Foreign Minister Naci Koru bluntly announced that the Annan plan was dead and buried. The foreign minister himself, Ahmet Davutolu, interrupted his visit to China and returned to Ankara to prepare for the next steps. Could these include Turkish military action in Syria, as this newspaper has reported? Is Ankara indeed expecting Russia and China to give up their resistance against a new UN resolution that would authorize some kind of military mission to stop the carnage? And if that does not happen, is Turkey going to invoke certain articles in bilateral agreements with Syria that would legitimize Turkish armed interference into Syrian territory to contain the threat of Syrian-sponsored Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism? Other analysts think that Russia and China will continue their obstruction against any intervention and find it hard to believe that Turkey in the end would be willing to act alone. They are contemplating a far more cynical scenario in which the US and Europe will keep pushing Turkey and the Arab League to take leadership of the matter (to which both will react with new diplomatic action, not military intervention). The UN will come up with a new toothless plan, and the Assad regime will give in to some demands like short cease-fires if pressured enough by Russia. Meanwhile, the killing will go on. If the skeptics are right and nothing is going to happen soon, the calls for military intervention will only grow stronger. In

Turkey and elsewhere, many supporters of armed action to create safe havens and humanitarian corridors or to bomb Assad's troops base their pleas on the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005. According to these principles, military action to stop atrocities should be contemplated when peaceful means prove inadequate. In Libya in 2011, many, including myself, were in favor of applying the R2P concept to avert the threat of a massacre in Benghazi. But does Syria comply with the criteria that have emerged from the R2P debate over the last decade? Roland Paris, professor of international relations at the University of Ottawa made a very pertinent point in a recent article on R2P. He argued that an important, prudential warning at the heart of R2P is too often forgotten by the doctrine's critics and proponents alike: R2P is not an automatic license for military intervention. Any contemplated armed action must be justified, necessary, proportional -- and proven to do more good than harm. Gareth Evans, the principal framer of the R2P doctrine and a former Australian foreign minister, recently underlined the same point. Let me quote from his article Saving the Syrians with which I fully agree: Any further militarization in Syria runs the risk of turning what is already a nascent civil war into a full-blown one, with casualties on a much greater scale. The Syrian military and government-backed militias are strong and will resist fiercely. Sectarian differences within Syria are profound, and there is little international confidence in either the cohesion or the democratic and human-rights credentials of the opposition. Fighting there could ignite the entire region. [...] With all military options appearing to be counterproductive, the only chance of halting Syria's descent into total chaos is Annan's political mediation. Its unstated premise is that enough senior officials in the regime can be persuaded to change course, with enough safe exits for the most divisive figures, to enable the situation to stabilize and reform to start. But, for that to happen, Russia will have to exercise its influence much more constructively than it has so far. That is a slim reed for the Syrian people to grasp, but unhappily it's the only one around. The message from both R2P defenders is clear. R2P also means the responsibility to prevent military recklessness.

The long shadow of the 1980 coup in Europe It has been said by many this week from all over the political spectrum and I can only agree: The start of the trial against retired generals Kenan Evren and Tahsin ahinkaya, two of those responsible for the 1980 military coup, is a historic event with an extremely high symbolic significance. It signals the end of an era in which army commanders could get away with anything and the Turkish state was not able or willing to seek justice for the victims of past wrongdoings by the military. Being an optimist by nature, I sincerely hope that this opportunity is not wasted by focusing solely on the events of September 1980 and the responsibilities of the two coup perpetrators. This trial should be used to shed new light on precoup atrocities, such as Bloody May Day in 1977 and the pogroms against Alevis at the end of 70s, incidents that were staged to prepare the ground for the military takeover. The disclose of all the horrors of the times before, during and after the coup should also be an extra push to finally deal with the poisoned legacy of September 1980. I hope the fact that the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) has applied to

become one of the co-plaintiffs in this case, is an indication of the awareness that it is now up to this same Parliament to get rid of the remnants of the military constitution that is still creating so many problems for Turkey. They should not spoil this chance by playing petty party games. The same duty to repair the damages caused by the coup should also convince the government to change its policy on the Kurdish question. The forced assimilation of Kurds by the Turkish state goes back long before 1980. But there is a direct link between the brutalities against Kurdish activists in the infamous Diyabakr prison right after the coup and the choice of radical Kurdish nationalists to take to the mountains. Turkey has come a long way in recognizing its past mistakes, but the problem wont be solved as long as politicians still believe that feelings of being discriminated against and treated unfairly can be suppressed by using violence or random arrests. But the long shadow of the 1980 coup does not only fall on Turkeys domestic policy agenda. For decades, the military takeover shaped the perception of Turkey abroad. A whole generation of political activists in Europe in the 80s and 90s grew up with the ugly image of Turkey as a country where the military ruled and leftists, trade unionists and Kurds were forced to flee to Germany, the Netherlands and other safe havens. My first personal political introduction to Turkey was via political refugees who spoke about the cruelties they and their comrades had to endure. Because I was so appalled by what I read and heard, I took the initiative at the end of the 80s to organize a holiday boycott, trying to persuade Dutch tourists not to go to Turkey. The initiative failed miserably because the big travel agencies had already discovered the many advantages of organizing trips to Turkey and many Europeans were willing to temporarily forget about their moral objections in return for two weeks of sun and cheap pleasure. For twenty years, Turkey topped the list of European countries where human rights were grossly violated, and for that reason the European Left strongly opposed all Turkish efforts to strengthen its ties with the EU. It was the centre-right -- the Christian democrats and the conservatives -- that defended Turkeys record, because they valued the benefits of improved commercial ties and the need to anchor Turkey to the West during the Cold War. For them, human rights were of secondary importance; the Customs Union was far more relevant. One of the ironies of history is that the European Left and Right changed sides after things started to improve in Turkey around the turn of the century. Because Turkey managed to get rid of some of the worst human rights violations, like systematic torture in prison and police stations, the Socialists and Greens changed their position on Turkeys EU membership and became strong defenders of accession. Many Conservatives also changed their minds after the Soviet threat had disappeared and was replaced by a new foe -- Islam -- and trade with Turkey was booming anyway, even without accession. For many on the centre-right, EU membership is not an option anymore, despite the fact that the disastrous effects of the 1980 coup have finally been overcome.

Can Turkey pull off a second Tehran Declaration? (2) After hosting the Friends of Syria last Sunday, Istanbul will soon be the venue for another meeting that will be closely watched by the rest of the world. On April 13 and 14 the Critics of Iran will sit together with representatives of the Islamic Republic to see whether they can make progress in finding a compromise on Iran's nuclear program.

As I explained in my previous article, expectations are low for this summit. Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5 + 1) have never been able to agree on anything. On the other hand, the pressure to strike a deal has never been stronger. Economic sanctions have started to hurt the Iranian economy badly, and Israel is keeping the option of military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities very visibly on the table. Turkey is not just the host of this gathering. In the past, Prime Minister Erdoan and Foreign Minister Davutolu have shown their ability to convince Tehran to give in to reasonable demands. Together with their Brazilian colleagues, the Turkish leaders had their finest moment, albeit a very brief one, in May 2010 when they persuaded the Iranian leadership to sign the Tehran Declaration. In order to understand the significance of that document, we have to go back to October 2009. Despite growing pressure from the US Congress and Israel to forget about diplomacy and opt for crippling sanctions against Iran, the Obama administration had proposed a so-called nuclear swap deal to the Iranians. If Iran were willing to ship 1,200 kilograms of its Low (5 percent) Enriched Uranium (LEU) to another country, preferably Russia, the P5 + 1 countries promised to reprocess that material to 20 percent enriched uranium, turn it into fuel pads that could be used for medical purposes and send it back to Iran within 12 months. It seemed to be a win-win deal for all parties. The US and the EU would be satisfied because Iran would be sending 75 percent of its LEU abroad, which means it could no longer be enriched by Iran for use in a nuclear bomb. Obama would also buy more time for an overall diplomatic solution. Iran would get the medical isotopes it so badly needed and, if not full acceptance, at least recognition of its enrichment activities. But after two rounds of talks, the negotiations failed because there was a basic lack of trust. In his new, highly acclaimed book A Single Roll of the Dice, Trita Parsi, one of the leading commentators in the US on Iran, spends several chapters on this period and the reasons why the swap deal did not work. Based on talks with American, Iranian, Brazilian and Turkish officials, Parsi also presents a detailed account of the efforts by Brazil and Turkey to make the same bargain work in May 2010. The two countries had the impression they were helping the US after both received a letter from Obama in April 2010 in which he outlined the conditions under which Washington would be willing to accept a deal with Iran. These do not fundamentally differ from the October 2009 proposal. One month later, in May 2010, Brazil and Turkey stayed within the American parameters and pressed the Iranians to do the same in their common Tehran Declaration. They were furious when the US quickly and bluntly dismissed the compromise as an Iranian trap that had been set for the Turks and the Brazilians. According to Parsi, the Americans never believed the two emerging powers would be able to pull off the deal and had in the meantime used all their diplomatic energy to convince the Russians and the Chinese to agree with tough sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council. There is the tendency to consider the Tehran Declaration a unique but unsuccessful endeavor that cannot and will not be repeated. I agree that the May 2010 arrangement cannot simply be copied two years later. Things have changed since then, such as the total amount of LEU that Iran now possesses and its own enrichment capabilities. Still, many observers do think that a similar agreement could still be reached and, maybe even more importantly, could still create the minimum of trust needed to conclude a much broader, all-encompassing settlement on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Let's hope that on April 13-14 Erdoan and Davutolu manage to revive the spirit of May 2010 and pave the way for a new

deal that, this time around, will be accepted by all countries involved.

Can Turkey pull off a second Tehran Declaration? (1) A few days ago Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu visited Iran and spoke to all the relevant decision makers in Tehran. At first glance, everything seems to be fine between the two neighbors. They are used to playing a centuries-old, intriguing game of cooperation and competition. Davutolu stated that relations between Turkey and Iran are on an exceptionally good level, and Erdoan voiced his unwavering support for Tehrans controversial nuclear ambitions as long as these remain nonmilitary. Beneath the surface, though, things are more complicated and less rosy. Turkey and Iran dont see eye to eye on Syria and Iraq, to put it mildly, and neither is willing to budge. Ankara has put all its political and diplomatic weight behind the Syrian National Council, the main opposition group to President Assad. Tehran is still backing the Syrian leader because it realizes that his fall would severely limit Irans influence in the region. In Iraq, Turkey tries to keep the country together by supporting the minority rights of the Kurds and the Sunnis, while Iran has a big stake in defending the majority rule of the Shiites. On top of these regional power games that have become more violent and destabilizing over the last six months, comes Turkeys choice to host the radar installations that are part of NATOs missile defense project. Iran resents the new system because it knows that, despite Turkish denials, the shield is aimed at preventing Iranian ballistic missiles from reaching Europe. These strategic differences are not going to disappear quickly and have led some commentators to conclude that Turkey and Iran are entering a period of Cold Peace. Surprisingly, finding a compromise on Irans highly controversial nuclear plans might be the best option for Turkey to regain some confidence in Tehran. Most probably a new round of negotiations between Iran and the so-called P5 + 1, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, will be held on April 13. At the moment of writing, it is not clear yet whether or not the venue will be Istanbul, but both Iran and Turkey are pushing very hard for that. The last round of these talks was held in Istanbul as well, in January 2011, but was not successful and this might lead the P5 to pick another meeting place this time. Whatever the venue will be, the world will be looking at the outcome of these talks with a combination of high hopes and low expectations. Some commentators, especially in Israel and the US, have declared that only an undisputed Iranian gesture of goodwill can prevent an Israeli attack on Irans nuclear sites. Others are less alarmist, knowing that US President Obama and his military chiefs are strongly opposed to any unilateral Israeli military actions that could cause a regional war. The US is in the middle of a process of retreating from the Middle East (Iraq and Afghanistan) and will do everything to prevent new engagements in the region. All relevant players in Washington are convinced that an Israeli strike would have unimaginable consequences, would only delay Irans program by two or three years and would definitively strengthen Tehrans intentions to go nuclear. The US and the EU have put all their cards on economic sanctions to force the Iranians to agree with the demands for more transparency and international control of their nuclear program. The EU has announced a stop to Iranian oil exports to

Europe starting on July 1, and the US has already implemented similar measures. Although Ankara is trying to be exempted from these initiatives, the Obama administration is also expecting Turkey to substantially reduce its oil imports from Iran. It is clear that all the existing and upcoming tough sanctions put together are hurting the Iranian economy, but it is also evident that they have not been able to change the minds of the Iranian leadership. Under these circumstances, what can we expect from the April 13 talks? More specifically: Will Turkey be able to build on the success of May 2010 when, together with his Brazilian colleague Lula, Erdoan managed to strike a deal with the Iranians, the so-called Tehran Declaration, that is still considered by many specialists as the starting point for any new agreement on Irans nuclear program? More about the history of the Tehran Declaration in my next column.

Compromising on the constitution Last week, the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) in cooperation with the Friends of Turkey Group in the European Parliament organized a conference on the quest for a new constitution in Turkey. It was a good opportunity to bring the debate in Turkey to a European audience. The meeting was well attended and managed to inform parliamentarians, their staff and other interested participants on the main sticking points. In the first panel Kemal Burkay and mit Firat, two prominent Kurdish intellectuals who strongly disagree with the tactics and politics of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), focused on the Kurdish demands for the new charter. Not surprisingly, the key issues were education in mother tongue and some sort of administrative decentralization. In the present constitution article 42 makes it impossible to teach any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens in any institution of training or education. Burkay and Firat stressed the need to delete that ban, and it seems, remarkably, that the majority of Turks have no problem with that demand anymore. A recent survey conducted by the Ankara-based MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research Center showed that 61.7 percent of respondents supported the proposal to educate children in their mother tongue on the condition that they learn Turkish as well. Of course, support among Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) supporters was highest but also the majority of Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Republican People's Party (CHP) voters agreed. Even half of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) electorate seems to have accepted the desirability of using languages other than Turkish in the public education system. It would be interesting to conduct a similar survey on the other Kurdish demand: a different organization of the Turkish state in which Ankara, at the moment, pulls all the strings, including the ones that could be dealt with much more effectively and democratically at a lower regional or local level. My guess is that the old fears of separatism are still very strong and will make the introduction of any kind of administrative decentralization extremely controversial, especially among CHP and MHP supporters. In the second panel, Radikal columnist Oral alilar cautioned against too high expectations. According to him, it will be impossible to fully erase all the problematic parts in the present Constitution in one sweep. alilar expects a temporary or

transitional charter to emerge from the present revision process, not a final one. That assessment is partly based on the method that was chosen to prepare a new draft constitution: a parliamentary committee in which all parties are equally represented and all decisions have to be made unanimously. This particular preparation process was the subject of the third and final panel last week in Brussels. Many participants wanted to know whether the panelists expected this procedure to produce a meaningful outcome. Professor of Law Levent Kker proved to be the most optimistic one, arguing that there is no way back for the four parties, and therefore, none of them wants to be seen as the spoiler. Personally, I still find it hard to believe that the MHP and the BDP, in particular, will be able to agree on any substantial revisions. Are MHP politicians as flexible on education in mother tongue as half of their voters seem to be? Will the BDP accept an extremely watered-downed version of their autonomy plans? On top of that, is the CHP willing to give up on all references to Atatrk that do not belong in a charter that should not favor or impose any particular ideology? Is the ruling party prepared to skip compulsory religion courses in primary and secondary schools and all the restrictions on labor union membership and activities? These are only some of the obstacles in front of a unanimous proposition by the parliamentary committee. My guess is that every party's right to veto any controversial article will fatally undermine the present preparations. In the end, I expect the AKP and the CHP to pick up the pieces after this failure and agree at the end of this year on a revised constitution that allows both of them to hang on to some of their so-called red lines without destroying the whole project. It means we probably end up with the temporary constitution that alilar predicted. Unless of course, Parliament Speaker iek and his colleagues prove all of us wrong and manage to show a degree of willingness to compromise that would be unprecedented in Turkey's political history.

The prince and the pasha As I have said before, 2012 is going to be a special year in the relations between Turkey and the Netherlands. Four hundred years ago, in March 1612, the first ambassador of the Dutch Republic to the Sublime Porte arrived in stanbul. A few months later, the Netherlands obtained highly desirable trade concessions and official trading relations became a reality. The agreement signed by the Turkish sultan is known under its Western name of capitulation. It put the Netherlands in the select company of three other countries enjoying these privileges: France, England and Venice. These capitulations would become a classic example of how the same phenomenon ended up being perceived in a totally different way by the original signatories. For the Western powers the agreements would remain practical tools to regulate their access to an attractive market. For the Ottomans, struggling to survive in the 19th century, these capitulations would become highly unpopular concessions that enabled the Europeans to interfere with the internal dynamics of the empire. In Turkish national memory, the capitulations are an example of the humiliating manner in which Europe treated the Ottomans and a warning not to get into such unfavorable relationships again.

The Dutch National Archives in The Hague decided to use this special year of celebrations to organize an exhibition of the most important official documents, including the original capitulations, which illustrate the developing relationship between the Netherlands and the Ottoman Empire and its successor, the Republic of Turkey. The exhibition is called The Prince and the Pasha and was opened last week by the Turkish ambassador to the Netherlands, Mr. Uur Doan. The title of the exposition refers to Maurice of Nassau, prince of Orange, the then leader of the young Dutch Republic, and the admiral of the Turkish fleet, Halil Pasha, who sent the letter inviting the Netherlands to send an envoy. Historians tend to minimize the role of the prince in this endeavor but all agree on the prominent role played by Halil Pasha who helped the new Dutch ambassador against the subversive activities of the French and Venetians, the main commercial rivals of the Dutch. Halil Pasha knew, of course, that at the time the Ottomans and the Dutch shared a common enemy, the Habsburg dynasty, which might explain some of his accommodating activities. Walking around among all the historical documents, treaties and diplomatic dispatches, one realizes the grandeur of the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations are true pieces of art, especially the colorful monogram of the sultan. With each new sultan, new capitulations were formulated so one can enjoy three, all embellished with beautiful decorative calligraphy. The last one from 1680 would keep its validity until 1914 when Turkey annulled all capitulations. The rest of the displays demonstrate the variety of subjects that were dealt with during the next centuries, ranging from a decree that granted a dispensation to Dutch diplomats in zmir to produce wine for their own consumption to a beautiful picture of the Turkish delegation at the First Peace Conference in The Hague in 1899 where a growing pacifist movement tried to resist the rising tide of violent nationalism. Personally, I was impressed by a letter of the Dutch envoy, Mr. Visser, who on Nov. 12 1938 explained to his minister of foreign affairs why Atatrk, who had passed away two days before, had been of such importance for Turkey and why the Turkish population should be grateful for everything that Atatrk had done. The letter combines unrestricted admiration and a patronizing worldview that are typical of those days. The ambassador writes about Atatrk: He achieved his reforms with restless energy and at times with merciless discipline; the people accepted these without complaint, like a child would have accepted this from his Father. There are many more nice and sometimes remarkable examples of Dutch-Turkish official interactions over the centuries. They are one more warning against easy judgments and popular prejudices, both in Turkey and the Netherlands, that tend to portray these relations as intrinsically hostile. Lets hope that this exhibition and many other activities in the framework of 400 years of Dutch-Turkish relations at least manage to inform both peoples that their common history is much more fascinating and multifaceted than narrow-minded nationalists on both sides want them to believe.

What should everybody know about Turkey? I have complained about it before in this column: the limited number of good general introductions to Turkey in English. With all the talk in Europe and the US about the growing importance of Turkey, it is amazing that there are so few options available for interested Europeans and Americans who want to read their way into Turkey smoothly. If you go on the Internet, you can definitively gather a big pile of articles and get discouraged by the many references to specialized, academic books on specific aspects of Turkish domestic or foreign policy. But the number of accessible books,

not too expensive or bulky, that explain present-day Turkey in a readable way to interested visitors is surprisingly small. I have often been asked for advice and, until recently, I always ended up suggesting one of the three classics: Crescent and Star by former New York Times stanbul bureau chief Stephen Kinzer, The Turks Today by Atatrk biographer Andrew Mango or the recently reworked and updated Turkey Unveiled, written by Nicole and Hugh Pope, two of the most knowledgeable foreign observers of Turkey who have both been living in this country for many years. Since last year, there are two more alternatives, both written by academics residing in the UK. Bill Park is a senior lecturer for the defense studies department at King's College in London and he has written a textbook called Modern Turkey that offers a comprehensive overview of contemporary Turkey in a globalizing world. He is the only one who has included a special section on the Glen movement. Finally, there is Kerem ktem, the only Turkish author, who works as a research fellow at the European Studies Centre at St. Antony's College in Oxford. His book, Angry Nation, deals with Turkey since 1989 and takes a clear position in many of the debates that have dominated the agenda in the last two decades. Now, another contender for the best introduction to Turkey has come out and it's a strong candidate. That has to do with the author, Andrew Finkel, and the setup of this book called Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know. I guess most of you know Andrew Finkel, who was a columnist for Today's Zaman for many years and is a regular contributor to various programs on Turkish television. But, above all, he is a journalist who has been based in Turkey for more than 20 years and has worked for many of the leading English-language newspapers and magazines like The Economist and The New York Times. This man has experienced Turkey from the inside; he has lived here for a long time, speaks the language and has met the main players. Most importantly for his readers, he knows how to convey his message. What he has done is translated the basics about Turkey in 50 questions. By answering all of them in his familiar elegant style, combining hard facts with casual anecdotes and subtle humor, he paints a picture of Turkey that is both informative and inviting for the average European or American who wants to know more about Turkey but is not willing to work his way through the stack of unconnected articles and specialized academic volumes. The questions are arranged in five chapters and an introduction plus conclusion, but nothing prevents the reader from jumping from one question to the other, depending on one's own private interests. In that sense, Finkel's work is more a small, easy-to-use reference book than a traditionally organized set of chapters that you are supposed to start reading from page one onwards. Did the author manage to cover everything and are all the answers equally convincing? Of course not. You can't deal with all the complexities of such a huge country in transformation in 200 pages, and sometimes one wonders why the author chose to spend several pages on that particular subject and not on another. The selection inevitably reflects the interests and preferences of the writer. One should not complain about that because it makes the book more than just another introduction to Turkey. This is a personal guide into the peculiarities of a country that the author, despite all his eloquent fault-finding, loves dearly. There are only a few people in Turkey who can combine the critical eye of the outsider with the compassion of the insider. Finkel is one of them. One practical note: The book will not be available in Turkey until May but can be ordered now from Amazon US.

Back to basics Last week journalists Ahmet k and Nedim ener and two other suspects in the OdaTV case were released from prison and can now wait at home for the next session of their trial, which will take place in June. It was good to see that in the extremely polarized political and media landscape in Turkey, there seemed to be at least some sort of consensus that, for several reasons, this was a welcome development. First and foremost, of course, for the persons involved. To be in prison for more than one year is a human tragedy that, fortunately, has now come to an end. Many observers expect that other detainees who are in the same position will soon receive similar treatment. That reflects the common view held by both supporters and opponents of the ongoing court cases that, pending trial, suspects should not be kept in prison unless there are very good reasons to do so. On top of this comes the assessment that these releases are a result of the upcoming legal changes that have been introduced by the government. A limited number of heavily criticized articles in the Anti-Terror Law and the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) will be changed soon that will make it more difficult to start cases on the basis of vague or unsubstantiated claims. I would like to elaborate on another reason why these releases are good news for Turkey: It allows everybody concerned with freedom of the press and the Ergenekon court case to refocus on the basics. Many analysts and columnists who are supportive of the investigations into the workings of the deep state in Turkey, past and present, have made the point, from day one, that the arrest of k and ener was a mistake that would undermine the legitimacy of the whole Ergenekon case. It exposed the investigations under way to heavy criticism, mainly from people who were always against it, claiming that at the heart of the Ergenekon case lies an attack from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) on its ideological adversaries and not a necessary cleanup of criminal networks in and around the state. It was much easier to convince uninformed outsiders of this distorted view by referring to unsuspected reporters like k and ener than by having to rely on tainted suspects like Veli Kk or other ultranationalists. The k and ener arrests were a gift to the Ergenekon opponents, and they have made maximum use of it, especially abroad. For a year, it has been very hard to find any positive article in the international media on the Ergenekon case. That is no coincidence. With k and ener out of prison, the time has come for the Ergenekon prosecutors to show that their work is dealing with extremely serious allegations and is based on sound proof. That means making an ultimate effort to conclude the cases against some of the key suspects this year. It should also include putting much more emphasis on the unsolved deep-staterelated murders that took place in the 1990s in the Southeast. These killings are about real people that disappeared without leaving a trace. It is impossible to deny or belittle these tragic events and therefore much harder to manipulate the news and the evidence about this part of the investigations. Which brings us to the Kurdish issue that is also at the heart of the problem with the arrested journalists. With all the focus on the k and ener imprisonment, many tended to forget that around 65 out of one 100 journalists in prison now are Kurds who are accused of helping or assisting in one way or the other the terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The issue here is not some ideological battle between the AKP and its critics. It is the old problem of laws that are phrased in such a general way that it allows for the arrest of sympathizers and supporters of Kurdish nationalist causes who have themselves never been involved in any violent act. Many of the allegations against these Kurdish journalists are not based

on convincing evidence and are not beyond any reasonable doubt, two of the requirements that the Council of Europe has repeatedly stressed. This is one of the other basics I hope we can return to: the need to go beyond the present insufficient legal changes and fully delete the disputed articles in the Anti-Terror Law and the penal code that create the basis for the waves of arrests that Turkey, unfortunately, has so gotten used to.

Serbia needs to compromise on Kosovo (2) Two weeks ago Serbia got the green light from the EU and is now, together with Macedonia and Montenegro, two other former Yugoslav republics, an official candidate for EU membership that can start accession negotiations at some point in the future. In the case of Serbia, this will only happen when there is a deal with Kosovo, a former Serbian province that declared independence in 2008, a step recognized by most EU countries but not by Belgrade. In fact, the decision on March 1 to give candidate status to Serbia was only taken after a last minute EU-brokered agreement between the Serbs and the Kosovars on Kosovo's presence and representation at future regional meetings. Until now, Serbia only accepted Kosovo at the table when the Kosovars were chaperoned by UN officials. According to Belgrade, it is the UN that has jurisdiction in Kosovo, not the Kosovars. From now on, Pristina will be allowed to attend regional meetings autonomously but all references to Kosovo will be accompanied by an asterisk directing people to a footnote that mentions both the UN Security Council resolution from 1999 that the Serbs cherish and a ruling by the International Court of Justice from 2008 that is emphasized by the Kosovars because it found that Kosovo's 2008 unilateral declaration of independence was not illegal. The bickering about these details shows how sensitive the issue of Kosovo's independence still is for both countries and how much time it will take to resolve the issue -- a pre-condition for Serbia's entry to the EU. As seasoned Balkan observer Tim Judah underlined in The Economist, the Brussels agreement also sets out a route to eventual EU membership for Kosovo itself by opening the procedure for a so-called Stabilization and Association Agreement, the first step towards future membership. So what we have now is an EU candidate, Serbia, that has to find a compromise with a potential candidate, Kosovo. It is clear that the main challenge will be to find a solution for the Serbs living in the northern part of Kosovo. The Kosovo Serbs themselves would like to split off from Kosovo and join Serbia. That is unacceptable for Pristina and for Brussels because it could set in motion a whole range of similar secessions in other parts of the Balkans. The most likely way out is some sort of northern Serb autonomy within an undivided, majority Albanian Kosovo. That makes sense for most outside observers, but logic and reason have never been the driving forces behind any dialogue in this region. It will take a lot of time and effort to convince, especially the Serbs, that, as a recent report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) put it, there is no alternative to a proper normalization of Kosovo-Serbia ties, including diplomatic relations and a transformation of the existing Serb institutions in northern Kosovo so that they are consistent with international law and acceptable to all concerned. The leading role in this complicated process of mediation will be for the EU. Both Serbia and Kosovo want to become a member and that will give Brussels the leverage it needs to push for a settlement.

Much needed assistance, though, could come from Turkey. Ankara has repeatedly offered its help. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan did so in November 2010 when he visited Kosovo, and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu reiterated the offer in August 2011. According to some regional experts, Belgrade is not very keen on Turkey's interference because it considers Ankara as being too close to Pristina. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo's independence in 2008 and has lobbied for international recognition of Kosovo since. At the same time, Turkey invested much in improving its ties with Serbia. In a recent article in Insight Turkey, Dimitar Bechev, head of the Sofia office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, stressed the gains of the last few years. Trade between the two countries has grown considerably, visa requirements have been lifted, Turkish soap operas have also conquered the Serbian TV market and Serb tourists have discovered Turkey as a holiday destination. Politically, further rapprochement depends on the ruling pro-European Democrats of President Boris Tadic holding on to power in this year's elections. The green light from Brussels was a boost for Tadic and his vision of a truly European Serbia. It is also in Turkey's interest that Serbia's democrats succeed with their mission, including an inevitable compromise with the Kosovars. Time for a new 2012 Turkish Balkan initiative, it seems.

Serbia needs to compromise on Kosovo (1) On March 1, the European Union decided that Serbia is an official candidate bound one day to join the EU. As I explained in my last column this is good news for Serbian democrats in their fight with radical nationalists for the future of their country in the upcoming parliamentary elections. It also bodes well for the rest of the Western Balkans because Serbia is the key country in the region; if the Serbs have a clear prospect of EU membership, their neighbors in the long run will profit as well. Finally, the decision was an indirect boost for Turkey because the EU made it clear that further enlargement is not dead and buried as some skeptics in Turkey and elsewhere in Europe have proclaimed. Does that mean that Serbia will join the EU soon and might even become a member before Turkey will? I dont think so. Serbia cannot be compared with Croatia, the second former Yugoslav republic after Slovenia that will most probably join the EU on July 1, 2013. Croatia started its accession talks on the same day as Turkey did, Oct. 3, 2005. There has always been a tendency in Turkey to compare the progress of Zagrebs EU negotiations with the slow pace of Ankaras efforts to comply with all EU demands. Conclusion, from day one: They are doing better and that means we are discriminated against. I have always found that interpretation rather silly. Croatia can in no way be compared to Turkey. It is a small country, surrounded by present or future EU member states, whose European credentials are not being challenged by anyone. It still has problems with restructuring its economy, rooting out corruption and establishing a proper rule of law. But these are all issues the EU is quite good and experienced in dealing with. They can be solved or brought under control. Once that is done, the accession of Croatia is business as usual for the EU. As we know, the accession of Turkey raises totally other topics that touch on the future of the EU as a whole: identity, internal dynamics, final borders and geopolitics. If and when Turkey joins, the EU will become a different entity. Besides, the

accession of strong and populous countries always poses a bigger challenge than the incorporation of small states. When we talk about degrees of complexity, Serbia should be situated somewhere in between Croatia and Turkey. Size and geography wise, it is of course closer to Croatia. But there are a lot of political catches that can be compared to the Turkish ones. First and foremost, the future of the final borders on the Western Balkans in general and those of Serbia and Kosovo in particular. Four years ago, Kosovo declared independence. Before 1999, Kosovo was a part of Serbia populated mainly by ethnic Albanians. In 1998 and 1999, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic tried to ethnically cleanse the province and kill or drive out most Kosovars. NATO intervened and kicked out the Serb administration. From then on, Kosovo was governed by the United Nations. In 2008, the Kosovars had enough of that and established their own state that was recognized by almost 90 countries, including the US, Turkey and 22 out of 27 EU member states. Serbia repeatedly announced that it will never do so and that has created a lot of problems with the Kosovars and with the EU. Belgrade kept supporting the Serbs living in the northern part of Kosovo, close to the Serbian border, who violently resist any interference in their lives by Pristina, Kosovos capital, and by EULEX, a civilian EU mission that is supposed to help the Kosovars in setting up a functioning state. In March 2011 the EU forced Serbia and Kosovo to sit down and talk about a whole range of practical problems caused by the enmity between the two countries and the Serb non-recognition of Kosovo. The Serbs knew from the start that without any progress in these talks, they could forget about getting candidate status. Last December, the EU under German pressure decided that the Serbs were not cooperative enough and postponed opening the door for Serbia. A last minute deal secured a green light on March 1 but most of the structural problems remain unsolved. More about them and about Turkeys role in straightening them out in my next column.

Serbias candidate status is good news for Turkey It did not attract much attention outside of the Balkans, but last week the European Council agreed to grant Serbia the status of candidate country. It makes Serbia the fifth former Yugoslav republic on its way to EU membership. Slovenia joined the EU in 2004, and Croatia will most probably do so on July 1, 2013, since its Accession Treaty was signed in December of last year. Two other countries, Macedonia and Montenegro, are struggling to progress from their present position -- official candidate -- to the more challenging next phase, the start of negotiations. Macedonia received candidate status in 2005 but has not been able to start accession talks because of a long-running dispute with neighboring Greece about the name of the country. Athens does not accept the name Macedonia because it considers that name to entail a claim to a part of Greece of the same name. UN-sponsored talks to resolve the issue have not produced a name that is acceptable for both countries and that is why the Greeks keep using their veto to block Macedonia on its road to EU membership. Montenegro was granted candidate status in December 2010 and is expected to get the green light to open accession negotiations with the EU in June if it manages to produce results in the fight against organized crime and corruption and if its track record in protecting fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary looks OK.

As a result of last weeks decision, the EU is now negotiating with two countries for future membership (Turkey and Iceland) and is monitoring three other candidates (Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) to see whether the conditions are in place to start accession talks. Three other potential candidates (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo) are still waiting to be officially recognized as candidate states. Having witnessed the lack of progress in the talks between Turkey and the EU and the problems the Western Balkan countries have in even starting that most elaborate phase, one might ask the question: So what? Is it really that important that Serbia has now joined the queue? Many Turks have already given up on the EU, and many Macedonians tend to agree. Does it make any difference that the Serbs will now be the next people to get frustrated with the EUs foot dragging and perceived double standards? Yes, it does matter. For several reasons. The most important one is that the decision on Serbia shows that the skeptics and cynics, who thought that EU enlargement was over and done with, have been proven wrong. Of course, encouraging new countries to join the EU is not very popular at the moment for obvious reasons. Why invite poor neighbors to come over and move in when the European house is in a total mess and nobody is sure whether the right recipe has been found to overcome the present problems and prevent a long economic recession in large parts of Europe. Still, European leaders have recognized the long-term interests of the EU and have come to the conclusion that keeping out the countries of the Western Balkans forever is not a clever thing to do. And, with all due respect to Macedonia and Montenegro, the key country in that region is Serbia. Without a stable, democratic and prosperous Serbia, this part of Europe runs the risk of becoming a black hole that will continue to create problems for the surrounding EU member states and for the union as a whole. As I will explain in my next column, it will take Serbia a long time and a huge effort to overcome all the remaining obstacles on its road to the EU. The most complicated one being the relations with its former province Kosovo, which declared independence in 2008. By giving Serbia the prospect of eventual membership, the EU has hit three birds with one stone: It has strengthened the position of the ruling Democratic Party of President Boris Tadic vis--vis the radical Serb nationalists in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in May; it has shown the rest of the region that, despite all the delays and hesitations, it still cares for the Western Balkans, if only for selfish reasons; and it has emboldened the advocates of further EU enlargement who were starting to get desperate, faced with the lack of any substantial progress in the last couple of years apart from Croatias forthcoming accession. That makes it also good news for Turkey.

Nebahat Albayrak for Dutch Labour Party leader Two issues dominate the news these days in the Netherlands. Most important is the question whether or not the country will be able to comply with the tough new European budget rules. Most exciting is the race for the leadership of the Dutch Labour Party. On the budget it seems the government is trapped between European promises and credibility on the one hand and national political and economic impediments on the other. During the recent debates in Brussels on the new financial and monetary treaty, it was the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte who, together with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, stressed, again and again, that no country in the eurozone should be allowed to walk away from the new commitments. He was obviously referring to Greece, Italy and Spain, EU member states that are facing huge problems in bringing down their budget deficits

and national debts. Rutte never imagined then that it would be his own country that would be confronted with similar challenges. But this week the new economic outlook for the Netherlands in 2013 predicted a budget deficit of 4.5 percent, which is 1.5 percent higher than the 3 percent limit that has been included in the new European targets for next year. To comply with the European deal that he himself pushed for so hard, Rutte will have to cut the national budget by an additional 15 billion euros, on top of the cuts that were already scheduled before. All analysts, employers and trade unions immediately warned that introducing another round of drastic reductions on public spending would push the country into a long period of economic recession. Mr. Wilders, whose Freedom Party supports Mr. Ruttes coalition cabinet, has already announced that he does not care about the European rules and is not willing to agree on budget cuts that would go down very badly with his electorate. So what is the government going to do? Stick to the European rules it forced on other European countries that would save its trustworthiness in Brussels but could destroy its majority in the Dutch parliament? Or listen to the domestic calls to interpret the new rules in a flexible way and run the risk of being slammed by their European colleagues for lack of integrity and reliability? Mr. Rutte has a couple of weeks to make a deal behind the scenes on next years budget and perform the political Houdini escape act that should save both his cabinet and the Dutch economy. In the meantime, a public contest between five members of parliament is attracting massive attention from the media. Each of them thinks that he or she would be the best successor to Job Cohen, the Labour Party leader who stepped down last week after he failed to meet high expectations and saw his party trailing behind the more radical Socialist Party in the polls. In the next two weeks the members of the Labour Party will get the chance to meet the five candidates during debates all around the country and will be asked to cast their votes in an inner party referendum. The result will be known on March 16. One of the five candidates is Nebahat Albayrak, who moved to the Netherlands in 1970 after being born in Sarkla in 1968. For years now, Albayrak has been the most visible and successful Dutch politician with Turkish roots. She was a member of parliament from 1998 until 2007 before becoming a junior minister responsible for Justice in the last Balkenende cabinet. In 2010 she was the number two on the Labour Party list behind Cohen. Now she wants to go for number one. Polls show that two of her male competitors are doing better but because of the peculiar voting system used, some analysts predict that Albayrak stands a good chance of ending up on top. That is because members will not only be asked to indicate who their favorite party leader is, but also who their second and third options are. Albayrak most probably will not get the most number one votes, but will gather a lot of second preferences. These might bring her victory in the end because with five candidates running, it is not likely that any candidate will get more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round. Having a Dutch Turkish woman as the leader of one of the established parties would be a welcome answer to the rising tide of Islamophobia that is so often associated with the Netherlands these days.

Using Turkeys expertise to deal with Iran Until recently, I never believed Israel, in the end, would be willing to deliver upon its threat to bomb nuclear facilities in Iran to prevent that country from acquiring a nuclear weapon. I presumed that, eventually, the Israelis themselves would see that poking a stick in that beehive would bring about enormous risks of a tit-for-tat war in the region in which Israel would be the main target. Or, if Jerusalem did not get it, the US would use its influence to convince the Israelis to back down and give

sanctions or diplomacy another chance. I am not so sure anymore. Of course, the escalation in Israels rhetoric over the last couple of months could still be sheer bluff to impress Tehran and the rest of the world. But I got an uncomfortable feeling when I noticed that all but one of the Republican candidates for the US presidency basically support the Israeli approach and, after all the talk of war, 75 percent of Americans believe Iran is already capable of using a nuclear bomb (which, according to all experts, it is not). I could not help thinking of 2003 and the alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that were used as the main argument for an invasion. On top of that, many analysts expect that, in the run-up to the November elections, President Obama will find it difficult to clearly and openly denounce an Israeli attack and run the risk of being portrayed as weak by his belligerent opponent. So the question is: If not war, what then do we want? The Economist had a go at it in this weeks edition. The magazine made a forceful argument against bombing Irans nuclear facilities. It will only delay -- not stop -- Iran and will make the country more determined to build a nuclear weapon and more dangerous when it gets one. The conclusion of the influential weekly: Short of occupation, the world cannot eliminate Irans capacity to gain the bomb. It can only change its will to possess one. Just now that is more likely to come about through sanctions and diplomacy than war. On sanctions, a growing number of observers agree that the new round of measures will definitively badly hurt the Iranian economy but will not convince the regime to stop with its nuclear program. The only available option with at least some chance of success seems to be old-fashioned diplomacy. And there Turkey comes in -- at least according to some. Last week, the International Crisis Group (ICG) presented a new report on Irans nuclear program. I would recommend everybody read the balanced assessment of the ICG and its proposal for a negotiated solution based on Turkeys past experiences and present potential. At the heart of the paper is a reconstruction of the Turkish-Brazilian effort in 2010 to strike a deal with Iran that resulted in the so-called Tehran Declaration. At the time, the agreement was swept aside by the US and the EU, although the content reflected many of the demands that Washington had put on the table only six months before. It turned out the US had given up on diplomacy then and had opted exclusively for sanctions. Turkey and Brazil felt betrayed and were astonished and angry. Both voted against a new round of trade bans in the UN Security Council. That was almost two years ago and in the meantime, things have moved on. Because of Syria and the NATO missile shield, relations between Ankara and Tehran are not that cozy anymore. The US needs Turkey to bring down Syrian mass murderer Bashar al-Assad and to counter Iranian dominance in Iraq. Now is a good moment to reflect upon the most effective strategy on Iran that could avoid an Israeli attack that both Obama and Prime Minister Erdoan dont want. The ICG suggests a return to the spirit of the 2010 Tehran Declaration: 1. Accept Irans right to nuclear research, enrichment, production and the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; 2. Force Iran to accept a rigorous monitoring system; 3. Revise the figures but stick to the mechanism that was agreed upon in 2010 to deal with Irans nuclear stockpile. Above all, the US and the EU should accept the crucial role in new negotiations of emerging, non-traditional powers, such as Turkey, Brazil and South Africa, that are more trusted by Iran. Would such a process guarantee success? No, it would not. But it would absolutely be preferable to a war that would rock

the region and sanctions that dont work.

I ask for your forgiveness Last November Germany and Turkey were in shock when it was discovered that a small neo-Nazi terror cell was responsible for the murder of eight Turkish and one Greek businessmen and one policewoman between 2000 and 2007. The revelations sparked a debate on the threat of right-wing extremism. German Turks accused the authorities of having systematically underestimated the danger of racist violence against migrants. Instead, it turned out the police investigators had focused on suspicions of family disputes or criminal ties, often suspecting the victims families of complicity. Soon after the discovery of this gruesome plot, reports were leaked to the press that showed that the German security apparatus had made major mistakes and state intelligence agents had even sabotaged police efforts to find the suspects before. One of the leading German newspapers, the center-left Sddeutsche Zeitung, wrote that it was no coincidence that the far-right gang came from the eastern part of Germany: Nowhere has the right-wing milieu blossomed as much as it has in the former East Germany. Nowhere have so many police officers turned a blind eye, sometimes out of sympathy for the neo-Nazis, sometimes out of fear for their own families. In Turkey, there was sadness and anger. Many openly asked the question whether these murders proved the critics right who claim that basically Germans are not willing to accept Turks as fellow citizens. Some ugly comments went one step further, suggesting that one should never trust the Germans. Once a Nazi, always a Nazi. Let me be clear: I have always hated these sweeping statements about Germans and their alleged tendency to repeat the past. They are based on a total lack of knowledge of Germanys post-war history and its efforts to deal with the ugly past. They are rude insults that prevent any decent discussion on what is going on in modern Germany. To be honest, I dont know of any other country that dealt with the follow-up to this drama in such a decent and honorable way. At the end of November the German parliament took the unusual step of issuing a joint declaration condemning the murders. German media were filled with images of Chancellor Angela Merkel and members of her cabinet standing with their heads bowed on the floor of the German parliament. Their statement said: We are deeply ashamed. That was November. Last week, there was another memorial event. Before a crowd of around 1,200 guests, including relatives of the victims and many leading politicians, Angela Merkel again used strong words to express her feelings about the neo-Nazi killings. She called them an attack on Germany and a disgrace for our country. She explicitly told the victims family that the state had abandoned them in times of need and some were even themselves suspected of wrongdoing. That is particularly oppressive. For this, I ask for your forgiveness. How else should a head of state react? Are there better words to show regret and sorrow and express apologies? I would not know. Does this mean that all the deeper-lying problems that caused these tragic events have been solved? Of course not. We are

still waiting for the results of the investigations into the role of the intelligence agencies. Were there a few bad apples who prevented effective action or should we worry about the overall mentality in Germanys security institutions? The person in the domestic intelligence agency responsible for right-wing extremism has already been replaced, maybe more heads will role. How to restore the confidence among German Turks that they are being protected in a proper and effective way by the German state against racists attacks? Apart from Merkel, also Semiya imek spoke at the memorial meeting. She is the daughter of Enver imek, the first person killed by the neo-Nazis in 2000. She raised the obvious question that preoccupies the minds of so many people with a migrant background in Germany: Am I at home here? How can I be sure of this when there are people who dont want me here because my parents come from another country? For Semiya the answer is clear. She will move in June to Isparta, the town where her father was born. Many others will keep on struggling with the same question. All these remaining doubts and obstacles should not cloud our judgment about the words of Angela Merkel. As someone wrote on the website of Todays Zaman: This is true and courageous statesmanship. Other world leaders take note and learn.

Ali, Aye and Tayyip Polarization in politics is inevitable and, to a certain extent, a precondition for a lively and interesting debate about the future, the present and sometimes even the past of any country. When everybody agrees on all the basics, political debates are boring and of little relevance. Extreme polarization on the other hand often prevents a meaningful exchange of opinions simply because both sides believe the differences between them are so great that it does not make sense to look for common ground. Why listen to the arguments of your opponent if you truly believe that there is nothing you have in common? I got a sense of that perception of total disconnect again last week when I was in the Netherlands to participate in two meetings on Turkey. One was a debate with Mustafa Akyol, a columnist at the Star daily and the Hrriyet Daily News, on democratization, the other a gathering of leftist Dutch Turks to honor the memory of Hrant Dink where also Rakel Dink was present. On both occasions I tried to present a balanced account of what, according to me, is happening in Turkey. Basically, my message was that there is a mixed picture of progress on some issues and stagnation on others. I stressed the point that one should not believe those domestic observers who claim that everything is fine and that the government is doing an excellent job across the board. At the same time, I strongly disagree with the picture painted by a rising number of Turkish and foreign journalists who suggest that Turkey is going down the drain because democracy is being totally crushed by an authoritarian prime minister. In my view, both arguments miss the point and fail to recognize the mixed and uneven nature of developments in Turkey. I got a lot of criticism during and after both events from Turks living in the Netherlands who considered my analysis to be either too negative or far too optimistic. They were not interested in the nuances and the shades of gray. Conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) supporters did not like my criticism of the performance of the ruling party; leftist

opponents thought I was too positive on the changes that had happened under AKP rule. Both agree that there is no middle way and that my efforts to escape from a black-and-white evaluation were doomed. One can witness the same kind of extreme polarization in Dutch politics. On the extremes, we have the right-wing and leftwing populists who agree on an agenda of social conservatism, economic protectionism and European skepticism. Both are doing great in the opinion polls. In between we have a collection of struggling center-right and center-left parties trying to adapt to the new realities of the 21st century. The populists can't get enough of bashing the center; the besieged centrists hate the extremists. The level of substantive debate between the two sides is close to zero. To end this non-productive political stalemate, the leader of the left liberals, Alexander Pechtold, took a remarkable initiative. The former minister of the interior is known for his strong and eloquent opposition to Mr. Wilders, the leader of the right-wing populists. He invited people who had voted for Mr. Wilders' party to come and talk with him in order for him to better understand their views and grievances. Recently, Pechtold published a book with 13 interviews in which he presents the opinions of these voters, the reasons why they prefer Mr. Wilders and his attempts to try and change their mind. The result is a fascinating read because one can witness the struggle to overcome prejudices and bridge the huge gap that exists between the liberal politician and his often angry and disgruntled conversation partners. The book is called Henk, Ingrid and Alexander because the two first names have become a sort of popular synonym for the male and female voters of Mr. Wilders. Would it not be a great idea if Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan would try and do the same? Sit down with CHP [Republican People's Party] voters, without cameras or journalists, just listen to their concerns and problems while gently trying to convince them that he respects their views but thinks they are wrong. It would be a brave and creative way to go beyond the extreme polarization that paralyzes Turkish politics at the moment and blocks any serious debate between the two main parties. It would surely be a great read: Ali, Aye and Tayyip.

Black tulips from Holland Geert Wilders did it again. The Dutch extreme-right politician managed to make it to the headlines in the Netherlands by targeting once more a group of immigrants, thereby provoking the anger and indignation of many of his fellow countrymen. Most Turks have heard of Mr. Wilders because of his extreme Islamophobia, labelling the religion as a fascist ideology, and his outspoken opposition to Turkish membership of the EU. This time though Mr. Wilders is not bashing Muslims. His party, the Party for Freedom (PVV), has set up a website where Dutch citizens can anonymously register their complaints about workers from Eastern Europe. The PVV accuses these migrants of many problems with nuisance and pollution and especially the stealing of Dutch jobs. Information on the website claims Romanians, Bulgarians and especially Poles are criminal threats. This latest show of Mr. Wilders infamous xenophobia has triggered a big debate at home and abroad. The main reason for most of the excitement is not only the content of the campaign which is considered to be outright discriminatory towards fellow Europeans. The huge outcry is directly linked to the fact that Mr. Wilders party supports the present Dutch government of Liberals and Christian Democrats. Without his help, the centre right coalition led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte

would not be able to survive in parliament. In other words, what Mr. Wilders says and does are not the extremist actions of a marginal party that could be discarded easily. They have an immediate impact on the perception of the government in the Netherlands and in the rest of Europe. That is why the opposition parties and, surprisingly, also the ruling Christian Democrats, have called upon Mr. Rutte to distance himself clearly and openly from Mr. Wilders initiative. Several Eastern European governments and the chairman of the European Parliament have done the same, calling the complaints website inappropriate and running against some of the core values of European integration. Till now, the Dutch prime minister has refused to do so, saying his task is not to comment on each and every move by Mr. Wilders and underlining that this approach is not backed by his government. The truth is he needs the support of the PVV in drafting new plans to drastically cut the national budget to comply with tough European rules Mr. Rutte has pushed for himself in Brussels. As in the past with most of his other provocations, Mr. Wilders is a master in magnifying certain real problems and putting all the blame on a specific ethnic, religious or national group. He did the same with Muslims and Greeks before. Now he tries to profit from the growing uneasiness among many Dutch people with the presence of foreign workers, while unemployment among the local population is growing. Of course he does not mention the fact that many Poles do the dirty and low paid work that most Dutch do not want to do anymore and that problems with housing and criminality are often caused by the illegal practices of Dutch landlords trying to profit from the need of most migrants for cheap accommodation. An interesting aspect of Mr. Wilders latest manoeuvre is that it shows the problem European populists have in keeping the attention and the votes of their electorate. Opinion polls and journalistic research show that many potential followers of Mr. Wilders and his colleagues in other European countries are getting tired of the Islam bashing that made up such a huge part of the original attraction of these parties. Mr. Wilders is clearly looking for other scapegoats and apparently he thinks he has found them in the peripheral countries of Europe. First he blamed the Greeks for being lazy profiteers that should be expelled from the EU. Now he has insulted the Poles for being criminals occupying the jobs of honest Dutch workers. A growing number of his compatriots are getting fed up with Mr. Wilders cheap blame games. The centrist religious newspaper Trouw called Mr. Wilders campaign a shame and commented: A black tulip is the blackest possible public relations for the Netherlands. Lets hope that the conclusion of todays outrage is that Islamophobia, racism and discrimination should be condemned each time someone tries to manipulate public opinion by appealing to these despicable instincts -- independent of the fact whether the victim is a Turk, a Greek or a Pole.

Media hype (and what gets overlooked) Turkey is in the middle of a new media hype again. This time it is the row between the National Intelligence Organization (MT) and the judiciary that is occupying the minds of practically all journalists and observers of Turkish politics. There is no room for misunderstanding, and this is normal because what we are all talking about these days touches upon some of the most sensitive aspects of the relations between different state institutions, and it deals with Turkeys most pressing problem, the Kurdish issue. Everybody is guessing and nobody knows for sure how to explain these remarkable events. As was to be expected, everyone tries to fit the news into an already prepared ideological mould. Those who always suspected MT of being involved in dirty business with the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] see their point proven by the attacks on the present and former MT

top brass. Others who have always supported the government-backed efforts by MT to strike a behind-the-scenes deal with PKK leader [Abdullah] calan consider the accusations against MT to be part of a strategy to fatally undermine any peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. My problem is not with all the attempts to try and make sense of these tumultuous developments. That is the task of the media. What I am concerned about is the fact that, as a result of the MT hype, nobody pays any attention anymore to the unanswered questions raised by previous media hype. What is happening with the investigations into the Uludere bombing of 34 innocent Turkish citizens? How are the survivors of the Van earthquake doing and what is being done to prevent similar disasters in the future? Or, to go back in time even further, how are the Ergenekon investigations and related court cases doing? On this particular issue, some media, like this newspaper, try to cover and analyze each major occurrence because they realize the importance of the case. But after so many years and so many twists and turns, it is hard to imagine who in Turkey can still claim to be fully aware of all the relevant aspects of these complex legal proceedings. Many other media outlets seem to have given up on the Ergenekon case because its simply too complicated or because the case is seen as being manipulated and instrumentalized by political and ideological forces they oppose. So better try to ignore it. I guess that is the reason why an important development in the Ergenekon case was initially missed by almost all Turkish media. Last week, out of the blue, there was a small and short media hype about a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, part of the Council of Europe, of which Turkey is a founding member. In December of last year the court ruled on the arrest of Tuncay zkan. He was imprisoned as an Ergenekon suspect in 2008 and went to the ECtHR in 2009 to complain about his arrest. Two months ago, the European judges deliberated whether or not there were good reasons to take zkan in for questioning and to keep him in jail since. This is a significant ruling because from the start, many opponents of the Ergenekon investigations have claimed that all the evidence has been fabricated and all suspects have been treated badly. The ECtHR concluded that zkans arrest was in conformity with European standards, that he was informed properly of the reasons for his arrest, that there is no proof that he was ill treated during his interrogation and that the length of his detention period remains just, but only just, within the regular limits in these kinds of complicated court cases. More importantly: Looking at the evidence against zkan provided by the Turkish prosecutors, the court decided that this was convincing enough to legitimize the arrest of zkan. In other words: no mention of fabrications or flimsy proofs. This does not mean that in other files there are no problems, but in this particular one, European judges do not see an obstacle. At the moment, they cannot decide yet whether zkan is getting a fair trial because the proceedings are still ongoing. Again, this ECtHR decision only covers one individual case and should not be seen as a general evaluation of the whole Ergenekon case by the highest European court on human rights. Still, it would have deserved slightly more attention in the Turkish media than it has received up until now. Unfortunately, it was swept aside by the latest media hype.

Helpless in the face of disaster

Following the debate on Syria in the Turkish and foreign press, there can only be one conclusion: This is how helplessness looks like. The failure to pass a resolution at the UN Security Council last week because of Russian and Chinese opposition has dealt a severe blow to all attempts to stop the bloodbath in Syria. Of course, diplomats keep going, trying to come up with a persuasive answer to the growing call to do something. For good reasons, Turkey is an active player in these efforts, talking to the EU, the US and the Arab League about new mechanisms to keep up the pressure on the Assad regime. There is talk of a joint Arab League-UN mission to monitor the Syrian governments deadly crackdown on protests. Plans are being discussed to establish a Friends of Syria group that should coordinate support for the Syrian opposition. Lets hope that, at least in this case, Turkey and France can overcome their mutual aversion and put the interests of the Syrian people first. While visiting Washington, D.C., Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu spoke passionately about the need for the world to act, faced with the horrors in places like Homs, Syrias third-biggest city, which was shelled relentlessly last week. Unfortunately, all these initiatives cannot hide the feeling of deep despair and hopelessness that is spreading among many observers. What could a new monitoring mission do other than repeat the same mistakes a previous failed Arab League commission made? Russia has already announced that it will not participate in any group of countries willing to act because it has very bad experiences with the Friends of Libya group, which, according to Moscow, was used to prepare foreign military intervention. Demonstrating similar feelings of frustration but from an opposite perspective, proponents of outside interference have expressed the hope that the diplomatic impasse will accelerate the discussion of military options that the Syrian opposition has been asking for. According to Shadi Hamid, head of research at the Brookings Doha Center and one of the supporters of some sort of armed intervention, the Security Council veto was the best recruiting tool that the Free Syrian Army [FSA] could have asked for. I think a lot of Syrians are saying We tried peaceful protests, it didnt work, now we have to defend ourselves from the repression of the regime. Most analysts do not want to go as far as Mr. Hamid is willing to go. But everybody is trying to find a mix of measures which, eventually, could lead to the end of the bloody repression. In this weeks edition, The Economist seems to have summarized most of that thinking in its proposal to get rid of President Bashar al-Assad: 1. Help unite the opposition so they can convince more Syrians to stop backing Alawite minority rule; 2. Keep peeling away Mr. Assads support internationally, especially with the Russians; and 3. Most controversially, back the creation of a safe haven in northwest Syria by Turkey, with the blessing of NATO and the Arab League. According to the British weekly, Turkey is willing to do this, providing it gets Western support. Although there would be risks, a free patch of Syrian land would allow the FSA to train its fighters and a credible opposition to take shape. It would show symbolically that Mr. Assads brutal days are numbered. The Economist believes such a haven is possible also because Mr. Assad would suffer only if he attacked it. But that is exactly what according to others is going to happen. In a sharp rebuff of the idea of a protected zone inside Syria, the influential and well-informed American blogger Juan Cole has warned of serious legal and military problems: Any such

zones would clearly immediately become war zones. Regional governments that back these zones, whether Turkey or Jordan, would almost certainly themselves be attacked by the Syrian army. He advises Syrian dissidents to keep up a nonviolent struggle that, Mr. Cole has to concede, might go on for a while. This brings us back to square one. Looking at the suggestions and justifications for military intervention in one way or the other, I tend to be sympathetic because I am horrified by the cruelty and the sadism of Mr. Assad and his army. Listening to the counter arguments and the warnings for even further bloodshed and the risks of regional warfare, hesitations and doubts set in. This is indeed what helplessness feels like

Misperceiving Europe: by accident or on purpose? Being European, I am probably more sensitive than others living in Turkey to the opinions and perceptions of Europe in this country -- especially because I am fully aware of the classic love/hate relationship that so many Turks have with the old continent to which they want to belong but whose intentions they have learned to distrust. Ten years ago, everything that was said or done in Europe was observed with great interest by many Turks because most believed Turkey was on its way to become a member of the EU. That euphoria did not last long, and already after five years, serious doubts set in whether membership would ever materialize. For understandable reasons, many Turks started to question the sincerity of Turkey-bashing European politicians. Over the last couple of years there has been a clear mood swing to the other extreme: Europe is seen as being in unstoppable economic decline and moral decay, and that is why Turkey should stop bothering and continue on its own glorious journey as an emerging global power. Exit Europe. Amidst all this volatility, it is always nice to hear someone put things in the proper perspective. Last week, former Turkish minister and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) head Kemal Dervi showed why he is considered by so many at home and abroad as one of Turkeys leading intellectuals. Dervi spoke at a panel discussion on Turkey-EU relations and basically made three points. One is that the EU is changing and this transformation into a more flexible organization offers new opportunities for Turkey to become a full member but with special arrangements. Secondly, he called on the EU to change strategy and rhetoric because, according to Dervi, Turkey has reached a point where it can no longer stand all this talk about bars and conditions. But it was his third point that I liked most. He stressed that the EU is still important for Turkey, also in its relations with the Arab word: Turkey is strong and influential because it is part of the European family and is already integrated with Europe. Without the EU dimension, Turkey would be just another Middle Eastern country and would have a weaker influence. For Dervi, the EU remains an attractive model: The EUs achievement is impressive. It has created a zone of peace and multinational decision-making mechanisms, a market economy with strong social policies. When I came home after his speech, I was immediately reminded of the fact that Dervis global vision on Europe is not shared by other renowned Turkish intellectuals. In his column in Todays Zaman of that same day, brahim Kaln tried to

show that Europe is losing its relevance for much of the world. Kaln is one of the chief advisers of Recep Tayyip Erdoan and someone who is very influential in shaping the views of the prime minister on the rest of the world. According to Kaln, the problem with Europe goes far beyond the present economic crisis. The continent is no longer able to live up to its own standards of freedom, rationality and equality for all. Main example: the debate in Europe on multiculturalism and migration that -- as Kaln sees it -- is totally dominated by the extreme right. Let me focus on this argument because it often pops up in debates in Turkey on Europe. To be honest, I think it is a typical example of not being able to see the forest for the trees. Yes, there is a serious problem in Europe with racism and rising Islamophobia as a result of mass migration and the growing fear for the negative effects of companies and people moving from one country to another. It will take time, patience and political courage to overcome this polarization. But it is a big mistake to suggest that the majority of Europeans agrees with the anti-Muslim populists (they dont, look at the election results) or that Europe is the only place in the world where migration and globalization have created these kind of problems (look at the US or the horrible treatment of Asian migrants in the Gulf states). These are the new global challenges of the 21st century. To single out the EU for extra scrutiny may be popular these days, but I think people like Kaln should be more careful and focused in their criticism and not indulge in these kinds of sweeping statements. Or is he preparing the ground intellectually for a political move away from the EU that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is contemplating?

Football and politics in Egypt Anyone who has ever been to a football match between staunch rivals in a fully packed stadium will probably recognize this uncomfortable feeling of anxiety. Imagine what might happen if the most fanatic supporters of both sides were allowed to confront each other on or off the pitch or were to go after you? How would you deal with a panicking crowd trying to get down from the stands, pushing and shoving in the narrow aisles, then to find the gates locked? These thoughts passed my mind when I saw the pictures of the Al-Masry supporters flooding the field at the Port Said football grounds after their team won the match against arch rivals Al-Ahly and when I read the stories of eyewitnesses recounting the horrors inside the stadium. Al-Ahly supporters were stabbed, thrown off high stadium tiers, trampled in passageways while trying to flee and suffocated against closed doors. Over 70 youngsters lost their lives in one of the worst football-related incidents in history. The obvious questions are how this could have happened and how these events relate to the ongoing political tensions in Egypt. Because, as Wendell Steavenson put it in the New Yorker magazine: We are in the middle of a revolution, and everything is political. I am not a big fan of conspiracy theories, but I must say, looking at what happened and having read several eyewitness

accounts, it is hard to escape the impression that there is more to these massacres than just football violence. How else to explain that there was no search for weapons when entering the stadium? How is it possible that after the match finished, all the gates to the pitch were opened in a coordinated way, while at the same time police officers were standing by, doing nothing to prevent supporters invading the field and going after Al-Ahly players and fans? How to explain the stories told by different people to reporters from Reuters and the Guardian of unknown armed agitators that infiltrated the ranks of the AlMasry fans before and during the match? These kinds of questions would pop up after each similar incident in which so many were killed in such peculiar circumstances. In this case, there is a special reason to be suspicious. The fans of Al-Ahly that took the blows are part of the so-called Ultras, hardcore football fans that played a key role in defending Tahrir Square one year ago against the police forces loyal to then-Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. The Ultras were among the fiercest fighters during the peak of the revolutionary battles that brought down the Mubarak regime. They hate the police with whom they love to pick a fight, and the police hate them. It is no coincidence that immediately after the Port Said tragedy, both the Ultras and the April 6 Youth Movement, one of the main political groups representing the revolutionary Tahrir Square spirit, accused the police, backed by the army, of taking revenge on the Ultras by allowing organized thugs to kill them. The plot fits in with other stories published before the football drama alleging that the military, in order to maintain internal cohesion and control over the country, was creating demons, be they Coptic protesters in October of last year or Tahririst groups in November and December. The Ultras match the profile perfectly. It is still too early to draw any final conclusions, but what could be the political fall out of this drama? Is James Dorsey, author of the popular blog The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, right when he claims that the Ultras might have walked into a trap set for them by the military and the police who wanted to deal a lethal blow to the continued street protests that have become less popular with large parts of the population longing for stability and economic recovery? Or does respected blogger Issandr El Amrani have a point when he suggests that in the eyes of many ordinary Egyptians the army failed to guarantee basic security in Port Said and that is why many, including the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, are wondering if the army is allowing -- or even encouraging -- the chaos in order to justify its rule? Instead of splitting the opposition, the death of so many young football fans may have united the street protesters and the newly elected parliamentarians in their struggle to establish civilian rule in Egypt.

Germany: its lonely at the top On Monday, 25 out of 27 EU member states agreed to new rules on budget discipline aimed at keeping deficits under strict control. The treaty will formally be signed in March and was presented as the first step in a strategy to win back the confidence of the financial markets and the large number of European citizens who still wonder whether or not their leaders are able to come up with solutions that really work. The second move in mid-February should be a new bailout package for Greece. That will only happen, though, when the Greek government manages to strike a deal with banks and other private holders of Greek bonds over the losses they are willing to accept. In the third and final stage of this plan, the EU has to agree in March on the details of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the permanent bailout fund that should be big and robust enough to

protect Italy and Spain against the risk of default and prevent similar future accidents in the eurozone. Criticism on this approach has been strong from the start, both inside the EU and from institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to many experts, the policy is too much focused on limiting spending and cutting budget deficits and too little on stimulating the economic growth necessary to reach balanced budgets in the foreseeable future. Guy Verhofstadt, former Belgian prime minister and now leader of the Liberals in the European Parliament, summarized the criticisms when he commented on Mondays deal: The new agreement consolidates fiscal discipline but omits completely to address the other side of the coin -- that of solidarity and investment that will create jobs and growth. Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning American economist, has lambasted the European obsession for cutting deficits. Stiglitz called the new EU treaty a suicide pact that risks pushing Europe into a coordinated and self-defeating recession. To a certain extent, these comments did have an influence on EU thinking. Apart from the new budgetary rules, the EU leaders on Monday also adopted a policy paper to stimulate job-friendly growth. Few people were impressed by these good intentions because, as one commentator put it, they look like new deadlines for old promises that were made before and were not successful in creating jobs for the rising number of unemployed young Europeans. Much of the blame for this European inability to come up with a balanced policy to solve both the acute problems with the euro and create the proper conditions for a longer term recovery, has been put on the shoulders of German chancellor Angela Merkel. Analysts have called her stubborn and too much focused on imposing a German fiscal and monetary model on the rest of Europe. Romano Prodi, the former president of the European Commission, called the German leader egoistic, echoing a broadly shared frustration among other European politicians who are afraid that Germany is becoming too powerful. In several EU member states a debate has started about the prospect of German domination of the EU, a union that was always based on the understanding that it would not be good for internal coherence and acceptance if one country would dictate decisions. Long term EU observers have tried to explain the recent German assertiveness by stressing the fact that Merkel and her advisers belong to a new, post-World War II generation that is not hindered by the old, historically induced modesty that characterized previous German leaders like Helmut Kohl. As the rest of her colleagues, Merkel is there to defend the national interest, in her case the German national interest, as she sees it. As one of her close aides put it: Europe should get used to the fact that for Merkel German financial interests are sometimes more important than European integration. That is the new European reality. Germany is contributing by far the most money to save Greece and other ailing eurozone countries because it is the best performing economy in Europe with a clear self-interest in a strong euro. In return, Berlin wants to be sure that the EU is not wasting that money. The rest of Europe should get used to those new facts of life. Germany, on the other hand, should understand that sometimes less pressure and more flexibility would do wonders. Above all, it should realize that with power come more responsibility and less appreciation. It is indeed lonely at the top.

Rathe Turkish than papist In 1612 the Dutch envoy Cornelis Haga arrived in Istanbul to become the first official representative of the young Dutch Republic to the Ottoman sultan.

This year, Turkey and the Netherlands will be celebrating 400 years of cultural, diplomatic and trade relations. There will be a range of activities and events in both countries. The celebrations will look at the future with the aim of boosting bilateral relations. The focus will be on economic diplomacy and people-to-people contacts. President Abdullah Gl will come to the Netherlands at the end of April, and most probably, both the Dutch queen and prime minister will be visiting Turkey during this year. In Istanbul the first event has already started. Last week, the Pera Museum opened an exhibition titled Sultans, Merchants, Painters: The Early Years of Turkish-Dutch Relations that presents oil paintings, engravings and books. The exhibition will be open till April 1 and will then move to Amsterdam. Many more exciting happenings will follow on which I will try to inform you as good as possible. There is at least one that I would kindly recommend you to put in your agenda, and that is the spectacular exhibition Rembrandt and the Golden Age of Dutch Painting that will open on Feb. 22 at the Sakp Sabanci Museum, marking its own 10th anniversary by bringing top pieces by 17th century Dutch masters Rembrandt, Vermeer and Frans Hals to Istanbul. Apart from big and small exhibitions, there will be debates and seminars on several other aspects of Dutch-Turkish relations through the centuries and at this particular moment. I personally hope that this year of extra attention will help people both in Turkey and the Netherlands to better understand the other country and its historic and present day peculiarities. I am sure all these activities will not be appreciated by the anti-Turkey lobby in the Netherlands. We could already see an example of that negative attitude when extreme-right populist politician Geert Wilders called on the government to stop with all celebrations because, according to him, there is nothing to be proud of in Dutch-Turkish relations. There will be more of this kind of provocations, but fortunately the government and a large majority of Dutch citizens have dismissed these proposals as nonsensical. What people like Wilders want to stress all the time is the old stereotype of the cruel and violent Turk threatening to invade and command Europe that, one has to admit, has dominated the perception of Turkey and Turks during large parts of these four centuries. They simply want to forget that, despite that negative image, many positive and long lasting ties and relations have been constructed as well. To take this argument one step further: During those 400 years there have been several interesting but often unknown moments of cooperation and mutual assistance between the Dutch and the Turks. One of these instances is reflected in a Dutch saying that many have heard of but few know where it comes from. It says: Rather Turkish than Papist. It was popular around 1600 when the Protestant Dutch were fighting for their independence against the Catholic Spaniards. The catchphrase was especially well-liked by Dutch freedom fighters and pirates called De Geuzen who wore a crescent-shaped medal with that slogan on their belts. The phrase was coined to indicate that life under the Ottoman sultan would be more desirable than life under the king of Spain, a Catholic hardliner or papist who did not tolerate the Protestant faith and whose ancestors had expelled the Jews from Spain a century before. Demonstrating the ambiguous conceptualization at that time among the Dutch, the Turks had a reputation for cruelty, but they were also known for their tolerance of other religions. It also shows that the classic maxim The enemy of my enemy is my friend was practiced in those days as well because the Dutch realized perfectly well that what they shared with the Ottomans was a common enemy: the Habsburg dynasty that tried to keep the Dutch down and the Turks out.

In 1612 the first Dutch ambassador was welcomed in stanbul, and the Ottoman Empire became the first major European power to officially recognize the independent Dutch Republic. The rest only followed in 1648. Lets try to use this year to highlight more historic facts and personalities showing that Turkish-Dutch relations have always been much more varied and entertaining than Mister Wilders and other Turkey phobics want us to believe.

Change in Egypt, Part 2 This week we will see many huge public manifestations in Cairo and other Egyptian cities celebrating the first anniversary of the demonstrations which, after a surprisingly short period of time, brought down the Mubarak regime. The first, revolutionary part of the Big Change is over, with the installation of the newly elected parliament two days ago. Many Egyptians, plus the rest of the world, will now be closely watching how a post-revolutionary Egypt will function. The first test will be the division of labor between the Egyptian parliament and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling military council that took over after Mubarak left. Who will be in control now: parliament or the army? For the first time in history, the Peoples Assembly is dominated by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), that together with a number of small allies managed to win 47 percent of the seats. The second biggest party in parliament is the ultra-orthodox Islamist Nour Party, with 25 percent of the seats. Liberal and left wing parties are represented but they are small. Will the present government, nominated by SCAF, be replaced by a new one based on a parliamentary majority? And will parliament sideline the army completely when adopting new laws, or selecting who will be part of the committee that writes a brand new constitution? According to many specialists, the relationship between parliament and SCAF remains ambiguous. It is unclear whether or not the military can still block legislation because it has the right to ratify or veto bills. Does parliament have the right to appoint ministers or withdraw its confidence in the cabinet? These are all open questions that need be answered soon if Egypt is going to tackle its urgent problems. Some observers expect the FJP not to push too hard for immediate, total control because the Muslim Brotherhood knows too well that with power comes responsibility. The problems facing Egypt are enormous, especially in terms of the economy. Egypt is a poor country with flagrant inequalities in wealth and opportunity. On top of that, since the start of the revolution one year ago foreign direct investment has fallen from $13 billion to $8 billion and the budget deficit is running at 10 percent. These are the hard facts the MB would face should it venture into government on its own. It seems the MB, experienced in opposition but without any track record of running the country, is calculating carefully and aiming for some sort of power sharing deal with other parties and the military. The MB wants to prevent a scenario in which it will be exposed to harsh criticism if they fail to deal quickly and effectively with the disastrous economic legacy of the Mubarak years. The problem, according to most analysts, is that the MB has few immediate solutions to Egypts looming economic crisis. It is one of the important comparisons that can be drawn with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) when they came to power in Turkey in 2002. In an interesting comment on the Carnegie Endowments website, Sebnem Gumuscu, a political scientist at Sabanci University, compares the economic policies of the AKP and the MB. She sees the rise of the AKP as the result of Turkeys neoliberal transition in the 80s that created an organized class of powerful and devout businessmen who

advocated ideological moderation. In Egypt, the benefits of neoliberalism were mainly enjoyed by the Mubarak regimes cronies and failed to trickle down to smaller enterprises. She says in analysis: There is no strong business constituency within the Egyptian Islamist movement that is insisting on neoliberal reforms, a smaller state or political pragmatism. The movement is dominated instead by professionals (doctors, engineers, teachers and lawyers) who prefer a strong and expansive state as a source of employment, social security and public goods. Because the structural and institutional factors that led to the rise and success of the AKP in Turkey are historically unique, Gumuscu is convinced we will not see a similar process unfold in Egypt. Under Islamist leadership, Egypt will have to establish another framework. As Olivier Roy, one of the great specialists on political Islam, put it in a recent article, the MB is benefiting from a democratization it did not trigger, stepping into a political vacuum created by the liberal vanguard that started the revolution but did not try to take power. Now the MB has to negotiate and deliver because the electorate wants stability and peace, not revolution.

Indeed, this case is not over yet I was planning to write my column about something else, thinking that on Sunday, the day this article is published and three days after the Hrant Dink march I participated in on Thursday, more or less everything would have been said about this amazing event. Maybe that is true, but I have to write about it anyway because it was such a powerful event, both sad and impressive, and because I am convinced that, as one of the key slogans during the demonstration highlighted, this case is not over yet. Let me try to explain why the killing of Dink and the scandalous execution and conclusion of the court case against his murderers have become such iconic phenomena. If the true driving forces behind Dinks murder remain hidden and protected, this case will keep haunting Turkey and its leaders for years to come. Why? Firstly, because of the person he was, and his ideals. Apart from the rancorous Turkish nationalists, most people who saw him on television or heard him speak appreciated his warm personality and respected his positive agenda: trying to reconcile Turks and Armenians. Dink was not a hard-liner but a conciliator. His murder shocked millions who did not know him personally but realized, up until today, that doves dont deserve to be killed. The second reason for the doggedness of this case, at home and abroad, is the subject that is directly linked to Dink and his work: the debate on the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. That issue is not going to go away, on the contrary. In the run-up to 2015, that debate will intensify and, with each round, Dinks fate will loom large in the background. Thirdly, this crime is easy to understand. We are not talking about complicated conspiracies like Ergenekon here. A few nationalist youngsters from Trabzon were told to kill Dink, someone they did not know personally. Everybody understands that these young guys did not plan the murder, let alone should be held responsible for the cover-up before and after. There were others, in the security apparatus of the state, who orchestrated this crime and used their contacts in the state hierarchy

to get away with it. As long as these links are not uncovered, nobody will believe that justice has been served. Fourth, the ruling of the court touches upon at least one hot issue that will be on the top of Turkeys political agenda for the next couple of years: the need to fundamentally reform the legal system. Many deficiencies have already been discussed and the government has announced reforms to tackle them. But how to convince anyone that things are improving when it is still possible in Turkey for a judge to rule that there was no conspiracy behind Hrants murder while the prosecutor and one of the main suspects have declared otherwise. Even the judge himself claimed in an interview afterwards that deep down he believes himself that there is something rotten out there. Finally, there is the power of the picture. Each time there is a massive demonstration linked to Dinks murder or court case, the familiar images of thousands of people holding famous slogans on small black-and-white cardboard placards make it to the front pages in Turkey and abroad. You do not need to follow the news on a daily basis to immediately realize that this is still about this case of the murdered Turkish journalist. Millions have stored these images in their memory and these will only gradually fade away when there is no longer a need to go out and express the anger and frustration of so many in a way that has become so well understood and recognized all over the world. For all those reasons, there is nowhere the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government can hide. After having been in power for almost 10 years now, they are responsible for a breakthrough of the present stalemate. If they choose to remain undecided on this matter, there are only two credible explanations: The ruling party is not willing to do so because it has opted for a deal with the status quo forces in the state or is not able to push for a satisfying solution because it still cant touch some of the old power centers. Either way, the AKP will come out morally damaged and politically weakened. I am sure this is not a scenario the AKP leadership prefers. Indeed, this case is not over yet.

Why are political apologies so difficult? This week it is five years ago since Hrant Dink was killed. As part of the efforts to keep his memory and the ideas he defended alive, each year a Hrant Dink Memorial Lecture is organized in stanbul and in Ankara. This year I was invited to deliver the Ankara lecture at the Middle East Technical University (ODT). I was honored to do so and want to share with you the main points of my speech that focused on the question of why it seems to be so difficult for politicians to apologize. I guess that when a contest is organized to choose The Word of the Year 2011, the word apology will have a good chance of winning. Other runners-up would probably be the words match-fixing and pre-trial detention period. The word apology played a key role on at least three occasions: 1. Turkey wanted apologies from Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident but did not get them; 2. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan became the first Turkish leader to issue an apology. He apologized for the killing by the Turkish state of more than 13,000 Kurds and Alevis in Dersim between 1936 and 1939; 3. Although asked to do so by many Turkish citizens, the same prime minister refused to apologize after Turkish planes mistakenly bombed and killed 34 innocent Kurdish smugglers close to the Turkish-Iraqi border in Uludere. In his book Apologia Politica, Girma Negash, a professor of political science at the University of South Carolina in the US,

looks into several high-profile cases of political apologies in history. On the basis of all these examples from all over the world, Negash suggests four criteria for a successful public apology that can have a healing effect and reconcile societies: Acknowledgement: This consists of the self-conscious process of assessing the damages one has committed. It is the act of reckoning and the recognition of the consequences of one's act to others. Truth-telling: Be transparent about the facts of the injurious events and don't try to get away with a vague and symbolic statement without cost or commitment. Accountability: It has to be clear who is apologizing to whom on whose behalf. Only when this is evident can the issue of responsibility be addressed; who will be morally answerable for the crimes perpetrated? Public remorse: The essence of remorse is regret for one's grievous actions, the wish that they did not happen and the accompanying feeling of sorrow. How do the Dersim apology and the Uludere non-apology score on this list of criteria? On Uludere we can be brief: What an enormous missed opportunity! On Dersim the jury is still out. As I wrote before, I do think the prime minister's apologies were an important first step forward. They should be used and built upon and not be ridiculed or belittled, as many political opponents have done. Having said that, I am not so sure whether the Dersim apologies will be successful in the long run because they do not fulfill most of Negash's criteria. Yes, there was the acknowledgement of tragic wrongdoing and yes, some figures were mentioned, although a comprehensive overview was not presented. But it was not clear to whom exactly he was apologizing and who should be morally answerable. By putting the blame immediately and fully on the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), one could easily get the impression that for the prime minister the apologies were first and foremost an opportunistic, politically motivated move to damage his main rival, Kemal Kldarolu. On the last criteria, public remorse, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader did show regret and sorrow. Unfortunately, as so often happens in Turkish politics, there seem to be no follow-ups, no plans to establish a museum, erect a statue or publish a popular history of the Dersim massacre that makes it understandable for a general audience what the responsibility of the Turkish state was, let alone a call on Turkish society to start dealing with other atrocities committed by the Turkish state in the past as well. Maybe these positive and highly symbolic gestures are still to come. If they do, they will show that the speech in Parliament was more than a spontaneous maneuver aimed at short-term political gains. Instead, it will signal the beginning of a new approach on how to deal with the many dark pages in Turkey's history, a new way of thinking that the country needs so badly. Making concessions in Cairo

The Turkish word for making concessions is taviz. It is seen as a synonym for losing out, giving in and surrendering. It is almost an insult. That does not bode well for the group of parliamentarians who have been asked to prepare a brand new Turkish constitution. This commission consists of an equal number of members of each party represented in Parliament -- very democratic and exactly the kind of interparty cooperation that many, including the European Commission, have been asking for. The problem is that every proposal has to be agreed to by all four parties. That would be quite a challenge in

every parliament where parties exist because by necessity they offer fundamentally different answers to the same questions. But, as several observers and specialists have already noted, asking Turkish politicians to find a compromise across the board seems to be asking for the impossible. Can you imagine Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) representatives coming out of the final meeting of the committee and telling the media that, in order to reach consensus, all of them have made ... concessions? Maybe Parliament Speaker Cemil iek should make a short trip to Cairo and see how the Egyptians are dealing with the same challenge. On Jan. 25 there will be big celebrations all over Egypt to mark the first anniversary of the start of the revolution that led to the downfall of the Mubarak regime a few weeks later. During the last two months we have seen elections for the new Egyptian parliament, and the next step planned is the working out of a new constitution. As in Turkey, that will be a hell of a job, knowing the deep suspicions that exist among the leading political actors. On one side of the spectrum we have the ultra-puritan, Salafist al-Nour Party that performed extraordinary well in the elections; on the other you will find small liberal and left parties who fear the rising influence in Egypt of a strict form of Islamism. Trying to position itself in the middle as a moderate and tolerant Islamist party is the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the big winner in the elections with over 40 percent of the votes. How can these opponents ever agree on a common text? In order to help the struggling politicians, Al-Azhar, Egypts leading Islamic institution, after three months of collaboration with secular and Islamist scholars, issued a document last week that should serve as the basis of the new constitution. At the core of the report are basic freedoms of opinion and expression that should apply to the media as well as to political parties and civil society organizations. Important is the reference to freedom of belief for all citizens, including non-Muslims. One day later more than 60 important political and religious figures from all sides of the political spectrum signed a common statement based on the Al-Azhar document that calls, among other things, for a swift handover of power from the military to an elected civilian authority, the speedy prosecution of former regime figures and full compensation for the families of slain protesters. All three major churches in Egypt, including the Coptic Orthodox Church, support the document although the more radical Coptic youth branch made the pertinent comment that they rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was issued by a religious body. They think, according to me rightly so, that freedoms must be recognized by the state, not a religious institution. Everybody knows it will be extremely hard to translate last weeks unity into the text of a new constitution. Egypt is not there yet. Still, the broadly supported statement is a remarkable sign of the willingness to look for common ground. Being aware of all the differences between Egypt and Turkey, why has such a highly symbolic gesture not been made yet by those responsible for a new Turkish constitution? Is it because they do not know how to compromise? During his visit to Egypt last year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan made a lasting impression on many Egyptians by defending secularism, a word with very bad connotations in the Arab world. Maybe iek could invite the Grand Sheikh of AlAzhar to come to Turkey and explain why making concessions in order to build a consensus is not that bad for societies trying to overcome deeply rooted divisions. For your information: in Arabic, taviz means receiving something and giving something.

Europe is the perfect punching bag I knew it had become quite popular these days to bash the EU and Europe in general -- to declare the old continent as being in a state of unstoppable decline, both economically and morally. In Turkey, the government has been kind enough to offer a lifeline to the struggling Europeans, underlining the ruling party's bloated self confidence. Many commentators revel in sweeping statements about the EU falling apart and the end of European influence outside its own borders. But the anti-European virus has spread all over the globe. The German weekly Der Spiegel this week published an intriguing overview on their English language website of Europhobic remarks made by Republican candidates running for the US presidency. It is both laughable and frightening to read how prejudiced and ignorant potential American leaders are about Europe. The interesting thing is that all of them look at Europe not as a beauty past its prime but as a competing model that they vehemently oppose. Candidates accuse each other of being too European, and they all try to damage the image of Democratic President Barack Obama by calling him a European social democrat. The most likely Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, put it very bluntly when he stated: I do not want America to become like Europe. I want America to be more like America. According to Der Spiegel the war on Europe is not only guided by economic concerns. It is presented as a cultural confrontation. The Republican candidates, playing to the fears of the substantial ultra-religious part of their core electorate, voice the anxiety that European values and principles will become dominant in the US. Secular Europe, in other words, has become a threat to Christian America. For totally different reasons, Europe is also the perfect punching bag for populists in several EU member states. Right-wing and left-wing opponents of the EU have found a common language that portrays the EU and its institutions as the enemy of the ordinary citizens, keen on taking away the powers of democratically elected national parliaments and transferring them to an unelected bureaucracy in Brussels. The reality is of course much more complicated, but in politics feelings are facts, so perception is extremely important. Part of the current problem in trying to restore confidence in the euro is the fear of many governments that the inevitable transfer of economic and fiscal power to EU institutions will be used by the populists to gain even more votes and further undermine the already crumbling trust in the EU as a whole. In times of troubles and uncertainty about the future of the European welfare states, Euro skepticism goes down quite well with a substantial part of the electorate. As a result of populist agitation and a lack of courage and vision on the part of European leaders, for many the EU has become part of the problem, not of the solution. Apart from American and domestic assaults, the European model is under growing attack from new emerging global powers as well. At a prestigious conference on the New World in Paris last week, a Brazilian businessman reflected the thinking among many new kids on the block when he stated provocatively that the West is no longer an example that countries like Brazil, China or India want to follow. The problem according to him is that the Europeans still do not realize that their time is over and still think that the rest of the world wants to be like them. The popular Europe bashing in Turkey should be seen as part of this powerful trend that will dominate many debates in the years to come. The lesson for European politicians and intellectuals? 1. Forget about the Republicans; they are not going to win the election anyway. 2. Take the criticism on unnecessary EU interventions in national politics seriously and try to reorganize the union accordingly. At the same time, stand up to populism at home by defending the need for a strong Europe in a global world in which the center of gravity is gradually shifting to the East and the South. 3. Rethink your relations with neighbors and start acting strategically. Only by further integrating Turkey and the Balkans and developing strong relations with the emerging

Arab democracies can Europe remain a global player. Indeed, it is not easy these days to be a European.

Two great opportunities missed I am sure each football fan can remember some of those moments where his favorite team had a great opportunity to score a goal in a difficult, tight match against a strong opponent, but did not. After the match is lost or has ended in a draw, hours will be spent on speculating what would have happened if. Last week, I experienced two of those if moments. Not while watching football but while observing Turkeys politicians and legal elite. The first missed opportunity that could cost them the match was the refusal of the government to apologize after the horrible incident in Uludere that killed 35 citizens because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Several columnists and commentators in this newspaper have made the point: In any decent democracy, the civil authorities responsible for the functioning of the country would have come out straight away and would have apologized for the terrible fate that hit 35 of their citizens. What happened in Turkey? Several spokesmen offered their condolences, promised compensation and created a shocking lack of clarity on the apologies by making them dependent on the outcome of investigations still taking place. As if any future report could present the government with a good excuse not to say they were terribly sorry for what happened. It does not matter who made which mistake or who might deliberately have given the wrong information to the pilots. Whatever the background, whoever is found guilty, the basic understanding should be that a mistake was made and that there is only one authority that is supposed to act after such a lethal error: the government. By not doing so, the ruling party indeed missed a golden opportunity to show that for them there is no difference between Kurds and Turks and that all the sick suggestions that this bombing was done on purpose are a lie. The prime minister can and should give many speeches explaining his plans for a new constitution that recognizes the equal rights of all Turkish citizens, independent of ethnicity or religion. The sad truth is that, after so many unfulfilled promises, no speech will have the power to convince the skeptics that things are really changing in Turkey and that the old days are finally over. A quick, honest and highly symbolic apology could have had that effect. If only. The second great opportunity was missed by the judge and the prosecutor in the trail against several journalists who are accused of belonging to the shady Ergenekon network. I have made it clear before that I have no sympathy at all for people linked to the OdaTV website like Soner Yaln. I have no problem with them being called in for questioning about their alleged role in media manipulation efforts. At the same time, I still do not understand why journalists like Ahmet ik and Nedim ener were arrested and accused of having assisted these ultra-nationalists in one way or the other. The point is that all of them were arrested 10 months ago. They finally got the chance to defend themselves last week and that is what they did. They also asked to be released from prison so they could go home and wait there for their trial to continue. We know that, from all over the world, reliable and bona fide organizations have criticized the arrests of so many journalists in Turkey and have questioned the old Turkish habit of keeping suspects in jail as long as their trial is ongoing. If there is no danger of

fleeing the country or of destroying or tampering with evidence, why should all these suspects be jailed? The government has tried to counter the growing tide of criticism by sticking to the line that most journalists were not arrested because of their work and that they are preparing judicial reforms that would improve the situation of suspects during trial. The uncomfortable reality is that less and less people are convinced by these explanations and promises. Again, instead of more words, one concrete gesture would have helped to ease the situation and could have indicated that the new Turkish judiciary under construction is moving away from the old rigid mentality and procedures. Unfortunately, the request was refused and the defendants are still in prison. Another chance missed in a match that Turkey is unlikely to win if it does not change strategy.

No responsibility to protect in Syria? How much longer can we stand by and witness the ongoing killing of civilians in neighboring Syria? The question keeps popping up in my mind each time I read about the daily count of people murdered in Homs, Damascus or anywhere else by a ruthless dictator not willing to give in to mounting international pressure. The latest effort to stop the bloodshed was by the Arab League. They sent a mission to Syria last week to check whether the Syrian regime was keeping its promise to the league to end the violence and withdraw its troops from the inner cities. The mission utterly failed. Syrian activists say more than 150 people have been killed since the monitors arrived. The Arab League's director, Nabil al-Arabi, had to concede last Monday that the mission had not been able to stop the Syrian authorities from killing their opponents. What does the Syrian opposition want? In an interview with Today's Zaman, Mohammad Bassam Imadi, a member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), remained optimistic about the will of the Syrian people to keep coming out and demonstrating against the regime. According to him, the fall of the Assad government is inevitable. The only thing Imadi asked for was the establishment of buffer zones along the Turkish and Jordanian border. These would give refuge to civilians and army defectors who want to escape from the oppression and for the moment have no place to go. On the other hand, Samir Nashar, a member of the SNC's executive board, claimed two days ago in an interview with The Washington Times that the majority of SNC leaders now support international military action but are not brave enough to express it openly. Nashar no longer believes that the popular uprising alone can force Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down or trigger a coup d'tat within the regime. According to him, people on the ground are growing restless and desperate and would not object to a Turkish-led NATO operation with cover from Arab states. What to make of this contradicting advice coming from the main Syrian opposition? Was Marc Lynch, an American Middle East specialist who is very active on Twitter, correct when he tweeted on Monday that basically Syrian opposition leaders still don't know what they want, just like the rest of the world doesn't know what it can do? It reminds me of the debate we had last year on the merits of military intervention in Libya. Remember Gaddafi's threat to kill the citizens of Benghazi who opposed his rule? Together with many others, I supported a French-British led military operation to prevent mass killings. Many of us referred to the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, adopted by the United

Nations General Assembly some years ago, that legitimizes international intervention in situations where national authorities are no longer able or willing to protect their citizens. Why could R2P be invoked in Libya and not in Syria? I know there are important differences between the two cases, and I fully realize the huge potential regional and international consequences of a military intervention in Syria. It is true that in deciding on outside action, moral indignation alone is not enough. It should also be feasible and effective. Still, it breaks my heart to read each day about dozens of brave Syrians being butchered by a mass murderer who knows very well that the international community is paralyzed and does not know what to do. On one of the leading English language Arab websites, Jadaliyya (www.jadaliyya.com), Ziad Majed recently posted a passionate plea for the Syrian activists to stick to non-violence. He listed the enormous achievements of the present strategy such as the destruction of the barrier of fear and the involvement of women. According to Majed, the popular revolution has gradually weakened the regime and transformed it into a terrified killing machine incapable of defeating or controlling its enemies. For political, moral and pragmatic reasons, non-violent action is still the superior choice. I was impressed by Majed's arguments and perseverance in the face of so much brutality. He is probably right. Military intervention could make things even worse, and it would shift the leadership of the domestic opposition from civilian citizen bodies to militant groups. But it is hard to accept that R2P may still be a nice idea that, unfortunately, cannot always be implemented in situations that cry out for action.

My 2012 wish and fear list I want to start by offering my sincere condolences to the families of the people who were killed in the tragic accident in Uludere. I hope the government will apologize for this horrible incident, compensate the family members and do everything in its power to find those responsible for the mistakes made and take all necessary legal measures. This is the day to look forward to 2012 and speculate on what might occur. In this article you will find my personal Top 4 of things I wish will take place in Turkey in 2012. To prevent mixing up hopes and fears, I will first tell you what I think should happen and then what I expect will happen. Here we go. New Constitution. I hope the preparatory committee in Parliament will realize the enormous responsibility put on its shoulders. That should set their minds free and allow them to go the extra mile to find compromises on all major issues, preparing the groundwork for a new, modern and civil constitution. What I am afraid will happen is that most members will only keep an eye on their own partys red lines. After months of bickering, nothing will come out of it, and the ruling party will be faced with two options: use the lack of willingness to cooperate as the perfect excuse to drop the whole project, or start looking for individual deputies of other parties to create a majority to adopt a Justice and Development Party (AK Party)dominated constitution and bring it to referendum in 2013. Kurdish problem. I wish the government would be able to find the right balance between talking to Kurdish representatives who are willing to find a compromise and fighting those Kurds who continue with terrorist attacks. My advice would be not to

wait for the new constitution but to start offering concrete incentives by using the AK Party majority in Parliament to allow education in the mother tongue, along with Turkish, in certain regions and to introduce a new law on decentralization for the entire country. My fear is that there will be too much emphasis on fighting, combined with too many general promises that are, again, not kept. After several new rounds of Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) arrests, there will be nobody left to talk to on the Kurdish side who is able and credible enough to make and defend a deal with the Turkish state. Frustration will grow while the problems spiral out of control. Freedom of the press. I hope for the rapid introduction of a comprehensive proposal to delete all the articles in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and the Anti-Terror Law that are frequently misused to start launch cases against journalists. The judiciary should start a major operation to review all cases involving journalists and decide to release them as soon as possible so they can wait at home for their trial to start. The few cases in which that procedure might create problems should be prioritized so they can be finished before the end of the year. What probably will happen is a continuation of the arrests of journalists and others who are sympathetic to the Kurdish movement. Those who are already in jail will be kept there, and the blame for the slow process will be put on the general deficiencies of the Turkish legal system. That will convince nobody in Turkey or abroad and will further undermine Turkeys standing in the rest of the world. Reform of the judiciary. Lets hope the new, reformed Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) will set priorities (see above) and will stop the Ergenekon and KCK operations from spreading too thin and losing focus, which would cause frustration about the real culprits still not being convicted, while new arrests among small and/or innocent fish continue. More likely is the muddling through scenario in which the judiciary will remain a battlefield between an old caste of judges and prosecutors who see it as their main task to make life difficult for the AK Party and new ones who copy the same old methods to do exactly the opposite. This will further undermine trust in the judiciary, this time especially among those who voted in favor of the HSYK-related constitutional amendment in September 2010. It will only be possible in December 2012 to judge whether it was a good year for Turkey or not. I definitively hope it will be a wonderful year for each and everyone one of you, in good health and with lots of happy moments. Mutlu Yllar!

Being angry is not a strategy It seems as if the decision by the French parliament to criminalize the denial of the Armenian genocide has had a liberating and at the same time alarming effect on members of the Turkish government. It has removed all constraints that are normally imposed on responsible politicians by dignity, reason or coolheaded calculation. Don't get me wrong. As I wrote last week, there are several good reasons to be unhappy and frustrated about last week's decision: Politicians acted like historians and put restrictions on freedom of expression that every democrat should oppose. But the reactions that came bursting out of Ankara immediately after the vote went far beyond those appropriate points of criticism. Let me give you three examples. In an effort to give France a taste of its own medicine, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip

Erdoan accused the French state of being guilty of genocide on the Algerians during the last decades of French colonial rule in North Africa. I could not believe my eyes when I read about this allegation. Not because the French are innocent. They are not. Horrible crimes were committed by the French army in Algeria in the 1950s and early 1960s. But why didn't any of Erdoan's advisers tell the prime minister that by coming up with this charge, he was doing exactly the same thing that the French parliament had just done: instrumentalizing the history of another country for domestic political purposes. A second example of the implausible reactions by the Turkish Cabinet was given by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu. He set his academic professionalism and logic thinking aside when he tried to explain French President Nicolas Sarkozy's support for the genocide denial bill by saying that the French president is envious of the Turkish successes in North Africa. According to the foreign minister, acting as an amateur psychologist, Sarkozy is probably sorry for the support he gave to the Tunisian and Egyptian autocratic leaders in the past, and that is why he is so frustrated about Turkey's newfound appeal in the region. I wish Davutolu was right about the presumed French remorse. But it does not convince anybody outside of Ankara if the analysis comes from the representative of a government that, until very recently, had no problem whatsoever in maintaining cordial relations with Libyan dictator Col. Muammar Gaddafi and Syrian mass murderer Bashar al-Assad. Of course, there may have been good reasons to do so, for instance, to promote Turkish trade and investments, or to gradually moderate the extremist policies of Turkey's counterparts. But being so keen yourself on defending the interests of the Turkish state abroad, it sounds slightly insincere to accuse your French colleagues of having done the same somewhere else, doesn't it? Finally, there was Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan, usually an example of level-headedness and honest analysis. He linked the decision of the French parliament to the further economic decline of Europe. According to Turkey's economy supremo, the mentality behind last week's vote was the same as the reasoning behind the recent efforts to save the euro. According to Babacan, both are doomed to fail. Excuse me? One can criticize the outcome of the last EU summit in Brussels on many points, for instance, of being too little and too late. But I fail to understand how the complicated process of trying to assure skeptical financial markets and European citizens that one European currency does make sense is in any way connected to the petty provincial political games that were played out in the French national assembly. Such a comparison simply does not make sense at all. All three reactions are examples of lashing out based on sheer frustration. Not a foreign policy that befits a country that aspires to be a regional model and a global player. I am afraid Turkey is in the process of burning bridges that it might need one day. To mention only one: Does refusing French cooperation in solving the Syrian crisis really benefit Turkey? Or does it make things even more complicated than they already are? More than any other European country, France still has a lot of contacts and interest in Syria and is willing to cooperate with Turkey to get rid of Assad. Eliminating that option because you are angry and because you think you can do it all by yourself is not even a risky strategy. It is no strategy. fkeli olmak strateji deildir Fransz meclisinin Ermeni soykrmnn inkarn su haline getiren tasary kabul etmesi Trk hkmeti yeleri zerinde dizginlerinden boaltc, ayn zamanda da endie verici bir etki yapm grnyor.

Tasarnn kabul, sorumlu siyasetilerin normalde tamas gereken arballk, mantk veya serinkanl deerlendirme gibi btn tahditleri ortadan kaldrm durumda. Beni yanl anlamayn: Geen hafta da yazdm gibi, Fransz meclisinin bu kararyla ilgili memnuniyetsizlik ve rahatszlk duymak iin birok sebep var. Siyasetiler kendilerini tarihi yerine koydu ve ifade zgrlne her demokratn kar kmas gereken snrlamalar getirdi. Fakat oylamann hemen ardndan Ankara'dan patlama halinde gelen tepkiler uygun eletiri llerinin ok tesine geti. Size rnek vermek isterim. Babakan Tayyip Erdoan, Fransa'y kendi silahyla vurmak abasyla, Fransz devletini Kuzey Afrika'daki smrge ynetiminin son on yllarnda Cezayirlileri soykrmdan geirmekle sulad. Bu itham okuduumda gzlerime inanamadm. Franszlar susuz olduundan deil. Masum deiller. 1950'lerde ve 1960'larn banda Fransz ordusu Cezayir'de korkun sular iledi. Fakat bir tek danman da kp Babakan'a bu sulamay ortaya koymann tam da Fransz meclisinin yaptn (yani bir baka lkenin tarihini i siyasetteki amalar iin arasallatrmak) tekrarlamak olduunu niye sylemedi? Bir ikinci rnek Trk hkmetine mensup bakanlarn, bata da Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu'nun makul olmaktan uzak tepkileriydi. Davutolu, Sarkozy'nin soykrm inkar yasasna verdii destei Trkiye'nin Kuzey Afrika'daki baarlarndan duyduu kskanlkla aklamaya alrken, akademik profesyonelliini ve mantkl dnmeyi bir kenara brakm oldu. Amatr bir psikolog gibi davranan Dileri Bakan'na gre, Sarkozy muhtemelen gemite Tunus ve Msr'n otokratik liderlerine her daim verdii destekten pimand ve blgede son dnemde Trkiye'ye kar artan ilgiden bu denli rahatsz olmasnn sebebi de buydu. Davutolu'nun Fransa'nn pimanlk duyduuna dair deerlendirmesinin doru olmasn dilerim. Fakat byle bir analiz ok yakn zamana dek Libya diktatr Albay Muammer Kaddafi ve Suriye'deki kitle katliamcs Bear Esad'la samimi ilikiler yrtmekte hibir saknca grmemi bir hkmetin temsilcisinden geldiinde, Ankara dnda kimseyi inandrmaz. Elbette o ilikileri yrtmenin makul gerekeleri olabilir, szgelimi Trkiye'nin ticaretini ve yatrmlarn gelitirmek veya muhatap lkelerin arlk politikalarn adm adm yumuatmak gibi hedefler gtm olabilirsiniz. Fakat Trk devleti dardaki menfaatlerini savunmak konusunda bu kadar hevesliyken, Fransz muadillerinizi baka yerlerde aynsn yapm olmakla sulamanz biraz samimiyetsiz kayor, yle deil mi? Son rnek normalde saduyulu ve drst analizler ortaya koymasyla bilinen Babakan Yardmcs Ali Babacan'd. Babacan, Fransz meclisinin kararn Avrupa'nn ekonomik gerilemesinin derinlemesine balad. Trkiye'nin ekonomi patronuna gre, geen haftaki oylamann arkasndaki mantk, avroyu kurtarmak iin son dnemde gsterilen abalarn ardndaki mantkla aynyd. Babacan'a gre her ikisi de baarszla mahkumdu. Nasl yani? Brksel'deki son AB zirvesinden kan sonu pek ok noktada, szgelimi ok clz ve ok ge olmakla eletirilebilir. Fakat Avrupa'nn ortak para biriminin mantkl olduu konusunda kukucu finans piyasalaryla Avrupa vatandalarn ayn anda ikna etmeye almak gibi karmak bir srecin, Fransz ulusal meclisinde oynanan kk yerel siyasi oyunlara nasl balanabildiini anlayamyorum. Byle bir kyaslamann en ufak bir mantnn olmad ak. Bu tepki de infial halinde esip grlemenin rnekleri. Blgesel bir model ve kresel bir aktr olmay arzulayan bir lkeye yakan bir d politika deil. Korkarm ki Trkiye gnn birinde ihtiya duyabilecei kprleri yakma sreci iinde. Mesela Suriye krizini zmek konusunda Fransa'nn ibirliini reddetmek gerekten Trkiye'nin yararna mdr? Yoksa ileri zaten olduundan daha da iinden klmaz hale mi getirir? Fransa, Suriye'de hl pek ok Avrupa lkesinden ok daha fazla balantya ve kara sahip, bu yzden de Esad'dan kurtulmak iin Trkiye'yle ibirlii yapmak istiyor. fkeli olduunuz ve her eyi kendi banza yapabileceinizi dndnz iin bu seenei silmeye riskli bir strateji bile denemez. Bu strateji falan deil.

Merci, Marc!

It is not very politically correct these days to pay tribute to a French diplomat. We all know why after the adoption of the genocide denial law in the French parliament last week. Still, speaking highly of an ambassador born in France is exactly what I am planning to do. The object of my praise is Marc Pierini, head of the Delegation of the EU to Turkey or, to put it in plain language, the EU ambassador in Ankara who is leaving this weekend after having served here for five years. The reason why I want to talk about Marc Pierini is not the fact that many people, including myself, who got to know him, liked his combination of charm and detailed knowledge and interest in Turkey that made him such an engaging personality and an excellent EU representative. This was no career diplomat who coincidentally ended up in Turkey. Looking at his CV, this had to be his last assignment. Before coming to Turkey, he was EU ambassador in Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. Maybe even more important, he was born in Marseille. This Mediterranean background combined with his experiences in the Arab world endowed him with the right mix of skills to understand this complicated country that takes pride in being at the heart of so many different regions. Representing the EU in Turkey was never an easy job. But Pierini had to fight an uphill struggle from the moment he arrived in Ankara in November 2006 -- one month after the European Commission had recommended blocking eight chapters in Turkey's EU accession negotiations because Ankara did not want to open its ports to Cypriot ships and airplanes. Looking back, it was the start of a gradual loss of momentum in the talks between Turkey and the EU. Optimism turned into skepticism and both parties seemed to be more focused on their domestic problems (EU) and growing potential elsewhere (Turkey) than on finding new ways to revitalize their relationship. Nothing much an EU ambassador in Ankara can do about that. But instead of sitting in his residence and moaning about wasted opportunities, Pierini started off on an amazing Tour de Turkey. I do not know how many places he visited in the last five years, but it must have been hundreds. This frantic travelling scheme was not just a result of the deadlock in the negotiations. It was also a logical consequence of the steep rise in financial support from the EU for Turkey. The total annual amount of EU funds allocated to Turkey went up from 500 million euros in 2007 to 900 million the next year. EU financial assistance and cooperation is expected to bring candidate countries closer to the union's rules, policies and practices and thus to provide a better quality of life for citizens. Over the years, these billions of euro have been spent on hundreds of big and small projects all over Turkey, and most of them were visited by Pierini. I would suggest you have a look at the bilingual website of the EU delegation (www.avrupa.info.tr) and see how EU money was used, among many other things, to modernize Turkish Railways, to improve food safety, to provide clean drinking water in anlurfa and to create jobs for women in Denizli. By helping Turkish institutions and citizens to improve their work and their lives, European standards and values started to have a practical significance for thousands of Turks who, before, only knew the EU from high-level conferences on television. The EU got a meaning and it got a face. That face was Marc Pierini, who did not grow tired of going around Turkey, meeting ordinary Turks in coffee houses and listening to their hopes and desires. Back in Ankara or Istanbul, everybody had to listen to his stories about his adventures in Anatolia, especially the journalists and analysts who tended to become more cynical about the EU after each year of stalemate at the official level. It is easy to belittle all these EU projects outside of the centers of power and stick to the illusion that Turkey-EU relations are

only determined in Ankara or Istanbul. That would be a major mistake. The EU virus has already been spread all over Turkey, and it will not be easy to put that genie back into the bottle, even if some politicians sometimes seem to contemplate a Turkish retreat from Europe. Thanks to people like Marc Pierini. Mersi Marc! Bu gnlerde bir Fransz diplomatn saygyla anmak siyaseten pek mnasip deil. Geen hafta Fransz meclisinde kabul edilen soykrm inkr tasars sonras sebebini hepimiz biliyoruz. Fakat bu yazda tam da yapmay dndm ey, Fransa'da domu bir bykeliden vgyle sz etmek. vglerimin muhatab, AB Trkiye Heyeti'nin Bakan (daha anlalr tabiriyle AB'nin Ankara bykelisi) olan ve be yllk grev dneminin ardndan bu hafta Trkiye'den ayrlan Marc Pierini. Marc Pierini hakknda konumak istememin sebebi, ben de dahil, tanyan birok insann ona duyduu hayranlk deil; o cazibesiyle, Trkiye'ye dair ayrntl bilgisini ve derin merakn birletiren, son derece ho bir kiilik ve mkemmel bir AB temsilcisiydi. Pierini kendisini tesadfen Trkiye'de bulmu bir diplomat da deildi. CV'sine bakldnda, Trkiye'ye gelene kadar nasl uzun bir yoldan getii grlebilir. Trkiye'den nce Fas, Suriye ve Tunus'ta AB bykelilii yapt. Belki daha da nemlisi, Marsilya doumlu olmasyd. Bu Akdeniz kkeni, Arap dnyasnda edindii tecrbelerle birletiinde, ona birok farkl blgenin tam ortasnda bulunmaktan gurur duyan bu karmak lkeyi anlamak asndan doru becerilerden mteekkil bir kvam vermiti. AB'yi Trkiye'de temsil etmek hibir zaman kolay bir i olmad. Fakat Marc Pierini Kasm 2006'da Ankara'ya geldii andan itibaren iyice etin hale gelen bir mcadele vermek zorunda kald. Avrupa Komisyonu'nun, Ankara'nn, limanlarn Kbrs gemi ve uaklarna amay istememesinden dolay Trkiye'nin AB ile yelik mzakerelerinin sekiz balnn bloke edilmesini nermesinden bir ay sonrasyd. Geriye dnp bakldnda bu Trkiye ile AB arasndaki grmelerin yava yava ivme kaybetmesinin de balangcyd. yimserlik kukuculua dnt ve her iki taraf da, ilikilerini tekrar canlandrmann yeni yollarn bulmak yerine, kendi i sorunlarna (AB) ve baka yerlerde artan potansiyele (Trkiye) odaklanr hale geldi. Ankara'daki bir AB bykelisinin elinden bununla ilgili ok da fazla ey gelemezdi. Fakat Marc Pierini konutunda oturup heba edilen frsatlara szlanmak yerine mthi bir Trkiye Turu'na giriti. Son be ylda ka yere gittiini bilmiyorum, fakat yzlerce olmas gerekir. Bu lgnca seyahat program sadece mzakerelerdeki tkanmadan kaynaklanmyordu. Ayn zamanda AB'den Trkiye'ye gelen mali destekteki ciddi artn da sonucuydu. Trkiye'ye tahsis edilen AB fonlar 2007'de 500 milyon avroyken, bir sonraki yl 900 milyon avroya ykseldi. AB'nin mali destek ve ibirliinin aday lkeleri Birlik kurallarna, politikalarna ve uygulamalarna yaknlatrmas, bylece vatandalarna daha yksek hayat kalitesi sunmas murat ediliyor. Yllar iinde bu milyarlarca avro Trkiye'nin drt bir kesindeki irili ufakl projelere harcand ve Marc Pierini grevdeyken bunlarn byk ounluunu ziyaret etti. AB heyetinin iki dilli internet sitesine (www.avrupa.info.tr) bir bakmanz neririm; AB'nin tahsis ettii parann birok baka eyin yannda, Trkiye Demiryollar'n modernize etmek, gda gvenliini slah etmek, anlurfa'ya temiz ime suyu salamak ve Denizli'deki kadnlara i yaratmak iin nasl kullanldn greceksiniz. Trk kurumlar ve vatandalarna ilerini gelitirip hayatlarn iyiletirmek konusunda yaplan yardmla, Avrupa standartlar ve deerleri, daha nce AB'yi sadece televizyondaki st dzey konferanslardan bilen binlerce Trk iin pratik bir neme sahip olmaya balad. AB bir anlama ve bir yze sahip oldu. te o yz, Trkiye'yi dolamaktan, kahvehanelerde sradan Trklerle bir araya gelip umutlarn ve isteklerini dinlemekten hi yorulmayan Marc Pierini'ydi. Ankara veya stanbul'a geri dndnde, herkes, bilhassa da resmi dzeyde tkanmayla geen her yln ardndan AB konusunda daha da karamsar hale gelmeye meyyal gazeteciler ve analistler onun Anadolu'daki maceralarn dinlemeliydi.

G merkezlerinin dndaki btn bu AB projelerini kmsemek ve Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin sadece Ankara veya stanbul'da belirlendii yanlsamasna sarlmak kolay. Bu byk bir hata olur. AB virs Trkiye'nin drt bir tarafna oktan yaylm durumda ve baz siyasetiler zaman zaman Trkiye'yi Avrupa'dan ekmeyi dnyor grnse de cini ieye geri sokmak, Marc Pierini gibi insanlar sayesinde, hi kolay olmayacaktr.

Being right and wrong at the same time This week Turkey is again forced to use all its power of persuasion and its political, economic and diplomatic clout to try and stop another country from meddling with Turkey's national history. We have been here before and it is no surprise to see what the fuss is all about: the Armenian massacres in 1915 and whether or not they should be labeled as genocide. This time it is the French senate that is about to vote on a proposal to criminalize the denial of what the French state officially considers genocide. If this new legislation is adopted, everyone who explicitly disagrees with the French reading of history will be punished by a maximum one-year prison sentence or a 45,000 euro fine. The Turkish government is fully right in trying to prevent such a ludicrous decision for two reasons. The first is that determining what happened in the past is definitively not a task for politicians but for historians. Parliamentarians should simply stay out of historical debates. The second reason why Turkey has a good point is the fact that this new law violates the very freedom of speech the French always claim to uphold. Are these French lawmakers the heirs to Voltaire, the French philosopher who famously said: I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it? Or are they spineless opportunists who are willing to sacrifice their professed principles in return for some expected electoral benefits? Can you imagine the cries of indignation these same people would produce if Turkey adopts a similar piece of legislation, punishing those who disagree with the official Turkish state version of history? At the same time, Turkey is also wrong. Wrong in thinking it can keep on bullying and blackmailing its way out of these uncomfortable situations. It is an illusion to think that in the run-up to the 1915 centenary, the pressure on Turkey will decrease. Whether or not Turkey likes it, there is a widely shared feeling among many all over the world -- including many friends of Turkey -- that the time has come for Turkey to come to terms with these dark pages in its history, both for its own good and for the sake of good relations with its neighbor Armenia. No country wants to be forced to accept a stranger's version of its own history. That is why all these genocide recognition initiatives coming from the Armenian diaspora were never going to produce a change of mind among Turks. To the contrary, they created resentment and anger. What Turkey needs is a debate among Turks about what happened in 1915. Based on a new, unprejudiced reading of history, using all the pieces of information that have already been gathered by Turkish, Armenian and other specialists. That is why Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan's 2005 proposal to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan to establish a joint commission of historians was such a good idea. That is why it is such a pity that the 2009 Turkish-Armenian protocols

that would have led to the establishment of such a body have still not been ratified. But why should Turkey wait any longer to start something that needs to be done anyway? Three weeks ago, during a visit to Turkey, Alain Jupp, the French foreign minister who does not see eye to eye on this issue with President Nicolas Sarkozy, came up with an offer that went almost unnoticed at the time. He said his country would be willing to host a Turkish-Armenian joint history commission meeting to at least start a dialogue on the events of 1915 that are so painful to both peoples. It is easy to be cynical about his offer or to conclude immediately that it will never work. Yes, it won't be easy and no, there is no guarantee that such a mixed group of historians will come up with a shared vision that will convince both Turks and Armenians. But it is worth trying. Instead of constantly trying to block others, would it not be wise, clever and surprising for Turkey to respond positively and take the lead in trying to find a solution to a problem that, if kept unsolved, will keep on haunting Turkey? Why is there no Turkish delegation in Paris this week to discuss the details of his plan with Jupp? Ayn anda hem doru hem yanl olmak Bu hafta Trkiye bir kez daha btn ikna gcn ve siyasi, ekonomik ve diplomatik arln, Trkiye'nin ulusal tarihine burnunu sokan bir lkeyi daha durdurma abasna hasretmek zorunda kald. Bu noktaya daha nce de gelinmiti ve btn bu telan sebebi malum: 1915'teki Ermeni katliamlar ve bunlara soykrm denmeli mi denmemeli mi tartmas. Bu kez mesele, Fransa Senatosu'nun Fransz devletinin resmen tand soykrm inkr etmeyi su haline getiren bir tasary oylamak zere olmas. Tasar yasalarsa, Fransz devletinin tarih yorumuna aka kar kan herkes bir yla kadar hapis veya 45 bin avro para cezasyla yz yze kalacak. Trk hkmeti bylesine abes bir karar engellemeye almakta tmyle hakl. Bunun iki sebebi var: Birincisi, gemite neler olduunu belirlemek kesinlikle siyasetilerin deil, tarihilerin grevi. Parlamenterler tarih tartmalarnn dnda kalmal. kinci sebep, yeni yasann tam da Fransa'nn srekli bal olduunu iddia ettii ifade zgrln ihlal ediyor olmas. Fransa meclisindeki bu vekiller, "Fikirlerinize katlmyor olabilirim, fakat onlar ifade etmenizi hayatm pahasna savunurum" szyle nl Fransz filozof Voltaire'in torunlar m? Yoksa seimde oy toplama hesabyla sahip olduklarn iddia ettikleri ilkeleri feda etmeye niyetli omurgasz oportnistler mi? Trkiye, Trk devletinin resm tarih versiyonuna kar kanlar cezalandran bir yasa karsa, ayn insanlarn nasl fkeyle feryad basacan tahayyl edebiliyor musunuz? te yandan Trkiye de yanl yolda. Bu tr rahatsz edici durumlardan gz korkutarak ve antaj yaparak syrlmaya devam edebileceini sanarak hata yapyor. 1915'in yznc ylna yaklalrken, Trkiye'nin zerindeki basknn azalacan dnmek yanlsamadan ibaret. Trkiye beense de beenmese de, dnyann drt bir tarafnda Trkiye'nin tarihinin karanlk sayfalaryla yzleme vaktinin geldiini, byle bir yzlemenin hem Trkiye'nin hayrna olduunu ve komu Ermenistan ile iyi ilikilerin byle kurulacan dnen ok sayda insan var; buna Trkiye'nin birok dostu da dahil. Hibir lke kendi tarihine dair bir yabancnn yorumunu kabul etmek zorunda kalmay istemez. te bu yzden Ermeni diasporasndan gelen btn bu soykrm tanma giriimleri Trkler arasnda hibir zaman bir zihniyet deiiklii salamayacaktr. Tam tersine, bu tr abalar hn ve fke yaratt. Trkiye'nin ihtiyac olan, 1915'te neler yaandn Trklerin tartmas. Bu tartma yeni, nyargsz bir tarih okumas temelinde, Trk, Ermeni ve dier lkelerden uzmanlarn halihazrda bir araya getirdii btn bilgi paralarnn kullanlmasyla yrtlmeli. Bu yzden Babakan Erdoan'n 2005'te Ermenistan Devlet Bakan Koaryan'a ortak bir tarihiler komisyonu kurulmasn nermesi gayet iyi bir fikirdi. Byle bir

yapnn oluturulmasn salayacak 2009 Trk-Ermeni protokollerinin hl onaylanmam olmas da bu yzden ok zc. Fakat Trkiye her halkarda yaplmas gereken bir eyi balatmak iin niye daha fazla beklesin ki? Bu meselede Cumhurbakan Sarkozy ile ayn fikirde olmayan Fransa Dileri Bakan Alain Juppe hafta nceki Trkiye ziyaretinde, o gnlerde neredeyse hi dikkat ekmeyen bir neride bulundu. lkesinin, iki halka da byk aclar veren 1915 olaylarna dair en azndan diyalog balatacak ortak bir Trk-Ermeni tarih komisyonu toplantsna ev sahiplii yapmaya istekli olduunu syledi. Juppe'nin nerisine burun kvrmak veya hemen bunun ie yaramayaca hkmne varmak kolay. Evet, kolay olmayacak ve hayr, byle karma bir tarihiler grubunun hem Trkleri hem Ermenileri ikna edecek ortak bir gr ortaya koyacann garantisi yok. Fakat denemeye deer. Srekli kardakinin nn kesmeye almak yerine, mspet karlk vermek ve zmsz kalmas halinde Trkiye'nin peini hi brakmayacak olan bir soruna zm bulma abasna nclk etmek Trkiye asndan aklc ve artc olmaz m? Bu hafta Juppe ile plannn detaylarn konumak iin Paris'te olan niye bir tek Trk heyeti yok?

EU shows global leadership Being an optimist by nature, it is not always easy these days to keep spirits up concerning the European Union. The last EU summit produced a result that will not restore the necessary trust in the euro or prevent EU countries from entering into a period of recession. More needs to be done but nobody is sure whether European leaders will be willing to go the extra mile. While every informed person knows that an ongoing economic crisis in Europe will hit Turkish exports and foreign direct investment, it is still popular among many Turkish observers and columnists to rejoice over the problems in Europe. It is depressing to see how happy some are that the EU is in bad shape. It was alarming to find out that even clever people like President Gl could not escape from this tendency to kick the EU in the back when it is already lying flat on the ground. President Gl referred to the EU as a miserable union. I guess all these comments reflect both frustration about the stalled EU accession negotiations and the sense that Turkey is finally in a position to take some kind of revenge after having been exposed to so much European arrogance in the past. At the same time, it is also encouraging to read the reactions by other commentators who realize very well that it would be foolish for Turkey to give up on the EU just because Europeans are facing difficulties and Turkey is doing fine at the moment. I agree that the EU bashing is short-sighted and remind my readers that for economic and democratic reasons Turkey would be well-advised to keep its eyes on the prize. It is in Turkeys long-term interests that the EU overcomes its problems quickly. Only with an economically strong Europe that is willing to open up to new members and invest in its immediate neighborhood will Turkey be able to continue reforming itself and become a first league economic player and a first class democracy. It is good to see that amidst all these arguments about the future of the EU, Europe will still be capable of standing out as an example for the rest of the world, if it manages to get its act together. Fortunately, that happened last weekend in Durban at the UN climate conference. After long and heated debates, it was agreed that, as a successor to the Kyoto Treaty, a new legal framework must be written by 2015 and come into force by 2020. All three big polluters (China, India and the US) signed on to the treaty to develop legally binding plans to cut their green house gas emissions. It is true that many specialists

fear that waiting till 2020 to start implementing these regulations might mean that their overall goal -- limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius -- cannot reached. But the fact that the big polluters were willing to engage themselves for the first time was a large step forward. Until now, China and India have refused to curb emissions because they wanted the rich countries to act first. The US used the Asian refusal as an excuse to avoid any legally binding agreement. That is going to change if and when every country sticks to the commitments they made in Durban. The EU that set the agenda last weekend and the European commissioner for climate action, Connie Hedegaard, proved to be a tough and tenacious negotiator. She made an alliance with the small island states that are facing the biggest threat of rising sea levels and the least developed countries. This alliance will put maximum pressure on the three reluctant big boys. I hope this example of global leadership has not escaped the attention of EU skeptics in Turkey. As Hedegaard explained afterwards, the EU will not be sitting back and waiting for the new big deal. Europe will have to improve on its present reduction ambitions and increase its own targets. Hedegaard also emphasized that international agreements are not the only answer to climate change: What defines our climate policies as strong and effective or weak and inadequate is what nations, regions, municipalities, companies and individual citizens do. Combating climate change concerns us all. Lets hope this message comes to Turkey as well.

AB, kresel liderlik sergiliyor yimser mizal biri olarak, bugnlerde Avrupa Birlii ile ilgili enseyi karartmamak her zaman kolay olmuyor. Son AB zirvesinden, Euro'ya gerekli gveni yeniden tesis edecek veya AB lkelerinin bir resesyon dnemine girmesini engelleyecek sonular kmad. Yaplmas gereken daha ok ey var, fakat Avrupal liderlerin daha fazla gayret gstermeye gnl olup olmadndan kimse emin deil. Konuyla alakal her insan Avrupa'da sregiden ekonomik krizin Trkiye'nin ihracatna ve dorudan d yatrma darbe vuracan biliyor olsa da, birok Trk gzlemci ve ke yazar arasnda Avrupa'daki sorunlardan sevin duymak hl revata. Bazlarnn AB'nin kt vaziyette olmasndan ziyadesiyle mutluluk duyduunu grmek zc. Cumhurbakan Gl gibi zeki insanlarn bile AB'ye kar 'dene bir tekme de sen vur' tavr sergilemekten kendini alamadna (Gl, ngiltere'de AB'yi "miserable", yani acnacak halde, perian diye nitelemiti) tank olmak endie vericiydi. Sanrm btn bu yorumlar hem tkanan AB yelik mzakerelerine dair rahatszl hem de Trkiye'nin, gemite Avrupa'nn kibrine fazlasyla maruz kaldktan sonra nihayet bir eit intikam alma konumunda olduu hissiyatn yanstyor. te yandan srf Avrupallar u an zorluklarla yz yze ve Trkiye iyi gidiyor diye AB'den vazgemenin hi de aklc olmadn gayet iyi anlayan yorumcularn da yazp izdiini grmek cesaret verici. Onlar AB'ye vurmay dar grllk olarak niteliyor ve okurlarna hem ekonomik hem demokratik gerekelerle sreci devam ettirmenin Trkiye'nin hayrna olacan hatrlatyor, ki katlyorum. AB'nin sorunlarnn stesinden hzl bir ekilde gelebilmesi uzun vadede Trkiye'nin menfaatine. Trkiye'nin reformlar srdrmesi ve nde gelen bir ekonomik aktr, yan sra birinci snf bir demokrasi haline gelmesi, ancak yeni yelere kaplarn amaya ve yakn komularna yatrm yapmaya istek duyan ekonomik adan gl bir Avrupa ile mmkn. AB'nin geleceine dair btn bu argmanlarn ortasnda, Avrupa'nn birlikte hareket edebildii takdirde dnyann geri kalan iin rnek tekil etmeye hl muktedir olduunu grmek gzel. kr ki bu manzaraya, geen hafta Durban'da yaplan BM

iklim konferansnda tank olduk. Uzun ve hararetli tartmalarn ardndan Kyoto'nun halefi mahiyetinde yeni bir hukuk erevenin 2015 yl itibaryla neticelendirilmesi ve 2020'den itibaren yrrle girmesi konusunda anlamaya varld. byk kirleticinin (in, Hindistan ve ABD) hepsi seragaz salnmlarn azaltmak ynnde hukuken balayc planlar ortaya koyma ykmlln kabul etti. Birok uzmann, bu kesintileri uygulamaya balamak iin 2020'ye dek beklemenin sz konusu grmelerin nihai hedefine (kresel snmay 2 derecede tutmak) ulamamas anlamna gelebileceinden korktuu doru. Fakat en fazla salnma sebep olan lkelerin kendilerini ilk kez taahhtlerle balamaya istek gstermesi ileriye doru atlm byk bir admd. Bugne kadar in ve Hindistan salnmlar dizginlemeyi reddetti, nk ilk hareketin zengin lkelerden gelmesini istiyorlard. ABD Asya'nn bu reddini, her tr hukuk sistemin dnda kalmann bahanesi olarak kulland. Btn lkeler Durban'da verdikleri taahhtlere bal kaldnda ve kalrsa, artk bu durum deimi olacak. Geen hafta gndemi belirleyen AB'ydi ve Avrupa Komisyonu'nun iklim deiikliiyle mcadeleden sorumlu yesi Connie Hedegaard sk ve inat bir mzakereci olduunu gsterdi. Hedegaard, gnlsz byk lke zerinde azami bask kurmak iin ykselen su seviyesinin en fazla tehdit ettii kk ada lkeleriyle ve en az gelimi lkelerle ittifak kurdu. Umarm bu kresel liderlik rnei Trkiye'deki AB kukucularnn dikkatinden kamamtr. Sonrasnda Hedegaard'n da dile getirdii zere, AB ylece yerinde oturup yeni byk anlamay beklemeyecek. Avrupa'nn mevcut salnmlar azaltma abalarn gelitirmesi ve kendi hedeflerini yukarya ekmesi gerekecek. Hedegaard ayrca uluslararas anlamalarn iklim deiikliinin tek zm olmadnn altn iziyor: "klim politikalarmzn gl ve etkin ya da zayf ve yetersiz olup olmadn belirleyen, lkelerin, blgelerin, belediyelerin, irketlerin ve tek tek vatandalarn ne yaptdr. klim deiikliiyle mcadele hepimizi ilgilendiriyor." Umalm ki bu mesaj zaman iinde Trkiye'de de karln bulsun.

Off to the next euro crisis summit! Last week European leaders got together in Brussels, once again, to try solve the euro crisis after it became clear that most commentators, citizens and especially investors remained unconvinced that the EU could contain, manage and ultimately overcome the crisis. Was the summit the major breakthrough that everybody was hoping for, the meeting that turned the tide? Only a handful of diehard optimists would respond positively to this question. Most analysts agree that although some important steps have been made, the EU is not there yet. There will be new euro summits in the foreseeable future to regain the trust of both the financial markets and the European citizens. The most spectacular outcome of the December summit was the row between the United Kingdom and the 26 other EU member states. In return for his country's support for a necessary treaty change to guarantee better future economic policy coordination among eurozone countries, British Prime Minister David Cameron demanded special safeguards to protect the interests of the financial sector in the City of London. Because he did not get these, he used his veto, thereby isolating the UK and forcing the other EU member states to look for an alternative solution outside the existing treaties. Much has been said about the wisdom of this radical negotiating strategy. I tend to agree with opposition Labour Party leader Ed Miliband, who said: It is not a veto when something goes ahead without you. That's called losing. Cameron has come back with a bad deal for Britain. Far from protecting our interests, he has left us without a voice. The British isolation on such an important issue has fueled speculation that the EU might be on its way to a so-called multispeed Europe in which not all member states participate in all EU policies. Next to a core of countries that have opted for

further integration, the EU might allow others, like the UK, to settle for less and remain out of certain fields of cooperation such as a common currency, the Schengen unrestricted travel zone or, one day, a shared foreign policy. I will come back to this model in future columns because if the EU would indeed develop in this direction, that would radically change the options for candidate states like Turkey as well. Back to the specifics of the euro crisis and the decisions made last week. I would like to recommend everybody who is interested in a clear and balanced assessment of the summit's outcome to go the website of the European Policy Center (EPC), an influential think tank in Brussels, and read the paper written by Janis A. Emmanoulidis, senior policy analyst at the EPC. His three main conclusions are as follows: 1. Much is still unclear about the new intergovernmental agreement that is being prepared. It could create major problems related to the existing treaties, the procedure for ratification and the role of EU institutions in the new setup. 2. There is still no convincing answer to the key question: How can austerity and growth be pursued simultaneously? Nobody would dispute the need for cuts in public debt in countries with unsustainable debt levels. But public spending cuts will have negative effects on economic growth and could contribute to prolonged and deep recessions. 3. As long as Germany is not willing to consider the possibilities of some kind of common EU stability bonds, it will be hard to convince the financial markets that eurozone members are ready and willing to tie themselves together more closely than in the past, which could increase the confidence in the future of the common currency. According to Emmanoulidis, the present crisis is predominantly one of a lack of trust in the EU and the euro. In that sense, last week's summit sent very mixed signals to policy-makers, citizens and investors. There was some concrete progress in some areas but at the same time several sensitive decisions were postponed. His prediction: The EU will remain in crisis mode' for some time to come. Markets are not likely to calm down; confidence and trust will not return quickly. The EU is on a long and bumpy road and it is impossible to be sure which phase of the crisis we are in. This is a systematic crisis which threatens not only the EU's periphery but the very foundations of European integration. As I said: Off to the next summit! Bir sonraki avro krizi zirvesinde grmek zere! Geen hafta Avrupal liderler, yorumcular, vatandalar ve bilhassa yatrmclarn byk ksmnn AB'nin krizi dizginlemek, idare etmek ve nihayetinde stesinden gelmekte baar elde edebileceine hl ikna olmadnn aka grlmesi sonras bir kez daha Brksel'de toplanarak avro krizini zmeye altlar. Peki zirve herkesin umduu gibi byk bir dnm noktas, dalgay tersine eviren bir toplant oldu mu? Sadece bir avu iflah olmaz iyimser bu soruya olumlu cevap verecektir. Analistlerin ou, baz mhim admlar atlm olsa da, AB'nin henz o noktaya gelmedii konusunda hemfikir. ngrlebilir gelecekte, hem finans piyasalarnn hem Avrupa vatandalarnn gvenini yeniden kazanmak iin yeni avro zirveleri dzenlenecek. Aralk zirvesinin en arpc sonucu Britanya ile kalan 26 AB yesi lke arasndaki kapmayd. Britanya Babakan David Cameron, lkesinin avro blgesi lkeleri arasnda gelecekte daha iyi ekonomik politika koordinasyonu salamak iin gereken anlama deiikliine destei karlnda, Londra'daki finans sektrnn karlarn koruyacak zel gvenceler talep etti. stediini alamad iin de veto yetkisini kulland ve bylece Britanya'y tecrit edip dier AB yesi lkeleri mevcut anlamalar

haricinde alternatif bir zm aramaya mecbur brakt. Bu radikal pazarlk stratejisiyle ilgili ok ey sylendi. Muhalefetteki i Partisi'nin lideri Ed Miliband'in u szlerine byk lde katlyorum: "Bir eyler sizin dnzda ilerliyorsa bu bir veto deildir. Buna kaybetmek denir. (...) Cameron Britanya iin kt bir anlama ile geri dnmtr. Bunun karlarmz korumakla uzaktan yakndan alakas yoktur, bizi sz hakkndan mahrum brakmtr." Byle nemli bir meselede Britanya'nn kendisini tecrit etmesi, AB'nin ye lkelerin hepsinin tm AB politikalarna dahil olmad "ok vitesli" denilen bir Avrupa'ya doru ilerliyor olabileceine dair speklasyonlar ayyuka karm durumda. Buna gre AB, daha ileri entegrasyonu tercih eden lkelerden oluan bir ekirdein yannda, Britanya gibi dier lkelerin daha azna raz olmasna ve ortak para, Schengen kstsz seyahat blgesi veya gnn birinde ortak d politika gibi belli ibirlii alanlarnn dnda kalmasna izin verebilir. Bu modele gelecekteki yazlarmda tekrar deineceim, nk AB gerekten de bu ynde geliirse, Trkiye gibi aday lkeler iin seenekler de temelinden deiecektir. Biz avro krizi meselesine ve geen hafta alnan kararlara dnelim. Zirvenin sonucuna dair sarih ve dengeli bir deerlendirme okumak isteyen herkese, Brksel merkezli etkili bir dnce kuruluu olan Avrupa Politikalar Merkezi'nin (EPC) internet sitesine gitmelerini ve EPC'nin kdemli siyaset analistlerinden Janis A. Emmanoulidis'in yazsn okumalarn tavsiye etmek isterim. Emmanoulidis'in vard balca sonu yle: 1. Hazrlanmakta olan yeni hkmetleraras anlamayla ilgili pek ok nokta hl mulak. Bu da mevcut anlamalar, onay prosedr ve AB kurumlarnn yeni yapdaki rolyle ilgili byk sorunlar yaratacak. 2. Kilit nemdeki sorulara hl ikna edici cevaplar verilmi deil: kemer skma ile byme nasl ezamanl yrtlebilir? Srdrlemez dzeyde borlu lkelerde kamu borlarnn azaltlmas gerektiine kimse itiraz etmeyecektir. Fakat kamu harcamalarndaki kesintiler ekonomik byme zerinde olumsuz etkiler yapacaktr ve uzatmal ve derin resesyonlar tetikleyebilir. 3. Almanya bir tr ortak AB istikrar tahvili karma ihtimalini dnmeye raz olmadka, finans piyasalarn, avro blgesi yelerinin ortak parann geleceine duyulan gveni artrabilecek ekilde birbirlerine daha sk balanmaya hazr ve istekli olduuna ikna etmek zor olacaktr. Emmanoulidis'e gre, mevcut kriz byk lde AB'ye ve avroya ynelik gven eksikliinden kaynaklanyor. Bu bakmdan geen haftaki zirve siyasi karar mercilerine, vatandalara ve yatrmclara son derece kark sinyaller verdi. Baz alanlarda baz somut ilerlemeler kaydedildi, fakat ayn zamanda birok hassas karar ertelendi. Emmanoulidis'in tahmini u: "AB bir sre daha 'kriz ikliminde' kalacak. Piyasalar muhtemelen yatmayacak; gven ve inan hzl ekilde geri gelmeyecek. (...) AB uzun ve engebeli bir yolda ve krizin hangi aamasnda olduumuzu kestirmek imknsz. (...) Bu, sistemle ilgili bir kriz ve sadece AB'nin eperini deil, tam da Avrupa entegrasyonunun temellerini tehdit ediyor." Dediim gibi: bir sonraki zirvede grmek zere!

Match-fixing all over the place Match-fixing does not only make it to the headlines in Turkey. These days the Dutch papers are full of it as well after a remarkable change of fortunes last Wednesday involving Dutch former Champions League winner Ajax Amsterdam. What happened? In the last games of the qualifying rounds for the Champions League, Ajax played at home against Real Madrid and Olympique Lyon went to Croatia to face Dinamo Zagreb. The Spanish team was already through to the next round; the Croatians were out after losing all of their previous games. The key question was which of the two other teams in Group D would make it to the second stage: Ajax or Olympique. Before the last matches started, the Dutch team was in a much better position, having three points more and a positive goal difference of +3, compared to the French squads -4. At the end of the evening though, it was Lyon that made it after beating Dinamo 7-1 and Ajax losing 3-0 to Real. Both teams ended up with 8

points but the goal difference changed dramatically in favor of the French, +2, compared to Ajax 0. Since then, many all over Europe wonder how it is possible that Dinamo, the present leader in the Croatian national league, lost so big at home. At half-time the score was still 1-1 after the Croatians took the lead despite the fact that they were down to 10 men after 30 minutes. In the second half, Lyon made six goals in half an hour (three of them even within four minutes). In a widely publicized picture, the Croatian defender Vida winks at the French striker Gomis and puts his thumb up after Lyon scored 5-1, suggesting that some kind of deal has been made. Ajax asked the European football federation UEFA to start an investigation. Already after one day UEFA decided not to do so after they checked on hundreds of European gambling offices and did not find any irregularities. In the meantime, several stories about the bad reputation of Croatian football have been published. Many teams are having problems paying their players and apparently two years ago it was UEFA itself who suspected dozens of matches being rigged in the Croatian league. On the other hand, some observers have stressed that Dinamo lost big against Real Madrid as well, has shown a lack of fighting spirit before and simply has an awful defensive record, ending up with a negative goal difference of 19 after six Champions League games. Whatever the reasons behind Wednesdays super defeat, I agree with the Canadian journalist Declan Hill, who wrote a revealing book about corruption in international football called The Fix. Asked for his comments, he strongly pressed for further investigations, referring to Croatias long history of fraud and bribery. According to Hill, if UEFA lets this incident go unchecked, the credibility of European football will be further undermined. Which brings me to the integrity of Turkish football and Turkish politics. Much has been said about the controversial bill that seeks to introduce shorter jail terms for match-fixers, which was vetoed by President Abdullah Gl last week, but was still passed in Parliament last Friday without any changes. I do not want to go into the speculations that changing the law now is directly related to the ongoing match-fixing and fraud investigations, involving, among others, Fenerbahe Chairman Aziz Yldrm. Let me formulate is carefully: In a case like this, politicians should avoid even the semblance of being influenced by the powerful football lobby. They have not been able to convince me. Why has the refusal of the president not been used in a constructive way to look for a compromise between the long, very harsh sentences in the present law and the short prison terms in the amendments at hand that, as has been pointed out by many critics, do not offer a sense of justice or deterrence? Instead of taking some time to reconsider and try to find an acceptable middle ground, the three big parties opted for a full confrontation and pushed their unchanged proposals through Parliament as quickly as possible. I am afraid that both UEFA and the Turkish Parliament fully underestimate the feeling among many Turks and other European citizens that todays highly commercialized football seems to be above the law. That impression is extremely damaging, both to football and the rule of law. ike her yerde

ike sadece Trkiye'de manetlere kmyor. Geen aramba, Hollanda'nn eski ampiyonlar Ligi ampiyonu Ajax Amsterdam takmnn da dahil olduu dikkat ekici ma sonularnn ardndan bugnlerde Hollanda gazeteleri de ike bahsiyle dolu. Peki ne oldu? ampiyonlar Ligi eleme grubunun son malarnda Ajax evinde Real Madrid'le, Olympique Lyon da deplasmanda Hrvat takm Dinamo Zagreb'le oynad. spanyol takm gruptan kmay garantilemi, daha nceki tm malarn kaybeden Hrvatlar ise oktan havlu atmt. Kilit soru, gruptan kacak ikinci takmn hangisi olacayd: Ajax m, Olympique mi? Son malar ncesinde Hollanda takm ok daha iyi pozisyondayd: puan ndeydi ve Fransz ekibinin -4'lk averajna karlk, +3'lk bir averaja sahipti. Ancak gecenin sonunda gruptan kan, Dinamo'yu 7-1'le geen Lyon oldu; Ajax ise Real'e 3-0 yenildi. ki takm da grubu 8 puanla tamamlam, fakat gol averaj arpc bir ekilde Franszlarn lehine (+2'ye kar 0) deimiti. O zamandan beri Avrupa'nn drt bir kesinde birok insan, halihazrda Hrvat ulusal liginin lideri olan Dinamo'nun evinde nasl bu kadar ar bir yenilgi alabildiini soruyor. lk yarda skor 1-1'di ve ilk gol de 30. dakikada 10 kii kalmalarna ramen Hrvatlar atmt. kinci yarda Lyon yarm saatte 6 gol att (hatta gollerden drt dakika iinde geldi). Her tarafta dolaan bir fotorafta Hrvat savunma oyuncusu Vida, Lyon skoru 5-1 yaptktan sonra bir tr anlama yapldn dndrecek ekilde Fransz golc Gomis'e gz krpyor ve baparman 'aferin' manasnda kaldryordu. Ajax, Avrupa futbol federasyonu UEFA'dan soruturma balatmasn istedi. UEFA bir gn sonra soruturma amamaya karar verdi, zira yzlerce Avrupa bahis brosu denetlenmi ve herhangi bir usulszlk bulunmamt. Bu arada Hrvat futbolunun kt hretine dair eitli haberler yaynland. Birok takm oyuncularna deme yapmakta sorun yayordu ve grne gre iki yl nce Hrvat ligindeki malarda ike olduundan kuku duymu olan UEFA'nn kendisiydi. Dier yandan baz gzlemciler Dinamo'nun Real Madrid karsnda da ar bir yenilgi aldn, bunun takmn mcadele azmini daha nce kaybettiini ve berbat bir savunma sicili olduunu gsterdiini, alt ampiyonlar Ligi man -19 averajla tamamladn vurguluyordu. aramba gn yaanan sper malubiyetin arkasndaki sebepler ne olursa olsun, uluslararas futboldaki yolsuzlukla ilgili "ike" adl ifa edici bir kitap yazan Kanadal gazeteci Declan Hill'le ayn fikirdeyim. Konuyla ilgili yorumu sorulduunda Hill, Hrvatistan'n epey ykl hile ve rvet siciline atfta bulunarak, daha ileri soruturmalar yaplmasn kuvvetle desteklediini syledi. Hill'e gre eer UEFA bu olayn incelenmeden kalmasna gz yumarsa, Avrupa futbolunun gvenilirlii daha da zedelenecek. Bu da beni Trk futbolu ve Trk siyasetinin drstl meselesine getiriyor. ikecilere daha az hapis cezalar getiren ve geen hafta Cumhurbakan Gl tarafndan veto edilse de cuma gn Meclis'ten yine deitirilmeden geen tartmal yasa hakknda ok ey sylendi. Yasann imdi deitirilmesinin dorudan doruya, bakalarnn yan sra Fenerbahe Bakan Aziz Yldrm' da kapsayan mevcut ike ve hile soruturmalaryla alakal olduuna dair speklasyonlara girmek niyetinde deilim. Meseleyi dikkatli bir ekilde yle formle etmek isterim: Bunun gibi bir davada, siyasetiler gl futbol lobisinin etkisi altnda kaldklar ynnde en ufak bir izlenim vermekten kanmaldr. Beni bu konuda ikna edebilmi deiller. Cumhurbakan'nn vetosu, mevcut yasadaki uzun, son derece ar cezalarla, sz konusu deiikliklerde, birok gzlemcinin iaret ettii zere adalet duygusu veya caydrclk salamayan ksa hapis cezalar arasnda bir uzlama bulmak iin niye yapc bir ekilde kullanlmyor? Bir mddet tekrar dnmek ve kabul edilebilir bir orta yol bulmaya almak yerine btn byk partiler kesin bir reddi tercih etmi ve yasay Meclis'ten hi deitirmeden mmkn olduunca hzl geirmek iin elinden geleni yapm grnyor. Korkarm ki hem UEFA hem Trkiye Meclisi, birok Trk'n ve dier Avrupa vatandann, bugnn ziyadesiyle ticariletirilmi futbolunun hukukun stnde olduuna dair hissiyatn fazla hafife alyor. Oysa bu hissiyat gerek futbola gerek hukukun stnlne muazzam zararlar veriyor.

Tackling climate change can't wait For understandable reasons, most of the global media attention this week will be on the EU summit in Brussels that should produce an effective and convincing answer to the euro crisis threatening to push the world economy into an immediate recession. There is another summit taking place in Durban, South Africa, that will not make it to the headlines because the outcome will not affect the lives of most people in the short run. It is this year's UN climate change summit, where solutions have to be found to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases in 2015 and beyond. In the long term though, the failure or success of the Durban summit will have a profound effect on the lives of billions of citizens all around the world. What is at stake? Almost 20 years ago the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was established as a response to the alarming findings of scientists who convincingly claimed that the rapid growth of emissions was warming the Earth, threatening the ecology and putting future human welfare at risk. After years of talking, most of the industrialized countries, including Turkey, signed up to the so-called Kyoto Protocol and promised to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These commitments will end next year so the challenge for the Durban summit is to continue the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 and to pave the way for a new, binding deal in 2015 that will include all the main players, including the US and China, the world's two biggest polluters that, until now, have not been willing to pledge concrete reductions. The main focus of international efforts at the previous two summits was to keep average global temperature rise below two degrees Celsius. Last week two reports were published that indicate that this goal is in serious danger of being breached. The UN Environment Program (UNEP) presented a report called Bridging the Emissions Gap, showing a growing gap between ambition and reality. Even if all the current commitments and pledges of developed and developing nations are kept, emissions in 2020 will be too high and the temperature rise will be higher than 2 degrees. To make matters even worse, the Global Carbon Project, an international collaboration of scientists tracking the numbers, released an analysis indicating that emissions in fact did not go down last year but rose by almost 6 percent. This increase, a half-billion extra tons of carbon pumped into the air, was the largest one since 2003. We will see at the end of this week what the outcome of the Durban summit will be and whether, for instance, the EU has managed to strike a deal with China to keep hopes alive, against the stubborn resistance of countries like the US and India. In this debate, Turkey is conspicuously absent, although its leaders constantly put forward the suggestion that the country wants to become an exemplary global power. Unfortunately, not on climate change. What worries me more than the lack of ambitions at these global summits, though, is the absence of any sense of urgency in Turkish politics. It seems that for most Turkish politicians, climate change is taking place somewhere else and will not really affect Turkey. Of course, there are beautiful plans to deal with the negative effects of climate change, some day in the far future. What is missing are concrete proposals that can produce visible results now and tomorrow. Why are there no serious incentives to force the cement industry, one of the biggest polluters, to shift to a more sustainable way of production? Why is the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOK) not building more energy efficient houses? Why is the government still planning to build electricity plants based on coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel? Why, despite all the potential, has

solar energy not been developed as a clean and cheap source of energy, thereby also reducing Turkey's huge dependency on imported and expensive oil and gas? We are not talking rocket science here. Successful examples abroad are available. With the right combination of common sense, political will and smart technologies, Turkey could still catch-up with the rest of the world that has recognized that climate change is a reality that cannot and should not be denied. Extreme temperatures, more floods and droughts are already there and they are not going to disappear automatically. No time for wait-and-see policies anymore. Not in Durban, not in Ankara. klim deiikliiyle mcadele ertelenemez Bu hafta kresel medyann byk ounluunun dikkati anlalabilir nedenlerden dolay Brksel'deki AB zirvesinde olacak. Zira bu zirvenin dnya ekonomisini ani bir resesyona srkleme tehlikesi olan avro krizine etkili ve inandrc bir zm bulmas gerekiyor. Gney Afrika'nn Durban kentinde ise sonucu insanlarn ounun hayatn ksa vadede etkilemeyecei iin manetlere karlmayacak olan bir baka zirve dzenleniyor. Bu, BM'nin 2015 ve sonrasnda sera gaz salnmlarn azaltmak ynnde zmler bulmas gereken yllk iklim deiiklii zirvesi. Halbuki Durban zirvesinin baars veya baarszl uzun vadede dnyadaki milyarlarca insann hayat zerinde derin bir etki yapacak. Peki tehlikede olan ne? Yaklak yirmi yl nce klim Deiikliine Dair BM ereve Anlamas, salnmlardaki hzl artn yeryzn sttna, ekolojiyi tehdit ettiine ve insanln mstakbel refahn riske attna dair ikna edici iddialar ortaya koyan bilim insanlarnn alarm verici bulgularna bir karlk mahiyetinde oluturuldu. Yllarca sren grmelerin ardndan sanayilemi lkelerin byk ounluu (bu arada Trkiye de) mehur Kyoto Protokol'n imzalad ve sera gaz salnmlarn azaltmay taahht etti. Sz konusu taahhtlerin sresi gelecek yl sona erecek, bu yzden Durban zirvesinin nndeki mesele Kyoto Protokol'n 2012'nin tesine tamak ve 2015'te (dnyann en byk iki kirleticisi olan, fakat bugne kadar somut azaltma taahhtlerinden kanan ABD ve in de dahil) btn baaktrleri kapsayacak yeni, balayc bir anlamann yolunu demek. Daha nceki iki zirvede uluslararas gayretlerin balca oda, ortalama kresel s artn 2 derecenin altnda tutmakt. Geen hafta bu hedefin tutturulamama tehlikesinin ok ciddi olduunu belirten iki rapor yaynland. BM evre Program'nn (UNEP) hazrlad 'Salnmlar Konusunda A Kapatmak' adl rapor arzu edilen ile gerekleen arasndaki giderek byyen uurumu gsteriyor. Gelimi ve gelimekte olan lkeler tm mevcut taahhtlerini ve szlerini yerine getirse bile 2020'de salnmlar fazlasyla yksek olacak ve s art 2 derecenin zerine kacak. Daha da kts, saysal verileri takip eden bilim insanlarnn uluslararas ibirlii niteliindeki Kresel Karbon Projesi, salnmlarn aslnda geen yl inie gemek yle dursun, neredeyse yzde 6 arttn gsteren bir analiz yaynlad. Havaya pompalanan yarm milyar ton ilave karbon anlamna gelen bu art, 2003'ten bu yana en yksek rakam iaret ediyor. Bu haftann sonunda Durban zirvesinin neticesinin ne olacan ve szgelimi AB'nin in'le, ABD ve Hindistan gibi lkelerin inat direniine kar, umutlar canl tutacak bir anlamaya varp varamayacan greceiz. Bu tartmada Trkiye bariz ekilde yok, halbuki Trk liderler lkelerinin rnek tekil eden kresel bir g olmak istediini srekli syleyip duruyor. Ne yazk ki bu istek iklim deiiklii iin geerli deil. Fakat bu kresel zirvelerde beni heves noksanlndan daha fazla endielendiren husus, Trk siyasetinde zerre kadar tela emaresinin olmamas. Grnen o ki Trk siyasetilerin ou iin iklim deiiklii baka bir lemde yaanyor ve Trkiye'yi hi etkilemeyecek. Elbette iklim deiikliinin olumsuz etkilerinin stesinden, ok uzak gelecekte bir gn gelmek ynnde gzel planlar var.

Olmayan ise bugnden yarna gzle grlr sonular retebilecek somut neriler. En byk kirleticilerden biri olan imento sanayiini, daha srdrlebilir bir retim tarzna gemeye sevk edecek ciddi giriimler niye yok? TOK niye enerjiden yana daha tasarruflu evler yapmyor? Hkmet niye hl en kirli fosil yakt olan kmre dayal elektrik santralleri ina etmeyi planlyor? Onca potansiyele ramen, temiz ve ucuz enerji kayna mahiyetinde gne enerjisi niye gelitirilmiyor da, Trkiye'nin pahal doalgaz ve petrol ithalatna muazzam bamlln srdrmesinde srar ediliyor? Burada roket biliminden sz etmiyoruz. Darda baarl rnekler bulmak mmkn. Saduyu, siyasi irade ve akll teknolojilerin doru bileimiyle Trkiye, dnyann iklim deiikliinin inkr edilmeyecek ve edilmemesi gereken bir gereklik olduunu kabul etmi kalanna hl yetiebilir durumda. Dengesiz hava scaklklar, daha fazla sel ve kuraklk, bunlar oktandr karmzda duruyor ve kendi kendilerine yok olup gitmeyecekler. Artk bekle-gr politikas iin vakit yok. Durban'da da yok, Ankara'da da yok.

What will the Muslim Brother-hood do after elections? The first round of voting for a new Egyptian parliament is finished and all indications suggest that the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), is the big winner. The FJP won about 40 percent of the votes, the ultraconservative Islamists known as Salafis got about 25 percent and a left/liberal coalition called the Egyptian Bloc slightly less. The FJP victory and the poor performance of the left and liberals did not come as a surprise, the good result of the Salafis did. In December and January we will have two more rounds outside of the big cities and most observers expect the results of the FJP and the Salafis to improve in these more conservative rural areas. Whatever the final outcome of the elections will be, it is perfectly clear that the key role in the new parliament will be for the FJP. I vividly remember my talks with members of the MB in 2005 and 2006 when I visited Egypt -- first as an election observer, later, together with my then colleague from the European Parliament Jan Marinus Wiersma, preparing for a book on the EUs policies towards Bosnia, Turkey, Morocco and Egypt that was eventually published in 2007 in Dutch and translated into Turkish in 2009. What struck us most in Egypt were the differences of opinion within the MB and the detailed knowledge some of them had on developments in Turkey in general and on the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in particular. We spoke with older MB leaders who basically were not that much interested in politics and stuck to the traditional view that law should come from God and not man. But we also met with young MB members of parliament who acted in a very pragmatic way, trying to use their seats to improve the living conditions of their voters, not for preaching Islam. This new generation was very much aware of what the AK Party was trying to do in Turkey, and many of them expressed the desire to copy, one day, the AK Party experience in Egypt. These strong divisions within the MB on basic goals and means of the organization raised of course the question who would be in charge once the moment would come that they would be in a position to realize their ideas. That moment has arrived. What is the MB going to do after the elections? Based on my impressions and experiences then and an analysis of the present situation, I think there are three main challenges facing the MB. The first one is how they will deal with the army. The MB has a complicated and mixed history of accommodation and

confrontation with the military. Although many MB leaders in the past ended up in jail, at crucial moments this year the army and the MB joined forces to stabilize the post-revolutionary chaos. Will this pattern of pragmatic or, as some liberals claim, opportunistic cooperation continue or is the FJP going to stick to its promise to push back the role of the army in nominating the next government and in drafting the new constitution? A second key question that the MB will have to answer is with whom they want to make an alliance in parliament. Will the FJP, which presents itself as a moderate Islamist party, side with the victorious orthodox Salafis or with the defeated liberals? Finally, is the MB willing to defend the rights of women and religious minorities in the new constitution? By doing so they might be able to convince many skeptics at home and abroad who doubt the sincerity of the MB in defending human rights and democracy. These are formidable tests for a new party after 80 years of oppression, confronted with a society in rapid transition and an economy in ruins. They must sound familiar though to the AK Party leaders who came to power in 2002. Whether or not the MB could learn from the AK Party experience remains to be seen. Essam el-Erian, the leader of the FJP, has set his goals higher than simple imitating the Turkish model. In an interview with Reuters he stated: I hope we can have a different model. We hope that when we build a modern democratic country in Egypt, this will be a good example, inspiring others to build democracy. How else to react to these intentions then by saying inshallah? Mslman Kardeler seimden sonra ne yapacak? Yeni Msr parlamentosu iin yaplan seimlerin ilk turu tamamland ve btn gstergeler Mslman Kardeler'in siyasi kanad olan Hrriyet ve Adalet Partisi'nin (HAP) en byk galip olduu ynnde. HAP oylarn yaklak yzde 40'n elde etti; Selefiler diye bilinen ar muhafazakr slamclar yzde 25'e yakn, Msr Bloku adl sol/liberal koalisyon bunun biraz altnda oy toplad. HAP'n zaferi ve solcularla liberallerin kt performans artc olmad; Selefilerin kazand baar ise srprizdi. Aralk ve ocakta byk kentlerin dnda iki tur daha yaplacak ve gzlemcilerin ou HAP ile Selefilerin bu daha muhafazakr krsal blgelerde ilk turdan da iyi sonular almasn bekliyor. Seimlerin nihai sonucu ne olursa olsun, uras gayet ak: Parlamentoda kilit rol HAP'ta olacak. 2005 ve 2006'da Msr'a yaptm ziyaretlerde Mslman Kardeler'in (MK) yeleriyle konumalarm dn gibi hatrlyorum. lk ziyaretimi seim gzlemcisi olarak yapmtm; ikincisinde ise Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndan mesaidam Jan Mairinus Wiersma ile AB'nin Bosna, Trkiye, Fas ve Msr'a ynelik politikalarna dair bir kitap hazrl iindeydik. O kitap nihayet 2007'de Hollandaca basld, 2009'da da Trkeye evrildi. Msr'da bizi en fazla arpan husus, MK iindeki gr farkllklar ve bazlarnn genelde Trkiye, zelde de iktidardaki AKP hakkndaki gelimelere dair sahip olduu detayl bilgiydi. Temelde siyasetle fazla ilgilenmeyen ve hukukun insan deil, Tanr kaynaklar olmas gerektiine ynelik geleneksel baka sahip yal MK liderleriyle konutuk. Fakat son derece pragmatik davranan, sahip olduklar parlamento koltuklarn slam' telkin etmek iin deil, semenlerinin hayat koullarn iyiletirmek iin kullanmaya alan gen MK vekilleriyle de bir araya geldik. Bu gen kuak AKP'nin Trkiye'de ne yapmaya altnn ziyadesiyle farkndayd ve birou gnn birinde AKP tecrbesini Msr'da tekrarlamak arzusunu ifade ediyordu. rgtn temel amalar ve aralarna dair MK iindeki bu keskin ayrmlar, ideallerini hayata geirecek konuma geldiklerinde dmenin banda kimin olaca sorusunu da gndeme getiriyordu elbette. te o gn gelip att. MK seimlerden sonra ne yapacak? O dnemde edindiim izlenimler ve tecrbelere, yan sra mevcut durumun analizine dayanarak, MK'nin karsnda zmesi gereken temel mesele olduunu dnyorum.

Birincisi orduyla nasl itigal edecekleri. MK'nin ordu ile uzlama ve atmadan mteekkil etrefilli ve kark bir tarihi var. Gemite birok MK lideri hapse atlm olsa da, bu yl kritik anlarda ordu ile MK devrim sonras kaosu istikrara kavuturmak iin glerini birletirdi. Bu pragmatik veya baz liberallerin iddia ettii gibi oportnist ibirlii tavr devam edecek mi, yoksa HAP yeni hkmetin belirlenmesi ve yeni anayasann hazrlanmas noktasna ordunun roln geriletme szne bal kalacak m? MK'nin cevap vermek zorunda kalaca ikinci kilit soru, parlamentoda kiminle ittifak kurmak istedikleri. Kendisini lml slamc bir parti olarak takdim eden HAP, seimden zaferle kan tutucu Selefilerle mi, yoksa malup liberallerle mi yan yana gelecek? nc ve son soru da u: MK yeni anayasada kadnlarn ve din aznlklarn haklarn savunmaya niyetli mi? Byle yaparak lke iinde ve dnda, MK'nin insan haklarn ve demokrasiyi savunmak konusundaki samimiyetini sorgulayan birok kukucuyu ikna edebilirler. Bunlar 80 yllk bask sonras, hzla deien ve ekonomisi yerle bir olmu bir lkeyle kar karya olan yeni bir parti iin epey zorlu snavlar. 2002'de iktidara gelen AKP liderlerine de tandk geliyor olmal. MK'nin AKP deneyiminden ders karp karamayacan ise zaman gsterecek. HAP lideri Essam el-Eryan, nne Trkiye modelini basite taklit etmekten daha ileri hedefler koyuyor. Reuters'e verdii rportajda unlar sylyor: "Farkl bir model oluturabileceimizi umuyorum. Msr'da modern bir demokratik toplum ina ettiimizde, bunun demokrasiyi kurmak isteyen bakalar iin iyi bir rnek olacan mit ediyoruz." Bu niyetler karsnda inallah demekten baka ne yaplabilir? 04 Aralk 2011, Pazar

A revolution in the making No, this is not an article about the first free elections in Egypt in 60 years, which could produce a victory for Islamist parties. It is not about the victory of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD in French acronym, AKP in Turkish), either. Add to these successes the leading role of the moderate Tunisian Islamists, and it would not be an exaggeration to talk about revolutionary changes under way in North Africa. No, the revolution I am referring to is the total overhaul of the European Union as a result of the present euro crisis. For months now, European leaders have been struggling to find the right answers to save countries that are no longer able to make ends meet. But they never succeeded in convincing skeptical financial markets that the EU was in full control and that trust in the euro could be restored. Instead, the ongoing doubts about the effectiveness of Spains drastic budget cuts and the new revelations about Italys poor economic situation have led to growing speculation the euro is on the verge of collapse and that European leaders are not able or willing to do what it takes to prevent this nightmare scenario. The cover of this weeks edition of The Economist says it all. The picture is of a euro coin crashing down; the title reads Is this really the end? The main culprits according to the leading global weekly are Germanys Chancellor Angela Merkel and the European Central Bank (ECB). The bank rejects the idea of acting as a lender of last resort to embattled, but solvent, governments because it does not want to reward bad behavior and because it wants to stick, dogmatically, to its traditional role of securing price stability and low inflation. But with the eurozone in such dire need of a quick but sustainable fix, many observers agree with the recommendations of The Economist. They are all convinced that the ECB must buy government bonds of endangered economies on a large and unlimited scale to prevent these countries from being ruined by the extreme high interest rates they have to pay on the international money market. The second main actor being blamed is German leader Merkel, firstly because she is preventing the ECB from playing the role most specialists want the bank to play now. But also because she refuses even to contemplate the introduction of socalled Eurobonds that would allow eurozone members to refinance their debt via the issue of bonds guaranteed by the

eurozone itself. National and vulnerable debt markets would be replaced by one large and attractive continental debt market that could profit from lower interest rates. The German government is basically against this option because it will probably mean that Germany will have to pay higher interest rates than the extremely low ones they are paying now and because Berlin fears that other eurozone countries will not be willing to stick to the required tough standards. With all potential exit routes blocked, even the biggest euro optimists started to doubt whether this time around the EU would be able to find an effective last-minute solution. But news is now coming out that Germany and France are preparing plans that could indeed be called unorthodox and groundbreaking. According to German newspapers and the well-informed EUobserver.com, Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, in close cooperation with the Dutch, Finnish, Austrian and Luxembourg governments, are considering a core eurozone that would issue joint elite bonds in a bid to raise more money at low interest rates for themselves and, under strict conditions, for the troubled southern euro-countries. This tighter fiscal union, established via an intergovernmental treaty, would be joined by those willing to participate but not necessarily by all present 17 eurozone states, let alone by all 27 EU members. To ease some of the immediate problems, the German chancellor would even be willing to soften her position on ECB lending. On Dec. 9 there will be a crucial EU summit. Until then, we will undoubtedly see more speculation about radical changes to the present setup of the EU and the eurozone. It seems to indicate that, finally, EU leaders have understood that they are expected to come up with plans that were unimaginable one year ago. To save the euro and the EU, some revolutionary thinking is needed. Lets see whether they manage. Olu halinde bir devrim Hayr, 60 yldan beri ilk kez dzenlenen ve muhtemelen slamc partilerin zaferle kaca Msr seimleriyle ilgili bir yaz deil bu. Fas'ta Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi'nin (Franszca ksaltmas PJD, Trke ksaltmas ise AKP) zaferi hakknda da deil. Bu baarlara Tunus'taki lml slamclarn oynad nc rol de eklendiinde, Kuzey Afrika'da devrimci deiimlerin yaanmakta olduunu sylemek abart olmayacaktr. Hayr, benim szn ettiim devrim, mevcut Avro krizinin sonucunda Avrupa Birlii'nin tepeden trnaa tadilattan geirilmesi. Avrupal liderler aylardr, artk kendisini idame ettirecek gc kalmayan lkeleri kurtaracak doru zmleri bulmak iin cebelleiyor. Fakat kukucu finans piyasalarn AB'nin tam kontrol altnda olduuna ve Avro'ya gvenin yeniden tesis edilebileceine inandrmay hi baaramadlar. Bunun yerine spanya'daki keskin bte kesintilerinin etkili olup olmayacana dair kukular ve talya'nn vahim ekonomik durumuna dair yeni ifaatlar Avro'nun kn eiine geldiine ve Avrupal liderlerin bu kbus senaryosunu nlemek iin gerekenleri yapmaya ne gc ne de gnl olduuna dair giderek artan speklasyonlara yol at. "The Economist"in bu haftaki saysnn kapa her eyi anlatyor. Bir Avro'luk demir para yere doru aklrken, "Bu gerekten de son mu?" bal okunuyor. Saygn haftalk dergiye gre ba sorumlular Almanya Babakan Angela Merkel ile Avrupa Merkez Bankas (ECB). Banka mkl, fakat borlarn deyebilecek durumda olan hkmetlere son bor verme mercii roln stlenmeyi reddediyor; nk hovardal dllendirmek istemiyor ve fiyat istikraryla dk enflasyonu salama almaktan mteekkil geleneksel rolne dogmatik bir ekilde sk skya bal kalmak istiyor. Fakat Avro Blgesi'nin hzl fakat srdrebilir bir zme fena halde ihtiya duyduu bir dnemde, birok gzlemci The Economist'in tavsiyelerine katlyor. ECB'nin tehlike altndaki ekonomilerin devlet tahvillerini, bu lkelerin uluslararas para piyasasnda demek zorunda

kalacaklar ar yksek faiz oranlaryla yerle bir olmasn nlemek iin byk ve snrsz lekte satn almas gerektii konusunda hepsi hemfikir. Sulanan ikinci baaktr ise Almanya lideri Angela Merkel. Sulanmasnn birinci sebebi ECB'yi, uzmanlarn byk ounluunun bankann u an stlenmesini istedii rolden alkoymas. Bir baka sebep de Avro Blgesi yelerinin borlarn bizzat Avro Blgesi tarafndan garanti edilen tahviller zerinden tekrar finanse etmesine imkn verecek Avro tahvillerin karlmasn bahis konusu bile ettirmemesi. Bu tahviller sayesinde ulusal ve savunmasz kredi piyasalarnn yerini, daha dk faiz oranlarndan faydalanabilecek tek bir byk ve cazip ktasal kredi piyasas alacak. Alman hkmeti bu seenee temelden kar, zira bu muhtemelen Almanya'nn u an demekte olduu ar dk oranlardan daha yksek faiz oranlar demek zorunda kalmas anlamna gelecek. Ayrca Berlin dier Avro Blgesi lkelerinin ihtiya duyulan kat ilkelere sk skya bal kalmaya yanamayacandan korkuyor. Btn potansiyel k yollarnn tkand bir ortamda, Avro'ya en iyimser bakanlar bile AB'nin bu kez de etkili bir son dakika zm bulmay baarp baaramayacandan kuku duymaya balad. Fakat imdi Almanya ile Fransa'nn gerekten de tutucu olmayan ve dnm noktas saylabilecek planlar hazrladna dair haberler geliyor. Alman gazetelerine ve salam bilgi kaynaklar olan "EU Observer"a gre, Merkel ve Sarkozy Hollanda, Finlandiya, Avusturya ve Lksemburg hkmetleriyle yakn ibirlii iinde, kendileri ve (kat koullar altnda) sorunlu gney Avro lkeleri iin dk faiz oranlarnda daha ok para ortaya koyma hedefi erevesinde ortak 'elit' tahviller karacak ekirdek bir Avro Blgesi oluturulmasna kafa yoruyor. Hkmetleraras bir anlamayla kurulacak olan bu daha sk mali birlie isteyenler katlacak; fakat brakn 27 AB yesinin tamamn, mevcut 17 Avro Blgesi lkesinin hepsinin katlmak gibi bir mecburiyeti olmayacak. Acil sorunlarn bazlarn hafifletmek iin Alman babakannn ECB'nin bor vermesine dair tutumunu yumuatmaya dahi raz olabilecei syleniyor. 9 Aralk'ta hayati nemde bir AB zirvesi yaplacak. O zamana dek, AB ile Avro Blgesi'nin mevcut yapsndaki radikal deiikliklere dair yeni speklasyonlara tank olacamza hi kuku yok. Bu deiiklikler, AB liderlerinin kendilerinden, bir yl nce hayal edilemeyecek planlar ortaya koymalarnn beklendiini nihayet anladnn iareti gibi grnyor. Avro'yu ve AB'yi kurtarmak iin bir miktar devrimci dnce gerekiyor. Bakalm altndan kalkabilecekler mi?

Making better use of historic opportunities What is the similarity between the strong endorsement of secularism by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan in Cairo some time ago and the apologies he offered last week for the killing of thousands of Kurds by the Turkish state in Dersim between 1936 and 1939? It is the tendency of most of the people who do not like the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader to shift immediately in what I would call the Yes, but mode. When he recently visited Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, Erdoan made a statement that caught many off guard. He advised Arab politicians to respect the principle of secularism while building up new, post-revolutionary state institutions. To the surprise of many in Turkey and abroad the Turkish leader defended a passive form of secularism that we know from countries like the United Kingdom and the United States in which the state maintains an equal distance to all religions and, as Erdoan underlined, to those who do not share any religious belief. It was, in my opinion, a courageous intervention in a part of the world where secularism is perceived by many as synonymous with anti-religious. Erdoan knew what he was doing, he realized that it would not make him very popular among staunch Islamists and still he did it because, for good reasons, he

believes state secularism is a basic requirement in a multi-religious society. What was the reaction of many AKP opponents? They downplayed the significance of his speech for the Arab world and straight away demanded that the AKP leader should practice at home what he preaches abroad. They were right in the sense that there are still many challenges with regard to secularism in Turkey that have not yet been met, ranging from the one-sided promotion of the traditional Sunni interpretation of Islam by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a state institution, and the non-recognition of Alevi houses of worship to the refusal to reopen the Greek Orthodox Halki seminary because the church does not want to operate under state control. Indeed, these are all but a part of the many domestic issues on which Erdoan has not shown the same commitment to the new secularism he promoted elsewhere. My problem with the naysayers is that they missed a golden opportunity to confront the prime minister with the consequences of his own words. Instead of praising him for his bold redefinition of secularism first and then gently questioning him on the remaining inadequacies in Turkey, they fatally undermined their own credibility and effectiveness by minimizing the importance of his Cairo speech from the start. One could see the same mechanism at work last week with the Dersim apologies. Knowing how difficult it is for any country to admit past mistakes, I think it was truly remarkable that Erdoan fully acknowledged the responsibility of the state in the notorious massacres that took place in 1937 in Dersim. Of course one can criticize the prime minister for rubbing it so cruelly in the face of the helpless leader of the opposition, who damaged his own reputation and that of his party by refusing to join the prime minister in his expression off regret. And yes, there are many other violent episodes in the history of Turkey on which Erdoan has not yet spoken out so clearly. But again, I am convinced it would be much more credible and productive to acknowledge the importance of this unique apology on behalf of the Turkish state first and only then move on to other painful historic dossiers. In my view the prime minister has crossed a psychological threshold, and I agree with Hurriyet Daily News Editor-in-Chief Murat Yetkin that it could trigger apologies on other disputed episodes in Turkish history. We all know the examples: the 1915 massacre of the Armenians, the 1942 exuberant taxation of the Jewish community, the 1955 pogroms of the Greeks, the 1977 killings of Alevis in Kahramanmaras. One day, Turkey has to come to terms with each and every one of these dirty pages in its history. The first time is always the most difficult one, especially in a country like Turkey that, at the official level, has always denied any wrongdoing. That is why I sincerely hope that the next steps can be made jointly by both supporters and opponents of the present government. That will only happen when everybody is able and willing to appreciate and utilize historic turnings points once they occur. Tarih frsatlardan daha iyi yararlanmak Babakan'n bir mddet nce Kahire'de laiklie verdii gl destekle geen hafta Dersim'de binlerce Krt'n 1936-39 yllar arasnda Trk devleti tarafndan ldrlmesi nedeniyle diledii zr arasndaki benzerlik ne?

Benzerlik AKP liderinden holanmayan insanlarn byk ounluunun benim "Evet, ama..." slubu dediim noktaya hemen kayma eilimi. Babakan Erdoan, ksa zaman nce Msr, Libya ve Tunus'u ziyaret ettiinde biroklarn hazrlksz yakalayan bir aklama yapt. Arap siyasetilere devrim sonras yeni devlet kurumlar ina ederken, laiklik ilkesine riayet etmeleri tavsiyesinde bulundu. Babakan, Trkiye'de ve darda biroklarn artarak, Britanya ve ABD gibi lkelerden bildiimiz pasif bir laiklik tarzn savundu; bu ilkeye gre, devlet btn dinlere ve Erdoan'n da altn izdii zere, herhangi bir dini inanc paylamayanlara eit mesafede duruyor. Bana kalrsa bu, dnyann, laikliin biroklar tarafndan din kartlyla e tutulduu bir parasnda cesur bir kt. Erdoan ne yaptn biliyor, sylediklerinin kat slamclarn gznde kendisini pek de popler klmayacan gryordu. Buna ramen o szleri syledi, zira gayet mantkl gerekelerle, devletin laikliinin ok dinli bir toplumda temel bir zorunluluk olduuna inanyor. Peki birok AKP kartnn tepkisi ne oldu? Erdoan'n Arap dnyasna hitaben yapt konumann nemini kmsediler ve derhal AKP liderinin darda vaaz ettiklerini lkede uygulamas gerektiini sylemeye baladlar. Trkiye'de laiklikle ilgili hl zlmemi birok sorun olduu noktasnda haklydlar. Bir devlet kurumu olan Diyanet leri Bakanl tarafndan slamiyet'in geleneksel Snni yorumunun tek tarafl olarak desteklenmesinden, Alevilerin ibadet evlerinin tannmamasna, oradan kilise devlet kontrol altnda faaliyet gstermek istemedii iin Heybeliada'daki Rum Ortodoks Ruhban Okulu'nun yeniden almasnn reddedilmemesine kadar pek ok sorun saylabilir. Gerekten de Erdoan'n baka yerlerde destek verdii yeni laiklie ayn ball sergilemedii lke ii meseleler sz konusu. Benim menfi konuanlarla ilgili derdim ise u: Kendi szlerinin sonular zerinden Babakan'a itiraz etmek ynnde altn bir frsat kardlar. lkin laiklii cesur bir ekilde yeniden tanmlamasn takdir edip ardndan Trkiye'de varln srdren eksiklikler konusunda onu nazike sorgulamak yerine, Kahire konumasnn nemini en batan azmsayarak kendi gvenilirliklerine ve itibarlarna ar bir darbe indirmi oldular. Ayn ileyii geen haftaki Dersim zr konusunda da grebilmek mmkn. lkelerin gemiteki yanllarn kabul etmesinin ne kadar zor olduunu bilen biri olarak, Erdoan'n devletin 1937'de Dersim'de gerekletirilen meum katliamlardaki sorumluluunu tmyle kabul etmesini son derece arpc buluyorum. Elbette Erdoan'n bu meseleyi, znt beyan etmek noktasnda babakan gibi davranmay kabul etmeyerek hem kendisinin hem partisinin itibarn zedeleyen aresiz muhalefet liderinin yzne bylesine acmaszca vurmas eletirilebilir. Ve evet, Trkiye'nin tarihinde Erdoan'n hakknda henz byle ak konumad birok baka vahim vaka var. Fakat bir kez daha, Trk devleti adna dilenen bu esiz zrn nemini ilkin kabul edip ardndan dier acl tarih dosyalarna doru ilerlemenin ok daha muteber ve verimli bir tutum olacandan kukum yok. Benim grme gre Babakan, psikolojik bir eii am durumda ve bunun Trkiye tarihindeki baka tartmal dnemlerle ilgili zrlere kap aabilecei konusunda Hurriyet Daily News Genel Yayn Ynetmeni Murat Yetkin'e katlyorum. rnekler hepimizin malumu: Ermenilere ynelik 1915 katliam, Yahudi toplumuna 1942'de dayatlan varlk vergisi, Rumlara ynelik 1955'teki pogromlar veya 1977'de Kahramanmara'ta Alevilerin ldrlmesi. Trkiye, ulusal tarihindeki bu kirli sayfalarn her biriyle er ge yzlemek zorunda. lk yzleme her zaman en zor olandr, bilhassa Trkiye gibi her tr yanln resmi dzeyde her daim inkr edildii bir lkede. Bu yzden sonraki admlarn mevcut hkmetin destekileri ve kartlar tarafndan ortaklaa atlabilmesini can- gnlden mit ediyorum. Bu da ancak, tarihsel dnm noktalar yaandnda, herkes bunlar takdir etme ve bunlardan faydalanma becerisi ve istei sergilediinde gerekleecektir.

Should Egypt's elections be postponed? Can you have elections in a country where people are dying in the streets, almost all parties have suspended their electoral

activities, the prime minister has announced that he and his cabinet are willing to step down and the generals who are actually running the country seem to be completely out of touch with the desires and demands of large parts of the population? This is the question that has to be answered in the next couple of days in Egypt because the several stages of the parliamentary elections are scheduled to begin next weekend. And there are no easy answers. For months frustration has been building up among the people, who managed to kick out former president Hosni Mubarak in February. Since then, Egypt has been ruled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). For months, there were high expectations that, albeit slowly, Egypt was heading towards democratic elections, a new constitution and a civilian government. Unfortunately, the military council met few of its commitments and tightened its grip on freedom of expression, association and assembly. Now, the hope that things would move forward under military guidance has completely evaporated. In a report published this week, Amnesty International accused the SCAF of brutalities sometimes exceeding those of the Mubarak era. Last weekend at least 35 people were killed after security forces fired live ammunition at demonstrators during the course of several days of clashes. In the last six months, about 12,000 civilians have been tried by military courts and at least 13 of them have been sentenced to death. The immediate reason for the violent clashes we are witnessing now is a recent attempt by the military to impose itself on Egypt's future constitution. In what was seen by many as a dictatorial act by the generals, the army tried to ensure that the military budget would be above parliamentary scrutiny and that the armed forces would be considered the guardians of constitutional legitimacy. It confirmed the suspicion of many Egyptians across the board that the SCAF plans to remain in power even after parliamentary and presidential elections and the adoption of a new constitution. On Friday, tens of thousands of Islamists, in a show of strength, marched peacefully to protest the dominant role of the army. On Saturday, the police tried to remove some of the remaining demonstrators, but their excessive use of violence only triggered new demonstrations, this time by the same groups that made Tahrir such an iconic square in February. These demonstrations quickly turned into full-scale battles. There is a lot of speculation that the riots are part of a plot to postpone elections because the army is afraid that a likely victory by Islamist parties at the ballot box will soon terminate their grip on power. One of the most informed observers, Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Doha Center, warns that if the elections are delayed, Islamists will perceive it as a soft coup directed against them. Muslim Brotherhood (MB) officials told him they believe the army may have deliberately provoked protestors to create a pretext for postponing elections in which they would undoubtedly do well. Hamid agrees that there are ample reasons to worry about an Islamist electoral victory but that this fear should never be used to subvert a democratic process that is already underway. What do other political forces want? A leading figure in the Youth Coalition of the Revolution, one of the main players at Tahrir, called for a national salvation government and the departure of the SCAF, but did not mention the upcoming elections. Mohamed ElBaradei, presidential hopeful and head of the National Association for Change, has condemned the violence and called for the formation of a National Salvation Council that could take over the country from the military. Unclear are the timing and the impact of a new government on the scheduled start of the elections.

The latest news is that the SCAF is talking to ElBaradei and other political leaders to find a way out of the present chaos. The question remains whether it is realistic to expect citizens to go out and vote in such a complex situation. My opinion is that what Egypt needs first is a new, respected civilian leadership, a clear timetable for the army's exit from politics and a societal climate conducive to honest and transparent elections. These conditions simply cannot be met in a few days. Msr seimleri ertelenmeli mi? nsanlarn sokaklarda ld, neredeyse btn partilerin seim faaliyetlerini askya ald, babakann kabinesiyle birlikte ekilmek istediini aklad ve lkenin esas yneticisi olan generallerin halkn geni kesimlerinin arzular ve talepleriyle ban klliyen koparm grnd bir lkede seim yapabilir misiniz? Msr'da gelecek gnlerde cevaplanmas gereken soru bu, zira aamal olarak planlanan parlamento seimleri gelecek hafta balayacak. Ve ortada kolay cevaplar yok. ubatta eski devlet bakan Hsn Mbarek'i alaa etmeyi baaran halk arasnda aylardr giderek artan bir huzursuzluk sz konusu. Mbarek'in devrilmesinden bu yana Msr' Silahl Kuvvetler Yksek Konseyi (SKYK) ynetiyor. Aylar boyu Msr'n yava da olsa demokratik seimlere, yeni bir anayasaya ve sivil ynetime doru ilerleyeceine dair byk beklentiler vard. Ne yazk ki asker konsey taahhtlerinin pek azn karlad ve ifade, rgtlenme ve toplanma zgrl zerindeki basksn artrd. Gelinen noktada askeriyenin rehberliinde ileriye gidilecei umudu tamamen buharlam durumda. Uluslararas Af rgt bu hafta yaynlad raporda SKYK'y zaman zaman Mbarek dnemini mumla aratan bir zalimlik sergilemekle sulad. Geen hafta gvenlik glerinin gnler sren atmalarda gstericilerin zerine gerek mermiyle ate amas sonucu en az 35 kii hayatn kaybetti. Son 6 ayda yaklak 12 bin sivil, asker mahkemelerde yargland ve en az 13' idam cezasna arptrld. u an tank olduumuz iddetli atmalarn sebebi ise ordunun kendisini Msr'n mstakbel anayasasnn zerine koymak ynndeki son giriimi. Biroklar tarafndan generallerin dayatmas olarak grlen bu giriim erevesinde ordu, asker btenin parlamento denetiminden muaf tutulmasn ve silahl kuvvetlerin anayasal meruiyetin koruyucusu saylmasn salamaya alt. Bylece her grten pek ok Msrlnn SKYK'nn parlamento ve devlet bakanl seimleri ve yeni bir anayasann kabulnden sonra da iktidarda kalmay planlad ynndeki kukular dorulanm oldu. Geen cuma gvde gsterisi yapan on binlerce slamc, ordunun hakim roln protesto etmek iin bar bir yry dzenledi. Cumartesi gn gvenlik gleri kalan baz gstericileri datmaya kalkt, fakat ar iddet uygulamalar yeni gsterileri tetiklemekten baka ie yaramad; bu kez gsteri yapanlar, Tahrir'i ubatta bylesine efsanevi bir meydan haline getiren gruplarn ta kendisiydi. Gsteriler hzla geni apl atmalara dnt. Bu ayaklanmalarn seimleri ertelemek ynndeki bir komplonun paras olduuna dair bir yn speklasyon yaplyor, zira ordunun slamc partilerin sandkta kazanaca muhtemel bir zaferin ok gemeden iktidar zerindeki hakimiyetini sona erdirmesinden korktuu syleniyor. Brookings Doha Merkezi'nde grev yapan ve en bilgili Msr gzlemcilerden biri saylan adi Hamid, seimlerin ertelenmesi halinde slamclarn bunu kendilerini hedef alan yumuak bir darbe olarak grecei uyarsnda bulunuyor. Hamid'in konutuu Mslman Kardeler yetkilileri ordunun, Kardeler'in baar kazanacana kesin gzyle baklan seimleri erteleme bahanesi yaratmak iin protestocular kasten tahrik etmi olabileceini sylyor. Hamid, slamclarn seim zaferinden endie duymak iin pek ok sebep olduuna, fakat bu korkunun halihazrda yryen demokratik sreci raydan karmak iin asla kullanlmamas gerektiine katlyor. Peki dier siyasi gler ne istiyor? Devrimci Genlik Koalisyonu'nun (DGK) nde gelen isimlerinden ve Tahrir'in ba aktrlerinden biri, mill birlik hkmeti kurulmas ve SKYK'nn ekilmesi arsnda bulundu, fakat yaklaan seimlerden sz

etmedi. Devlet bakanlnn gl adaylarndan ve Ulusal Deiim Birlii'nin lideri Muhammed el Baradey iddeti knad ve ynetimi ordudan devralabilecek bir Mill Birlik Konseyi oluturulmas arsnda bulundu. Yeni bir hkmetin zamanlamas ve seimlerin planlanm balangc zerinde nasl bir etki yapaca ise belirsizliini koruyor. Son haberler SKYK'nn El Baradey ve dier siyasi liderlerle mevcut kaostan k yolu bulmak iin grmeler yapt ynnde. Vatandalarn byle karmak bir ortamda gidip oy vermesini beklemenin gereki olup olmad sorusu ise yerli yerinde duruyor. Bana gre Msr'n ihtiyac olan ilk ey yeni, gvenilir bir sivil liderlik, ordunun siyasetten ekilmesine ynelik ak bir takvim ve drst ve effaf seimlere uygun bir toplumsal ortam. Bu koullarn birka gn iinde oluamayaca ortada.

I was once a conscientious objector Hardly a day goes by in Turkey without surprises. Sometimes these unexpected events are deeply tragic like a murderous terrorist attack or a devastating earthquake. But once in a while someone manages to come up with a startling positive announcement that catches everybody off guard. Last week Turkish Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin did just that. He made public that the government was working on a draft to decriminalize conscientious objection. In other words: Men who do not want to go to the army to perform their compulsory military service because they have deeply felt moral, religious or other objections against doing so would no longer automatically end up in jail. Much is still unclear about the content of the new regulation. But it is already quite a big thing that, finally, after many years of unwillingness to deal in a decent way with conscientious objectors, the Turkish government seems to be convinced that it has to make the same kind of arrangements that other democracies have already made before. I am sure that a number of rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg have played an important role. The court spoke out strongly against the violent and degrading way Turkey deals with conscientious objectors. Based on these rulings, the Council of Europe (CoE), of which Turkey is a founding member, has put increased pressure on Turkey to change its policy. Recently, Mevlt avuolu, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), warned the Turkish government that the CoE could even deprive Turkey of its membership of the council if the country fails to solve the problem by the end of this year. Whatever the reason, I am personally very happy that Turkey is making progress on this issue. The reason for my joy is simple: I was a conscientious objector myself. In 1985, just before the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands still had an army based on compulsory military service for all able men. Being part of NATO, the ultimate aim of the Dutch army then was to stop the Russians from invading Europe, if necessary through the use of nuclear weapons. I did not believe that the Russians were coming and I did not want to be part of an institution that was ultimately willing to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens by using indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction. I never was a total pacifist who refuses every kind of violence to defend himself, his loved ones or the values he stands for. I was (and still am) in favor of minimizing the use of violence and was convinced that serving in the army did not contribute to that goal. So I refused to show up when I was called to perform my military service and made use of a law that enabled people like me to apply for an alternative civilian service. But in order to get recognized as a true conscientious objector, I

had to explain my objections before a board of experts. Initially, I was refused recognition because they considered my explanation to be too political. A second panel eventually approved of my arguments. While most conscientious objectors served as assistants in hospitals or in other public services, I managed to find a place in the Dutch parliament, where I became the assistant of a member of parliament for 18 months, six months longer than the normal military service. A few years later, the Netherlands moved to a professional army and there was no longer a need to accommodate conscientious objectors. I really hope that Turkish men who feel strongly about not joining the army will soon have the same options. In a civilized country, people should have the opportunity to explain their objections. When these are deemed to be serious, they should not be punished but be able to serve their country in a different way. I realize that many details still have to be worked out and that there are many pitfalls that should be avoided. But it was indeed a pleasant surprise last week to see that this government has come to realize that most probably not every Turk is born a soldier. Ben vicdan retiydim Trkiye'de gn gemiyor ki bir srpriz yaanmasn. Bu beklenmedik olaylar bazen canice bir terrist saldr veya ykc bir deprem gibi son derece trajik bir hal alyor. Fakat arada bir de birileri artc derecede mspet bir aklamayla arz endam ediveriyor ve herkesi hazrlksz yakalyor. Geen hafta Adalet Bakan Sadullah Ergin tam da bunu yapt. Hkmetin vicdani reddi su olmaktan karan bir tasar zerinde altn kamuoyuna aklad. Dier bir deyile: ciddi ahlaki, dini veya baka itirazlar olduu iin zorunlu askerlik hizmetini yerine getirmek istemeyen erkekler artk soluu doruca hapiste almayacak. Yeni dzenlemenin ierii hl byk lde belirsiz. Fakat vicdani retiler meselesini hakkyla ele almak konusunda gnlszlkle geen yllarn ardndan Trk hkmetinin, dier demokrasilerin ok nce yapt trden dzenlemelere girimeye nihayet ikna olmu grnmesi tek bana ok nemli. Eminim ki Strazburg'daki Avrupa nsan Haklar Mahkemesi'nin bir dizi karar da bu admn atlmasnda nemli rol oynad. Mahkeme Trkiye'nin vicdani retileri maruz brakt iddete ve aalayc muameleye kar sert ifadeler kulland. Bu kararlar temelinde, Trkiye'nin de kurucu yesi olduu Avrupa Konseyi, Ankara zerinde sz konusu politikay deitirmesi ynnde basky artrd. Geenlerde Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenterler Meclisi (AKPM) Bakan Mevlt avuolu da Trkiye'yi, Avrupa Konseyi'nin bu yl sonuna kadar sorunu zememesi halinde Konsey yeliinden karlmasnn bile gndeme gelebilecei konusunda uyard. Sebebi ne olursa olsun, Trkiye'nin bu meselede ilerleme kaydetmesinden ahsen ok mutluyum. Sevincimin sebebi basit: Ben de vicdani retiydim. 1985'te, Souk Sava'n sona ermesinden hemen nce, Hollanda hl askerlie elverili btn erkekler iin zorunlu askerlik hizmetine dayal bir orduya sahipti. NATO'nun paras olan Hollanda ordusunun o dnemdeki ba hedefi Ruslarn Avrupa'y igal etmesini, gerektiinde nkleer silah da kullanarak engellemekti. Ruslarn kapda olduuna inanmyordum ve neticede, ayrm gzetmeyen kitle imha silahlar kullanarak yz binlerce masum insan ldrmeye niyetli bir kurumun paras olmak istemiyordum. Kendini, sevdiklerini veya savunduu deerleri savunmak iin her tr iddeti reddeden mutlak bir pasifist olmadm hibir zaman. iddet kullanmnn asgariye indirilmesinden yanaydm (hl yleyim) ve orduda grev yapmann bu hedefe katks olmayacan dnyordum. Bu yzden arldmda askerlik hizmetini yapmaya gitmedim ve benim gibi insanlarn alternatif kamu hizmetine bavurmasna imkn veren yasadan yararlandm. Fakat vicdani reti olarak kabul edilmem iin bir uzmanlar kurulunun karsnda itirazlarm izah etmem gerekiyordu. lk bata kabul edilmedim, nk izahm fazla siyas buldular. Toplanan ikinci kurul nihayet argmanlarm onaylad. Vicdani retilerin byk ounluu hastanelerde veya dier kamu kurulularnda yardmc olarak hizmet verirken, ben Hollanda

Parlamentosu'nda bir i bulmay baardm. 18 ay boyu (normal askerlik hizmetinden alt ay fazla) bir parlamento yesinin yardmcln yaptm. Birka yl sonra Hollanda profesyonel orduya geti ve artk vicdani retileri baka hizmetlere sevk etme gerei kalmad. Askerlik yapmamak konusunda gl gerekeleri olan Trk erkeklerinin de ksa sre sonra ayn seeneklere sahip olmasn can gnlden mit ediyorum. Medeni bir lkede insanlarn itirazlarn dile getirme ans olmal. Bu itirazlar ciddi grldnde cezalandrlmak yerine lkelerine farkl bir ekilde hizmet edebilmeliler. Birok detayn zerinde hl alldnn ve kanlmas gereken pek ok tuzak olduunun farkndaym. Fakat geen hafta bu hkmetin her Trk'n asker domayabileceini idrak etmeye baladn grmek hakikaten ho bir srpriz oldu.

The Hrant Dink case should not end this way In July 2007 I attended the first session of the trial of the people who were suspected of killing Hrant Dink in January of that year. I was there as a friend of Hrant to give moral support to his family and as a member of the European Parliament to show that Europe cared about this murder that had shocked so many in Turkey and abroad. The mood in the packed Beikta courtroom was a mix of sadness and determination to uncover the full truth about Hrants murder. There was even some optimism that this time around the persons responsible would not be able to escape justice. Everybody still remembered what had happened before in the 1980s and 1990s, when several journalists were killed but none of the cases were solved. Many, including myself, thought that maybe, hopefully, this trial would be different because Turkey had changed and there was a government in place that seemed to be willing to confront past and present brutalities. Hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens had shown at Hrants funeral that they were willing to support these efforts to go the extra mile to bring the guilty ones before court. Two days ago I was among the few hundred friends of Hrant who gathered in front of the same Beikta court to protest against the way the case was handled over the last four years. The mood was a mix of gloom, anger and outrage about the inability of the judicial authorities to do what they were expected to do and the unwillingness of the government to intervene and stop the court messing up this trial. In the years in between many have tried to convince the prime minister and other ruling party leaders to step in and prevent the Dink case from ending up in the same pile of unresolved murders for which Turkey is so infamous. The Dink family lawyers tabled many requests to broaden the scope of the investigations beyond the small circle of nationalist youngsters from Trabzon who were on trial because nobody believes that they were the ones who masterminded the murder. There was ample evidence that Ogn Samast, the young guy who pulled the trigger, and his friends were under the control and surveillance of Trabzon state officials long before the assassination. Links with the local police and gendarmerie have been uncovered but these officials were not investigated. Other law enforcement agents knew that Hrant was under threat but still did not act. They remained off the hook as well. State institutions lost proof and evidence of this involvement but nothing happened. The latest example of this shameful and criminal negligence is the unwillingness of the Telecommunications Directorate (TB) to come up with crucial records that would help to determine the whereabouts of several suspects and their accomplices. TB has been ordered by the court to provide this information but has refused, so far, to deliver those records. This clear

obstruction of justice is done by an organization that is under the direct control of the government. Who is protecting TB and why? This is only one of many questions about the responsibility of the present authorities in Ankara. In a fully functioning democracy where the rule of law is undisputed one could argue that there is no role to play, for the executive and court cases should be left to the judiciary. In Turkey, it is a bad joke to hide behind this legalism. The Turkish judiciary is neither impartial nor independent. It never was. As previous governments did, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) administration has intervened in the functioning of the judiciary when it deemed it necessary to push for reforms or to protect vested interests. I know it tried in the Dink case to put pressure on certain suspects behind the scenes. It is sad and worrying to conclude that these interventions were not successful -- either because the government did not push hard enough or because it was not courageous enough to enter into a hazardous confrontation with still existing deep state structures. As long as people can get away with murder in Turkey because part of the state apparatus helps and protects them, and the government is not able or willing to break that ring of impunity, Turkey will be unable to convince anybody that it is on the right path to becoming a true democracy. Hrant Dink davas byle sona ermemeli Temmuz 2007'de, ayn yln ocak aynda Hrant Dink'i ldrmekle sulanan zanllara alan davann ilk durumasna katlmtm. Hrant'n arkada olarak ailesine moral destek vermek ve Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun bir mensubu sfatyla da Avrupa'nn Trkiye'de ve darda birok insan oke eden bu cinayete byk nem verdiini gstermek iin oradaydm. Beikta'taki tka basa dolu mahkeme salonunda ruh hali zntyle, Hrant'n ldrlmesine dair gerekleri tam manasyla ortaya karma kararllnn bir bileimiydi. Hatta bu defa cinayetten sorumlu olanlarn adaletten kaamayacana dair belli bir iyimserlik de vard. Herkes daha nce neler yaandn hl hatrlyordu; 1980'ler ve 90'larda pek ok gazeteci ldrlm, fakat bu cinayetlerin hibiri aydnlatlmamt. Ben de dahil birok insan, bu davann farkl olabileceine ynelik umutlu bir beklenti iindeydi, zira Trkiye deimiti ve eski-yeni cinayetlerle yzlemeye gnll bir hkmet i bandayd. Yz binlerce Trkiye vatanda da Hrant'n cenazesinde, sulular adalet nne karmak ynnde elden gelen abann gsterilmesine desteini ilan etmiti. Birka gn nce, Hrant'n birka yz arkadann arasndaydm: Ayn Beikta mahkemesinin nnde, davann son drt yldr grlme eklini protesto etmek iin toplanmtk. Hzn, kzgnlk ve adli makamlarn kendilerinden bekleneni yerine getirmemelerine ve hkmetin duruma mdahale edip mahkemenin bu davay yzne gzne bulatrmasna engel olma isteksizliine duyulan fkenin karmndan oluan bir ruh hali vard. Cinayetten bu yana geen dnemde biroklar babakan ve dier iktidar partisi liderlerini adm atmaya ve Hrant Dink davasnn Trkiye'nin alnnda kara leke gibi duran zlmemi cinayetler ynnda yerini almasn engellemeye ikna etmeye alt. Dink ailesinin avukatlar soruturmalarn leinin yarglanan bir avu Trabzonlu milliyeti gencin tesine geniletilmesi ynnde birok bavuruda bulundu, nk cinayetin asl planlayclarnn onlar olduuna kimse inanmyordu. Tetii eken Ogn Samast ve arkadalarnn suikasttan ok nce Trabzon'daki devlet yetkililerinin kontrol ve takibi altnda olduuna dair bir yn kant vard. Yerel polis ve jandarmayla balantlar aa karld, fakat bu yetkililer soruturulmad.

Baka emniyet grevlileri de Hrant'n tehdit altnda olduunu biliyordu, fakat harekete gememilerdi. Onlar da yakalarn kurtard. Devlet kurumlar bu balantlara dair kantlar kaybetti, fakat yine bir ey olmad. Bu utan verici ve su tekil eden ihmalin en son rnei Telekomnikasyon letiim Bakanl'nn (TB) baz zanllarn ve su ortaklarnn nerede olduunun tespitine yardmc olacak hayati nemdeki kaytlar vermek konusundaki gnlszl. Mahkeme, TB'den bu bilgiyi sunmasn talep etti, fakat TB bugne kadar talebi reddetti. Adaletin nne bu bariz engel, dorudan hkmet kontrolndeki bir kurum tarafndan konuluyor. TB'i kim, niye koruyor? Bu, Ankara'daki mevcut makamlarn sorumluluuna dair sorulabilecek pek ok sorudan sadece biri. Tam manasyla ileyen ve hukukun stnlnn tartma gtrmedii bir demokraside, yrtmenin oynayaca hibir rol olmad ve davalarn yargya braklmas gerektii ne srlebilir. Trkiye'de ise bu yasalcln arkasnda sakl kt bir aka var. Trk yargs ne tarafsz ne de bamsz. Hibir zaman da yle olmad. nceki hkmetlerin yapt gibi AKP hkmeti de reformlar ilerletmek veya belli karlar korumak adna gerekli grdnde yargnn ileyiine mdahale ediyor. Hrant Dink davasnda perde arkasndaki belli pheliler zerinde bask kurmaya altklarn biliyorum. Bu abalarn baarl olmadn grmek znt ve endie verici. Sebebi ya hkmetin yeterince kuvvetli bastrmamas ya da hl var olan derin devlet yaplaryla tehlikeli bir kapmaya giriecek kadar cesur olmamasyd. Trkiye'de cinayetler, devlet aygtnn bir ksm yardm ettii ve kol kanat gerdii, hkmet de dokunulmazlk zincirini krmaya muktedir ve istekli olmad iin ileyenlerin yanna kr kalabildii srece Trkiye gerek bir demokrasi haline gelmek iin doru yolda ilerlediine kimseyi ikna edemeyecektir.

How to deal with Iran? Last week the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published another report on Irans highly controversial nuclear program. Tehran has been accused by the US and the EU of using the civilian project as a cover-up for the development of nuclear weapons. Previous IAEA assessments were very cautious on that claim and mainly pointed out that there were still a lot of uncertainties concerning Irans real intentions. The latest report represents the strongest judgment the UNs nuclear watchdog has issued in its decade-long struggle to pierce the secrecy surrounding the Iranian program. The weapons inspectors express serious concerns about research and development work by Iran and claim that they have found new evidence that they say makes a credible case that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device and that the project may still be under way. The reactions to the report underline the deep divisions in how to evaluate Irans nuclear program. Forget about the extremes. Of course, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lashed out at the IAEA, called them American stooges and told the world that there are no reasons to doubt Tehrans sincerity. On the other side of the spectrum, as expected, the Israeli government and some American hard-liners stressed that this report confirms their worst fears and that military action to stop Iran might be necessary soon. I tend to agree with the sober analysis of Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and a strong opponent of the theocrats ruling Iran. He said: Contrary to speculation, the report largely reinforced the reigning assessment of the Iranian nuclear program: Tehran is, and has been for decades, seeking nuclear latency -- the capacity to make nuclear

weapons -- but the IAEA does not conclude that it currently has an active program to build nuclear weapons. For non-specialists it is very hard to fully understand and judge all the details in the IAEA report and the reservations tabled by Parsi and others. Developing nuclear weapons is not that simple, and it is easy to confuse and deceive even informed experts, especially when they do not have full access to Iranian facilities, as has been the case for a long time now. In that sense another Iran expert, Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was probably right when he concluded that ultimately, mutual distrust may render the evidence largely irrelevant. For those who are cynical about Iranian intentions, any amount of proof is sufficient and for those who are cynical about US intentions, no amount of proof is enough. After all this speculation, the most important question is what to do now. For good reasons many observers reject the idea of an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, based on the argument that a military strike would not set back Irans program for very long and it would rally Iranians around their illegitimate government. Personally, I think the best line of action is to keep on pushing to significantly enhance the IAEAs ability to inspect and verify the nature of the Iranian program, as Parsi suggests. More transparency will yield better results than sanctions that have not been able to stop Iran up until now anyway. On top of that, I strongly agree with a recommendation made by Freedom House officials on the website of the American magazine Foreign Affairs. Instead of solely focusing on Irans contentious nuclear program, the renowned human rights watchers propose to undermine the present regime in Tehran by exposing Irans horrible human rights record. According to them, the regimes main vulnerability is its false claim to legitimacy. Since staging a rigged election in 2009 to keep Ahmadinejad in power, the ayatollahs have been relying on repression and brutality to silence the opposition, jailing journalists, torturing detainees and executing critics. Focusing on these gross human rights violations, Freedom House suggests, would expose the hypocrisy of the regime and remind Iran of its domestic troubles as it tries to expand its power and influence. This strategy should also appeal to Turkey, never keen on sanctions and, as Turkish Foreign Minister Davutolu expressed it recently, always standing with the people. In Iran, many democrats wonder whether these good intentions include them as well. The time for an unambiguous answer from Ankara has come. ran'la nasl itigal etmeli? Geen hafta Uluslararas Atom Enerjisi Ajans (IAEA), ran'n hararetli tartmalara konu olan nkleer programyla ilgili yeni bir rapor yaynlad. Tahran, ABD ve AB tarafndan sivil projeyi, nkleer silah gelitirmenin kisvesi olarak kullanmakla sulanyor. Daha nceki IAEA deerlendirmeleri bu iddiaya son derece temkinli yaklayor ve byk lde, ran'n gerek niyetleriyle ilgili hl pek ok belirsizlik olduuna iaret ediyordu. En son rapor BM'ye bal nkleer denetim kurumunun ran'n nkleer programn kuatan sr perdesini aralamak ynnde on yldr gsterdii abada en kuvvetli hkm ifade ediyor. Silah denetileri ran'n yrtt aratrma ve gelitirme faaliyetine dair "ciddi endielerini" dile getirirlerken, "ran'n nkleer bir aygt gelitirmekle balantl faaliyetler yrtt ynnde muteber bir kanya" sevk ettiini syledikleri yeni kantlar bulduklarn ve projenin hl yryor olabileceini iddia ediyorlar.

Rapora verilen tepkiler, ran'n nkleer programnn nasl deerlendirilecei noktasndaki derin ayrmlarn altn iziyor. Ular bir kenara brakn. Elbette ran Cumhurbakan Ahmedinejad IAEA'ya verip veritirdi, onlar Amerika'nn uaklar olarak niteledi ve dnyaya Tahran'n drstlnden kuku duymak iin hibir sebep olmadn syledi. Yelpazenin dier tarafnda, beklendii gibi srail hkmeti ve baz Amerikal sertlik yanllar vard; onlar raporun en vahim korkular teyit ettiini ve ran' durdurmak iin askeri mdahalenin ok gemeden mecburiyet haline gelebileceini vurgulad. Ben, Ulusal ran Amerikan Konseyi'nin bakan ve ran' yneten teokratlarn sk kart olan Trita Parsi'nin saduyulu analizine katlma eilimindeyim. unlar sylyor Parsi: "Speklasyonun tersine, rapor ran'n nkleer programyla ilgili hakim kany byk oranda glendirdi: Tahran on yllardr nkleer gizlilik (yani nkleer silah retme kapasitesi) peindeydi, imdi de yle, fakat IAEA ran'n halihazrda nkleer silah gelitirmeyi hedefleyen aktif bir programa sahip olduu sonucuna varmyor." Konunun uzman olmayanlar iin IAEA raporundaki btn detaylar ve Parsi gibilerin ortaya koyduu ekinceleri tam anlamyla kavramak ve deerlendirmek ok zor. Nkleer silah gelitirmek o kadar basit deil ve bilhassa ran tesislerine tam eriim imkn verilmediinde, bilgili uzmanlar bile kafa karklna srklemek ve kandrmak kolay, ki uzun zamandr da durum bu. Bu bakmdan bir baka ranl uzman, Carnegie Uluslararas Bar Vakf'ndan Kerim Sadjapur u sonuca varrken muhtemelen hakl: "Nihayetinde karlkl gvensizliin kantlar byk oranda geersizletirdiini syleyebiliriz. ran'n niyetlerinden kuku duyanlar iin irili ufakl her kant yeterli; ABD'nin niyetlerinden kukulu olanlar iinse irili ufakl hibir kant yeterli deil." Btn bu speklasyonlardan sonra en nemli soru imdi ne yaplaca. Birok gzlemci hakl nedenlerle ran'n nkleer tesislerine saldr dncesini reddediyor, zira askeri bir mdahalenin ran'n programn ok uzun mddet geciktirmeyeceini ve ranllar gayri meru hkmetlerinin arkasnda birletireceini savunuyorlar. ahsen, Parsi'nin nerisinin yaplacak en iyi ey olduunu dnyorum: IAEA'nn denetim ve ran programnn niteliini belirleme imknlarn ciddi ekilde glendirmek istikametinde basky srdrmek. Daha fazla effaflk, bugne kadar ran' durdurmaya muvaffak olamayan yaptrmlardan daha iyi sonular verecektir. Bunlarn tesinde, Freedom House yetkililerinin Amerikan dergisi Foreign Affairs'n internet sitesinde ne srd bir tavsiyeye de can gnlden katlyorum. nde gelen insan haklar savunucular, sadece ran'n tartmal nkleer programna odaklanmak yerine, ran'n korkun insan haklar sicilini tehir ederek Tahran'daki mevcut rejimin altn oymay neriyor. Onlara gre rejimin esas yumuak karn, meruiyete sahip olduu ynndeki alt bo iddias. Ahmedinejad' iktidarda tutmak iin 2009'da hileli bir seim tezghladndan bu yana Ayetullahlar, muhalefeti susturmak iin baskya ve zulme bel balam durumda; gazetecileri hapse atyorlar, tutuklular ikenceden geiriyorlar ve muhalifleri infaz ediyorlar. Freedom House, bu yaygn ve bariz insan haklar ihlallerine odaklanmann rejimin ikiyzlln tehir edeceini ve ran'a, gcn ve nfuzunu artrmaya alrken lke iinde yaad sorunlar hatrlatacan sylyor. Bu strateji, yaptrmlara hi hevesli olmayan ve Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu'nun da geenlerde dile getirdii gibi, her daim "halkn yannda olan" Trkiye iin de geerlilik tamal. ran'da birok demokrat bu iyi niyetlerin kendilerini de kapsayp kapsamadn soruyor. Ankara'nn bu soruya sarih bir cevap vermesinin vakti geldi.

Zero neighbors without problems Most analysts of Turkey's foreign policy during the last couple of years will never say so aloud. They are either too polite or make the calculation that making fun of Ankara's recent global activism will not go down well with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leadership, with whom they will have to work for the foreseeable future. But in private or behind the scenes, they make jokes about the so-called zero problems with neighbors policy and the person who came up with the concept, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu.

The phrase most often used ridicules the concept of zero problems and states that, instead of having less problems with its neighbors, Turkey is faced with a growing number of highly problematic situations along its borders. Davutolu's tireless efforts to practice his own ideas have not created zero problems with neighbors but zero neighbors without problems. The list of proof is discouragingly long. Accession negotiations with the EU are stalled and relations with Cyprus are still very bad. Efforts to improve the relations with Armenia have failed and have led to suspicion and bad feelings among the brothers in Baku. Until recently the theocrats in Tehran were quite happy with Turkey's support in their dispute with the international community on Iran's nuclear program. But after Turkey agreed to host US radars as part of a new NATO missile defense shield and turned against Iran's most important regional ally, Syria, bitter accusations by senior Iranian officials have been leveled at the Turkish government. Add to that inventory the harsh rhetoric and broken diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel and the remarkable change of policy towards the regime in Damascus, turning Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from friend to foe, and it is not difficult to see why many cynical pundits come to the conclusion that the net result of Davutoglu's numerous and energetic activities is negative. Despite good intentions and an impressive intellectual foundation, the former academic has not managed to create a ring of friends around Turkey. This week the German Marshall Fund (GMF) published an interesting report on the implications of the Arab Spring for Turkish foreign policy. One of the authors, Nathalie Tocci, Italy's most knowledgeable Turkey expert, is careful in her criticism of Ankara's actions abroad but nevertheless her analysis must be painful for many at the Foreign Ministry. For good reason she makes a difference between the short-term effects of the Arab Spring and the medium and long-term opportunities that the changes in the Middle East may present to Turkey. According to Tocci, the uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Syria have revealed a number of inconsistencies in Turkish foreign policy and have brought to the forefront the inherent tension between the normative and realpolitik dimensions of Davutolu's strategy. In Egypt, Turkey was on the side of democracy from the start, largely because there has always been an implicit rivalry between the two countries and, at the same time, a lack of strong economic ties. In Libya, $15 billion in investment and 25,000 Turkish citizens made Turkey much more cautious. In Syria, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan first had to experience his close to zero influence on Syrian dictator Assad before Turkey was willing to abandon its wait-and-see approach. The good thing about the GMF report is that it does not only highlight the contradictions and limits of Turkish foreign policy. Several contributors make the point that Turkey has a huge potential to play a dominant role in positively influencing the eventual outcome of the Arab revolutions. In order to do that, the authors suggest structured cooperation between Turkey and two other interested parties in the region, the EU and the US. That will definitively not be easy, they admit, but it should at least be tried seriously. As for all global players, the big challenge for Turkish foreign policy is to find the right balance between high principles and smart concepts on the one hand and effective interventions and practical proposals on the other. Davutolu has to prove the cynics wrong who think that his theories do not work in the real world. One way of doing so is to admit that there are still plenty of problems with neighbors and that Turkey is willing to work with every constructive partner to solve them. Better forget about zero problems in this part of the world. Be happy when you end up with less. Sfr sorunsuz komu

Trkiye'nin son birka yldr uygulad d politikay takip eden analistlerin byk ounluu balktaki cmleyi yksek sesle dile getirmeyecektir. Ya ok nazikler ya da Ankara'nn son dnemdeki kresel girikenliiyle dalga gemenin, ngrlebilir gelecekte birlikte almak zorunda olacaklar AKP liderliinin houna gitmeyeceini hesaplyorlar. Fakat zel grmelerde veya kapal kaplar ardnda "komularla sfr sorun" tabir edilen politikayla ve onun mimar olan Trkiye Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu ile ilgili akalar yapyorlar. Bu ifade en ok 'sfr sorun' kavramn ti'ye almak iin kullanlyor ve Trkiye'nin komularyla daha az sorun yaamak bir yana, snrlar boyunca giderek daha fazla sorunlu durumla yz yze kald dile getiriliyor. Ahmet Davutolu'nun fikirlerini hayata geirmek ynnde gsterdii yorulmak bilmez abalar, komularla sfr sorun deil, sorunsuz sfr komu yaratm durumda. Buna dair kant listesi de cesaret kracak raddede uzun. AB ile yelik mzakereleri tkanm durumda ve Kbrs'la ilikiler hl ok kt. Ermenistan'la ilikileri iyiletirme abalar baarsz oldu ve Bak'deki 'kardelerde' kukuya ve rahatszla yol at. Yakn zamana dek Tahran'daki teokratlar ran'n nkleer programna dair uluslararas toplumla yaadklar ihtilafta Trkiye'nin desteini almaktan gayet memnundu. Fakat Trkiye yeni bir NATO fze savunma kalkannn paras mahiyetinde Amerikan radarlarna ev sahiplii yapmay kabul edip, ran'n blgedeki en nemli mttefiki konumundaki Suriye'nin aleyhine dndkten sonra st dzey ranl yetkililer Trk hkmetine sert sulamalar yneltmeye giritiler. Bu listeye bir de Trkiye ile srail arasndaki keskin sylemleri ve kopan diplomatik ilikileri, am'daki rejime ynelik politikada Suriye Devlet Bakan Esed'i dosttan hasma dntren dikkat ekici deiiklii de eklediinizde, niye pek ok alayc yorumcunun Davutolu'nun saysz enerjik faaliyetinin sonucunun negatif olduu neticesine vardn anlamak zor deil. yi niyetlere ve etkileyici bir entelektel temele ramen, eski akademisyen Trkiye'nin etrafnda bir dostluk zinciri yaratmay baarabilmi deil. Bu hafta German Marshall Fonu (GMF) Arap Bahar'nn Trk d politikas zerindeki etkilerine dair ilgin bir rapor yaynlad. Raporun yazarlarndan talya'nn en birikimli Trkiye uzman Nathalie Tocci, Ankara'nn d faaliyetlerine ynelik eletirilerinde temkinli, fakat yine de ortaya koyduu analiz Dileri Bakanl'nda biroklarn zm olmal. Tocci mantkl gerekelerle, Arap Bahar'nn ksa vadeli etkileri ile Ortadou'daki deiimlerin Trkiye'ye sunabilecei orta ve uzun vadeli frsatlar birbirinden ayryor. Tocci'ye gre Msr, Libya ve Suriye'deki isyanlar Trk d politikasndaki bir dizi tutarszl aa vurdu ve Davutolu'nun stratejisine "ikin normatif ve reelpolitik boyutlar arasndaki gerilimi" n plana kard. Trkiye, Msr'da bandan itibaren demokrasinin safndayd, bunun en byk sebebi de iki lke arasnda her daim st kapal bir husumet olmas ve ayn zamanda gl ekonomik balarn yokluuydu. Libya'da ise 15 milyar dolarlk yatrm ve 25 bin Trkiye vatanda Ankara'y ok daha temkinli kld. Suriye'ye gelince, Trkiye'nin bekle-gr yaklamn terk etmesi, ancak Babakan Erdoan'n Suriye diktatr zerindeki nfuzunun sfra yakn olduunu grmesiyle mmkn oldu. GMF raporunun iyi taraf, Trk d politikasnn elikilerine ve snrlarna k tutmakla kalmamas. Rapora katkda bulunan eitli uzmanlar, Trkiye'nin Arap Bahar'nn nihai sonucunu mspet ynde etkilemek bakmndan baskn bir rol oynamak konusunda muazzam bir potansiyeli olduunu savunuyor. Yazarlara gre bunu yapmak iin de Trkiye ile blgedeki iki alakal taraf (yani AB ve ABD) arasnda planl ibirlii gerekiyor. Bunun hi kolay olmayacan kabul etmekle birlikte, en azndan ciddi ekilde denenmesi gerektiini sylyorlar. Btn kresel aktrler iin olduu gibi, Trk d politikas iin de byk sorun bir yanda yce ilkeler ile iddial fikirler, dier yanda da etkili mdahaleler ile pratik neriler arasnda doru dengeyi bulmak. Ahmet Davutolu, teorilerinin gerek dnyada ie yaramadn dnen alayclarn yanldn kantlamal. Bunu yapmann yollarndan biri, komularla hl pek ok sorun bulunduunu ve Trkiye'nin bu sorunlar zmek iin btn yapc ortaklarla birlikte almaya istekli olduunu kabul etmek. Dnyann bu ksmnda sfr sorunu unutmakta, netice daha az sorun olduunda da kretmekte hayr var.

The world is watching Turkey

The conference season has started again. Last week there was the eighth Bosporus Conference, organized by the British Council, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), a Turkish think tank, and the delegation of the European Union in Turkey. The focus, as in previous years, was on the relations between Turkey and the EU. A couple of days ago, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), in partnership with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Economic Policy Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), invited a selected group of Turkish and foreign specialists to discuss the impact of the Arab Spring on Turkey, the EU and the US. Next week we will see the second Istanbul Forum, hosted by Suat Knklolu's Center for Strategic Communication, in partnership with the GMF, where several panels will be dedicated to the changes in Turkey's neighborhood and what that means for Ankara's policy. Finally, on November 17-18, the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) will gather another mixed group of Turkish and foreign pundits to see how the common interests in bringing Turkey closer to the EU can be rediscovered. I am sure that there are many other meetings that I am not aware of. It is clear that from a European and American perspective, Turkey, more than ever, is a key player in the region and that analysts all over the world are interested in how to interpret Turkey's policy, now and in the future. On the one hand, many wonder how Turkey and the EU will manage to overcome the present stalemate in the official accession negotiations. For understandable reasons, some participants in the conferences I attended are very skeptical about Turkey-EU relations and do not believe there is a way out. Most others admit that there are the difficulties but, at the same time, recognize that there is no interest on the part of the EU nor Turkey to break up. Everybody is curious whether or not recent efforts by the EU to find common ground with Turkey on the Balkans and in North Africa and the Middle East will lead to a renewed sense of common destiny. Overall, the conclusion is that, in order to safeguard their long term economic and strategic interests, Turkey and the EU should try to hang on in the next two years. After the presidential elections in France next year and the parliamentary elections in Germany in 2013, it will be clear whether major internal obstacles inside the EU will be removed. By that time, the EU should also have been able to solve the euro crisis which would allow the union to look beyond its present borders once more. Much more exciting than the complexities of Turkey's relations with the EU, are of course the popular uprisings in North Africa and the role Turkey is playing there. The so-called Turkish Model always pops up in those debates. It was interesting to see at the recent GMF event how analysts from different countries came to totally opposing conclusions. While one Arab specialist underlined the importance of Turkey as a source of inspiration for many activists and democrats in the Arab world, another commentator from the region strongly objected to this positive perception. According to him, the Turkish Model is an urban myth, repeated over and over again by a small group of Arabs who want to please their Turkish and European counterparts and prove to them that there is no need to be afraid of radical changes in Egypt or Libya. In the real world, for instance on most Arab websites and blogs, he claimed, Turkey does not figure as a shining example. Most Western participants seemed to be disappointed after hearing this sobering message. Turkish officials pretended not to be and stressed that Turkey has never had any intention to export its successful mix of a liberal economy, a secular state and a democratic society in the making, to a neighborhood that went through a totally different historical experience during the last 100 years.

I am not so sure whether the mentioned Turkish hands-off policy is completely true. It seems obvious that Turkey has an interest in stable and democratic neighbors that goes beyond finding new markets for Turkish products. The good thing is that we still have quite a lot of time to find out who is right here. We are only at the start of a process in the Arab world that might well take 25 years to crystallize. In other words: many more conferences to go. Dnya Trkiye'yi izliyor Konferans sezonu yine ald. Geen hafta British Council, Trk dnce kuruluu TESEV ve Trkiye'deki Avrupa Birlii delegasyonunun dzenledii 8. Boazii Konferans vard. nceki yllarda olduu gibi konferansn oda Trkiye-AB ilikileriydi. Birka gn nce ABD German Marshall Fonu (GMF), Hollanda Dileri Bakanl ve Trkiye Ekonomik Politikalar Aratrma Vakf (TEPAV) ortaklnda, Arap Bahar'nn Trkiye, AB ve ABD zerindeki etkisini tartmak zere bir grup seilmi Trk ve yabanc uzman davet etti. Gelecek hafta Suat Knklolu'nun Stratejik letiim Merkezi'nin GMF ile ortaklaa dzenledii ikinci stanbul Forumu'na tank olacaz; Trkiye'nin yakn evresindeki deiimler ve bunun Ankara'nn politikalar asndan ne anlama geldiine dair eitli paneller dzenlenecek. Nihayet 17-18 Kasm'da da TUSKON, Trkiye'yi AB'ye yaknlatrmak konusunda hangi ortak karlarn yeniden ne karlabileceini gzden geirmek amacyla Trk ve yabanc yorumcular bir araya getirecek. Eminim haberdar olmadm baka birok toplant da vardr. Avrupa ve Amerika'nn bak asndan Trkiye'nin blgede hi olmad kadar kilit bir aktr olduu ve dnyann her kesindeki analistlerin Trkiye'nin bugn ve gelecekteki politikalarn yorumlamak konusunda mesai harcad ak. Bir yandan biroklar Trkiye ile AB'nin resmi yelik mzakerelerindeki mevcut tkanmay nasl aabileceini soruyor. Anlalr sebeplerden dolay katldm konferanslardaki baz katlmclar Trkiye-AB ilikilerine derin bir kukuyla bakyor ve bir k yolu olduuna inanmyor. Baka biroklar da zorluklar kabul ediyor, fakat aradaki ba koparp atmann AB'nin de Trkiye'nin de karna olmadnn farkndalar. Herkes AB'nin Trkiye ile Balkanlar, Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadou'ya dair ortak zemin bulma ynndeki son abalarnn yeni bir kader ortakl hissiyatna vesile olup olmayacan merak ediyor. Neticede varlan sonu u: uzun vadeli ekonomik ve stratejik karlarn korumak iin Trkiye ile AB'nin gelecek iki ylda aralarndaki ba srdrmeye gayret etmesi gerek. Gelecek yl Fransa'daki cumhurbakanl, 2013'te Almanya'daki parlamento seimlerinin ardndan AB dahilindeki byk engellerin ortadan kalkp kalkmayaca aklk kazanacak. O zamana kadar AB'nin tekrar birlik snrlarnn tesine bakmasna imkn verecek ekilde avro krizini de zebilmesi gerekiyor. Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin glklerinden ok daha heyecan verici olan elbette Kuzey Afrika'daki halk isyanlar ve Trkiye'nin orada oynad rol. u mehur Trkiye Modeli meselesi, mevzu bahis tartmalarda daima gndeme geliyor. Son GMF etkinliinde farkl lkelerden analistlerin taban tabana zt sonulara varmasn grmek ilginti. Arap uzmanlardan biri Arap dnyasndaki birok aktivist ve demokrat iin Trkiye'nin bir ilham kayna olarak nemini vurgularken, blgeden gelen bir baka yorumcu bu mspet deerlendirmeye iddetle itiraz ediyordu. Ona gre Trkiye Modeli, Trk ve Avrupal muhataplarn memnun etmek ve onlara Msr veya Libya'da radikal deiimlerden korkmaya lzum olmadn kantlamamak isteyen kk bir grup Arap'n durmadan tekrarlad bir ehir efsanesiydi. Gerek dnyada, szgelimi Arap internet siteleri ve bloglarnn ounda Trkiye'nin parlak bir rnek olarak grlmediini iddia ediyordu. Batl katlmclarn byk ksm bu ayltc mesajn ardndan hayal krklna uram grnyordu. Trk yetkililer ise hibir ey olmam gibi davrand ve Trkiye'nin liberal ekonomi, laik devlet ve olu halindeki demokratik toplumdan mteekkil baarl bileimini, son 100 ylda tmyle farkl bir tarihsel tecrbeden geen komularna ithal etmek gibi bir niyetinin asla olmadn vurgulad.

Trkiye'ye dair dile getirilen bu 'biz karmayz' politikasnn tmyle doru olup olmadndan emin deilim. Trkiye'nin, Trk mallar iin yeni pazarlar bulmann tesinde, istikrarl ve demokratik komular istedii ak gibi. in iyi taraf kimin bu noktaya geleceini grmek iin nmzde hl epey zaman var. Arap dnyasnda, berraklk kazanmas eyrek asr alabilecek bir srecin daha bandayz. Dier bir deyile: nmzde daha ok konferans var.

Happy end to euro thriller? Let me start by offering my deepest condolences to the families of the victims of the earthquake in Van. It is heartbreaking to see the destruction in the places that were hit and to witness the sorrow and despair among the people who are suffering. The terrible natural disaster in Turkey's East got a lot of attention in the foreign media. Inevitably though, this catastrophe was overshadowed in the European press by the looming danger of another calamity, this time man made: the euro crisis. Last weekend, there was an extraordinary string of meetings in Brussels at which European finance ministers and heads of government tried to come up with the ultimate set of solutions for what is, according to many seasoned observers, the most serious challenge to the EU ever. Pessimists are afraid that the countries of the eurozone will not manage to present a package of convincing answers this Wednesday. As a result of that failure, they fear, the European economic and financial system will face a meltdown with unimaginable spillover effects on the rest of the global economy. Optimists and most realist commentators have the impression that the foundation that was laid over the weekend should be sufficient to enable the European leaders to build a consensus on how to tackle the imminent problems in Greece and how to remedy the structural deficiencies of a common currency zone without, until now, an effective mechanism of coordination and control. As Herman van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, formulated it: In fact, one of the origins of the current crisis is that almost everybody has underestimated the extent to which the economies of the eurozone are linked. The three key questions that need to be answered on Wednesday evening are: How to diminish the Greek debt? How to save the banks? And how to prevent further contamination? After months of hesitation and denial, everyone agrees that if the present Greek debt remains unchanged, the country will never be able to recover and pay back its creditors. The question is how much loss the banks are willing to take. Will it be 50 or 60 percent? The French government has long resisted such a drastic haircut because several big French banks are among the private holders of Greek government bonds. But after a secret report was leaked this weekend, showing that the Greek debt is even bigger than expected, French President Nicolas Sarkozy also had to admit that without a substantial deal with the banks on cutting down the Greek debt, there is no way out of this crisis. The other eurozone countries are simply not able or willing to spend more money on Athens' problems than the 109 billion euros they already agreed upon in July. There seems to be consensus as well on the need to strengthen Europe's weakened banks by forcing them to recapitalize, meaning that they have to create bigger reserves to better cope with future troubles. Banks should first try to raise that capital privately and turn to their governments if necessary. Only if both efforts fail can banks draw upon the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the bailout fund that was created to deal with all the weaknesses of the eurozone. That possibility is directly linked to the third crucial issue that needs to be dealt with: How large should the stability fund be to

cover, if needed, Spain and especially Italy, and to convince speculators that the buck stops with Greece? There is talk of raising around 1 trillion (1,000 billion) euros, not only by getting extra contributions from EU member states but possibly by involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, quite revolutionary, investors and sovereign-wealth funds from outside Europe, like those from China and India. My guess is that this euro thriller will have a happy end for the simple reason that the EU has always managed to overcome similar crises. Yes, there is strong domestic pressure on many governments not to pay too much. There are obvious tensions between the eurozone countries and those EU member states like the UK that do not use the euro but will be affected regardless of the outcome of Wednesday's summit. Yet, in the end, they all know that they are in this together and that failure is not an option. Avro kbusunda mutlu son mu? Van depreminde hayatn kaybedenlerin ailelerine en iten basal dileklerimi ifade ederek balamak isterim. Depremin vurduu blgelerdeki ykm ve afetzedelerin acsn ve aresizliini grmek yrek dalayc. Trkiye'nin dousundaki korkun doal afet yabanc medyada geni yer buldu. Ancak kanlmaz olarak bu felaket Avrupa basnnda, bu kez insan yapm olan ve kara bulutlar gibi dolaan bir baka felaketin glgesinde kald: avro krizi. Geen hafta sonu Brksel'de olaanst bir toplant silsilesine tank olundu. Bir araya gelen Avrupa maliye bakanlar ve hkmet bakanlar, birok deneyimli gzlemcinin AB tarihindeki en ciddi sorun diye niteledii avro krizine kalc zm yollar bulmaya alt. Ktmserler avro blgesi lkelerinin bugn yaplacak zirvede ikna edici bir zm paketi ortaya koyamayacandan korkuyor. Bu baarszln sonucunda da Avrupa ekonomik ve mali sisteminin, kresel ekonominin geri kalan zerinde de tahayyl tesi yan etkileri olacak bir kle kar karya kalacandan endieliler. yimserlerin ve gereki yorumcularn ounun izlenimi ise, hafta sonu ortaya konan temelin Avrupal liderlerin Yunanistan'daki acil sorunlarla nasl baa klaca ve bugne kadar etkili bir koordinasyon ve kontrol mekanizmasndan yoksun olan ortak para blgesinin yapsal kusurlarna nasl are bulunaca konusunda bir konsenss ina edebilmesi asndan yeterli olmas gerektii ynnde. Avrupa Konseyi Bakan Herman van Rompuy'un da formle ettii zere: "Aslnda mevcut krizin sebeplerinden biri u: Avro blgesi ekonomilerinin bal olduu lei neredeyse herkes hafife ald." Bu akam cevaplanmas gereken kilit soru yle: Yunanistan'n borcu nasl eritilecek? Bankalar nasl kurtarlacak? Ve krizin baka lkelere sirayet etmesinin nne nasl geilecek? Tereddt ve inkrla geen aylarn ardndan herkes u konuda hemfikir: Yunanistan'n mevcut borcu byle kalrsa, lke asla toparlanamayacak ve alacakllarna deme yapamayacak. Mesele bankalarn ne kadar kayba raz olaca. Yzde 50 veya 60 m? Fransa hkmeti byle ciddi bir 'kesintiye' uzun zamandr direniyordu, nk Yunan devlet tahvillerini elinde bulunduran zel sektr kurulular arasnda birok byk Fransz bankas var. Fakat bu hafta sonu Yunanistan'n borcunun tahmin edilenden ok daha fazla olduunu gsteren gizli bir raporun basna szmasnn ardndan Fransa Cumhurbakan Sarkozy de Yunanistan borcunun indirilmesi ynnde bankalarla ciddi bir anlama yaplmadka bu krizden k olmadn kabul etmek zorunda kald. Dier avro blgesi lkelerinin de, Atina'nn sorunlarna temmuzda kararlatrlan halihazrdaki 109 milyar avrodan fazla para harcamaya ne gc ne de gnl var. Avrupa'nn zayflayan bankalarnn sermaye yaplarn yeniden dzenlemeye (yani gelecekteki sorunlarla daha iyi baa kmak iin daha byk kaynaklar yaratmaya) sevk edilerek glendirilmesi gerektii konusunda da konsenss var gibi grnyor. Bankalar ilk nce sermayelerini kendi balarna ykseltmeye almal, lzum halinde hkmetlere bavurmal. Bankalar ancak her iki abann da baarsz olmas halinde, avro blgesinin btn zayflklaryla itigal etmek iin kurulan kurtarma fonu Avrupa Mali stikrar Mekanizmas'ndan yararlanabilir.

Bu ihtimal, halledilmesi gereken nc hayati meseleyle dorudan balantl: Gerekirse spanya ve bilhassa talya'y da kapsamas ve speklatrleri sorumluluun Yunanistan'n tesine gemeyeceine ikna etmesi iin istikrar fonu ne byklkte olmal? Fona bir trilyon avro koymaktan ve bu parann sadece AB yesi lkelerin ilave katklaryla deil, muhtemelen iin iine IMF'nin ve gayet devrimci bir admla, inliler ve Hintliler gibi Avrupa dndan yatrmclarn ve devlet fonlarnn katlmasyla toplanmasndan sz ediliyor. Benim tahminim avro kbusunun mutlu sonla bitecei ynnde. Zira AB benzer krizlerin stesinden gelmeyi daima baarmtr. Evet, birok hkmet zerinde ok fazla para verilmemesi ynnde gl dahili basklar var. Avro blgesi lkeleriyle Britanya gibi avro kullanmayan, fakat bugnk zirvenin sonucundan her halkarda etkilenecek olan AB yesi lkeler arasnda da bariz gerilimler sz konusu. Ancak neticede hepsi ayn gemide olduklarn ve baarszln bir seenek olmadn biliyor.

50 years I never talk as much to taxi drivers as I do when I am in Berlin. There is a simple reason for that. In the Netherlands I hardly ever use a taxi because public transport is well organized. In stanbul I regularly do, but because of my limited Turkish language skills I still dont manage to go beyond the weather or the big names in the history of Dutch football. The good thing in Berlin is that most taxi drivers are Turks, and they speak German. I should be careful here because with good reason one could raise the question whether a person with Turkish origins but born in Germany should still be considered a Turk. I do not want to go into that disputed issue now, so lets agree that, for the sake of convenience, I will call everybody who speaks Turkish a Turk, wherever he is born or whatever his passport says. Last week I was in Berlin, and again the taxi driver found out quite soon that I had something to do with Turkey after I used some Turkish words when speaking on the phone with my wife. I explained my situation, and before I could even ask, the young guy started talking in perfect German about his longing for stanbul and his plans to go there. He was born in Germany after his parents moved there in the seventies. I should say reunited because his father left for Germany years before. My taxi driver was doing fine financially. But instead of investing his money in extra Berlin taxis, he had started to transfer his earnings to Turkey where he had bought some apartments that he rented out. He was convinced that one day he would come to stanbul and stay there; as soon as possible because he did not like living in Berlin anymore. After so many years he still had the feeling that he was not really accepted by his compatriots without Turkish roots. Even more importantly, he sensed that Turkey was moving in the right direction, while in Germany things could only become more complicated, both economically and in society. For him, Turkey meant dynamism, Germany stagnation. One often hears similar stories from Turks living in Germany or the Netherlands. Some decide to break up and move to Turkey. Most of them regret the situation but feel compelled to stay because of family reasons or because, despite all kind of problems, they got used to their adopted country. Fifty years ago in October 1961, the German and Turkish governments agreed to regulate the possibilities for German employers to look for unemployed Turkish citizens and offer them a job. There were no public announcements, no

receptions, no headlines. It was a three-page diplomatic note that did not even need to be signed. It was, totally unintentionally, the official start of a relationship that would radically change German society, the link between the two countries and the mutual perceptions of Turks and Germans. This week, the German weekly Die Zeit published a long, beautiful article to commemorate the October 1961 non-event that set in motion a turbulent history of pain and pleasure, tragic events and joyful memories, failed expectations and successful careers. There is the former German Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt who admits the many mistakes made by the German authorities. There is Gnter Wallraff who revealed the discrimination and exploitation of hard-working Turks in his book My name is Ali. Actress Renan Demirkan, raised between Kant and the Quran, is an example of the tensions between young ambitious German Turks and their tradition-honoring parents. In a moving combination of grief and forgiveness, Mevlde and Durmus Gen look back at the drama in Solingen in 1993 when five children died after their house was set on fire by racists. Psychologist Elif Cindik explains how she treats the fears and anxieties of old and young Turks that reflect both personal traumas but also the ongoing difficulties faced by Turks in a multicultural society where the majority of late tends to deny that fact. The article concludes by refuting the question whether or not it was worthwhile to start this long story of ups and downs in 1961. It does not make sense. Germans and Turks are in this together and that is not going to change. Even my taxi driver would have to agree there. 50 yl Taksi ofrleriyle Berlin'den daha fazla konutuum baka bir yer yok. Nedeni basit: Hollanda'da nadiren taksiye binerim, zira toplu tama gayet iyi organize edilmitir. stanbul'da dzenli olarak taksi kullanyorum, fakat Trkeyi snrl konuabildiim iin hl hava durumunun veya Hollanda futbol tarihindeki byk yldzlarn tesine geemiyorum. Berlin'de iyi olan ey taksi ofrlerinin byk ksmnn Trk olmas ve Almanca konumalar. Bu noktada dikkatli olmam lazm, zira Trkiye kkenli olan, fakat Almanya'da domu bir insann hl Trk saylp saylmayaca sorusu sorulabilir, ki ok da haksz bir soru olmaz. imdi bu tartmal meselenin derinine inmek istemiyorum, o yzden kolaylk adna Trke konuan herkese, nerede domu olursa olsun veya pasaportunda ne yazarsa yazsn, Trk diyeceim. Geen hafta Berlin'deydim ve taksi ofr yine ok gemeden Trkiye'yle bir alakam olduunu fark etti, zira eimle telefonda konuurken baz Trke kelimeler kullanmtm. Durumumu akladm ve daha sormama bile frsat kalmadan gen ofr kusursuz bir Almancayla stanbul'u ne kadar zlediinden ve oraya gitme planlarndan sz etmeye balad. Anne-babas yetmilerde Almanya'ya gelmi, kendisi de burada domutu. Aslnda aile birlemesi demeliyim, nk babas annesinden yllar nce Almanya'ya gelmiti. yi para kazanyordu. Fakat Berlin'de bir taksiye daha yatrm yapmak yerine kazancn Trkiye'ye aktarmaya balam, bylece birka daire alp kiraya vermiti. Gnn birinde stanbul'a yerleeceine inanyordu. Bunu mmkn olduunca erken yapacakt, zira artk Berlin'de yaamay sevmiyordu. Onca yldan sonra Trkiye kkenli olmayan yurttalar tarafndan aslnda hl kabul grmediini hissediyordu. Daha da nemlisi, hem ekonomik hem toplumsal olarak Almanya'da iler sadece daha karmak hale gelirken, Trkiye'nin doru istikamette ilerlediini dnyordu. Onun iin Trkiye dinamizm, Almanya ise durgunluk demekti.

Almanya veya Hollanda'da yaayan Trklerden sk sk benzer hikyeler dinliyorsunuz. Bazlar oralardan kopup Trkiye'ye tanmaya karar veriyor. ou iinde bulunduu durumdan hi memnun deil, fakat ailev sebeplerle veya btn sorunlara ramen ikinci lkelerine altklar iin kalmaya mecbur hissediyor. Elli yl nce, Ekim 1961'de Alman ve Trk hkmetleri Alman iverenlerin isiz Trkiye vatandalarn istihdam etme srecini balatt. Kamuoyuna aklamalar yaplmad, resepsiyonlar verilmedi, manetlerde yer almad. mzalanmas bile gerekmeyen sayfalk bir diplomatik belgeydi bu. Ve o belgeyle, tamamen istemsiz olarak, Alman toplumunu, iki lke arasndaki ba ve Trklerle Almanlarn birbirlerine dair alglarn kknden deitirecek bir iliki resmen balam oldu. Bu hafta, haftalk Alman gazetesi 'Die Zeit', ac ve sevinten, trajik olaylardan ve neeli hatralardan, boa kan beklentilerden ve baarl kariyerlerden mteekkil alkantl bir tarihi harekete geiren Ekim 1961'deki o nemsiz olayn ansna uzun, gzel bir makale yaymlad. Makalede neler yoktu ki: Alman makamlarnn yapt pek ok hatay kabul eden eski Almanya Babakan Helmut Schmidt. "En Alttakiler" kitabnda ar artlar altnda alan Trklere ynelik ayrmcl ve smry ifa eden Gnter Wallraff. Kant ile Kur'an arasnda yetien, heyecan dolu Almanyal gen Trklerle annebabalarnn bal olduu gelenekler arasndaki gerilimlerin bir rnei olan aktris Renan Demirkan. Evleri rklar tarafndan yakldnda be ocuklarn kaybeden Mevlde ve Durmu Gen'in 1993'teki Solingen dramna dnp baktklarnda sergiledikleri gz yaartc yas ve balayclk. Yal ve gen Trklerin, bir yandan kiisel travmalar, bir yandan da okkltrl bir toplumda yz yze geldikleri, ama ounun inkr etme eiliminde olduu sregiden zorluklar yanstan korkularna ve endielerine nasl yaklatn anlatan psikolog Elif Cndk... Makale, 1961'de artlar ve eksileri olan bu uzun hikyeyi balatmaya deip demedii sorusunu reddederek neticeleniyor. Artk nemi yok. Almanlar ve Trkler bugn bir arada ve bu deimeyecek. Taksi ofrm bile bunu kabul etmek zorunda kalrd.

A blessing in disguise The fundamental call for a fairer distribution of wealth cannot be ignored. What is at stake is the future of the American dream. The bargain has always been that all who work hard should have an opportunity for prosperity. That dream has been shattered by a crisis brought about by financial excess and political cynicism. The consequence has been growing inequality, rising poverty and sacrifice by those least able to bear it. The frustration of protesters railing against the global financial system and of the 54 per cent of Americans who polls suggest support their calls is legitimate. The cry for change is one that must be heeded. This comment on the worldwide actions of the Occupy movement last weekend was not published by a small radical left magazine or an anti-capitalist blogger. It is the opinion of the editors of the Financial Times, one of the most influential and prestigious global newspapers and a strong defender of free markets and liberal democracy. It is only one example of the many positive endorsements of the Occupiers by establishment representatives. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schuble, a member of Chancellor Angela Merkels conservative Christian Democrats, admitted that he was taking the protests very seriously. Future head of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi said, Young people have a right to be furious. How to explain this support for what still seems to be a marginal phenomenon in terms of numbers of people and institutions that are crucial parts of the very system the demonstrators are protesting? It is true that last weekend hundreds of thousands all over the world participated in so-called occupations of places that are seen as symbolic for an unjust and rotten banking system. But in most cities the turnout was not impressive, and the message was unclear for the simple reason that there are

no agreed slogans or demands. Besides, we have seen much bigger and targeted demonstrations in the past, for instance against the Iraq War, that had no impact at all on the decision makers in Washington, London or Madrid. Why all of a sudden this sympathy and understanding? Part of the explanation is probably that in the last couple of months many politicians have noticed that the anger over the extreme consequences suffered by the people because of the present financial system has reached their middle and lower class electorate as well. Calls for more and better control of bankers who were able to survive the economic crisis because governments bailed them out with taxpayers money started with a small group of activists. But the sentiment is shared by a growing number of ordinary citizens who will not take to the streets easily but who do agree that something needs to be done against financial markets that have failed them. Here we come to the second reason for the unexpected backing. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso even went so far as to demand legal consequences for rogue bankers, and he has announced European legislation to make it happen. On top of that, European leaders are preparing drastic plans to save Greece from insolvency at a summit this weekend. Many expect a debt haircut for Greece of up to 50 percent. That would create major problems for several big French and German banks that have lent billons of euros to the Greek state in the past. Therefore, the plans might also include a forced recapitalization of European banks to help them deal with the hefty write-downs that may result. Leading European bankers are not happy with the prospect of new state funding and the public control that comes with it. For that reason, as the German magazine Der Spiegel put it, From the perspective of European leaders, the timing of last weekends protests and their message casting banks as the bad guys could not have been better. In order to impose new and strict regulations and reset the power balance between private banks and public authorities, European leaders will try to surf on the waves of popular protests that started one month ago with Occupy Wall Street. I am sure the New York activists were not aware of their huge and acute impact on the restructuring of the European banking system. I am convinced Barroso and Schuble were not at the time. Now they are. For them the Occupiers are a blessing in disguise. Her erde bir hayr var "Zenginliin daha adil datlmas ynndeki temel ar grmezden gelinemez. Burada mevzu bahis olan Amerikan ryasnn gelecei. Ryann aments her daim uydu: Sk alan herkes mreffeh bir hayat ansna sahip olmal. te o rya finansal arln ve siyasi kinizmin yol at krizle parampara oldu. Sonu byyen eitsizlik, artan yoksulluk ve krizi srtlanmak asndan en zayf durumda olanlarn fedakrl. (...) Kresel finans sistemine kar sokaklara dklen protestocular ve anketlerin onlarn arlarn desteklediini gsterdii yzde 54 oranndaki Amerikal hakl bir rahatszlk duyuyor. (...) Deiim lna kulak verilmeli." gal hareketinin geen hafta sonu dnya apnda dzenledii eylemlere dair bu yorum radikal solcu kk bir dergi veya anti-kapitalist bir blogcu tarafndan yazlmad. Bu satrlar, dnyann en etkili ve prestijli gazetelerinden biri ve serbest piyasa ile liberal demokrasinin sk mdafii olan Financial Times'n bayazsnda yer alyordu. Messes nizam temsilcilerinin "galcilere" dair sarf ettii pek ok mspet szn rneklerinden sadece biri bu. Almanya Maliye Bakan ve Babakan Angela Merkel'in muhafazakr Hristiyan Demokratlar'na mensup Wolfgang Schuble de

protestolar "ziyadesiyle ciddiye" aldn kabul etti. Avrupa Merkez Bankas'nn mstakbel bakan Mario Draghi ise "genlerin fkelenmeye hakk olduunu" syledi. Gstericilerin protesto ettii sistemin ta kendisinin hayati nemde paralar olan insanlarn ve kurumlarn, kafa saysna bakldnda hl marjinal grnen bir fenomene destek beyan etmelerini nasl aklamal? Geen hafta dnyann drt bir kesinde yz binlerce insann, adaletsiz ve rm bankaclk sisteminin simgesi saylan yerlerde 'igal' ad altnda gerekletirilen eylemlere katld doru. Fakat kentlerin ounda katlm ok etkileyici deildi ve zerinde ortaklalan sloganlar veya talepler olmadndan verilen mesaj mulak kald. Dahas gemite, szgelimi Irak Sava'na kar, Washington, Londra veya Madrid'deki siyasi karar mercilerine hibir tesiri olmayan ok daha byk ve hedefli gsterilere tank olmutuk. Bu ani sempatinin ve anlayn sebebi ne? Bir yanyla yle aklanabilir: Son birka ayda birok siyaseti, mevcut finans sisteminin tmrlerine ynelik fkenin orta ve aa tabaka semenlerine de ulatn fark etti. Hkmetlerin vergi mkelleflerinin cebinden kan paralarla hazrlad kurtarma paketleri sayesinde ekonomik krizden kabilen bankaclarn daha sk ve iyi denetlenmesi arlar kk bir grup aktivistle balad. Fakat sz konusu hissiyat, kolayca sokaklara kmayacak olsa da, kendilerini batran finans piyasalarna kar "bir eyler yaplmas gerektii" konusunda hemfikir olan ve saylar giderek artan sradan vatandalarca da paylalyor. Bu noktada beklenmedik destein ikinci sebebine geliyoruz. Avrupa Komisyonu Bakan Jose Manuel Barroso, dzenbaz bankaclarn yasalar karsnda hesap vermesini talep edecek kadar ileri giderek, Avrupa hukukunun buna muktedir olduunu ilan etti. En nemlisi Avrupal liderler bu hafta sonu yaplacak zirvede Yunanistan' iflastan kurtarmak iin iddial ve sert planlar hazrlyor. Biroklarnn beklentisi Yunanistan'n borlarnn yzde 50'ye varan oranda indirilecei ynnde. Byle bir indirim, gemite Yunan devletine milyarlarca Euro bor vermi olan eitli Fransz ve Alman bankalar iin byk sorunlar douracak. Bu yzden planlar, srecin sonunda ortaya kabilecek byk bor silmeleriyle baa kmalarna yardmc olmak iin Avrupa bankalarnn sermaye yaplarnn zorla yeniden dzenlenmesini de ierebilir. nde gelen Avrupal bankaclar bunun beraberinde getirecei yeni devlet finansman ve kamusal denetim ihtimalinden hi memnun deil. Bu sebeple, Alman dergisi Der Spiegel'in de belirttii gibi, "Avrupal liderlerin bak asyla geen haftaki protestolarn zamanlamas (ve bankalar kt adamlar olarak gsteren mesajlar) 'kr istedi bir gz, Allah verdi iki gz' kabilinden bir gelime." Yeni ve kat kurallar dayatmak ve zel bankalarla resm makamlar arasndaki g dengesini kurmak iin Avrupal liderler, Wall Street'i gal Et hareketinin bir ay nce balatt halk protestolar dalgasnn zerine binmeye alacak. Eminim ki New Yorklu aktivistler, Avrupa bankaclk sisteminin yeniden yaplandrlmas zerinde byle muazzam ve ciddi bir etkide bulunacaklarnn farknda deillerdi. O gnlerde Barroso ve Schuble'nin de olmadndan hi kukum yok. imdi farkndalar. Onlar iin igalciler erdeki hayr gibiler.

Occupying Wall Street and beyond This weekend, all over the world, thousands of people will occupy streets and squares around buildings that are associated with the excesses of the capitalist system that, according to the demonstrators, has run totally out of control. In London, the target is the stock exchange, in Frankfurt its the European Central Bank, in other cities it may just be a place that symbolizes unchecked financial hubris. The Occupy movement has gone global. It all started four weeks ago in New York when a small magazine came up with the Occupy Wall Street idea, inspired by the Arab Spring protests that toppled governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The start was somewhat obscure and it was

unclear what the purpose was of trying to occupy the heart of the American financial system. The occupiers ended up in a park five blocks from City Hall in lower Manhattan, without a fixed set of demands or a common ideology. What united the many-colored crowd was the feeling that the Wall Street banks bailouts by the federal government in 2008 left banks enjoying huge profits while average Americans suffered under high unemployment and job insecurity with little help from Washington. I must admit that when I first heard of it, I thought it would be over in a few days. It looked like a marginal event, staged by a small group of radical activists. Sympathetic maybe, but also vague and without any chance of mobilizing more than a couple of thousand local diehards. Or, as the Times from London put it, the protests were passionate but pointless. We were all wrong. After two weeks the demonstrators were still there and their numbers grew. More specific demands were presented such as a tax on the richest 1 percent, a tax on currency trades and a tax on all financial transactions. The last proposal was echoed on the other side of the Atlantic when the European Commission came up with a similar plan. It signaled that the Wall Street occupiers were not totally out of touch with reality. Media from all over the world got interested and sympathizers in other American cities started their own occupations, crying out against the billions of dollars in bank bailouts but, more in general protesting against a system of economic relations that has lost its way and fails to serve the public. And, to the surprise of many skeptics, support is growing. Time magazines latest national poll shows that in the US the Occupy movement has a 54 percent favorable rating. It turns out that some of the Occupy demands, like prosecuting ill-behaving Wall Streeters or raising taxes on wealthy people, are much more popular than expected. Last week, Nobel Prize-winning former US Vice President Al Gore wrote on his blog: With democracy in crisis a true grassroots movement pointing out the flaws in our system is the first step in the right direction. Count me among those supporting and cheering on the Occupy Wall Street movement. In four weeks time a small, shady group of activists has gone both global and respectable. Why? It is not very easy to explain the attraction of the Occupy movement. There is still no common program and there are no leaders or identifiable structures. But there is Facebook, Twitter and YouTube for communication. More importantly, there is a widespread popular intuition that it is not normal for millions of people to be helpless and hopeless during an economic crisis while at the same time a small elite is getting richer every year, as is the case in the US. You dont need to be a loony liberal or leftist to be outraged when you read, for instance, in the Guardian newspaper this week that nine out of 10 finance professionals in London expect to receive higher bonuses this year than last year while the banks they are working for were only recently rescued from collapse by the taxpayer. Perhaps the Occupy movement will fade away after some time because its goals are beyond reach. More likely, it will be a wake-up call for political and business elites in Washington and other capitals around the world. The core message: The present system of unlimited corporate greed is unsustainable; we want you to change it and we dont take no for an answer. Wall Street'i igal etmek ve tesi Bu hafta sonu dnyann drt bir kesinde binlerce insan, tmyle kontrolden ktn savunduklar kapitalist sistemin arlklaryla balants bulunan binalarn etrafndaki sokaklar ve meydanlar igal edecek.

Londra'da Borsa binas, Frankfurt'ta Avrupa Merkez Bankas, dier kentlerde de denetimsiz finansal agzll sembolize eden binalar hedefte olacak. Yani igal hareketi kresellemi durumda. Her ey drt hafta nce New York'ta, kk bir derginin Tunus, Msr ve Libya'da iktidarlar deviren Arap Bahar protestolarndan ilhamla "Wall Street'i gal Et" fikrini ortaya atmasyla balad. Balang bir yanyla mulakt; Amerikan finans sisteminin kalbini igal etmeye almann amacnn ne olduu belirsizdi. Nihayetinde igalciler, net bir talep silsileleri veya ortak bir ideolojileri olmakszn aa Manhattan'daki Belediye Binas'ndan be blok uzaktaki bir parka yerleti. Bu rengarenk kalabal birletiren ey, Wall Street bankalarn 2008'de kurtaran federal hkmetin, yksek isizliin ve i gvencesizliinin penesinde kvranan sradan Amerikallar umursamazken, bankalar muazzam krlarla ba baa brakt hissiyatyd. Eylemi ilk duyduumda birka gn iinde sona ereceini dndm itiraf etmeliyim. Kk bir radikal aktivistler grubunun marjinal bir giriimi gibi grnyordu. Sempatikti belki, fakat mulakt da ve olsa olsa muhitteki birka bin inat eylemciyi seferber etme ans vard. Ya da Londra'da yaynlanan Times'n dedii gibi, protestolar "heyecan verici, fakat nafileydi." Hepimiz yanldk. Aradan iki hafta gemiken protestocular hl oradayd ve saylar da artmt. En zengin yzde 1'lik kesime vergi konmas, dviz ticaretinin ve btn finans ilemlerinin vergilendirilmesi gibi daha belirgin talepler ortaya kondu. Son talep, Avrupa Komisyonu benzer bir plan nerdiinde Atlantik'in dier yakasnda da yank bulmu oldu. Wall Street igalcilerinin gereklikle bann klliyen kopuk falan olmadnn iaretiydi bu. Dnyann drt bir kesinden medya kurulular eyleme ilgi gsterdi ve dier Amerikan kentlerindeki sempatizanlar kendi igallerini balatt. Gsteriler milyarlarca dolarlk banka kurtarmalarna kar birer feryat, fakat daha genel anlamda yolunu kaybetmi ve halka hizmet edemeyen bir ekonomik ilikiler sistemine kar birer itiraz nitelii tayor. Ve destein giderek bymesi birok pheciyi artyor. Time Dergisi'nin en son ulusal anketi ABD'de gal hareketinin yzde 54 orannda destek bulduunu gsteriyor. gal'in, usulszlk yapan Wall Streetilerin yarglanmas veya zenginlerin dedii vergilerin artrlmas gibi baz taleplerinin beklenenden ok daha popler olduu anlalyor. Geen hafta Nobel dll eski ABD Bakan Yardmcs Al Gore blogunda unu yazd: "Demokrasinin krizde olduu bir dnemde, sistemimizin kusurlarna dikkat eken gerek bir taban hareketi doru istikamette atlm ilk admdr. Wall Street'i gal Et hareketini destekleyen ve alklayanlar arasnda beni de sayn." Drt haftada kk, ad duyulmam bir aktivistler grubu kresel apta hem tannd hem sayg kazand. Niye? gal hareketinin cazibesini izah etmek kolay deil. Ortada hl ortak bir program yok, liderler veya tespit edilebilir yaplar yok. Fakat iletiim iin Facebook, Twitter ve YouTube var. Daha da nemlisi, ABD'de olduu gibi, milyonlarca insan ekonomik krizin ortasnda aresiz ve umutsuzken, bir avu sekinin her yl daha da zenginlemesinin normal olmadna dair yaygn bir popler idrak sz konusu. Szgelimi bu haftaki Guardian gazetesinde, altklar bankalar vergi mkelleflerinin parasyla kten daha yeni kurtarlan 10 Londral profesyonel finansdan dokuzunun bu yl geen yldan daha yksek ikramiye almasnn beklendiini okuduunuzda ileden kmanz iin lgn bir liberal veya solcu olmanz gerekmez. Belki gal hareketi bir sre sonra ulalamaz hedefleri olduu iin silinip gidecek. Daha muhtemelen olan, Washington ve dnyann dier bakentlerindeki siyaset ve i sekinleri iin bir kalk borusu olacak. Temel mesaj u: snrsz irket agzllnden mteekkil mevcut sistem srdrlemez, bunu deitirmenizi istiyoruz ve 'hayr' bir cevap olarak kabul etmiyoruz.

Turkey-EU relations: dont give in to cynicism Today, the European Commission (EC) will present its annual Progress Report on Turkey. Thanks to the diligent and wellconnected Brussels correspondent of this newspaper, we were able to read about its content last week.

To be honest, there are no bolts from the blue. For all those who have followed developments in Turkey and between Turkey and the EU in the last 12 months, the compiled list of positives and negatives should not come as a surprise. As most Turks, the EC is happy with the improved civilian oversight of the armed forces and the progress that has been made in strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary as a result of the adoption of the September 2010 constitutional amendments. The Ergenekon investigation, despite heavy lobbying from anti-Justice and Development Party (AK Party) circles, is still described as an opportunity for Turkey to shed light on alleged criminal activities against democracy. On the other hand, it was to be expected that the EC is worried about the lack of progress, or sometimes even regress, on some other issues. There is strong criticism in the report on the extremely long pre-trial detention periods and the length of time it takes to complete a court case. Instead of diminishing, violence against women -- including killings -- is increasing, underlining the growing gap between a legal framework guaranteeing womens rights and gender equality on the one hand and social and economic reality on the other. Finally, the EC raises serious concerns about the high number of violations of freedom of expression and the unchanged, highly problematic criminal legislation that is open to abuse by different prosecutors and causes widespread self-censorship in the Turkish media. As in previous years, everybody can pick and choose from the long list of subjects that are covered by the report and either conclude that the report is balanced, as I would, or concentrate on some omissions or disputed judgments and dismiss the report as biased or one-sided. The interesting thing about the report, though, is not the appreciation of all its details. I am curious to see how the government and other stakeholders will use this years edition to position themselves in the Turkish debate on future EU membership. I am sure some will use the 2011 EC assessment to put all the blame on the EU. They will scold Europe for being insincere, will underline all the mistakes made by the EU itself and conclude that Turkey does not need to take the critical remarks from Brussels very seriously. These are mainly the ones in Turkey who were always skeptical about EU membership plus the growing number of Turks who are frustrated with the lack of progress in Turkeys EU accession talks and the anti-Turkey rhetoric from French President Sarkozy and others. Although I understand their disappointment and anger, I would humbly advise the responsible Turkish authorities to follow another line of response. Everybody knows that at the moment bashing the EU goes down quite well in Turkey. So I would not be surprised if, as a reaction to the report, we will see some harsh words by the prime minister on the EU and, for instance, its failings in the Cyprus issue. He will play with the popular sentiment that wonders why Turkey should put a lot of energy in trying to join a union in crisis while at the same time the Arab world is welcoming Turks and their model of society with open arms. But when the ruling party is really willing to keep the long-term interests of Turkey in mind, they should not give in to the present mood of cynicism about the EU. They should realize that finding ways to keep the accession process alive will also benefit Turkey. The same EC that has compiled the progress report is willing to go the extra mile to soften the existing rigid visa regime. Turkish Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Ba has understood the advantages for ordinary Turks and has reacted positively. The same applies to EU plans to cooperate more closely with Turkey on the Balkans and North Africa. Better to look for solutions where both would profit than to turn Turkeys back on the EU. Nothing good will come out of that, and the government knows it, maybe even better than they are able to admit.

Trkiye-AB ilikileri: Karamsarla teslim olmayn Avrupa Komisyonu (AK), bugn yllk Trkiye lerleme Raporu'nu aklayacak. Zaman Gazetesi'nin salam balantlar olan acar Brksel muhabiri sayesinde raporu bir hafta ncesinden okuyabildik. Dorusu raporda srpriz bir ey yok. Metinde sralanan mspet ve menfi hususlar Trkiye'de ve Trkiye ile AB arasnda son on iki aydr yaanan gelimeleri takip eden kimseye artc gelmemi olmal. Trklerin byk ounluu gibi AK de silahl kuvvetler zerindeki sivil denetimin ilerlemesinden ve Eyll 2010'da anayasal deiikliklerin kabul edilmesi sonucu yargnn bamszl ve tarafszlnn glenmesi noktasnda kaydedilen ilerlemeden memnun. AKP muhalifi evrelerin sk lobi faaliyetine ramen Ergenekon davasn hl Trkiye iin, demokrasi kart yasad faaliyetlere k tutmak asndan bir frsat olarak niteliyor. Dier yandan AK'nin baz baka meselelerde ilerleme kaydedilmemesi, hatta zaman zaman geriye gidilmesi konusunda endielerini dile getirmesi bekleniyordu. Raporda ar uzun tutukluluk srelerine ve davalarn sonulandrlmasnn ok uzun srmesine dair sert eletiriler var. Kadnlara ynelik iddet ve cinayetler azalmak yerine artyor ve bu, bir yanda kadn haklarn ve toplumsal cinsiyet eitliini garanti eden hukuki ereve ile dier yanda sosyal ve ekonomik gereklik arasnda giderek alan mesafeyi gzler nne seriyor. Nihayet AK ok sayda ifade zgrl ihlaline ve oransz istismara ak kap brakan ve Trk medyasnda yaygn otosansre yol aan son derece sorunlu ceza yasasnn deimemesine dair ciddi kayglarn dile getiriyor. nceki yllarda olduu gibi herkes raporun ierdii uzun konu listesinden istediini seebilir ve raporun dengeli olduuna hkmedebilecei gibi (ki bence de yle), baz hususlarn zerinden atlanmasna ya da tartmal hkmlere odaklanp raporu tarafl veya tek yanl diye reddedebilir. Ancak raporun ilgin taraf, btn ayrntlarn inceden inceye deerlendirmek deil. Ben asl hkmetin ve dier taraflarn, bu ylki raporu mstakbel AB yeliine dair Trkiye'de yryen tartmada kendilerini konumlandrmak asndan nasl kullanacan merak ediyorum. Eminim ki bazlar 2011 AK deerlendirmesini btn suu AB'ye yklemek ynnde kullanacak. Avrupa'y samimiyetsiz olmakla itham edip bizzat AB tarafndan yaplan hatalarn altn izecek ve Trkiye'nin Brksel'den gelen eletirel yorumlar ok ciddiye almasna lzum olmad sonucuna varacak. Bu kesimi esasen AB yeliine her daim kukuyla bakanlar oluturuyor. Onlara Trkiye'nin yelik mzakerelerinde ilerleme salanamamasndan ve Fransa Cumhurbakan Sarkozy gibilerin Trkiye kart syleminden rahatsz olan ve saylar giderek artan Trkler de ekleniyor. D krklklarn ve fkelerini anlasam da, sorumlu Trk makamlarna baka bir tepki izgisi izlemelerini, naizane, tavsiye ederim. u sralar AB'ye yklenmenin Trkiye'de ziyadesiyle alk topladn herkes biliyor. Bu yzden rapora tepki mahiyetinde Babakan'n AB'ye ynelik (szgelimi Kbrs meselesindeki hatalaryla ilgili) baz keskin szler sarf ettiini grrsek hi armam. Erdoan, Trkiye'nin, hele Arap dnyasnn Trkleri ve onlarn toplum modelini kollarn ap kucaklad bir dnemde, krizdeki bir birlie katlma abasyla niye bir yn enerji sarf etmesi gerektiini soran halkn hissiyatna oynayacaktr. Fakat iktidar partisi Trkiye'nin uzun vadeli karlarn gerekten aklnda tutmak istediinde, AB'ye ynelik mevcut karamsar ruh haline teslim olmamal. yelik srecini canl tutmann Trkiye'nin de yararna olduunu grmeli. lerleme raporunu hazrlayan AK, bir yandan da mevcut kat vize sistemini yumuatmak ynnde adm atmak niyetinde. Trkiye'nin Avrupa Birlii Bakan Egemen Ba, bunun sradan Trklere getirecei avantajlar anlyor ve mspet tepki gsteriyor. Ayns AB'nin Trkiye ile Balkanlar ve Kuzey Afrika'da daha yakn ibirlii yapma planlar iin de geerli. Trkiye'nin srtn evirmesi yerine her iki tarafn yarar salayaca zmler aramak daha iyidir. Srt dnmekten hibir hayr gelmez ve hkmet, bunu belki itiraf bile edemeyecei kadar iyi biliyor.

Why attack German foundations? Never a dull moment with Recep Tayyip Erdoan. After having won many hearts and minds in the Arab world, the Turkish prime minister continued to the Balkans and South Africa last week, presenting Turkey as a confident new player on the world stage. Read the international media coverage of these visits and you can see how big the impact is of this Turkish soft power offensive. In between his travels abroad, Erdoan is always willing to pick a fight at home. Last week for instance he started a row about German foundations, accusing them of supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist organization. His provocative way of making unsubstantiated allegations makes you wonder whether maybe the prime minister spent too much time up in the air, losing touch with reality on the ground. What did Erdoan say, and why does it make no sense at all? On two occasions, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader claimed that German foundations have signed loan deals with municipalities run by Turkeys main opposition, the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), and accused them of financing the PKK in this way. He did not specify which foundations he was talking about. Speaking about German foundations working in Turkey, most people think of the four foundations that are linked to the main German political parties, named after leading politicians or intellectuals: the Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer, the socialist Friedrich Ebert, the liberal Friedrich Naumann and the green Heinrich Bll. All of them have been active in Turkey (and other places around the globe) for many years now, mainly organizing meetings and writing reports. Their budgets are limited, and their activities are closely monitored by both the German and Turkish authorities. There is no way that these foundations would be able to do the things Erdoan is accusing them of. Then there are two other German organizations -- not foundations -- that spend money in Turkey. One is Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation, or GIZ). In a declaration GIZ underlined that they only support joint projects initiated, controlled and implemented by the Turkish government. The other German institution involved in a range of local projects is the KfW Development Bank, again not a foundation. Over the last 50 years, this bank has committed almost 5 billion euros in the form of low-interest loans and non-repayable grants to more than 100 projects in cities all over Turkey, run by BDP, CHP and many AKP mayors. All plans have been approved by Turkeys Treasury Department. How could these funds have been misused? To be honest, I really do not understand what the prime minister is up to. I remember the attacks by Turkish nationalists back in 2002 on the same political foundations, charging them with espionage. In the end, the Ankara State Security Court acquitted the foundation representatives. Why would Erdoan want to repeat these nationalist reflexes against so-called foreign interventions in Turkey? Is Turkey, despite all the confident rhetoric abroad, still fearful that a few small foreign foundations can decisively influence developments in the country? You must be kidding. Or is the Heinrich Bll Foundation right when their spokespersons reacted to the wild accusations by suggesting that they were not the real target? According to them, it is no coincidence that the attacks on the foundations happened in the same week that hundreds of Kurdish nationalists were arrested. They believe it is the governments strategy to cut off elected

Kurdish local politicians from international support. Whatever the reasons behind last weeks strikes at the German foundations, I am afraid that the prime minister does not realize how much damage he has already caused. I have been working with these foundations for many years. Their representatives in Turkey are an outstanding example of well-informed Turkey specialists who put a lot of energy in trying to convince their often skeptical party colleagues at home that Turkey is moving in the right direction and that the policies of the present German government are counterproductive and not in Germanys long-term interests. If you would be one of them, having spent time and money in defending and assisting Turkey in a nuanced manner for years, what would you feel if the prime minister of that country publicly accuses you of being a tool in the fight of a terrorist organization? I am sure that, again, because of its own blunders, Turkey has lost some of its best friends.

Bashing the Greeks instead For me, writing about Islamophobia in Europe has always been a complicated balancing act. On the one hand, I want to show how extreme right populists are using anti-Islam rhetoric to win votes. They have injected fear in a multicultural society, mixing old prejudices with real problems of integration and, above all, the post 9/11 hysteria that portrays each Muslim as a potential terrorist. On the other hand, I strongly oppose the inclination in many Muslim-majority countries like Turkey to explain each and every incident that involves Muslims by referring to rising Islamophobia in Westerns societies. Not every conflict is related to bad feelings about Islam. Sometimes problems are purely private; at times they are caused by bad habits by the police or other state institutions from which non-Muslims also suffer. Maybe even more important, with all the attention for the growing visibility of Islamophobes, one should never forget that approximately 75 percent of Europeans do not agree with their obsessive behavior. Let me take this last point one step further. I have the strong impression that using Islamophobia as an instrument to gain support for extremist policies has reached its limits. In the Netherlands, one could see it coming already last year. Asked why they had voted for the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, one of the leading global Islamophobes, most people responded by listing other reasons than fear of Muslims or their religion. Wilders got 15 percent of the votes in the last national elections because his electorate hates the mainstream politicians, is afraid of losing their job and their identity as a result of globalization and migration and is sick and tired of the many petty crimes by young Moroccans. It is true, they distrust Muslims but most of them do not share the deep hatred espoused by Wilders himself. Some even blamed him for overdoing his criticism of Islam. That was a first sign that fear mongering was not the catch-all mechanism that Wilders and his close circle hoped it could be. Things have moved on since. The Arab Spring showed that Arabs, the quintessential Muslims, have the same dreams as Europeans. They want less corruption, more democracy and better living conditions. In Tunis and Cairo protesters did not go into the streets to ask for more shariah or an Islamic state. Their clear message and courageous behavior subtly undermined the populist argument that depicts Muslims as confirmed anti-democrats. On top of the changing paradigm at the neighbors' came the real problems Europe is facing. They are economic and

institutional and in no way related to Islam. Uncertain and anxious Europeans want their politicians to come up with credible answers to the euro crisis and are not interested in their opinions on issues that do not top the list of priorities of most citizens, like Islam. Clever populists got the message and have changed tactics. In the Dutch debate on where the country is heading, Islam is almost absent. But, according to the extremists, there is a new enemy. Its name: Europe. Both right-wing and leftist populists are targeting the European Union and blaming Brussels for the problems the eurozone is facing. It's the bureaucrats and the complicated rules they have forced on the EU member states that are held responsible. And why, the radicals argue, should the Dutch pay for the reckless behavior of other Europeans? That brings into the spotlight the other culprits: the Greeks.

Listening to Wilders these days, you would think that for the rightwing populists the Greeks have become the new Muslims. They can be blamed for everything. No mention of the European banks that gave all these cheap credits to the Greek governments, creating a national debt that is almost insurmountable. No reference to the European leaders that rejected tougher rules in the past because they did not want to give up their own sovereignty. That is all far too complicated for populists. The new game in town is bashing Greece and the Greeks. They are lazy, wasted our money and can't be trusted. Better kick them out of the eurozone. It is the same mechanism of exclusion that we have seen before in which all Greeks are held responsible for the mistakes of some. I wonder how long it will take this time before the old scapegoats have to be replaced by new ones.

Mslmanlar olmuyorsa, vur Yunanllara Benim iin Avrupa'daki slamofobi'ye dair yazmak daima karmak bir dengeleme mesaisini ifade ediyor. Bir yandan ar sac poplistlerin slam kart sylemi oy kazanmak iin nasl kullandn gstermek istiyorum. Entegrasyonun gerek sorunlaryla ve hepsinden nemlisi btn Mslmanlar potansiyel terrist olarak gsteren 11 Eyll sonras histerisiyle eski nyarglar kartrarak okkltrl bir topluma korku zerk ediyorlar. Dier yandan Trkiye gibi ounluu Mslman olan birok lkede, Mslmanlar kapsayan her olay Bat toplumlarnda slamofobi'nin ykseliine atfta bulunarak aklama eilimine de kuvvetle kar kyorum. Her ihtilaf slam'a beslenen olumsuz hislerle balantl deil. Bazen sorunlar tamamen ahsi nitelik tayor ve zaman zaman polisin veya dier resmi kurumlarn Mslman olmayanlarn da cefasn ektii kt davranlarndan kaynaklanyor. Belki daha da nemlisi, slamofobiklerin giderek grnr hale gelmesinin ziyadesiyle dikkat ektii bir ortamda, asla unutulmamas gereken u nokta: Avrupallarn yaklak yzde 75'i onlarn saplantl tutumlarna katlmyor. Bu son noktay bir adm ileri gtrmek isterim. slamofobi'nin arlk politikalara destek kazanmak iin bir ara olarak kullanlmasnn snrlarna gelip dayandna dair gl bir izlenim iindeyim. Hollanda'da bu noktaya gelindiini daha geen yldan grmek mmknd. Dnyann mimli slamofobiklerinden Geert Wilders'n zgrlk Partisi'ne niye oy verdikleri sorulduunda insanlarn byk ounluu, Mslmanlardan veya dinlerinden baka sebepler sralyordu. Wilders son genel seimlerde yzde 15 orannda oy ald, zira kendisine oy verenler anaakm siyasetilerden nefret ediyor, kresellemenin ve gn sonucunda ilerini ve kimliklerini kaybetmekten korkuyordu ve gen Fasllarn kart birok kk sutan bkp

usanmt. Mslmanlara gvensizlik duyduklar doruydu, fakat ou Wilders'n sergiledii derin nefreti paylamyordu. Hatta bazlar onu slam eletirisini fazla abartmakla suluyordu. Korku tellallnn Wilders ve yakn evresinin umduu trden bir 'sihirli denek' olmadnn ilk iaretiydi bu. ler o zamandan beri deiti. Arap Bahar, Mslmanln kayna olan Araplarn kurduu hayallerin Avrupallardan farkl olmadn gsterdi. Onlar da daha az yolsuzluk, daha fazla demokrasi ve daha iyi hayat artlar istiyordu. Tunus ve Kahire'de protestocular daha fazla eriat veya slami bir devlet talebiyle sokaklara dklmedi. Verdikleri ak mesaj ve sergiledikleri cesur tavr, Mslmanlar tescilli demokrasi kartlar olarak sunan poplist argmann altn inceden inceye oydu. Komulardaki deien paradigmann zerine bir de Avrupa'nn yz yze geldii gerek sorunlar eklendi. Ekonomik ve kurumsal olan, slam'la hibir alakas olmayan sorunlard bunlar. Kukulu ve endieli Avrupallar, siyasetilerinin avro krizine ynelik gvenilir zmler ortaya koymasn istiyordu ve vatandalarn byk ounluunun ncelikler listesinin st sralarnda yer almayan slam gibi meselelerle zihinlerini megul etmeye niyetleri yoktu. Akll poplistler bu mesaj ald ve taktiklerini deitirmeye balad. Hollanda'daki 'ne olacak bu memleketin hali' tartmasnda slam'n esamisi neredeyse hi okunmuyor. Fakat arlklara baklrsa ortada yeni bir dman var. Ad da Avrupa. Hem sac hem solcu poplistler Avrupa Birlii'ni hedef alyor ve avro blgesinde kar karya kalnan sorunlardan dolay Brksel'i suluyor. Onlara gre mevcut durumun sorumlusu Brksel'deki brokratlar ve onlarn AB yesi lkelere zorla dayatt karmak kurallar. Ve radikaller, 'Dier Avrupallarn pervaszlnn faturasn niye Hollandallar desin?' sorusunu soruyor. 'Dier Avrupallarn pervaszl' deyince de gzler malum sululara dnyor: Yunanllar. Bugnlerde Wilders'a kulak verdiinizde, ar sac poplistler iin Yunanllarn yeni Mslmanlar haline geldiini dnyorsunuz. Her eyden dolay sulanabiliyorlar. Yunan hkmetlerine btn o ucuz kredileri verip da gibi bir ulusal bor oluturan Avrupa bankalarn azna alan yok. Kendi egemenliklerinden feragat etmek istemedikleri iin gemite daha sk kurallar konmasn reddeden Avrupal liderlerden sz edeni ise ara ki bulasn. Bunlar poplistler iin fazlasyla karmak meseleler. Muhitteki yeni oyun Yunanistan'a ve Yunanllara vurmak. Onlar tembel, paramz arur ettiler ve gvenilmezler. En iyisi onlar avro blgesinden atalm gitsin. Bu dlama mekanizmasnn aynsn daha nce de grdk; bazlarnn hatalarndan btn Yunanllar sorumlu tutuluyor. Eski gnah keilerinin yerine ne zaman yenilerini koymak zorunda kalacaklarn ok merak ediyorum.

Uncertainty and tension in Europe I am currently in the Netherlands for some meetings and a visit to Brussels to catch up with former colleagues and EU officials on Turkish-EU relations. However, after only one day it is obvious that the talk of the town is not Turkey. Of course, those closely involved with the relations between Ankara and Brussels are excited about Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoans recent North African tour and his defense of the secular state model. They are also extremely worried about all the saber-rattling in the eastern Mediterranean. Having followed the news in the papers and on TV and after having spoken with some old friends, it is clear which issue is on everybodys mind: the prospect of a further deteriorating economy. The main problem is the total confusion among both economists and politicians over the best way out of the crisis. I suppose the friends I keep have an above-average interest in domestic and foreign politics. They follow the news and try to determine the best solution for the ongoing problems in the eurozone. But they all had to admit that they could not make up their minds over who has the better side in this debate.

Last Thursday, the German Parliament voted in favor of expanding the eurozone bailout fund. That was a relief to many across Europe. However, doubts immediately set in, fueled by the comments of respectable economists, as to whether the move would provide more than a few days of calm to jittery markets. Perhaps Europe needs a much bigger fund, because while the present one might be able to save Greece, it will not be nearly enough to quiet the crises building due to Italys debt, Frances weakened banks and other troubles that loom elsewhere. Maybe Greece should go ahead and default, partially or fully, because the current, extremely tough austerity program is politically unsustainable and economically devastating. Should the big European economies, instead of cutting budgets, enact stimulus programs to create the necessary growth to get out of this crisis? When you ask ordinary Dutch or German citizens, they will tell you they simply do not know and, whats worse, that they have the impression their leaders do not know, either. At the same time, the information that people get through the media is maddeningly confusing, with financial specialists arguing with each other about general outlines and each and every detail of possible rescue packages. Many analysts agree, though, that ultimately the EU has move towards a more integrated economic, fiscal and political union. In his annual state of the union address last week, European Commission President Jos Manuel Barroso made a brave attempt to underline the need for EU member states to hand over control of important parts of their sovereign financial and economic policy to European institutions. Although some critics accused him, after having already been in power for seven years, of not putting his money where his mouth is, many European politicians had to agree that Barroso has a point. Individual countries -- even the big ones -- are not capable of handling things on their own once they become part of a monetary union and share the same currency. It is painful to recognize this structural error in the EUs architecture. Rationally, it is hard to disagree with the call for a quick fix by transferring these powers to the European level. But most politicians know very well that this present need is extremely unpopular with a growing number of skeptical citizens who are aware of the uncertainty among their leaders. If their elected representatives do not know how to handle the crisis, then why should they move to an even more complicated level with even fewer possibilities of influencing the outcome? The EU is in danger of getting caught in a vicious circle in which a lack of trust prevents the adoption of measures that seem inevitable to many outsiders. As Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff put it: I dont think little steps are credible here. There needs to be a United States of Europe at the end of this, and it may well not include everyone in the eurozone. They were thinking they had 20 years to get there and instead they have 20 weeks. He might be right, but it is still easier for an American professor to say than for a European politician to defend and implement. Avrupa'da belirsizlik ve gerilim Baz toplantlara katlmak ve Brksel'deki eski mesaidalarm ve AB yetkilileriyle Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin son dnemine dair fikir alveriinde bulunmak zere u sralar Hollanda'daym. Fakat aradan daha bir gn gemiken, buralarda konuulan meselenin Trkiye olmad belli. Elbette Ankara-Brksel ilikileriyle yakndan itigal edenler Erdoan'n Kuzey Afrika'ya dzenledii son ziyaret ve laik devlet modelini savunmasndan heyecan duyuyorlar. Dou Akdeniz'deki sava tehditlerinden de ziyadesiyle endieliler.

Gazeteler ve televizyonlardaki haberleri izleyip baz eski dostlarla konutuktan sonra herkesin aklndaki meselenin ne olduu aka ortaya kyor: Ekonomik krizin daha da ktleme ihtimali. Balca sorun, hem iktisatlar hem siyasetiler arasnda krizden en uygun k yolunun ne olduuyla ilgili tam bir kafa karkl yaanmas. Tahmin edersiniz ki dostlarm i ve d politikayla ortalama birinden daha fazla ilgileniyorlar. Haberleri takip etmeye ve avro blgesinde sregiden sorunlara en iyi zmn ne olacan kestirmeye alyorlar. Fakat bu tartmada kimin doru kimin yanl olduuna bir trl karar veremediklerini hepsi kabul etmek zorunda kalyor. Geen perembe Alman parlamentosu avro blgesi kurtarma fonunun artrlmas lehinde oy kulland. Bu, Avrupa'nn drt bir kesinde biroklarna rahat nefes aldrd. Fakat hemen sonrasnda, bu kararn tedirgin piyasalar yattrmak konusunda birka gnden fazlasn kazandrp kazandramayacana dair, saygn iktisatlarn yorumlaryla daha da alevlenen kukular gndeme geldi. Mevcut fon Yunanistan' kurtaramamakla kalmayp, talya'nn borcuna, Fransa'nn zayflayan bankalarna ve baka lkelerde ufukta grlen sorunlara bal gelien krizleri yattrmann yanna bile yaklaamayacandan dolay, Avrupa'nn ok daha byk bir fona m ihtiyac var? u an uygulanan son derece sk kemer skma program siyaseten srdrlemez ve ekonomik adan ykc olduu iin Yunanistan her halkrda ksmen veya klliyen iflas m etmeli? Byk Avrupa ekonomileri bte kesintilerine gitmek yerine, krizden kmak iin gereken bymeyi yaratacak tevik programlarn m devreye sokmal? Sradan Hollanda veya Alman vatandalarna sorduunuzda, bu konuda hibir fikirleri olmadn ve daha da vahimi, grne gre liderlerinin de kendileriyle ayn durumda olduunu syleyeceklerdir. te yandan insanlarn medya zerinden ald bilgiler delirtecek raddede kafa kartrc, zira finans uzmanlar genel hatlar ve olas bir kurtarma paketinin en ufak ayrntlar zerine birbirleriyle kavga ediyor. Bununla birlikte birok analist nihayetinde AB'nin daha entegre bir ekonomik, mali ve siyasi birlik ynnde ilerlemesi gerektii konusunda hemfikir. Geen hafta yllk Birlie Sesleni konumasnda Avrupa Komisyonu Bakan Jos Manuel Barroso, AB yesi lkelerin mali ve ekonomik politikalara dair ulusal egemenliklerinin nemli ksmlarndan feragat etmeleri ve kontrol Avrupa kurumlarna devretmeleri gerektiini vurgulayarak cesur bir teebbste bulundu. Baz muhalifler zaten yedi yldr bakanl yrten Barroso'yu grev dnemi boyunca sylediklerinin arkasnda durmamakla sulasa da, Avrupal siyasetiler Barroso'nun sylediklerinin yabana atlacak gibi olmadn kabul etmek zorunda kald. Tek tek lkeler, hatta byk olanlar bile, parasal bir birliin paras olup ayn para birimini kullandklar koullarda artk meselelerin stesinden yalnz balarna gelecek gte deiller. Bu, AB'nin mimarisinde yapsal hata olduuna dair ac bir itiraf. Mantksal gerekeleri itibaryla, yetkileri Avrupa kurumlarna devrederek abuk bir toparlanmaya gitme arlarna katlmamak zor. Fakat siyasetilerin ou unu gayet iyi biliyor: Liderlerine baktnda belirsizlik gren ve says giderek artan kukucu vatandalar, u an ihtiya duyulan eyden hi hazzetmiyor. nsanlar u soruyu soruyor: Seilmi temsilcilerimiz bu krizle nasl baa kacan bilmiyorsa, meseleyi, sonucu etkileme ihtimali daha da az olan ok daha karmak bir dzeye tamann ne manas var? AB, dardan bakan birok insann kanlmaz addettii nlemleri benimsemesini engelleyen gven eksikliinden kaynakl bir ksr dngye srklenme tehlikesiyle yz yze. Harvard iktisatlarndan Kenneth Rogoff'un da dedii gibi: "Gelinen noktada kk admlarn inandrc olduunu dnmyorum. Bu srecin sonunda bir Avrupa Birleik Devletleri kmas gerek ve bu yap avro blgesindeki herkesi kapsamayabilir. Sz konusu noktaya 20 yl sonra geleceklerini dnyorlard, ama imdi nlerinde 20 hafta var." Rogoff hakl olabilir, fakat Amerikal bir profesrn bunu sylemesi, Avrupal bir siyasetinin savunup uygulamasndan hl ok daha kolay.

Back to square one or? The most depressing part of the new terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the military reaction of the Turkish state is that everybody knows it is not going to solve anything. We have been here before, many times.

Young, innocent people are dying simply because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. The government is under pressure to react and gives the green light to army operations in Turkey and across the border. Harsh language is spoken; feelings of hatred and disgust between different ethnic groups are fueled. One of the most striking characteristics of apparently unsolvable conflicts is that all informed and unbiased persons involved know more or less what the solution should look like. In the case of the Kurdish problem, everybody is fully aware that the future of the Turkish Kurds lies inside a more democratic Turkey, that one day the Kurdish language will be used in education in parts of Turkey, that Turkey needs to decentralize its administration and that at the end of the day most regular PKK members will have to be reintegrated into society. Again, the difficulty is not the solution; the big stumbling block is how to get there. Especially when each time the parties seem to be close to a deal, hard-liners on either side do their utmost to destroy the compromise within reach. Are we about to enter another of these vicious cycles? Or is there cause to be more optimistic this time around? I think we could see a different scenario unfold in the foreseeable future because, compared to the past, two crucial things have changed. Let me be more cautious: They seem to have changed. One is the strong and publicly expressed opposition among Kurds to the recent PKK attacks, particularly the ones that killed civilians -- Turks and Kurds -- in Ankara, Siirt and Batman. A growing number of Kurds are calling on the PKK to stop these assaults. Don't kill on my behalf is their powerful slogan, and it has put the diehards on the defense. The crucial change is that the present opposition comes from within the ranks of the Kurdish nationalist movement, not from outsiders without any influence. Mayors and other elected politicians have said they are not willing to accept these kinds of atrocities any longer. These are the same people who are pushing the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) to take their seats in Parliament and fight for results in the political arena. Many BDP parliamentarians have declared their willingness to make politics in Ankara. When you read this column, it will be known whether they were able to convince the rest of their colleagues. My guess is that the BDP will enter Parliament on Oct. 1. That is a precondition for the second important change to be effective. After his trip to New York, Prime Minister Erdoan gave a statement on the new strategy of the government on the Kurdish issue that if fully and consistently implemented signals an important new direction. He said, We will talk with those who want to talk and will fight those who resort to terrorism. That may sound obvious, but it is not. According to me, the prime minister announced that while the army will keep on bombing PKK hideouts in the Kandil Mountains, he is willing to sit down and talk to all Kurdish representatives who have made it clear they believe in political solutions. That would include of course BDP politicians but also, whether one likes it or not, imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah calan, with whom the Turkish state has already been negotiating for a long time anyway. The big challenge ahead is to isolate PKK diehards by opening a promising avenue for credible Kurdish representatives. This strategy will only work, though, under two conditions. The government has to be willing to offer their counterparts a substantial deal that goes a long way in satisfying legitimate Kurdish demands. On the other hand, calan and the BDP need to be able to deliver, meaning that terrorist violence needs to stop once there is an agreement they are willing to defend. That may be the hard part and will only happen when Kurdish public opinion massively turns against ongoing PKK

violence. For these reasons I am cautiously optimistic that Turkey may be able to bypass square one this time. Baa dnmek mi, yoksa...? PKK'nn yeni terr saldrlarnn ve Trk devletinin saldrlara verdii asker karln en moral bozucu taraf, herkesin bunun hibir eyi zmeyeceini bilmesi. Daha nce de pek ok kez ayn noktaya geldik. Gen, masum insanlar srf yanl zamanda yanl yerde olduklar iin lyor. Hkmet karlk verme basks altnda ve Trkiye iinde ve snr tesindeki operasyonlar iin orduya yeil k yakyor. Hain bir dil kullanlyor, farkl etnik gruplar arasndaki fke ve nefret duygular alevlendiriliyor. zlmez grnen ihtilaflarn en arpc niteliklerinden biri meseleye vakf ve tarafsz olan herkesin zmn neye benzemesi gerektiini aa yukar bilmesidir. Krt sorunu noktasnda da herkes Trkiyeli Krtlerin geleceinin daha demokratik bir Trkiye'de olduunun, gnn birinde Krtenin lkenin belli kesimlerinde eitimin bir paras haline geleceinin, Trkiye'nin idari yapsnda ademimerkeziyetilie ihtiya duyulduunun ve nihayetinde sradan PKK yelerinin topluma yeniden entegre edilmesi gerekeceinin ziyadesiyle farknda. Velhasl zorluk zmn kendisi deil; asl byk engel oraya nasl varlaca meselesi. Bilhassa ne zaman taraflar bir anlamaya yaklayor gibi grnse, her iki taraftaki sertlik yanllar menzil dahilindeki uzlamay yok etmek iin ellerinden geleni yapyor. Bu ksrdnglerin bir yenisine mi kaplmak zereyiz? Yoksa bu kez daha iyimser olmak iin sebep var m? Bence ngrlebilir gelecekte farkl bir senaryonun ekillendiine tank olabiliriz, zira gemile kyaslandnda hayati nemde iki noktada deiim var. Daha temkinli syleyeyim: Deiim var gibi grnyor. Bunlardan biri Krtler arasnda son PKK saldrlarna, bilhassa Ankara, Siirt ve Batman'da Krt ve Trk sivillerin lmne yol aan saldrlara kar kuvvetli ve aleni bir ekilde dile getirilen itiraz. Giderek artan sayda Krt, PKK'ya bu saldrlar durdurmas arsnda bulunuyor. nat eden tutucularn savunmaya gemesine yol aan gl bir sloganlar da var: "Benim adma ldrme." Bu noktada hayati deiim u anki muhalefetin hibir etkisi olmayan dardaki unsurlardan deil, bizzat Krt milliyeti hareketinin saflarndan geliyor olmas. Belediye bakanlar ve dier seilmi siyasetiler artk bu tr acmasz saldrlar kabul etmek istemediklerini sylyor. BDP'yi Meclis'teki koltuklarna oturmaya ve siyasi arenada sonu almak iin mcadeleye zorlayan da bu insanlar. Birok BDP milletvekili Ankara'da siyaset yapmak istediini aklad. Siz bu yazy okurken arkadalarnn geri kalann buna ikna edip edemedikleri belli olacak. Benim tahminim, BDP'nin 1 Ekim'de Meclis'e gelecei ynnde. kinci nemli deiimin etkin olabilmesinin nkoulu da bu. New York ziyaretinin ardndan Babakan Erdoan hkmetin Krt meselesine ynelik, tam ve tutarl olarak uygulanmas halinde nemli bir istikamet deiikliinin iaretini veren yeni stratejisine dair aklamalarda bulundu. "Konumak isteyenlerle konuacaz, terrizme bavuranlarla savaacaz," ifadesini kulland Babakan. Kulaa ak geliyor olabilir, fakat deil. Bana gre Babakan'n aklamas u anlama geliyor: Ordu PKK'nn Kandil Dalar'ndaki slerini bombalamaya devam ederken, Erdoan siyasi zme inancn aka dile getiren btn Krt temsilcileriyle oturup konumak niyetinde. Onlarn iinde elbette BDP'li siyasetiler olacak, fakat ayn zamanda, ister beenin ister beenmeyin, Trk devletinin zaten uzun sredir o veya bu ekilde mzakere ettii hapisteki PKK lideri calan da olacak. lerleyen gnlerde byk zorluk PKK'nn inat ve tutucu unsurlarn, muteber Krt temsilcileri iin vaatkr bir yol aarak izole etmek olacak. Fakat bu strateji sadece iki koul altnda ie yarayacaktr. Hkmet muhataplarna meru Krt taleplerini karlamak konusunda epey mesafe kat eden die dokunur bir anlama nermeye niyetli olmal. Dier yandan calan ve

BDP'nin buna karlk verebilmesi, yani savunabilecekleri bir anlama sz konusu olduunda terrist iddetin durmas gerekiyor. in zor ksm muhtemelen bu olacak ve ancak Krt kamuoyu kitlesel olarak sregiden PKK iddeti aleyhine dndnde gerekleecektir. Bu sebeplerden dolay Trkiye'nin bu kez en baa dnmekten kanabilecei konusunda temkinli bir iyimserlik iindeyim.

Different speeds Last week provided another example of the contrasting problems different parts of the world are confronted with at the same time. At the United Nations in New York, the Palestinians tried to keep their dream of an independent and viable state alive, maneuvering between one-sided Americans, divided Europeans and the rest of the world that is fed up with all the delaying tactics. In Turkey, the media proudly reported about the rising star of the prime minister who has managed to position Turkey as the indispensable country in the region and as the model that all new Arab democracies want to copy. That might be true to some extent. At the same time, the government was violently reminded of the uncomfortable truth that Turkeys attractiveness abroad will be seriously damaged if the country does not manage to solve its domestic Kurdish problem soon. Sticking to the old routine of bombing terrorist outposts in Iraq is clearly not enough. Legitimate Kurdish demands can only be met by continued reforms. The Kurds know, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan knows and world public opinion knows. And Europe? The EU is still trying to find a way out of the gravest economic crisis it has faced since the introduction of the euro. Speculation on a Greek default persists. Big European banks seem to be in need of another round of state support. Public backing in key countries such as Germany and the Netherlands for additional loans to Greece is weakening. A growing number of analysts and politicians realize that the problems of the eurozone go well beyond the present setbacks in Athens and Rome. This crisis is forcing the EU to rethink its financial and institutional architecture. Many options are being discussed, and one seems to gain ground, at least among pro-European pundits who are afraid that the never-ending postponement of structural reforms could deal a lethal blow to the raison dtre of the European Union. Before going into the details of one possible answer, let me remind you that the way out the EU opts for in the end will have huge repercussions for Turkey as well, both economically and institutionally. Dont believe the politicians who claim that a deepening and unresolved economic crisis in Europe will have no effect on Turkey. It will, especially on the already alarmingly high current account deficit. But there will be a long-term institutional impact on Turkey as well if the EU would were to the advice of people like Ulrike Gurot and Charles Grant. Both work for influential think tanks in Berlin and London and are promoting the idea of a socalled core, or two-speed, Europe. They envisage a Europe with three circles: The first one would be a euro-core, consisting of the strong EU economies that would be willing to share more sovereignty in economic and fiscal matters. They would probably also opt for further integration in other fields, such as foreign and security policy. In the second circle we would find those EU member states that, for the moment, are not able or willing to join the core group but might do so in the

future. Finally, there would be a circle of friends of the EU to which one day the United Kingdom may belong because the Brits prefer the pound to the euro and are opposed to more integration. Another possible contender for friend status is Turkey, a state that, according to Gurot and Grant, is visibly downgrading it eagerness to join the EU and has regional power ambitions that do not go well with full EU membership. A few years ago, these kinds of scenarios were debated only among academics. Nowadays, they have returned with a vengeance. EU leaders are obliged to contemplate the possibility of a Europe that develops with different speeds for various members. Hopefully sooner rather than later we will learn which strategic vision for the EU as a whole will be followed. If the EU decides to go for a strong nucleus, surrounded by different circles, Turkey has to make up its mind. Join the core group of leading nations but also accept the constraints that come with it, or be in a circle with less influence on the EU as a whole but more freedom to stick to an autonomous economic and foreign policy. Farkl hzlar Geen hafta dnyann farkl kesimlerinin ayn anda yz yze geldii birbiriyle elien sorunlarn bir baka rneine tank olduk. New York'taki Birlemi Milletler'de Filistinliler, tek tarafl Amerikallar, blnm Avrupallar ve dnyann onca erteleme taktiinden gna getirmi olan geri kalan lkeleri arasnda manevra yaparak, bamsz ve yaayabilir bir devlet hayalini canl tutmaya alt. Trkiye'de medya, Trkiye'yi blgedeki yeri doldurulmaz lke, btn yeni Arap demokrasilerinin takip etmek istedii model olarak konumlandrmay baaran Babakan'n yldznn parladna dair gururlu haberler yaymlad. Bu, belli bir dereceye kadar doru olabilir. te yandan hkmet, u rahatsz edici gerei de olanca iddetiyle hatrlad: Trkiye'nin dardaki cazibesi lke iindeki Krt sorununu ksa sre iinde zemedii takdirde ciddi zarar grecek. Irak'taki terrist slerini bombalayarak eski rutine sarlmann yeterli olmad ak. Meru Krt talepleri ancak sregiden reformlarla karlanabilir. Bunu Krtler de, Erdoan da, dnya kamuoyu da biliyor. Peki ya Avrupa? AB Euro'nun hayata geirilmesinden bu yana kar karya kald en vahim ekonomik krizden k yolu aryor hl. Yunanistan'n iflas edeceine dair speklasyonlar berdevam. Grne gre byk Avrupa bankalar bir tur daha devlet desteine ihtiya duyuyor. Hollanda ve Almanya gibi kilit nem tayan lkelerde halkn Yunanistan'a ilave bor verilmesine destei zayflyor. Giderek artan sayda analist ve siyaseti Euro blgesinin sorunlarnn Atina ve Roma'daki mevcut dibe vurularn ok tesine gidebileceinin farknda. Bu kriz, AB'yi mali ve kurumsal yapsn yeniden dnmeye zorluyor. Birok seenek tartlyor ve bunlardan biri, en azndan yapsal reformlardaki bitmek bilmez ertelemelerin Avrupa Birlii'nin varlk sebebine lmcl bir darbe vurmasndan korkan Avrupa yanls yorumcular arasnda zemin kazanyor gibi grnyor. Olas zmlerden birinin ayrntlarna girmeden nce size unu hatrlatmak isterim: AB'nin bu sre sonunda tercih edecei k yolunun Trkiye zerinde de, hem ekonomik hem kurumsal adan muazzam etkileri olacak. Avrupa'daki derinleen ve zlmemi ekonomik krizin Trkiye'ye hi etkisi olmayacan iddia eden siyasetilere inanmayn. Bilhassa oktandr alarm veren yksek cari aa tesir edecek. Fakat AB, Ulrike Gurot ve Charles Grant gibi isimlerin tavsiyelerine kulak verdii takdirde, bunun Trkiye zerinde uzun vadeli bir kurumsal etkisi de olacak. Her iki uzman da Berlin ve Londra'daki etkili dnce kurulularnda alyor ve 'ekirdek' veya iki vitesli Avrupa diye tanmladklar fikri savunuyor. halkadan oluan bir Avrupa tahayyl ediyorlar: Birincisi, ekonomik ve mali meselelerde daha fazla egemenlik paylamna gnll gl Avrupa ekonomilerinden mteekkil bir Euro-ekirdei olacak. Bu lkeler muhtemelen d politika ve gvenlik gibi dier alanlarda da daha ileri entegrasyonu

tercih edecekler. kinci halkada, u an iin ekirdek gruba katlmaya ehil veya istekli olmayan, fakat gelecekte katlabilecek lkeler yer alacak. Britanyallar pound'u Euro'ya yeledii ve daha fazla entegrasyona kar ktndan dolay gnn birinde Birleik Krallk'n da dahil olabilecei nc ve sonuncu halkada ise AB'nin "dostlar" olacak. "Dost" stats iin bir dier aday Trkiye. Gurot ve Grant'a gre Trkiye'nin AB'ye katlma hevesi gzle grlr ekilde azalyor ve Ankara tam AB yelii ile pek de uyumlu olmayan blgesel g arzular besliyor. Birka yl nce bu tr senaryolar sadece akademisyenler arasnda tartlyordu. Bugnse daha iddetli bir ekilde tekrar gndemdeler. AB liderleri eitli yeler iin farkl hzlarda gelien bir Avrupa ihtimali zerine kafa yormaya mecbur kalyor. Bir btn olarak AB iin hangi stratejik vizyonun tercih edileceini umarm ki ok gecikmeden reniriz. AB farkl emberlerle kuatlm gl bir ekirdek oluturmaya karar verirse, Trkiye de kendi kararn vermek zorunda. Lider lkelerin oluturduu ekirdek gruba katlp ayn zamanda bunun gerektirdii snrlamalar kabul m edecek, yoksa bir btn olarak AB zerinde daha az etkide bulunduu, fakat zerk bir ekonomik ve d politika yrtmek konusunda daha zgr olduu emberde mi yer alacak?

United opposition: US, Israel and Hamas All eyes of the international community this week will be on New York, where world leaders are gathering for the annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. It promises to be one of the most dramatic ones in years because the Palestinians have announced their intention to submit to the Security Council an application for Palestines full membership in the UN. According to the current schedule, the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, will present the request right after he addresses the General Assembly this Friday. Until that moment, be prepared for a couple of hectic days in which all kinds of efforts will be made to have the Palestinians change their plans. For instance, promising them an immediate start to new negotiations with Israel for a comprehensive solution or, as a fallback position, convincing them not to apply to the Security Council for full membership (an attempt that would definitively be blocked by an American veto) but to go to the General Assembly in which no one has a veto and a comfortable majority would support the upgrading of Palestines position from observer to that of a non-state member of the UN. For the moment, it seems as though Abbas is not going to give in to the mounting pressure from the US, Israel and some European countries. Understandably, the Palestinians are fed up with all sorts of promises that have led them nowhere in the past. They consider the membership application a desperate attempt to force the uncompromising and reluctant Israel back to the table and get meaningful and substantial negotiations back on track. Personally, I hope that Abbas will stick to his original intentions. After two decades of failed talks with Israel, during which settlements in the West Bank doubled and Gaza was isolated, the Palestinians need a moral boost. Success in New York, in one way or the other, will strengthen their position vis--vis the Israelis. Abbas knows very well that a vote at the UN alone will not bring the Palestinians the state they are entitled to. In order to get there, difficult negotiations are necessary in which both Israel and the Palestinians will have to be pushed to make substantial concessions that hurt. But it does help if all players involved know that a large majority of UN member states want an outcome that guarantees the viability of two states, not just one. One interesting aspect of this weeks diplomatic struggles in New York is the makeup of the opposition to Palestinian

statehood. Of course, I am not talking about the Israeli government or the Obama administration, although the latters backpedaling on earlier promises is both disappointing and self-defeating. One of the prominent opponents is Hamas, the Islamist movement that rules Gaza. Over the last few days, Hamas leaders have made it clear that, according to them, the UN move will lead nowhere. A lot of their rhetoric consists of the same old mix of maximalist demands and the unwillingness to think strategically that we have heard before. The crucial part is the rejection of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, meaning the territorial lines as they stood before the Arab-Israeli war in that year. This is what Abbas is asking for in New York, and that constitutes indeed the explicit recognition of Israel on the other side of these borders. In the past, several Hamas spokespersons have implicitly acknowledged the 1967 borders as the basis for a deal with Israel, including some adjustments and an acceptable solution for Palestinian refugees. This moderate approach has clearly been shelved. The last statement from Hamas again used the old-style rhetoric of not giving up any inch of the land of Palestine or the rights of the Palestinians, including the right of return. Everybody knows this is a non-starter, but apparently Hamas has decided to use this opportunity to underline the internal Palestinian differences. It does not bode well for the near future. Without Palestinian unity and some sort of involvement of Hamas, nothing sustainable will come out of new talks. Maybe Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu can call the leadership of Hamas he knows so well and tell them that wasting historic opportunities is a thing the Palestinians cannot afford. Birleik muhalefet: ABD, srail ve... Hamas Uluslararas toplumun gz, bu hafta dnya liderlerinin Birlemi Milletler Genel Kurulu yllk toplantsnda bir araya gelecei New York'ta olacak. Muhtemelen yllardr yaplan en dramatik toplantlardan birine tank olacaz, zira Filistinliler Gvenlik Konseyi'ne Filistin devletinin tam BM yelii iin bavurma niyetini aklad. Mevcut takvime gre, Filistin Ynetimi Bakan Mahmud Abbas bu bavuruyu, cuma gn Genel Kurul'da yapaca konumann hemen ardndan takdim edecek. O ana kadar Filistinlilere planlarn deitirtmek iin her tr abann seferber edilecei birka scak gne hazr olun. Szgelimi Filistinlilere srail ile kapsaml bir zm dorultusunda yeni grmelere derhal balama sz verilebilir. Ya da bir adm geri atan bir tutum mahiyetinde, tam yelik iin Gvenlik Konseyi'ne bavurmak yerine (ki bu giriimin Amerikan vetosuna toslayaca kesin saylr), kimsenin veto hakkna sahip olmad ve net bir ounluun Filistin'in pozisyonunun gzlemciden BM'nin devlet olmayan yesi seviyesine karlmasn destekleyecei Genel Kurul'a bavurmaya ikna edilebilirler. u an iin Abbas ABD, srail ve baz Avrupa lkelerinin artan basksna boyun emeyecek gibi grnyor. Filistinliler anlalabilir sebeplerle, gemite kendilerini hibir yere gtrmeyen envai eit vaatten bkp usanm durumda. yelik bavurusunu, taviz vermeyen ve gnlsz srail'i masaya tekrar oturmaya zorlayacak ve anlaml, ciddi mzakereleri yeniden rayna oturtacak cretli bir giriim olarak gryorlar. ahsen umudum Abbas'n ilk bataki niyetleri noktasnda sk durmas. srail'le, Bat eria'daki yerleimlerin ikiye katland ve Gazze'nin nefessiz brakld yirmi yllk baarsz grmelerin ardndan Filistinlilerin moral kazanmaya ihtiyac var. New York'ta o veya bu ekilde elde edilecek bir baar srail karsndaki pozisyonlarn glendirecek. BM'de yaplacak bir oylamann tek bana Filistinlilere hak ettikleri devleti getirmeyeceini Abbas da gayet iyi biliyor. O noktaya varmak iin, hem srail'in hem Filistinlilerin actc ciddi tavizler vermek zorunda kalaca zorlu mzakereler yrtlmesi gerek. Fakat iin iindeki btn aktrler, BM yesi lkelerin byk ounluunun sadece bir devletin deil, iki devletin yaayabilirliini garanti eden bir sonu istediini bilirse, bunun srece katks olur.

Bu hafta New York'ta yaanacak olan diplomasi mcadelelerinin ilgin bir vehesi, Filistin devletine muhalefetin bileimi. Elbette srail hkmetinden veya daha nceki szlerinden ark ederek hem hayal krkl yaratan hem kendi itibarn iki paralk eden Obama ynetiminden bahsetmiyorum. nde gelen muhaliflerden biri Gazze'ye hkmeden slamc hareket Hamas. Son birka gndr Hamas liderleri BM'deki giriimin kendileri asndan hibir yere varmayacan aka ifade ediyorlar. Sylemlerinin byk ksm, daha nce de iittiimiz azamiyat taleplerle stratejik dnme isteksizliinin bildik karmndan oluuyor. Sylemin hayati nemde paras, 1967 snrlar dahilinde, yani o yl gerekleen Arap-srail savandan nce var olan snr hatlar zerinden kurulacak bir Filistin devletinin reddi. Abbas'n New York'ta tannmasn istedii devlet bu, ki snrn dier tarafndaki srail'in de aka tannmas anlamna geliyor. Gemite pek ok Hamas szcs 1967 snrlarn st kapal ekilde, srail'le baz ayarlamalar ve Filistinli mlteciler iin kabul edilebilir bir zm de ieren olas bir anlamann temeli olarak kabul etti. Bu lml yaklamn rafa kaldrld ak. Hamas'n son aklamas yine "Filistin toprann bir karn veya Filistinlilerin (geri dn de dahil) haklarnn bir gdmn bile vermemeyi" savunan eski tarz lgat kullanyor. Herkes bu tutumun baar ans olmadn biliyor, fakat Hamas bu frsat Filistinlilerin iindeki farkllklarn altn izmek iin kullanmaya karar vermi grnyor. Bu tutum, yakn gelecek asndan hayra alamet deil. Filistinliler aras birlik ve Hamas'n bir ekilde dahli olmadka, yeni grmelerden die dokunur hibir ey kmayacaktr. Belki Trkiye Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu ok iyi tand Hamas liderliini arayp onlara tarihi frsatlar heba etmenin Filistinlilerin kaldramayaca bir ey olduunu anlatabilir.

Perceptions versus facts Last week the Transatlantic Trends survey 2011 was presented. Starting in 2002, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, one of the leading international think tanks, each year publishes data on US and European public opinion, focusing on foreign policy issues, transatlantic relations and the economy. This years survey includes the US, Turkey and 12 EU member states. You can find all the data on the website www.transatlantictrends.org. In this column I want to concentrate on a few remarkable findings related to Turkey. Having worked on Turkey-EU relations for a decade now, I experienced first-hand how the mood on Turkeys EU accession process has changed over the years. It is definitively true that in general the enthusiasm, both in Turkey and in the EU, has gone down. The reasons are well known and we do not need to go into them in detail: the unresolved Cyprus problem, the change of leadership in France and Germany, the economic crisis in the EU and, as a result of that, the growing impression in Turkey that the EU is no longer serious and that Turkey should maybe start looking for alternatives. Against this backdrop, the new Transatlantic Trends survey (TT 11) offers some striking results. First, it confirms the outcome of several Turkish public opinion polls indicating that public support for EU membership in Turkey has not gone down as dramatically as is often claimed. Almost half (48 percent) of the Turks questioned think Turkish membership in the EU would be a good thing. To put things in perspective: After five years of accession negotiations between Poland and the EU in the 1990s, we could witness the same negative curve in support for membership in Poland, coming down from 75 percent at the start to around 50 percent after a couple of years. At some point, the Poles also lost hope of a quick result and had the impression that the EU was adding tough conditions all the time. In other words, this trend in public support during negotiations is nothing special for Turkey. It has happened before. Poland joined the EU in 2004

after a clear majority of Poles spoke out in favor in a referendum. Back to the TT 11. Contrary to the general perception in Turkey, the majority of those living in EU countries do not believe that Turkeys predominantly Muslim population is a reason to keep Turkey out of the EU. The same results were found for the popular idea that Turkey might be too poor to be integrated into the EU. Almost 60 percent of Europeans see no barrier there. It underlines the point that Turks should be a little bit more careful when they accuse all EU citizens of being Islamophobes who do not want to share their prosperity with the Turks. These Europeans exist and they are quite vocal and visible but, as TT 11 shows, they do not constitute the majority. Another interesting contradiction between perception and reality can be found in the answers to the question Who should Turkey cooperate closest with? The plurality of Turks (43 percent) considers their neighbors in the Middle East as more important to the countrys economic interests than countries of the EU. The fact is that 42 percent of Turkeys total trade in the last two years has been with the EU and only 11 percent with the Arab world. Apart from the quantitative gap, Turkeys exports to Europe consist of mid and high-tech products. Of all foreign direct investment in Turkey between 2008 and 2010, 76 percent came from EU countries and 8 percent from the Gulf countries. On top of that, most European investments in Turkey create new jobs while most Arab money goes into buying shares in already existing Turkish companies. These are just two examples of popular perceptions not being based on the actual state of affairs. The preference for the Middle East is indicative of the positive reaction to the Arab Spring and the negative news coming out of the EU. But I guess most Turks would agree with the conclusion that it makes more sense to base your policies on facts and not on perceptions. Alglara kar olgular Geen hafta 2011 yl Transatlantik Eilimleri aratrmas yaynland. nde gelen uluslararas dnce kurulularndan ABD German Marshall Fonu 2002'den bu yana her yl Amerikan ve Avrupa kamuoyuna dair, d politika, transatlantik ilikileri ve ekonomiye odakl veriler yaynlyor. Bu ylki aratrma ABD, Trkiye ve 12 AB yesi lkeyi kapsyor. Verilerin tamamn www.transatlantictrends.org adresinde bulabilirsiniz. Ben bu yazda Trkiye'yle ilgili baz arpc bulgulara odaklanmak istiyorum. On yldr Trkiye-AB ilikileri zerine mesai harcayan biri olarak Trkiye'nin AB yelii srecine dair ruh halinin yllar iinde nasl deitiini ilk elden biliyorum. Genel olarak hem Trkiye hem AB'de bir heyecan azalmas olduu kesinlikle doru. Sebepleri gayet iyi biliniyor ve ayrntlarna inmeye lzum yok: zlmeyen Kbrs sorunu, Fransa ve Almanya'daki liderlik deiimi, AB dahilindeki ekonomik kriz ve bunun sonucu olarak, Trkiye'de AB'nin artk ciddi olmadna ve belki baka alternatifler aranmas gerektiine dair glenen kan. Byle bir ortamda yaplan Transatlantik Eilimler aratrmas (TE11) baz arpc sonular ortaya koyuyor. Birincisi, Trkiye'de AB yeliine kamuoyu desteinin sk sk iddia edildii kadar keskin bir d yaamadn gsteren eitli anket sonularn doruluyor. Grlen Trklerin yaklak yars (yzde 48) Trkiye'nin AB yeliinin iyi bir ey olacan dnyor. Bu manzaray belli bir perspektife yerletirirsek unu gryoruz: Polonya ile AB arasnda 1990'larda yaplan be yllk yelik mzakerelerinin ardndan yelie verilen destein Polonya'da da de getiine, balangta yzde 75 olan destek orannn birka yl sonra yzde 50 civarna indiine tank olmutuk. Belli bir noktada Polonyallar da

hzl sonu alnacana ynelik umutlarn yitirmi ve AB'nin srekli olarak ilave kat koullar ne srd kansna kaplmt. Dier bir deyile: mzakereler srasnda destek oranlarnda grlen bu deiim Trkiye'ye has bir durum deil. Daha nce de yaanmt. Polonya AB'ye 2004'te, vatandalarn net ounluunun referandumda yelie 'evet' demesinin ardndan girdi. TE11'e dnelim. Trkiye'deki genel algnn tersine, AB lkelerinde yaayanlarn ounluu Trkiye'nin AB dnda tutulmasnn sebebinin Mslman ounluklu nfusu olduuna inanmyor. Ayn sonular, Trkiye'nin AB'ye entegre olamayacak kadar yoksul olduuna dair popler dnceyle ilgili de sz konusu. Avrupallarn yaklak yzde 60' bu noktada herhangi bir engel grmyor. Bu, Trklerin btn AB vatandalarn zenginliklerini Trkiye ile paylamak istemeyen slamofobikler olarak sularken biraz daha dikkatli olmas gerektiini gsteren bir husus. Byle Avrupallar var elbette ve sesleri de yksek kyor ve gz nndeler, fakat TE11'in de ortaya koyduu zere, ounluu tekil etmiyorlar. Alg ile gereklik arasnda bir baka ilgin tezat, Trkiye'nin kimlerle daha yakn ibirlii yapmas gerektii sorusuna verilen cevaplarda grlebilir. Trklerin nemli bir ksm (yzde 43) Ortadou'daki komularn lkenin ekonomik karlar asndan AB yelerinden daha nemli buluyor. Gerek ise u: Trkiye'nin son iki ylda toplam ticaretinin yzde 42'si AB, sadece yzde 11'i Arap lkeleriyle. Miktarn tesinde, Trkiye'nin Avrupa'ya yapt ihracat orta ve ileri teknoloji rnleri oluturuyor. Trk sanayiinin gelecei tam anlamyla retimindeki teknolojik nitelii modernletirmeye alan bu sektre dayanyor. Dier yandan Trk irketleri geri teknoloji rnlerini Ortadou'ya satyor. Bu kr salamak asndan iyi, fakat gelecekte daha fazla bymek noktasnda pek fazla ans sunmuyor. Trkiye'de 2008-2010 dnemindeki tm dorudan yabanc yatrmlarn yzde 76's AB lkelerinden, sadece yzde 8'i Krfez lkelerinden geliyor. Daha da nemlisi, Avrupa'nn Trkiye'deki yatrmlarnn byk ounluu yeni istihdam alanlar yaratrken, Arap parasnn byk ksm zaten mevcut olan Trk irketlerinde hisse satn almaya gidiyor. Bunlar, popler alglarn gerek duruma dayal bir temeli olmadn gsteren rneklerden sadece ikisi. Ortadou'ya ynelik tercih Arap Bahar'na gsterilen olumlu reaksiyondan ve AB'den gelen olumsuz haberlerden belli. Fakat bence Trklerin byk ounluu neticede politikalarn alglara deil olgulara dayanarak belirlenmesinin daha mantkl olduunu kabul edecektir.

Which Turkish model for Egypt? At the moment of writing this column, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan is about to land at Cairo Airport, marking the beginning of a highly publicized Arab Spring tour that will take the Turkish leader to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. His visit to post-revolutionary Egypt in particular is being closely followed by the global media. They expect to see the birth of a new anti-Israel coalition in the region since Turkey has downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel and the Israeli ambassador had to leave Egypt after an angry crowd broke into the embassy last week. But Erdoan did not come to Egypt only to repeat his verbal attacks against the spoiled Israelis who stubbornly refuse to apologize for the killing of nine Gaza flotilla activists last year. He is also there to show the world how popular he is in the Arab world. As a leader who dares to stand up against the strongest military power in the region. And as the prime minister of a country that is seen by many Egyptians and other Arabs as an example that their countries should try to follow. Since the start of the Arab Spring in January of this year there has been a lot of talk on Turkey as a model. I agree with those analysts who have warned of simplifications and have stressed the huge differences between Turkey and the Arab countries that just got rid of their despots. It is true that you cannot copy present-day Turkey in countries that, for instance, do not have a history of 80 years of secular state institutions, to name just one huge difference. Still, it is a fact that many Arabs who want

to reform their countries, from all walks of life, do look at Turkey and at the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) as attractive examples from which they can learn much. What intrigues me is which Turkish model the prime minister has promoted in his talks in Egypt. The authorities in Cairo were not very keen on allowing Erdoan to steal the show in front of the cameras of the world press so they did not allow him to go to Tahrir Square or to give a public speech at the university. So much of what he said was done behind closed doors. But it must have been difficult to stick to one story line when you meet with both young revolutionaries who were the driving force behind the uprising that ousted former President Hosni Mubarak in February and with the aged head of Egypts ruling military council, Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. For the young protesters, present day Turkey is an attractive example of a Muslim country where a secular state is run by a post-Islamist conservative party, a successful economy and a democracy where, with all its shortcomings, citizens enjoy more personal freedoms than in any of the Arab countries. It is a perception of the new Turkey that, I am sure, was welcomed by the AK Party leader. But there is also an old Turkish model, and that is precisely the one that Tantawi and his military colleagues have in mind. They took over from Mubarak and have shown few signs that, after elections, they are willing to give up their present powers. One example is the new Egyptian constitution. Leading generals have already indicated that they expect that document to include several articles that would guarantee the military future possibilities to intervene in the ruling of the country if they feel that is necessary. Sounds familiar, doesnt it, for Turks who, after several decades of military tutelage, have just managed to push back the role of the army in politics. Has Erdoan, behind closed doors of course, warned the generals to give up on their political ambitions and to accept that the new civilian authorities will be in charge? Or did he say one thing to the protesters who are sick and tired of the ongoing dominance of the army and another thing to the military rulers with whom he needs to cooperate, at least in the short run, to make life difficult for Israel? It is only one example of the dilemmas that are faced by a Turkish government that wants to be seen on the side of the new democrats but that needs to do business with the old guard still in power. Msr iin hangi Trkiye modeli? Bu yaz yazld srada Babakan Tayyip Erdoan, Kahire Havaalan'na inmek zere. Kahire, Trkiye liderinin Msr, Tunus ve Libya'ya gidecei, epey reklam yaplan Arap Bahar turunun ilk dura. Erdoan'n bilhassa devrim sonras Msr'a yapt ziyaret kresel medya tarafndan yakndan takip ediliyor. Medya, Trkiye'nin Kuds ile diplomatik ilikileri koparmasnn ve srail bykelisinin geen hafta fkeli bir kalabaln elilik binasna zorla girmesiyle Msr'dan kamak zorunda kalmasnn ardndan yeni bir srail kart koalisyonun ortaya ktn grme beklentisinde. Fakat Erdoan Msr'a, geen yl dokuz Gazze filosu aktivistinin ldrlmesine dair zr dilemeyi inatla reddeden "mark" srail'e szl saldrlarn tekrarlamak iin gitmedi sadece. Dnyaya, blgedeki en kuvvetli asker gce kar ayaa kalkmaya cesaret eden bir lider ve Msrllar ile dier Araplarn pek ounun kendi lkelerinin izlemeye almas gereken bir rnek olarak grd bir lkenin babakan sfatyla, Arap dnyasnda ne kadar popler olduunu gstermek de istiyor.

Bu yln ocak aynda Arap Bahar'nn balamasndan beri bir model olarak Trkiye'ye dair pek ok ey syleniyor. Basitletirmeler konusunda uyarda bulunan ve Trkiye ile despotlarndan yeni yeni kurtulan Arap lkeleri arasndaki derin farkllklar vurgulayan analistlerle hemfikirim. Bugnn Trkiye'sini, szgelimi 80 yllk bir laik devlet kurumlar tarihine sahip olmayan lkelerde kopya edemeyeceiniz doru. Sz konusu tarih derin farkllklardan sadece biri. Yine de, lkelerini reforma tabi tutmay isteyen her toplumsal kesimden birok Arap'n, Trkiye ve AKP'ye ok ey renebilecekleri cazip rnekler olarak bakt da hayatn gerei. Beni ilgilendiren, Babakan'n Msr'daki grmelerinde hangi Trkiye modelini tevik ettii. Kahire'deki resm makamlar, Erdoan'n dnya medyasnn kameralar nnde gsteriyi almasna izin vermeye hi hevesli deildi. Bu yzden Tahrir Meydan'na gitmesine veya niversitede kamuoyuna hitaben bir konuma yapmasna izin vermediler. Velhasl Erdoan'n syledikleri kapal kaplar ardnda kald. Fakat hem ubatta devlet bakan Mbarek'i deviren isyann arkasndaki itici g olan gen devrimcilerle hem de Msr'a hkmeden asker konseyin ihtiyar bakan Mareal Tantavi ile grtnzde, tek bir hikyeye bal kalmanz pek kolay olmasa gerek. Gen protestocular iin gnmz Trkiye'si, laik bir devletin post-slamc bir muhafazakr parti tarafndan ynetildii bir Mslman lke, btn eksiklerine ramen vatandalarn btn dier Arap lkelerinden daha fazla bireysel zgrlkten yararland baarl bir ekonomi ve demokrasi mahiyetinde cazip bir rnek. Yeni Trkiye'ye dair bu algnn AKP lideri tarafndan da memnuniyetle karlandndan eminim. Fakat ortada eski bir Trkiye modeli de var ve Tantavi ve general mesaidalarnn aklnda olan model tam da bu. ktidar Mbarek'ten aldlar ve seimlerden sonra mevcut yetkilerini teslim etmeye niyetli olduklarna dair pek az iaret var. Bunun rneklerinden biri yeni Msr anayasas. nde gelen generaller, sz konusu belgenin orduya gelecekte gerekli grd takdirde lke ynetimine mdahale imkn salayacak baz maddeler iermesini beklediklerinin iaretini oktan verdiler. On yllar sren asker vesayetin ardndan ordunun siyasetteki roln daha yeni geriletmeyi baaran Trkler iin kulaa tandk geliyor deil mi? Erdoan (elbette kapal kaplar ardnda) Msrl generallere siyasi heveslerinden vazgeip grevin yeni sivil makamlarda olmasn kabul etmeleri ynnde uyarda bulundu mu? Yoksa ordunun sregiden hakimiyetinden yaka silkmi olan protestoculara baka, srail'e hayat dar etmek iin en azndan ksa vadede ibirlii yapmak zorunda olduu asker muktedirlere baka m konutu? te bu, yeni demokratlarn safnda grlmek isteyen, fakat hl iktidarda olan eski muhafzlarla i yapmas gereken Trk hkmetinin yz yze olduu ikilemlerin rneklerinden sadece biri.

Turkey and 9/11 While it was hard last week not to read an article or see a TV item on the 10th anniversary of 9/11 in the American and European media, there was hardly any attention for the biggest terrorist attack ever in the Turkish press. That will probably be different today, but in the run-up to this global commemoration day the interest of Turkish journalists and commentators for this landmark historic event was markedly less than their colleagues in other Western countries. Is it because 9/11 really means something completely different for a Turk than it does for an American or a German? Or are the Turkish media simply too preoccupied with domestic news? This would explain the discrepancy between the huge number of articles on the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relations and the few on 9/11. Probably it is a mix of both. Whatever the reason, it signals a remarkable underestimation of the impact 9/11 has had on the perception of Turkey in

many parts of the world. Lets start with the debate on Turkey in Europe. The discussion on how to assess 9/11 in many EU countries quickly led, as Osama bin Laden wanted it, to the theory of the inevitable clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world, put forward some years before by American Professor Samuel Huntington. Most analysts and politicians strongly rejected this idea and for that reason started emphasizing the need for the EU to take Turkey in as a full member. It would be Europes biggest contribution to dismantling the dangerous idea that Christians, atheists and Muslims would never be able to live together in peace. Important politicians like Joschka Fischer, the then-German foreign minister, changed their opinion on Turkeys EU membership and moved from being hesitant to fully in favor. Unfortunately, this positive shift among Europes elite is only one side of the story. On the other hand, all the sudden attention for Islam after 9/11 and the way this religion was abused by terrorists to motivate their deadly attacks all over the globe created a climate of fear among many European citizens. Public opinion polls started to show a strong aversion to Muslims based on the perception that many of them, deep down, might be fundamentalists and potential terrorists as well. Because the large majority of Turks are Muslims, the growing antipathy against Islam, fueled by populists, had a negative effect on the support for Turkeys EU accession among parts of the electorate in Europe. But the influence of 9/11 went far beyond Turkeys relations with the EU. After the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), many analysts and commentators around the world started to see Turkey as the ideal counterweight against the aggressive export of jihadist Islamism by bin Laden and his Saudi countrymen. US President George Bush came up with the phrase moderate Islam and, because of his extreme unpopularity, instantly spoiled the whole concept behind that term. But it did make sense. Turkey under AK Party rule was living proof that a secular state can be run by a conservative Muslim party that promotes a moderate interpretation of Islam. It does not mean, as claimed by dogmatic AK Party opponents at the time, that Turkey was slowly Islamizing and that Washington and Brussels were happy with that. Lets forget about the label and focus on the content. As a result of 9/11 and the simultaneous rise of the AK Party (no, dear conspiracy theorists, there is no link between these two), Turkey and its ruling party became an extremely interesting phenomenon not only for American and European strategists but also for many struggling Islamists and democrats across the Mediterranean. Turkey became an example for many Arabs who wanted to combine their faith with the personal freedoms and the prosperity they were witnessing over in Turkey. This upgrading of Turkey started long before the Arab Spring of this year and might even prove to be one of the reasons behind the popular uprisings. They would not have happened if people in the Arab world would not have been looking for an alternative to the extremely unattractive models offered to them: secular dictatorship or Islamic despotism. Of course, the rise of Turkey as a regional power and an example to follow is the result of a conscious policy implemented by the AK Party since 2002. But without 9/11 and its fallout, both in the West and in the Arab world, these efforts would not have been that successful. Trkiye ve 11 Eyll

Geen hafta Amerikan ve Avrupa medyas 11 Eyll'n 10. yldnm vesilesiyle yazlan yazlardan ve yaynlanan televizyon programlarndan geilmiyordu, fakat tarihin grd en byk terrist saldrya Trk basnnda dikkat sergilendiini sylemek pek mmkn deildi. Bugn muhtemelen farkl olacak, fakat bu kresel anma gnnn arefesinde Trk gazetecileri ve yorumcular tarihsel dnm noktas niteliindeki bu olaya dier Bat lkelerindeki meslektalarndan dikkat ekici lde az ilgi gsterdi. Bunun nedeni 11 Eyll'n bir Trk iin bir Amerikal veya Alman iin tadndan tmyle farkl bir anlam ifade etmesi mi? Yoksa Trk medyas lke ii haberlerle fazlasyla megul olduu iin mi byle? Bu yzden mi ktleen Trkiye-srail ilikilerine dair yazlarn says 11 Eyll yazlarn fersah fersah geride brakyor? Muhtemelen her iki sebebin bir karm sz konusu. Sebep ne olursa olsun bu, 11 Eyll'n dnyann birok lkesindeki Trkiye algs zerinde yapt etkinin ciddi ekilde azmsandnn bir iareti. Avrupa'daki Trkiye tartmasyla balayalm. Birok Avrupa lkesinde 11 Eyll'n nasl deerlendirilmesi gerektiine dair tartma, tam da same bin Ladin'in istedii gibi, birka yl ncesinde Amerikal profesr Samuel Huntington tarafndan ne srlen Bat ve Mslman dnya arasnda kanlmaz bir medeniyetler atmas yaanaca teorisine gelip dayand. Birok analist ve siyaseti bu fikri kuvvetle reddetti ve bu nedenle AB'nin Trkiye'yi tam yelie kabul etmesi gerektiini vurgulamaya balad. Bu, Avrupa'nn Hristiyanlar, ateistler ve Mslmanlarn asla bar iinde bir arada yaayamayacan savunan tehlikeli fikrin boa karlmasna yapaca en byk katk olacakt. Almanya Dileri Bakan Joschka Fischer gibi nemli siyasetiler Trkiye'nin AB yeliine dair fikirlerini deitirdi ve kararszlktan tam destek verme noktasna geldi. Ne yazk ki Avrupa'nn sekinleri arasndaki bu mspet deiim, madalyonun sadece bir tarafyd. Dier tarafta 11 Eyll sonras dikkatlerin aniden slamiyet'in zerine evrilmesi ve terristlerin dnyann drt bir kesindeki kanl saldrlarn motive etmek iin bu dini istismar etmesi birok Avrupa vatanda arasnda bir korku iklimi yaratt. Kamuoyu yoklamalarndan Mslmanlara kar, birounun derinlerde bir yerde kktendinci ve potansiyel terrist olabilecei yargsna dayanan gl bir honutsuzluk kmaya balad. Trklerin byk ounluu Mslman olduundan dolay slam'a kar giderek artan ve poplistler tarafndan kkrtlan antipati Avrupa'daki semenlerin belli kesimleri zerinde Trkiye'nin AB yeliine destek asndan olumsuz bir etki yapt. Fakat 11 Eyll'n etkisi Trkiye'nin AB ile ilikilerinin ok tesine uzand. AKP'nin iktidara geliinin ardndan dnyann drt bir tarafndaki birok analist ve yorumcu Trkiye'yi, cihat slamcln Bin Ladin ve Suudi yurttalar tarafndan saldrgan ithali karsnda ideal bir zt denge noktas olarak grmeye balad. ABD Bakan George W. Bush "lml slam" ifadesini ortaya att ve hi sevilmedii iin de btn kavram derhal bu ifadenin arkasnda berbat oluverdi. Fakat yabana atlacak bir kavram deildi bu. AKP iktidarnda Trkiye laik bir devletin, slam'n lml bir yorumunu destekleyen muhafazakr bir Mslman parti tarafndan ynetilebileceinin canl kant oldu. O dnemdeki dogmatik AKP kartlarnn iddia ettii gibi bu, Trkiye'nin yava yava slamlat ve Washington ile Brksel'in bundan memnun olduu anlamna da gelmiyordu. Biz zarf unutup mazrufa odaklanalm. 11 Eyll'n ve onunla ezamanl olarak AKP'nin ykseliinin (hayr sevgili komplo teorisyenleri, bu ikisi arasnda hibir ba yok) sonucu Trkiye ve onu yneten parti, sadece Amerikal ve Avrupal stratejistler iin deil, Akdeniz boyunca mcadele eden slamclar ve demokratlar iin de son derece ilgin bir fenomen haline geldi. Trkiye, inanlaryla burada tank olduklar kiisel zgrlkleri ve refah birletirmek isteyen birok Arap iin rnee dnt. Trkiye'nin konumundaki bu ykseli bu ylki Arap Bahar'ndan uzun zaman nce balad ve hatta belki halk isyanlarnn arkasnda yatan nedenlerden biri olduu bile sylenebilir. Arap dnyasndaki insanlar kendilerine sunulan birbirinden beter modellere (laik diktatrlk veya slami despotizm) bir alternatif aramyor olsayd bu isyanlar gereklemezdi. Elbette Trkiye'nin blgesel bir g ve alnacak bir rnek olarak ykselii AKP'nin 2002'den bu yana izledii bilinli bir politikann sonucu. Fakat 11 Eyll ve onun hem Bat'da hem Arap dnyasnda yaratt etkiler olmasayd, sz konusu abalar bu kadar baarl olmazd.

Migrants perceived as Muslims after 9/11 Over the course of the last couple of days I have been trying to read as many articles on 9/11 as possible. This Sunday will mark the 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on the United States that killed 3,000 people. In the run-up to that day, the American and European media are filled with articles and essays that try to explain the impact of 9/11 on the world in general and the position of the US in particular. It seems there is an undeclared contest going on between analysts who claim that the world has profoundly changed since the day hijacked airplanes flew into the Word Trade Center and the Pentagon, and others who are of the opinion that we should not exaggerate the influence of one single event on developments that would have occurred anyway. I guess I would position myself close to the first group without overlooking structural changes that had already started before 9/11. Let me explain my point by focusing on the rise of a new form of extreme right-wing populism in many Western countries. Lets be clear: Without 9/11 there would not be a small but very influential Islamophobic network in the US that has managed to negatively influence the debate on Islam and Muslims across the Atlantic via anti-Islam grassroots organizations, right-wing media and high-profile politicians affiliated with the Tea Party. Without 9/11, American states would not be considering outlawing Shariah law, simply because nobody would take the claim serious that Shariah is a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the US and in the world as we know it, as the Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich put it. But does the denunciation of Islam by opportunist politicians mean that without 9/11 we would not have seen a resurgence of the populist right in the US? I dont think so. The rise of the Tea Party and its influence on the Republican Party is closely connected to a strong anti-government, anti-taxation and anti-liberal establishment undercurrent in American society that has always been there. It rears its ugly head almost every decade. My impression is that white frustration with the first-ever black presidency of Barack Obama is more important in explaining the blatant racism that we witness among some of the Tea Party rank and file than the presence of a small and rather invisible Muslim community on American soil. Fear mongering about Islam is popular because of 9/11. But it plays only a marginal role in explaining the popularity of Tea Party candidates. To a certain extent one could make the same analysis with regard to the rise of the populist, anti-Islam extreme right in Europe. The difference is the presence of substantial and quite visible Muslim communities in many West European countries. The Islamization of politics that I described in my last column is apparent in the discourse on migrants in Europe. After 9/11, from one day to the other, migrants came to be considered as Muslims. Many of the problems related to the presence of newcomers in an unprepared society like the Netherlands were already well known on Sept. 10, 2001. Only few explanations made a link with the majority religion among those migrants. Most focused on discrimination and failed policies of integration. That changed drastically after 9/11. All of a sudden Islam was seen as the best explanation for the ongoing problems. Populist politicians, looking for scapegoats, realized that blaming their religion was an easy way to hold migrants responsible for their own problems and those of the Dutch society in general. But the popularity of Geert Wilders cannot be understood by only looking at his anti-Islam rhetoric.

The rise of the new populism in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe is a much more complicated phenomenon. Structural changes in the labor market, the loss of many simple and low paid jobs, the growing influence of the European Union, the loss of a clear identity, to name only a few factors, have caused an alarming feeling of insecurity among many Europeans, who feel that they are losing out in the 21st century. But globalization does not have a face. Muslims do, and populists have realized that very well. As in the US, without 9/11 bashing Islam could not have been used in the Netherlands to attract angry and insecure undecided voters to the new populist cause. But winning 15 percent of the votes was only possible because Wilders echoes the frustrations of many Dutch, who fear an unknown future that does not bode well for them. With or without Islam. Gmendiler, Mslman oldular Son gnlerde 11 Eyll zerine mmkn olduunca ok yaz okumaya alyorum. Bu pazar, El Kaide'nin ABD'ye ynelik 3 bin insann lmne yol aan terrist saldrlarnn 10. yldnm olacak. O gnn arifesinde Amerikan ve Avrupa medyas 11 Eyll'n genelde dnyaya, zelde ABD'nin pozisyona yapt etkiyi aklamaya alan makale ve yazlarla dolu. Karlan uaklarn Dnya Ticaret Merkezi'ne akld gnden bu yana dnyann kknden deitiini iddia eden analistler ile tek bir vakann her halkrda yaanacak gelimeler zerindeki etkisini abartmamamz gerektiini dnenler arasnda ilan edilmemi bir yar var gibi grnyor. Sanrm ben, 11 Eyll'den nce zaten balam olan yapsal deiimlerin zerinden atlamakszn, kendimi ilk gruba daha yakn buluyorum. Bu fikrimi, birok Bat lkesinde yeni bir ar sac poplizmin ykseliine odaklanarak izah etmek isterim. Ak olalm: 11 Eyll yaanmasayd, ABD'de, Atlantik'in iki yakasnda slam ve Mslmanlara dair sregiden tartmaya slam kart taban rgtleri, sac medya ve ay Partisi'ne yakn st dzey siyasetiler araclyla olumsuz ekilde tesir edebilen kk, fakat son derece etkili bir slamofobik a olmayacakt. 11 Eyll olmasayd, Amerikan eyaletleri eriat hukukunu yasaklamay aklna getirmeyecekti, zira Cumhuriyeti bakanlk aday Newt Gingrich'in dedii zere, "eriatn ABD ve dnyada zgrln bildiimiz haliyle bekasna ynelik lmcl bir tehdit olduu" iddiasn kimse ciddiye almayacakt. Peki slam'n oportnist siyasetiler tarafndan taa tutulmas 11 Eyll yaanmakszn ABD'nin poplist san canlanna sahne olmayaca anlamna m gelir? Sanmyorum. ay Partisi'nin ykselii ve Cumhuriyetiler zerindeki tesiri, Amerikan toplumunda alttan alta her daim varln hissettiren hkmet kart, vergilendirme kart ve liberal olmayan gl bir yapyla yakndan balantl. Bu yap irkin ban her on ylda bir karp kkrer. Benim izlenimim, ay Partisi'nin baz yeleri arasnda tank olabildiimiz yaygarac rkl aklamak sz konusu olduunda, beyazlarn ABD tarihindeki ilk siyahi bakandan duyduu rahatszln, Mslmanlarn Amerikan topraklarndaki kk ve pek de grnr saylmayacak varlndan daha nemli olduu ynnde. slam'la ilgili korku tellall 11 Eyll sebebiyle popler. Fakat bu, ay Partisi adaylarnn poplerliini aklamak bakmndan ancak marjinal bir rol oynuyor. Avrupa'daki poplist, slam kart ar san ykseliiyle ilgili belli bir raddeye kadar ayn analiz yaplabilir. Fark, birok Bat Avrupa lkesinde hatr saylr ve gayet gz nnde Mslman topluluklarn varl. Son yazmda anlattm siyasetin slamlamas meselesi Avrupa'daki gmenlere dair sylemde aka kendisini gsteriyor. 11 Eyll'den sonra gmenler bir gnde Mslmanlar haline geldi. Hollanda gibi hazr olmayan bir toplumda yeni gelenlerin varlna bal sorunlarn birou 10 Eyll 2001'de de gayet iyi biliniyordu. Pek az izahat bu gmenlerin ounluunun mensup olduu dinle balant kuruyordu. ounlukla ayrmcla ve baarsz entegrasyon politikalarna odaklanlyordu. te bu durum 11 Eyll'den sonra keskin bir biimde deiti.

slam birdenbire sregiden sorunlarn en iyi aklamas saylr oldu. Gnah keileri arayan poplist siyasetiler slam dinini sulamann, bizzat gmenlerin ve genelde Hollanda toplumunun sorunlarndan yine o gmenleri sorumlu tutmann kolay yolu olduunu grd. Fakat Geert Wilders'n poplerlii sadece slam kart sylemine baklarak aklanamaz. Yeni poplizmin Hollanda ve Avrupa'nn baka lkelerindeki ykselii ok daha karmak bir fenomen. gc piyasasndaki yapsal deiimler, birok basit ve dk cretli iin kaybedilmesi, Avrupa Birlii'nin artan nfuzu, bariz bir kimlik yitimi gibi faktrler (ki daha baka faktrler de saylabilir) 21. asrda kaybettiklerini dnen birok Avrupalda tedirgin edici bir gvensizlik hissiyatna yol am durumda. Fakat kresellemenin iaret edebileceiniz bir yz yok. Mslmanlarn ise var ve poplistler bunu gayet iyi idrak etti. ABD'de olduu gibi, 11 Eyll yaanmasayd, Hollanda'da fkeli ve gvensiz hisseden yzer gezer semenleri yeni poplist davaya ekmek iin slam'n taa tutulmasn kullanmak mmkn olmazd. Fakat oylarn yzde 15'ini almak da, pek hayra alamet grmedikleri bilinmez bir gelecekten korkan birok Hollandalnn huzursuzluunun yansmasn Wilders'ta bulmasyla mmkn olabilirdi ancak.

Where were you on 9/11? There is only one week to go before the world will, no doubt massively, commemorate the day that, 10 years ago, al-Qaeda terrorists flew planes into the towers of the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon, killing 3,000 people. This week, thousands of articles and TV items will be published to tell the story of that day, the reasons behind the biggest terrorist attack ever and especially the impact it has had on our lives since. In this column and in the next two, I will explain why, according to me, Sept. 11 was indeed a defining moment for my generation of politicians, journalists and analysts, a dramatic incident that changed the way we look at the world. When I grew up in the '60s and '70s of the 20th century, almost everybody older than me could answer the question Where were you when you heard that John F. Kennedy was killed in 1963? I could not remember because I was 6 years old at the time and we did not have a TV set at home, but for my parents' generation, the shots that killed the president of the United States were a defining moment. Since then, there have been other events that made a huge impression on billions all over the world, like the fall of the Berlin War in 1989, but nothing compares to the impact of the attack on the twin towers in New York on Sept. 11, 2001. Images of incredible destruction and inconceivable tragedy were broadcast live all over the world. This time I remember very well where I was. I was a member of the European Parliament (EP) then and we were having a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Elmar Brok, a German Christian-Democrat who combines a bullish temperament with a great sense of humor. While we were discussing the situation in a particular part of the world, highly excited assistants came to the chairman, informing him about something important that was happening outside of our meeting room. At a certain moment, Brok interrupted one of the speakers and told us, in a quiet and serious way, that he proposed to stop our gathering because he had just been informed about dramatic events taking place in New York. Puzzled, I rushed to my office and was met with my assistants glued to the TV screens, where they witnessed a video of the second plane flying into the WTC. In that room, confusion and disbelief were mixed with anxiety and fear. There were rumors that more planes were on their way to destroy landmark buildings in the US, but maybe in Europe as well. Some people wanted to leave the EP building, a potential target in their view. A few people left while the rest of us watched the terrible

events across the Atlantic being replayed again and again. In assessing the impact of 9/11 in my next two columns, I will concentrate on one leading concept: the Islamization of global politics. Osama bin Laden had multiple goals when he planned this operation. The most important was to provoke a war between the West and the Islamic world that would demonstrate that the two are incompatible, echoing the basic thesis of Samuel Huntington's classic The Clash of Civilizations.

I will come back to the mixed results of those efforts this week. But the al-Qaeda terrorists were definitely successful in the sense that they forcefully injected Islam into public discourse in the US and Europe. Never before has Islam been used and especially misused to try and explain domestic developments inside Western countries and international relations around the globe. I just finished reading the book Der Islam-Irrtum (The Islam Fallacy), written by Michael Thumann, the Turkey and Middle East correspondent of the influential liberal German weekly Die Zeit (The Time). In an eloquent and convincing way, Thumann shows how this obsession with Islam has fully distorted the way many citizens and politicians in the West analyze problems in their own societies and countries surrounding them. They ended up with the wrong answers to the wrong questions. 11 Eyll'de neredeydiniz? Sadece bir hafta sonra btn dnya, on yl nce El Kaide terristlerinin kardklar uaklar Dnya Ticaret Merkezi ve Pentagon'a akp 3 bin insan ldrd gn anacak. Bu hafta binlerce yaz ve televizyon programnda, o gnn hikyesi, tarihin tank olduu en byk terr saldrsnn arkasndaki sebepler ve bilhassa o zamandan beri hayatlarmza yapt etki anlatlacak. Bu ve bundan sonraki iki yazmda 11 Eyll'n benim kuamdan siyasetiler, gazeteciler ve analistler iin tam manasyla bir dnm noktas olmasnn sebebini, 11 Eyll'n niye dnyaya bakmz deitiren dramatik bir vaka olduunu anlatmaya alacam. 20. asrn 60'l ve 70'li yllarnda bydm ve benden yaa byk olan hemen herkes, "1963'te John F. Kennedy'nin ldrldn duyduunda neredeydin?" sorusunu yantlayabilir. Ben artk hatrlayamyorum, zira suikast srasnda alt yamdaydm ve evde televizyonumuz yoktu. Fakat anne-babamn kua iin ABD bakann ldren kurunlar, bir dnm noktasyd. O zamandan beri dnyann drt bir kesindeki milyarlarca insanda, szgelimi 1989'da Berlin Duvar'nn yklmas gibi derin izler brakan baka olaylar gerekleti. Ne var ki hibiri 11 Eyll 2001'de New York'taki ikiz kulelere yaplan saldryla kyaslanamaz. nanlmaz ykmn ve akl almaz trajedinin grntleri dnyann her tarafnda canl yaynland. Bu kez nerede olduumu gayet iyi hatrlyorum. Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun (AP) bir yesiydim ve dik kafal mizacn ahane bir mizah duygusuyla birletiren Alman Hristiyan-Demokrat Elmar Brok'un bakanln yapt D likiler Komitesi'nin toplantsndaydk. Biz dnyann belli bir blgesindeki durumu tartrken, byk heyecana kaplm olan asistanlar bakana yaklat ve ona toplant odamzn dnda ok nemli bir eyler olduu bilgisini verdi. Brok o srada konuan kiinin szn derhal kesti ve bize sakin ve ciddi bir edayla, toplanty bitirmemizi nerdiini, zira az nce New York'ta dramatik olaylar yaandna dair bilgilendirildiini syledi. Kafam karm bir halde ofisime kotum. Ofiste asistanlarm, Dnya Ticaret Merkezi'ne arpan ikinci uan grntlerinin tekrar tekrar verildii televizyon ekranlarna adeta yapmt. Olanlar

karsndaki aknla ve inanamamaya, endie ve korku elik ediyordu. ABD'deki nemli binalar yerle bir etmek zere ilerleyen baka uaklar da olduu sylentileri vard. Kim bilir belki Avrupa da hedefteydi. Bazlar, potansiyel hedef olarak grdkleri AP binasn terk etmek istiyordu. Birka kii binadan ayrld. Geri kalanlarmz Atlantik'in dier yakasndaki tekrar tekrar gsterilen korkun olaylar izledik. 11 Eyll'n etkisini deerlendireceim sonraki iki yazmda ne kan kavramlardan birine odaklanacam: kresel siyasetin slamilemesi. Bu operasyonu planlarken same bin Ladin'in pek ok hedefi vard. En nemlisi de Bat ile slam dnyas arasnda, Samuel Huntington'n klasik "Medeniyetler atmas" temel tezini yanklayan ekilde, ikisinin uyumsuzluunu kantlayacak bir sava kkrtmakt. Sz konusu gayretlerin dourduu kark sonulara bu hafta geri dneceim. Fakat El Kaide terristleri slam' ABD ve Avrupa'daki kamusal syleme zorla zerk etmek bakmndan kesinlikle baarl oldular. slam, daha nce Bat lkelerindeki i gelimeleri ve dnya apnda uluslararas ilikileri deerlendirip aklamak iin (bilhassa da yanl ekilde) hi kullanlmamt. Etkili liberal Alman gazetesi 'Die Zeit'n ('Zaman') Trkiye ve Ortadou muhabiri Michael Thumann'n 'Der slam-Irrtum' ('slam Yanlgs') kitabn henz bitirdim. Thumann belagatli ve ikna edici bir tarzda, slam saplantsnn Bat'daki birok vatandan ve siyasetinin kendi toplumlarndaki ve onlar evreleyen lkelerdeki sorunlar analiz etme eklini nasl tepeden trnaa arpttn gsteriyor. Netice ise yanl sorulara verilen yanl cevaplar oluyor.

Understanding Atatrk It remains one of the biggest mysteries for foreign visitors to Turkey: Why are the pictures and statues of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk still so omnipresent more than 70 years after his death? There is no country in Europe where you will find a similar situation. In monarchies, portraits of the ruling king or queen adorn official state offices, but these are depictions of the living monarch and will be replaced after his or her rule with those of his of her successor. In republics, the same applies to the president in office. Nowhere else will you find such an abundance of representations of a former king or president so many years after his death. For many Europeans, this calls to mind all sorts of associations with the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe or the present day authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, governed by anti-democratic ideologies and old-fashioned despots. By both counts, these comparisons do not bode well for a positive opinion of Turkey. On the other hand, most Turks find it hard to cope with this Western incomprehension. They blame the visitors for their insensitivity and lack of knowledge about Turkish history and defend Atatrks ongoing domination of public spaces by referring to his pivotal role in saving the country from annihilation 90 years ago and for laying the still invaluable groundwork for todays Turkey. You will probably find more ardent supporters of Atatrk among the Turks who do not vote for the current ruling party, but even among the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rank and file, many would passionately make the case for honoring Atatrks legacy in such a visible way. I vividly recall an incident some years ago when a then-colleague from the European Parliament, knowledgeable about the country and strongly in favor of Turkeys accession to the EU, cautiously suggested in an off-the-record conversation with Turkish journalists that maybe one day, as a sign of strengthened democracy and growing self-confidence in Turkey, the pictures of Atatrk might slowly fade away. His remarks were leaked and caused a flurry of commotion in the Turkish media.

Before being able to visit Turkey again, he had to explain publicly that he did not intend to insult Atatrk or his ideas. The Atatrk perception gap between Turks and non-Turks is not going to disappear quickly. But there is good news for those who find it important to bridge that divide and stimulate some common understanding about the founder of the Turkish republic. Now for sale in Turkish bookshops is the latest publication by kr Haniolu, a professor at Princeton University in the US and a distinguished scholar on the late Ottoman Empire and the early republic. The book is called Atatrk: An Intellectual Biography. In less than 250 pages and in a very accessible style, Haniolu shows how the founder of the Turkish Republic was an intellectual and social product of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Through an analysis of Atatrks life, ideas and work, the author explores the uneasy transition from the late Ottoman imperial order to the modern Turkish nationstate and traces Atatrks intellectual development. The book is a must read for both Turks and non-Turks. Turkish historiography tends to view Atatrk as a solitary genius who singlehandedly wrought a miracle in the form of modern Turkey. One way of showing respect for this extraordinary achievement is by hanging his picture on all Turkish walls even today. While fully acknowledging the enormous impact of his leadership, Haniolu explains the ways in which Atatrks views were shaped, for instance, by his Thessalonikian background and his education at non-religious and military schools. In constructing his vision of a new Turkey, Atatrk acquired most of his ideas from Western and Ottoman grand theories on the importance of science and the diminishing role of religion in the modern world. The book does not shy away from criticism and explains that the radicalism of Atatrks program led to the authoritarian character of his politics. Like many other transformative state builders, he harbored little tolerance for dissent or criticism. Let us hope that, after reading this book, both foreigners and Turks alike will have a better understanding of who Atatrk really was, where he got his ideas from and why he is so important to Turkey. We will see in 20 years time whether this improved and more balanced awareness will have an impact on the number of pictures and statues of Atatrk in this country and the appreciation for them by guests and hosts alike. Atatrk' anlamak Trkiye'yi ziyaret eden yabanclar iin en byk gizemlerden biri her daim udur: lmnn zerinden 70 yldan fazla bir sre gemiken niye hl her yerde Mustafa Kemal Atatrk'n resimleri ve heykelleri var? Avrupa'da hibir lkede benzer bir manzarayla karlamazsnz. Monarilerde tahttaki kraln veya kralienin portresi resm dairelere aslr, fakat onlarn mr de tahtlarn haleflerine braktklar gn sona erer. Cumhuriyetlerde de ayns grevdeki devlet bakan iin geerlidir. lmnn zerinden onca yl geen eski bir kraln veya devlet bakannn suretini bu kadar bol bir ekilde hibir yerde bulamazsnz. Birok Avrupal iin bu durum, Orta ve Dou Avrupa'daki eski komnist lkelerle veya anti-demokratik ideolojiler ve/veya eski moda despotlar tarafndan ynetilen Orta Asya'daki mevcut otoriter rejimlerle her neviden arm ieriyor. Oysa Trkiye her iki trle de kyaslanabilecek bir lke deil. Dier yandan Trklerin byk ounluu Bat'daki bu idrak eksikliiyle baa kmakta zorlanyor. Ziyaretileri duyarszlklar ve Trkiye tarihine dair bilgisizlikleri nedeniyle suluyorlar ve Atatrk'n kamusal alanlardaki sregiden hakimiyetini, lkenin 90 yl nce yok olmaktan kurtarlmasnda ve bugnn Trkiye'sinin hl ok deerli olan temelinin atlmasnda oynad nc role atfta bulunarak savunuyorlar. Muhtemelen iktidar partisine oy vermeyen Trkler arasnda Atatrk'n daha ateli

destekilerini bulursunuz, fakat AKP saflarnda bile birok insan Atatrk'n mirasnn byle grnr bir biimde onurlandrlmasn hararetle savunuyor. Birka yl nce yaadmz bir olay dn gibi hatrlyorum: O dnem Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndan bir mesaidam (ki kendisi Trkiye'yi gayet iyi tanyor ve AB yeliini kuvvetle destekliyordu) Trk gazetecilerle kaytd bir grmede belki gnn birinde, Trkiye'de demokrasinin glenmesinin ve artan zgvenin iareti mahiyetinde, Atatrk resimlerinin yava yava azalabileceini ihtiyatl bir ekilde dile getirmiti. Szleri basna szdrld ve Trk medyasnda byk tartma kopard. Trkiye'ye tekrar gelebilmesi iin kamuoyuna niyetinin Atatrk'e veya fikirlerine hakaret etmek olmadn aklamas gerekti. Trklerin ve Trk olmayanlarn Atatrk algsndaki farkllk ksa zamanda ortadan kalkmayacak. Fakat Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusu hakkndaki bu bak farklln gidermeyi ve belli bir ortak kavray zemini oluturmay nemli bulanlar iin iyi haberler var. Amerikan Princeton niversitesi profesrlerinden, Osmanl mparatorluu'nun son, Cumhuriyet'in erken dnemi konusunda tannm bir akademisyen olan kr Haniolu'nun en son kitab, u an Trkiye'deki kitaplarn raflarnda yerini ald. Kitabn ismi "Atatrk: Entelektel Bir Biyografi". Haniolu, 250'den az sayfada ve son derece anlalr bir slupla Trkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucusunun 19. asr sonu, 20. asr bandaki dnemin entelektel ve sosyal bir rn olduunu gsteriyor. Yazar Atatrk'n hayatn, fikirlerini ve eserlerini analiz ederek, Osmanl imparatorluk dzeninden modern Trkiye ulus-devletine zorlu geii anlamaya ve Atatrk'n entelektel geliiminin izini srmeye alyor. Hem Trkler hem Trk olmayanlar bu kitab mutlaka okumal. Trk tarihilii Atatrk' modern Trkiye eklindeki bir mucizeyi tek bana gerekletiren yalnz bir dahi olarak grme eiliminde. Bugne kadar bu olaanst baarya sayg gstermenin bir yolu da onun resimlerini Trkiye'deki btn duvarlara asmak. Haniolu, Atatrk'n liderliinin muazzam etkisini kabul etmekle birlikte, szgelimi Selanikli gemiinin ve din olmayan okullarda ve asker akademilerde grd eitimin grlerini biimlendirmekte oynad rol izah ediyor. Atatrk yeni bir Trkiye vizyonunu ina ederken, fikirlerinin ounu modern dnyada bilimin nemine ve dinin zayflayan rolne dair byk teorileri poplerletiren Batllardan ve Osmanllardan ald. Kitap eletiriden de geri durmuyor ve Atatrk'n programnn radikalliinin, politikalarnn otoriter nitelik kazanmasna yol atn anlatyor. Birok baka dntrc devlet kurucusu gibi, Atatrk'n de muhalefete veya eletiriye pek az msamahas vard. Umalm ki bu kitab okuduktan sonra hem yabanclar hem Trkler Atatrk'n kim olduuna, fikirlerini nereden aldna ve Trkiye iin neden bu kadar nemli olduuna dair daha iyi bir kavraya sahip olsun. Bu gelimi ve daha dengeli idrakin bu lkede Atatrk resimlerinin ve heykellerinin says ve onlarn hem misafirler hem ev sahipleri tarafndan alglanma biimi zerinde tesiri olup olmayacan 20 yl iinde greceiz.

People 3 -- Dictators 0 At the moment of writing this column, much is still unclear in and around the Libyan capital of Tripoli. Fighting between rebels and regime forces is ongoing, Muammar Gaddafi, the dictator himself, is at large and his sons keep popping up even though they are supposed to have been arrested. Despite all the last-minute doubts and uncertainties, one thing seems clear: Following Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the third North African dictator has lost the fight in suppressing the demands for more democracy by his own people. It is only natural that attention is now focused on how a post-Gaddafi Libya should look like and whether or not the rebels will be able to prevent another Iraq, a country ripped apart by an ethnically and religiously inspired insurgency after Saddam Hussein lost power. Many observers fear the internal rivalries within the National Transitional Council (NTC) and are afraid that it will be extremely difficult to govern a country that has effectively neither functioning institutions nor a history of political pluralism. The rebels have won the war, but it is far from obvious whether or not they will manage to secure the peace.

Listening to the comments coming from Washington, London and Paris, one thing is apparent: The US and Europe are willing, if and when asked to do so, to offer a helping hand in the reconstruction of the new Libya, but the main burden of unifying Libya as a modern state and nation will be on the shoulders of the Libyans themselves. Hardly anybody would dispute the fact that one of the main reasons why the tide turned against Gaddafi last week was the more sophisticated and effective coordination between NATO and the rebels. In the last five months NATO has made around 7,500 air strike attacks against Gaddafis forces. It took a while for the bombing campaign to reduce the governments military advantage and for the rebels to be organized into a proper fighting force. Once that point was reached, there was no longer any escape. It was the Libyans themselves who liberated their country from Gaddafis grip, but the help from NATO was crucial. Having that reality in mind, lets look back and evaluate some of the main objections that were made against any foreign involvement in the Libyan conflict. We should not forget that when NATO decided to intervene and prevent a massacre in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, many critics, on the left and on the right, in Turkey and elsewhere, objected strongly. According to the fault-finders, Western political leaders and the media had manipulated public opinion against Gaddafi, and the only reason to intervene was Libyas oil and anyway the odds of success of the NATO air operation were small. Soon the West would put their boots on the ground as well. Most of the criticism can be labeled as a classic anti-American conspiracy theory in which the US is responsible for all the bad things happening around the world. In his excellent article last week in this newspaper, Ali H. Aslan rightly called upon Turkeys opinion makers to get real and adopt a more mature attitude towards the US. Looking back, almost all the cynical and skeptical assertions and predictions were simply wrong. In a superb piece on his blog Informed Comment, the left-leaning American Islam expert Juan Cole dismantled the top 10 myths about the Libya war. Let me single out two. One was that the US led the charge to war. Cole lists all the objections against a NATO intervention originally mentioned by both President Barack Obama and then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The US was clearly extremely reluctant to get involved in yet another war in the Muslim world. In the end it was the French and the British that took the lead and the Obama administration that came along as a junior partner. The second myth that Cole convincingly destroys is that this was a war for Libyas oil. That is daft. Libya was already integrated into the international oil markets, and had done billions of deals with BP, ENI, etc, etc. None of those companies would have wanted to endanger their contracts by getting rid of the ruler who had signed them. An economic argument for imperialism is fine if it makes sense, but this one does not and there is no good evidence for it, and it is therefore just a conspiracy theory. Halk: 3 Diktatrler: 0 Bu satrlar yazarken Libya'nn bakenti Trablus iinde ve etrafndaki durum hl byk lde belirsizliini koruyor. syanclarla rejime bal gler arasndaki atmalar sryor, diktatr Muammer Kaddafi'nin nerede olduu bilinmiyor ve tutuklandklar iddiasna ramen oullar sada solda boy gstermeye devam ediyor. Son dakikadaki onca kukuya ve belirsizlie ramen, tek bir ey ak gibi grnyor: Tunus Devlet Bakan Bin Ali ve Msrl muadili Mbarek'in ardndan nc Kuzey Afrika diktatr de kendi halknn daha fazla demokrasi taleplerini bastrma mcadelesini kaybetti.

imdi dikkatlerin Kaddafi sonras Libya'nn nasl olmas gerektiine ve isyanclarn, Saddam Hseyin'in iktidarn kaybetmesi sonrasnda etnik ve din temelli atmalarla darmadan olan Irak'n bir tekrarndan kanp kanamayacana odaklanmas gayet doal. Birok gzlemci Ulusal Gei Konseyi (NTC) iindeki dmanlklardan korkuyor ve ne ileyen kurumlar ne de siyasi oulculuk tarihi olan bir lkeyi ynetmenin ziyadesiyle zor olacandan endie ediyor. syanclar sava kazand, fakat huzuru salayp salayamayacaklar hi belli deil. Washington, Londra ve Paris'ten gelen yorumlara kulak verildiinde, bir husus daha bariz ekilde grlyor: ABD ve Avrupa, kendilerinden istenirse ve istendiinde yeni Libya'nn inasna yardm etmeye istekli; fakat en ar vazife, yani Libya'y modern bir devlet ve ulus olarak birletirme vazifesi, bizzat Libyallarn omuzlarnda olacak. Rzgrn geen hafta Kaddafi'nin aleyhine dnmesinin balca sebeplerinden birinin NATO ile isyanclar arasnda daha gelikin ve etkili koordinasyon olduu hemen herkesin malumu. Son be ayda NATO, Kaddafi glerine yaklak 7.500 hava saldrs dzenledi. Bombardmanlarn hkmetin asker avantajn azaltmas ve isyanclarn dzgn bir silahl g olarak rgtlenmesi belli bir zaman ald. Bu noktaya ulaldnda ise artk ka yoktu. lkelerini Kaddafi'nin penesinden kurtaranlar bizzat Libyallard, fakat NATO'nun yardm da ok nemli bir rol oynad. Bu gereklii aklda tutarak geriye dnelim ve Libya'daki atmaya ynelik her tr d mdahaleye kar dile getirilen balca itirazlar deerlendirelim. NATO mdahaleye karar verdiinde ve Libya'nn dousundaki Bingazi kentinde bir katliam nlediinde, Trkiye'de ve baka lkelerde birok sac ve solcu kuvvetle kar kmt. Mdahaleyi yanl bulanlara gre Batl siyasi liderler ve medya, kamuoyunu Kaddafi aleyhinde maniple etmiti; mdahalenin tek sebebi Libya'daki petrold ve zaten NATO hava operasyonunun baar ans da ok zayft. Bat ksa sre sonra kara kuvvetlerini devreye sokmak durumunda kalacakt. Bu eletirilerin byk ksm, dnyann her yerinde yaanan kt eylerden ABD'nin sorumlu olduunu ne sren klasik Amerikan kart komplo teorisi olarak nitelenebilir. Geen hafta gazetesinde yaynlad ahane bir yazda Ali Aslan, doru bir tavrla Trkiye kamuoyunu belirleyen evrelere gereki olmalar ve ABD'ye kar daha olgun bir yaklam sergilemeleri arsnda bulundu. Geriye dnp bakldnda sinik ve kukucu yarglarn ve tahminlerin neredeyse hepsi yanl kt. Sol eilimli Amerikal slam uzman Juan Cole da "Informed Comment" adl blogunda yaynlad harikulade bir yazda Libya sava ile ilgili en byk on efsaneyi darmadan etti. ki tanesinden bahsetmek isterim. Birincisi savaa ABD'nin nclk ettii efsanesiydi. Cole, NATO mdahalesine kar en bata Bakan Obama ve Savunma Bakan Gates'in dile getirdii btn itirazlarn bir listesini veriyordu. ABD'nin Mslman dnyada bir baka savaa dahil olmak konusunda son derece gnlsz olduu aka ortadayd. Neticede ncl Franszlar ve Britanyallar stlendi ve Obama ynetimi kk ortak olarak kald. Cole'un ikna edici ekilde boa kard ikinci efsane, savan Libya petrol iin olduuydu: "Bu, abesle itigaldir. Libya uluslararas petrol piyasalarna oktan entegre olmu ve BP, ENI vs. ile milyarlarca dolarlk anlamalar yapmt. Bu irketlerin hibiri, anlamalarn altnda imzas olan muktedirden kurtularak ilerini tehlikeye atmak istemez. (...) Emperyalizme dair ekonomik bir argman mantklysa ne l, fakat bunda mantk falan yok ve meselenin bu olduuna dair kant da yok. Yani sadece komplo teorisinden ibaret." j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Ankara should confront Tehran A few days ago the US and the EU finally did what they had been expected to do for some time: In a coordinated action they called on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down. According to Washington and Brussels the Syrian leader has lost all legitimacy after his governments recent brutal attacks against his own people.

Before the US and EU issued their call, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had made clear that the American and European demands would only be effective if they were joined by countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, regional powers that, according to Clinton, have more influence on Syria. White House officials told the press that President Obama had held back from issuing his ultimatum to give Turkeys diplomatic attempts of the last two weeks more time to work. Unfortunately, Ankaras pressure on Assad was not effective, so now we are moving to the next phase. The question is whether Turkey will join the US and Europe in their call for Assad to go. I think Turkey should and probably will do so, preferably together with Saudi Arabia. This last connection is a significant indicator of the fact that the Syrian crisis is having a profound impact on the regions political balance. Saudi King Abdullah has decided to come out against the Syrian regime because, with good reason, he has made the analysis that getting rid of Assad would seriously weaken Iran, which currently uses its closeness with Damascus to play a role in Lebanon (Hezbollah) and the Palestinian territories (Hamas). For years now, Riyadh has considered Tehran its arch enemy and main rival for control of the Gulf. The Saudi interest in undermining Irans influence in the region is clear, but what about Turkey and Iran? We know how closely Ankara aligned itself with Tehran on the issue of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, voting against sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council. Turkeys support for the Syrian opposition has caused some cracks in its relations with Iran, but still the Turkish government claims that because of its past alignment it has the potential to influence Irans policy. The problem for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu is that a growing number of international observers wonder whether this will really prove true when push comes to shove. Assad did not listen to Turkeys repeated requests to implement reforms, despite similar claims from Ankara to strong ties with Syria. Why would Iranian President Ahmadinejad pay any attention to Turkeys concerns about Syria when Irans future role in the region is at stake? In my opinion there are three good reasons why Turkey should join the growing crowd of those who are convinced that there is no future for Assad as president of Syria, thereby knowingly confronting Iran. One is, as Suat Knklolu put it in his column in this paper this week, If Turkey is going to become a leading player and an inspiration for the people of the Middle East, it needs to come out of the Syrian crisis on the right side. It is now clear that this means joining the US and Europe, not Iran. A second good reason is the new round of Turkish attacks on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Iraq. It is true that Iran has the potential to make life difficult on Turkey if it wants to, as Tehran skillfully demonstrated with the wellorchestrated rumors of the arrest of PKK leader Murat Karaylan. But in the end, in fighting the PKK, Turkey has more to gain from good intelligence cooperation, non-transparent though it might be, with the US, because both have a clear interest in diminishing the presence and influence of terrorists in Iraq. Finally, my guess is that Turkey and the rest of the world will be confronted with a new wave of protests in Iran in the foreseeable future. In 2009, Turkey sided with the Iranian regime in its violent suppression of the demands for more democracy during and after the rigged presidential elections. After Turkeys support for the Arab Spring, Ankara should realize that it cannot remain silent when the Persian Spring arrives. Better to be on the right side then as well. For all these reasons, I believe Turkey has a unique chance to use the Syrian revolt to recalibrate its regional alliances and put some more distance between Ankara and Tehran.

Ankara, Tahran'a kar durmal Birka gn nce ABD ve Avrupa Birlii, bir sredir kendilerinden bekleneni nihayet yaptlar: koordineli bir ekilde, Suriye Devlet Bakan Bear Esed'e ekilmesi ynnde arda bulundular. Washington ve Brksel'e gre Suriye lideri, kendi halkna kar srekli ve vahi saldrlarnn ardndan btn meruiyetini yitirdi. Fakat daha bu arlar yaplmadan nce ABD Dileri Bakan Hillary Clinton, Amerikan ve Avrupa taleplerinin, ancak Trkiye ve Suudi Arabistan gibi lkelerin de katlmas halinde etkili olacan aka dile getirmiti. Clinton'a gre bu lkeler, Suriye zerinde daha fazla nfuza sahip blgesel glerdi. Beyaz Saray yetkilileri de basna Bakan Obama'nn ltimatomunu, Trkiye'ye son iki haftadr yrtt diplomatik giriimlerde zaman tanmak iin beklettiini syledi. Ne yazk ki Ankara'nn Esed zerindeki basks etkili olmad, bu yzden imdi bir sonraki safhaya geiyoruz. Soru Trkiye'nin Esed'e gitme arlar noktasnda ABD ile Avrupa'nn yannda yer alp almayaca. Bence Trkiye, tercihen Suudi Arabistan ile birlikte, bunu yapmal ve muhtemelen de yapacak. Bu son balant Suriye krizinin blgesel dengeler zerinde derin bir etkide bulunduu gereinin gstergelerinden sadece biri. Suudi Kral Abdullah, Suriye rejimine kar kmaya karar verdi, zira kraln hesabna gre Esed'den kurtulmak, am'a yaknln Lbnan'da (Hizbullah) ve igal altndaki Filistin topraklarnda (Hamas) rol oynamak iin kullanan ran' ciddi lde zayflatacak, ki haksz da saylmaz. Riyad, Krfez'in kontrol asndan Tahran', yllardr en byk hasm ve balca rakibi olarak gryor. Suudilerin ran'n blgedeki nfuzunu zayflatmaktan menfaati olduu ak. Peki ya Trkiye ve ran? Ankara'nn BM Gvenlik Konseyi'nde ran'a ynelik yaptrmlar aleyhinde oy kullanarak nkleer enerjinin bar kullanm meselesinde Tahran'la ne kadar yakn durduunu biliyoruz. Trkiye'nin Suriye muhalefetine destei ran'la ilikisinde baz atlaklar yaratm durumda, fakat Trk hkmeti gemiteki bu yaknlktan dolay, hl ran'n politikalarna etki edecek potansiyeli olduunu iddia ediyor. Erdoan ve Davutolu asndan sorun u: Giderek artan sayda uluslararas gzlemci iler kartnda bunun gerekten byle olup olmayaca sorusunu soruyor. Ankara, Suriye ile ilikileri konusunda benzer iddialarda bulunsa da Trkiye'nin tekrar tekrar dile getirdii 'reformlar hayata geir' arlar Esed'in bir kulandan girip br kulandan kt. ran'n blgedeki mstakbel rol tehlikeye girdiinde ran Cumhurbakan Ahmedinejad, Trkiye'nin Suriye'ye dair kayglarna niye kulak versin ki? Bana gre Trkiye'nin Esed'in Suriye devlet bakan sfatyla artk hibir geleceinin olmadna kanaat getiren, bylece ran' bile bile karsna alanlarn gittike kalabalklaan safnda yer almas iin geerli sebep var. Birincisini, Suat Knklolu bu hafta kesinde yazd: "Eer Trkiye nde gelen bir aktr ve Ortadou halklar iin ilham kayna olacaksa, Suriye krizinden doru safta yer alarak kmal." Artk bunun ran'n deil, ABD ve Avrupa'nn safnda yer almak anlamna geldii aka ortada. kinci sebep Trkiye'nin Irak'taki PKK'ya ynelik yeni saldrlar. ran'n istedii takdirde Trkiye'nin ban artma potansiyeline sahip olduu bir gerek; ki Tahran PKK lideri Murat Karaylan'n tutuklandna dair gayet iyi ayarlanm sylentilerle bunu yapabileceini ustalkla gsterdi. Fakat neticede PKK ile sava asndan Trkiye'nin ABD ile mmkn mertebe effaf ve olumlu istihbarat ibirliiyle elde edecei daha fazla ey var, zira Irak'ta terristlerin varln ve etkisini ortadan kaldrmak her iki lkenin de karna. Son sebep ise u: Tahminimce Trkiye ve dnyann geri kalan, ngrlebilir gelecekte ran'da yeni bir protesto dalgasyla kar karya kalacak. 2009'da Trkiye, hileli cumhurbakanl seimleri srasnda ve sonrasnda daha fazla demokrasi taleplerini iddetle bastran ran rejiminden yana tavr almt. Trkiye'nin Arap Bahar'na verdii destek sonrasnda Ankara, Fars Bahar gelip attnda sessiz kalamayacan idrak etmeli. Bu noktada da doru safta olmak daha hayrl. Btn bu sebeplerden dolay bence Trkiye'nin nnde Suriye'deki isyan blgesel ittifaklarn yeniden ayarlamak ve Ankara ile Tahran arasna belli bir mesafe koymak iin kullanmak gibi az bulunur bir frsat var.

Why bash your friends? What would you do? Suppose an old friend comes to you and says he does not like your attitude towards a common acquaintance. Why are you being so rude to him lately? You definitively do not agree with the criticism, so there are basically two ways to react. One is to tell the old friend that although you disagree, you value his opinion and invite him to come over one day and discuss his point of view. The other response would be to get very angry about the unjust reproach and tell him that you never trusted his judgment in the first place. Knowing how important amicable relations are in life, I would expect most people to opt for the first reply and not start insulting and bashing the old friend because you don't see eye to eye on this specific point. Yet, aggressive hammering is exactly what Atilla Yayla did in his op-ed article Why Is The Economist Wrong? in the last edition of Sunday's Zaman. Yayla is a political scientist and strong defender of liberal values. The Economist is one of the most respected and influential global weeklies. Based on three recent articles, Yayla comes to the bold and blunt conclusion that "The Economist made it a rule of thumb to report completely wrong, incomplete and false information about Turkey." My first reaction was to wonder whether or not Yayla and I have been reading the same magazine during the last 10 years. Since the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, The Economist has supported the Erdoan governments because of its liberal economic, pro-reform and pro-EU policies. In 2007 the weekly advised its Turkish readers to vote for the AKP in order to guarantee a new period of structural change in Turkey's economy and society. The Economist always defended Turkey's accession to the EU and strongly criticized Europe's feet dragging. In all honesty, I cannot think of any other global publication that has so strongly spoken out in favor of Turkey during the last 10 years. But it is also true that old friends can get it wrong sometimes. Yayla seems to have forgotten all the past support and focuses on the recent mistakes. Does he have a point? He does when he criticizes the call of The Economist on Turkish voters to vote for the Republican People's Party (CHP) in the last elections. Personally, I think they overdid their AKP disapproval and suggested wrongly that liberal values were in better hands with a party that has only started to distance itself from a horrible past record of anti-liberal thinking and acting. Unfortunately, Yayla undermines his credibility by suggesting that The Economist is advocating a strong involvement by the military in politics, and therefore does not seem to be happy with the army's diminishing role. Yayla should have known that the weekly has always supported the AKP efforts to control the military. Two weeks ago they commented that "Erdoan is (justly) credited with having brought about more reforms than any of his predecessors. His greatest achievement may be to have defanged the generals." No reason to bash The Economist on that assessment, I would say. If Yayla would have stopped here, I would probably not have reacted. It is his third objection that makes his article symptomatic of the way many academics and journalists who feel close to the ruling party react to criticism from friends abroad, including The Economist, that freedom of the press is under threat in Turkey. Yayla is right in blaming the old friends for not wanting to understand that most of the journalists are not in jail on charges of

being anti-AKP but are indicted for conspiring against the government. He also has a point when he blames foreign media for not referring to the thousands of lawsuits against journalists reporting on the Ergenekon case. The problem is his conclusion that in Turkey there is no such thing as government pressure on media owners and journalists, partly related to the prime minister's authoritarian streaks. Why not recognize that soft and hard coercion does exist and self-censorship is not just Kemalist fiction? I would advise Yayla and others critics of The Economist to sit down with the weekly's journalists and explain why they are wrong on some points. At the same time, the fault-finders should never forget that good friends come up with inconvenient truths as well. Dostlara vurmann sebebi ne? yle bir durum karsnda ne yapardnz: Dnn ki eski bir dostunuz size geliyor ve ortak bir tandnza ynelik davrannz tasvip etmediini sylyor. Ona son zamanlarda niye kaba davrandnz soruyor. Siz ise bu eletiriye hi katlmyorsunuz, o zaman temelde iki tr karlk verebilirsiniz. Birincisi eski dostunuza, ayn fikirde olmasanz da dncesine deer verdiinizi sylersiniz ve onu bir gn oturup meseleyi tartmaya davet edersiniz. Dier tepki ise bu haksz sitem karsnda kplere binmek ve eski dosta zaten ezelden beri onun fikirlerine zerre itimat etmediinizi sylemektir. Hayatta dostluk ilikilerinin ne kadar nemli olduunu bilen biri olarak, ou insandan ilk tepkiyi tercih etmesini ve spesifik bir meselede ayn fikirde olmad iin eski dosta hakaret edip vurmaya girimemesini beklerim. Ancak agresif vurulara girimek, tam da Atilla Yayla'nn Sunday's Zaman'n son saysndaki "Why Is The Economist Wrong?" ("Economist Niye Yanlyor?") makalesinde yapt ey. Yayla, bir siyasetbilimci ve liberal deerlerin sk bir savunucusu. Economist dnyann en saygn ve etkili haftalk dergilerinden biri. Yayla, geenlerde dergide yaymlanan yazy temel alarak, "Economist Trkiye hakknda tmyle yanl, eksik ve uydurma bilgi vermeyi det haline getirdi." gibi cretli ve keskin bir sonuca varyor. Yazya dair ilk tepkim, son on yldr Yayla ile ayn dergiyi okuyup okumadmz merak etmek oldu. AKP'nin iktidara geldii 2002'den bu yana Economist, liberal ekonomik politikalar, reform ve AB yanls tutumundan dolay Erdoan hkmetlerini destekliyor. Dergi 2007'de Trk okurlarna, Trkiye ekonomisi ve toplumunda yeni bir yapsal deiim dnemini garantilemek iin AKP'ye oy vermelerini tavsiye etmiti. Economist, Trkiye'nin AB yeliini her daim destekledi ve Avrupa'nn ayak srmesine sert eletiriler yneltti. Btn drstlmle, son on yldr Trkiye'nin lehine bu kadar gr sesle ve ak konuan bir baka kresel yayn dnemiyorum. Fakat eski dostlarn bazen meseleleri yanl anlayabildii de doru. Yayla, gemiteki onca destei unutmu ve son hatalara odaklanm grnyor. Peki bu noktada hakl m? Economist'in Trk semenleri son seimlerde CHP'ye oy vermeye armasn eletirdiinde hakl. ahsen AKP'yi gzden karp, anti-liberal dnceler ve eylemlerle dolu vahim bir gemile arasna daha yeni yeni mesafe koymaya balam bir partiye liberal deerleri emanet etmenin daha iyi olaca gibi yanl bir dnceye kaplmakla fazla abartya katlar. Ne yazk ki Yayla, Economist'in askerin siyasete gl dahlini savunduunu, bu yzden ordunun zayflayan rolnden memnun olmadn ne srerek kendi gvenilirliine zarar veriyor. Yayla bu derginin AKP'nin ordu zerinde denetim salama abalarn daima desteklediini biliyor olmal. ki hafta nce de dergide u yorum yer almt: "Erdoan btn seleflerinden daha fazla reformu hayata geirmesiyle (hakl olarak) takdire ayan. En byk baarsnn da generallerin kolunu kanadn krmak olduu sylenebilir." Economist'e bu deerlendirmesinden dolay vurmann ne gibi bir sebebi olabilir?

Yayla burada durmu olsayd muhtemelen tepki vermezdim. Yayla'nn yazsn semptomatik klan nokta, iktidar partisine yakn hisseden birok akademisyen ve gazetecinin, (Economist de dahil) dardaki dostlardan gelen Trkiye'de basn zgrlnn tehdit altnda olduu ynndeki eletiriye tepki verme tarzn yanstan nc itiraz. Yayla, eski dostlar, gazetecilerin byk ksmnn AKP kart olmaktan deil, hkmet aleyhinde komplo hazrlama sulamalarndan dolay cezaevinde olduunu anlamak istememekle itham ederken hakl. D basn Ergenekon davasn haber yapan gazeteciler aleyhindeki binlerce davadan sz etmemekle sularken de haksz deil. Sorun Yayla'nn, Trkiye'de medya kuruluu sahipleri ve gazeteciler zerinde, ksmen babakann otoriter eilimlerine bal olarak, hkmet basks diye bir ey olmad sonucuna varmas. Yumuak ve sert basknn gerekten var olduunu ve otosansrn Kemalist bir kurgudan ibaret olmadn niye kabul etmiyorsunuz? Yayla ve Economist'in dier tenkitilerine tavsiyem, derginin gazetecileriyle oturup onlara niye baz noktalarda hatal olduklarn izah etmeleri. te yandan hata bulanlar, iyi dostlarn yeri geldiinde ac gerekleri dile getireceini de hi unutmamal.

Stuck in the Syrian swamp At the end of April, based on analyses by several experts on Syria, I predicted that the crackdown on the demonstrators in Syria would continue, that calls on the Syrian regime to stop their brutality would increase but that, unfortunately, none of the bystanders would be able or willing to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power. Reasons behind this extremely unattractive scenario: unclarity and uneasiness about the post-Assad period, a divided opposition and an army that is closely connected to the Assad family and, therefore, unwilling to follow in the footsteps of the Egyptian army that gave up on former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak when domestic opposition became too strong. I am afraid we are basically still in the same situation as three months ago, whereas hundreds of peaceful protesters have been killed. Since the uprising began in March an estimated 2,000 people have been murdered and many more are missing or have been arrested. Every week new calls on the Syrian regime to stop with its violent oppression are made and several rounds of new sanctions are announced. Friends and foes have threatened Assad that he will not get away with it, but up until now none of those pleas or commands has been successful. The Syrian opposition gathered in Turkey a number of times but foreign governments keep complaining about a lack of coordination and shared goals. The fear that a removal of Assad from power might lead to an uncontrollable and long period of civil strife in Syria is still strong, both inside the country and abroad. Turkey is playing a growing and dominant role in the diplomatic efforts to put pressure on the Assad regime to stop killing its own people. Last week Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu visited Damascus and made it clear that patience in Ankara has run out. The results of the visit are slightly ambiguous. The Turkish government expects Assad to change course within two weeks but is at the same time openly preparing for a situation in which the repression continues. According to the last script, Turkey should be ready to receive many more refugees and strengthen its borders with Syria. Outside of Turkey, reactions to the Davutolu visit have been positive, assessing it as a clear-cut and well coordinated attempt to force Assad to abandon his murderous policies. Inside Turkey, the foreign minister was criticized from two totally different angles. Opposition leader Kemal Kldarolu accused the Erdoan government of being the voice of America,

thereby showing again that the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) is still unable to read the developments in the Arab world in a proper way. Why speak out against a Turkish foreign policy that cunningly combines Turkeys own interests with the concerns of the wider international community? Others were disappointed because of the lack of concrete results and are convinced that Turkey should be tougher on the Syrian regime because, according to these critics, more talk about deadlines and sanctions will simply not convince the ruling elite in Damascus. I sympathize with the skeptics on the effect of more diplomatic or economic pressure at the moment, but the problem is that none of them have come up with viable alternatives. Everyone, including Assad, knows that military intervention is not realistic, looking at the problems the United States and the European Union are having at home, economically, and abroad, in Libya and Afghanistan, militarily. Even more important, for the moment there is no support for an armed foreign intervention, neither in Syria nor in the rest of the Arab world. Taking all options into account, the only realistic scenario seems to be to continue helping the Syrian opposition to unite and further isolate the Syrian regime. On the last point, the US and the EU have done their part but their efforts will only produce results once the other main players join in. Behind the scenes, China and India are pushed to use their influence on the Syrian oil and gas industry while Russia is under pressure to stop selling arms to Assad. Turkey will be called upon to do its bit in tightening the screws. My guess is that after the end of Ramadan Ankara will be ready to do so. Lets hope the outspoken anti-Assad and very active Syrian twitterer @BSyria is right. Two days ago he wrote: The Syrian regime remains strong. Its like a big (evil) tree that is being cut down. Cutting is in progress, but it hasnt begun falling yet. Suriye bataklna saplanmak Nisan sonunda, eitli Suriye uzmanlarnn analizlerine dayanarak Suriye'deki gstericilere ynelik basknn devam edecei, Suriye rejimine bu zulme son vermesi arlarnn artaca, fakat ne yazk ki olan bitenleri dardan seyredenlerin hibirinin Suriye Devlet Bakan Esed'i iktidardan drmeye muktedir veya istekli olmayaca tahmininde bulunmutum. Bu gayet tatsz senaryonun ardndaki sebepler unlard: Esed sonras dneme dair belirsizlik ve endie, blnm bir muhalefet ve Esed ailesiyle sk balar olan, bu yzden de lke ii muhalefet ok gl hale geldiinde devlet bakan Mbarek'ten yz eviren Msr ordusunun yolundan gitmeyecek bir ordu. Korkarm ki esasen hl ay nceki durumdan farkl bir yerde deiliz. O zamandan bu yana yzlerce bar protestocu ldrld; isyann balad mart ayndan beri tahminen 2.000 insan katledildi ve daha fazlas kayp veya tutuklu. Her hafta Suriye rejimine bu kanl basky sona erdirmesi ynnde arlar yaplyor ve yeni yaptrmlarn devreye sokulduu aklanyor. Dostlar ve dmanlar Esed'e yaptklarnn yanna kr kalmayaca tehditlerinde bulunuyor, fakat u ana kadar bu arlarn veya tehditlerin hibiri baarl olmad. Suriye muhalefeti birka kez Trkiye'de topland, fakat yabanc hkmetler srekli koordinasyon ve ortak hedef eksikliinden yaknyor. Esed'in devrilmesinin Suriye dahilinde kontrol edilemez ve uzun bir i atma dnemine yol aabilecei korkusu hem lke iinde hem darda hl kuvvetli. Esed rejimine kendi halkn ldrmekten vazgemesi ynnde bask yapmay amalayan diplomatik abalar erevesinde Trkiye giderek byyen ve baskn bir rol oynuyor. Geen hafta Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu am' ziyaret etti ve Ankara'nn sabrnn tkenmekte olduunu aka dile getirdi. Ziyaretin sonular biraz mulak. Trk hkmeti Esed'in iki hafta iinde rotasn deitirmesini umuyor, fakat ayn zamanda basknn devam ettii bir durum iin de alenen hazrlk yapyor. En son senaryoya gre Trkiye ok daha fazla mlteci kabul etmeye ve Suriye snrndaki kontrol glendirmeye hazr olmal.

Davutolu'nun ziyaretine Trkiye dndan gelen reaksiyonlar olumlu; bunun Esed'i canice politikalarn terk etmeye zorlamak ynnde net ve iyi koordine edilmi bir giriim olduu deerlendirmesi yaplyor. Trkiye iinde ise Dileri Bakan tmyle farkl iki adan eletirildi. Muhalefet lideri Kldarolu, Erdoan hkmetini 'Amerika'nn sesi' olmakla sulad ve bylece CHP'nin Arap dnyasndaki gelimeleri hl doru dzgn okuyamadn bir kez daha gstermi oldu. Trkiye'nin z karlarn genel manada uluslararas toplumun endieleriyle aklc bir ekilde birletiren bir d politikaya atmann sebebi nedir? Bazlar ise somut sonularn alnmamasndan hayal krklna urayarak Trkiye'nin Suriye rejimine kar daha sert olmas gerektiine kanaat getirdiler, zira bu tenkitilere gre son tarihler ve yaptrmlara dair daha fazla laf am'daki muktedir sekinleri ikna falan etmeyecek. u an daha fazla diplomatik veya ekonomik bask uygulamann etkisinden kuku duyanlara kendimi yakn hissediyorum, fakat sorun u ki, onlarn da hibiri uygulanabilir alternatifler ortaya koymuyor. Esed de dahil herkes, ABD ve AB'nin kendi iinde ekonomik, darda, yani Libya ve Afganistan'da asker adan yaad sorunlara bakarak, asker mdahalenin gereki olmadn biliyor. Belki u an daha da nemlisi silahl bir d mdahaleye gerek Suriye'de gerek Arap dnyasnn geri kalannda hibir destek olmamas. Btn seenekler hesaba katldnda, tek gereki senaryo, Suriye muhalefetine birlemesi konusunda yardmc olmay ve Suriye rejimini daha da tecrit etmeyi srdrmek gibi grnyor. Son noktada ABD ve AB kendi rollerini oynuyor, fakat abalar ancak dier ba aktrler de iin iine girdiinde sonu retecektir. Perde arkasnda in ve Hindistan, Suriye'nin petrol ve doalgaz sanayiindeki nfuzlarn kullanmaya zorlanrken, Rusya'ya Esed'e silah satmay durdurmas basks yaplyor. Trkiye de am'n keye sktrlmas konusunda zerine deni yapmaya davet edilecektir. Benim tahminim Ramazan'dan sonra Ankara'nn bunu yapmaya hazr olaca ynnde. Umalm ki son derece aktif ve akszl bir Esed kart olan Suriyeli twitter kullancs @BSyria hakl olsun. ki gn nce unu yazd: "Suriye rejimi hl gl. Kesilmekte olan byk (ve uursuz) bir aaca benziyor. Kesme sreci devam ediyor, fakat henz devrilmeye balam deil."

Not there yet The speed of the normalization of civil-military relations in Turkey is incredible. On July 29 the chief of General Staff and the commanders of the army, navy and air forces resigned. Five years ago, during the first Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, this move would have caused a major crisis in which the ruling party would have been under immense pressure to reformulate the policies that caused the military top brass to publicly express their dissatisfaction. Most probably the Istanbul Stock Exchange (MKB) would have faced a serious crisis of confidence because of the fear that the civil authorities would be unable to protect the economy against the fallout of this show of military anger. The media focused on the collective resignation for two days and found out very quickly that life went on undisturbed. The prime minister simply nominated another chief of General Staff and continued the preparations for a total new line-up of the top posts in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Investors recognized the determination on the part of the civil authorities and the despair behind the decision of the commanders and concluded that the Turkish economy was in good hands. Even more important, most Turks made the same calculation and decided that there was no reason to panic. In the last five years, the military has lost so much of its original standing and respect that nobody expected any serious repercussions from the desperate attempt by the TSK big shots to make life difficult for the government. After two days, other topics made the headlines, and most analysts, some of them grudgingly, acknowledged that what had happened was normal

procedure in a democracy: If there is a disagreement between the government and the General Staff, the generals will have to step down, not the elected politicians. July 29 was the day on which a rapid and unstoppable process of civil-military normalization in Turkey was confirmed. Out in the open, for everybody to see. But Turkey is not there yet. By there I mean a situation in which normal procedures between civil and military authorities are not determined by the character and personal power of the main players but by rules laid down in laws that are accepted by both politicians and generals. In that sense, Turkey still has a lot to do. I remember very well a report made in 2004 by the Center for European Security Studies (CESS), a Dutch think tank on civilmilitary relations. The CESS paper was very critical on the lack of sufficient and efficient means for the civil authorities in Turkey to control and steer the TSK. The intentions behind the report were laudable, but the language was quite blunt. The military was extremely irritated and condemned the CESS suggestions as unacceptable foreign intervention. Many AK Party politicians agreed with the basic conclusions but were too afraid or intimidated to speak out in favor. For some years no Turkish politician dared to visit another CESS seminar. The Dutch reformers did not give up and during the last two years have restarted their efforts to introduce in the Turkish debate European concepts that are being practiced in EU member states. Not to tell Turkey to copy a European model that does not exist but to show how, for instance, parliamentary control over the TSK budget could be organized. That do-to-list is still quite long. Some other examples: attaching the General Staff to the Defense Ministry; unlimited civilian audits of all TSK expenses; fully reformulating the curriculum in military schools; and reorganizing the military court system. This government should be praised for standing up against the undemocratic interference of the military in politics. But I fully agree with retired military judge mit Kardas when he said that the biggest danger for the government is to refrain from introducing the institutional changes that anchor the diminished role of the military in laws and regulations that will still be there when this government is long gone. It is tempting for any government to put its own people in high positions, thereby trying to change a rival into a friend. But the government would be well advised not to stop here. Only after structural changes such as the ones mentioned above are made will the July 29 victory be judged on its proper merits: as an important stepping stone in the direction of sustainable civil-military relations, not the end goal. Olmas gereken noktaya henz gelinmedi Trkiye'de sivil-asker ilikilerinin normalleme srecinin hz ba dndryor. 29 Temmuz'da Genelkurmay Bakan ve kara, hava ve deniz kuvvetleri komutanlar istifa etti. Be yl nce, ilk AKP hkmeti srasnda bu istifalar, iktidar partisini ordunun st komuta kademesinin rahatszln alenen ifade etmesine yol aan politikalarn gzden geirmesi ynnde ar bask altna sokar ve byk bir krize sebebiyet verirdi. stanbul borsas ok byk ihtimalle, sivil makamlarn ekonomiyi ordu fkesinin bu tezahr karsnda inie gemekten koruyamayaca korkusundan kaynakl ciddi bir gven kriziyle yz yze gelirdi.

imdiyse medya toplu istifalara iki gn odakland ve hayatn etkilenmeden devam ettiini abucak grd. Babakan bir baka genelkurmay bakan atayverdi ve Trk Silahl Kuvvetleri'ndeki (TSK) st mevkilerin tmyle yeniden dzenlemesi ynndeki hazrlklarn srdrd. Yatrmclar sivil makamlarn kararlln ve komutanlarn ald kararn ardndaki aresizlii grd ve Trk ekonomisinin emin ellerde olduu sonucuna vard. Daha da nemlisi, Trklerin byk ounluu ayn hesab yaparak, paniklemek iin bir sebep olmadna hkmetti. Son be ylda ordu ilk bataki konumundan ve itibarndan o kadar ok ey kaybetti ki, TSK ar toplarnn hkmete hayat zindan etmek ynndeki aresiz abalarndan herhangi bir ciddi sonu kacan kimse dnmedi. ki gn sonra manetlerde baka konular vard ve analistlerin ou (bazlar da gnlszce) olan bitenlerin bir demokrasideki normal prosedr olduunu kabul etti: Eer hkmetle Genelkurmay arasnda bir anlamazlk varsa, seilmi siyasetiler deil, generaller ekilmek zorundadr. 29 Temmuz, Trkiye'de sivil-asker ilikilerindeki hzl ve durdurulamaz normalleme srecinin teyit edildii gnd. Herkesin aka grd bir durum sz konusu. Fakat Trkiye henz olmas gereken noktada deil. O noktadan kastm, sivil ve asker makamlarn arasndaki normal prosedrlerin ba aktrlerin karakteri ve kiisel gc ile deil, hukukun tayin ettii ve hem siyasetiler hem de generaller tarafndan benimsenen kurallarla belirlendii bir durum. Bu adan Trkiye'nin hl kat etmesi gereken epey yol var. 2004'te Hollandal dnce kuruluu Avrupa Gvenlik almalar Merkezi'nin (CESS) sivil-asker ilikilerine dair hazrlad bir raporu gayet iyi hatrlyorum. CESS raporu Trkiye'de sivil makamlarn TSK'y kontrol ve idare etmek asndan yeterli ve etkili aralardan yoksun olmas konusunda son derece eletireldi. Raporun ardndaki niyet takdir edilesiydi, fakat dili son derece kaba ve keskindi. Birok AKP'li siyaseti temel karmlara katlyordu, fakat raporun lehinde konuamayacak kadar korkuyor veya bunu gze alamyordu. Yllarca tek bir Trk siyaseti baka bir CESS seminerine katlmaya cesaret edemedi. Hollandal reformcular ise pes etmedi ve son iki yldr Trkiye'deki tartmalarda AB yesi lkelerde uygulanan Avrupa konseptlerini tantmak ynndeki abalarn tekrar balatm durumda. Amalar Trkiye'ye var olmayan bir Avrupa modelini kopyalamasn sylemek deil, szgelimi Meclis'in TSK btesi zerindeki denetiminin nasl organize edilebileceini gstermekti. Yani yaplmas gerekenler listesi hl epey uzun. Baka rnekler de verelim: Genelkurmay Bakanl'n Savunma Bakanl'na balamak; btn TSK harcamalarnn kstsz denetimi; asker okullardaki mfredatn batan aa yeniden formle edilmesi ve asker yarg sisteminin yeniden dzenlenmesi. Bu hkmet, ordunun siyasete anti demokratik mdahalesine kar koyduu iin takdir edilmeli. Fakat emekli asker hkim mit Karda'n sylediklerine tmyle katlyorum: Hkmet iin en byk tehlike ordunun zayflayan roln, bu hkmet gittikten sonra da yerli yerinde kalacak yasalara ve dzenlemelere balayan kurumsal deiiklikler yapmaktan kanmas. Btn hkmetler iin kendine yakn isimleri st mevkilere getirmek, bylece bir hasm dosta evirmek ayartcdr. Fakat hkmetin orada durmamas hayrl olacaktr. Ancak yukarda bahsi geen trde yapsal deiimler sonrasnda 29 Temmuz zaferi hak ettii deeri bulacaktr: Yani nihai hedef deil, srdrebilir sivil-asker ilikileri dorultusunda nemli bir srama tahtas olacaktr.

Turkeys contested identity For me, every year August is the month in which I make an effort to finally read some of the books that have piled up during the year. Part of that annual rite is buying one new book, just before holidays start, to add to the already extensive summer reading program. Some weeks ago I found a book that perfectly fits the profile: How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk, written by Gavin D. Brockett, an associate professor of Middle East and Islamic history at Wilfrid Laurier University in Ontario. I have just finished reading the book and I must say, I hope it will be translated into Turkish soon because what Brockett has

to say about the construction of the Turkish identity is fascinating and, according to me, should be part of the curriculum for every Turkish student. The author starts by challenging two of the main themes in the nationalist historical narrative that emerged under Atatrk in the 1930s. One is Mustafa Kemals assertion that a Turkish nation already possessing its own identity existed prior to 1923. Brockett convincingly shows that this is patently false. The second theme that the writer refutes is the notion that Atatrk should be credited with successfully creating the new Turkish nation through his ambitious program of modernization. Without denying the extremely important role he played in laying the foundations for the modern republic, Brockett makes it abundantly clear that before 1945 a large part of the Turkish population, especially outside the main cities, did not identify with the nation Atatrk was trying to create. One of the main reasons for this lack of identification, Brockett claims, was the central role given to the concept of laiklik. Because of the efforts to marginalize the role of religion, many Turks found it difficult to connect with the new nation Atatrk imagined. One of the main themes of the book is the claim that the new national identity forced on the Turkish citizens from Ankara did not manage to replace previous religious and ethnic identities, or, as Brockett puts it: Allah was not dethroned. The author substantiates his bold thesis by comparing the newspapers published before and after 1945. In the 1930s, the mainly national newspapers were an instrument used by the new Kemalist elite to present their vision of the new, postOttoman republic. Brockett shows that outside of stanbul, Ankara and zmir these attempts were not very successful. After the introduction of the multi-party system in 1945 and the spectacular growth of newspapers outside the big cities, this all changed. The second part of the book is a detailed overview of the role of the new provincial newspapers in shaping a truly popular national identity that incorporated pre-existing Muslim identities with the vision that Atatrk had developed for the nation. The transition from single-party authoritarian rule, the proliferation of print media and the infrastructural modernization of the country combined brought about a truly national debate on how the Turkish identity should look, allowing many more people than before to participate and facilitating the emergence of a discourse of difference. The book focuses on many examples in the period until 1954 to show how religion and laiklik became part of the debate in a wide range of provincial and local papers. In the conclusion Brockett makes a short but interesting comparison between the 1950s and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). He sees the ruling party as a reassertion of the linkage between democratic politics and the expression of religious identities first witnessed in 1945-1954. But he warns of the risks of an overconfident hegemonic party and a prime minister who has demonstrated an increasing intolerance of criticism. He reminds Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and his party of the main findings of his book: A popular national identity could only emerge after 1945 because of a civil and inclusive approach that allowed the expression of diverse opinions and other identities than those promoted by the secular Kemalist elite during the single-party period. In other words: Please do not make the same mistake again. Do not try to force one particular identity on the nation and accept the existence of multiple identities and lifestyles. It will only make Turkey stronger. Trkiye'nin tartlan kimlii

Benim iin austos ay, yl boyunca st ste ylan kitaplardan bazlarn nihayet okumaya giritiim bir dnemdir. Her ylki ritelin bir paras da, tatil balamadan hemen nce yeni bir kitap almak ve onu zaten kapsaml olan yaz okumas programna eklemektir. Birka hafta nce tam da bu ritele uygun bir kitap buldum: "Ne Mutlu Trk'm Diyene". Yazar, Kanada Ontario'daki Wilfried Laurier niversitesi'nde Ortadou ve slam tarihi doenti olan Gavin D. Brockett. Kitab yeni bitirdim ve bir an nce Trkeye evrilmesini umduumu sylemeliyim, nk Brockett'in Trk kimliinin teekklne dair syledikleri olduka arpc ve bana gre her Trk rencisi iin mfredatn bir paras olmal. Yazar, 1930'lardaki Atatrk dneminde ortaya kan milliyeti tarih anlatsnn iki ana temasna kar karak balyor. Biri Mustafa Kemal'in 1923 ncesinde de mevcut olan bir kimlii halihazrda tayan bir Trk ulusunun varlna dair iddias. Brockett bunun "aka yanl" olduunu ikna edici bir ekilde gsteriyor. Yazarn aksini ispat ettii ikinci tema Atatrk'n yeni Trk ulusunu tutkulu modernleme program zerinden baaryla yaratt ve bundan dolay takdir edilmesi gerektii dncesi. Brockett, Atatrk'n modern cumhuriyetin kurumlarnn olumasnda oynad son derece nemli rol inkar etmeksizin unu gayet ak ortaya koyuyor: 1945'ten nce Trk nfusunun byk blm, bilhassa byk kentler dnda yaayanlar, kendilerini Atatrk'n yaratmaya alt ulusla zdeletirmiyordu. Brockett'in iddiasna gre, bunun balca sebeplerinden biri 'laiklik' mefhumuna tannan merkezi rold. Dinin roln marjinalletirmek ynndeki abalardan dolay birok Trk Atatrk'n tahayyl ettii yeni ulusla ba kurmakta zorland. Kitabn ana temalarndan biri de Trkiye vatandalarna Ankara'dan zorla dayatlan yeni ulusal kimliin daha nceki dini ve etnik kimlikleri yerinden etmeyi baaramad iddias. Brockett'in ifadesiyle: "Allah tahtndan indirilmedi!" Yazar bu cesur tezini, 1945 ncesinde ve sonrasnda yaymlanan gazeteleri karlatrarak destekliyor. Otuzlarda, balca ulusal gazeteler yeni Kemalist sekinler tarafndan Osmanl sonras yeni cumhuriyete dair vizyonlarn takdim etmekte birer ara olarak kullanld. Brockett stanbul, Ankara ve zmir dnda bu abalarn pek baarl olmadn gsteriyor. 1945'te ok partili sistemin hayata geirilmesinin ve byk kentler dndaki gazetelerin dikkat ekici bymesinin ardndan bu durum klliyen deiti. Kitabn ikinci ksm, daha nce var olan Mslman kimlikleri Mustafa Kemal'in ulus iin gelitirdii vizyonla birletiren gerekten popler bir ulusal kimliin ekillenmesinde yeni yerel gazetelerin oynad rol ayrntl bir ekilde gzden geiriyor. Tek partinin otoriter ynetiminden k, basl medyann yaylmas ve lke altyapsnn modernletirilmesi bir arada, Trk kimliinin neye benzemesi gerektiine dair gerekten ulusal bir tartmay beraberinde getirdi, ncesine gre daha fazla insann bu tartmaya katlmasna imkan tand ve bir farkllk syleminin ortaya kmasn kolaylatrd. Kitap din ile 'laikliin' nasl ok geni bir yelpazedeki ulusal ve yerel gazetelerde yryen tartmann paras haline geldiini gstermek iin, 1954'e dek geen dnemde pek ok rnee odaklanyor. Kitabn sonu blmnde Brockett 1950'ler ile AKP'nin ykselii arasnda ksa, fakat ilgin bir kyaslama yapyor. ktidar partisini "demokratik siyaset ile, ilk olarak 1945-54 dneminde tank olunan dini kimliklerin ifadesi arasndaki ban yeniden kurulmas" olarak gryor. Fakat kendine ar gvenen hegemonik bir partinin ve eletiriye kar artan bir hogrszlk sergileyen bir babakann tehlikelerine dair de uyarda bulunuyor. Erdoan ve partisine kitabnn balca bulgularn hatrlatyor: popler bir ulusal kimlik ancak 1945'ten sonra, "tek parti dneminde Kemalist sekinler tarafndan desteklenenden farkl fikirlerin ve kimliklerin ifade edilmesine izin veren" sivil ve kapsayc bir yaklamla ortaya kabildi. Dier bir deyile: ltfen ayn hatay tekrarlamayn. Belli bir kimlii ulusa dayatmaya almayn ve farkl kimliklerle hayat tarzlarnn varln kabul edin. Trkiye'yi daha gl klacak ey ancak budur.

Which scenario will it be? A couple of days ago someone sent me a link to a document produced by New York University's Center for Global Affairs

(CGA). The paper outlines three different scenarios for Turkey in 2020 and is part of the CGA Scenario Initiative that already covered Iraq, Iran, China and Russia. The Turkey 2020 scenario is based on the CGA expertise with describing plausible potential outcomes of certain developments, the coordinating efforts of Joshua W. Walker, one of the most prominent US experts on Turkey and the input from a workshop held in May 2010 in which several Turkey watchers with totally opposing views participated. The result is a fascinating read because it forces the reader to evaluate the reasoning behind the three scenarios that are described in the CGA report. One option, called Illiberal Islamism, is a Turkey in 2020 where the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) will have managed to consolidate its power, capitalizing on the weakness of the secularist opposition, responding to the demands of the conservative urban lower-middle class and building an alliance with the Islamist Felicity Party (SP). Sunni Islam will have become the most powerful force in domestic and foreign policy, to the exclusion of minority views. The second scenario, Illiberal Secularism, in a way mirrors the first one. In this projection, in the coming years the AK Party will face socioeconomic challenges, increasing resistance to its Islamist tendencies and a deteriorating security situation. This creates an opportunity for the Republican People's Party (CHP) to come to power, with the support of the military and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The new coalition will espouse a strong, secure and secular Turkey. In pursuit of these goals, however, it tends toward authoritarianism. Although these two scenarios are interesting to read, I personally think it is neither very likely nor desirable that either of them will come true. That is why I will only focus on the details of the third scenario, Political Pluralism. According to the authors of this political forecast, the AK Party's influence peaked this year, but from next year onwards the challenges to its hegemonic position will grow, in part as a consequence of its own failures to meet the expectations of the electorate, in part due to its constitutional overreach and resurgence in the opposition. Voters' patience will grow thin with the underperformance of the government in creating enough jobs. At the same time, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan's efforts to introduce a presidential system, continued restrictions on the media and a distinctly Islamic foreign policy will cause many moderate voters and politicians to distance themselves from the ruling party. Other options have become more attractive because between 2012 and 2015 the CHP will have developed an attractive social democratic agenda and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) will have managed to transform itself into a broad-based alternative for disappointed Kurdish AK Party voters and center-leftists. The elections in 2015 will produce a hung Parliament in which the AK Party is still the biggest party but has no outright majority. The resulting political stalemate ends in 2017 with a split in the AK Party and early elections. Here the scenario turns into political science fiction as Ali Babacan steps forward to distance himself from Erdoan, accusing him of stalling the EU accession project by neglecting the Cyprus question. After the 2017 elections, the CHP and AK Party will have more or less the same number of seats in Parliament and have to compromise to win support from the BDP. Consequently, ideologically charged rhetoric gives way to more moderate policy-oriented discussions. Reformist AK Party politicians take the party back to a program of pro-EU policies and market liberalization. A new generation of CHP leaders will have solidified the party's new image as a social democratic party that emphasizes the democratic aspects of Kemalism

over its polarizing ideological aspects. At the end of this most favorable scenario for Turkey, the country's political landscape in 2020 will be dramatically different than in 2011. Polarizing tendencies will have given way to moderate, pluralistic politics in which a robust, diverse civil society plays a crucial role. I know, it's easy to make fun of these kinds of thought provoking intellectual exercises. At the same time, the last scenario in particular contains many elements that we can witness in today's debates, be they on the dangerous overdose of confidence in the government's handling of the Cyprus and EU dossier, the aggressive tone in politics or the inability to solve the Kurdish issue. My advice: Read the scenarios (www.scps.nyu.edu/cga) and see what the consequences might be. Hangi senaryo gerekleecek? Birka gn nce birileri, New York niversitesi'ndeki Kresel likiler Merkezi'nin (CGA) hazrlad bir belgenin linkini gnderdi. Belge 2020'de Trkiye iin farkl senaryo ortaya koyuyor ve bu, daha nce Irak, ran, in ve Rusya zerine de alan CGA Senaryo nisiyatifi'nin bir paras. "Trkiye 2020" senaryosu CGA'nn belli gelimelerin potansiyel mantki sonularn irdeledii uzmanlna, ABD'nin en saygn Trkiye uzmanlarndan Joshua W. Walker'n koordinasyon abalarna ve Mays 2010'da dzenlenen ve tmyle farkl grlere sahip eitli Trkiye gzlemcilerinin katld bir seminerden elde edilen verilere dayanyor. Neticede ortaya kan belge gayet etkileyici, zira okuyucuyu CGA raporunda anlatlan senaryonun ardndaki mant lp bimeye sevk ediyor. Senaryolardan 'Banaz slamclk' adnda olan, 2020'de AKP'nin, laik muhalefetin zayflndan yararlanarak, muhafazakr kentli alt-orta snflarn taleplerini karlayarak ve slamc Saadet Partisi (SP) ile ittifak oluturarak iktidarn salamlatrmay baard bir Trkiye resmi iziyor. Bu senaryoda Snni slam i ve d politikadaki en baat g ve aznlk grlerini dlyor. 'Banaz Laiklik' adl ikinci senaryo bir yanyla ilkinin aynadaki aksi gibi. Bu projeksiyona gre, gelecek yllarda AKP sosyoekonomik sorunlarla, slamc eilimlerine ynelik artan direnile ve ktleen bir gvenlik durumuyla yz yze kalyor. Bu da CHP iin, ordunun ve MHP'nin desteiyle iktidara gelme frsat yaratyor. Yeni koalisyon gl, gvenli ve laik bir Trkiye'yi hedefliyor. Ancak bu hedef dorultusunda otoriterlie meylediyor. Bu iki senaryoyu okumak ilgin olsa da, ahsen bunlardan birinin gereklemesinin ne muhtemel ne de arzu edilir olduu kanaatindeyim. Bu yzden de sadece "Siyasi oulculuk" adl nc senaryoya odaklanacam. Bu siyasi tahminin yazarlarna gre AKP'nin gc bu yl zirvesine kt, fakat gelecek yl ve devamnda, ksmen semenlerin beklentilerini karlamak konusundaki kendi baarszlklar sonucunda, ksmen de anayasal snrlar zorlamas ve muhalefetteki canlanma nedeniyle hegemonik pozisyonuna ynelik meydan okumalar artacak. Hkmetin yeterli istihdam yaratamamas karsnda semenlerin sabr azalacak. te yandan Erdoan'n bakanlk sistemini getirme abalar, medyaya ynelik sregiden kstlamalar ve apak 'slami' bir d politika, birok lml semenin ve siyasetinin iktidar partisinden uzaklamasna yol aacak. Bu srete dier seenekler n plana kacak, zira CHP 2012 ile 2015 arasnda cazip bir sosyal demokrat program gelitirmi olacak ve BDP de kendisini, AKP'nin hsrana urayan Krt semenleri ve merkez solcular iin geni tabanl bir alternatife dntrmeyi baaracak. 2015'teki seimlerden AKP'nin hl en byk parti olduu, fakat net ounlua sahip olmad dengeli bir meclis kacak. Bunun sonucunda yaanacak siyasi tkanklk da 2017'de AKP'nin blnmesi ve erken seimlerle alacak. Bu noktada senaryo siyasi bir bilimkurguya dnyor: Ali Babacan n plana kp Erdoan'la arasna mesafe koyacak ve onu Kbrs sorununu grmezden gelerek AB yelii projesini kmaza sokmakla sulayacak. 2017 seimlerinden sonra CHP ve AKP mecliste aa yukar benzer sayda sandalye elde edecek ve BDP'nin desteini almak iin taviz vermek zorunda kalacak. Bunun neticesinde ideoloji arlkl sylemin yerini daha lml politikalara meyyal tartmalar alacak. AKP'nin reformcu siyasetileri partiyi tekrar AB ve serbest piyasa yanls bir siyasi izgiye ekecek. Yeni bir CHP liderleri kua

partinin Kemalizm'in kutuplatrc ideolojik veheleri yerine, demokratik yanlarn vurgulayan sosyal demokrat bir parti olarak yeni imajn salamlatracak. Trkiye iin retilen bu en mspet senaryonun sonunda, lkenin 2020'deki siyasi manzaras 2011'den ciddi lde farkl olacak. Kutuplatrc eilimlerin yerini, eitlilik ieren gl bir sivil toplumun hayati rol oynad lml, oulcu politikalar alacak. Biliyorum, entelektel egzersizleri kkrtan bu tr dncelerle dalga gemek kolaydr. te yandan bilhassa son senaryo, hkmetin Kbrs ve AB meseleleriyle itigal ederken sergiledii ar dozda tehlikeli zgven, siyasetteki saldrgan slup ve Krt sorununu zme basiretsizlii gibi, bugnn tartmalarnda tank olduunuz pek ok unsur barndryor. Tavsiyem u: Senaryolar okuyun (www.scps.nyu.edu/cga) ve ne gibi muhtemel sonular zerinde durulduunu grn.

The danger of apocalyptic visions One week after the terrorist attacks in Norway, many Europeans are still trying to find out what lessons should be drawn from the horrific events. Optimists hope that the majority of shocked citizens will come to the conclusion that Europe has to come to terms with the multicultural society it has become and that extremist attempts to deny or eradicate that reality will only lead to more violence. Others fear that the Islamophobia on which the Oslo massacre was based is deeply rooted in European societies and that the right-wing populists that thrive on anti-Muslim and anti-multicultural sentiments will be able to survive the present storm by sticking to the argument that Anders Behring Breivik was a crazy lone wolf. In that respect it is interesting to see that, for instance in the Netherlands, there is a curious coalition between extreme-right leader Geert Wilders and some of his most ardent opponents on the undesirability of making any link between Wilders aggressive rhetoric and the ultimate conclusion that Breivik drew from that. Both populists and liberal defenders of unlimited freedom of speech totally reject any suggestion that Islamophobic politicians and bloggers might have created an atmosphere in which an ideological extremist like Breivik could come to the conclusion that talking does not help anymore and that radical and violent gestures are required. The good thing in the Dutch debate is that Wilders, praised by Breivik as the best cultural conservative politician, is under growing pressure to make his position clear. Several newspaper editorials and columnists have called on the leader of the Freedom Party to explain what exactly he means when he writes and talks about the need to fight for our freedoms or to totally clean up our streets and push out the Muslims. According to his critics, it should not come as a surprise to Wilders that some of his followers interpret the word fighting not as an invitation to participate in a laborious and long democratic process. In order to prevent any further tragic misinterpretations of his ideas, Wilders should underline in an unambiguous way that using violence can never be legitimate in a democracy. Others have urged him to stop using war metaphors. The bad thing is that, for now, all these efforts to force Wilders to stop with his inflammatory rhetoric come from the usual suspects: liberal and center-left papers and politicians. The two conservative governing parties that are dependant on Wilders support in parliament do their utmost to depoliticize the situation, the tabloids read by many of his populist followers have not asked him to account for a violent extremist who drank from the same poisonous wells as Wilders does. There is one interesting exception. Bart Jan Spruyt is a conservative intellectual and columnist who worked with Wilders in

the past. He has stated clearly that Wilders is indirectly responsible for what happened in Oslo. His main argument is the, what he calls, apocalyptic visions created by Wilders. According to Spruyt, the Dutch populist is guilty of constantly suggesting that Western society is on the brink of disaster, that democratic politics are rendered useless by social democratic and liberal traitors, insinuating that only drastic measures can help prevent utter ruin. Spruyts analysis is fully in line with the remarks of the outspoken American academic Juan Cole on his blog Informed Comment. Cole is the author of Engaging The Muslim World, in which he argues that Western society is suffering from Islam Anxiety, the product of fear mongering and misinformation. In the book he tries to debunk the many myths concerning Islam. In his blog on the atrocities in Norway, Cole compares Breiviks fear of Europe losing its identity as a result of uncontrolled massive Muslim migration with other periods in time when people had the impression that undesirable change as a consequence of immigration was coming very rapidly. Let me quote his conclusion because I believe it summarizes very well the dangers of the extreme-right hate speech that Wilders and others have been using: Worrying about the impact of immigration is not pernicious. Opposing left political ideas is everyones right in a democracy. Disagreeing over religion is natural. But when you hear people talking about lumping all these issues together; when you hear them obliterating distinctions and using black-and-white rhetoric; when you hear them talk of existential threats, and above all when you see that they are convinced that small movements that they hate are likely to have an immediate and revolutionary impact, then you should be afraid, be very afraid. That is when extremism learns to hate, and turns to violence. Kyamet kehanetlerinin tehlikesi Norve'teki terrist saldrlarn zerinden bir hafta geti ve Avrupallar hl bu korkun olaylardan hangi derslerin karlmas gerektiini bulmaya alyor. yimserlerin umudu u: oka urayan vatandalarn byk ounluu, btn bu olan bitenlerden, Avrupa'nn okkltrl bir toplum olduu gereiyle yzlemesi gerektii ve bu gereklii inkr veya yok etmek ynndeki arlk abalarn olsa olsa daha fazla iddete yol at sonucunu karacak. Bazlar ise undan korkuyor: Oslo katliamnn temelini oluturan slamofobi'nin Avrupa toplumlarnda derin kkleri var ve Mslman veya okkltrllk kart hissiyatlar zerinden ykselen ar sac poplistler bu frtnay Anders Breivik'in ldrm bir meczup olduu argmanna snarak atlatmay baaracak. Bu itibarla, szgelimi Hollanda'da ar sac lider Geert Wilders ile en ateli baz kartlar arasnda yle tuhaf bir koalisyon olutuunu grmek ilgin: ki taraf da Wilders'n saldrgan sylemi ile Breivik'in o sylemden devirdii nihai sonu arasnda ba kurmakta son derece isteksiz. Hem poplistler hem snrsz ifade zgrlnn liberal savunucular, slamofobik siyasetiler ve blogcularn, Breivik gibi ideolojik bir arlknn artk konumann yarar olmad, radikal ve iddetli eylemlerin gerektii sonucunu karabilecei bir atmosfer yaratt ynnde her iddiay klliyen reddediyor. Hollanda'daki tartmann iyi yan, Breivik'in en iyi kltrel muhafazakr siyaseti diyerek vd Wilders'a kar, tutumuna aklk kazandrmas ynndeki basklarn giderek artmas. eitli gazetelerin bayazlar ve ke yazarlar zgrlk Partisi liderine, "zgrlklerimiz iin savamamz" veya "sokaklarmz tmyle temizleyip Mslmanlar kovmamz" gerektiini yazarken ve sylerken tam olarak neyi kastettiini aklamas arsnda bulunuyor. Tenkitilerine gre, baz yandalarnn "savamak" kelimesini zahmetli ve uzun bir demokratik srece katlmaya davet olarak yorumlamamas Wilders' hi artmamal. Fikirlerinin ileride yeniden trajik yanl yorumlara mahal vermemesi iin Wilders, iddete bavurmann bir demokraside asla meru olamayacan sarih bir dille vurgulamal. Ayrca sava metaforlar kullanmaktan da vazgemeli. u

an iin kt olan yan ise Wilders' kkrtc sylemini sona erdirmeye zorlamak ynndeki btn bu abalarn, olaan phelilerden, yani liberal ve merkez sol gazeteler ve siyasetilerden geliyor olmas. ktidarlarn srdrmek iin Wilders'n parlamentodaki desteine muhta olan iki muhafazakr parti, durumu depolitize etmek iin ellerinden geleni yapyor; ar sac liderin pek ok poplist yanda tarafndan okunan tabloid gazeteler ise kendisiyle ayn zehirli kaynaktan beslenen iddet yanls bir arlkdan dolay Wilders'tan hesap sormuyor. lgin bir istisna da var. Bart Jan Spruyt, gemite Wilders iin alan muhafazakr bir entelektel ve ke yazar. Spruyt, Wilders'n Oslo'da olanlardan dolayl sorumluluu olduunu aka ifade ediyor. Balca argman ise kendi tabiriyle, Wilders'n yaratt "kyamet kehanetleri". Spruyt'a gre Hollandal poplist srekli olarak, Bat toplumunun felaketin eiinde olduunu, demokratik siyasetin sosyal demokrat ve liberal 'hainler' tarafndan ie yaramaz hale getirildiini ve nihai ykm ancak sert nlemlerin engelleyebileceini iddia ettii iin sulu. Spruyt'un analizi, akszl Amerikal akademisyen Juan Cole'un 'Informed Comment' adl blogunda ifade ettikleriyle tam bir uyum iinde. 'Mslman Dnyay Kavramak' kitabnn yazar Cole, Bat toplumunun korku tellallnn ve yanl bilgilerin rn olan slam Anksiyetesi'nden mustarip olduunu savunuyor. Kitabnda slam'la ilgili pek ok mitin maskesini drmeye alyor. Blogunda Norve'teki vahete dair yazan Cole, Breivik'in kontrolsz kitlesel Mslman g sonucunda kimliini kaybeden Avrupa korkusunu, insanlarn g sonucu istenmeyen deiimlerin hzla yaklat izlenimine sahip olduu dier tarihsel dnemlerle kyaslyor. Vard sonucu burada alntlamak isterim, zira Wilders ve dierlerinin kulland ar sac nefret syleminin tehlikelerini gayet iyi zetliyor: "Gn etkilerine dair kayg duymak zararl deildir. Solcu siyasi fikirlere kar kmak bir demokraside herkesin hakkdr. Din konusunda fikir ayrl doaldr. Fakat insanlarn btn bu meseleleri ayn kaba koymaktan konutuunu; farkllklar silip siyah-beyaz sylemini kullandn; varolusal tehditlerden sz ettiini duyduunuzda ve hepsinden nemlisi, nefret ettikleri kk hareketlerin acil ve devrimci bir etkisi olabileceine ikna olduklarn grdnzde korkmalsnz, hakikaten ok korkmalsnz. Arlkln nefret etmeyi rendii ve yzn iddete dnd nokta ite burasdr."

Words do matter After the Norway massacre in which a homegrown extreme-right Islamophobe killed dozens of people, a profound debate started in the United States and Europe on how this could happen. One of the most sensitive elements in that discussion is the relationship between, on the one hand, violent actions by individual extremists and, on the other, the rising popularity of far-right populist parties in Europe and the growing influence of anti-Muslim ideologues in the US. In other words: Should we blame extremist politicians and columnists for having prepared the ground for the kind of horrific actions that we saw in Norway? Or should we not make that link and, in the end, blame each and every individual for the acts that he commits? Let me start with the reactions of the American anti-Muslim bloggers to the Norwegian drama. When it turned out that it was a blonde Norwegian who planted the bomb and killed dozens of children in cold blood, the Islam critics tried to downplay the right-wing anti-Muslim ideology driving the shooter. Anders Behring Breivik was a lonely lunatic who had acted on his own. In a blog on the website of The Washington Post, someone compared the reactions of two of the most well-known professional Islamophobes, Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer, to the terrorist attack in Oslo with their usual habits of tarring all Muslims with responsibility for acts of Islamist terrorism. Geller is an outspoken critic of Islam who runs the blog Atlas

Shrugs. She wrote that any assertion that she or other anti-jihad writers bore any responsibility for Mr. Breivik's actions was ridiculous. Spencer, who operates the Jihad Watch website and published several books unveiling Islam as a totalitarian ideology, angrily denied that what had happened in Norway has anything remotely to do with anything we have ever advocated. As The Washington Post blogger put it: Geller and Spencer are now pleading for the world not to do what they've spent their careers doing -- assigning collective blame for an act of terror through guilt-by-association. They are now begging for the kind of tolerance and understanding they cheerfully refuse to grant to American Muslims. By the way, after this blog was published, it became known that Mr. Breivik had written a 1,500-page manifesto in which he explains his motives. That document contains dozens of quotations from Geller, Spencer and many other American bloggers and writers who have warned for years about the threat of Islam. According to some well-informed American specialists, we should not underestimate the influence of these American Islamophobes. According to Max Blumenthal, a writing fellow for the Nation Institute, the Islamophobic crusade has gone beyond the right-wing pro-Israel activists, cyber-bigots and ambitious hucksters who conceived it. It now belongs to leading Republican presidential candidates, top-rated cable news hosts and crowds of Tea Party activists. In that same manifesto, Mr. Breivik also refers many times to European politicians he admires, like the Dutch populist Geert Wilders. Confronted with appreciation by a mass murderer, these politicians' reactions were copies of the American ones. Wilders said the killer was a violent and sick character and that he did not share any of the views of Breivik. Marine Le Pen, leader of the anti-immigrant National Front in France, claimed her party has nothing to do with the Norwegian slaughter, which is the work of a lone lunatic who must be ruthlessly punished. Back to The Washington Post blog. After having bashed the American anti-Muslim ideologues for their hypocrisy and double standards, the writer concludes by saying that all of us should take this lesson to heart: Terrorist acts are committed by individuals, and it is those individuals who should be held responsible. After reading this conclusion, I was left with very ambiguous feelings. Should we deny any link between Mr. Breivik and the poisonous wells he drank from? Are people like Spencer or Wilders in no way responsible for the acts of an individual who has clearly stated that he was inspired by their ideas and success? The answer is indeed a straightforward No if we look at the majority of reactions by European liberals. They abhor what happened in Norway and they totally disagree with Islamophobic politicians and writers. But they draw a clear line between the violent acts of Mr. Breivik, for which only he can be held accountable, and the aggressive words of his ideological enablers who should be free to express their despicable views. If we would hold Mr. Wilders and others in any way responsible for Mr. Breivik's cruelties, we would be making the same mistake as they do by blaming all Muslims for the terrorist acts of Osama bin Laden. Guilt-by-association is always wrong. To be honest, I find it difficult to accept this rigid division of responsibilities. Mr. Breivik is definitively not a lunatic who got out of control. He is an ideological extremist who carefully planned his terrorist acts and who has a clear vision of the world and

what he considers to be the threats to the open society he favors. His ideas are part of a much wider, growing right-wing movement in Europe and the US that, according to me, should not be able to get off the hook so easily by blaming all wrongs on a so-called crazy individual. In order to understand what is happening in Europe and the US, we should not make the mistake to claim, as is often done in Turkey, that the new cultural conservatism that both Mr. Breivik and Mr. Wilders are championing is a copy of the fascist ideology of the 1930s. There are clear differences and they are important in explaining the success of the current right-wing movement. The new populists distance themselves openly from the racism and authoritarianism of the past. They defend the Jewish state of Israel and gay rights, two positions that the old fascists would never support. Their focus is on anti-multiculturalism, antiIslamization and the immediate threat to Western civilization as they define it. On both issues, there is an overlap with the classic conservatives and even part of the social-democrats that enables them to reach out to parts of the electorate that the small post-war extreme right could never dream of. It also makes it much more difficult to isolate or marginalize this new movement. They are no longer harmless on the sidelines. Their ideas are the talkof-the-town and, especially in northwestern Europe, their influence has reached government levels. To pretend that this growing presence and popularity has absolutely no influence on some of their extreme supporters would, in my view, be dangerously naive. On the website of the American magazine Foreign Policy, I think two researchers strike the right balance in their assessment of the Norway tragedy. No one really knows the exact relationship between extreme right-wing movements and political violence. Indeed, academics are still arguing, without resolution, about whether peaceful but extreme Islamist organizations are gateways' into Islamist terrorism. Yet all terrorists believe they are defending a wider constituency, fighting for ideas that others agree with but are too ignorant or afraid to take action. Like al-Qaeda, far-right terrorists often see themselves as vanguards -- striking a blow that will awaken the masses. There is no question that someone like Anders Behring Breivik is more likely to find that environment in Europe now than a decade ago. And though he may have acted alone, there are certainly more like him who share his concerns, his ideology and his belief that without immediate and drastic action Western civilization will be lost. The world can no longer afford to ignore this growing threat, they say. Whether they like it or not, Geller, Spencer, Wilders and Le Pen should realize that, although they are not directly responsible for the acts of people like Mr. Breivik, their words can and will be used by extremists to justify atrocities. Hate speech should no longer be tolerated as the ultimate proof of freedom of expression but should be treated as the ugly and dangerous form of incitement it is because words do matter. Sorumluluktan kaamazsnz Norve'te doup bym ar sac bir slamofobiin onlarca kiiyi katletmesinden sonra hem ABD'de hem de Avrupa'da bunun nasl gereklemi olabileceine dair byk bir tartma balad.

Bu tartmadaki en hassas konulardan biri arlk yanls kiilerin gerekletirdii iddet eylemleriyle Avrupa'daki ar sac poplist partilere artan destek, yan sra ABD'deki slam kart ideologlarn artan etkisi arasnda nasl bir ba olduu. Dier bir ifadeyle, Norve'te tank olduumuz trden korkun eylemlere zemin hazrladklar iin arlk siyasetileri ve ke yazarlarn m sulamalyz? Ya da, byle bir balant kurmaktansa herkesi kendi eylemlerinden sorumlu tutup 'Bunlar mnferit olaylardr' m demeliyiz? Amerikal slam kart blogcularn Norve'te yaanan drama verdikleri tepkilerle balayaym. Bombay yerletiren ve onlarca ocuu soukkanllkla ldren kiinin sarn bir Norveli olduu ortaya ktktan sonra slam eletirmenleri katili harekete geiren sac ve slam kart ideolojiyi gzden uzak tutmaya altlar. Anders Behring Breivik, kendi bana hareket eden meczubun tekiydi. Washington Post'un internet sitesindeki blogda bir okur, alkanlk olduu zere slamc terrizmi tm Mslmanlara mal eden bir tavrla, en tannm iki profesyonel slamofobik Pamela Geller ile Robert Spencer'in tepkilerini Oslo'daki terrist saldrlarla karlatrd. Geller, 'Atlas Silkiniyor' blogunun sahibi ve slam' en yksek sesle eletirenlerden biri. Geller, kendi sitesinde, Breivik'in eylemlerinden onun ve onun gibi cihat kart yazlar kaleme alan kiilerin de sorumlu olduu iddiasnn gln olduunu belirtti. 'Jihad Watch' internet sitesini yneten ve slam' totaliteryen bir ideoloji olarak sunan birka kitap yaymlayan Spencer, byk bir fkeyle "Norve'te olanlarn bizim savunduumuz eylerle uzaktan yakndan ilgisi yoktur." diye yazd. Washington Post blogcusu unlar sylyordu: "Geller ve Spencer imdi dnyann kendi kariyerleri boyunca yaptklar eyi yapmamasn istiyor, yani bir terr eyleminin suunu btn bir toplulua atfetmek ve yklemek... Amerikal Mslmanlardan gnl rahatlyla esirgedikleri hogr ve anlayn imdi kendilerine gsterilmesi iin ortal ykyorlar." Bu arada, bu blog yaymlandktan sonra Breivik'in eylemlerinin nedenlerini aklad bin 500 sayfalk bir manifesto yazd ortaya kt. Bu manifesto Geller ve Spencer'dan, ayrca yllardr insanlar slam tehdidine kar uyaran dier Amerikal blogculardan ve yazarlardan onlarca alnt ihtiva ediyor. Bu konu hakknda bilgili baz Amerikal uzmanlara gre bahsi geen bu Amerikal slamofobiklerin sahip olduklar etkiyi hafife almamamz gerek. Nation Institute'da almalar yrten Max Blumental'a gre, "slamofobik hal seferi sac srail yanls aktivistlerin, siber-banazlarn ve slam dmanl pazarlamaclarnn tesine gemi durumda. slamofobi artk Cumhuriyetilerin nde gelen bakan adaylar, en ok izlenen kablolu televizyon haber program yapmclar ve ay Partisi aktivistleri tarafndan da benimseniyor." Ayn manifestoda Breivik Hollandal poplist Geert Wilders gibi hayran olduu Avrupal siyasetilere defaten gndermede bulunuyor. Bir kitle katliamcsndan gelen bu vgler karsnda onlar da Amerikal muadillerini taklit etmeyi setiler. Wilders, katilin 'iddet yanls ve hasta bir ahsiyet' olduunu ve 'Breivik'in hibir grn paylamadn' syledi. Fransa'daki gmen kart Ulusal Cephe'nin lideri Le Pen, partisinin 'Norve'teki katliamla hibir ilikisi' olmadn, bunun 'acmaszca cezalandrlmas gereken bir meczubun' ii olduunu syledi. Washington Post'taki bloga geri dnelim. Amerikal slam kart ideologlar ikiyzllkleri ve ifte standartlar yznden yerin dibine soktuktan sonra ayn yazar hepimizin ok iyi bellememiz gereken bir ders olduunu yazyordu: "Terrist eylemler bireyler tarafndan gerekletirilir ve bu eylemlerden sorumlu tutulmas gerekenler bu kiilerdir." Bu sonucu okuduktan sonra kendimi karmak duygular iinde buldum. Breivik ve onun beslendii zehirli kaynaklar arasnda bir ba olduunu inkar etmemiz mi gerekiyordu? Onlarn dncelerinden ve baarlarndan ilham aldn aka syleyen bir kiinin eylemlerinden Robert Spencer ve Geert Wilders gerekten sorumlu tutulamaz myd? NEFRET SYLEM, FADE ZGRL DELDR Avrupal liberallerin ounun verdii tepkiye bakarsak bu sorunun cevab kesin bir 'Hayr' olur. Bu kiiler Norve'te olanlar lanetliyorlar ve slamofobik siyaseti ve yazarlarn grlerine asla katlmyorlar. Fakat Breivik'in iddet eylemleriyle (ki bunlardan bir tek kendisi sorumlu tutulabilir) onu destekleyen ideologlarn saldrgan szleri arasnda net bir izgi ekiyorlar (bu ideologlar aalk grlerini zgrce ifade edebilirler). Onlara gre eer Wilders ve dierlerini Breivik'in canice eylemlerinden herhangi bir ekilde sorumlu tutarsak, Usame bin Ladin'in terrist eylemleri yznden btn Mslmanlar sulayanlarla ayn hataya dm oluruz. Birilerine, bizzat ilemedii bir suu isnat etmek her zaman yanltr.

Dorusu, sorumluluklarn byle kat bir ekilde ayrlmasn kabul etmekte zorlanyorum. Breivik kesinlikle kontroln kaybetmi bir meczup deil. Aksine, terrist eylemlerini titizlikle planlam bir ideolojik arlk, dnyaya ve taraftar olduu ak toplumu tehdit edenin ne olduuna dair ak bir gr var. Breivik'in dnceleri Avrupa ve ABD'de hzla byyen ok daha geni bir sa akmn paras ve bana gre bu akm btn yanl szde deli bir ahsa ykleyerek kolayca aklanmamal. Avrupa ve ABD'de bugn olanlar anlamak istiyorsak, Trkiye'de sklkla yaplann aksine, Breivik ve Wilders gibilerinin savunduu yeni muhafazakarln 1930'larn faist ideolojisinin bir kopyas olduunu iddia etme hatasndan kanmalyz. Arada ok bariz farkllklar var ve son dnemin sac hareketinin baarsn aklamak iin bunlara dikkat etmemiz gerek. Yeni poplistler kendileriyle gemiin rkl ve otoriteryenlii arasna aka mesafe koyuyorlar. srail'deki Yahudi devletini ve ecinsel haklarn savunuyorlar, ki bunlar 'eski' faistlerin asla savunmayacaklar iki konum. Odaklandklar meseleler arasnda okkltrllk ve slam kartl ile onlarn tarifine gre Bat medeniyetine ynelik yakn tehditler yer alyor. Her iki meselede de gnmz muhafazakrlar, klasik muhafazakrlarla ve hatta sava sonras ar sann hayal edemeyecei lde en uzak semen gruplarna bile ulamasn salayan bir grup sosyal demokratla rtebiliyor. Bu yeni hareketi dierlerinden ayrtrp marjinalize etmek bu yzden daha da zorlayor. Artk kenarda duran zararsz bir hareketten bahsetmiyoruz. Grleri yaygn ekilde konuulan ve etkisi zellikle kuzeybat Avrupa'da hkmet dzeyine ulaan bir hareket var karmzda. Varl ve poplaritesi giderek daha fazla hissedilen bu akmn, arlk yanls baz takipileri zerinde hibir etkisi olmadn dnmek bence tehlikeli bir safdillik olur. Amerikan dergisi Foreign Policy'nin internet sitesinde yazan iki aratrmac bence Norve'teki trajediyi doru ve dengeli bir deerlendirmeyle ele alyorlar: "Kimse ar sac hareketlerle siyasi iddet arasndaki ilikiyi tam olarak bilmiyor. Aslna bakarsanz akademisyenler hl barl fakat ar slamc rgtlerin slamc terrizme alan birer yol olup olmadn tartyorlar. Yine de btn terristler ok daha geni bir kitleyi savunduklarna, dierlerinin de hemfikir olduu, ama ya cehaletten ya da korkudan uruna eyleme geemedikleri fikirler adna savatklarna inanyorlar... Ar sac terristler ou zaman, tpk El Kaide gibi, kendilerini kitleleri ayaa kaldracak darbeler indiren ncler olarak gryorlar. phesiz Anders Behring Breivik gibi birinin bylesi bir ortam on yl ncesinin Avrupa'snda bulmas ok daha g olurdu. Tek bana hareket etmi olsa da onun endielerini, ideolojisini, acil ve kapsaml bir nlem alnmazsa Avrupa medeniyetinin kaybedilecei inancn paylaan birok insan var. Dnya giderek artan bu tehdidi grmezden gelemez." Holarna gitsin ya da gitmesin, Pam Geller, Robert Spencer, Geert Wilders ve Le Pen artk unun farkna varmal: Breivik gibi insanlarn eylemlerinden dorudan sorumlu olmasalar da, bavurduklar sylemler arlk yanls kiiler tarafndan caniliklerini hakl gstermek iin kullanlabilir ve kullanlacaktr. Nefret sylemine, ifade zgrlnn vard en u nokta olarak tahamml edilemez. Bu sylem neyse o ekilde, yani irkin ve tehlikeli bir kkrtma olarak grlmelidir. nk kelimeler nemlidir.

How to bluff ones way out of Cyprus Last week Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan went to the Turkish part of Cyprus. He used the visit to repeat the blunt message that Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu had expressed before. Turkey wants a deal on the reunification of the island before mid 2012, but is fed up and tired with the Greeks Cypriots. If and when there is no solution by that time, Turkey will freeze its relations with the EU because from July 1 until Dec. 31, 2012, Cyprus, a country not recognized by Turkey, will take over the EU rotating presidency. Before commenting on these extremely bold statements, let me be clear on some of the issues that always pop up when one writes about Cyprus. Yes, I believe it was a huge mistake on the part of the EU to agree in December 1999 with a Greek demand to accept Cyprus as a future member, even when the problems between the Greek and Turkish communities would

not be solved. As we know, the EU accepted Greek Cyprus as a member in May 2004 after the Greek Cypriots rejected a UN plan to reunite the island. Yes, I fully understand the Turkish frustration with the attitude of the Greek Cypriot administrations since 2004, which have used their EU membership to delay and frustrate all efforts to find a solution. Finally, I do think Turkey unnecessarily put itself in the corner after it decided not to ratify and implement the agreement it signed with the EU in 2005 to open its harbors and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and airplanes. I am making these preliminary remarks to discourage some of the hardcore protagonists from both the Cypriot and the Turkish side who after every article related to Cyprus fill the newspapers websites and email boxes with their predictable enumerations that, according to them, show that all the blame should be put on the other side. I see three main messages in the speeches of Davutolu and Erdoan. One makes perfect sense, another does not and the last one might have a very special effect. Lets start with the sensible one. After so many years of negotiations that have dragged on without deadline and real commitment, I welcome the target date that the Turkish government has set, July 2012, using the opportunities offered by the latest efforts of the UN to push both sides into an agreement. This cannot go on forever. All parties involved should make an ultimate attempt to find a solution now. If it does not work, Turkey will walk out of the talks and consider its options. These are, by the way, much more limited than Ankara is willing to acknowledge, but that is another issue. But then we come to the second message: Turkey still wants a deal but is not willing to compromise and refuses to sit down at one table with Greek Cypriot representatives. Excuse me? Do you think anybody will believe Turkeys good intentions if at the same time the country declares it is unwilling to make any concession to make it happen? Besides, why does Turkey not sit down and talk with the Greek Cypriot president while we know it does exactly that with Abdullah calan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)? Does Turkeys pragmatism stop at the borders? Lets face it: If Turkey is not willing to do its share to build up trust between itself and the Greek Cypriots, there will never be a deal. Finally, let us consider the threat to stop negotiations with the EU, at least temporarily. Who does the Turkish government want to impress by making this announcement? Friends of Turkey in Europe feel embarrassed after so much misguided Turkish diplomatic doggedness. Opponents of Turkeys EU membership in Paris, Berlin and Nicosia, on the other hand, are cheering. Single handedly Turkey has raised the rewards for all European obstructionists. Suppose there is a Cyprus deal early next year. That will be put to a vote in a referendum in both Cypriot communities. By voting No on a possible solution, every Greek Cypriot hard-liner can kill two birds with one stone: no concessions to the Turkish Cypriots and a perfect chance to derail Turkeys EU accession process. Do Erdoan and Davutolu really think that Paris and Berlin will not try to use the opportunity they are being offered now on a golden plate and bury the negotiations in the freezer for ever? Or is that the perfidious outcome of the Cyprus game that Ankara really wants? Kbrs meselesinden blf yaparak kurtulmak Geen hafta Babakan Erdoan, Kuzey Kbrs'a gitti ve bu ziyaretini, Dileri Bakan Davutolu'nun daha nce verdii net mesaj tekrarlamak iin bir frsat olarak deerlendirdi.

Buna gre Trkiye, 2012 yl yarlanmadan Ada'nn tekrar birlemesi iin bir anlama yapmaya hazr, fakat Kbrsl Rumlarn tavrlarndan stk syrlm durumda. O zamana kadar bir zm bulunmazsa Trkiye AB'yle ilikilerini askya alacak, nk 1 Temmuz ile 31 Aralk 2012 tarihleri arasnda Trkiye tarafndan tannmayan Kbrs, AB bakanln devralacak. Bu ziyadesiyle cesur ifadeleri yorumlamaya gemeden nce, ne zaman Kbrs hakknda bir eyler yazsam karma kan birka mesele hakknda grlerimi aka belirtmek istiyorum. Evet, Rum ve Trk toplumlar arasndaki sorunlar zmeye katks olmayaca halde AB'nin Aralk 1999'da Yunanistan'n Kbrs' ye yapma talebini kabul etmesi ok byk bir hatayd. Hepimizin bildii gibi bu sorunlar Kbrsl Rumlarn Ada'y tekrar birletirmek iin sunulan BM plann reddetmesiyle daha da trmand. Evet, 2004'ten bu yana AB yeliklerini, bu soruna olas zmleri ertelemek veya kmaza sokmak iin kullanan Kbrs Rum Kesimi ynetimlerinin Trklerde yaratt fkeyi de tamamen anlyorum. Nihayet, Trkiye'nin 2005'te limanlarn ve havaalanlarn Kbrs gemilerine ve uaklarna ama ynnde AB ile imzalad anlamay yrrle sokmayarak kendisini gereksizce keye sktrdn dnyorum.Bunlar batan belirtiyorum ki hem Rum hem de Trk tarafndan baz sabit fikirli kiiler Kbrs'la ilgili yazlan her makaleden sonra yaptklar gibi gazetenin internet sitesini ve e-posta adresini o ok bilindik ve btn suu srekli dier tarafa atan yorumlaryla bir kez daha doldurmasnlar. Ben, Davutolu ve Erdoan'n konumalarnda ana mesaj gryorum. Bunlardan biri olduka makul, dieri o kadar deil, ncs ise ok zel bir etki yaratabilir. Makul olan mesajla balayalm. Belirlenmi herhangi bir sre ve samimi bir aba olmakszn yllarca srp giden mzakerelerden sonra Trk hkmetinin, BM'nin son dnemde taraflar uzlatrmak iin yapt almadan ortaya kan frsatlar da deerlendirip Temmuz 2012 gibi hedef bir tarih nermesini son derece olumlu buluyorum. Bu mzakereler ilelebet sremez. lgili tm taraflar bu soruna nihai bir zm bulmak iin gerekli admlar bir an evvel atmaldr. Eer bu olmazsa Trkiye grmelerden ekilecek ve baka seenekleri gzden geirmeye balayacaktr. Bu arada, bu seenekler Ankara'nn kabul ettiinden ok daha kstl ama bu baka bir yaznn konusu. Buradan ikinci mesaja geliyoruz. Trkiye hl zm yanls bir tavr iinde, fakat baz eylerden dn vermek ve Kbrsl Rum temsilcilerle ayn masaya oturmak istemiyor. aka gibi! Trk hkmeti zm iin herhangi bir fedakarlkta bulunmak istemediini syledike insanlar Trkiye'nin iyi niyetli olduuna nasl inanabilir? Dahas, hapisteki PKK lideri Abdullah calan ile karlkl oturup grmeler yapan Trk devleti niin ayn eyi Kbrsl Rum devlet bakanyla da yapmasn? Trkiye'nin pragmatik siyaseti lkenin snrlarnn tesine gemiyor mu? unu kabul etmemiz gerek: Eer Trkiye kendisi ve Kbrsl Rumlar arasnda gven oluturmak iin kendi payna deni yapmazsa herhangi bir anlama gerekleemez. Son mesaj ise AB ile mzakereleri, en azndan geici olarak durdurmak. Bu aklamay yaparak Trk hkmeti kimi etkilemeye alyor? Trkiye'nin Avrupa'daki dostlar bu lde hedefi am bir diplomatik katlk karsnda hicap duyuyor. Trkiye'nin AB yeliine kar olanlar ise Paris'te, Berlin'de ve Lefkoa'da sevin lklar atyor. Trkiye tek bir hareketiyle, kendi AB yelik srecini tkamak isteyenlerin ekmeine ya srd. Diyelim ki gelecek yln banda Kbrs'taki iki toplumun oyuna sunulacak bir anlama gndeme geldi. Bu referandumda 'Hayr' oyu veren her Kbrsl Rum bir tala iki ku vuracak, yani hem Kbrsl Trklere hibir taviz vermeme hem de Trkiye'nin AB'ye yelik srecini rayndan karma ansna sahip olacak. Erdoan ve Davutolu gerekten de Paris'in ve Berlin'in kendilerine altn tepside sunulan bylesi bir frsat geri tepeceklerini ve mzakereleri sonsuza dek dondurma ansn karacaklarn m dnyor? Ya da Ankara'nn gerekte istedii Kbrs oyunundan kacak bylesi ykc bir sonu mu?

Saving the euro At an emergency EU summit in Brussels this Thursday, European leaders will again sit together and try to restore trust in the euro, which is under attack after several countries in the eurozone ran into problems. The first thing they have to do is agree on terms for a second bailout package for Greece after the first attempt some months ago failed to restore international investors' confidence in Athens, as they think it will not be able to get its economy back on track. There are sharp differences of opinion within the EU on how to proceed. Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria are

under domestic pressure not to agree too quickly because they will have to come up with most of the money. Political leaders in these countries feel the growing pressure from an anti-European public opinion that does not understand why Dutch or Finnish citizens should be asked to pay for mistakes made in Greece. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Dutch Finance Minister Jan-Kees de Jager have repeatedly said that they are not willing to sign up for a second loan to Greece when there are no guarantees that big private investors will also voluntarily contribute.

Personally, I think they have a strong point. Why should German and Dutch taxpayers have to run all the risks, instead of the big banks that earned so much money in the past, when things were looking better in Greece? The problem is that most EU member states and the European Central Bank are afraid that involving private creditors will have all kinds of unpredictable consequences and would be interpreted by big and powerful rating agencies as a bad sign, causing even more trouble for the rest of the eurozone. In the run-up to the Brussels meeting, politicians were again bombarded with advice from many renowned economists. As before, these well-intended recommendations show no coherence at all. Some specialists have suggested they use the present crisis to introduce some revolutionary changes in the European monetary system.

Why not replace some of the national loans with European loans? These euro-bonds would be rated very highly internationally because they are backed by all eurozone countries and therefore interest rates would be low. This would also allow early and in-depth monitoring of the budgets of all participating countries to prevent future derailments.

Another idea is to stop negotiating with private investors about their contributions to Greek bailout and instead introduce a European financial transaction tax that would put the brakes on financial speculation and could raise as much as 200 billion euros per year. These are all interesting proposals but I am afraid that under strong pressure from financial markets and skeptical public opinion, most leaders will not opt for this kind of out-of-the-box thinking. The same goes, by the way, for radical advice to stop trying to save Greece.

Daniel Gros, the outspoken director of the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels made the comparison between Argentina in the 1990s and today's Greece. His conclusion is that all of the present efforts, which to a large extent copy the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) rescue packages for Argentina, will not work, instead they will create more and bigger problems for Greece and the EU. He quotes Karl Marx, who famously wrote that history normally repeats itself as farce. In Greece's case, Gros states, history might turn out to be a much larger version of Argentina's tragedy, which ten

years ago ended with a messy default, which the country is still recovering from. Again, good to know. But the EU leaders are not going to pull the plug on Greece this week or come up with radical changes to the present system. After much internal bickering they will probably opt for a middle-of-the-road solution, hoping that determination to do more of the same will ease pressure on Greece and the rest of the eurozone. Only the future will tell whether this formula will work or whether the EU will be forced to do the unthinkable. Whatever the outcome this week, let's not forget that the consequences will be felt in Turkey as well. Turkey's growing selfconfidence about the performance of its economy should not hide the fact that a stagnating eurozone will have huge negative effects on European investments in Turkey and on demands for goods produced here. Avro'yu kurtarmak Bu perembe Brksel'de acil toplanacak AB zirvesinde Avrupal liderler bir kez daha masaya oturup, Avro blgesindeki baz lkelerin sorunlara batmas sonras taarruz altnda olan ortak para birimine gveni yeniden tesis etmeye alacak. Yapmalar gereken ilk ey, Yunanistan'a ynelik ikinci kurtarma paketinin artlar zerinde anlamak. Aylar nce bu yndeki ilk giriim, Atina'nn ekonomisini tekrar rayna sokamayacan dnmeyi srdren uluslararas yatrmclarn gvenini salayamad. Nasl ilerlenecei konusunda AB iinde keskin fikir ayrlklar var. Almanya, Hollanda, Finlandiya ve Avusturya pakete hemen olur dememeleri konusunda dahili bask altnda, nk parann byk ksm onlarn cebinden kacak. Bu lkelerdeki siyasi liderler, Yunanistan'da yaplan hatalarn bedelini niye Hollanda veya Finlandiya vatandalarnn demesi gerektiini anlamayan Avrupa kart bir kamuoyunun artan basksn enselerinde hissediyor. Almanya Babakan Angela Merkel ve Hollanda Maliye Bakan Jan-Kees de Jager, byk zel yatrmclarn da katk salayacana dair garantiler olmakszn Yunanistan'a ikinci kez bor vermeye yanamayacaklarn defalarca dile getirdiler. ahsen bunun yabana atlr bir fikir olmad kanaatindeyim. Niye btn riskleri gemite Yunanistan'da iler yolunda grnrken uvalla para kazanan byk bankalar deil, Alman ve Hollandal vergi mkellefleri srtlansn ki? Sorun u: AB yesi lkelerin ou ve Avrupa Merkez Bankas, zel sektrdeki kredi verenleri iin iine katmann envai eit beklenmedik sonulara yol amasndan ve byk ve gl derecelendirme kurulular tarafndan kt bir iaret olarak yorumlanmasndan, velhasl btn bunlarn Avro blgesinin geri kalan iin daha da fazla sorun dourmasndan korkuyor. Brksel toplantsnn arifesinde siyasetiler yine birok nl iktisat tarafndan nasihat bombardmanna tutuluyor. Daha nce olduu gibi, bu iyiniyetli tavsiyeler birbirini zerre kadar tutmuyor. Baz uzmanlar mevcut krizi Avrupa para sisteminde birtakm devrimci deiimler yapmak ynnde kullanmay neriyor. Niye ulusal borlarn bir ksm Avrupa'nn borcuna dntrlmesin? Bu Avro-tahviller, btn Avro blgesi lkeleri tarafndan desteklendii iin uluslararas alanda son derece gvenilir addedilecek ve bylece faiz oranlar da dk olacak. Ayrca gelecekteki yeni raydan kmalar nlemek iin btn katlmc lkelerin btelerinin erkenden ve derinlemesine denetlenmesine imkn verecek. Bir baka dnce, Yunanistan paketine katklar konusunda zel yatrmclarla pazarln braklmas ve bunun yerine mali speklasyonu frenleyecek ve ylda 200 milyar Avro gibi bir gelir salayabilecek bir Avrupa finans ilemleri vergisi koymak. Bunlarn hepsi ilgin neriler, fakat korkarm ki finans piyasalarnn ve kukulu kamuoylarnn ar basks altndaki liderlerin byk ounluu bu tr 'yeniliki' fikirleri tercih etmeyecek. te yandan Yunanistan' kurtarma abasn toptan kesip atma nerisi iin de ayns geerli. Brksel merkezli Avrupa Politika almalar Merkezi'nin (CEPS) szn saknmayan direktr Daniel Gros, bugnk Yunanistan' 1990'larn Arjantin'i ile kyaslyor. Vard sonu u: Mevcut abalarn tm byk lde IMF'nin Arjantin iin nerdii kurtarma paketlerini kopya ediyor ve bu yine ie yaramayacak, olsa olsa Yunanistan ile AB iin daha ok ve byk sorunlar yaratacak. Gros, Karl Marx'n mehur szne atfla, tarihin tekerrr ettiini ve normalde ilkinin trajedi, ikincisinin komedi eklinde yaandn sylyor. Fakat Gros'a gre Yunanistan, Arjantin'in on yl nce feci bir iflasla neticelenen ve hl belini dorultmaya alt trajedisinin ok daha byk bir versiyonu haline gelebilir.

Neler olabileceini bilmek her eye ramen iyidir. Fakat AB liderleri bu hafta Yunanistan'dan elini eteini ekmeyecek veya mevcut sistemde kkl deiiklikler nermeyecek. Kendi aralarnda bir yn didimeden sonra muhtemelen 'orta yolcu' bir zm tercih edecek ve ayn tas ayn hamam srarnn Yunanistan ve Avro blgesinin geri kalan zerindeki basnc ortadan kaldracan umacaklar. Bu formln ie yarayp yaramayacan veya AB'nin 'dnlemez' olan yapmaya mecbur kalp kalmayacan ise ancak gelecek gnler gsterecek. Bu haftaki zirveden kacak sonu ne olursa olsun, etkilerinin Trkiye'de de hissedileceini unutmayalm. Trk ekonomisinin performansna dair artmaya devam eden zgven, durgunlua giren bir Avro blgesinin Trkiye'deki Avrupa yatrmlar ve burada retilen mallara ynelik talep zerinde muazzam olumsuz etkiler yapaca gereini gizlememeli.

It always seems impossible until its done -- Nelson Mandela Being an optimist by nature, I had a tough day Thursday. That day 13 soldiers were killed in Diyabakrs Silvan district and negotiations broke down between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) over the latters refusal to take the parliamentary oath. One month ago, when the results of the elections showed the three parties crucial for a solution to the Kurdish problem (the AKP, the Republican Peoples Party [CHP] and the BDP) had come out strongly, I was hopeful that finally Turkey could move on to the next stage, away from violence and confrontation, each party willing to do its bit to end a conflict that has caused so much pain among so many Kurds and Turks. Now, a month later, all we have are Kurdish deputies unwilling to take their parliamentary seats, bad blood on all sides after the exchange of harsh words and accusations, and on top of that, young lives being destroyed because in the twisted brains of some leaders using violence is still an option. Why is there no one in Turkey capable of breaking this seemingly endless chain of poisonous reactions and counterreactions? The prime minister has the power and the prestige to do so, but he seems to be unable and unwilling to step out of his own shadow. The man who is still supposed to command enormous respect among many Kurds, the imprisoned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah calan, seems to be out of touch with reality. He recently referred to a deal between himself and the Turkish state, but instead of his promised peace council we are witnessing acts of war. Why doesnt Turkey have anyone like Nelson Mandela, the man who managed to keep his deeply divided country, South Africa, together after the end of apartheid because he was able to bridge differences and to reconcile groups that without his wisdom and guidance would have continued to fight each other? We all know Nelson Mandela as the former president of the Republic of South Africa and Nobel Peace laureate who, despite 27 years in prison, refused to compromise his beliefs. He led South Africa through a peaceful transition to a genuinely multi-racial democracy firmly founded on a constitution protecting fundamental human rights. I know the differences between Turkey and South Africa are enormous, and it does not make sense to look for a Turkish version of Mandela. What I hope for is that his style, his positivism and his perseverance could be an example that would inspire todays Turkish leaders to move off their dead-end streets in which no sustainable solutions to the Kurdish problem will ever be found. This Monday, July 18, Nelson Mandela will celebrate his 93rd birthday. The day has been declared Nelson Mandela International Day by the United Nations. As part of the celebration of Nelson Mandela International Day, people all over the world are asked to give at least 67 minutes of their time in service of their communities. Sixty-seven minutes is a symbolic

number, representing the number of years Mandela was involved in social activism. When I spoke with Mr. Tebogo Seokolo, the South African ambassador to Turkey, last week, he told me that on Monday at 11:00 a.m. he would take his tie and jacket off and go with his colleagues to a care home for the elderly in the Keiren neighborhood of Ankara to spend at least 67 minutes interacting with the residents of the center and painting the building. It is heartwarming to think of diplomats, civil society organizers and government officials getting together to celebrate this special day and extending a hand of goodwill to the residents of the elderly home in the name of Nelson Mandela. It shows that his life can be an inspiration, both for leaders at the top and for ordinary people who want to give a helping hand to their fellow citizens. Let me finish with a quote from Nelson Mandela that I hope will encourage all those in Turkey struggling for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem: I am fundamentally an optimist. Whether that comes from nature or nurture, I cannot say. Part of being optimistic is keeping ones head pointed toward the sun, ones feet moving forward. There were many dark moments when my faith in humanity was sorely tested, but I would not and could not give myself up to despair. That way lays defeat and death. 'Gerekleene kadar hep imknsz gibi grnr'* yimser mizal bir insan olarak geen perembe benim iin ok zor gnd. Ayn gn iinde Diyarbakr'n Silvan blgesinde 13 asker ldrld ve AKP ile BDP arasnda milletvekillii yemini konusunda yrtlen mzakereler kt. Bir ay nce seim sonular Krt sorununun zm asndan kilit nem tayan partinin sandktan glenerek ktn gsterdiinde, Trkiye'nin nihayet bir sonraki safhaya geebilecei konusunda umutluydum. parti de iddetin ve atmann uzanda, pek ok Krt ve Trk'e byk aclar yaatan bir sava sona erdirmek iin zerine deni yapmaya niyetliydi. Bir ay sonra gelinen noktada elimizde sadece koltuklarna oturmak istemeyen Krt vekiller, btn taraflarda karlkl sert szlerin ve ar sulamalarn yaratt husumet ve hepsinden nemlisi de, baz liderlerin arpk zihinlerinde iddet yntemini kullanmak hl bir seenek olduu iin yok olan gen hayatlar var. Trkiye'de bu sonu gelmez grnen zehirli tepkiler ve kar tepkiler zincirini krabilecek bir Allah'n kulu niye yok? Babakan bunu yapacak gce ve prestije sahip, fakat kendi glgesinin dna kmaya muktedir ve istekli grnmyor. Birok Krt'n gznde hl byk saygnla sahip olduu sylenen hapisteki PKK lideri Abdullah calan'n gereklikle ba kopmu gibi. Geenlerde kendisiyle Trk devleti arasnda bir anlamadan dem vurdu, fakat szn ettii bar konseyi yerine sava eylemlerine tank oluyoruz. Trkiye'nin niye bir Nelson Mandela's yok? O Mandela ki, derinlemesine blnm lkesi Gney Afrika'y, apartheid'n sona ermesinden sonra bir arada tutmay baard, zira onun bilgelii ve rehberlii olmakszn uzun ve iddetli atmalara devam edecek olan gruplar arasndaki farkllklar giderip onlar uzlatrabildi. Hepimiz Nelson Mandela'y 27 yllk hapislie ramen inanlarndan taviz vermeyen Gney Afrika'nn eski Devlet Bakan ve Nobel Bar dl sahibi olarak tanyor, biliyoruz. Gney Afrika'y bar bir gei sreciyle, temel insan haklarn koruyan bir anayasaya sk skya bal, hakiki bir ok-rkl demokrasiye tad. Trkiye ile Gney Afrika arasnda byk farklar olduunu ve Mandela'nn bir Trk kopyasn aramann mantkl olmadn biliyorum. Benim umudum, onun tarznn, pozitivizminin ve azminin Trkiye'nin bugnk liderlerine, Krt sorununa srdrebilir zmler bulmann imknsz olduu kmaz sokaklardan kurtulmak konusunda ilham verecek bir rnek olabilmesi.

Bu pazartesi, yani 18 Temmuz'da Mandela 93. yan kutlayacak, ki Birlemi Milletler tarafndan Uluslararas Mandela Gn ilan edildi. Kutlamann paras mahiyetinde, dnyann drt bir kesindeki insanlardan o gn en az 67 dakikalarn topluma hizmet etmek iin ayrmas isteniyor. 67 dakikann sembolik bir yan var: Mandela'nn sosyal aktivizmde geirdii yllarn saysn ifade ediyor. Geen hafta Gney Afrika'nn Trkiye Bykelisi Tebogo Seokolo ile konutuumda, pazartesi gn 11.00'de kravatn ve ceketini karp mesaidalaryla birlikte Ankara'daki Keiren Huzurevi'ne gideceini ve en az 67 dakika boyu orada yaayanlarla hasbhal edip binay boyayacan syledi. Diplomatlarn, sivil toplum rgtlerinin ve hkmet yetkililerinin bu zel gn kutlamak iin bir araya geleceini ve Nelson Mandela erefine huzurevinin sakinlerine efkat eli uzatacan bilmek insann kalbini styor. Mandela bylece hayatnn, en tepedeki liderlerden sradan insanlara kadar, vatandalarna yardm eli uzatmak isteyen herkes iin ilham kayna olabileceini gsteriyor. Yazy, Trkiye'de Krt sorununun bar zm iin mcadele eden herkese cesaret vereceini umduum bir Nelson Mandela alntsyla bitirmek isterim: "Ben iflah olmaz bir iyimserim. Bunun doutan gelen bir zellik olup olmadn bilemem. yimser olmak bir yanyla insann yzn srekli gnee dnmesi, admlarn hep ileri doru atmasdr. nsanla inancmn zorlu snavlardan getii birok karanlk dnemim oldu, fakat kendimi asla mitsizlie teslim etmem ve edemem. nk o yenilgiye ve lme giden yoldur." * Nelson Mandela

EU skeptics are wrong I hope Let me start with a warning. Some people should probably not read this article because it totally goes against their opinions. Firstly, there are those who believe that Turkey's EU accession is now history. Some were never in favor of Turkey joining the world's biggest economic bloc in the first place, while others who thought that it would be a good idea seven years ago have now given up on it. According to them, the EU has shown that deep down they do not want Turkey in, and in the meantime Turkey has proven that it can prosper without the EU. The second category of potential readers who might want to skip this column comprise those who think that all of the problems between Turkey and the EU arise from hypocrisy and double standards on the part of the Europeans. They believe Turkey should in no way be blamed for the stalemate in the negotiations. Let me continue in the hope that there are still some interested persons left. These days, Stefan Fle, the European commissioner responsible for EU enlargement, is in Turkey to discuss with Turkish civil society organizations and the government the best ways to revitalize Turkey's accession negotiations. My prediction is that these talks will focus on two issues: Cyprus and visas. On both topics, the EU representative will call on Turkey to develop a common policy that would benefit both Turkey and the EU. On Cyprus, we have seen a new wave of enthusiasm over the last couple of days, even among skeptics who thought that the Cyprus problem would never be solved. This optimism is based on the talks that took place in Geneva last week in which United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented a plan for the completion of the talks between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in October of this year. Many had given up hope that these negotiations would produce anything close to a solution. The UN chief has now made clear that he is not willing to accept failure or an endless dragging on. The

two sides seem to realize that they will have to deliver results this year or otherwise be faced with, for instance, a withdrawal of UN troops that would make the Greek Cypriots feel extremely uncomfortable. Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu shared in the optimism and expressed his hopes for a referendum in the spring of 2012 that, when the outcome is positive on both sides, would allow for the reunification of the island before July 2012, when Cyprus will take over the EU rotating presidency. It would be even better if, in his talks with Fle, Davutolu would confirm the speculation that Turkey is willing to open one or two of its ports to Greek Cypriot ships for a limited period of time. It would be a clever move to unblock the relations with the EU on this point and put the ball in the court of the EU and the Greek Cypriots. I am sure the symbolic gesture would be welcomed by Fle, who knows very well that patience in Brussels with the obstructionist attitude of Nicosia is running out. On the visa issue, the commissioner is squeezed between the uncompromising attitude of some EU member states and the refusal of Ankara to enter into a complicated multi-step process, the only option available at the moment. The government wants visas abolished for all Turkish citizens as the predetermined outcome of any procedure, and they want to get this outcome as soon as possible. It was understandable that Turkish politicians were taking a principled stance in the run-up to the elections, but by now they should realize that making a deal with the European Commission on a gradual liberalization of the visa regime serves the interests of Turkish businessmen, students and academics better than sticking to an all-or-nothing approach that will not help any Turk and only plays into the hands of hard-liners in Europe. The vote for change on June 12 has created a window of opportunity for both the new government of Recep Tayyip Erdoan and the EU to show that they are still committed to Turkey obtaining full membership in the EU. They can show their willingness by coming up with creative proposals and entering into compromises that will bring concrete benefits. Let's hope both partners are willing to demonstrate that the EU skeptics in Turkey are wrong. AB kukucular yanlyor umarm Bir uyaryla balamak isterim. Bazlar bu yazy okumasn, zira fikirleriyle taban tabana zt dyor. lk kategoride Trkiye'nin AB yeliinin tarihe gmldne inananlar var. Bunlardan bazlar Trkiye'nin dnyann en byk ekonomik blokuna katlmasn zaten hi istememiti, bazlar ise yedi yl nce bunun iyi bir fikir olduunu dnyordu, fakat artk pes etmi durumdalar. Onlara gre AB kalbinin derinliklerinde Trkiye'yi istemediini fazlasyla gsterdi ve bu arada Trkiye de AB dnda baarl olabileceini kantlad. Bu yazy gemek isteyebilecek ikinci kategori okurlar ise Trkiye ile AB arasndaki btn sorunlarn Avrupallarn ikiyzll ve ifte standard olduunu dnenler. Onlar mzakerelerdeki tkanmadan Trkiye'nin sorumlu tutulmas gerektiine inanyorlar. Umarm hl geriye yazy merak eden insanlar kalmtr. Bugnlerde Avrupa Komisyonu'nun genilemeden sorumlu yesi Stefan Fle, Trk sivil toplum rgtleri ve hkmetle Trkiye'nin yelik mzakerelerini canlandrmann en iyi yolunun ne olduunu tartmak zere Trkiye'de. Bu grmelerin iki meseleye odaklanacan tahmin ediyorum: Kbrs ve vize. Her iki konuda da AB temsilcisi Trkiye'ye, hem Trkiye hem AB'nin yararna olacak ortak bir politika gelitirme arsnda bulunacak. Kbrs konusunda son birka gndr, sorunun asla zlmeyeceini dnen kukucular arasnda bile yeni bir heyecan dalgasna tank oluyoruz. Bu iyimserlik BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-moon'un Kbrs Rum ve Kbrs Trk taraflarna bu yln ekim ayna kadar grmelerin tamamlanmas arsnda bulunan bir plan sunduu geen haftaki Cenevre grmelerinden kaynaklanyor. Biroklar bu mzakerelerden zme yaklaan herhangi bir ey kaca ynndeki umutlarn kaybetmiti.

BM patronu, gelinen noktada baarszl veya sonu gelmez bir srncemeyi kabul etmeye hi niyetli olmadn aka ortaya koydu. Grnen o iki taraf bu yl meseleyi halletmek zorunda olduklarn, aksi takdirde szgelimi BM askerlerinin ekilmesi gibi Kbrsl Rumlar ziyadesiyle rahatsz edecek sonularla yzleeceklerini idrak etti. Trkiye Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutolu da iyimserlii paylat ve 2012 baharnda bir referandum yaplmas umudunu dile getirdi. Referandumdan her iki tarafta da evet sonucu kmas, Kbrs'n AB dnem bakanln alaca 2012 Temmuz'undan nce adann tekrar birlemesine imkan verecek. Fle ile grmesinde Davutolu, Trkiye'nin limanlarnn birkan snrl bir sre Kbrs gemilerine amaya niyetli olduu ynndeki speklasyonu dorularsa, iler daha da iyi bir noktaya gelecektir. Bu noktada AB ile ilikilerin nndeki engeli kaldrmak ve topu AB ile Kbrsl Rumlarn sahasna atmak akll bir adm olacaktr. Brksel'in Lefkoa'nn engelleyici tutumuna ynelik sabrnn tkenmekte olduunu gayet iyi bilen Fle'nin bu sembolik jesti memnuniyetle karlayacandan hi kukum yok. Vize konusuna gelince Fle, baz AB yesi lkelerin tavizsiz tutumu ile Ankara'nn u an iin tek mmkn seenek mahiyetinde, adm adm ilerleyecek karmak bir sreci reddetmesi arasnda skp kalm durumda. Hkmet vizelerin, herhangi bir prosedrn nceden belirlenmi sonucu olarak, btn Trkiye vatandalar iin kaldrlmasn ve bu noktaya bir an nce gelinmesini istiyor. Trk siyasetilerin seimler ncesinde bu konuda hakl ve meru bir noktada durmalar anlalabilirdi. u an ise Avrupa Komisyonu ile vize rejiminin aamal serbestletirilmesi ynnde bir anlama yapmalarnn Trk iadamlarnn, rencilerinin ve akademisyenlerin karlarna, hibir Trk'e faydas dokunmayacak ve Avrupa'daki sertlik yanllarnn deirmenine su tamaktan baka ie yaramayacak bir 'ya hep ya hi' yaklamna yapmaktan daha fazla hizmet edeceini grmeliler. 12 Haziran'da deiim iin verilen oylar hem yeni Erdoan hkmeti hem de AB'nin nnde, Trkiye'nin tam yeliine hl bal olduklarn gstermeleri bakmndan bir frsat penceresi at. Yaratc neriler ortaya koyarak ve somut yararlar getirecek uzlamalara vararak bu ball kantlamallar. ki tarafn da Trkiye'deki AB kukucularnn yanldn gstermeye istekli olduunu umalm.

Disoriented and disgusted As a staunch Fenerbahe fan I am deeply disturbed and saddened by the ongoing investigation into match-fixing allegations in Turkeys football leagues. Although more teams are involved, it seems that my team is playing a key role. Under pressure from UEFA, the governing body of European football, the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) must decide before July 15 which Turkish teams will compete in the European leagues upcoming season. If and when Fenerbahe is found guilty, the club will be stripped of its 2010-2011 title and will most probably be relegated to a lower division and thus will not be allowed to participate in the highly lucrative UEFA Champions League. It would be an immense sporting and financial disaster for the Kadky-based squad. I can understand the deep frustration felt by Fenerbahe coach Aykut Kocaman and team captain Alex De Souza. They are now faced with the perception that it might not have been Kocamans coaching skills or Alex sometimes brilliant play that produced Fenerbahes 18th championship. After all that has been said and rumored, many will think that it was Fenerbahe President Aziz Yldrm who simply bought the title. I watched all the controversial games, and I agree with Kocaman that in all three matches against Eskiehirspor, Bucaspor and Sivasspor, Fenerbahe was the best team but could have lost points because their defensive play was again sloppy or because the other team hit the bar just before time. Is it possible to manipulate all of this because there is a paycheck waiting? Should Alex from now on think that the Bucaspor goal keeper did not get a hand in his free-kick that brought Fenerbahe back into the game because he was promised a lot of money? These

are questions that would drive every sportsman crazy. And make every fan feel cheated. What makes this whole affair so confusing is that, at the same time, I am happy that finally these kinds of allegations are being investigated. Ever since I started going to Fenerbahe matches in 2003, I have often been told by well-informed journalists that Turkeys football competition was marred by dirty games played by dictatorial club presidents who were willing to spend a lot of money on the pitch but also in some dark corners outside of the stadium. Lale Kemals mention of alleged links between soccer club presidents and the arms trade in her Todays Zaman column last week is only one example of the many stories that have been going around for years now. Until now, no prosecutor was able or willing to check whether they were true or not. It is a good thing for Turkish football and for society in general that finally the untouchables in the skyboxes are being brought in for questioning. When you Google match-fixing, you find out how discouragingly widespread this phenomenon is. Although I have followed international football for many years now, it had escaped my attention that, for instance, the South Korean soccer league is in crisis after five professional players and two suspected brokers were arrested in connection with match-fixing claims one month ago. I did remember, vaguely, the 2006 Italian football scandal in which major teams like Juventus and Milan were found guilty of rigging games by selecting favorable referees. League champions Juventus lost two titles and were relegated to the Serie B. A month ago, new arrests were made and the credibility of the Italian competition was once again undermined. Some time ago, prosecutors in Naples opened their own investigation into the growing influence of organized crime in football -- both through betting and direct involvement in clubs. In May three people were convicted of fraud by a German court for their part in what has been described as Europes biggest match-fixing scandal in which more than 20 matches, including a World Cup qualifying game and several matches in top European club competitions, had been manipulated. More convictions will follow shortly. This cannot go on. As the biggest Italian sports paper La Gazzetta dello Sport put it: If we continue down this road, we will truly open up an irreversible decline. People of good will are disoriented and disgusted. Public opinion calls for an injection of legality and correctness in football. Turkey is now doing its bit to clean up the mess in European football. That should be welcomed by all fans, including those of Fenerbahe. But it hurts. Karan kafalar, bulanan mideler Sk bir Fenerbahe taraftar olarak Trkiye futbol liglerindeki ike iddialaryla ilgili sregiden soruturmadan byk rahatszlk ve znt duyuyorum. ike konusunda baka takmlarn da ismi geiyor, fakat grne gre 'benim' takmm bu meselede kilit bir rol oynuyor. Avrupa futbolunun ynetici kurumu UEFA'nn basks altndaki Trk Futbol Federasyonu 15 Temmuz'dan nce gelecek sezon hangi Trk takmlarnn Avrupa liginde mcadele edeceine karar vermek zorunda. Fenerbahe sulu bulunduu takdirde, 2010-2011 ampiyonluu elinden alnacak, ok byk ihtimalle bir alt kmeye drlecek ve bu yzden son derece kazanl olan UEFA ampiyonlar Ligi'ne katlmasna izin verilmeyecek. Bu, Kadky merkezli kulp iin muazzam bir sportif ve mali felaket olacak.

Fenerbahe teknik direktr Aykut Kocaman ve takm kaptan Alex De Souza'nn duyduu derin rahatszl anlayabiliyorum. imdi Fenerbahe'nin 18. ampiyonluunun Kocaman'n teknik direktrlk becerilerinden veya Alex'in bazen gz kamatrc olan oyunundan kaynaklanmam olabilecei algsyla kar karyalar. Sarf edilen bunca laftan ve ortalkta dolaan sylentiden sonra birok insan ampiyonluu Fenerbahe Bakan Aziz Yldrm'n satn aldn dnecektir. Btn tartmal malar izledim ve u konuda Kocaman'la hemfikirim: Eskiehirspor, Bucaspor ve Sivasspor'la yaplan malarn hepsinde Fenerbahe iyi oynayan taraft, fakat savunmas yine dank olduu iin veya rakip takmn toplar direkte patlamam olsa puan da kaybedebilirdi. Bir ek yazarak btn bunlar maniple etmek mmkn olabilir mi? Bundan byle Alex, Bucaspor kalecisinin Fenerbahe'yi oyuna geri dndren serbest atna, uvalla para sz verildii iin uzanmadn m dnmeli? Bunlar her sporcuya sa ba yolduracak ve her taraftara kandrldn hissettirecek sorular. Btn bu manzara karsnda kafam ziyadesiyle kark, fakat bir yandan da bu tr iddialarn nihayet aratrlyor olmasndan memnunum. Fenerbahe malarna gitmeye baladm 2003'ten bu yana iyi bilgi alan gazetecilerden sk sk Trkiye'deki futbol yarnn, sadece sahada deil, stat dndaki karanlk kelerde de bol para dkmeye niyetli diktatrvari kulp bakanlarnn oynad kirli oyunlarla malul olduunu iitirim. Lale Kemal'in Today's Zaman'daki kesinde yazd futbol kulb bakanlaryla silah ticareti arasnda balant olduu iddias, yllardr sada solda anlatlan birok hikyeden sadece biri. Bugne kadar hibir savc bu iddialarn doru olup olmadn incelemeye muktedir veya istekli deildi. Loca koltuklarndaki 'dokunulmazlarn' nihayet sorgulanyor olmas Trk futbolu ve genel olarak Trk toplumu iin iyi bir ey. Google'a 'ike' yazp aradnzda, bu fenomenin ne kadar cesaret krc bir yaygnlk tadn gryorsunuz. Yllardr uluslararas futbolu takip ederim, fakat szgelimi Gney Kore futbol liginin, be profesyonel futbolcu ile iki pheli aracnn bir ay nce ike iddiasyla tutuklanmas sonras yaad kriz gzmden kam. 2006'da talya'da yaanan futbol skandaln da az ok hatrlyorum: Juventus ve Milan gibi byk takmlar yanl hakemler seerek malara hile kartrmaktan sulu bulunmutu. Juventus'un elinden iki ampiyonluu alnm ve takm Serie B'ye drlmt. Bir ay nce yeni tutuklamalar gndeme geldi ve talyan liginin gvenilirlii bir kez daha yara ald. Bir sre nce Napoli'deki savclar futbolda organize suun (hem bahis yoluyla hem kulplerde dorudan yer alarak) artan etkisine ynelik kendi soruturmalarn balatt. Maysta kii bir Alman mahkemesi tarafndan Avrupa'nn en byk ike skandal diye nitelenen vakada oynadklar rol nedeniyle sulu bulundu. 20'den fazla mata ike yaplm, szgelimi bir Dnya Kupas eleme ma ve Avrupa'nn st dzey msabakalarnn bazlar maniple edilmiti. Bu cezalar ksa sre sonra yenileri takip edecek. Bu byle devam edemez. talya'nn en byk spor gazetesi "Gazzetta dello Sport"un da dedii gibi: "Bu yolda ilerlemeye devam edersek, geri dnlmez bir kn kaplarn ardna kadar aacaz. yi niyetli insanlarn kafas karyor ve midesi bulanyor. Kamuoyu futbolda yasaya uygunluun ve drstln yerletirilmesini istiyor." Trkiye imdi Avrupa futbolundaki kirin temizlenmesi konusunda kendi payna deni yapyor. Fenerbaheliler de dahil, btn taraftarlar bunu memnuniyetle karlamal. Fakat ac da veriyor.

Building strong Turkish-German ties Raise the topic of Turkey's EU accession these days and most people will look at you pityingly. Didn't you read the news about Greece's narrow escape and the ongoing uncertainty about the euro, they might ask. Or did you miss the latest spectacular growth figures on the Turkish economy? Why would Turkey want to join a union that is going through an existential crisis while the country is performing so well on its own? Even prominent Europeans like former NATO supremo and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana admit that Europe is in danger of becoming a museum, occupied by a shrinking population that is growing older each decade but still does not want to accept that joining forces with young and dynamic countries like Turkey is necessary for its own survival.

When you think, on top of that, of the rise of Islamophobia in several European countries, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the EU has given up on Turkey and that Turkey should, therefore, forget about the EU and look for other options. My advice would be not to jump to conclusions. The EU has survived similar crises before, the Turkish economy is not as robust as some claim and, most importantly, many Europeans know very well that it is in their own long-term interests for the EU and Turkey to get together. Last Tuesday evening I was present at an occasion that proves the last point. In Essen, the center of the Ruhr area, one of the industrial heartlands of Germany, Gler Sabanc, head of Sabanc Holding, delivered the annual Mercator lecture. Stiftung Mercator is one of the largest private foundations in Germany, named after the famous German cartographer and cosmographer Gerhard Mercator. It is a name that is associated with global thinking, scientific precision and entrepreneurship. According to the founders, Mercator's life also symbolizes the significance of intercultural and interreligious tolerance, values that the foundation supports. Stiftung Mercator was founded by the Schmidt family, one of the main shareholders of the highly successful Metro Group, also known in Turkey for its supermarkets and electronics retailers. In her speech Sabanc stressed the need for a common German-Turkish approach to global challenges such as climate change, the turbulent global economy and political instability in the region. The two countries are closely connected economically and demographically with around 2.7 million people of Turkish origin living in Germany. Both states are doing well and feel confident about their future. At the same time, Sabanc underlined, we have all become much more interdependent than two or three decades ago. For instance, both Germany and Turkey have an interest in Greece's recovery because the European and world economy as a whole could be threatened and that would affect all of us. Gler Sabanc also used her speech to announce the decision of Stiftung Mercator and Sabanc University to launch a strategic and long-term cooperation that will be implemented by the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC). The partnership will focus on three core areas: climate change, education and a common German-Turkish approach to the future of Europe and EUTurkey relations. After Europe and China, Turkey will be the third region or country that Mercator will focus on because they believe these are crucial areas for Germany in a globalized world. This decision shows how key economic and intellectual players in Germany look at Turkey. They have to accept that the present German government is not very keen on Turkey's accession to the EU. They realize that it might take some time before Turkey will join. But they know very well that it is in Germany's and Turkey's long-term interest to strengthen the ties that already bind them together. In the globalized world of the 21st century, even big players like Germany and Turkey are well advised to focus on their common interests, be it energy security or stable and democratic neighbors. As Sabanc put it when speaking about Turkey's relations with the EU: Governments come and go. Relationships remain. And they get better. Gl Trk-Alman ilikileri kurmak Bugnlerde Trkiye'nin AB yelii meselesini atnzda, insanlarn ou size acyarak bakacaktr.

Yunanistan'n iflastan klpay kurtulmasna ve Avro ile ilgili sregiden belirsizlie dair haberleri okumadn m diye soracaklardr. Ya da Trk ekonomisinin en son mthi byme rakamlarndan haberdar olup olmadnz. Trkiye kendi bana bu kadar iyi performans gsterirken, varolusal kriz yaayan bir birlie katlmay niye istesin ki? Eski NATO efi ve AB Yksek Temsilcisi Javier Solana gibi nde gelen Avrupallar bile Avrupa'nn, her yl daha da yalanarak azalan bir nfusun barnd bir mze haline gelme tehlikesi olduunu, fakat hayatta kalmasnn gerei mahiyetinde Trkiye gibi gen ve dinamik lkelerle gcn birletirmekten hl geri durduunu kabul edecektir. Bunun da tesinde eitli Avrupa lkelerinde slamofobi'nin ykseliini dndnzde, AB'nin Trkiye'den vazgetii ve bu yzden Trkiye'nin AB'yi unutup baka seeneklere bakmas gerektii sonucuna kolayca varabilirsiniz. Bense bu sonuca varmak konusunda acele etmemek gerektii kanaatindeyim. AB daha nce de benzer krizlerden sa kt, Trk ekonomisi bazlarnn iddia ettii kadar mthi durumda deil ve en nemlisi, birok Avrupal, Trkiye ile AB'nin bir araya gelmesinin uzun vadeli menfaatlerine uygun olduunu gayet iyi biliyor. Sal akam bu son noktay kantlayan bir etkinlie katldm. Almanya'nn sanayi youn blgelerinden Ruhr'un merkezi konumundaki Essen'de Sabanc Holding Bakan Gler Sabanc yllk Mercator Konumas'n yapt. Stiftung Mercator Almanya'daki en byk zel vakflardan biri ve adn nl Alman kartograf ve kozmograf Gerhard Mercator'dan alyor. Mercator ismi kresel dnce, bilimsel doruluk ve giriimcilik kavramlaryla birlikte anlyor. Kurucularna gre Mercator'un hayat vakfn destekledii deerler mahiyetinde, kltrler ve dinler aras hogrnn nemini de simgeliyor. Stiftung Mercator, Trkiye'de de spermarketleri ile bilinen ve byk baarlar kaydeden Metro Group'un hissedar olan Schmidt ailesi tarafndan kuruldu. Gler Sabanc konumasnda iklim deiiklii, dnya ekonomisindeki sarsnt ve blgedeki siyasi istikrarszlk gibi kresel sorunlara ortak bir Trk-Alman yaklamnn gereini vurgulad. ki lke arasnda sk ekonomik ve demografik balar var; neticede 2,7 milyon Trkiye kkenli insan Almanya'da yayor. Her iki lke de baarl ve gelecee gvenle bakyor. Sabanc'nn da altn izdii zere, yirmi-otuz yl ncesine nazaran hepimiz ok daha fazla birbirimize baml haldeyiz. Szgelimi Yunanistan'n krizden kmas hem Almanya hem de Trkiye'nin karna, zira Yunanistan'n dibe vurmas bir btn olarak Avrupa ve dnya ekonomisi iin tehdit oluturabilir ve bu hepimizi etkiler. Gler Sabanc konumasnda Stiftung Mercator ile Sabanc niversitesi'nin, stanbul Politikalar Merkezi (IPC) tarafndan hayata geirilecek stratejik ve uzun vadeli bir ibirlii balatma kararn da aklad. Ortaklk mhim alana odaklanacak: klim deiiklii, eitim ve Avrupa ile AB-Trkiye ilikilerinin geleceine ynelik ortak bir Trk-Alman yaklam. Avrupa ve in'den sonra Trkiye Mercator'un odaklanaca nc blge veya lke olacak, nk buralarn kresellemi bir dnyada Almanya iin hayati nemde blgeler olduuna inanyorlar. Sz konusu karar Almanya'daki kilit iktisadi ve entelektel aktrlerin Trkiye'ye nasl baktn gsteriyor. Mevcut Alman hkmetinin Trkiye'nin AB yeliine pek de heveskr bakmadn kabul ediyorlar. Trkiye'nin birlie katlmnn belli bir zaman alacann da farkndalar. Fakat Almanya ve Trkiye'yi zaten bir arada tutan ilikileri glendirmenin iki lkenin de uzun vadeli karna olduunu gayet iyi biliyorlar. 21. asrn kresellemi dnyasnda Almanya ve Trkiye gibi byk aktrler iin bile, szgelimi enerji gvenlii veya istikrarl ve demokratik komular gibi meselelerde, ortak karlara odaklanmak hayrlarna olacaktr. Trkiye'nin AB ile ilikilerine deinirken Gler Sabanc'nn da syledii gibi: "Hkmetler gelir ve gider. likiler kalr. Ve ilikiler daha da iyiye gidiyor."

What is happening in Egypt? It should not come as a surprise that Egypt is not making the headlines anymore. The whole world was watching Tahrir Square in central Cairo in January and February this year when the Egyptian people stood up against Hosni Mubarak, the president who had ruled the country for 30 years. The fall of the Egyptian dictatorship was the first prize in the Arab Spring. Democrats worldwide cheered, stereotypes about Arabs and democracy had to be revised and the revolution in the region moved on to Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria.

Unfortunately, the exciting and ultimately quite smooth transfer of power that we witnessed along the Nile has not been repeated in Tripoli and Damascus. The Libyan and Syrian leaderships learned lessons from Mubaraks fall and decided to resist and not give in, whatever it takes. Each day pictures keep pouring in, showing the horrors of bloody fighting in Libya and Syria; on the one hand are people who are sick and tired of their autocratic leaders, while on the other are the Gadaffi and Assad regimes who prefer repression to reform. In the meantime, away from the spotlight, Egyptians are trying to cope with post-revolutionary challenges. This process is as important as the spectacular events of a few months ago but the logic of modern media means that one hardly hears about it outside Egypt or specialized websites by Arab speaking pundits. Last week, all of a sudden, Tahrir Square was back in the news. As if nothing had changed since February, we saw riot police beating demonstrators. Immediately, my Twitter timeline was flooded with angry tweets by some of the old protesters who had played such an important part in informing the world about the Egyptian uprising against Mubarak in February. Ironically, this time around the people being beaten up were the relatives of the martyrs who had died a few months ago. The families had organized a sit-in at Tahrir Square to push for an immediate start to a trial against the former president and members of his family. It was a reminder that some things had changed in Egypt, but others had remained the same. When Mubarak was forced to resign on Feb. 11, he turned over power to the Egyptian army. From then on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (known by its acronym SCAF), an 18-member body composed entirely of high-ranking commanders, was in charge. SCAF, headed by 76-year-old Field Marshall Mohammed Tantawi, was thrust into a political role for which it had little preparation. In the five months since taking power Tantawi was forced to meet some of the revolutions key demands, but other crucial requests still remain unfulfilled. A few days ago the Al Jazeera English website presented an extremely informative scorecard of SCAFs performance, making it abundantly clear that Egypt still has a long way to go before it can satisfy the democratic demands of its people. On a positive note there have been the arrests and trials of some regime officials, the dissolution of Mubaraks hated National Democratic Party and a public referendum on an interim constitution. But the to-do list is discouragingly long. A state of emergency has not been lifted and parliamentary and presidential elections have been postponed several times. The most frustrating broken promise has been a complete failure to protect demonstrators and reign in the police. According to activists, over recent months up to 10,000 civilians have been arrested with many of them being heavily beaten with cables and electric shock batons. Central Security Forces have not been subject to reforms and were involved in the breaking up of last weeks Tahrir Square protests, leaving more than 1,000 people injured. There are fears that the military may try to hold onto its own kind of executive authority, one general recently suggesting that in the new constitution the military should be exempted from budgetary oversight and be granted power to intervene in political affairs. Sounds familiar, doesnt it? Lets hope that the Egyptian revolutionaries manage to keep up the pressure on their temporary rulers and force them to make a clean break from the Mubarak era. Real progress in Egypt would also show brave Libyan and Syrian democratic activists that the region is able to move forward once the violent old regimes have been removed from power. Msr'da neler oluyor?

Msr'n artk manetleri sslemiyor olmas artc gelmesin. Btn dnya, bu yln ocak ve ubat aylarnda Kahire'nin merkezindeki Tahrir Meydan'n; Msr halknn lkeyi 30 yldr yneten devlet bakan Hsn Mbarek'e kar kalkt ayaklanmay izliyordu. Msr diktatrlnn devrilmesi, Arap Bahar isyannn en byk dlyd. Dnyann drt bir kesindeki demokratlar byk sevin iindeydi, Araplar ve demokrasiyle ilgili basmakalp fikirleri artk gzden geirmek gerekiyordu ve blgedeki devrim Libya, Bahreyn, Yemen ve Suriye'ye yayld. Ne yazk ki Nil boyunda tank olduumuz heyecan verici ve nihayetinde gayet yumuak iktidar devri Trablus ve am'da tekrarlanmad. Libya ve Suriye liderleri Mbarek'in dnden dersler karmt ve ne pahasna olursa olsun pes etmeyip direnme kararndaydlar. Otokratik liderlerinden bkp usanm Libyallar ve Suriyelilerle, reform yerine basky tercih eden Kaddafi ve Esad rejimi arasndaki kanl atmalarn dehetini gsteren resimler her gn akmaya devam ediyor. Bu arada gndemde geri sraya den Msrllar, devrim sonras zorluklarla baa kmaya alyor. Bu sre en az birka ay ncesinin olaanst olaylar kadar nemli, fakat modern medyann mant, neler olup bittiine dair Msr veya Arapa yazan yorumcularn bu meseleye hasrettii internet siteleri dnda bilgi sahibi olmamz son derece gletiriyor. Geen hafta Tahrir Meydan birdenbire tekrar haberlere konu oldu. ubattan bu yana hibir ey deimemiesine, polisin gstericileri dvdn grdk. Twitter sayfam derhal baz eski protestocularn fkeli tweetleri ile dolup tat; Mbarek'e kar ubattaki Msr isyan hakknda dnyay bilgilendirmekte nemli rol oynayan insanlard bunlar. ronik olan o ki, bu kez dvlen insanlar, birka ay nce len ehitlerin akrabalaryd. Aileler eski devlet bakan ve onun yaknlar aleyhinde alan davann bir an nce balamas talebiyle Tahrir Meydan'nda oturma eylemi rgtlemiti. Eyleme ynelik sert mdahale, Msr'da baz eylerin deitiinin, ama bazlarnn da ayn kaldnn gstergesiydi. Mbarek 11 ubat'ta istifa etmek zorunda brakldnda, iktidarn dizginlerini Msr ordusuna devretti. O zamandan beri, tamam st rtbeli komutanlardan oluan 18 yeli Silahl Kuvvetler Yksek Konseyi (SCAF) lkeyi ynetiyor. 76 yandaki Mareal Muhammed Tantavi'nin bakanln yapt SCAF, pek hazr olmad bir siyasi rol stlendi. ktidardaki be aynda Tantavi devrimin baz kilit taleplerini karlamak zorunda kald, fakat baz hayati nemdeki talepler hl yerine getirilmedi. Birka gn nce El Cezire'nin ngilizce internet sitesi SCAF'n performansna dair son derece bilgilendirici bir puan tablosu yaynlad; tabloya bakldnda Msr'n halkn demokratik taleplerini karlayabilmenin hl ok uzanda olduu aka grlyor. Olumlu tarafta baz eski rejim yetkililerinin tutuklanp yarglanmas, Mbarek'in nefret edilen Ulusal Demokratik Partisi'nin lavedilmesi ve geici anayasaya ynelik referandum var. Fakat daha yaplacaklar listesi cesaret kracak kadar uzun. Olaanst hal kaldrlm deil ve parlamento ve devlet bakanl seimleri srekli erteleniyor. Tutulmayan szlerin en rahatsz edici olan, gstericilerin korunmas ve polisin zapt edilmesi konusunda sergilenen kesin baarszlk. Aktivistlere gre son birka ayda 10 binden fazla sivil tutukland, pek ou kablolar ve elektrikli coplarla feci ekilde dvld. Merkezi devlet gvenlik gleri reforma tabi tutulmad ve geen hafta Tahrir Meydan'ndaki protestoda 1.000'den fazla insann yaralanmasna yol aan mdahaleyi bu gler gerekletirdi. Ordunun kendine mahsus otoritesini korumaya alabilecei ynnde korkular sz konusu. Geenlerde bir general yeni anayasann orduyu bte denetiminden muaf tutmas ve siyasete mdahale hakk tanmas gerektiini syledi. Kulaa tandk geliyor deil mi? Umalm ki Msrl devrimciler geici muktedirlerinin zerindeki basky srdrmeyi ve onlar Mbarek dnemi ile kesin bir kopua mecbur etmeyi baarsn. Ayrca Msr'da gerek bir ilerleme, cesur Libyal ve Suriyeli demokratlara, iddet ykl eski rejimler devrildikten sonra blgenin ileriye gidebileceini de gsterecektir.

BDP belongs in Parliament For a couple of days now the blame game has been on when it comes to the impossibility of several elected deputies taking

their seats in Parliament. The Supreme Election Board (YSK) last week stripped Hatip Dicle, one of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)-supported independent candidates, of his right to assume his post. A number of other independents plus three Republican People's Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) representatives who are in jail at the moment, were denied release and so were also not able to take the oath yesterday. Who got Turkey in this post-election mess? Most Justice and Development Party (AKP) politicians and some analysts blame the parties that put these disputed candidates on their electoral lists. The BDP, the CHP and the MHP knew or should have known that having Ergenekon or Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) suspects run for office would create problems. Some critics even think that creating these tensions is a deliberate effort to block Turkey from making progress on finding common ground for a new constitution. Others put the blame on the YSK, and I tend to agree with them. How is it possible that the same body that decided, before the elections, that Dicle and all the other would-be deputies were eligible to be elected as such, comes to the conclusion afterwards that Dicle is not and did not take into account the possibility that the people's representatives would not be released from prison? This is either incompetence, a major misjudgment or, not to be ruled out, a calculated attempt to put sand in Turkey's political machinery. Whichever, it is more than enough reason to start a full overhaul of this body as soon as possible. I fully understand why the aggrieved parties are furious. Whether you agree with them or not, once candidates are allowed to run for Parliament and have managed to collect enough votes, it should not be possible for courts to intervene and obstruct the outcome of democratic elections. I disagree with Dicle and some of the KCK suspects on important points and I have made it clear in the past that allowing Ergenekon suspects to use parliamentary immunity to bypass the judicial proceedings against them is not correct. But all of them were elected by popular vote and should be able to take their seat in Parliament. At the same time, I am deeply convinced that the BDP is making a big mistake by boycotting Parliament. The only way to prevent a repetition of the injustice done to Dicle and the others is to change the laws on which these controversial decisions are based. The only body that can do so is the new Parliament. The BDP has a duty towards the people who voted for them to take part, from the start, in the process of formulating a new constitution and revising outdated laws, like the Counterterrorism Law (TMK), that are still being used against them. The BDP has to make up its mind. Are they only in politics to express the anger and frustration of many Kurds or did they run for Parliament to try and have a real impact on the shape the new Turkey is taking? In an interesting study on Kurdish politics called Activists in Office, the American political scientist Nicole F. Watts comes to the conclusion that most Kurdish parties and movements over the years have pursued multiple aims that are not necessarily complimentary. Using resources for particular activities may further one set of goals, for instance mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Kurds to assert a collective Kurdish we. But these same actions have made forming alliances with the Turkish establishment more difficult. Some of their behavior in the past has been clearly self-defeating. Today's crisis could be a defining moment for the BDP. Does it prefer to be the voice of anger, positioning itself as an anti-

system challenger party? Or are BDP leaders able and willing to overcome their resentment of the present structures and play a constructive role in building new ones in which Kurds get the rights they are entitled to? Time is running out. The answer will determine whether Turkey is entering a phase of positive dynamism or whether it will remain stuck in the divisions of the past. BDP'nin yeri Meclis'tir Baz seilmi vekillerin Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi'ndeki koltuklarna oturmasnn imkansz olduuna dair birka gndr her kafadan bir ses kyor. Herkes birbirini sulayp duruyor. Yksek Seim Kurulu (YSK) geen hafta BDP destekli bamsz adaylardan Hatip Dicle'nin vekilliini drd. Bir grup baka bamszn yannda, u an cezaevinde bulunan CHP ve MHP temsilcisinin tahliye talebi de reddedildi ve onlar da dnk yemin trenine katlamad. Trkiye'yi seim sonrasndaki bu karmaaya kim srkledi? AKP'li siyasetilerin ou ve baz analistler bu tartmal adaylar seim listesine koyan partileri suluyor. Onlara gre BDP, CHP ve MHP, Ergenekon veya KCK zanllarnn sorunlar douracan biliyordu veya bilmeliydi. Hatta baz tenkitiler bu gerilimlerin yaratlmasn, Trkiye'nin yeni anayasaya dair ortak zemin bulmak ynnde ilerleme kaydetmesini engellemeyi amalayan kasti bir aba diye niteliyor. Bazlar ise kabahati YSK'da buluyor ve ben de bu gre katlma eilimindeyim. Nasl oluyor da seimlerden nce Dicle ve btn dier mstakbel vekillerin aday gsterilmeye uygun olduuna hkmeden kurum, seim sonrasnda Dicle'nin halkn temsilcilerinin cezaevinden braklmamas ihtimalini hesaba katmad sonucuna varyor? Bu ya beceriksizlik ve ciddi bir hkm yanll ya da Trkiye'nin siyaset arklarna omak sokmak ynnde hesapl kitapl bir giriim (ki bu son ihtimal yabana atlmamal). Ne olursa olsun, bu kurumu bir an nce tepeden trnaa gzden geirmek iin esasl gerekeler sz konusu. Madur partilerin niye fkelendiini gayet iyi anlyorum. Onlarla ayn fikirde olun veya olmayn, adaylara bir kez Meclis iin yarma izni verildiinde ve yeterince oy almay baardklarnda, mahkemelerin mdahale etmesi ve demokratik seimlerin sonucunu sekteye uratmas mmkn olmamal. Hatip Dicle ve baz KCK zanllaryla nemli hususlarda ayn fikirde deilim ve gemite Ergenekon zanllarnn yarg srecini bypass etmek iin Meclis dokunulmazln kullanmasna izin vermenin doru olmadn aka ifade ettim. Fakat hepsi halkn oylaryla seildi ve Meclis'teki koltuklarna oturmalarna izin verilmeli. te yandan BDP'nin Meclis'i boykot ederek byk bir hata yaptna da kuvvetle inanyorum. Hatip Dicle ve dierlerinin maruz brakld hakszln yinelenmesini nlemenin tek yolu, bu tartmal kararlarn dayand yasalar deitirmektir. Bunu yapabilecek yegane kurum ise Meclis'tir. BDP, yeni bir anayasa formle etme ve hl kendisi aleyhinde kullanlan Terrle Mcadele Yasas gibi miad dolmu kanunlar revize etme srecine bandan itibaren katlmas iin kendisine oy veren insanlara kar sorumlu. BDP akln bana toplamal. Sadece pek ok Krt'n fkesini ve rahatszln ifade etmek iin mi siyasetteler, yoksa yeni bir Trkiye'nin alaca biim zerinde gerek bir etkide bulunmak iin mi milletvekilliine aday oldular? Amerikal siyasetbilimci Nicole F. Watts, Krt siyaseti zerine yapt "Aktivistler Vazife Banda" adl ilgin almasnda u sonuca varyor: "Krt partilerinin ve hareketlerinin ou yllardr ok eitli hedeflerin peinde kouyor ve bunlar illa ki birbirini tamamlayc hedefler deil. Belli aktiviteler iin kaynaklar kullanmak bir dizi hedefi (szgelimi ortak bir Krt 'biz'ini ortaya koymak iin yz binlerce Krt' seferber etmek) ileriye tayabiliyor. Fakat ayn eylemler Trk messes nizam ile ittifaklar oluturmay daha da zorlatryor. Gemiteki davranlarnn bazlar aka kendi kendini ykc nitelik tayor."

Bugnk kriz BDP iin bir kader an olabilir. Sisteme meydan okuyan bir parti konumuna yerleerek fkenin sesi olmay m tercih ediyorlar? Yoksa BDP liderleri mevcut yaplara ynelik kzgnlklarnn stesinden gelip Krtlerin sahip olmas gereken haklar elde ettii yeni yaplar ina etmek konusunda yapc bir rol oynayabilecekler mi ve buna istekliler mi? Vakit tkeniyor. Bu sorunun cevab bir baka sorunun cevabn da belirleyecek: Trkiye pozitif bir dinamizm safhasna m girecek, yoksa gemiin blnmelerine mi aklp kalacak?

Hate speech it was Last week a Dutch court acquitted right-wing populist politician Geert Wilders of hate charges, saying his anti-Islam statements, while offensive to many Muslims, fall within the bounds of legitimate political debate. The judge added that some of Mr. Wilders remarks were rude and denigrating but could not be directly linked to increased discrimination against Muslims. Let me explain why I disagree with the court, especially with its conclusion on the two most important allegations: insulting a group of people (Muslims) based on their religion and incitement to hatred against people (Muslims) based on their religion. The court case against Wilders started when several minority rights groups pressed charges against him because they view Wilders comments on Islam and Muslims as having overstepped the bounds of free speech. From the beginning the case was controversial. Despite the fact that they strongly oppose Mr. Wilders and his anti-Islam utterances, most Dutch politicians and commentators were against putting the leader of the Freedom Party on trial. They believed that his comments were within the limits of free speech and were afraid that the court case would provide Mr. Wilders with another platform, fearing he would present himself as a martyr for free speech, raising his profile further. Many Liberals, in the Netherlands and abroad, were and still are of the opinion that Wilders should not be on trial for what he says about Islam. Instead, mainstream democratic politicians and other opinion leaders should be more brave and outspoken in combating his inflammatory rhetoric. I fully agree with the call for a robust debate on Mr. Wilders and his ideas inside and outside of parliament, although the problem is that most of the time the leading actor is not willing to engage in a meaningful dialogue but instead prefers to make provocative declarations and then rushes off. Where I disagree is that this much-needed confrontation of opinions is a good argument against bringing Mr. Wilders before court to see whether or not his statements breach the law that forbids incitement to hate. As long as there is such a law, it should apply to everybody. Listening to the judges and to many opinion leaders, one gets the impression that Mr. Wilders, because he is a politician, should not be judged in the same way as any ordinary Dutch citizen would be. In my view, politicians are not above the law. As the European Court on Human Rights has stated before, politicians should be extra careful in their expressions, especially on sensitive issues in the public debate. Mr. Wilders clearly is not, on purpose, and asking a judge to have a look at his highly incendiary activities is the full right of any Dutch citizen who feels unfairly treated or discriminated against. For me the heart of the matter was Mr. Wilders statements on Islam and the Quran. An example: The foundation of the problem is the fascist Islam, the sick ideology of Allah and Mohammed as laid down in the Islamic Mein Kampf: the Quran. The court ruled last week that these and other utterances refer to Islam and, therefore, do not incite hatred against people or

to discrimination of people. According to the judge, criticism of religion, any religion, is legitimate and should be tolerated as being covered by the freedom of speech. Therefore, people who adhere to that religion, in this case Muslims, may feel offended but are not entitled to charge the wrongdoer with uttering hate speech. According to me, Wilders equating fascism with Islam does incite hatred against Muslims. Fascism, especially in countries like the Netherlands and Germany, is the most despicable political ideology one can imagine. Fascist symbols and books like Hitlers Mein Kampf are forbidden and people who agree with that worldview, fascists, are hated by the large majority of European citizens and marginalized in politics and society. So when a leading politician repeatedly makes it clear that he despises Islam as much as he does fascism and wants to ban the book that is holy for Muslims, why is anybody surprised that Muslims feel that a wicked interpretation of their religion is the basis for this scaremongering? If this is not inciting hatred against people based on their religion, what is? The ruling of the court in the Wilders case leaves a bad taste in my mouth. Apparently, denigrating Muslims and inciting hatred against them is allowed in the Netherlands, as long as it is done by a politician who is cunning enough to repeat, each time he execrates Islam, that he feels no grudge against the followers of the religion he has just debunked. How can you believe such obvious lies? It is very unfortunate that the judge has walked into that trap, preferring a highly theoretical approach of free speech to a careful evaluation of the baleful influence of hate speech on the position of Muslims in a multireligious society, strengthening the impression that Muslims have become second-class citizens in the Netherlands who can be scorned at random. Bal gibi nefret sylemiydi Geen hafta Hollanda yargs sac poplist siyaseti Geert Wilders' nefret suu ithamlarndan aklad; gereke, slam kart aklamalarnn, pek ok Mslman iin incitici olsa da, meru siyasi tartma snrlar iinde kald ynndeydi. Hakim Wilders'n baz ifadelerinin "kaba ve ktleyici" olduunu, fakat Mslmanlara ynelik artan ayrmclkla dorudan ilikilendirilemeyeceini de gerekeleri arasnda sayd. Mahkemenin kararna niye katlmadm, bilhassa en nemli iki iddiaya ("bir grup insan yani Mslmanlar- mensup olduklar din temelinde aalamak ve insanlara yani Mslmanlara- kar dinlerine dayal nefret yaymak") dair hkmyle niye uyumadm anlatmak isterim. Wilders aleyhindeki dava, aznlk haklarn savunan eitli gruplar, Wilders'n slam ve Mslmanlar hakkndaki szlerinin ifade zgrl snrlarn ihlal ettii iddiasyla mahkemeye bavurmas zerine balad. Dava, bandan beri tartmalara vesile oldu. Wilders'a ve slam kart beyanlarna kuvvetle kar olsalar da, ou Hollandal siyaseti ve yorumcu zgrlk Partisi liderinin yarglanmasna karyd. Yorumlarnn ifade zgrl snrlar dahilinde olduuna inanyorlar ve davann Wilders'a kendisini bir ifade zgrl kahraman gibi gsterip daha da ne karmas iin yeni bir zemin sunmasndan korkuyorlard. Hollanda ve dardaki birok liberal, Wilders'n slam'a dair sylediklerinden dolay yarglanmamas gerektii kanaatindeydi ve hl da yleler. Oysa anaakm demokrat siyasetiler ve dier kanaat liderleri Wilders'n kkrtc sylemiyle mcadele etmek konusunda daha cesur ve ak szl olmalyd.

Her ne kadar tartmann barolndeki ahsn ou zaman anlaml bir diyalog yrtmeye istek duymamas ve bunun yerine kkrtc aklamalar yapp kamay tercih etmesi gibi bir problem sz konusu olsa da, Wilders ve fikirlerinin parlamento iinde ve dnda enine boyuna tartlmas gerektiini syleyenlere tmyle katlyorum. Benim katlmadm husus bu ok ihtiya duyulan fikir mcadelesinin, aklamalarnn nefret yaymay yasaklayan kanunlar ihlal edip etmediini grmek zere Wilders' mahkemeye karmak aleyhinde ciddi bir argman olarak kullanlmas. Ortada byle bir kanun varsa, herkese uygulanmal. Hakimlere ve birok kanaat nderine kulak verdiinizde, srf siyaseti olduu iin Wilders'a sradan Hollanda vatandalaryla ayn ekilde muamele edilmemesi gerektii izlenimine kaplyorsunuz. Bana gre siyasetiler hukukun stnde deildir. Daha nce Avrupa nsan Haklar Mahkemesi'nin de belirttii gibi, siyasetiler bilhassa kamuoyunun tartt hassas konularda sz sylerken daha fazla dikkat gstermelidir. Wilders'n kasten bu dikkati gstermedii aikar ve bir hakimden bu ziyadesiyle kkrtc tutumu gzden geirmesini istemek haksz muameleye veya ayrmcla maruz kaldn dnen her Hollanda vatandann temel hakkdr. Bence meselenin can alc noktas, Wilders'n slam ve Kur'an hakkndaki aklamalaryd. Bir rnek vereyim: "Sorunun temelinde faist slam, Allah ve Muhammed'in hasta ideolojisi var; bu ideolojinin kayna da slami 'Kavgam', yani Kur'an." Mahkeme geen hafta bu ve benzer beyanlarn "slam'a atfta bulunduuna ve bu yzden de insanlara kar nefret yaymadna veya insanlar ayrmcla uratmadna" hkmetti. Hakime gre din eletirisi, herhangi bir dinin eletirilmesi meruydu ve ifade zgrl ilkesi uyarnca msamaha grmeliydi. Velhasl sz konusu dine mensup insanlar (bu rnekte Mslmanlar) incinebilirdi, fakat hakszlk eden ahs nefret sylemiyle sulama hakkna sahip deillerdi. Bana gre Wilders'n slam' faizmle bir tutmas bal gibi Mslmanlara kar nefret yaymaktr. Faizm, bilhassa Hollanda ve Almanya gibi lkelerde, tahayyl edilebilecek en aalk siyasi ideolojidir. Faist semboller ve kitaplar (Hitler'in "Kavgam" mesela) yasaktr ve Avrupa vatandalarnn byk ounluu bu dnya grn benimseyen insanlardan nefret eder ve byle kiiler siyasette ve toplumda dlanr. Bu yzden nde gelen bir siyaseti slam' en az faizm kadar kt bulduunu ve Mslmanlarn kutsal sayd kitab yasaklamak istediini srekli olarak aka dile getirdiinde, Mslmanlarn dinlerinin arpk bir yorumunun bu korku tellallna dayanak edildiini dnmesine kim arabilir? nsanlara kar, dinleri zerinden nefret yaymak bu deilse nedir? Wilders davasnda mahkemenin verdii karar azmda kt bir tat brakyor. Anlalan o ki Hollanda'da, ne zaman slam'a kfretse hemen yanna bu dine inananlara kar hibir kini olmad nakaratn ilitirecek kadar kaarlanm bir siyasetinin azndan kt srece, Mslmanlar aalamaya ve onlara kar nefret yaymaya izin var. Bu bariz yalanlara nasl inanabilirsiniz? Hakimin bu tuzaa derek, ok dinli bir toplumda Mslmanlarn konumunu vahim ekilde etkileyen bu nefret sylemine dair dikkatli bir deerlendirme yerine ifade zgrlne ynelik son derece teorik bir yaklam tercih etmesi, bylece Hollanda'daki Mslmanlarn rastgele itilip kaklabilecek ikinci snf vatandalar haline geldii izlenimini glendirmesi byk talihsizlik.

Eurocrisis: threat and opportunity at the same time Reading about the recent crisis meetings of the EU's ministers of finance, it is hard not to feel some compassion. These guys (plus one French lady who will soon leave for Washington to become head of the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) sit together for hours to discuss the best way to save Greece from going bankrupt. In front of them are advice and proposals prepared by the brightest civil servants at their ministries. But reading the newspapers and watching news programs on television, the ministers cannot but have noticed that many economists, considered as bright as their own assistants, have come up with suggestions that totally contradict those being debated in

Brussels meeting rooms. Despite all the differences among them on specific conditions that Greece has to meet, the general aim of these EU ministers is still to lend Athens enough money to allow the country to pay its creditors and prevent default. These plans are based on a presumption that if Greece were to go down financially, the consequences would be horrible, for Greece, for the EU, for all big banks and for the international economic and monetary system in general. By the way, Turkey would also suffer if things go wrong in Greece. Most foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey is European. If that flow were to stop because European banks and companies face recession, Turkey's already uneven growth could come to a halt quite drastically. At the same time, renowned economists keep asking the question whether Greek bankruptcy should be avoided at all costs. They are afraid that after all these new EU loans, the debt burden for Athens will simply be too big. In order to get these loans, the Papandreou government has to make drastic budget cuts. The austerity measures that are meant to make the Greek economy more competitive in the future are in the short-term hurting much-needed growth. How will Greece be able to pay back all these loans within agreed time limits if economic activity is decreasing? On top of that, how long will the Greek population accept these policies that have such draconian effects on their daily lives. When will the point come when the pain is just too much to bear? With economic specialists fundamentally disagreeing on the best exit strategy, I feel pity for the ministers who have to decide on the least worse option and afterwards go before the cameras and try to convey the message to their citizens that their justified misgivings are not correct and that the ministers are sure their decisions are going to be effective this time around. While struggling with the present euro crisis, the EU is implementing sweeping measures to prevent a new one in the future. Two years ago, no one could have imagined the radical proposals now being discussed and accepted in Brussels. EU member states using the euro will have to put up with intrusive controls by the EU on their budgets. If Brussels is not happy with the plans, they will have to be changed. A financial stability mechanism will be put in place to help eurozone countries that face liquidity problems. The seemingly untouchable Lisbon Treaty will be amended to avoid any legal ambiguity. As Guy Verhofstadt, a former Belgian prime minister and now the leader of the Liberal and Democrat group in the European Parliament, put it: All eurozone countries have realized that effectively they are in the same boat. If the boat springs a leak, everyone sinks. Verhofstadt was always in favor of stronger economic governance at a European level but his plans were seen by most European leaders as naive and not acceptable for a growing number of Eurosceptics in many EU member states. Ironically, as a result of the Greek crisis, Verhofstadt is enjoying his finest moment and he is happy to underline the unpopular truth: If European countries are to emerge stronger from the current crisis, they need to think bigger and put more faith, not less, in the collective enterprise that is the EU. After all, European unification was conceived as a project of pooled sovereignty, not surrendered prosperity. Avro krizi: Tehlike ve frsat bir arada

AB maliye bakanlarnn son kriz toplantlarna dair haberleri okurken merhamet duymamak elde deil. Bu beyler (art, ksa sre sonra Uluslararas Para Fonu'nun bana gemek iin Washington'a gidecek olan bir Fransz bayan) oturup saatlerce Yunanistan' iflastan kurtarmann en iyi yolunun ne olduunu tartyor. nlerinde bakanlklarndaki en parlak memurlar tarafndan hazrlanm tavsiyeler ve neriler var. Fakat bakanlar gazeteleri okuyup televizyondaki haber programlarn seyrettiklerinde en az kendi yardmclar kadar parlak addedilen birok iktisatnn Brksel'deki toplant salonlarnda tartlanlarla klliyen elien neriler ortaya koyduunu grmeden edemiyorlar. Yunanistan'n karlamas gereken belli koullara dair kendi aralarnda hasl olan onca fikir ayrlna ramen AB bakanlarnn genel amac hl, Atina'ya borlarn demesine ve iflas nlemesine yetecek kadar paray vermek. Bu planlar Yunanistan'n mali olarak dibe vurmas halinde sonularnn Yunanistan iin, AB iin, btn byk bankalar iin ve genelde uluslararas ekonomi ve para sistemi iin korkun olaca kansna dayanyor. Bu arada Yunanistan'da ilerin sarpa sarmasndan Trkiye de payna deni alacak. Trkiye'deki dorudan yabanc yatrmn byk ksm Avrupa kaynakl. Bu ak Avrupa bankalar ve irketleri resesyonla yz yze kald iin kesilecek olursa, Trkiye'nin zaten inili kl olan bymesi, son derece vahim bir durgunlua girebilir. te yandan nl iktisatlar, Yunanistan'n iflasnn her ne pahasna olursa olsun engellenmesi gerekip gerekmediine dair sorular sormay srdryor. Btn bu yeni AB kredilerinden sonra, Atina'nn srtndaki bor yknn fazlasyla arlamasndan korkuyorlar. Bu kredileri almak iin Papandreu hkmetinin kallavi bte kesintileri yapmas gerekiyor. Yunanistan ekonomisini gelecekte daha rekabeti hale getirmeyi amalayan kemer skma nlemleri, ksa vadede ok ihtiya duyulan bymeyi zedeliyor. Ekonomik faaliyet yavalad takdirde Yunanistan, btn bu kredileri ngrlen zaman zarfnda nasl deyebilecek? Bunun da tesinde, Yunan halk gnlk hayatlar zerinde bylesine iddetli etkileri olan politikalara daha ne kadar katlanacak? Ac hangi noktada tahamml edilemez hale gelecek? ktisat uzmanlarnn en iyi k stratejisine dair kkl fikir ayrlklar iinde olduu bir ortamda, ktnn en iyisi olan seenee karar vermek ve sonrasnda kameralarn karsna geip vatandalarna hakl korkularnn yersiz olduunu ve bakanlarn aldklar kararlarn bu kez etkili olacandan kuku duymadn anlatmaya alacak olan bakanlara acyorum. AB bir yandan mevcut avro kriziyle bouurken, bir yandan da mstakbel bir baka krizi nlemeyi amalayan sert tedbirleri uyguluyor. ki yl nce u an Brksel'de tartlp kabul edilen radikal nerileri kimse tahayyl edemezdi. Avro kullanan AB yesi lkeler, birliin btelerini ke bucak denetlemesini sineye ekmek zorunda kalacak. Brksel planlardan memnun olmazsa deitirilmeleri gerekecek. Likidite sorunlaryla karlaan avro blgesi lkelerine yardm etmek iin bir mali istikrar mekanizmas devreye sokulacak. Dokunulamaz grnen Lizbon Anlamas, hukuki mulakl nlemek iin deitirilecek. Eski Belika babakan ve u an Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki Liberal Grup'un lideri Guy Verhofstadt'n da dedii gibi: "Btn avro blgesi lkeleri ciddi ciddi ayn gemide olduklarn idrak etmi durumda. Gemi su alrsa herkes batar." Verhofstadt daima Avrupa dzeyinde daha kuvvetli ekonomi ynetiminden yanayd, fakat nerdii planlar Avrupal liderlerin ou tarafndan naif ve birok AB yesi lkede saylar giderek artan Avroseptikler iin kabul edilemez bulundu. ronik olan u ki, Yunanistan krizinin sonucunda Verhofstadt en iyi gnlerini yayor ve ac gerei vurgulamaktan da gayet mutlu: "Eer Avrupa lkeleri mevcut krizden glenerek kacaksa, daha byk dnmek ve adna AB dediimiz ortak giriime daha az deil, daha ok inanmak zorundalar. Neticede Avrupa'nn birlii, refahn feda edilmesi deil, egemenliin birletirilmesi projesi olarak tasarland."

How dare Baykal speak of failure Did Republican Peoples Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kldarolu do a good job by winning 26 percent of the vote in last weekends elections?

If I had to grade him, I would give him seven out of 10. He made a mistake by raising the bar too high during the campaign, suggesting that 30 percent was a realistic target. It was not but apparently the CHP lacks the kind of professional polling expertise the Justice and Development Party (AKP) had in abundance. On the other hand, increasing the partys votes by 3.5 million compared to 2007 is not that bad. He made another mistake by giving in to the old guard in the party, putting Ergenekon suspects and center-right politicians on the list of candidates. By doing so, he confused many potential voters who concluded that there was a yawning gap between these new CHP politicians and the new policies on the Constitution, the Kurdish problem and the military that Kldarolu presented at his rallies. Still, he did manage to create the perception that things were changing inside the CHP. That is no small matter after many years of stagnation under former leader Deniz Baykal. All in all, I think no one could have done better and Kldarolu should now get the chance to prove that he is able and willing to stand up for his new ideas in preparing a new constitution and in finding a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem together with the AKP and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). It did not come as a real surprise that some of the CHP old-style hard-liners were not happy with the new leader and his electoral performance and did not hesitate to start the destruction work immediately after the votes were counted. I probably miss the necessary doses of cynicism and cunning but I had not imagined that the leader of the counterrevolution would be Baykal. I could not believe my eyes when I read his comments on the CHP results, scolding his successor for increasing the partys share of the votes to 26 percent. How shameless can you be? In all the elections that he lost, and there were many, Baykal never managed to win more than 21 percent of the vote. That was in 2007. In the three previous elections, he did not even get to 20 percent (2002), did not get enough votes to get into Parliament (8.7 percent in 1999) and barely jumped over the 10 percent threshold in 1995. So we are witnessing the most experienced loser of elections in Turkish history blaming the man who took over the bankrupt assets one year ago, for not improving the results with 50 percent but only with 25 percent. I know self harm it is an old tradition in the CHP but you would at least expect the one person who knows from his own experience how self-defeating this intra-party bickering is to shut up and let Kldarolu finish what he started. Unless, of course, you are not interested in the future success of the party but want to keep it as an instrument to defend the interests of those people in Turkey who have been misinterpreting developments in this country for decades. Most analysts agree that, in the end, the Baykal-led rebellion will not succeed. But it will take Kldarolu and his team a lot of time and energy to prevent the return of the political zombies. I sincerely wish he could spend that same amount on solving Turkeys problems. One remark on the decision by the prime minister to withdraw all accusations of libel and slander that he had filed against several politicians and journalists in the last couple of months: I have said on many occasions that the AKP leader should not have started these lawsuits in the first place. I now welcome the fact that he has woken up to the fact that these court cases only had one effect: to confirm the perception in Turkey and abroad that Recep Tayyip Erdoan has become an authoritarian

leader who does not accept any criticism. Blaming The Economist and other papers for printing these uncomfortable observations was not the best way of responding. Stopping the pending cases and, hopefully, in the future refraining from opening new ones is. Baykal'n konumaya hakk var m? CHP lideri Kemal Kldarolu'nun geen hafta sonu yaplan seimlerde oylarn yzde 26'sn almas bir baar mdr? Eer Kldarolu'na bir not verecek olsam, 10 zerinden 7 verirdim. CHP lideri yzde 30 oyun gereki bir hedef olduunu iddia edip tay ok yksee koyarak hata yapt. Bu gereki bir hedef deildi, fakat grnen o ki CHP, AKP'nin fazlasyla sahip olduu profesyonel kamuoyu aratrma uzmanlarndan yoksun. Dier yandan, 2007'ye gre partisinin oylarn 3,5 milyon artrmas Kldarolu iin art bir puan. Bir baka hata ise partinin eski muhafzlarna dn verip baz Ergenekon sanklarn ve merkez sa politikaclar milletvekili aday gstermesi oldu. Neticede byle yaparak, bu yeni CHP politikaclaryla, mitinglerde halka sunduu anayasa, Krt sorunu ve orduya ilikin yeni parti politikalar arasnda ciddi uurum olduuna kanaat getiren birok potansiyel semenin akln kartrm oldu. Yine de CHP iinde deiim yaandna dair bir alg oluturmay baard. Bu da eski lider Deniz Baykal dnemine damgasn vuran uzun durgunluktan sonra nemli bir kazan saylr. Bir btn olarak bakldnda, bence hi kimse CHP adna daha iyi bir performans sergileyemezdi. Yeni anayasann hazrlanmas ve Krt sorununa kalc bir zm bulunmas konularnda (tabii AKP ve BDP'yle beraber) ne srd yeni fikirlerin arkasnda durabileceini ve durmaya kararl olduunu gstermesi iin Kldarolu'na bir ans tannmal. CHP'deki eski kafal mfritlerin yeni liderlerinden ve onun seim performansndan memnun olmamalar, oylar saylr saylmaz da ykc faaliyetlere balamalar kimseyi artmad. Belki ben yeterince kurnaz deilim, fakat kar devrimin liderliini Deniz Baykal'n yapaca aklmn kysndan bile gemedi. Baykal'n, CHP'nin seim sonular iin yapt yorumlar okuduumda ve halefi, partisinin oylarn yzde 26'ya kard diye nasl yakndn grdmde gzlerime inanamadm. nsanda biraz utanma olur! Baykal ok sayda seim kaybetti ve bunlarn hibirinde yzde 21'in zerine kmay baaramad. Yzde 21 orann da 2007 ylnda elde etti. Ondan nceki seimde yzde 20 orann bile yakalayamad (2002), meclise girecek oyu alamad (1999'daki oy oran yzde 8,7'ydi) veya 1995'te yzde 10 barajn g bela aabildi. Demek ki Trkiye tarihinin en deneyimli kaybedeninin, kendisinden iflas bayran ekmi bir parti devralan adam, oylarn yzde 50 deil de sadece yzde 25 artrm olmakla itham ettiini gryoruz. CHP'de kkl bir kendi kendini sakatlama gelenei var, bunun farkndaym, fakat insan yine de bu tip parti ii dalaverelerin ne denli zararl olduunu kendi deneyimlerinden bilen bir ahsn enesini kapamasn ve Kldarolu'nun balad ii bitirmesine msaade etmesini bekliyor. Tabii bu kii partisinin baarsndan ziyade bu lkede on yllardr yaanan gelimeleri yanl yorumlayan evrelerin karlarna CHP'yi alet etmek istiyorsa, ona bir ey diyemem. Birok analist Baykal liderliindeki bu isyann baarsz olacanda hemfikir. Fakat siyasi zombilerin dnn engellemek Kldarolu ve ekibine ok fazla zaman ve enerji kaybettirecek. Keke bu zaman ve enerjiyi Trkiye'nin sorunlarna zm bulmaya harcayabilse. Bunu itenlikle diliyorum. Babakan'n son aylarda baz politikac ve gazetecilere ynelik iftira ve hakaret davalarn geri ekme kararna ilikin bir not: Daha nce birok defa sylediim gibi, AKP liderinin bu davalar amas balbana bir hatayd. Erdoan'n, bu tip davalarn Trkiye'de ve darda kendisine dair oluan eletiri kabul etmeyen otoriter bir lidere dnt algsn pekitirmek dnda bir ie yaramadn fark etmesi sevinle karlanacak bir gelime. Bylesi rahatsz edici gzlemlerde bulunan Economist ve onun gibi gazeteleri sulamak, bu tip eletirilere yant vermek iin ideal bir yntem deil. deal olan alm davalardan vazgemek ve gelecekte byle davalar amaktan kanmaktr.

Hiddink in, Hiddink out The moment I am writing this column, it is still not clear whether or not Guus Hiddink, the coach of the Turkish national football team, has agreed to sign a contract with Premier League side Chelsea. The Dutchman and his agent insist that he is still focused on leading Turkey to Euro 2012. One week ago the BBC claimed that a senior official at the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) had told them that Hiddink cant say no to Chelsea; we believe he wants to leave. The TFF reacted to that news by saying that no deal has yet been made and that nothing official can happen before both the Dutchman and Mahmut zgener, the TFF president, are back from vacation. My advice: forget about all these promises and solemn statements. Trust me, within the next few days, Hiddink will announce that he will move from stanbul to London, that he had a great time in Turkey and strongly believes the national team will qualify but that Chelsea made him an offer he could not refuse. Of course, zgener is a clever man and he knows that in order to get the full compensation from Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich, he needs to play hard to get. That is why the TFF president, in between his holiday activities this week, warned Chelsea against making an illegal approach towards Hiddink, who still has one year to go on his contract with the TFF. In case you did not know, the full value of the remaining 12 months on Hiddinks contract is TL 10 million. zgener will only back down when the TFF gets that amount from the Russian billionaire. Maybe you will find me nave, but I am extremely disappointed with Hiddinks behavior. I like him as a person and I think he really did a good job when he was the trainer of PSV Eindhoven and the Dutch and South Korean national teams. But the thin excuses he is using now have discredited him, at least in my view. Hiddink has indicated that he prefers the tempo of a club role to a national coaching job. I feel energetic, so a club is more preferable. And thats what I like, working every day. I feel I need to do more. Come on Guus, fool somebody else. You knew very well what you were doing in February 2010 when you signed a very lucrative contract with the TFF after having done the same job in Russia. Lets face it, Hiddink is doing exactly the same as a growing number of coaches and players is doing these days: they go where the money is and they dont care whether there is a contract or not. Loyalty does not exist anymore in todays football and Hiddink is rude enough to remind us of that uncomfortable truth. I guess some people will call me old fashioned but I find the job not done if coaches commit themselves to a certain task, for instance taking a country to the finals of the European Championships, and then, halfway, decide to change their minds and go somewhere else, always to earn even more money. As TFF President zgener put it, You cannot come to Turkey and then leave when you want. The same applies, by the way, to club coaches who change dressing rooms as easily as they put on a new shirt. It is one of the reasons why I like Manchester United (coached by Sir Alex Ferguson since 1986), the most successful English team in the last decade and Arsenal (coached by Arsne Wenger since 1996), the team that for years has played the most attractive football on the British Isles. Both coaches have shown what a long-term commitment can bring to a club, carefully building up a team, sticking to the same philosophy and integrating young homegrown players. I hate teams like big-spending Chelsea and Manchester City that each year try to buy themselves a title by luring coaches and players away from other clubs with

big contracts. Fortunately, these tactics have, till now, not produced the desired results and I sincerely hope that Hiddinks Chelsea will go through the same experience. Hiddink ieri, Hiddink dar Bu yazy yazdm srada Trk Milli Futbol Takm Teknik Direktr Guus Hiddink'in Premier Lig ekiplerinden Chelsea'nin teklifini kabul edip etmedii hl belirsizdi. Hollandal teknik adam ve menajeri srarla, Euro 2012'de Trk takmnn banda olmay dndn ne sryor. Bir hafta nce BBC, Trkiye Futbol Federasyonu'nun (TFF) st kademelerindeki bir kaynan Hiddink'in "Chelsea'ye hayr diyemeyeceini, ayrlmak istediine inandklarn" sylediini iddia etti. TFF, iddiaya, henz herhangi bir anlama olmadn ve Hiddink ile TFF Bakan Mahmut zgener bir haftalk tatilden dnmeden resmi bir ey gerekleemeyeceini aklayarak cevap verdi. Benim tavsiyem u: Btn bu szleri ve ciddi aklamalar unutun. Bana gvenin: Birka gn iinde Guus Hiddink stanbul'dan Londra'ya tanacan, Trkiye'de ok gzel zaman geirdiini ve Milli Takm'n eleme grubundan kacana inandn, fakat Chelsea'nin kendisine reddedemeyecei bir teklifte bulunduunu aklayacak. Elbette Mahmut zgener zeki biri ve Chelsea'nin sahibi Roman Abramovich'ten tam tazminat almak iin oyunu sk oynamas gerektiini biliyor. TFF Bakan'nn bu hafta, tatilinin ortasnda, Chelsea'yi, TFF ile hl bir yllk szlemesi olan Hiddink'e yasa d bir yaklamda bulunduu konusunda uyarmasnn sebebi de bu. Belki bilmiyorsunuzdur: Hiddink'in szlemesinde kalan 12 ayn tam deeri 10 milyon Trk Liras. zgener ancak TFF bu paray Rus milyarderden aldnda Hiddink'ten vazgeecektir. Beni belki naif bulabilirsiniz, fakat Hiddink'in davranndan derin hayal krklna uradm. nsan olarak kendisini severim; bence PSV Eindhoven'n ve Hollanda ve Gney Kore milli takmlarnn bandayken gerekten byk iler yapt. Fakat u an ne srd zayf bahaneler onu, en azndan benim amdan, gzden dryor. Hiddink, bir kulbn temposunu, milli takm teknik direktrlne yelediini ima ediyor: "Kendimi enerji dolu hissediyorum, bu yzden bir kulp daha tercih edilesi. Ve benim sevdiim ey her gn almak. Daha fazla ey yapmam gerektiini dnyorum." Yapma Guus, bu sylediklerine kargalar bile gler. ubat 2010'da, ayn ii Rusya'da yaptktan sonra TFF ile epey krl bir kontrat imzalarken ne yaptn gayet iyi biliyordun. Eri oturup doru konualm: Hiddink tam da bugnlerde giderek artan sayda teknik direktrn ve oyuncunun yaptn yapyor: Para neredeyse oraya gidiyorlar ve ortada bir szleme olup olmadn umursamyorlar. Bugnn futbolunda sadakat yok artk ve Hiddink bize bu tatsz gerei hatrlatacak kadar nezaketsiz davranyor. Belki bana eski kafal diyenler kacaktr, fakat teknik direktrler kendilerini belli bir greve, szgelimi bir lkeyi Avrupa ampiyonas finallerine karmaya adyorsa ve ardndan yar yolda fikrini deitirip daha fazla para kazanmak iin baka yere gidiyorsa ben bunu normal karlayamam. TFF Bakan Mahmut zgener'in de dedii gibi: "Trkiye'ye gelip cannz istedii zaman ekip gidemezsiniz." te yandan ayns gmlek deitirir gibi kolayca soyunma odas deitiren kulp teknik direktrleri iin de geerli. Son on yln en baarl ngiliz takm Manchester United' (1986'dan bu yana banda Sir Alex Ferguson var) ve Britanya adasnda yllardr en gz alc futbolu oynayan Arsenal'i (teknik direktr 1996'dan beri Arsene Wenger) sevmemin nedenlerinden biri bu. Her iki teknik direktr de bir takm dikkatle ina etmenin, ayn felsefeye sk skya bal kalmann, altyapdan yetien gen oyuncular bnyeye katmann, velhasl uzun dnemli bir inancn bir kulbe neler getirebildiini gsteriyor. Her yl dier kulplerden teknik direktrleri ve oyuncular kallavi szlemelerle ayartarak kendilerine bir isim satn almaya alan Chelsea ve Manchester City gibi para saan takmlardan ise hi hazzetmiyorum. kr ki bu taktikler u ana dek istenen sonular vermedi ve samimi umudum o ki, Hiddink'in Chelsea'si de ayn tecrbeyi tadacak.

Is Turkey ready for a historic compromise? In the first of my articles on the Turkish elections, I concluded that for lack of good ideas the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) will not be able to play an important role in the post-election debates whose outcome will shape Turkey in the next 25 years: a new constitution, solving the Kurdish problem, finalizing the EU accession process and securing a sustainable energy policy. The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) should be a key player in these discussions, especially of course the ones on the constitution and the Kurdish issue, but I am not sure whether that party will be able to convince the other political parties that a confrontational election strategy will not prevent them from playing a constructive role after June 12. Will the change inside the CHP last? That brings us to the question as to what these elections tell us about the capacities of the two big players, the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), to determine the future of Turkey. Lets start with the main opposition party. Even observers who, for good reasons, have always accused the CHP of being the custodian of the status quo, have to admit that the new leadership of Kemal Kldarolu has brought about some remarkable policy changes. Who can imagine Deniz Baykal promoting local autonomy along European lines, being open to education in the mother tongue, supporting parliamentary control of the military or offering constructive ideas on the EU accession process? I know, it is election time and promises are easily made. It is indeed far from clear whether Kldarolu will have the backing of his party on all these points. But his ideas do differ substantially from those of the old CHP on most of the key problems facing Turkey. It would be shortsighted and not very clever to dismiss all those policy ruptures as opportunistic or only intended to deceive the Turkish electorate. A better way of checking out how long-lasting these changes are would be to welcome them as important steps and press the new CHP parliamentary group on a quick and clear delivery. I am not sure whether Kldarolu will be able to control the old guard inside the CHP, of which some are already planning a post-election move against the new leader and his ideas. Lets not forget that there is quite a lot of plotting experience with some of the people surrounding Kldarolu, especially of course with the Ergenekon suspects who were put on the list. I still find it hard to understand why Kldarolu agreed on these candidates, except when one accepts that he is still obliged to look for a compromise inside the CHP with forces that oppose any substantial deviation from the Baykal doctrine. My problem with some comments on Kldarolus efforts to overcome this resistance inside his party is that I do not like the built-in satisfaction when he would fail to do so, based on the analysis that the CHP was, is and will always be the defender of the interests of the state and the old Turkish elite. Such a harsh verdict was well deserved in the past, but personally I would be happy if and when Kldarolu succeeds in reforming the CHP and makes it into a broad based, center-left party that, instead of holding it back, will put pressure on the AKP to continue the transformation process of Turkey into a more open, tolerant and democratic society. It is the big tragedy of Turkeys politics over the last 10 years that such a constructive, pro-reform, center-left party has been missing. Democrats of all convictions should welcome the birth of such a new player on the political stage, even more so when they see that the labors are painful and not over yet.

The burden of power Full responsibility for preparing Turkey for the 21st century was put on the shoulders of the AKP nine years ago. With all the criticism of their performance in some areas, one has to recognize that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoan and his team have done a remarkable job. One does not need to be a seasoned election observer to understand why the AKP will win its third national election in a row, a result of which other European parties can only dream. First and foremost, there is the fact that Turkeys economy has produced more wealth for more people than ever before. Yes, it is true, the ruling partys successful economic policies are based on the recipes of Kemal Dervi, unemployment is still high, the gap between the rich and the poor is as big as before, and there are some risks looming around the corner. Nevertheless, the growth figures are impressive and, even more important, many Turks have the impression that the future can only be better and that the AKP should be thanked for that. Facts, figures and perceptions are significant in elections. But if you cant explain them to a wider audience, you will have a hard time convincing people to vote for you. The AKP is blessed by having both the most charismatic leader and the most professional campaigning machine. Going around the country and being confronted with the massive presence of AKP posters, watching party leaders make their speeches, it does not come as a surprise to see that Erdoan is by far the most popular politician. Add to that the AKPs success in pushing back the role of the military in politics and in strengthening Turkeys image abroad and you have a golden recipe for another victorious election night. Does that mean that there are no clouds in the AKP sky? There are, and some of them are quite dark. The most imminent one in these elections is the strategic mistake made by the ruling party in not delivering on the hopes and expectations raised among the Kurds and the Alevis. Starting the Kurdish and Alevi initiatives in 2009 was a brave thing to do. Stopping them halfway dealt a severe blow to the AKPs image as a pro-reform party and left many potential voters, especially among the Kurds, dissatisfied and angry. In the longer run, I see two major problems for the AKP. One is the old-fashioned way in which this government wants to prepare Turkey for the future. All the crazy plans that have been revealed during the campaign entail more construction, more concrete and steel. Even the Chinese, acknowledging that houses and roads are important, spend a lot of money on innovation, clean energy and smart technologies in order to make their economic growth sustainable. No word on that in the old style developmentalist and environmentally hostile approach of the AKP. There will be an inevitable setback one day. The biggest danger for the AKP comes from the perception among many, Turks and foreigners, that the party has become the vehicle for the boundless ambitions of Erdoan. They do not need The Economist analysis to see that the checks and balances inside the AKP have slowly melted away and have left a leader in charge who does not accept any criticism on his person or his policies. Labeling the growing denunciation of the prime ministers authoritarian tendencies as being antiTurkish or anti-reform would be a grave mistake. Especially among Turkeys friends abroad and among pro-reform democrats in Turkey there is a rising fear that freedom of speech and the media are not in good hands with the AKP leader. Many are afraid that the extremely important debate on the new constitution will be hijacked by the presidential ambitions of the prime minister. These worries should be taken seriously, also by the AKP.

What Turkey needs after June 12 is not another one man-party show. What is necessary is a carefully arranged process of cooperation among the major players in the country to formulate a new constitution, to solve the Kurdish problem and to revitalize the EU accession process. For that to happen we need an AKP that is willing to compromise and a CHP that is able to deliver on its election promises. Trkiye tarih bir uzlamaya hazr m? Trk seimlerine dair ilk yazm, MHP'nin gl fikirler ortaya koymad iin, sonular Trkiye'yi gelecek eyrek asrda ekillendirecek olan seim sonras tartmalarda (yeni bir anayasa, Krt sorununun zlmesi, AB yelii srecinin nihayetlendirilmesi ve srdrlebilir bir enerji politikasnn gvenceye alnmas) nemli bir rol oynayamayaca tespitiyle bitirmitim. BDP bu tartmalarda, bilhassa da anayasa ve Krt sorunuyla ilgili hususlarda kilit bir aktr olmal, fakat bu partinin dier siyasi partileri, srtmeye dayal seim stratejisinin 12 Haziran sonras yapc bir rol oynamasna engel olmayaca konusunda ikna edip edemeyeceinden emin deilim. CHP iindeki deiim srecek mi? Bu da bizi 12 Haziran seimlerinin, iki byk aktr konumundaki CHP ve AKP'nin Trkiye'nin geleceini belirleme kapasitelerine dair ne gsterdii sorusuna getiriyor. Anamuhalefet partisiyle balayalm. CHP'yi statkonun muhafz olmakla sulayan (ve pek de haksz olmayan) gzlemciler bile Kemal Kldarolu'nun yeni liderliinin dikkat ekici baz politika deiikliklerini beraberinde getirdiini kabul etmek zorunda kalyor. Deniz Baykal'n Avrupa esaslarna uygun yerel zerklii desteklediini, anadilde eitime ak olduunu, ordu zerinde parlamento kontrolne arka ktn veya AB yelii srecine dair yapc fikirler ortaya koyduunu kim hayal edebilirdi? Seim zaman vaatlerin kolayca ortaya atldn biliyorum. Kldarolu'nun btn bu hususlarda partisinin desteini alp almayaca da henz olduka belirsiz. Fakat fikirleri, Trkiye'nin kar karya olduu kilit sorunlarn byk ounluunda "eski" CHP'ninkilerden ciddi farkllk arz ediyor. Btn bu siyasi krlmalar oportnistlikten veya Trk semenini kandrma gayretinden ibaret saymak dar grl ve pek aklc olmayan bir tutum olacaktr. Bu deiimlerin ne kadar kalc olduunu snamann daha iyi yolu, bunlar nemli admlar olarak memnuniyetle karlamak ve CHP'nin Meclis'teki yeni grubuna abuk ve sarih bir ekilde hayata geirilmesi ynnde bask yapmaktr. Kldarolu'nun CHP iinde bulunan ve bazlar seimler sonras yeni lidere ve fikirlerine kar harekete geme planlarna oktan balam olan tutucular kontrol edebileceine dair de kukularm var. Kldarolu'nun etrafndaki baz insanlarn, zellikle tabii ki aday gsterilen Ergenekon zanllarnn epey bir entrika tecrbesi olduunu unutmayalm. Kldarolu'nun bu adaylar niye kabul ettiini anlamakta hl zorlanyorum; tek aklamas, CHP iinde Baykal doktrininden ciddi bir sapmaya kar kan glerle uzlama arama mecburiyetinin ortadan kalkmamas olabilir. Kldarolu'nun partisi iindeki bu direniin stesinden gelme gayretlerine dair baz yorumlarla ilgili sorunum u: CHP'nin her daim devletin ve eski Trk sekinlerinin savunucusu olduu ve olaca analizine dayanarak, bunu baaramamas halinde sabit bir memnuniyet duyulacak olmasndan holanmyorum. CHP gemite bylesine ar bir hkm fazlasyla hak ediyordu, fakat Kldarolu CHP'de reform yapmak ve onu frenlemek yerine geni tabanl bir merkez sol parti haline getirmekte baarl olursa/olduunda bundan ahsen mutluluk duyarm; zira byle bir CHP, AKP'nin zerinde, Trkiye'yi daha ak, hogrl ve demokratik bir topluma dntrme srecini devam ettirmek dorultusunda basn oluturacaktr. Trkiye'deki siyasetin son on yldr yaad byk trajedi, byle yapc, reform yanls bir merkez sol partinin olmamas. Btn kanaatlerden demokratlar siyaset sahnesinde byle yeni bir aktrn arz endam etmesinden memnuniyet duymal, deiim srecinin meakkatli olduunu ve henz tamama ermediini grseler bile.

ktidarn yk Trkiye'yi 21. asra hazrlamann btn sorumluluu dokuz yl nce AKP'nin srtna yklendi. Baz alanlardaki performanslarna ynelik tm eletirilerle birlikte, Babakan Erdoan ve ekibinin etkileyici bir i kardn kabul etmek lazm. AKP'nin Avrupa'daki dier partilerin olsa olsa ryasnda grebilecei bir sonula, art arda nc genel seimi kazanacak olmasnn sebebini anlamak iin tecrbeli bir seim gzlemcisi olmaya da gerek yok. En bata Trkiye ekonomisinin daha nce hi olmad kadar fazla insan iin daha ok zenginlik retmesi sz konusu. Evet, iktidar partisinin ekonomi politikalarnn Kemal Dervi'in reetelerine dayand, isizliin hl yksek olduu, zenginle yoksul arasndaki uurumun eskisi kadar derin olduu ve ufukta baz risklerin belirdii doru. Bununla birlikte byme rakamlar gz kamatrc ve daha da nemlisi, birok Trk gelecein daha iyi olaca ve bundan dolay AKP'ye teekkr edilmesi gerektii kanaatinde. Olgular, rakamlar ve kanaatler seimlerde nemlidir. Fakat bunu geni bir kitleye izah edemezseniz, insanlar size oy vermeye ikna etmekte zorlanrsnz. AKP ise hem en karizmatik lidere hem de en profesyonel kampanya aygtna sahip olmasyla ne kyor. lkeyi dolatnzda, her yerde AKP posterleriyle karlatnzda ve konuma yapan parti liderlerini izlediinizde, Tayyip Erdoan'n ak ara en popler siyaseti olduunu grmek artc gelmiyor. Buna AKP'nin ordunun siyasetteki roln geriletmesini ve Trkiye'nin dardaki imajn glendirmesini eklediinizde, bir baka muzaffer seim akamnn altn formln elde ediyorsunuz. Bu AKP'nin semalarnda hi bulut olmad anlamna m geliyor? Bulutlar var ve bazlar gayet kara. Bu seimlerde iktidar partisinin en nemli sorunu, Krtler ve Aleviler arasnda ykselen umutlar ve beklentileri karlamayarak yapt stratejik hata. 2009'da Krt ve Alevi almlarn balatmak cesur bir admd. Bu almlar yar yolda durdurmak AKP'nin reform yanls parti imajna ar darbe vurdu ve bilhassa Krtler arasnda birok potansiyel semeni honutsuz ve fkeli halde brakt. Uzun vadede ise AKP asndan iki nemli sorun gryorum. Biri, bu hkmetin Trkiye'yi gelecee hazrlama istei noktasnda eski moda yntemler kullanmas. Kampanya srasnda aklanan btn "lgn" planlar daha fazla inaat, daha fazla beton ve elik gerektiriyor. Evlerin ve yollarn nemli olduunu kabul eden inliler bile ekonomik bymelerini srdrlebilir klmak iin yeniliklere, temiz enerjiye ve akll teknolojilere bir sr para harcyor. AKP'nin eski usul kalknmac ve evre dman yaklamnda bunun esamisi bile yok. Gnn birinde acs elbet kacaktr. AKP asndan en byk tehlike undan kaynaklanyor: Trkiye'de ve dardaki birok insan, partinin Tayyip Erdoan'n snrsz heveslerinin arac haline geldii kanaatinde. AKP iindeki gler ayrlnn yavaa eridiini ve geride kendisine veya politikalarna ynelik hibir eletiri kabul etmeyen tek bana bir lider braktn grmek iin 'Economist' analizi okumalarna gerek yok. Babakan'n otoriter eilimlerine dair artan eletirileri Trkiye veya reform kartl diye yaftalamak ciddi bir hata olur. Bilhassa Trkiye'nin dardaki dostlar ve Trkiye'deki reform yanls demokratlar arasnda ifade ve medya zgrlnn AKP liderinin ellerinde emniyette olmadna dair korkular artyor. Biroklarnda yeni anayasaya ynelik son derece nemli tartmann Babakan'n cumhurbakanlyla ilgili hevesleri tarafndan rehin alnaca endiesi var. Bu endieler (AKP tarafndan da) ciddiye alnmal. Trkiye'nin 12 Haziran'dan sonra ihtiyac olan ey, yeni bir tek adam partisi ovu deil. Yaplmas gereken, lkedeki byk aktrler arasnda yeni anayasay formle etmek, Krt sorununu zmek ve AB yelii srecini canlandrmak ynnde dikkatle dzenlenmi bir ibirlii sreci balatmak. Bunun gereklemesi iin de uzlamaya istekli bir AKP'ye ve seimde verdii szleri tutabilecek bir CHP'ye ihtiyacmz var.

A brutal election campaign and its aftermath With one week to go till elections, the moment has come to evaluate the performance of the main parties during the election campaign and try to predict which repercussions the pre-election period will have on the functioning of Parliament after June 12.

In this first article I will look at the two junior opposition parties: the Turkish nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). In a second article I will cover the main opposition party, the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Lets start with the MHP. The party has gotten a lot of media attention in the last couple of weeks but that was not related in any way to their campaign. The MHP was rocked by a sex video scandal that was grist to the mill of conspiracy theorists. I guess we will hear more about this after the elections. I really hope that the masterminds behind this smear campaign will one day be exposed. Whatever your opinion is of the behavior of the men involved, from a democratic point of view it is not acceptable that anonymous threats result in the stepping down of important politicians. Shocking events like this not only damage the image of the party concerned but of politics in general. Because the blackmail tactics worked this time, it is an open invitation to every person or group with a grudge against a particular party to resort to dirty tricks to ruin careers. MHP leader Devlet Baheli did his utmost to deny the poisonous impact of the sex scandal on the morale and the internal functioning of the party but the damage was done. A second reason why the MHP was often mentioned by election observers had, again, nothing to do with the things Baheli said or, better, shouted during election rallies. Because all polls indicate that the AKP will again come out as the biggest party, the million dollar question was and still is whether the ruling party will get a simple majority of parliamentary seats or a so-called super majority. In the first scenario, the AKP will have to find a compromise with opposition parties on the new constitution. When, in the second option, the AKP would manage to get more than two thirds of the seats in Parliament, the party could in principle do whatever it wishes without having to look for consensus. The party that will decide whether the first or the second script will be implemented is the MHP. If they pass the 10 percent threshold, the AKP will need to compromise. If the MHP fails to do so, the AKP is free to do what it wants. It has lead to the curious situation that many democrats who believe a national consensus on a new constitution is very important, are forced to hope that a party they strongly disagree with, the MHP, still makes it into Parliament. All the voyeurism and tactical games that explain the presence of the MHP in the headlines should not hide the fact that on policy matters the party had little or nothing interesting to say. I cannot remember a single proposal or initiative that managed to create the impression that the MHP has a plan for Turkey. All we heard was the same old rhetoric based on fears, attacking other parties without coming up with a positive agenda. Baheli is very good in painting the darkest nightmares, but nobody will have any sweet dreams after listening to the MHP leader. When, as seems likely at the moment, the party will make it to Parliament, the conclusion can already be drawn that on the big issues that will be discussed after June 12, the MHP has nothing to contribute. Whether it is on the new constitution or the Kurdish problem or relations with the EU, the MHP has become, more than ever, the party of the uncompromising No, reflecting the negative feelings of a noisy minority in Turkish society but not able to influence the future-oriented debates between the different representatives of the majority in Turkey that wants to move on. A more visible BDP The jury is still out on whether the BDP will be able to play a decisive role in the debates after June 12. They definitively have been very visible in the run-up to the elections, trying to profit fully from the space left by the AKP, after the ruling party

started the Kurdish initiative in 2009 but backed down soon afterwards, leaving behind many extremely disappointed Kurds. Although I fully understand the bitterness felt by many Kurds and the frustration about the promises that were not kept that the BDP is trying to exploit in this campaign, I have very ambivalent feelings about the way the party wants to maximize its electoral support. The functioning of the BDP in the last couple of months mirrors their operation in Parliament since 2007. On the one hand, there were the constructive efforts made to sit down with the AKP and try to find a solution to many of the pressing problems still facing the Kurds, especially those living in the Southeast. That approach included reasonable proposals on regional autonomy, the use of Kurdish by local authorities and, although not fully elaborated yet, plans for the use of their mother tongue in education. Unfortunately, the ruling party was not really interested in including Kurdish politicians and their plans in finding a solution to the Kurdish problem. After the arrests of many elected Kurdish local politicians and the failure to continue with the Kurdish initiative, most Kurds got the impression that the government had given up on them. It strengthened the radicals inside and around the BDP who never believed that gradual reforms or compromises with the AKP would bring the Kurds anything. Maximalist tendencies in the party grew stronger, as we could see in the September 2010 constitutional referendum when the BDP opted for a boycott and the choice for new parliamentary candidates with a militant profile. My worries are based on how the anger about missed opportunities and mounting old style state repression was translated into an election campaign where the use of violence against political opponents has become an almost inextricable element. Using a campaign to ventilate exasperation is one thing, making threats and intimidation an integral part of your electoral efforts is a totally different thing. The problem is not only a moral or tactical one. I know the police have been extremely forceful and brutal on several occasions where BDP politicians were involved. Trying to enter into a competition with the state security apparatus might bring the BDP some extra sympathy votes from among its hardcore constituents. At the same time, there is a real danger that after the elections it will be very hard to step back from the present escalation. The Kurdish problem is real and it needs to be solved, sooner rather than later. That will only happen when after June 12 the AKP, the CHP and the BDP manage to get together and strike a deal. This will include concessions from all parties involved. Is the BDP able and willing to do that after a campaign in which they are burning so many bridges with their future partners? atmal bir seim kampanyas ve sonras -Seimlere bir hafta kalmken, kampanya sreci boyunca belli bal partilerin nasl bir performans sergilediklerini ve seim ncesi dnemde yaananlarn, 12 Haziran sonras parlamentonun ileyii zerinde ne gibi etkilere sahip olabileceini deerlendirme vakti geldi. Bu iki makalede iki kk muhalefet partisine, Trk milliyetisi MHP ile Krt milliyetisi BDP'ye gz atacam. Bir baka makalede ise anamuhalefet partisi CHP ile hkmetteki AKP zerinde duracam. MHP'den balayalm. Parti son haftalarda medyada kendisine ok geni bir yer buldu fakat bu hi de partinin seim kampanyasna bal bir ilgi deildi. MHP bir 'seks kaseti' skandalyla salland ve bu da komplo teorisyenlerinin ekmeine ya

srd. Bence bu konuyla ilgili seimlerden sonra daha fazla ey iiteceiz. Samimiyetle umuyorum ki bu karalama kampanyasnn mimarlar bir gn ortaya karlr. Kasetlerde yer alan adamlarn davranlar hakknda ne dnrseniz dnn, demokratik bir bak asndan nemli politikaclar istifaya zorlayan isimsiz tehditler asla kabul edilemez. Bunun gibi oke edici olaylar sadece ilgili partinin kamuoyundaki imajn deil ayn zamanda genel olarak siyasetin imajn zedeler. antaj taktiklerinin bu durumda ie yaramas, herhangi bir partiye garezi olanlarn bu tip kirli yollara sapp siyasetilerin kariyerlerini mahvetmelerine ak davetiye karyor. MHP lideri Devlet Baheli, kaset skandalnn partisinin moraline ve i ileyiine etki etmemesi iin elinden geleni yapsa da olan oldu bir kere ve parti byk yara ald. MHP'nin, seim almalarn takip eden medya tarafndan sk sk gndeme getirilmesinin bir ikinci nedeni daha var fakat bu da Baheli'nin syledikleriyle, daha dorusu seim meydanlarnda haykrdklaryla ilgili deil. Tm anketler AKP'nin seimlerden tekrar birinci parti olarak kacan gsterdii iin herkesin aklndaki en byk soru u: AKP parlamentoda basit ounluk mu yoksa tek bana iktidar olmasn salayacak bir ounluk mu elde edecek? Birinci senaryoda AKP'nin yeni anayasa konusunda muhalefet partileriyle uzlama yoluna gitmesi gerekecek. kinci senaryoda, yani AKP'nin TBMM'deki sandalyelerin te ikisinden fazlasn elde etmesi durumunda herhangi bir uzlama gerekmeksizin istedii her eyi yapma frsat olacak. Bu iki senaryodan hangisinin hayata geeceini belirleyecek parti ise MHP. Eer MHP yzde 10 barajn aarsa AKP'nin Baheli'nin partisiyle uzlama aramas gerekecektir. Bu yle ilgin bir vaziyetin ortaya kmasna neden oluyor ki, yeni bir anayasa iin ulusal bir uzlamann son derece nemli olduunu dnen birok demokrat, taban tabana zt olduklar bir partinin, yani MHP'nin her eye ramen parlamentoya girmesini istemek zorunda kalyor. MHP'nin niin manetlerden dmediini aklayan tm bu rntgencilik ve taktiksel oyunlar, i siyas meselelere geldiinde MHP'nin dikkate deer hibir ey sylemedii veya ok az ey syledii gereini gizlememeli. MHP'nin Trkiye iin bir projesi olduunu gsteren tek bir neriye veya giriime denk geldiimi hatrlamyorum. ittiklerimiz, varsa yoksa korkuya dayanan ve mspet bir siyasi gndem sunmadan dier partilere saldran o ok bilindik konumalar. Baheli en karanlk kbus tablolar izmekte ok usta ve hi kimse MHP liderini dinledikten sonra tatl ryalara kaplacak gibi durmuyor. Grnen o ki MHP parlamentoya girecek ve imdiden belli olan bir ey varsa, o da 12 Haziran sonras parlamentoda yaplacak nemli tartmalara MHP'nin kataca pek bir ey olmayacak. Sz konusu olan yeni anayasa, Krt meselesi veya AB ile ilikiler olduunda MHP her zamankinden daha uzlamaz bir 'Hayr!' partisi grntsnde. Trk toplumunda bol grlt karan bir aznln olumsuz hislerini temsil eden MHP'nin, ounluk temsilcilerinin lkenin geleceiyle ilgili yaptklar tartmalar etkileyecek yetkinlii yok. BDP'nin 12 Haziran sonras tartmalarda nemli bir rol oynayp oynayamayaca ise henz bilinmiyor. Hkmetin 2009 ylnda balatt ve geride birok hayal krklna uram Krt brakarak ark ettii 'Krt alm' srecinde oluan boluktan olabildiince istifade etmeye alan BDP, seim ncesi dnemde ok belirgin bir yer kaplyor. Her ne kadar birok Krt tarafndan hissedilen fkeyi ve BDP'nin seim kampanyasnda kulland kendilerine verilen fakat tutulmayan szlerle ilgili yaanan derin memnuniyetsizlii anlasam da, oylarn artrmak iin partinin izledii yola dair baz ekincelerim var. Son birka ayda BDP'nin ileyi tarz, 2007'den bu yana parlamentoda yaptklarnn bir yansmas niteliinde. BDP bir yandan AKP ile karlkl oturup, zellikle Gneydou'da yaayan Krtleri ilgilendiren acil sorunlarn zm iin yapc admlar att. Bu admlar blgesel zerklie, Krtenin yerel yneticiler tarafndan kullanlabilmesine ve henz ierii tam olarak belli olmayan, Krtenin eitim dili olmasna ilikin makul neriler ieriyordu. Ne yazk ki hkmet, Krt sorununun zmne Krt siyasetileri ve onlarn tasarlarn dhil etmeye yanamad. Birok seilmi yerel Krt siyasetisinin tutuklanmas ve 'Krt alm'nn arkasnn gelmemesi, Krt kitlelerinde hkmetin onlar yzst brakt izlenimini yaratt. Bu da BDP iinde ve etrafnda bulunan, aamal reformlarn ve AKP ile ibirlii yapmann Krtlere hibir faydasnn dokunmayacana inanan radikallerin eline koz verdi. 2010 ylnn eyll aynda yaplan anayasa referandumunu boykot etmesi ve yeni milletvekili adaylarn militan nitelikte kiilerden semesi gsteriyor ki, BDP iindeki maksimalist eilimler epey glenmi durumda.

Benim endielerim kaan frsatlarn dourduu fkeden ve siyas hasmlara kar iddet kullanmn BDP'nin seim kampanyasnn ayrlmaz bir paras haline getiren eski tarz bir devlet basksnn tekrar uygulamaya konulmu olmasndan kaynaklanyor. Bir seim kampanyasn biriken kzgnlklar ifade etmek iin kullanabilirsiniz, fakat tehdit ve korkutmay seim almanzn ayrlmaz bir paras haline getirmek apayr bir tavrdr. Sorun sadece ahlak veya taktiksel deil. Biliyorum ki BDP'li siyasetilerin yer ald baz durumlarda polis ar g kullanmaktan kanmad. Devletin gvenlik gleriyle ba etmeye almak, kendi semen kitlesinden BDP'ye gelen oylarda bir art salayabilir. Ayn zamanda yle bir tehlike var ki, seimlerden sonra hlihazrda epey bym olan gerginlikten geri adm atmak BDP iin ok zor olabilir. Krt meselesi gerek bir mesele ve en ksa zamanda bir zme kavuturulmal. Bu da ancak 12 Haziran sonrasnda AKP, CHP ve BDP'nin bir araya gelmesi ve bir uzlamaya varmasyla mmkn olacak. Uzlamak iin bu partinin de baz eylerden feragat etmesi art. Gelecekteki ortaklaryla arasndaki birok kpry att bir seim kampanyasndan sonra BDP byle bir uzlamay isteyecek veya bunu gerekletirmeye vkf olacak m?

Trying to look beyond the rhetoric There are 11 days left till the elections on June 12. For columnists and political analysts these should be most exciting times. Democracy in full swing. Party leaders presenting their vision for the future of Turkey, doing their utmost to win over as many voters as possible. Citizens weighing options and ultimately deciding which party has the most convincing story to tell. But is that what we are witnessing these days? I must admit that I cannot get myself really excited about these elections. Reflecting on my lack of enthusiasm, two main reasons came to my mind. One is the absence of a tight race for victory. All opinion polls indicate the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), will come out strongest with more or less the same result as in 2007; the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), will do slightly better than last time; the junior opposition party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), will do worse; and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) will again be able to form a group in the Turkish Parliament after the elections with more than 20 independent candidates. In other words, the most likely outcome of the elections is a copy of the present Parliament, with only minor changes. The only question that keeps everybody busy is whether or not the MHP, troubled by sex scandals, will be able to cross the 10 percent electoral threshold. I agree, the answer is important because if the MHP does not manage to get into Parliament, the chances are big that the AKP will have a two-thirds majority of seats that would allow it to pass a new constitution without having to look for a compromise with the opposition parties. And yes, that would indeed be bad for Turkish democracy. But if the electoral performance of the MHP is the most thrilling part of these elections, I have to confess that this puts me in a very odd situation, I guess similar to many Turks. It forces me to be happy when the party with which I disagree most, does well. On top of that comes a feeling that was very well expressed on Sunday by Markar Esayan in his column in Today's Zaman: I am troubled and my heart aches with sadness when I take a look at the election rallies; I feel like I have been sent back to the Turkey of five decades ago. But maybe worse than this, I see the language and the style exhibited in the squares as a form of disrespect for the wisdom and understanding of Turkey's citizens. A rude style and denigrating rivals is not something the people want. I know, in the run-up to every election, in Turkey and abroad, there is always a big contrast between well-calibrated electoral platforms and nice policy proposals on the one hand and the hard fight out there to get the attention of the media and to persuade voters who are not interested in the details of your post-election plans. An election campaign is something

fundamentally different than a nuanced debate on policy alternatives. But to witness a campaign in which there is hardly any debate at all on the most important challenges that Turkey is facing after June 12 is discouraging -- to put it mildly. Why do Recip Tayyip Erdoan and Kemal Kldarolu not argue about the key concepts that should underpin the new constitution? Why is there no debate on concrete plans to finally solve the Kurdish problem? Why does no opposition party provoke the AKP on its unconditional support for nuclear energy, knowing that after the disaster in Japan most Turks are against investing billions of lira in producing electricity in a way that might put the lives and futures of many Turkish citizens in danger? In my next two articles I will look more in detail into the strong and weak points of all four parties that are represented in the present Parliament. By that I mean their policies in the last few years and their plans for the future because it does matter which ideas will be dominant in some crucial debates after the elections. Be sure, I will not spend any words on the volume or the content of the electoral rhetoric of any of the party leaders. Cafcafl szlerin tesine bakma abas 12 Haziran seimlerine on gn kald. Yorumcular ve siyaset analistleri iin en heyecanl dnem bu olmal. Demokrasinin en civcivli gnleri. Trkiye'nin geleceine dair vizyonlarn anlatan, mmkn mertebe ok semen kazanmak iin elinden geleni yapan parti liderleri. Seenekleri deerlendiren ve nihayetinde en ikna edici hikyeyi hangi partinin anlattna karar veren semenler. Peki bugnlerde tank olduumuz manzara bu mu? Bu seimler karsnda heyecan duymakta hakikaten zorlandm sylemeliyim. Heyecan eksiklii zerine kafa yorduumda ise iki sebep aklma geliyor. Biri yakn bir seim yarnn olmamas. Btn anketler 2007 seimlerinin aa yukar bir benzerinin yaanacan iaret ediyor: ktidardaki Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (AKP) ak ara birinci kacak, anamuhalefetteki Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) oylarn biraz artracak, muhalefetin kk aya Milliyeti Hareket Partisi (MHP) oy kaybedecek ve Bar ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) Meclis'te grup kurmasn salayan 20 veya zerinde vekili yine karacak. Dier bir deyile, seimlerin en muhtemel sonucu, mevcut Meclis'in sadece kk deiikliklerle bir kopyas olacak. Herkesin kafasn megul eden yegane soru, seks skandallaryla ba dertte olan MHP'nin yzde 10'luk seim barajn geip geemeyecei. Cevabn mhim olduuna katlyorum. nk MHP Meclis'e giremedii takdirde AKP'nin vekilliklerin te ikisini kazanp muhalefet partileriyle uzlama aramakszn yeni bir anayasay geirme imkn bulmas gl ihtimal haline gelecek. Ve evet, bu Trk demokrasisi iin gerekten de kt olacak. Fakat MHP'nin seim performans bu seimlerin en heyecan verici ksmysa, bunun beni, sanrm birok Trk gibi, son derece tuhaf bir duruma srklediini; fikirlerimin en uyumad partinin seimde iyi performans gstermesinden mutlu olmak zorunda braktn itiraf etmeliyim. Bunun da tesinde, iki gn nce Markar Esayan'n Today's Zaman'daki kesinde gayet gzel ifade ettii bir duygu hasl oluyor. Esayan unlar yazyor: "Seim mitinglerine baktmda rahatszlk duyuyorum ve kalbim zntyle burkuluyor; elli yl nceki Trkiye'ye geri gnderilmi gibi hissediyorum. Fakat belki bundan da kts, meydanlarda kullanlan dil ve slubu Trkiye vatandalarnn aklna ve zeksna bir tr saygszlk olarak gryorum. (...) Kaba bir slup ve rakipleri ktlemek, halkn istedii bir ey deil." ster Trkiye'de ister baka lkelerde olsun, her seim ncesi, bir yanda iyi hazrlanm seim programlar ve ho politika nerileri ile, dier yanda medyann dikkatini ekmek ve seim sonras planlarnzn ayrntlaryla ilgilenmeyen semenleri ikna etmek iin verilen sk mcadele arasnda daima byk bir tezat olduunu biliyorum. Bir seim kampanyas, alternatif politikalar zerine kl krk yaran bir tartmadan klliyen farkl bir ey.

Fakat Trkiye'nin 12 Haziran sonras karlaaca en nemli sorunlar zerine neredeyse hi tartlmayan bir kampanyaya tank olmak, en hafif tabiriyle, cesaret krc. Erdoan ve Kldarolu, yeni anayasann temeli olmas gereken kilit kavramlar hakknda niye tartmyorlar? Krt sorununu nihayet zmek ynnde somut planlar zerine niye hi tartma yok? Japonya'daki felaketin ardndan Trklerin byk ounluunun birok vatandan hayatn ve geleceini tehlikeye atabilecek bir enerji retim ekline milyarlarca lira yatrlmasna kar olduunu bildikleri halde niye hibir muhalefet partisi kp AKP'ye nkleer enerjiye verdii kaytsz artsz destek konusunda yklenmiyor? Sonraki iki yazmda mevcut Meclis'te temsil edilen drt partinin gl ve zayf taraflarna daha detayl bakmaya alacam. Bundan kastm, son birka yldr izledikleri politikalar ve gelecee dair planlar. nk seim sonras baz hayati tartmalarda hangi fikirlerin hakim olaca son derece mhim. Bunu yaparken, parti liderlerinin cafcafl seim nutuklarnn grlts veya ieriine tek bir kelime hasretmeyeceimden kukunuz olmasn.

A bad year for bad people It took more than 15 years, but last Thursday it finally happened: the arrest of Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb military during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which around 100,000 people were killed. Mladic faces 15 charges of war crimes, the most notorious one being the murder of 7,500 Muslim men and boys in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in July 1995. All over Europe Mladics arrest was welcomed with a mix of happiness and regret that it had taken so long to get him. It was indeed a big day for all the people who, in one way or the other, were involved in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. But, especially of course for the families of the victims of Mladic and his murderous army. For me personally the war in Bosnia fundamentally changed my opinion on the use of violence and the need for military intervention when human rights are being violated on such a massive scale. I will never forget the pictures of the tanks on the hills surrounding Sarajevo, shelling the poor city between 1992 and 1995. Snipers shooting at every living creature they could detect between the rubble. During three years of the siege, 10,000 people were killed in the Bosnian capital alone. And the commander of that campaign of terror was Mladic. It was only stopped when American warplanes bombed the Serb troops and forced them to retreat. The most infamous act of cruelty by the Butcher of Bosnia was the coldblooded murder of 7,500 unarmed Bosnian Muslims in and around Srebrenica. On July 11, 2005, 10 years after the worst crime in Europe since the Nazis, I visited the town where these horrors took place to attend a commemoration service. We walked through the remnants of the small military base that was defended by Dutch UN troops and considered by the men and women of Srebrenica as a safe haven. I vividly remembered the images of frightened locals asking for help and protection from young and inexperienced soldiers who had no idea how to deal with the looming cynical and intimidating tactics of the Bosnian Serb army commanded by Mladic. The Dutch were no match for the experienced war criminal. He forced them to leave and then separated the men from the women and killed all the males in the hills around, dumping their bodies in mass graves that were to be discovered years later. In July 2005, hundreds of coffins covered with green cloths were lined up at a huge graveyard, waiting to be buried. They contained the remains of the bodies found in some of the mass graves months before. Women in black were preparing

freshly dug holes in the ground. It was difficult not to cry, faced with so much sadness and so much proof of what the madness of ethnic cleansing leads to. For many, Mladic was and still is the symbol of this dark period in European history. Together with Radovan Karadic, a Bosnian Serb wartime political leader, he managed to escape justice following the end of the war. The fact that the Serbian government was not able or not willing to find both war criminals was the most significant reason why the EU has been extremely hesitant to start accession negotiations with Serbia. Lets hope that after the arrest of Karadic in 2008, the capture of Mladic last week will enable Serbia to start its long road towards EU membership. In the next couple of years, at the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague, the world will be confronted, once again, with the horrors of the Bosnian genocide when Karadic and Mladic stand trial. It will be ugly and necessary at the same time to show other mass murderers that they may flee justice for some time, but that in the end there is no escape. When a BBC journalist last week announced the arrest of the retired Bosnian Serb general, he called it A bad year for bad people, reminding us of the fall, death and arrest of Hosni Mubarak, Osama bin Laden and Ratko Mladic. And it is only May. Kt insanlar iin kt bir yl 15 yl srd, fakat geen perembe nihayet gerekleti: 1992-95 yllar arasnda Bosna-Hersek'te 100 bin insann hayatna mal olan sava srasnda Bosnal Srplarn komutanln yapan Ratko Mladi tutukland. Mladi on be ayr sava suuyla itham ediliyor; en vahimi Temmuz 1995'te Bosna kasabas Srebrenica'da 7500 erkein ve olan ocuunun ldrlmesi. Mladi'in tutuklanmas Avrupa'nn drt bir kesinde sevinle karland; mutlulua, tutuklanmasnn bu kadar uzun srmesinden kaynakl znt elik ediyordu. 1990'lardaki Balkan savalarnda o veya bu ekilde dahli olan btn insanlar iin; fakat elbette bilhassa Mladi ve cani ordusunun kurbanlarnn aileleri iin gerekten de byk bir gnd. ahsen benim iin Bosna'daki sava, insan haklar bylesine byk bir lekte ihlal ediliyorken iddet kullanmaya ve asker mdahalede bulunmann gerekliliine dair fikirlerimi temelinden deitirdi. Saraybosna'y evreleyen tepelerde konulanm, 1992-95 arasnda zavall kenti topa tutan tanklarn fotoraflarn asla unutmayacam. Keskin nianclar ykntlar arasnda tespit edebildikleri btn canllara ate ediyordu. 3 yllk kuatmada sadece Bosna bakentinde 10 bin insan ldrld. Bu terr harektnn komutan Ratko Mladi'ti. Bu dehet ancak Amerikan sava uaklar Srp birliklerini bombalayp geri ekilmek zorunda braktnda sona erdi. "Bosna Kasab"nn en vahim vahet eylemi Srebrenica iinde ve civarnda 7500 silahsz Bosnal Mslman'n soukkanllkla ldrlmesiydi. 11 Temmuz 2005'te, Nazilerden beri Avrupa'da ilenen en vahim suun onuncu ylnda, anma trenine katlmak zere katliamlarn gerekletirildii kasabaya gittim. Srebrenical erkek ve kadnlarn 'gvenli snak' olarak grd, Hollandal BM birlikleri tarafndan korunan kk asker ssn kalntlarn gezdik. Korku iindeki kasaballar, Ratko Mladi komutanlnda yaklaan Bosna Srp ordusunun sinsi ve yldrc taktikleriyle nasl baa kaca konusunda hibir fikri olmayan gen ve deneyimsiz askerlerden yardm ve koruma isterken gsteren resimleri tm canllyla hatrlyordum. Hollandallar bu tecrbeli sava sulusunun dengi deildi. Mladi onlar ss terk etmeye zorlad, ardndan erkekleri kadnlardan ayrd ve civar tepelerdeki btn erkekleri ldrd. Cesetleri, ancak yllar sonra bulunabilen toplu mezarlara doldurdu.

Temmuz 2005'te yeil rtlere sarlm yzlerce tabut devasa mezarlkta yan yana dizilmi, defnedilmeyi bekliyordu. Baz toplu mezarlarda birka ay nce bulunmu cesetlerin kalntlar vard ilerinde. Siyahlara brnm kadnlar topraa yeni kazlm ukurlar hazrlyorlard. Bylesine byk bir ac ve etnik temizlik lgnlnn nelere yol atna dair bu kadar ok kant karsnda alamamak ok zordu. Biroklar iin Ratko Mladi, Avrupa tarihindeki bu karanlk dnemin simgesiydi ve hl yle. Bosnal Srplarn sava dnemindeki siyas lideri Radovan Karaci'le birlikte savan sona ermesinin ardndan adaletten kamay baard. AB'nin Srbistan ile yelik mzakereleri balatmakta bu kadar tereddt etmesinin en nemli sebebi, Srp hkmetinin her iki sava sulusunu bulamamas veya bulmay istememesiydi. Umalm ki 2008'de Karaci'in tutuklanmasnn ardndan geen hafta da Mladi'in yakalanmas Srbistan'n uzun AB yelii yolculuuna balamasn salasn. Gelecek birka ylda dnya, Karaci ve Mladi Lahey'deki eski Yugoslavya, Sava Sular Mahkemesi'nde yarglanrken, bir kez daha Bosna soykrmnn dehetiyle yzleecek. Naho, ayn zamanda zaruri bir yzleme olacak bu. Dier kitle katliamclarna, adaletten bir sre kaabileceklerini, fakat eninde sonunda yakay ele vereceklerini gstermek asndan da son derece nemli yarglamalar olacak. BBC'den bir gazeteci geen hafta emekli Bosnal Srp generalin yakalandn duyururken, Hsn Mbarek'in devrilmesini, same bin Ladin'in ldrlmesini ve Ratko Mladi'in tutuklanmasn hatrlatarak, "Kt insanlar iin kt bir yl" ifadesini kulland. Ve daha mays ayndayz.

The last generation Last week Diyarbakr Mayor Osman Baydemir gave a warning that all of us should take extremely seriously. Baydemir, seen by many as one of the moderate voices in the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), said that the current leaders of the BDP are the last Kurdish generation that the Turkish state can negotiate and shake hands with. According to him there is a new generation that is not willing to compromise anymore, and their radical stance has started to influence some of the older generation as well. A major gap has developed in the way people in Turkey's West and East feel about each other, Baydemir stated. We no longer can sympathize with each other. This is unfortunate, but it is how it is. A few weeks ago I was talking to a Kurdish academician and women's rights activist who lives in Diyarbakr. She told me exactly the same. Her generation, let's say the ones between 30 and 45 years old, had not been directly involved in the cruel and violent suppression of Kurdish nationalists after the 1980 coup. They knew the horror stories from Diyarbakr prison, but these memories did not reflect their own daily experiences. Most of them, she explained, wanted to move on in life, learn Turkish and become part of Turkish society. They were afraid of the power of the Turkish Army and its omnipresence in the region, and therefore did not look for confrontations. Many of her generation knew perfectly well that Kurds were discriminated against, and they hated it. At the same time, they realized that armed resistance would not bring them anything. Getting educated and finding a proper job were their way of escaping the ongoing oppression of Kurdish culture and language. But that mentality is rapidly disappearing, she warned. There is a whole new generation of kids between 15 and 25 who are not afraid of the police or the army and take to the streets to pick a fight in which they might even get killed. But they don't care. Most of them are uneducated, but even the ones that finished school have given up hope that things will improve. They grew up during times when expectations were high, and many Kurds expected changes to finally take place that would

remove most of the old obstacles. Indeed, some things did change, ranging from TRT 6 to Kurdish politicians being able to speak Kurdish during election rallies. But much remained the same. Initiatives were stopped half way, and a growing number of young Kurds got sick and tired of all the broken promises and the endless repetition of old arguments by all sides. This new generation, my conversation partner told me, does not believe in gradual change or living together with Turks anymore. For them small steps or a soft spoken recognition of some of their demands are not enough. They want their rights, and they want them now. What does all of this mean for the debate on the Kurdish problem that for good reasons plays such an important role in the election campaign? I am afraid that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) does not realize how big the frustration is among many Kurds, not only the young ones, after the ruling party gave up on its own plans and after the prime minister recently declared that there is no Kurdish problem. Hundreds of Kurdish politicians are in prison, and military operations in the region have killed dozens of people over the last couple of months. Nobody understands why the government approves of this old style oppression, except for electoral opportunism, pandering to nationalist voters. The party that will profit from this disillusionment on June 12 is the BDP. But even the BDP seems to have only limited opportunities to check and control the new radicalism in the Southeast. After the elections the AKP and the BDP will have the chance, one more time, to sit down and find a historic compromise on the Kurdish question, with the support of the Republican People's Party (CHP) that under Kldarolu has indicated its willingness to cooperate constructively on this issue. It seems to be the last chance for this generation of Turkish and Kurdish politicians. If they fail again, I am afraid that, unfortunately, Baydemir will be proven right. Son kuak Geen hafta Diyarbakr Belediye Bakan Osman Baydemir hepimizin had safhada ciddiye almas gereken bir uyarda bulundu. Biroklarnn Bar ve Demokrasi Partisi'ndeki (BDP) lml seslerden biri olarak grd Baydemir, BDP'nin mevcut liderlerinin Trk devletinin mzakere edip tokalaabilecei son Krt kua olduunu syledi. Diyarbakr Belediye Bakan'na gre artk uzlamak istemeyen yeni bir kuak var ve onlarn radikal tavr baz eski kuak mensuplarn da etkilemeye balad. Trkiye'nin bats ve dousunda yaayan insanlarn birbirleri hakkndaki dnceleri arasnda byk bir mesafe olutuunu belirten Baydemir, "Artk duygudalk yaayamyoruz. Bu ok ac bir durum, fakat gerek bu." diye konutu. Birka hafta nce Diyarbakr'da yaayan Krt bir akademisyen ve kadn haklar aktivistiyle konutum. Bana tam da ayn eyleri syledi. Onun kua, diyelim ki 30 ile 45 yalar arasndakiler, 1980 darbesi sonras Krt milliyetilerinin acmasz ve iddetli bir ekilde ezilmesini dorudan tecrbe etmemiti. Diyarbakr Cezaevi'ndeki tyler rpertici hikyeleri biliyorlard, fakat bu hatralar kendi gnlk deneyimlerini yanstmyordu. Dediine gre, kendi kuandakilerin byk ounluu hayatta ilerlemek, Trke renmek ve Trk toplumunun paras olmak istemiti. Trk ordusunun gcnden ve blgenin her yerinde gze arpan varlndan korkuyorlar, bu yzden atmaya girmekten kanyorlard. Birok kuakda Krtlerin ayrmcla uradn gayet iyi biliyor ve bundan nefret ediyordu. te yandan silahl direniin kendilerine bir ey getirmeyeceini de gryorlard. Eitim almak ve dzgn bir i bulmak, onlarn Krt kltrnn ve dilinin sregiden bastrlmasndan kamann yoluydu. Krt akademisyen bu dnme biiminin hzla kaybolduu uyarsnda bulunuyor. Ona gre 15-25 ya arasnda ocuklardan oluan tamamen yeni bir kuak var ve onlar polis veya ordudan korkmuyor, ldrlebilecek bile olsalar sokaklara kp

atyorlar. lm tehlikesi umurlarnda deil. Byk ounluu eitimsiz, fakat okul bitirenler bile bir eylerin deiecei umudunu yitirmi durumda. Beklentilerin yksek olduu ve birok Krt'n nihayet gemiteki engellerin ounu ortadan kaldracak deiimler yaanacan umut ettii bir dnemde bydler. Baz eyler gerekten de deiti; szgelimi TRT 6 yayna balad, Krt siyasetiler seim mitinglerinde Krte konuabiliyor. Fakat ou ey de ayn kald. Almlar yar yolda tkand ve giderek artan sayda gen Krt tutulmayan onca szden, eski argmanlarn btn taraflarca srekli tekrarlanmasndan rahatsz ve bkp usanm durumda. te bu yeni kuak bir eylerin adm adm deieceine veya Trklerle birlikte yaamaya artk inanmyor. Onlar iin kk admlar veya baz taleplerinin yumuak bir yaklamla tannmas yeterli deil. Haklarn istiyorlar ve o haklar hemen imdi istiyorlar. Seim kampanyasnda haliyle bylesine nemli bir rol oynayan Krt sorununa dair tartma asndan btn bunlarn anlam ne? Korkarm ki AKP, birok Krt'n duyduu bu rahatszln ne kadar byk ve ciddi olduunu idrak etmiyor. ktidar partisinin Krt meselesine dair planlarndan vazgemesi ve geenlerde Babakan'n Krt sorunu diye bir ey olmadn ilan etmesi sonras genlerden ibaret kalmayan bir rahatszlk bu. Yzlerce Krt siyaseti hapiste ve son birka aydr blgede dzenlenen asker operasyonlarda yzlerce kii ldrld. Hkmetin bu eski tarz baskya niye cevaz verdiini kimse anlamyor; tek izah, milliyeti oylara gz krpan bir seim oportnizmi olabilir. 12 Haziran'da bu d krklndan kazanl kacak taraf BDP olacak. Fakat anlalan o ki, BDP bile Gneydou'daki yeni radikalizmi dizginleyip denetlemek ynnde ancak snrl bir gce sahip. Seimlerden sonra AKP ve BDP, masaya oturup, CHP'nin de desteiyle Krt sorununda tarih bir uzlamaya varmak konusunda bir frsat daha elde edecek. Kldarolu liderliindeki CHP de bu meselede yapc bir ibirliine istekli olduunun iaretini verdi. Bu, mevcut Trk ve Krt siyasetiler kuann son ans gibi grnyor. Yine baarsz olurlarsa, korkarm ve ne yazk ki Baydemir hakl kacak.

The problem with Internet filters Last week, on May 15, thousands of people, mainly in stanbul, took to the streets to protest a new system of filtering the Internet. According to the demonstrators, the directives that will come into effect on Aug. 22 will place Turkey among the worlds top Internet censoring countries. The new regulations have been introduced by the Information Technologies and Communications Authority (BTK). It will require Internet service providers in Turkey to offer consumers four choices for filtering the Internet. According to the BTK, three of them, labeled children, family and domestic, are being introduced because many Turkish Internet users have asked for them. They have complained about pornography, gambling and other offensive Internet content that they do not want to be confronted with. They want the state to protect them, and by introducing the filters that will limit access to many sites, the BTK is responding to these demands. For those Internet users who do not want the state to intervene, the BTK is offering the so-called standard option that, according to the BTK chairman and the responsible minister, does not contain any filters. That all sounds reasonable, doesnt it? So what is the problem? First, there is a lack of clarity about the standard option. The BTK says that Internet users will not be obliged to choose one of the three filtering options and that the standard option will allow everybody who so wishes to continue with their present Internet use. Opponents claim that also the standard option contains filters and, moreover, that the BTK is not willing to make the criteria for the standard option public. So what do you get when you go for the standard option? Will that be filtering lite, or will it allow full freedom for every user without any interference from the state? Second and more important, the announcement of the new regulations has raised some fundamental questions. Should

there be Internet filters at all, and who should be responsible for introducing them? Contrary to what many demonstrators alleged last week, having Internet filters in place is not always wrong, and it is not a typical Turkish problem. I would advise everybody to visit the website of OpenNet Initiative (http://opennet.net), dedicated to inform people around the globe about free access to the Internet. When you look at the situation in the rest of Europe, there is a long list of efforts to filter unwanted content. Most countries filter child pornography, others use filters to prevent copyright infringement or hate speech. Attempts are undertaken at the EU level to study new filtering technologies to fight illegal content. But it is important to notice that most of these plans are not aimed at giving governments more instruments for censorship. Based on years of experience, they promote voluntary self-regulation by the Internet industry, and they encourage Internet service providers to provide filtering tools and rating systems that enable parents and teachers to regulate the access of Internet content by children in their care, while allowing adults access to legal content. What is at stake in Turkey is not the death of the Internet, as some cheap slogans suggested last week. The problem is that the Turkish state is making the wrong choices. My advice to the BTK and the government: Encourage providers, schools and Internet cafs to use filter programs, but stay out of the filtering business yourself as much as possible. Press those who provide filters to make it clear which criteria they are applying and which kind of sites are being blocked. Give the guarantee that there will always be a zero filter option available for Internet users in Turkey. Stop blocking access to hundreds of alternative media websites that have nothing to do with pornography. The debate on how to regulate the Internet will continue, not only in Turkey, and the choices will not always be as black and white as some suggest. But lessons can be learned. States like China and Iran that have erected extensive censorship and surveillance regimes online have found them hard to implement with any degree of accuracy and fairness. The threat to innovation and creativity is high. I hope that Turkey will make the right decisions in the future based on a desire for an open culture, not a closed one. nternet filtreleriyle ilgili sorun ne? Geen hafta 15 Mays'ta, bata stanbul olmak zere, pek ok kentte binlerce insan, internetin filtrelenmesini ngren yeni sistemi protesto etmek zere sokaklara dkld. Gstericilere gre, 22 Austos'ta yrrle girecek olan ynetmelik Trkiye'yi dnyadaki en vahim internet sansrcleri arasna sokacak. Yeni dzenlemeler Bilgi Teknolojileri ve letiim Kurulu (BTK) tarafndan hazrland. Ynetmelik, Trkiye'deki servis salayclarnn tketicilere interneti filtreleme konusunda drt tercih sunmasn gerektiriyor. BTK'ye baklrsa, bunlardan , yani "ocuk", "aile" ve "yurtii" denilen filtreler, ok sayda Trk internet kullancsnn talebinden kaynaklanyor. Bu kullanclar, pornografi, kumar ve dier karlamak istemedikleri zararl internet ieriinden ikayeti. Devletin kendilerini bu ierikten korumasn istiyorlar; BTK de birok siteye eriimi snrlayacak filtreler koyarak bu taleplere karlk vermi oluyor. Devletin mdahale etmesini istemeyen internet kullanclar iinse BTK "standart" denilen seenei sunuyor; BTK bakan ve internetten sorumlu bakana gre, bu seenek hibir filtre iermiyor. Btn bunlar kulaa makul geliyor deil mi? yleyse sorun ne? Birincisi, ortada "standart" seenei ile ilgili tam bir aklk yok. BTK internet kullanclarnn filtre seeneinden birini tercih etmek mecburiyetinde olmadn ve "standart" seeneinin mevcut internet kullanmn aynen srdrmek isteyenlere bu imkan vereceini sylyor. Kartlar ise "standart" seeneinin de filtreler ierdiini, dahas BTK'nin "standart" seenei iin

kriterlerin ne olduunu kamuoyuna aklamaya niyetli olmadn savunuyor. Yani "standart" seenei zerinden devam ettiinizde ne alacaksnz? Bu bir tr "light filtreleme" mi olacak, yoksa isteyen her kullancya devletin hibir mdahalesi olmakszn tam zgrlk verecek mi? kinci ve daha nemli husus, yeni dzenlemelere dair aklamann baz temel sorular gndeme getirmi olmas. nternet filtreleri hi olmamal m ve bunlarn uygulanmasndan kim sorumlu olmal? Geen hafta birok gstericinin iddia ettiinin aksine, internet filtrelerinin konmas her daim yanl deil ve bu Trkiye'ye has bir mesele de deil. Dnya apnda internete zgr eriim konusunda insanlar bilgilendirmeyi amalayan OpenNet nisiyatifi'nin internet sitesini (http://opennet.net) ziyaret etmesini herkese tavsiye ederim. Avrupa'nn geri kalanndaki duruma baktnzda, istenmeyen ierii filtreleme abalarna dair uzun bir liste gryorsunuz. lkelerin ou ocuk pornografisini filtrelerken, telif hakk ihlallerini veya nefret sylemini nlemek iin filtre koyan lkeler de var. AB dzeyinde yasad ierikle mcadele iin yeni filtreleme teknolojileri gelitirmek ynnde abalar sz konusu. Fakat bu planlarn byk ksmnn hkmetlere daha ok sansr imkan salamay amalamadna dikkat etmek nemli. Yllarn tecrbesine dayanarak internet endstrisinin gnll olarak kendi kendini dzenlemesini tevik ediyorlar ve internet servis salayclarn, ebeveynlerin ve retmenlerin sorumluluklar altndaki ocuklarn internet ieriine eriimini dzenleyebilecekleri, bu arada yetikinlere de yasal ierie eriim imkan veren filtreleme aralar ve snflandrma sistemleri sunmak konusunda cesaretlendiriyorlar. Trkiye'de mevzubahis olan mesele, geen hafta baz ucuz sloganlarn iddia ettii gibi, "internetin lm" deil. Mesele, Trk devletinin yanl tercihlerde bulunmas. BTK'ye ve hkmete tavsiyem u: 1. Servis salayclarn, okullar ve internet kafeleri filtre programlar kullanmaya tevik edin, fakat filtreleme iine kendiniz girmekten mmkn olduunca kann. Filtreler koyanlarn hangi kriterleri uyguladklarn ve ne trde sitelerin bloke edildiini aka belirtmelerini salayn. 2. Trkiye'deki internet kullanclar iin her zaman bir "sfr filtre" seeneinin var olaca garantisini verin. 3. Pornografiyle hibir alakas olmayan yzlerce alternatif medya sitesine eriimi engellemekten vazgein. nternetin nasl dzenleneceine dair tartma, sadece Trkiye'de deil, btn dnyada devam edecek ve seenekler bazlarnn sand gibi her zaman ak ve kara eklinde olmayacak. Fakat dersler karlabilir. nternet zerinde geni kapsaml sansr ve takip sistemleri kuran in ve ran gibi lkeler, bunlar isabetli ve adil bir ekilde uygulamakta zorlanyor. Yenilikilik ve yaratcla ciddi bir tehdit sz konusu oluyor. Trkiye'nin gelecekte, kapal deil ak bir kltre duyulan arzu temelinde, doru kararlar alacan umut ediyorum.

Georgia on my mind It hardly comes as a surprise to see that during an election campaign marked by low-level bickering, there is no room for meaningful debates about Turkeys foreign policy. In Europe and the US, discussions on Turkeys role in the world focus on the problems between Turkey and the EU and, on a positive note, Turkeys potential to influence the outcome of the Arab Spring. For the moment, there is little interest, either at home or abroad, in Turkeys relations with its western and eastern neighbors, the Balkans and the southern Caucasus. But that does not mean that everybody has stopped thinking about that. Last week the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) and the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael

organized a high-level seminar on Georgia in The Hague. Most of the debates dealt with internal developments in the former Soviet republic, trying to answer the intriguing question whether Georgia is leading or losing the struggle for democracy. I had been asked to speak on the wider policy implications of Georgias transformation from a Turkish perspective. I must say that I was impressed with the quality of the contributions, especially those of the Georgian participants. Among the speakers were Giorgi Baramidze, vice prime minister of Georgia; Irakli Alasania, head of the Georgian Free Democrats and leader of the opposition; and Shorena Shaverdashvili, a critical journalist and editor of the online publication The Liberal (http://liberali.ge/english). The speakers fundamentally disagreed on many points. Ruling party representatives underlined the progress made in fighting corruption and in improving the business climate, others gave many examples of the autocratic tendencies of President Mikheil Saakashvili, the lack of an independent judiciary and the pro-government bias in the media. In the past, I have witnessed many of this kind of confrontation between opponents in Balkan countries or elsewhere. Most of the time, these exchanges of opinion do not lead anywhere because the speakers are not willing or able to listen to each other and just try to push their own points. Not among the Georgians, at least not at this conference. Everybody did his utmost to respond to the criticism, tried to come up with concrete examples and, despite the disagreements, showed respect for the views of his challenger. After listening to all of them, I am still not sure whether Georgia is really a democratic model for the region. But I do know that many other countries would be well advised to aspire to having such a mature political culture in which differences of opinion are dealt with in a balanced way. As far as Turkish-Georgian relations are concerned, I could only stress the fact that although Turkey is faced with pretty much the same kind of domestic problems, Georgia is not seen as a model. Relations between Ankara and Tbilisi are shaped by a combination of cultural closeness, strong economic ties and a common interest in positioning both countries as vital energy corridors. The last point touches on the complex relations between Turkey and Russia, described by one observer as full with elements of large scale cooperation and subtle competition. Georgia plays a key role in the TurkishRussian rivalry in transporting gas and oil from Central Asia to Europe. The famous pipelines that start in Baku and end up in Turkey always run through Georgia, bypassing Russia. According to many analysts the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia was meant, among other things, to make it clear to Georgia and Turkey that these pipelines are not safe if Russia feels excluded from these energy deals. It was a blow to Turkeys plans, but there is little the country can do about it because it is heavily dependant on Russian gas and oil. Since 2008, Turkey and Georgia have focused on strengthening their economic ties. Recent plans include Turkey building three hydroelectric power plants in Georgia and further opening its borders to Georgian citizens. Turkey wants to be a major player on the southern Caucasus but the unsolved problems with Armenia, the negative influence of Azerbaijan and the undesirability of antagonizing the Russians strongly limit Turkeys ambitions. Sticking to a precarious balancing act between its own and Russias energy interests seems the only viable option. For the foreseeable future, Turkey will not have Georgia on its mind, but Russia. Aklmdaki Grcistan Dk seviyeli atmalarn damgasn vurduu bir seim kampanyas srasnda Trkiye'nin d politikasna dair ciddi tartmalar yapmaya mahal kalmamas pek de artc deil.

Avrupa ve ABD'de Trkiye'nin dnyadaki rol zerine tartmalar Trkiye ile AB arasndaki sorunlara ve (olumlu bir iaret mahiyetinde) Trkiye'nin Arap Bahar'nn sonucunu etkileme potansiyeline odaklanyor. u an iin ieride ve darda Trkiye'nin bat ve dou komularyla, Balkanlar ve Gney Kafkasya'yla ilikilerine pek ilgi gsteren yok. Fakat bu, herkesin bu konu zerine kafa yormay brakt anlamna gelmiyor. Geen hafta Avrasya Ortaklk Fonu ve Hollanda Uluslararas likiler Enstits Clingendael, Lahey'de Grcistan hakknda st dzey bir seminer dzenledi. Tartmalarn byk ounluu eski Sovyet cumhuriyetindeki i gelimelere younlat. "Grcistan demokrasi mcadelesine nclk m ediyor, yoksa bu mcadeleyi yitiriyor mu?" sorusuna cevap arand. Benden de Grcistan'n dnmnn genel siyasi etkilerine dair, Trkiye'nin bak asndan bir konuma yapmam istendi. Katklarn niteliinden, bilhassa da Grcistan'dan gelen katlmclarn katklarndan etkilendiimi sylemeliyim. Konumaclar arasnda Grcistan Babakan Yardmcs Giorgi Baramidze, Grcistan Hr Demokratlar'nn ve muhalefetin lideri Irakli Alasania, muhalif gazeteci ve internetten yaynlanan 'The Liberal'in yayn ynetmeni orena averdavili de vard (http://liberali.ge/english). Konumaclar birok noktada esasl bir fikir ayrl iindeydi. ktidar partisinin temsilcileri yolsuzlukla mcadele ve ticaret ortamnn iyiletirilmesi konularnda kaydedilen ilerlemeyi vurgularken, dierleri Saakavili'nin otokratik eilimlerine dair pek ok rnek verdi. Szgelimi yarg bamsz deildi ve medyaya hkmet yanls bir tarafgirlik hakimdi. Gemite, Balkan lkelerinde veya baka yerlerdeki kartlar arasnda bu tr atmalara epey tanklk etmiliim vardr. ou zaman bu fikir alverileri hibir yere varmaz, nk konuanlar birbirlerini dinleme niyetinde deildir ve sadece kendi fikirlerini kabul ettirmeye alrlar. En azndan bu konferansta Grcler arasnda byle bir ey yoktu. Herkes eletirilere cevap vermek iin elinden geleni yapt, somut rnekler ortaya koymaya alt ve fikir ayrlklarna ramen kartnn fikirlerine sayg gsterdi. Hepsini dinledikten sonra Grcistan'n blge iin gerekten demokratik bir model olup olmadndan hl emin deilim. Fakat farkl fikirlerin dengeli ve saygl bir tarzda tartld byle olgun bir siyasi kltrden dier birok lkenin ders almasnn hayrl olacan syleyebilirim. Trkiye-Grcistan ilikilerine gelirsek, sadece u olgunun altn izebilirim: Trkiye aa yukar ayn trden i sorunlarla yz yze olsa da, Grcistan bir model olarak grlmyor. Ankara ile Tiflis arasndaki ilikileri, kltrel yaknlk, gl ekonomik balar ve iki lkeyi nemli enerji koridorlar olarak konumlandrmaktan kaynakl ortak karlarn bir bileimi ekillendiriyor. Son meselenin ucu Trkiye ile Rusya arasndaki karmak ilikilere de dokunuyor; bir gzlemcinin de syledii gibi, "geni apl ibirlii ve gizli rekabet unsurlaryla dolu" bir iliki bu. Grcistan, Trkiye ile Rusya arasnda Orta Asya'dan Avrupa'ya doalgaz ve petrol nakli konusunda yaanan rekabette kilit bir rol oynuyor. Bak'de balayp Trkiye'de sona eren mehur boru hatlar hep Rusya'y baypas ederek Grcistan zerinden geiyor. Birok analiste gre Grcistan ile Rusya arasndaki Austos 2008 savann, birok baka hususun yannda bir sebebi de Rusya'nn, enerji anlamalarndan dlandn dnd takdirde bu boru hatlarnn gvende olmadn Grcistan ve Trkiye'ye aka gstermek istemesiydi. Bu Trkiye'nin planlarna vurulan bir darbeydi, fakat bununla ilgili yaplabilecek pek fazla ey yok, zira Trkiye Rus doalgazna ve petrolne ar ekilde baml durumda. 2008'den bu yana Trkiye ve Grcistan ekonomik balarn glendirmeye odaklanyor. Son dnemdeki planlar arasnda Trkiye'nin Grcistan'da hidroelektrik santrali ina etmesi ve snrlarn Grcistan vatandalarna daha fazla amas da var. Trkiye Gney Kafkasya'da nemli bir aktr olmak istiyor, fakat Ermenistan ile zlmeyen sorunlar, Azerbaycan'n negatif etkisi ve kimsenin Ruslar karsna almak istememesi Trkiye'nin hedeflerini ciddi ekilde daraltyor. Kendisinin ve Rusya'nn enerji karlar arasnda hassas bir denge gzetmek Trkiye'nin nndeki tek makul seenek gibi grnyor. ngrlebilir gelecekte Trkiye'nin aklnda Grcistan deil Rusya olacak.

Together forever? A corona of stars / Rolling over the deep blue sea / Together forever This is the text of the haiku, a Japanese poem of a

specific form, that was written by Herman van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, two days ago. To commemorate May 9, the day on which the European Union pays homage to the historic declaration made by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on May 9, 1950 which eventually would lead to the founding of the EU in 1957. It is always nice to have politicians around who write poetry and Van Rompuy is known for his love for the haiku. His latest one is a clear reference to the blue European flag with its yellow stars and, more importantly, to the need felt by one of Europes top politicians to stress unity among the member states of the EU, now and in the future. Van Rompuy underlined European togetherness only a few days after that harmony was called into serious question by Der Spiegel. The renowned German weekly reported last Friday that a secret meeting of all EU finance ministers had been planned for that day and the main topic to be discussed was whether or not Greece should leave the euro-zone. The impact of the article was incredible. The euro immediately lost 1 percent of its value, all European media jumped on the story and all of a sudden the EU was faced with a serious crisis. What followed in the next couple of hours was an avalanche of firm denials and timid justifications. No, there was no plan whatsoever for Greece to leave the euro zone. But yes, it was true that the Luxembourg prime minister and chairman of the euro zone, Jean-Claude Juncker, had invited the finance ministers of the biggest European economies that use the euro (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) for a meeting at a small castle in his home country. Invited as well were European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, European Commissioner responsible for economic affairs Olli Rehn and Greek Finance Minister Giorgos Papakonstantinou. It lead to angry reactions in other European capitals. Why had not all euro zone countries been invited for that meeting, especially, as in the case of the Netherlands, when that country contributes substantially to the fund set up to help the struggling economies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal? The reasons mentioned for the exclusive character of the Luxembourg event were not really convincing and only strengthened the feeling that an important deal was being prepared by the big EU member states. The main topic on their agenda had indeed been Greece. Not to throw the Greeks out but how to deal with the ongoing problems Greece is facing. The country has received huge loans from the EU and the IMF in the recent past to be able to survive economically. But that support package is not working. The financial markets do not believe that Greece -- or Portugal -- is going to grow rapidly enough to service its debts and therefore it becomes more difficult every week for Athens to get new loans. The conclusion of the senior euro zone policymakers last Friday was that Greece will need a second bail out package soon to avert a disorderly overhaul of its debt obligations. That could mean providing additional funds and perhaps extending the maturity of the existing loans. When that decision will be taken is unclear, but it might well be that the financial markets force the EU to act rapidly. At the same time, a growing number of economists are convinced that in the end only hard restructurings comprising debt write-downs of 50 percent or more are necessary. Many European banks that have invested in Greek bonds would suffer if the value of those commitments would be reduced drastically. Some analysts believe that even these draconian measures will not be enough and that the EU should prepare for a negotiated withdrawal from the currency union by Greece and Portugal. Sixty-one years after Schuman started it all, the EU is going through one of its most serious crises. In the past the union

always managed to survive and often came out stronger. But I am not sure whether all the present member states will be together forever. lelebet beraber mi? "Yldzlardan bir hale/Raks ediyor derin mavi denizin zerinde/lelebet beraber" Bu bir haiku, Japon iirinde belli bir kalpla yazlan bir tr. Yukardaki haiku iki gn nce Avrupa Konseyi Bakan Herman van Rompuy tarafndan, 9 Mays'n ansna yazld. Avrupa Birlii iin nemli bir gn bu. Fransz Dileri Bakan Robert Schuman'n 9 Mays 1950'de okuduu tarih bildiri, 1957'de AB'nin kurulmasyla sonulanan sreci balatmt. Siyasetilerin iir yazmas her zaman ho bir eydir ve Van Rompuy da haiku sevgisiyle biliniyor. En son haikusu sar yldzl mavi Avrupa bayrana bariz bir gnderme. Fakat daha nemlisi, Avrupa'nn nde gelen siyasetilerinden birinin AB'ye ye lkeler arasndaki mevcut ve mstakbel birlii vurgulama ihtiyac hissetmesi. Van Rompuy'un Avrupa'nn birlikteliine yapt vurgu, birlik iindeki uyumun 'Der Spiegel' tarafndan ciddi ekilde sorgulanmasndan birka gn sonrasna denk geldi. Mehur Alman dergisi geen cuma btn AB maliye bakanlar arasnda 9 Mays'ta gizli bir toplant planlandn ve ana gndemin Yunanistan'n Avro blgesinden ayrlmas gerekip gerekmediini tartmak olacan yazd. Haber mthi bir etki yapt. Avro derhal yzde 1 deer kaybetti, btn Avrupa medyas haberin zerine atlad ve AB birdenbire ciddi bir krizle kar karya kald. Sonraki birka saat boyunca bir sert yalanlamalar ve mahcup gerekelendirmeler furyasna tank olduk. Hayr, Yunanistan'n Avro blgesinden ayrlmas asla ve kat'a sz konusu deildi. Fakat evet, Lksemburg babakan ve Avro blgesi bakan Jean-Claude Juncker'in Avro kullanan en byk Avrupa ekonomilerinin (Almanya, Fransa, talya ve spanya) maliye bakanlarn lkesindeki kk bir kalede toplantya davet ettii doruydu. Avrupa Bankas Bakan Jean-Claude Trichet, Avrupa Komisyonu'nun ekonomik ilerden sorumlu yesi Olli Rehn... Yunanistan maliye bakan George Papakonstantinu da davetliler arasndayd. Bu aklama dier Avrupa bakentlerinin fkeli tepkilerine yol at. Niye btn Avro blgesi lkeleri toplantya davet edilmemiti? Szgelimi bilhassa Hollanda, Yunanistan, rlanda ve Portekiz gibi zor durumdaki ekonomilere yardm etmek iin oluturulan fona ciddi katkda bulunurken nasl olur da toplantya dahil edilmezdi? Lksemburg toplantsnn herkese ak olmamasna dair ne srlen gerekeler ikna edici olmaktan ok uzakt ve byk AB yesi lkeler tarafndan nemli bir anlama hazrl yapld hissiyatn glendirmekten baka ie yaramad. Ana gndem maddesi gerekten de Yunanistan'd. Yunanllar Avro blgesinden karmak deil, Yunanistan'n yz yze olduu sregiden sorunlarla nasl baa klaca mevzubahisti. lke, ekonomik olarak ayakta kalabilmek iin yakn gemite AB'den ve IMF'den byk borlar ald. Fakat destek paketi ie yaramyor. Finans piyasalar Yunanistan'n (veya Portekiz'in) borlarn geri deyecek kadar hzl byyeceine inanmyor ve bu yzden Atina iin yeni borlar almak her geen gn daha da zorlayor. Geen cuma Avro blgesinin nde gelen siyasi karar mercilerinin vard sonu, Yunanistan'n, demelerinin dzensiz bir ekilde revize edilmesinden kanmak iin ksa zaman sonra bir ikinci kurtarma paketine ihtiya duyaca ynnde. Bu da ilave fonlarn devreye sokulmas ve belki de mevcut borlarn vadesinin uzatlmas anlamna gelebilir. Bu kararn ne zaman alnaca belirsiz, fakat finans piyasalar AB'yi hzl hareket etmesi ynnde zorlayabilir. Ayn zamanda, giderek daha fazla iktisat, borcun yzde 50'si veya daha fazlasnn silinmesini ieren 'etin' yeniden yaplandrmalarn eninde sonunda zorunlu hale gelecei kansnda. Yunan tahvillerine yatrm yapan birok Avrupa bankas, bu taahhtlerin deeri ciddi ekilde azaltlrsa skntya girecektir. Baz analistler bu sert nlemlerin bile yeterli olmayacana ve AB'nin Yunanistan ve Portekiz'in ortak para biriminden ekilmesi ynndeki mzakerelere kendisini hazrlamas gerektiine inanyor.

Schuman'n sreci balatmasndan 61 yl sonra, AB en ciddi krizlerinden birini yayor. Gemite birlik ayakta kalmay ve krizlerden daha da glenerek kmay baard. Fakat gelinen noktada mevcut ye lkelerin hepsinin ilelebet beraber kalp kalmayacandan emin deilim.

What do you know about the Crimean War? When people learn that I am a historian by education they often start asking questions about events and people that are related to very specific periods in the past. Having specialized in Dutch history after World War II, most of the time I have to disappoint them by saying that I have heard about it, but I dont know the details. Some are surprised to find out that not every historian knows all the facts about the old days. Most understand that historians also need to focus their attention, and therefore are not a walking historical encyclopedia. Last year I read a very positive review of a book on the Crimean War, written by Orlando Figes, praised before for several of his books on Russian history. For me the Crimean War was an example of a historic event that I knew very little about. Of course there is Florence Nightingale, the British nurse that during that war became the symbol of altruistic assistance to the sick and the wounded. And there was the vague memory of a remarkable anti-Russian coalition of Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire. To cut a long story short, I decided to buy the book, Crimea, and read my way into the events that took place on the shores of the Black Sea between 1853 and 1856, forever connected with such mythical places as Sevastopol and Balaklava. It took me a couple of months to finish the book because, although it is well written, it is also full of unknown details and pieces of information that invite you to reflect on other parts of history related to the main proceedings. Not really an easy read in between many other activities. Still, I would really recommend you get a copy of the book and learn more about this unknown war. I do not have the ambition to inform you in a few lines about the war itself, its background and repercussions, and I definitively would not dare to summarize the richness of Figes thesis and main findings. Let me focus on the role of the Ottoman Empire. The subtitle of the book is The Last Crusade, and that makes it clear how important religion was in this conflict according to Figes. The first chapter is a detailed overview of incidents that occurred in and around holy places in Palestine, then part of the Ottoman Empire, in the first half of the 19th century. The main opponents were Russian Orthodox and French Catholics who disputed each others privileges. Add to that the Russian obsession with protecting the rights of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman sultan, the occupation of modern Romania by the Russians and the desire to incorporate large parts of the crumbling Ottoman Empire in the East and one can understand why the Turks declared war on Russia in October 1853. The sultan got backing from the French, who were pissed off by the aggressive Russian behavior in the Holy Land, and by the British, who were afraid that Russia would become too strong if it managed to replace the Ottoman Empire as the main player in Asia Minor and the Middle East. The result was a unique coalition of Christian Britain and France supporting Muslim Turkey against Christian Russia. In the end, the war turned into a badly managed battlefield on which approximately 750,000 soldiers lost their lives. Russia was beaten, the cross-religious allied coalition won. Surprisingly, in Russian memory the Crimean War is a big event that is

commemorated frequently, turning a defeat into a moral victory, a national act of sacrifice in a just war to defend the Orthodox faith and Russias standing in the world. In Turkey, the war has been almost totally ignored by Turkish historiography because it does not fit the nationalist version of Turkish history. As Figes puts it: Despite its victorious conclusion for the Turks, the war has come to be seen as a shameful period in Ottoman history, a turning point in the decline of the empire, when the state fell into massive debt and became dependent on the Western powers, who turned out to be false friends. Maybe the time has come for some new unbiased Turkish research into a period that is still a big unknown for so many. Krm Sava hakknda ne biliyorsunuz? nsanlar tarih eitimi aldm rendiklerinde genellikle gemiteki ok zel dnemlerle ilgili olaylar ve insanlar hakknda sorular sormaya balyor. kinci Dnya Sava sonras Hollanda tarihi zerine uzmanlatmdan, ou zaman mevzu bahis olay veya insan duyduumu, fakat ayrntlarn bilmediimi syleyerek soru sahiplerini hayal krklna uratyorum. Bazlar her tarihinin eski zamanlarla ilgili btn olgular bilmediini grnce aryor. Byk ounluu ise tarihilerin de belli bir konuya odaklanmas gerektiini, yani yryen birer tarih ansiklopedisi olmadklarn anlyor. Geen yl, Rus tarihi zerine yazd eitli kitaplar vgyle karlanan Orlando Figes'n Krm Sava hakkndaki kitabyla ilgili son derece olumlu bir eletiri yazs okudum. Benim iin Krm Sava, hakknda ok az ey bildiim tarih olaylardan biriydi. Elbette Florence Nightingale'in bu sava srasnda hastalara ve yarallara fedakrca yardmn simgesi haline geldiini biliyordum. Ve ayn savata Britanya, Fransa ve Osmanl mparatorluu'nun Rusya'ya kar artc bir koalisyon oluturduunu da hayal meyal hatrlyordum. Uzun lafn ksas, kitab almaya ve 1853 ile 1856 arasnda Karadeniz kylarnda gerekleen ve ad her daim Sivastopol ve Balaklava gibi efsanevi yerlerle anlan olaylar okumaya karar verdim. Kitab bitirmem iki aym ald, zira ok iyi yazlm olsa da, bilinmeyen ayrntlarla ve paralarla doluydu; sizi tarihin ana konuyla alakal dier ksmlar zerine bilgilenip dnmeye davet ediyordu. Yaplmas gereken ynla i arasnda kolay bir okuma mesaisi deildi dorusu. Yine de bu kitab edinmenizi ve bu bilinmeyen sava hakknda daha fazla ey renmenizi tavsiye ederim. Sizi bizzat savaa, arka planna ve yanklarna dair, birka satrda bilgilendirme niyetinde deilim; Figes'n tezi ve balca bulgularnn zenginliini zetlemeye cret edemem. Daha ziyade Osmanl mparatorluu'nun savataki rolne odaklanmak istiyorum. Kitabn alt bal "Son Hal Seferi" ve Figes'n bu savata dini ne kadar nemsediini aka ortaya koyuyor. lk blm 19. asrn ilk yarsnda Filistin'deki kutsal yerlerde ve civarnda, ardndan Osmanl mparatorluu'nun eitli blgelerinde gerekleen olaylara ayrntl bir bak atyor. Balca rakipler konumunda, birbirlerinin imtiyazlar zerinden ihtilaf yaayan Rus Ortodokslar ve Fransz Katolikler var. Buna bir de Rusya'nn Osmanl sultannn Ortodoks tebaasnn haklarn korumaya kafay takmasn, bugn Romanya dediimiz blgenin Ruslar tarafndan igal edilmesini ve Dou'da atrdayan Osmanl mparatorluu'nun geni topraklarn ele geirme arzusunu eklediinizde, Trklerin Ekim 1853'te Rusya'ya sava ilan etmesini anlayabiliyorsunuz. Sultan, Ruslarn Kutsal Topraklar'daki saldrgan tutumundan dolay kplere binen Franszlarn ve Rusya'nn Asya Minr ve Ortadou'daki balca aktr olarak Osmanl mparatorluu'nun yerini almay baarmas halinde fazla gleneceinden korkan Britanyallarn desteini alyor. Sonuta, Hristiyan Britanya ve Fransa'nn Hristiyan Rusya'ya kar Mslman Trkiye'yi destekledii benzeri grlmemi bir koalisyon kuruluyor. Nihai noktada sava, yaklak 750 bin askerin hayatn kaybettii kt ynetilen bir cenk sahasna dnyor. Rusya yeniliyor, farkl dinleri bir araya getiren koalisyon kazanyor. artc olan, Ruslarn yenilgiyi ahlaki bir

zafere dntrmesi, bylece Krm Sava'nn ortak hafzada Ortodoks inancn ve Rusya'nn dnyadaki konumunu savunmak iin verilen hakl bir savataki ulusal bir fedakrlk olarak yer etmesi ve sk sk anlmas. Trkiye'de ise sava Trk tarih yazclar tarafndan neredeyse tmyle grmezden geliniyor, nk Trk tarihinin milliyeti versiyonuna uygun dmyor. Figes'n da syledii gibi: "Trkler iin Krm Sava zaferle sonulanmasna ramen, Osmanl tarihindeki utan verici bir safha, imparatorluun k srecinde, devletin bor batana srklendii ve dostluklar sahte kan Batl glere baml hale geldii bir dnm noktas olarak grlr oldu." Belki de biroklar iin hl bilinmez olan bu dneme dair yeni ve bamsz bir aratrma yapmann vakti gelmitir.

Holy warrior I guess the 19th century American writer Mark Twain expressed the feelings of many 21st century global citizens learning about the death of Osama bin Laden when he wrote: Ive never wished a man dead, but I have read some obituaries with great pleasure. In numerous comments and reactions, one could sense the combination of relief and a sense of justice after a serial killer had been eliminated, but also embarrassment about the loud cheering and jubilation that we witnessed in some American cities after the news about bin Ladens death came out. No doubt, bin Laden had become the symbol of a murderous branch of Islamic fundamentalism that killed scores of people indiscriminately, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. President Obama was right when he called bin Laden not a Muslim leader, but a mass murderer of Muslims. But bin Ladens most devastating legacy was poisoning the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims world wide, joining forces with those in the West who cherish the idea of a clash of civilizations. The idea that Islam and other religions will never be able to comfortably live together has unfortunately not been buried in the sea this week. Fanatics from all walks of life, and in all religions, still subscribe to bin Ladens basic thesis. It is even expected that some of them will use the death of their most well-known ideologue as a reason for new attacks on innocent citizens all over the world. According to a Reuters online poll, almost 80 percent of those who participated said the US government made the right decision to kill bin Laden. But only 25 percent said they felt safer after the death of the al-Qaeda leader, compared with 59 percent who said they did not. The ongoing popularity of bin Ladens ideas is not only reflected in the fear of more terrorist violence. Among the barrage of reactions to bin Ladens death, there was one that ruined my day. Ismail Haniye, head of the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, told reporters: We condemn the assassination and the killing of an Arab holy warrior. I beg your pardon, a holy warrior? How on earth could someone say this, except when he is a committed, diehard terrorist himself? The Israeli government must have been very happy with Haniyes posthumous endorsement of the al-Qaeda leader because they have always labeled every Hamas leader a terrorist, Most Hamas watchers, though, considered Haniye, at least till recently, as a pragmatist who recognized the value of compromise in the day-to-day running of the Gaza Strip much better than the ideologically pure Hamas leadership in exile. Political analysts in the Gaza Strip tried, not very convincingly, to explain Haniyes comments by saying that he was attempting through his remarks to cool tensions in the territory with al Qaedainspired Salafi groups who consider Hamas too moderate and waged gun battles with its forces. Whatever the background of Haniyes remarks, they do not bode well for the interim Palestinian unity government that will be announced this week as a result of an Egyptian-brokered deal between Hamas and its rival, the Fatah-led Palestinian

Authority led by President Abbas. Read what PA spokesman Ghassan Khatib had to say about bin Ladens death: Getting rid of bin Laden is good for the cause of peace worldwide but what counts is to overcome the discourse and the methods -the violent methods -- that were created and encouraged by bin Laden and others in the world. How long will the Hamas-Fatah deal last when there is such a fundamentally different appraisal of the best strategy to reach their common goal of an independent and viable Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders? It would create major drama if the fragile agreement among the Palestinians collapsed before it even started to produce positive results. The solution of the Palestinian problem would be the best antidote to all Islamic fundamentalists who love to refer to the ongoing suffering of the Palestinians as an excuse for their violent tactics. I am afraid the long shadow of bin Laden and his violent mindset will still hang over us and the innocent victims for quite a while and will also hinder finding a sustainable solution. Mcahit 19. asrn Amerikal yazarlarndan Mark Twain, u satrlar yazarken sanrm iki asr sonra Usame bin Ladin'in lmn renen dnya vatandalarnn duygularna tercman olmutu: "Bir insann lmesini asla dilemem, fakat baz lm ilanlarn byk bir zevkle okurum." Pek ok yorum ve tepkide, bir seri katilin ortadan kaldrlmasndan kaynakl rahatlama ve adalet duygusunun bileimini, fakat Ladin'in lm haberi sonras baz Amerikan kentlerinde tank olduumuz sevin lklar ve kutlamalardan duyulan rahatszl grmek mmkn. Kukusuz Bin Ladin, slami kktenciliin Mslman olup olmadna bakmakszn ok sayda insan ldren bir kanadnn simgesi haline gelmiti. Bakan Obama, Bin Ladin'in Mslman bir lider deil, Mslmanlar kitlesel katliama uratan biri olduunu sylerken haklyd. Fakat Ladin'in en ykc miras dnya apnda Mslman olanlarla olmayanlar arasndaki ilikileri zehirlemesi, Bat'da medeniyetler atmas fikrinin havariliini yapanlarla g birlii yapmasyd. slam'la dier dinlerin asla bir arada huzur iinde yaamayaca dncesi ne yazk ki bu hafta da denize gmlm deil. Hayatn her alanndan ve btn dinlerden fanatikler hl Bin Ladin'in temel tezine inanyor. Hatta onlardan bazlarnn, en tannm ideologlarnn lmn dnyann her kesinde masum insanlara yeni saldrlar dzenlemenin gerekesi olarak kullanaca beklenebilir. Reuters'in dzenledii ankete katlanlarn yaklak yzde 80'i ABD ynetiminin Bin Ladin'i ldrmekle doru karar verdiini sylyor. Fakat sadece yzde 25'i Kaide liderinin lmnden sonra kendisini daha gvende hissediyor, yzde 59'u ise byle hissetmiyor. Fakat Bin Ladin'in fikirlerinin sregiden poplerlii, tezahrn sadece daha fazla terrist iddet korkusunda bulmuyor. Bin Ladin'in lmne ynelik tepki selinin ortasnda Gazze eridi'ndeki Hamas ynetiminin lideri smail Haniye gazetecilere yapt aklamada, "Bir Arap mcahide suikast dzenlenmesini ve ldrlmesini knyoruz." dedi. Bizzat inat bir terrist olmadka bir insan bunu nasl syleyebilir? srail hkmeti, Haniye'nin, lmnn ardndan Kaide liderine sahip kmasndan gayet mutlu olmal, zira btn Hamas liderlerine srekli terrist damgas yaptryor. Halbuki Hamas' yakndan takip edenlerin byk ounluu, en azndan yakn zamana dek Haniye'yi, Gazze eridi'nin gndelik ileyiini devam ettirmek sz konusu olduunda uzlamalarn deerini, ideolojik bakmdan katksz ve tavizsiz olan srgndeki Hamas liderliinden ok daha iyi bilen bir pragmatist olarak gryordu. Gazze eridi'ndeki siyasi analistler Haniye'nin szlerini, blgede Hamas' fazla lml addeden ve glerini silahl atmalara sren Kaide balantl Selefi gruplarla gerilimleri yattrma abas olarak izah etmeye altlar, fakat ok ikna edici olamadlar. Haniye'nin szlerinin arkaplannda ne olursa olsun bu, Msr arabuluculuunda Hamas ile rakibi El Fetih'in Abbas bakanlndaki Filistin Ynetimi arasnda salanan anlama sonucu bu hafta ilan edilecek Filistin geici birlik hkmeti asndan hi hayra alamet deil. Filistin Ynetimi szcs Gassan Hatib'in Bin Ladin'le ilgili szleri ise yleydi: "Bin Ladin'den kurtulmak bar iinde bir dnya hedefi iin hayrl, fakat nemli olan Bin Ladin gibilerin dnyada yaratt ve tevik ettii sylemin ve yntemlerin iddet yntemlerinin- stesinden gelmek."

Ortak amalar mahiyetinde, 1967 snrlarna dayal bamsz ve yaayabilir bir Filistin devletine ulamak ynndeki en iyi stratejiyle ilgili bylesine esasl deerlendirme fark varken, Hamas-El Fetih anlamas ne kadar ayakta kalacak? Filistinliler arasndaki hassas anlamann, daha olumlu sonular retmeye bile balamadan kmesi hazin olacaktr. Filistin sorununun zm, iddete dayal taktiklerinin bahanesi olarak Filistinlilerin sregiden acsna iaret etmeyi pek seven btn slami kktencilerin en iyi panzehiridir. Korkarm ki Bin Ladin'in ve iddet ykl zihniyetinin uzun glgesi bir sre daha zerimizden kalkmayacak. Bir sre daha masum kurbanlara ve onlarla birlikte die dokunur zmlere ket vurulduuna tank olacaz.

Zero solution in Syria The calls on the international community to get tougher on Syria are growing by the day. After the killing of more than 100 people last Friday and the ongoing deadly attacks on demonstrators in several Syrian cities, the United States, the European Union and Turkey have already expressed their anger and frustration with the Syrian leadership. They appealed to Bashar al-Assads regime to refrain from excessive use of force and to launch meaningful political reforms. All over the world, many, including the main opposition party Republican Peoples Party (CHP), strongly believe that more should be done although it is not quite clear which effective measures could be taken to immediately stop the killing. Will harsher statements or even the threat of more sanctions on top of the already existing ones convince the Syrian authorities to stop their brutal persecution? I am afraid they wont. It is striking to observe the difference between on the one hand the rising outrage and the call for action in public opinion and among many politicians and the cautious analysis and low expectations of most Syria experts on the other hand. Last week when I was in the US, I coincidentally met with Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and author of the popular digital newsletter Syria Comment. According to Landis there are both international and domestic reasons why, at least for the moment, the Syrian president will not be forced out of power. All the regions key players (Iran, Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) have an interest in seeing Assad survive. Everybodys knee-jerk position is going to be to hope that Assad can regain control, Landis explained, because the chances that Syrias national institutions will collapse, like Iraq, are great. And then youll have endless factionalism. For Iran the stakes are highest: Syria is its only Arab ally, and losing it would be a serious setback in Irans efforts to influence events in Lebanon and Israel/Palestine via Hezbullah and Hamas. Between Israel and the Assad regime no love is lost, but Jerusalem wonders what the alternative to Assad might be, fearing chaos and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Over the last couple of years, Turkey has developed very good relations with its neighbor that have brought many commercial gains. Ankaras first option is to put pressure on Assad to reform, not to go for regime change and the instability that most certainly will follow. Landis comments echo those of other Syria specialists who realize that Syria is not Egypt. In the Arab Reform Bulletin, Bassam Haddad, director of the Middle East Studies Program at George Mason University, explained why the two should not be compared. Despite the repression under former president Hosni Mubarak, civil society in Egypt is much better developed than in Syria. Over the past decade in Egypt, this had led to a level of individual and group empowerment -- as well as repoliticization of society -- from which Syrians are quite removed, according to Haddad. On top of that, Syrian society is much more heterogeneous in terms of region, community, sect and ethnicity, discouraging cohesion among the opposition. On the other hand, Syrias coercive apparatuses and army are closely knit around the heights of power with Assad family members in all key positions. This leads Haddad to the conclusion that the Syrian army and security services are not likely to rise against Assad. Adding to this sobering evaluation, Landis notes the lack of leadership in the Syrian uprising: It has been led

by young activists in their 20s and 30s. They have been brave, disciplined and very successful at rallying the people behind the cry for freedom. To be successful they will have to produce a leadership that can reassure the Syrian people that their future can be bright without going through the horrors of civil war or the collapse of national institutions. Being confronted with shocking daily pictures of bloody violence, one definitively hopes that the experts are wrong. But if they are right, we should prepare for an extended period of cruel repression in Syria and bystanders who call for an end to it but are both unable and unwilling to remove Assad from power. Suriye'de sfr zm Uluslararas toplumun Suriye'ye kar sertlemesi ynndeki arlar gn getike artyor. Geen cuma 100'den fazla insann ldrlmesinin ve eitli Suriye kentlerinde gstericilere ynelik sregiden kanl saldrlarn ardndan ABD, AB ve Trkiye, Suriye liderliinden kaynakl kzgnln ve rahatszln ifade etti. Esad rejiminden ar g kullanmndan kanmasn ve die dokunur siyas reformlar balatmasn istediler. Dnyann her kesinde, anamuhalefet partisi CHP de dahil, birok evre daha fazlasnn yaplmas gerektiine kuvvetle inanyor, fakat bu cinayetleri bir an nce durdurmak iin ne gibi etkin nlemlerin alnabilecei o kadar ak deil. Daha sert aklamalar, hatta var olanlara ilaveten yeni yaptrmlarn devreye sokulmas Suriye makamlarn bu ar zulm durdurmaya ikna edebilir mi? Korkarm ki edemez. Bir tarafta kamuoyunun ve birok siyasetinin artan fkesi ve harekete geilmesi arlaryla, dier tarafta Suriye uzmanlarnn byk ksmnn temkinli analizleri ve dk beklentileri arasnda arpc bir farkllk sz konusu. Geen hafta ABD'deyken tesadfen Oklahoma niversitesi Ortadou almalar Merkezi'nin direktr ve internetteki popler haber sitelerinden Syria Comment'in yazar Joshua Landis ile karlatm. Landis'e gre Suriye devlet bakannn zorla iktidardan drlemeyecek olmasnn, en azndan u an iin hem uluslararas, hem lke ii sebepleri var. Esad'n ayakta kalmas blgedeki btn kilit aktrlerin (ran, srail, Trkiye ve Suudi Arabistan) menfaatine. "Herkesin refleks halinde taknd tavr, Esad'n kontrol tekrar ele alabilmesini ummak olacaktr." diyor Landis, zira "Suriye'nin ulusal kurumlarnn Irak'ta olduu gibi kme ihtimali yksek. Ve sonrasnda karnza bitmek bilmez hiziplemeler kacaktr." Byle bir durumdan en fazla kayb olacak lke ran: Suriye Tahran'n yegane Arap mttefiki ve onu kaybetmek ran'n Lbnan ve srail/Filistin'deki gelimeleri Hizbullah ve Hamas zerinden etkileme abalarna ciddi bir darbe vuracak. srail ile Esad rejimi birbirini zerre kadar sevmiyor, fakat kaostan ve Mslman Kardeler'in ykseliinden korkan srail kendisine Esad'n alternatifinin ne olabileceini soruyor. Son birka yldr Trkiye komularyla, birok ticar kazanm getiren ok iyi ilikiler gelitirmi durumda. Ankara'nn ilk tercihi de, rejim deiikliini ve byk ihtimalle onu izleyecek olan istikrarszl tevik etmek deil, Esad'a reform basks yapmak. Suriye'nin Msr olmadn bilen dier Suriye uzmanlarnn yorumlar Landis'inkilerden farkl deil. George Manson niversitesi Ortadou almalar Program direktr Bessam Haddad, Arap Reform Blteni'nde iki lkenin niye kyaslanmamas gerektiini aklyor. Eski Devlet Bakan Mbarek dnemindeki ar baskya ramen Msr'da sivil toplum Suriye'dekinden ok daha gelikin. Haddad'a gre, Msr'da son on yl zarfnda bu belli dzeyde bir bireysel ve grupsal g birikimine (yan sra toplumun yeniden politiklemesine) yol at, ki Suriyeliler byle bir gten tmyle mahrum. En nemlisi de Suriye toplumu din, cemaat, mezhep ve etnisite asndan ok daha heterojen, bu da muhalefet arasnda uyumu zorlatryor. Dier yandan Suriye'nin zor kullanan aygtlar ve ordusu, btn kilit mevkileri tutmu olan Esad ailesi yeleriyle iktidarn st kademelerinde sk bir birlik oluturuyor. Bu da Haddad', Suriye ordusu ve gvenlik birimlerinin Esad'a kar ayaa kalkma ihtimalinin zayf olduu sonucuna gtryor. Bu ayltc deerlendirmeye ilaveten Landis, Suriye isyanndaki liderlik eksikliine dikkat ekiyor: "syann ban 20'li ve 30'lu yalarnda gen aktivistler ekiyor. Cesurlar, disiplinliler ve insanlar zgrlk lnn arkasnda toplamak konusunda ok baarllar. Daha tesini baarmak iin Suriye halkn, i

savan dehetini veya ulusal kurumlarn kn tecrbe etmeksizin parlak bir gelecein mmkn olduuna ikna edebilecek bir liderlik retmeleri gerekiyor." Her gn kanl iddetin oke edici grntleri karsnda insan elbette uzmanlarn haksz kmasn umut ediyor. Fakat eer hakllarsa, Suriye'de uzun bir acmasz bask dnemine ve bu zulmn sona ermesi arlar yaparken Esad iktidarn devirmeye muktedir ve istekli olmayan kenardaki seyircilere hazrlkl olmalyz.

Oklahoma City Last week I traveled to the United States to deliver a speech on the EU, Turkey and the Middle East at several universities in Texas and Oklahoma. It was fun to do and, as far as I am able to judge, my lecture was appreciated by the students and professors who attended the meetings. It is true that many Americans know very little or nothing about Turkey, Europe or the Middle East. Most of them do not care because they have no intention of leaving the state they were born in. So why bother with what is happening elsewhere? But the people I met in Houston, Dallas and Oklahoma City were very interested in the developments in this part of the world, especially in Turkeys growing significance as an example for the post-revolutionary Arab world. As was to be expected, I got a lot of questions on Turkeys policies on Israel and Iran, seen by many in the US as proof of Turkeys infamous shift of axis away from the West. I hope I was able to convince a mostly academic audience that this would be a fundamentally flawed reading of Turkeys activist policy in the region. Many listeners were also curious about how Turkey would deal with a successful uprising against the Assad regime in Syria with which Ankara has developed such close links. In the end, though, what impressed me most on this trip were not the concerns of my American hosts or the size and quality of the campuses at Rice University, Texas A&M and the University of Oklahoma. What struck me most last week was my visit to the Oklahoma City National Memorial and Museum, built to commemorate the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995. The bombing killed 168 men, women and children. It was the biggest terrorist attack in the US before 9/11. I could remember some of the facts and names when I visited the spot where it all happened, but I had never realized the magnitude of the drama that unfolded in the center of this city, exactly 16 years ago last week. Outside, on the place where the bombed building once stood, an impressive memorial has been constructed. Two monumental twin gates frame the moment of destruction -- 9:02 a.m. on April 19. The Field of Empty Chairs symbolizes the lives that were lost, with smaller chairs representing the 19 children killed. Inside, in a building that survived the enormous explosion, the most breathtaking rooms in the museum are the ones in which you can hear the official recording of a hearing that took place just across the street at the moment of the assault. You hear someone explaining the procedures of that meeting and all of a sudden there is a gigantic explosion, followed by screaming and shouting. In the next room you can see helicopter news footage of the ravaged building at 9:13 a.m. -- the first images broadcast. I remembered these pictures of a huge building that had been ripped open, entire floors that had disappeared. The FBI immediately started the largest criminal investigation in history. Soon two men were arrested, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, who indeed turned out to be the men who filled a truck with explosives and drove it in front of the federal

building -- two frustrated men with extreme anti-government views who knew each other from their time in the army. But for a long time, some news media outlets and many Americans believed that others must have been involved. They did not want to accept that two clean-shaven, short-haired US Army veterans could inflict such destruction on their own people. There was talk of Middle Easterners who had been seen running away from the building just before the explosion. Some local politicians promptly referred to the danger of Islamic fundamentalism, a shameless and baseless attempt to blame outsiders. They were forced to apologize shortly after. In the end, most Americans had to accept the uncomfortable truth that this terrorist act was homemade. McVeigh was sentenced to death and was executed in 2001. Nichols is serving a life sentence in prison. Oklahoma City Geen hafta Teksas ve Oklahoma'daki eitli niversitelerde AB, Trkiye ve Ortadou zerine konuma yapmak iin ABD'deydim. Keyifliydi ve grebildiim kadaryla, konumam toplantlara katlan renciler ve retim yeleri tarafndan beenildi. Birok Amerikalnn Trkiye, Avrupa veya Ortadou hakknda pek az ey bildii veya hi bilgisi olmad doru. Byk ounluunun umurunda da deil, zira doduklar lkeden ayrlmak gibi bir niyetleri yok. yleyse baka yerlerde ne olup bittiiyle ilgilenmenin ne alemi var? Fakat Houston, Dallas ve Oklahoma City'de tantm insanlar dnyann bu kesindeki gelimelerle, bilhassa da Trkiye'nin devrim sonras Arap dnyas iin bir rnek mahiyetinde artan nemiyle son derece ilgiliydi. Beklenebilecei gibi Trkiye'nin srail ve ran politikalarna dair pek ok soru aldm; birok Amerikal bu politikalar Trkiye'yi Bat'dan uzaklatran u mehur eksen kaymasnn kant olarak gryor. ounluunu akademisyenlerin oluturduu dinleyicileri, bunun Trkiye'nin blgedeki aktif d politikasn temelden yanl okumak olduuna ikna edebildiimi umarm. Birok dinleyici Trkiye'nin, gayet yakn ilikiler gelitirdii Suriye'deki Esed rejimine kar baarl bir isyana nasl yaklaacan da merak ediyordu. Ne var ki sonuta beni bu geziyle ilgili en ok etkileyen ey, Amerikal ev sahiplerimin endieleri veya Rice niversitesi, Teksas A&M ve Oklahoma niversitesi'nin kampslerinin bykl ve kalitesi deildi. Geen hafta beni asl arpan, 19 Nisan 1995'te Alfred P. Murrah Federal Binas'na ynelik bombal saldry anmak iin ina edilen Oklahoma City Ulusal Ant&Mzesi'ydi. Saldrda 168 erkek, kadn ve ocuk ld. 11 Eyll ncesi ABD'deki en byk terr saldrsyd. Saldrnn gerekletii yeri ziyaret ettiimde baz olgular ve isimleri hatrlayabiliyordum. Fakat bu kentin merkezinde, tam 16 yl nce yaanan dramn ne kadar byk olduunu hi tahayyl edememitim. Vaktiyle bombalanan binann bulunduu yerin dnda etkileyici bir ant ina edilmi. Birbirinin ei olan iki antsal kap ykm ann ifade ediyor 19 Nisan 09.02. "Bo Sandalyeler Alan" kaybedilen hayatlar simgeliyor; buradaki daha kk sandalyeler ldrlen 19 ocuu temsil ediyor. Muazzam patlamadan geriye kalan binann ierisinde dzenlenmi mzenin en nefes kesici odalarndan birinde, saldr annda sokan karsnda yaplan bir toplantnn resm kaytlarn dinleyebiliyorsunuz. Birilerinin toplantnn prosedrlerini anlattn duyuyorsunuz ve birdenbire inanlmaz bir patlama sesi, ardndan lklar ve feryatlar. Yandaki odada 09.13'te harap olmu binann helikopterden ekilmi haber grntlerini izleyebiliyorsunuz bunlar yaynlanan ilk grntler. Bu grntleri hatrlyordum: Adeta ortadan yarlm kocaman bir bina, btn katlar yok olmu. FBI derhal tarihteki en byk soruturmay balatt. Ksa sre sonra iki kii, Timothy McVeigh ve Terry Nichols tutukland; gerekten de ikilinin kamyona patlayclar dolduran ve federal binann nne getiren kiiler olduu ortaya kt. Birbirlerini ordudan tanyan, ar hkmet kart fikirlere sahip, hayal krkl iindeki adamlard bunlar. Fakat baz haber kurulular ve birok Amerikal uzun mddet bakalarnn da iin iinde olmas gerektiine inand. Bu sinekkayd tral, ksa sal iki Amerikal eski askerin kendi insanlarn bylesine byk bir ykma maruz brakabileceini kabul etmek istemiyorlard.

Patlamadan hemen nce binadan kp koarak uzaklaan Ortadoululardan bahsedildi. Baz yerel siyasetiler hi vakit kaybetmeden slami kktencilie atfta bulundu; yabanclar sulamak ynnde utan verici ve temelsiz bir abayd bu. Ksa sre sonra zr dilemeye mecbur oldular. Neticede ou Amerikal ac gerei kabul etmek zorunda kald: Bu terr eylemi lkenin kendi barndan kmt. McVeigh idama mahkum edildi ve cezas 2001'de infaz edildi. Nichols ise mebbet hapse arptrld.

Zana out, Cihaner in During several months in 2003 and 2004, I for many hours looked at the back of the head of Leyla Zana. She was sitting a few meters in front of me, facing the judge and the prosecutor in one of the depressing courtrooms of the State Security Court (DGM) in Ankara. Together with three colleagues she was undergoing a repetition of the court case that had gotten her into prison many years before for having links with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). This retrial was the result of a new law adopted in 2003 that forced the Turkish state to redo those trials that had been judged by the European Court of Human Rights as unfair. Zanas original court case, in which she was sentenced to 10 years, was one of those flawed cases. Her crime? Speaking one sentence in Kurdish while taking the oath as a new member of Parliament in 1991. Soon after her conviction, for many Europeans she became the symbol of the struggle of the Kurds in Turkey for the recognition of their language, culture and political rights. In 1995 the European Parliament awarded her the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, a special prize for people who have suffered while standing up for human rights. I travelled to Ankara several times on behalf of the European Parliament to be present at the retrial, to give moral support to Zana and three other prisoners and to see whether this time around the defendants would get a fair trial. They did not because Zana and the three other former Kurdish deputies were again sentenced in April 2004 on the basis of the same flimsy evidence and controversial interpretation of the restrictive articles in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). The whole case took a surprising turn when three months later all four of them were released after the Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the verdict on the basis of a technical mistake. Zana was finally free and in the following years visited the European Parliament several times -- to collect her prize and to discuss the Kurdish question. On a number of occasions I had the opportunity to speak with her about what should happen in Turkey. These were lively debates in which we agreed on some points but did not see eye-to-eye on the key role that, according to her, imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah calan had to play in solving the Kurdish problem. She repeated that support in public in Turkey and, because of that, was again sentenced to many years in prison. The courts convicted her in 2008 and 2009 for spreading terrorist propaganda. I did not speak to her over the last couple of years. I had the impression that although she was still active, a new generation of Kurdish politicians had overtaken her. But the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) did put her on the list for the June elections, giving her a second chance to prove that she could be a good deputy. And although I disagree with her on many crucial issues, I looked forward to her performance. It was not to be, however. Two days ago the Supreme Election Board (YSK) decided to annul her candidacy and that of several other BDP candidates for having a criminal record. This means that, in the end, all the mistakes and arbitrary rulings

of the Turkish judiciary that got her into prison in the past still haunt her. Once a suspect, always a suspect. The same YSK did not have a problem with the candidacy of a handful of Ergenekon defendants, including former chief prosecutor lhan Cihaner. Although it is clear for everyone that the only reason these people are running for Parliament is to stay out of jail, the supreme electoral authorities have expressed no doubts about this abuse of parliamentary mandate and the immunity that comes with it. The rejection of Zana and the approval of Cihaner send two clear messages: It is a provocation of the BDP that I hope the party and her supporters will be wise enough to ignore. It is also an invitation to all present and future criminal suspects to look for a party in the run-up to elections that is willing to help them in frustrating the proper functioning of the Turkish legal system. Zana dar, Cihaner ieri 2003 ve 2004'te aylar boyu saatlerce Leyla Zana'nn bann arkasna baktm. Birka metre nmde, Ankara'daki kasvetli Devlet Gvenlik Mahkemesi salonlarndan birinde hkimle savcnn karsnda oturuyordu. arkadayla birlikte, birka yl nce terrist PKK ile balantlar olduu gerekesiyle hapse girmelerine yol aan dava yeniden grlyordu. Bunun sebebi 2003'te kabul edilen ve Trk devletini Avrupa nsan Haklar Mahkemesi'nin adil olmadna hkmettii davalar yeniden grmeye mecbur brakan yeni bir yasayd. Zana'nn 10 yl hapisle cezalandrld ilk dava, o kusurlu davalardan biriydi. Peki suu neydi? 1991'de TBMM'deki milletvekillii yemini srasnda Krte bir cmle kurmas. Ceza almasndan ksa sre sonra birok Avrupal iin Trkiye'deki Krtlerin dillerinin, kltrlerinin ve siyasi haklarnn tannmas iin verdii mcadelenin simgesi haline geldi. 1995'te Avrupa Parlamentosu Zana'ya Saharov dln verdi; insan haklarn savunduu iin eziyet gren insanlara verilen zel bir dld bu. Parlamento adna, yeniden grlen davada bulunmak, Zana ve dier mahkuma moral destek vermek ve bu kez davallarn adil yarglanp yarglanmayacan grmek zere defalarca Ankara'ya gittim. Adil yarglanmadlar, zira ayn sudan kantlar ve Trk Ceza Kanunu'nun kstlayc maddelerinin tartmal yorumu sz konusuydu. Neticede Zana ve eski Krt parlamenter Nisan 2004'te tekrar ceza ald. Btn dava ay sonra artc bir noktaya geliverdi ve Yargtay'n karar teknik bir hataya dayanarak bozmas zerine drd de serbest brakld. Zana nihayet zgrd ve ilerleyen yllarda, dln almak ve Krt sorununu tartmak iin eitli defalar Avrupa Parlamentosu'nu ziyaret etti. Trkiye'de ne olmas gerektiine dair pek ok kez onunla konuma frsat buldum. Canl tartmalard bunlar, baz noktalarda anlayorduk, fakat hapisteki PKK lideri Abdullah calan'n Krt sorununun zm konusunda oynamas gereken kilit role dair yaklamnda ayn fikirde deildik. Bu dncesini Trkiye'de de aka ifade etti ve bundan dolay 2008 ve 2009'da "terr propagandas yapt" gerekesiyle yine yllarca hapis cezas ald. Son birka yldr Zana'yla konumadm. Hl aktif olmasna ramen, yeni bir Krt siyasetiler kuann onun yerini ald izlenimi iindeydim. Fakat BDP haziran seimleri iin onu tekrar aday gsterdi ve iyi bir parlamenter olabileceini kantlamas iin ikinci bir ans verdi. Ve birok kritik meselede onunla hemfikir olmasam da, performansn merakla bekliyordum. yle bir ey olmayacak. ki gn nce Yksek Seim Kurulu (YSK) Zana'nn ve baka baz BDP'lilerin adayln eski mahkumiyetlerini gereke gstererek veto etti. Neticede bunun anlam u: Trk yargsnn gemite Zana'y hapse gtren btn hatalar ve keyfi kararlar hl onun peini brakmyor. O bir zamanlarn deil, btn zamanlarn san. Ayn YSK eski basavc lhan Cihaner de dahil, baz Ergenekon sanklarnn adaylnda ise hibir sorun grmedi. Bu insanlarn Meclis'e girmek istemesinin tek nedeninin hapisten kmak olduu herkesin malumu olsa da, YSK yetkilileri Meclis

yetkilerinin ve onunla birlikte gelen dokunulmazln bu ekilde suiistimal edilmesine dair hibir kuku beyan etmi deil. Zana'nn reddedilip Cihaner'in onaylanmas iki bariz mesaj veriyor. Bu BDP'ye ynelik bir kkrtma, ki partinin ve destekilerinin buna kaplmayacak kadar akll davranmasn umut ediyorum. Bu ayn zamanda btn mevcut ve mstakbel su sanklarna, bir sonraki seimler ncesi kendilerine Trk yarg sisteminin dzgn ilemesini bozmakta yardmc olmaya istekli bir parti aramalar ynnde karlm bir davetiye.

Turkey in Africa A few months ago I got a phone call from Fadi Hakura, the Turkey specialist at Chatham House, one of the most renowned global think tanks, based in London. We had met several times before to discuss common projects between Chatham House and the stanbul Policy Center (IPC). Topics that were mentioned included Turkey-EU relations and climate change. To my surprise, during our phone conversation Fadi did not refer to any of these well-known issues but suggested we organize a seminar on Turkeys relations with Africa. To be honest, I had to think twice before agreeing. What was so interesting about Turkeys Africa policies? Why spend time and energy on evaluating what I considered to be a sideshow? But Fadi was insistent, underlining the growing interest in Turkey among his colleagues at Chatham House working on Africa. Reading my way into Turkeys activities in Africa was not that easy, either, simply because there was not much to cover. One of the few good articles on the subject was written last year by Professor Birol Akgn from Selcuk University in Konya, together with Mehmet zkan from Sevilla University. Their piece in the Journal of Modern Africa Studies persuaded me that it was worthwhile to organize a seminar on Turkeys Opening to Africa. The article also convinced me to contact the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), which has played a pioneering role in developing Turkey-Africa relations. They turned out to be very happy to contribute, using their multiple contacts to guarantee high quality speakers at the seminar. Eventually, last Thursday we got together in stanbul with a small but dedicated group of businessmen, civil servants and academics from Turkey and abroad, all extremely experienced and knowledgeable about Turkeys endeavors in Africa. I must say, I was impressed. Most of the time, when you participate in conferences or seminars on topics that you are familiar with, you hardly hear new arguments. These meetings are good for contacts, but they do not really shape or reshape your thinking. That was different this time. Within a few hours a picture emerged of a rather unknown but well thought out part of Turkeys new active foreign policy. What impressed me most was the synergy between government policies, business strategies and humanitarian activities. At the government level, the thinking had already started at the end of the 90s under the late foreign minister smail Cem. But it was only after 2005 that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government took a new approach to Africa as an integral part of its foreign policy. The number of embassies was raised from 12 in 2005 to 22 this year, aiming at 32 next year. The prime minister and the president made well-prepared visits to key African countries, and on international platforms such as the G20 Turkey is acting as the voice of Africa. In the meantime, many small and medium-sized Turkish companies, most of them TUSKON members, have established themselves all over the African continent. The result has been a steep rise in the total trade volume.

Responding to the growing needs, Turkish Airlines (THY) has expanded its direct flights to Africa, successfully positioning stanbul as the best hub for Africa-bound flights from all over the world. At the same time, Turkey also used so-called soft power instruments such as schools, development aid, humanitarian assistance and scholarships for imams to position itself as a major contender in many African countries. Competition is tough in Africa. China is famous for its aggressive policies, but also rising powers such as India and Brazil are very active on the continent. Turkey is the new kid on the block but seems to have developed a strategy that makes it different from the other players. Chinas presence is strongly driven by state interests, while India leaves it to big Indian companies to take the lead. As Akgn and zkan point out, Turkeys Africa policy is an arena in which, for the first time, the interests of civil society organizations, business sectors and the state have largely converged, underlining the growing influence of domestic actors in shaping foreign policy. I am happy Fadi called me and pushed all of us to get together and use British analytical abilities to further interpret Turkeys efforts to become a global power Trkiye Afrika'da Birka ay nce, dnyann en nl dnce kurulularndan biri olan Londra merkezli Chatham House'da alan Fadi Hakura telefon etti. Daha nce Chatham House ile stanbul Politikalar Merkezi (IPC) arasndaki ortak projeleri ele almak iin eitli defalar bir araya gelmitik. zerinde konutuumuz balklar arasnda Trkiye-AB ilikileri ve iklim deiiklii vard. Telefon grmemiz srasnda Fadi bu kez iyi bilinen bu meselelere deinmeyip Trkiye'nin Afrika ile ilikilerine dair bir seminer dzenlememizi nerince ardm. Drst olmak gerekirse, kabul etmeden nce iki kez dnmek zorunda kaldm. Trkiye'nin Afrika politikalaryla ilgili bu kadar ilgin olan neydi? kincil nemde grdm bir meseleye kafa yormak iin zaman ve enerji harcamaya deer miydi? Fakat Fadi srarlyd; Chatham House'da Afrika zerine alan mesaidalarnn Trkiye'ye ilgisinin giderek arttndan dem vurdu. Trkiye'nin Afrika'daki faaliyetlerine dair fikir edinmek iin okuma yapmam da kolay grnmyordu, zira ok fazla kaynak yoktu. Konu hakknda birka iyi makaleden birini geen yl Konya Seluk niversitesi'nden Prof. Birol Akgn, Sevilla niversitesi'nden Mehmet zkan ile birlikte yazmt. Modern Afrika almalar Dergisi'nde yaymlanan yaz, beni "Trkiye'nin Afrika Alm" zerine bir seminer dzenlemeye deeceine ikna etti. Yaz beni ayrca Trkiye-Afrika ilikilerinin gelimesinde nc rol oynayan Trkiye adamlar ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (TUSKON) ile temas kurmaya sevk etti. Seminere yksek nitelikli konumaclar salamak iin eitli balantlarn kullanarak katkda bulunmaktan gayet mutlu olacaklarn sylediler. Neticede geen perembe Trkiye iinden ve dndan kk, fakat kararl bir grup iadam, devlet grevlisi ve akademisyenle stanbul'da bir araya geldik; hepsi Trkiye'nin Afrika'daki teebbsleriyle ilgili son derece deneyimli ve bilgili insanlard. Etkilendiimi sylemeliyim. Aina olduunuz konularla ilgili konferanslara veya seminerlere katldnzda ou zaman yeni argmanlar duymazsnz. Bu toplantlar temaslarda bulunmak asndan iyidir, fakat aslnda dncelerinize ekil vermezler veya yeni bir ey katmazlar. te bu kez durum farklyd. Birka saat iinde Trkiye'nin yeni aktif d politikasnn bu pek bilinmeyen, fakat zerinde epey kafa yorulmu vehesine dair bir resim ortaya kt. Beni en fazla etkileyen, hkmet politikalar, ticari stratejiler ve insani yardm faaliyetleri arasndaki sinerjiydi. Hkmet dzeyinde Afrika'yla ilgili dnsel mesai 90'larda, merhum Dileri Bakan smail Cem dneminde balamt. Fakat ancak 2005'ten sonra AKP hkmeti Afrika'ya ynelik yeni bir yaklam gelitirerek, bu blgeyi d politikann ayrlmaz bir paras haline getirdi. 2005'te 12 olan bykelilik says bu yl 22'ye karld, gelecek ylki hedef 32. Babakan ve cumhurbakan kilit nemdeki Afrika lkelerine iyi hazrlanm ziyaretler gerekletirdi; Trkiye G20 gibi

uluslararas platformlarda da Afrika'nn sesi gibi hareket ediyor. te yandan ekserisi TUSKON yesi olan birok kk ve orta lekli Trk irketi Afrika ktasnn drt bir kesinde kk salyor. Sonu toplam ticaret hacminde inanlmaz bir art. Artan ihtiyalara cevap vermeyi hedefleyen Trk Hava Yollar Afrika'ya dorudan seferlerini artryor ve stanbul'u dnyann drt kesinden Afrika'ya aktarmal uular iin en uygun merkez mahiyetinde baaryla konumlandryor. Trkiye ayn zamanda okullar, kalknma destei, insan yardm ve imamlar iin burs gibi iyi bilinen yumuak g aralarn da kullanarak, kendisini birok Afrika lkesinde nemli bir rekabeti konumuna yerletiriyor. Afrika'da sk bir rekabet sz konusu. in atak politikalaryla biliniyor, fakat Hindistan ve Brezilya gibi ykselen gler de ktada son derece aktif. Trkiye sahadaki yeni oyunculardan, fakat kendisini dier oyunculardan farkl klan bir strateji gelitirmi gibi grnyor. in'in ktadaki varl daha ziyade devlet kurulular tarafndan yrtlrken, Hindistan nclk etme iini byk Hint irketlerine brakyor. Akgn ve zkan'n da iaret ettii zere, Trkiye'nin Afrika politikas, ilk kez sivil toplum rgtlerinin, zel sektrn ve devletin karlarnn byk lde akt bir alan tekil ediyor; bu durum ayn zamanda lke ii aktrlerin d politikann ekillenmesi zerinde artan etkisini de gzler nne seriyor. Fadi iyi ki beni arayp bir araya gelmemiz ve Britanya'nn analitik yeteneklerini Trkiye'nin kresel bir g olma abalarn daha derinlikli yorumlamak iin kullanmamz konusunda srar etmi.

Turkey-EU: a strong team Should Turkey, the European Union and the United States cooperate in their efforts to help the countries of North Africa and the Middle East become more democratic and more prosperous? It was one of the key questions discussed at a workshop organized last weekend in Amsterdam by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). The organizers brought together experts from Turkey, Europe and the US to tackle the issue that tops the foreign policy agendas in Ankara, Washington, D.C., and most European capitals: How can we contribute to a positive follow-up to the Arab Spring? The meeting was very timely, just after the successful shift away from dictatorship in Tunisia and Egypt. At the same time, the revolution is still ongoing in Libya, Syria and some of the Gulf states, and the outcome is far from clear. For the moment, the main international players need all their diplomatic skills to deal with the mess in Libya, trying to prevent a similar scenario in Syria. They do not have the luxury to concentrate solely on post-revolutionary plans. But in Tunis and Cairo things are moving on, and decisions made today on constitutions and elections will have huge repercussions in the future. No time to waste if you want to play a role in these processes. The EU is busy revising its neighborhood policy, knowing that is has not been particularly effective over the last 15 years. The European approach was based on the same methods that were used in dealing with countries that were planning to become an EU member: The EU opens itself up for products and eventually people from the partner states on the condition that they introduce democratic reforms. But as one of the participants in the Amsterdam conference who knows the Brussels kitchen very well put it: There was a lot of pretending on both sides. The southern Mediterranean countries pretended to reform, the EU pretended to open itself up. In the end, nothing much happened. Conclusion: the EU needs a new, more realistic, policy to deal with countries that will never join the EU and will be eternal neighbors, using different kinds of incentives and cooperating more closely with other major players in the region. In their latest communication, the European Commission and the EU High Representative made clear that they got the message. Turkey is singled out as a key partner

because it is an important regional player and a compelling case of multi-party democracy in a country with a predominantly Muslim population. Most experts in Amsterdam agreed and tried to specify the synergy. In promoting democracy, the transformational experiences of new EU member states like Poland and Hungary should be combined with the Turkish lessons learned since the 1980s. In creating jobs, the problems and imperfections in Turkey are probably more attractive for a country like Egypt than the models the EU could offer. Overall, most participants agreed, EU money and experience should be combined with Turkeys affinity with the region. As one Turkish specialist put it, in dealing with Arab countries Turkey is the only one that can claim We are in this together, appealing to a sense of common destiny that other Europeans, let alone the Americans, simply cannot offer. Will it work? We will have to wait and see, but I am convinced Turkey and the EU should give it a try. Under one condition, though, that it is perfectly clear from the start that close cooperation in the southern Mediterranean is no substitute for the real thing: Turkeys accession to the EU. I know that in the past Ankara was not very keen on setting up sideshows next to the accession process. Turkish policy makers were afraid that these could potentially develop into alternatives for membership, realizing that some Europeans would be very happy if accession would be replaced by partnership. That is not what we discussed in Amsterdam. Coordinated Turkey-EU action in their common neighborhood could create a win-win situation for all. It might even help to raise the awareness that the long-term strategic interest of both the EU and Turkey are better served by playing on the same team on all other major challenges as well. Trkiye-AB: Gl bir takm Trkiye, Avrupa Birlii ve ABD, Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadou lkelerinin daha demokratik ve mreffeh olmasna yardm etme abalarnda ibirliine gitmeli mi? Geen hafta sonu German Marshall Fonu'nun (GMF) Amsterdam'da, Hollanda Dileri Bakanl ve Trkiye Ekonomik Politikalar Vakf (TEPAV) ile ortaklaa dzenledii atlye almasnda tartlan kilit sorulardan biri buydu. Atlyeyi organize edenler, Ankara, Washington ve Avrupa bakentlerinin byk ksmnn d politika gndeminin ilk srasnda yer alan soruyu tartmak zere Trkiye, Avrupa ve ABD'den uzmanlar bir araya getirdi: Arap Bahar'nn olumlu istikamette devam etmesine nasl katkda bulunabiliriz? Tunus ve Msr'n diktatrlklerden baaryla kurtulmasnn hemen sonrasnda yaplmas itibaryla, toplantnn zamanlamas son derece yerindeydi. te yandan Libya, Suriye ve baz Krfez lkelerinde devrim hl sryor ve sonucunun ne olaca hi belli deil. u an balca uluslararas aktrlerin Libya'daki hengme ile itigal etmek iin btn diplomatik becerilerini seferber etmesi, Suriye'de benzer bir senaryonun tekrarlanmasn nlemeye almas gerekiyor. Sadece devrim sonras planlara odaklanma lksleri yok. Fakat Tunus ve Kahire'de sre geliiyor ve kurumlar ve seimlere dair u an alnan kararlarn gelecekte ok byk etkileri olacak. Bu srelerde rol oynamak istiyorsanz kaybedecek zamannz yok. AB, komularna ynelik politikalarn gzden geirmekle megul, zira son 15 yldr ok etkili olmadnn farknda. Avrupa'nn bu blgeye yaklamnn temelinde, AB yesi olmay planlayan lkelerle itigal ederken kullanlan yntemlerin ayns vard: AB mallara ve nihayetinde ortaklk kurulan lkelerden gelen insanlara kaplarn ayor, bunun iin de demokratik reformlar yapmalarn art kouyordu. Fakat Amsterdam'da Brksel'in mutfan gayet iyi bilen bir katlmcnn da syledii zere: "ki taraf da bir yn numara yapt. Gney Akdeniz lkeleri reform yapar gibi, AB de kapy aar gibi yapt." Bunun sonucunda da pek bir ey olmad. Sonu: AB'nin, birlie hibir zaman katlmayacak ve ilelebet komu kalacak lkelerle itigal etmek iin yeni, daha gereki bir politikaya ihtiyac var. Farkl trde inisiyatifler kullanmas ve blgedeki dier nemli aktrlerle daha yakn ibirlii yapmas gerekiyor. Avrupa Komisyonu ve AB Yksek Temsilcisi, aralarndaki en son istiarede mesaj aldklarn aka gsterdi. Trkiye, "nemli bir blgesel aktr ve Mslman ounluklu nfusa sahip bir lkede ok partili

demokrasinin saygn bir rnei" olmas sebebiyle, kilit nemde bir ortak olarak zellikle zikredildi. Amsterdam'daki uzmanlarn byk ounluu bu konuda hemfikirdi ve sinerjiyi vurgulamaya alt. Demokrasiyi tevik etmek asndan Polonya ve Macaristan gibi AB yesi lkelerin dnmsel tecrbeleri Trkiye'nin 1980'lerden bu yana rendii derslerle birletirilmeliydi. alanlar yaratmak bakmndan, Trkiye'deki sorunlar ve kusurlar Msr gibi bir lkeye AB'nin sunabilecei modellerden muhtemelen daha cazip gelecekti. Genelde katlmclarn ou AB'nin paras ve tecrbesinin Trkiye'nin blgeye yaknlyla birletirilmesi gerektiinde de hemfikirdi. Bir Trk uzmann dedii gibi: Arap lkeleriyle itigal etmek konusunda Trkiye, "Bu ite hep beraberiz" iddiasn ortaya koyabilecek, bylece, brakn Amerikallar, dier Avrupallarn bile sunamayaca kader ortakl hissiyatna hitap edebilecek yegne lkeydi. e yaracak m? Bekleyip greceiz, fakat Trkiye ve AB'nin bunu denemesi gerektiinden hi kukum yok. Fakat tek bir artla: Gney Akdeniz'de yakn ibirliinin, "asl mesele"nin, yani Trkiye'nin AB yeliinin yerini alamayaca bandan beri gayet ak. Gemite Ankara'nn ikincil meseleleri yelik srecinin nne koymaya ok hevesli olmadn biliyorum. Trk siyasi karar mercileri bunlarn yeliin alternatifi halinde geliebilme ihtimalinden korkuyordu, nk baz Avrupallarn yeliin yerini ortakln almasndan gayet mutlu olacann farkndaydlar. Amsterdam'da tarttmz ey bu deildi. Trkiye ile AB'nin ortak yakn evrelerinde ibirlii iinde adm atmas herkes iin bir kazan-kazan durumu yaratabilir. Hatta AB ile Trkiye'nin uzun vadeli stratejik karlar asndan en iyisinin, btn dier byk sorunlarda da ayn takmda oynamak olduuna dair kavrayn glenmesine yardmc olabilir.

The two faces of Turkey Having spent some days in the Netherlands last week, it became clear to me how two recent developments have caused a problematic split in the European perception of Turkey. On the one hand, it is striking to see the growing number of highly critical reactions to the latest twists and turns in the Ergenekon investigations. Especially the arrests of several journalists and the search for an unpublished book did not go down very well in Europe. Mind you, most of this negative feedback comes from friends of Turkey, politicians and journalists who have always defended Turkeys accession to the EU -- insiders who wish to see Turkey get closer to European standards on freedom of the press and freedom of expression. Over the last two weeks, many of them have openly expressed their worries that Turkey is not moving closer but drifting into unknown territory, full of arbitrary interventions by the judiciary and pressure on critical journalists. The reaction of many Turkish commentators close to the government has been to dismiss these concerns as being the result of a lack of information or plain manipulation by anti-government forces. It is true that many of the European critics tend to lump all journalists together and unfortunately do not make a difference between those under attack for reporting on the Ergenekon trial, those arrested for allegedly having ties with other Ergenekon suspects and those harassed journalists whose writings may have offended or displeased some of the authorities. But it would be a grave mistake to expect this criticism to die down soon or, even worse, to provoke these uneasy friends by telling them that Turkey basically does not care anymore what they think because the EU accession process is going nowhere at the moment anyway. Every Turkish supporter of EU accession, representing the majority view in this country, should feel uncomfortable witnessing the liberal, social democrat and green promoters of Turkeys accession turning negative. If that is the result of ignorance or deception, Turkey has a clear interest to inform its European friends better. But their disapproval should be taken seriously. It is in the long-term interest of Turkey to have European friends who are willing to make the case for Turkeys EU membership. Bullying them or portraying them as uninformed fools only serves the interests of those in Turkey and the EU who were

always against this project. On the other hand, despite their criticism on some incidents in Turkey, many European pundits are very excited about the possibilities of joint EU-Turkey initiatives in post-revolutionary North Africa. This weekend, the German Marshall Fund has organized a high-level workshop in Amsterdam on EU, Turkey and the Neighborhood. American, European and Turkish specialists will discuss the different strategies to cope with the challenges posed by a region looking for help and advice in its complicated transformation process. In one of the preparatory papers for this conference, Turkish political analyst Sinan lgen makes a convincing case for an ambitious and comprehensive framework of collaboration between Ankara and Brussels in North Africa and, who knows, part of the Middle East. He presents a list of potential areas of EU-Turkey cooperation, ranging from private sector development and regulatory reform to political institutions and civil-military relations. On all those issues, an effective partnership would be beneficial for both Turkey and the EU. According to lgen, it would alleviate the trust deficit between the two sides: It would provide a definitive answer to the role that Turkey could potentially play as an EU member state. It would also help to assuage fears that Turkish accession would dilute the EU. On the contrary, a successful foreign policy collaboration between Ankara and Brussels would prove Turkish claims that the EU can become a more effective and influential global actor with Turkish accession. The criticism on domestic events and the optimism about fruitful partnership around the Mediterranean are two sides of the same coin. Taking only one side seriously and disregarding the other is the easy way out. European friends of Turkey deserve a decent and honest response to their anxieties about media freedom. Turkey is entitled to a constructive European offer on concrete future cooperation in its neighborhood. Trkiye'nin iki yz Geen hafta Hollanda'da geirdiim birka gn zarfnda son dnemdeki iki gelimenin Avrupa'nn Trkiye algsnda nasl sorunlu bir blnmeye sebep olduunu aka grdm. Bir yandan Ergenekon soruturmalarndaki inili kl gidiata dair ar eletirilerin giderek arttn grmek arpc. Bilhassa baz gazetecilerin tutuklanmas ve yaymlanmam bir kitabn peine dlmesi Avrupa'da hi iyi karlanmad. Olumsuz geri dnlerin byk ksmnn Trkiye'nin dostlarndan; AB yeliini daima desteklemi olan siyasetiler ve gazetecilerden geldiini hatrlatmak isterim. Birlik iinde Trkiye'nin basn ve ifade zgrl gibi konularda AB standartlarna daha da yaklatn grmek isteyen insanlar bunlar. Son iki haftadr birou Trkiye'nin yaknlamak yerine bilinmeyen topraklara srklendiine, yargnn geliigzel tutuklamalarnn ve muhalif gazetecilere ynelik basklarn arttna dair endielerini aka dile getiriyor. Hkmete yakn birok Trk yorumcunun tepkisi ise, bu endieleri, bilgi eksikliinin veya hkmet kart glerin su katlmam maniplasyonunun sonucu diye niteleyip reddetmek ynnde. Avrupal tenkitilerin btn gazetecileri ayn kefeye koyma ve Ergenekon davasna dair haber yapt iin taarruz altnda olan, dier Ergenekon phelileri ile balants olduu iddiasyla tutuklanan ve yazlar baz resm makamlar rahatsz ettii iin canndan bezdirilen gazeteciler arasnda ayrm yapmama eiliminde olduu doru. Fakat bu eletirilerin ksa sre sonra yatacan ummak veya daha kts, Trkiye'nin AB yelii sreci u an yerinde sayd iin artk ne dndklerini hi umursamadn syleyerek bu 'ac syleyen' dostlar kkrtmak hayati bir hata olacaktr. Bu lkedeki ounluk fikriyat mahiyetinde AB yeliine arka kan her Trk, Trkiye'nin yeliinin liberal, sosyal demokrat ve yeil destekilerinin aleyhe dndn grmekten rahatszlk duymal. Eer bu cehaletin veya kandrlmann sonucuysa, Trkiye'nin Avrupal dostlarn daha iyi bilgilendirmesi gerektii aka ortada. Fakat bu evrelerin olumsuz dnceleri ciddiye alnmal. AB yeliini savunmaya istekli Avrupal dostlara sahip olmak Trkiye'nin

uzun vadeli karlarnn gerei. Onlara kabadaylk taslamak veya bilgisiz aptallar gibi gstermek Trkiye ve AB'de bu projeye her daim kar km olanlarn ekmeine ya srmekten baka ie yaramaz. Dier yandan Trkiye'deki baz gelimelere ynelik eletirilerine ramen birok Avrupal yorumcu, AB ile Trkiye'nin devrim sonras Kuzey Afrika'da ortak giriimlerle bulunma ihtimalinden byk heyecan duyuyor. Bu hafta sonu German Marshall Fonu Amsterdam'da "AB, Trkiye ve Komular" balkl st dzey bir atlye almas dzenliyor. Amerikal, Avrupal ve Trk uzmanlar, karmak dnm sreci konusunda yardm ve tavsiye arayan bir blgenin tekil ettii zorluklarla baa kma stratejilerini tartacak. Konferansn hazrlk belgelerinden birinde Trk siyaset analisti Sinan lgen, Kuzey Afrika'da ve kim bilir belki Ortadou'nun belli blgelerinde Ankara ile Brksel arasnda iddial ve kapsaml bir ibirlii erevesi oluturulmasna ynelik ikna edici bir neri ortaya atyor. AB ile Trkiye arasnda zel sektrn gelitirilmesinden siyasi kurumlarn yapsnn reformdan geirilmesine, oradan asker-sivil ilikilerine uzanan potansiyel ibirlii alanlarnn bir listesini karyor. Btn bu meselelerde etkin bir ortakln hem Trkiye'nin hem AB'nin yararna olacan vurguluyor. lgen'e gre bu, iki taraf arasndaki gven eksikliini de giderecek: "Trkiye'nin AB yesi bir lke sfatyla ne gibi bir rol oynayabilecei sorusuna kesin bir cevap oluturacaktr. Yan sra Trkiye'nin yeliinin AB'yi 'sulandraca' korkularnn giderilmesine de yardmc olacaktr. Tam tersine, Ankara ile Brksel arasnda baarl bir d politika ibirlii, Trkiye'nin katlmas halinde AB'nin daha etkin ve nfuzlu bir kresel aktr haline gelebilecei iddiasn da kantlayacaktr." Trkiye'deki i gelimelere ynelik eletiriler ve Akdeniz etrafnda verimli ortakla ynelik iyimserlik bir madalyonun iki yz. Sadece tek bir yz ciddiye alp dierini grmezden gelmek iin kolayna kamaktr. Trkiye'nin Avrupal dostlar medya zgrl ile ilgili endielerine doru ve drst bir cevab hak ediyor. Trkiye, komu blgelerde somut mstakbel ibirlii ynnde Avrupa'nn ortaya koyaca yapc bir neri iin biilmi kaftan.

Angry Nation For foreigners who want to know more about modern Turkey, the number of good books in English on the subject is surprisingly limited. Many visitors who come here for the first time or friends back home who are curious for the story behind the newspaper headlines have only a few options if they go to a bookshop or on the Internet. Probably they will end up with Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two World from Stephen Kinzer, the former New York Times bureau chief in stanbul, or with The Turks Today by Andrew Mango, an eminent scholar on Turkey and author of a widely acclaimed biography on Atatrk. Both books are informative and well written but were published at least seven years ago, so they do not cover Turkey under Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. There is a growing number of very interesting publications available on the ruling party, but they are all academic and expensive. Yesterday a new book was presented at the Istanbul Policy Center that could bridge the gap between the outdated general books on Turkey and the specialized literature on the AKP: Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989. It is part of a series on the world after the end of the Cold War and was written by Kerem ktem, a Turkish research fellow at the European Studies Centre at Oxford University in the UK. Does it have the potential to replace the above-mentioned classics? In some ways it certainly has. For good reason, ktem does not start in 1989 and spends his first chapter on a brief sketch of the late Ottoman state, the birth of the republic and the period leading up to the 1980 coup. He needs another chapter on the Turgut zal years until 1991 to be able to explain the main trends in the Turkish economy and the changes that took

place domestically and in Turkeys relations with the outside world. Overall, ktem is positive on zal and his efforts to respond to the hopes and fears of ordinary people, the restructuring of the economy and the new engagement with the neighborhood. The years between 1991 and 2002 are described as a lost decade in which the process of modest modernization that started in the 1980s was interrupted and tens of thousands of lives were lost in the fight between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). He is especially critical of the Feb. 28, 1997 coup, the manipulations by the old elites that continued with impunity and the general brutalization of the country through war and arbitrary state action. He is positive on the first AKP government and describes well their efforts to pick up where zal had left off but also makes it clear how after 2005 the opposition against these changes deepened, on and behind the stage. Inevitably the last chapter on the years since 2007 is only a first attempt to make sense of developments that are still unfolding. But the questions he raises are the correct ones and, for instance, his treatment of the Ergenekon case is balanced. The investigations into the dark sides of Turkeys recent history directly touch on the basic theme of the book. According to ktem, republican history should be seen as a constant battle to push back the influence of what he calls the guardian state, an amorphous power structure within the state hierarchy which is upheld by interpersonal contacts at the highest level. Others would call it the deep state. Although I basically agree with the analysis, I am not sure whether this highly ideological way of looking at Turkey will go down very well with foreigners who are not familiar with the concept and might consider its central role in the book overdone. It is in fact also the guardian state that ktem, not fully convincingly, blames for having created all the anger in Turkeys society among groups and individuals who were mistreated for decades by the pro-status quo powers: the left, the Islamists and the Kurds. One piece of advice to the author: Improve the part on the EU and get your facts right in the second edition or translation of the book. Then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gl was not present at the funeral of Hrant Dink and the e-coup was on April 27, 2007 (not April 24). Despite this sloppiness, I would advise all my friends to read the book because it does enable the reader to make better sense of this complicated country. fkeli lke Modern Trkiye hakknda daha fazla ey renmek isteyen yabanclar iin konuyla ilgili iyi ngilizce kitaplarn says artc lde az. Buraya ilk kez gelen birok ziyareti veya Trkiye'ye dair gazete manetlerinin ardndaki hikyeyi merak eden birok insan kitapya gittiinde veya internete girdiinde pek az seenek buluyor karsnda. Muhtemelen New York Times'n eski stanbul brosu efi Stephen Kinzer'in "Hilal ve Yldz" ya da tannm Trkiye uzman ve yaygn beeni toplayan Atatrk biyografisinin yazar Andrew Mango'nun "Gnmzde Trkler" kitabyla karlalacaktr. Her iki kitap da bilgilendirici ve iyi yazlm, fakat en aa yedi yl nce kaleme alndklarndan AKP iktidarndaki Trkiye'yi kapsamyorlar. ktidar partisi hakknda yaynlanan ilgin kitaplarn says giderek artyor, fakat hepsi akademik ve pahal. Dn stanbul Politikalar Merkezi tarafndan, zaman gemi genel Trkiye kitaplar ile AKP zerine uzmanlam klliyat arasndaki mesafeyi kapatabilecek bir kitap piyasaya sunuldu: "fkeli lke. 1989'dan bu yana Trkiye." Kitap, Souk Sava'n bitiminden sonraki dnyaya dair hazrlanan bir dizinin paras ve Britanya'daki Oxford niversitesi'nin Avrupa

almalar Merkezi'nde retim grevlisi olan Kerem ktem tarafndan yazld. Kitabn yukarda ad geen klasiklerin yerini alma potansiyeli var m peki? Baz alardan kesinlikle var. ktem yerinde bir tercihle 1989'dan balamyor ve ilk blmde Osmanl Devleti'nin son dnemini, Cumhuriyet'in douunu ve 1980 darbesine varan dnemi zetliyor. Trk ekonomisindeki ana eilimleri ve lke iinde ve Trkiye'nin d dnya ile ilikilerindeki deiimleri aklayabilmek iin 1991'e kadarki zal yllarna mstakil bir blm ayryor. ktem, zal'a ve sradan insanlarn umutlaryla korkularna karlk verme, ekonomiyi yeniden yaplandrma ve komulara kar yeni bir yaklam sergileme abalarna genel olarak mspet bakyor. 1980'lerde balayan lml modernleme srecinin kesintiye urad ve Trk devleti ile PKK arasndaki savata on binlerce hayatn kaybedildii 1991 ile 2002 arasndaki dnem "kayp on yl" diye niteleniyor. ktem ubat 1997 darbesine, eski sekinlerin hi hesap vermeden srdrd maniplasyonlara ve lkenin sava ve devletin keyfi uygulamalaryla genel olarak sindirilmesine bilhassa eletirel yaklayor. Birinci AKP hkmetine mspet bakyor ve abalarn 'zal'n brakt yerden devam edilmesi' olarak tarif ediyor, fakat 2005 sonrasnda bu deiimlere kar ak ve gizli muhalefetin derinletiini vurgulamay da ihmal etmiyor. 2007'den bugne geen dnemi ele alan son blm ise kanlmaz olarak hl srmekte olan gelimeleri anlamlandrma ynnde bir ilk abadan ibaret. Fakat ktem doru sorular ortaya koyuyor ve szgelimi Ergenekon davasna dair dengeli bir yaklam sergiliyor. Trkiye'nin yakn tarihinin karanlk sayfalarna ynelik soruturmalar dorudan doruya kitabn temel mevzuuna temas ediyor. ktem'e gre Cumhuriyet tarihi, "muhafz devlet, devlet hiyerarisi iinde en yksek mevkilerdeki kiisel ilikilerle kurulan amorf bir iktidar yaps" diye tanmlad eyin gcn geriletmek ynnde srekli bir mcadele olarak grlmeli. Bunu derin devlet diye de okuyabilirsiniz. Temelde bu analize katlsam da, Trkiye'ye ynelik bu son derece ideolojik bakn kavrama aina olmayan yabanclar tarafndan iyi karlanp karlanmayacandan emin deilim; ideolojinin kitaptaki merkez roln ar bulabilirler. ktem, on yllarca statko yanls gler tarafndan itilip kaklan gruplar ve bireyler (sol, slamclar ve Krtler) arasnda ve Trkiye toplumunda hasl olan fkenin btn suunu da, tam manasyla ikna edici olmayan ekilde muhafz devlete yklyor. Yazara AB hakkndaki blm gelitirmesini ve kitabn ikinci basksnda veya tercmesinde baz olgular dzeltmesini tavsiye etmek isterim. Szgelimi dnemin dileri bakan Abdullah Gl Hrant Dink'in cenazesine katlmad ve e-darbe 24 Nisan deil, 27 Nisan 2007'de yapld. Bu tr hatalarna ramen btn dostlarma kitab okumalarn nereceim, zira gerekten de okuyucunun bu karmak lkeyi daha iyi anlayabilmesini salyor

Johan Cruijff In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi is fighting his last battle. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad is trying to survive by combining brutal force and half-hearted concessions. In Japan, fallout from potentially the biggest nuclear disaster in recent years is spreading. In the Netherlands, the media is dominated by one man: Johan Cruijff. Johan Cruijff? I guess you have to be over 50 to remember Cruijff as a football player. He started his career with Ajax Amsterdam in 1964 and played with them until 1973. In 1971, 1972 and 1973 Ajax won the European Cup, the predecessor of the Champions League. In 1974 he was the captain of the Dutch national team, one of the most famous national teams ever, known for their so-called Total Football, which dominated the World Cup but lost out to Germany in the finals. He left for Barcelona in 1973 where he revitalized the club and restored Catalan pride. He is widely regarded as one of the greatest

players of all time, only to be compared with players such as Pele and Diego Maradona. As manager of Ajax and, again, Barcelona, he was highly successful in the 1980s and 1990s and is seen by many as the (grand)father of the present impressive Barcelona team, coached by Josep Guardiola, who started his career as a player under Cruijff. In case you did not get the message yet: We are talking here about one of great Dutch icons of all time who, at the age of almost 64, is still extremely well-known, popular and influential. Why is Cruijff all over the media now? He has decided that the time has come for him to reconstruct Ajax, the team where he started his impressive career. A club in decline that has not won the Dutch title for years and had to accept grudgingly that first PSV Eindhoven and more recently FC Twente have overtaken the former pride of Amsterdam. But Cruijff never accepts defeat. In 2008 he made a serious intervention and tried to restructure the club, replace the management and introduce a new style and training method. He failed because the then Ajax coach, Marco van Basten, one of Cruijffs trustees, thought that the proposals were too radical. But Cruijff never gives up. So he tried again and this time he seems to have prepared better. After a smart and well-orchestrated media campaign, the Ajax executive board resigned. They were fed up and tired of being ordered around by Cruijff, who uses his weekly column in the biggest Dutch newspaper, De Telegraaf, as an important weapon to push his own favorites and blacken the reputation of those he dislikes. His demands: The present coach, Frank de Boer, who briefly played at Galatasaray, can stay but should be assisted by two former Ajax players, Wim Jonk and Dennis Bergkamp, who fully share Cruijffs football philosophy. The new board should also consist of people with strong soccer roots. Only then, according to the self acclaimed Savior, can Ajax restore its reputation as a team known for its attacking play, ready to take on every opponent in Holland and abroad. The drama unfolding in Amsterdam has all the elements to make it a media hit. A charismatic leader who is no match for technocratic managers who ran the club up until this week. Alas, as in the past, Cruijff is good at telling others what to do but he never wants to take any responsibility himself. His ambition is to rock the boat and have his disciples run the new show, not to become the Ajax president or coach himself. After the chaotic scenes of last week, Cruijff left for Barcelona where he lives a quiet life. There are still many in Amsterdam who believe that Ajax will be better off when Cruijffs orders are implemented fully and rapidly. There are many others outside the Dutch capital who are convinced that, despite their love and respect for the old master, a golden past is no guarantee for a golden future. Times have changed, quite dramatically, also in soccer. The problem is that Cruijff is too self-partial and too stubborn to accept that uncomfortable truth. Cruijff never listens. Johan Cruyff Libya'da Muammer Kaddafi lm kalm sava veriyor. Suriye'de Bear Esed acmasz g ve gnlsz tavizleri bir arada devreye sokup ayakta kalmaya alyor. Japonya'da son yllarn en byk nkleer felaketinin yol at szntnn nne geilemiyor. Hollanda'da ise medya tek bir adam konuuyor: Johan Cruyff.

Johan Cruyff? Sanrm Cruyff'un bir futbol oyuncusu olduunu hatrlamanz iin elli yan zerinde olmanz lazm. Kariyerine 1964'te Amsterdam'da, Ajax takmnda balad ve orada 1973'e dek top koturdu. 1971, 72 ve 73 yllarnda Ajax, ampiyonlar Ligi'nin selefi olan Avrupa Kupas'n kazand. 1974'te gelmi gemi en nl milli takmlardan Hollanda Milli Takm'nn kaptanyd; Total Futbol diye bilinen mehur oyun tarzyla Dnya Kupas'na damgasn vuran Hollanda takm finalde Almanya'ya kaybetti. 1973'te Barcelona iin Ajax'tan ayrlan Cruyff, kulb adeta diriltti ve ulusal gururu yeniden tesis etti. Btn zamanlarn en byk futbolcularndan biri sayld, Pele ve Diego Maradona gibi oyuncularla kyasland. Ajax'n ve sonra tekrar Barcelona'nn menajeri olarak 1980'ler ve 90'larda da byk baarlar kazand ve biroklar tarafndan, kariyerine Cruyff dneminde oyuncu olarak balayan Josep Guardiola'nn altrd u anki etkileyici Barcelona takmnn (byk)babas olarak grlyor. Demem o ki, burada tm zamanlarn en byk Hollanda ikonlarndan birini konuuyoruz; 64'ne merdiven dayayan Cruyff hl ok tannyor, popler ve etkili. Peki medya bugnlerde niye Cruyff'la yatp kalkyor? nk gz kamatrc kariyerine balad Ajax' yeniden yaplandrmasnn vakti geldiine karar vermi durumda. Yllardr Hollanda ampiyonluunu kazanamayan ve Amsterdam'n gururu unvann nce PSV Eindhoven'n, daha yakn dnemde de Twente'nin kaptn gnlszce kabul etmek zorunda kalan d halinde bir kulp Ajax. Fakat Cruyff yenilgiyi asla kabul etmez. 2008'de ciddi bir mdahalede bulunarak kulb yeniden yaplandrmay, ynetimi deitirmeyi ve yeni bir tarz ve idman yntemi getirmeyi denedi. Baarsz oldu, zira o dnem Ajax' altran ve Cruyff'un gvendii isimlerden olan Marco van Basten nerilerin fazla radikal olduu kansndayd. Fakat Cruyff asla pes etmez. O yzden tekrar denedi ve bu kez daha iyi hazrlanm grnyor. Zekice ve iyi ayarlanm bir medya kampanyasnn ardndan Ajax'n ynetim kurulu istifa etti. En byk Hollanda gazetesi De Telegraaf'taki kesini gzdelerini ne karp sevmediklerini itibardan drmek ynnde nemli bir silah gibi kullanan Cruyff tarafndan itilip kaklmaktan bkp yoruldular. Cruyff'un talepleri unlard: Ksa sre Galatasaray'da da top koturan mevcut teknik direktr Frank de Boer kalabilir, fakat yardmclna Cruyff'un futbol felsefesini tmyle paylaan iki eski Ajax oyuncusu, Wim Jonk ve Dennis Bergkamp getirilmeli. Yeni ynetim kurulu da gl futbol kkenlerine sahip isimlerden olumal. Kendinden menkul kurtarc Cruyff'a gre, ancak bunlar yaplrsa Ajax saldrgan futbol oynayan bir takm olarak hretini tekrar tesis edebilir ve Hollanda'da ve dardaki btn rakiplerini devirecek noktaya gelebilir. Amsterdam'da yaananlar medya manetlerini sslemek asndan btn unsurlara sahip. Bu haftaya kadar kulb yneten teknokrat yneticiler kadar g sahibi olan karizmatik bir lider sz konusu. Yazk ki, gemite olduu gibi Cruyff bakalarna ne yapmalar gerektiini sylemekte pek mahir, fakat kendi bana sorumluluk almay hi istemiyor. Onun istedii gemiyi sarsp kendi mritlerinin ovun dmenine gemesini salamak, fakat bunu yaparken Ajax bakanlndan veya teknik direktrlnden uzak durmak. Geen haftaki kaotik sahnelerin ardndan Cruyff sessiz sakin bir hayat srd Barcelona'ya gitti. Amsterdam'da Cruyff'un talimatlarnn tam ve hzl ekilde uygulanmas halinde Ajax'n daha iyi olacana inanan pek ok insan var hl. Hollanda bakenti dndaki pek ok baka insan ise yal ustaya duyduu sevgi ve saygya ramen, altn bir gemiin altn bir gelecein garantisi olmad kanaatinde. Futbolda da iler ok deiti. Sorun u ki, Cruyff bu tatsz gerei kabul etmeyecek kadar kendinden emin ve inat. Cruyff asla dinlemez.

R2P Is upholding and, if necessary, enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya and protecting Libyan citizens against brutal violence in the end just another example of Western imperialism? Is this intervention that was authorized by the United Nations Security Council in essence a crude attempt to safeguard American and European access to Libyan oil reserves? The answer is an unequivocal yes if one listens to many left-wing critics of the present attempt to shield the popular uprising against Muammar Gaddafi by bombing the planes and tanks of the Libyan dictator. For leftists in Turkey and abroad,

the Libyan intervention is proof of the hypocrisy and double standards of the US and the EU, which have decided to intervene in Libya but not in Cote dIvoire, a country torn apart by violent clashes between rival groups, because, according to the critics, there is no oil there. The irony is that it is not only the ultra-left that is supportive of this radical anti-Westernism. Many conservatives tend to agree with it as well, especially in the Muslim world. In Turkey, a toned-down version could be heard in some government statements during the recent slalom maneuvers to explain Turkeys policy on Libya. There was a reference to oil. There was a comparison with Americas interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq -- another classic among the Libya detractors. Let me explain why I believe linking Libya to Afghanistan and Iraq is a fundamental misreading of the present events. I am convinced that what is happening now in Libya is closely connected with the non-interventions in Rwanda and Bosnia in the past. We all remember the horrors of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 when an estimated 800,000 people in the small East African nation were killed. The international community stood by and did not know how to react. It led to long and emotional discussions afterwards on what to do if similar atrocities were about to happen again. In 2006 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution in which it listed a set of principles aimed at preventing future genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansings. The concept was called Responsibility to Protect, or R2P. If a state is failing to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures are not working, the international community has the responsibility to intervene, as a last resort with military force. But it was not only Rwanda that triggered this quite revolutionary break with a past in which national sovereignty was untouchable. Many had also not forgotten how undecided and divided world powers had allowed Bosnian Serbs to kill thousands of Bosnian Muslims between 1992 and 1995. I remember very well how Turkey -- for good reason -- pushed for action to stop the killing in Sarajevo and how happy I was when the Americans finally intervened. I am not the only one who will never forget how the unwillingness to bomb the approaching troops of Gen. Ratko Mladic led to the murder of 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995. All these tragedies had to happen before the world was ready for R2P. Does this mean that from now on we will never witness any brutalities because the UN has authorized a humanitarian intervention? Unfortunately, no. The world did not intervene in Darfur when thousands were killed in 2003. That might happen again in another place when there is no political will to act, when the immediate interests of one of the big global powers are at stake or when it is simply extremely difficult to translate the R2P norms into an effective operation. On top of that, most interventions are surrounded by uncertainties. They may even fail. Still, I was in favor of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 that saved the lives of thousands of Kosovars. For the same reasons I am happy that the airstrikes against Gaddafis troops have prevented a massacre in Benghazi. The Libyan intervention is legal, it is necessary and it is supported both by the Libyan population and public opinion in the region. Lets criticize world leaders if they refuse to intervene when, according to R2P, they should. Not when they do.

R2P* Libya zerinde uua yasak blge ilan etmek ve gerektiinde bunu uygulayarak Libyal sivilleri acmasz iddete kar korumak Bat emperyalizminin bir baka rneinden mi ibaret? BM Gvenlik Konseyi tarafndan verilen mdahale yetkisi, znde Amerika ve Avrupa'nn Libya'nn petrol rezervlerine eriimini garantiye almak ynnde adi bir aba m? Kaddafi'ye kar halk isyanna, Libya diktatrnn uaklar ve tanklarn bombalayarak kalkan olmak ynndeki mevcut abay eletiren birok solcuya kulak verirseniz cevap net: 'Evet'. Trkiye ve baka lkelerdeki solcular iin Libya mdahalesi ABD ve AB'nin ikiyzllnn ve ifte standardnn kant. Bu lkeler szgelimi hasm gruplar arasndaki iddetli atmalarla parampara olan Fildii Sahili'ne deil de Libya'ya mdahale etmeye karar veriyor, zira Fildii Sahili'nde petrol yok. ronik olan u ki, bu radikal Bat kartlna destek verenler ultra-soldan ibaret deil. Bilhassa Mslman dnyada birok muhafazakr da bu yaklam benimseme eiliminde. Trkiye'de dk tonlu bir versiyonunu Ankara'nn Libya politikasn izah etmek ynndeki son zikzak hareketleri srasnda hkmetin baz aklamalarnda da bulmak mmkn. Sz konusu aklamalarda petrole atfta bulunuluyor. Libya mdahalesi aleyhinde konuanlarn bir baka klasik temas mahiyetinde, Amerika'nn Afganistan ve Irak mdahaleleriyle kyaslama yaplyor. Ben Libya ile Afganistan ve Irak arasnda ba kurmann, mevcut olaylar klliyen yanl okumak olduu kanaatindeyim. Sebebini izah etmek isterim: Bence u an Libya'da olan bitenler, gemite Ruanda ve Bosna'ya mdahale edilmemesiyle yakndan balantl. Ruanda'da 1994'te gerekleen soykrmn dehetini hepimiz hatrlyoruz; bu kk Dou Afrika lkesinde yaklak 800 bin insan ldrlmt. Uluslararas toplum ylece seyretmi ve nasl karlk vereceini bilememiti. Sonrasnda, benzer mezalimlerin gereklemek zere olduu durumlarda ne yaplacana dair uzun ve hararetli tartmalar yaand. 2006'da BM Gvenlik Konseyi mstakbel soykrmlar, sava sularn, insanla kar sular ve etnik temizlikleri nlemeyi amalayan bir ilkeler dizisinin yer ald bir tasary kabul etti. Tasarnn ortaya koyduu kavram 'Koruma Sorumluluu' (R2P) idi. Eer bir devlet vatandalarn kitlesel mezalimden koruyamyorsa ve bar nlemler ie yaramyorsa, uluslararas toplumun son are olarak asker gle mdahale sorumluluu vard. Fakat ulusal egemenliin dokunulamaz sayld gemile bu son derece devrimci kopuu tetikleyen sadece Ruanda deildi. Biroklar kararsz ve blnm dnya glerinin Bosnal Srplarn 1992 ile 95 arasnda binlerce Bosnal Mslman' ldrmesine nasl gz yumduunu unutmamt. Trkiye'nin gayet hakl gerekelerle Saraybosna'daki cinayetleri durdurmak amacyla harekete geilmesi iin nasl bastrdn ve Amerikallar nihayet mdahale ettiinde nasl mutlu olduumu dn gibi hatrlarm. General Mladi'in yaklaan birliklerini bombalamak ynndeki gnlszln 1995'te Srebrenica'da 8 bin Mslman erkein ve erkek ocuunun ldrlmesine yol amasn asla unutmayacak olan sadece ben deilim. Dnyann R2P noktasna gelmesi iin btn bu trajedilerin yaanmas gerekti. BM'nin insani mdahale yetkisi vermesi, bundan byle bu tr vahetlere artk hi tank olmayacamz anlamna m geliyor? Ne yazk ki hayr. 2003'te Darfur'da binlerce insan lrken dnya mdahale etmedi. Harekete gemek ynnde siyasi irade olmadnda, byk kresel glerden birinin ksa vadeli karlar tehlikeye girdiinde veya R2P'nin normlarn etkili bir operasyona tercme etmek son derece zor olduunda bu trajediler baka bir yerde tekrar yaanabilir. Hepsinin tesinde mdahalelerin byk ksm belirsizliklerle dolu. Hatta baarsz da olabiliyorlar. Yine de 1999'da binlerce Kosovalnn hayatn kurtaran NATO mdahalesinden yanaydm. Ayn sebeplerle Kaddafi birliklerine ynelik hava saldrlarnn Bingazi'de bir katliam nlemesinden memnunum. Libya mdahalesi yasal, gerekli ve hem Libya halk hem blge kamuoyu tarafndan destekleniyor. Dnya liderlerini gerektiinde R2P dorultusunda mdahaleyi reddettiklerinde eletirelim, mdahale ettiklerinde deil. (*) Responsibility to Protect ifadesinin ksaltmas olan R2P Trkeye "koruma sorumluluu" olarak evrilebilir.

German risks and Turkish risks Three days ago I was having dinner in Berlin with an old friend from the German Greens. After commenting on the latest results in the German and Turkish football leagues, we discussed the two topics that have made the headlines since last week: the intervention against the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the nuclear disaster resulting from the earthquake in Japan. The German government has taken a remarkable position on both issues. Germany did not support the UN resolution that called for a no-fly zone over Libya and made it clear that it will not take part in operations to protect the civilian population. Intervening in Libyan infighting was considered too risky, and the small number of deployable German troops is already occupied elsewhere anyway. The decision was strongly criticized by most German commentators and analysts, who did not understand why Chancellor Angela Merkel had chosen to isolate her country inside the EU and took sides in the UN Security Council with Russia and China, two countries known for their aversion to humanitarian interventions because they are afraid that one day the international community might target them for their ruthless treatment of the Chechens and Uighurs. But the event that really shook the whole German nation was the horror show at Japans Fukushima nuclear power plant. My friend told me that while watching the events unravel, he had regularly switched between German TV and CNN. The difference in reporting was amazing, according to him. Looking at the German version of the news, it was difficult not to get the feeling that soon something disastrous was going to happen in Germany, too. Summarizing the gloomy mood, he said it looked as if the German reporters were counting the bodies, while the CNN journalists were constantly trying to find the survivors. The German government immediately reacted in line with the national feeling of panic and distress and decided to temporarily close seven old nuclear power plants and to put the decision about what to do with the rest on hold. If such a thing can occur in Japan, you cant continue in Germany as if nothing has happened, Merkel declared. It has led to a debate in the German media on the tendency among citizens and politicians in this country to avoid, if possible, all risks. Specialized soul searchers came to the conclusion that there is such a thing as the typical German inclination to long for security and the perfect world in which there is no place for nuclear risks. The Turkish reaction to the same two eye-catching events could not have been more different. It is still not quite clear to me what the Turkish position on Libya is exactly. It is opposed to sanctions and the UN resolution on the no-fly zone but, only a few days later, it said it was prepared to contribute to the military offensive against Gaddafi. Not really the most convincing and consistent piece of diplomacy, to put it mildly. For old-fashioned clarity, we have to turn to the response of the Turkish government to the nuclear problems in Japan. According to both the prime minister and the energy minister, there is no need at all to reconsider the plans to build two nuclear power plants in Turkey, a country known to be prone to earthquakes. Both underlined the difference between the old-fashioned Japanese plant that ran into problems and the ultra-modern factory that the Russians are planning to build in the Mediterranean town of Akkuyu. There are good arguments against this

comparison, but that is not the point I want to make here. Asked about the risk that a nearby earthquake would lead to Fukushima-like scenes on the Turkish coast, the prime minister was not impressed. LPG tanks at home are also not riskfree, he said, so why bother? It is an answer that would ruin the career of any German politician. In Turkey downplaying nuclear risks is accepted, it seems. Is it because, compared to Germany, Turkish society is less focused on total risk aversion? Or is it because there has not been a serious debate on nuclear energy in Turkey yet? Almanya'nn riskleri ve Trkiye'nin riskleri gn nce Berlin'de Alman Yeillerinden eski bir arkadamla akam yemeindeydim. Alman ve Trk futbol liglerindeki en son neticelerle ilgili yorum yaptktan sonra geen haftadan bu yana manetleri igal eden iki konuyu konutuk: Libya'daki Kaddafi rejimine mdahale ve Japonya'daki deprem sonucunda yaanan nkleer felaket. Alman hkmeti her iki konuda da arpc bir tavr sergiledi. Almanya, Libya zerinde uua yasak blge ngren BM tasarsn desteklemedi ve sivil nfusu korumak iin yaplacak operasyonlara katlmayacan aka ifade etti. Libya'nn i atmasna mdahale etmenin ok riskli olduu dnlyordu ve zaten az sayda konulandrlabilir Alman birlii baka yerlerde grevliydi. Karar Alman yorumcularn ve analizcilerin byk ksm tarafndan iddetle eletirildi; Merkel'in neden AB iinde lkesini izole etmeyi ve BM Gvenlik Konseyi'nde in ve Rusya'nn yannda saf tutmay tercih ettiini anlamyorlard. in ve Rusya insani mdahalelere kar isteksiz tutumlaryla biliniyor, zira eenlere ve Uygurlara ynelik insafsz muamelelerinden dolay gnn birinde uluslararas toplumun kendilerini de hedef alabileceinden korkuyorlar. Fakat Alman ulusunu bir btn olarak sarsan asl vaka, Japonya'nn Fukuima nkleer santralindeki korku filmi oldu. Arkadam, olaylarn geliimini izlerken Alman televizyonlar ile CNN arasnda srekli gidip geldiini anlatt. Ona gre haberleri veri tarzndaki fark hayret vericiydi. Haberlerin Alman versiyonuna bakldnda, ok gemeden Almanya'da da bir felaket yaanabilecei hissine kaplmamak mmkn deildi. karartc ruh halini zetleyen ey uydu: Sanki Alman gazeteciler cesetleri sayyor, CNN gazetecileri ise srekli hayatta kalanlar bulmaya alyordu. Alman hkmeti derhal ulusal panik ve endie duygusuna uygun bir karlk retti ve yedi eski nkleer enerji santralini geici olarak kapatmaya karar verdi; geri kalan santrallerle ilgili ne yaplaca kararn ise zamana brakt. "Eer Japonya'da byle bir ey yaanabiliyorsa, Almanya'da sanki hibir ey olmam gibi devam edemezsiniz." diyordu Merkel. Bu karar medyada, Almanya'daki vatandalar ve siyasetiler arasnda var olan mmkn mertebe btn risklerden kama eilimine dair bir tartma balatt. Uzman 'ruh okuyucular' u sonuca vard: Gvenlik ve kusursuz dnya taknts Almanlarn tipik eilimiydi ve byle bir lkede nkleer risklere asla yer yoktu. Ayn iki arpc vakaya Trkiye'nin tepkisi ise son derece farkl oldu. Buna karn Libya konusunda Trkiye'nin duruunun tam olarak ne olduunu hl anlayabilmi deilim. Yaptrmlara ve BM'nin uua yasak blge tasarsna kar kt, fakat sadece birka gn sonra Kaddafi'ye ynelik asker saldrya katkda bulunmaya hazrd. Hafif tabiriyle sylersek, buna inandrc ve tutarl bir diplomasi demek pek mmkn deil. Trk hkmetinin Japonya'daki nkleer soruna tepkisine baktmzda da durum pek i ac deil. Babakan'a ve enerji bakanna gre, depremlerden ok ekmi bir lke olan Trkiye'de iki nkleer enerji santrali ina etme planlarn yeniden gzden geirmeye hi gerek yoktu. Her ikisi de sorunlara gark olan eski moda Japon santrali ile Ruslarn Akdeniz kasabas Akkuyu'da ina etmeyi planlad ultra modern tesis arasndaki farkn altn izdi. Bu kyaslamann karsna sk argmanlar koymak mmkn, fakat burada bahsetmek istediim husus bu deil. Santralin yaknnda bir deprem olmas halinde Trkiye kysnda Fukuima benzeri sahneler yaanma riski sorulduunda Babakan hi istifini bozmad. Babakan'a baklrsa evlerdeki tpgazlar da risksiz deildi, yleyse endieye mahal yoktu.

Herhangi bir Alman siyaseti bu cevab verse kariyeri mahvolur. Grnen o ki Trkiye'de nkleer riskleri kmsemek kabul edilir bir tutum. Bunun nedeni, Almanya ile kyaslandnda Trk toplumunun btn risklerden kanmaya daha az odaklanmas m? Yoksa henz Trkiye'de nkleer enerji zerine ciddi bir tartma yaplmam olmas m?

Finding the right balance Last week the European Parliament adopted its annual resolution on Turkey. The parliament traditionally focuses on the so-called Copenhagen criteria on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The statement was prepared by the Turkey rapporteur of the parliament, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, a Dutch Christian-Democrat who for the last five years has been extremely successful in producing evaluations that, despite all the differences between parties, have been considered by and large as balanced and fair by all major political groups in the parliament. In the past, the clear stance of the European Parliament against the e-coup of the army in April 2007 and against the efforts to close down the ruling party in 2008 were highly appreciated by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leaders. Last year, the Turkish government welcomed the report despite the fact that the parliament was quite critical on certain developments such as the tax case against the Doan Media Group and the stalemate on the Kurdish and Alevi initiatives. Last week there was no understanding at all on the part of the Turkish government. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan slammed the latest parliament report as being unbalanced. Adding insult to injury, he even accused OomenRuijten and her colleagues of being unbalanced themselves and lacking proper information on Turkey. Based on a classic conspiracy theory, he even suggested that the document had been drafted upon instruction. What has caused this outrage? Listening to Erdoans tirade, it is obvious which two paragraphs in the parliaments resolution have provoked his anger: the one on freedom of the press and the one on the Ergenekon investigation. The parliament expressed its concern about the deterioration in freedom of the press, about certain acts of censorship and about growing selfcensorship within the Turkish media, including on the Internet. It called on the government and the judiciary to protect press freedom and decided to closely follow the cases of Nedim ener. Ahmet k and other journalists facing police and judicial harassment. On the Ergenekon case that has always been supported by the European Parliament, the resolution expresses concern about excessively long pre-trial detention periods, the lack of progress in investigations and notes that the recent detention of well-known journalists such as Nedim ener and Ahmet k might lead to a loss of credibility of these trials which should, on the contrary, strengthen democracy. Contrasting this carefully formulated criticism with the extremely harsh words of the prime minister, one can draw some conclusions: -- Apparently the same parliamentarians who were praised in the past for their courageous stand and balanced judgments have during the last year turned into confused outsiders who were manipulated by unspecified dark forces bent on undermining the ruling party. -- Respected journalists and columnists such as Hasan Cemal, Taha Akyol, Cengiz andar, Ahmet Altan, Ergun

Babahan, Ali Bayramolu and Fehmi Koru, to name just a few, who have expressed their concerns on the same topics in even stronger words, are all seen by the prime minister as unbalanced personalities. -- The prime minister is doing his utmost to prove his critics right, who have been saying for a long time that one of his main shortcomings is his inability to cope with criticism. I would also add another, which is distinguishing between friends who feel obliged to tell him the truth and those who never trusted him in the first place. It seems as if the prime minister is the only person left in Turkey who thinks there is no problem with freedom of the press. Nowadays, journalists from dailies Zaman and Taraf are faced with hundreds of court cases because of their reporting on the Ergenekon trial. On the other hand, journalists working at the Doan newspapers feel intimidated by the same investigations. But the most powerful Turkish politician feels that every critical remark on this issue amounts to slander. The present row is only the latest in a string of extremely bitter remarks made by the prime minister about the European Union. Most observers believe that these statements are part of political tactics ahead of the June 12 general elections. My fear is that the repercussions of these nasty comments will be felt long after that day. Dengeyi bulmak Geen hafta Avrupa Parlamentosu, Trkiye'yle ilgili yllk raporunu oylayp kabul etti. Parlamento geleneksel olarak demokrasi, insan haklar ve hukukun stnlne dair Kopenhag Kriterleri'ne odaklanyor. Rapor, parlamentonun Trkiye raportr Ria Oomen-Ruijten tarafndan hazrland. Hollandal bir Hristiyan Demokrat olan Oomen-Ruijten, son be yldr byk bir baaryla, taraflar arasndaki onca farklla ramen parlamentodaki btn byk siyasi gruplarca genelde dengeli ve adil addedilen deerlendirmeler ortaya koyuyor. Gemite Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun ordunun 2007'deki e-darbesi ve 2008'de iktidar partisini kapatma abalar aleyhindeki net tavr AKP ve liderleri tarafndan takdire ayan bulunmutu. Geen yl Trkiye meclisi parlamento Doan Grubu'na ynelik vergi cezasna ve Krt ve Alevi almlarndaki atalete kar sert eletiriler yneltmesine ramen, raporu memnuniyetle karlamt. Geen hafta ise Trk hkmeti rapora dair en ufak bir anlay gstermedi. Babakan Recep Tayyip Erdoan, en son parlamento raporuna, dengeli olmadn iddia ederek verip veritirdi. Hatta daha da ileri giderek Ria Oomen-Ruijten ve mesaidalarn bizzat dengeli davranmamakla ve Trkiye hakknda doru dzgn bilgiye sahip olmamakla sulad. Klasik komplo teorilerine yaslanp, raporun "sipari zerine" hazrlandn iddia etmekten de geri kalmad. Peki bu fkenin sebebi ne? Erdoan'n tiradna kulak verildiinde, parlamento raporundaki iki paragrafn bu fkeyi tetikledii aka ortada. Paragraflardan biri basn zgrl, dieri ise Ergenekon davasyla ilgili. Parlamento, "basn zgrlnn ktye gitmesine, baz sansrc tutumlara ve internet de dahil, Trk medyasnda giderek artan oto-sansre dair" kaygsn dile getiriyor. Hkmete ve yargya basn zgrln koruma arsnda bulunurken, "yarg ve polis cenderesiyle kar karya kalan Nedim ener, Ahmet k ve dier gazetecilerin davalarn yakndan takip etme" kararn beyan ediyor. Rapor, Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun her daim destekledii Ergenekon davasyla alakal olarak da yarglama ncesi ar uzun tutukluluk srelerine dair endiesini dile getiriyor ve "Nedim ener ve Ahmet k gibi tannm gazetecilerin tutuklanmasnn, tam tersine demokrasiyi glendirmesi gereken yarglamalarn gvenilirliini yitirmesine yol aabileceine dikkat ekiyor." Bu dikkatle formle edilmi eletiriyi Babakan'n son derece keskin szleriyle kyasladmzda baz sonulara varabiliriz:

Grne gre gemite cesur durular ve dengeli hkmleri nedeniyle methedilen ayn parlamenterler, bir yl iinde, iktidar partisinin altn oymaya ahdetmi ne id belirsiz karanlk gler tarafndan maniple edilen kafas kark yabanclara dnm durumda. Sadece bir ksmn sayarsak, ayn konulara dair endielerini daha da sert ifadelerle dile getiren Hasan Cemal, Taha Akyol, Cengiz andar, Ahmet Altan, Ergun Babahan, Ali Bayramolu ve Fehmi Koru gibi saygn gazeteciler ve ke yazarlarnn hepsi Babakan tarafndan dengeli olmayan kiiler olarak grlyor. Babakan, balca eksikliklerinden birinin eletiriye tahamml edememek olduunu syleyen tenkitilerini hakl karmak iin elinden geleni yapyor. unu da eklemek isterim: Babakan, kendisine hakikatleri sylemeyi grev bilen dostlaryla bandan beri asla gvenmemi olanlar birbirinden ayrt edemiyor. Sanki Trkiye'de basn zgrlyle ilgili hibir sorun olmadn dnen tek insan Babakan gibi grnyor. Bugnlerde Zaman ve Taraf gazetelerindeki gazeteciler Ergenekon soruturmasna dair haberlerinden dolay yzlerce davayla yz yze. Dier yandan Doan gazetelerinde alan gazeteciler de benzer davalar nedeniyle kendilerini tehdit altnda hissediyor. Fakat en kuvvetli Trk siyasetisi, bu meseleye dair her eletirel szn iftira olduunu dnyor. Mevcut az dala, Babakan'n AB'ye ynelik birbiri ardna gelen ziyadesiyle keskin aklamalarnn en sonuncusu. Gzlemcilerin ou, bu aklamalarn 12 Haziran genel seimleri ncesi siyasi taktiklerin paras olduuna inanyor. Benim korkum, bu naho yorumlarn etkilerinin seim gnnden sonra da epey uzun mddet grlecek olmas.

How to deal with the neighbors One week after the start of anti-Mubarak demonstrations in Cairo, on Feb. 2, Timothy Garton Ash, one of the leading European intellectuals, wrote an inspiring article in The Guardian in which he explained why the Egyptian uprising was extremely important for the future of Europe. Both success and failure would have a huge impact on EU countries that are geographically so close to countries south of the Mediterranean. Europe would profit when a new generation of open-minded Arabs would circulate across the region and contribute to the ageing European economies. Failure would shake Europe to its foundations because millions of young men and women would carry their pathologies of frustration across the sea. He called on Europe to react quickly: No one has more experience than Europeans do in difficult transitions from dictatorship to democracy. No region has more instruments at its disposal to affect developments in the Arab Middle East. ... Europe has more trade [than the US], gives a lot of aid, and has a thick web of cultural and person-to-person ties across what the Romans called Mare Nostrum, our sea. ... It is the place that most young Arabs want to come -- to visit, to study, to work. Their cousins are here already. Garton Ash judged harshly the silence of Catherine Ashton, the EU high representative for foreign affairs, who in those first days of the uprising was conspicuously absent for the simple reason that the EU could not get its act together. He called on her to take the lead, show flexibility, boldness and imagination and prove that Europe by acting boldly abroad can shape its own future at home. I am sure Ashton must have read the scolding by her prominent fellow countryman. It is definitively not the only reason why she felt obliged to respond swiftly. But still, last week, only five weeks after Garton Ash provoked her, the EU foreign policy supremo showed that she got the message. Ashton presented a paper in which she outlined her plans to deal with the challenges posed by the events unfolding in EUs southern neighborhood. The plan is called A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. According to Ashton, the EU must not be a passive spectator but should actively support the people in the region who are looking for the same freedoms that Europeans enjoy. In order to

strengthen democracy and prosperity, the EU should focus on a list of priorities, ranging from supporting civil society and promoting small and medium-sized enterprises to enhancing mobility and integrating the southern Mediterranean in the EU internal energy market. Skeptics might say that many of these plans sound familiar. This is indeed not the first time that the EU has come up with ambitious proposals for its southern neighborhood. It was first called the Barcelona Process and later transformed into the Union for the Mediterranean. Most observers agree that both initiatives were unsuccessful and did not bring the reforms that many were hoping for. Forced to choose between change and short-term stability, the EU opted for the status quo, afraid that instability might lead to the rise of Islamic fundamentalists and the arrival of even more migrants. As Marwan Muasher, a reformist deputy prime minister of Jordan in 2004-2005, put it in the European Voice, the EU allowed the governments of the region to do what they wanted to do anyway, without having to reform their governance. It looks like Ashton does not want to repeat the mistakes of the past. In her paper she underlines that political and economic reforms must go hand-in-hand and that those countries that go further and faster with democratic reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU. We will have to wait and see whether this time the EU is able to implement these good intentions and is really willing to stick to the policy of positive conditionality. For the moment, we should thank Garton Ash for having pushed Ashton to set a new European record by coming up with a new approach on such a crucial issue so rapidly. Komularla nasl itigal etmeli? Kahire'de Mbarek kart gsterilerin balamasndan bir hafta sonra, 2 ubat'ta, Avrupa'nn nde gelen entelektellerinden Timothy Garton Ash, Guardian gazetesinde, Msr isyannn Avrupa'nn gelecei asndan niye son derece nemli olduunu anlatan ilham verici bir yaz yaymlad. syan, baarl olsa da olmasa da, Akdeniz'in gneyindeki lkelere corafi olarak ok yakn olan AB lkeleri zerinde muazzam bir etki yapacakt. Ak fikirli Araplardan oluan yeni bir kuak blgenin drt bir tarafna yayldnda ve yalanan Avrupa ekonomilerine katk yaptnda Avrupa bundan fayda salayacakt. Baarszlk ise Avrupa'y temellerinden sarsacakt, zira milyonlarca gen erkek ve kadn hayal krklklarndan kaynakl patolojilerini denizin te tarafna tayacakt. Ash, Avrupa'ya bir an nce harekete gemesi arsnda bulunuyor ve unlar yazyordu: "Diktatrlkten demokrasiye zorlu gei dnemleri konusunda kimse Avrupa'dan daha tecrbeli deil. Hibir blge Arap Ortadou'daki gelimeleri etkilemek bakmndan bu kadar ok imkna ve araca sahip deil. (...) Avrupa (ABD'den) daha fazla ticaret yapyor, bir yn yardmda bulunuyor ve Romallarn Mare Nostrum, yani 'bizim denizimiz' dedii blge boyunca sk bir kltrel ve insani ilikiler ana sahip. (...) Gen Araplarn gelmek istedii, gezip grmek, okumak, almak istedii yer Avrupa. Zaten kuzenleri de burada." Garton Ash AB D likiler Yksek Temsilcisi Catherine Ashton'n taknd sessizlie sert kyor, isyann ilk gnlerinde AB'nin bir trl ortak tavr belirleyememesi gibi basit bir sebepten aklalmaz ekilde ortalklarda grnmemesini eletiriyordu. Ashton' ipleri ele almaya, esneklik, cesaret ve hayal gc gstermeye aran Garton Ash, ondan Avrupa'nn denizin te yakasyla ilgili cesur davranarak kendi geleceini ekillendirebileceini kantlamasn istiyordu. Ashton'n nl yurttann bu zehir zemberek yazsn okuduundan hi kukum yok. Kendisini gayet hzl tepki vermek zorunda hissetmesinin tek sebebi elbette sz konusu yaz da deildir. Fakat yine de geen hafta, Garton Ash'in kkrtc yazsndan sadece be hafta sonra, AB d politika yetkilisi mesaj aldn gsterdi. Ashton, AB'nin gney komularnda yaanan gelimelerin ortaya kard etrefilli meselelerle baa kma planlarnn yer ald bir rapor sundu. Raporun ad "Gney Akdeniz ile Demokrasi ve Refah Ortakl". Ashton'a gre AB pasif bir izleyici olmamal, Avrupa ile ayn zgrlklerden nasiplenmek isteyen blge insanlarn aktif ekilde desteklemeli. Demokrasi ve refah glendirmek iin AB sivil toplumun desteklenmesinden kk ve orta lekli iletmelerin tevik edilmesine, oradan dolamn artrlmas ve Gney Akdeniz'in AB'nin enerji i pazarna entegre edilmesine kadar bir ncelikler listesine odaklanmal.

Kukucular bu planlarn birounun kulaa tandk geldiini syleyebilir. AB gney komularna ynelik ilk kez hevesli neriler ortaya koymuyor gerekten de. Buna ilk nce Barcelona sreci dendi ve ardndan Akdeniz Birlii'ne dntrld. Gzlemcilerin byk ounluu her iki giriimin de baarsz olduu ve biroklarnn umut ettii reformlar getirmedii konusunda hemfikir. Deiimle ksa vadeli istikrar arasnda tercih yapmak zorunda kalan AB, istikrarszln slami kktencilerin ykseliine ve daha da fazla gmenin ktaya gelmesine yol aabilecei korkusuyla statkodan yana kt. rdn'de 2004-2005 yllarnda grev yapan reformcu babakan yardmcs Mervan Muaer'in "European Voice" gazetesinde ifade ettii gibi: "AB blge hkmetlerinin, ynetimlerini reformdan geirmek zorunda kalmakszn istedikleri her eyi yapmalarna gz yumdu." Grnen o ki Ashton gemiin hatalarn tekrarlamak istemiyor. Raporunda siyasi ve ekonomik reformlarn atba gitmesi gerektiinin ve demokratik reformlar ileriye tayan ve hzlandran lkelerin AB'nin daha fazla desteine gvenebileceinin altn iziyor. Bu kez AB'nin bu iyi niyetleri hayata geirip geiremeyeceini ve mspet yaptrmclk politikasna bal kalmay gerekten isteyip istemediini bekleyip greceiz. u an iin Timothy Garton Ash'e Catherine Ashton' bylesine hayati bir meselede bu kadar hzla yeni bir yaklam ortaya koyarak yeni bir Avrupa rekoru krmaya sevk ettii iin teekkr etmeliyiz.

Trust is gone Looking back at the last couple of days and the multitude of comments about the latest wave of arrests in the Ergenekon case, it is clear that these investigations have reached the limit: the limit of understanding and tolerance by those who once defended the case strongly because they believed it was part of an effort to deal with the shady past and make Turkey more democratic. Those who are still defending each and every move by Ergenekon prosecutors should not underestimate the disappointment and anger among democrats in Turkey and abroad. When even President Abdullah Gl goes to the limits of his office to express his concerns, something big is happening. This newspaper has always, for good reason, supported the ongoing investigations. Now some of its columnists are trying to explain why we should not worry and leave it to the prosecutors to do their job. I agree with some of their arguments. It is true that not all of the arrested journalists were just writing articles or preparing TV programs. When one reads about the other undertakings by some Odatv journalists, it is obvious that they were involved in several suspicious activities that have nothing to do with journalism proper. Being a journalist does not give you immunity, especially when there are strong indications of wrongdoing. I am convinced we would not have seen the present outcries if it were only Odatv journalists who were arrested last week. Most Turkish pundits realize that there could be good reasons to look carefully into the links of that channel with some Ergenekon suspects. But I am afraid that those who keep on defending Zekeriya z and his team of Ergenekon prosecutors are missing the key point. There is no longer any trust that z and his men are doing the right thing. That loss of trust did not just happen overnight. At the beginning of the investigations, no one had any doubt that the likes of Veli Kk and ultranationalist lawyer Kemal Kerinsiz were most probably deeply involved in backstage plotting and could be linked to some of the unsolved past killings. When Cumhuriyet Ankara correspondent Mustafa Balbay was arrested and his journals were published, most understood that he might have been part of some dirty games as well, despite the fact that he is a journalist. No democrat raised his voice when retired Gen. etin Doan and other former army commanders were indicted because many believed that the accusations against them might well be true. After some arrests last year, doubts

started to set in because of the vague wording of the allegations, coming close to guilt by association. But most were still willing to give the prosecutors the benefit of a doubt, even when criticism was growing about the long detention periods and the lack of convictions. Not so anymore. The arrests of Ahmet k and Nedim ener have shattered that trust. It is as if all of a sudden the board of the Felicity Party (SP) was arrested for drunk driving. In theory it could be true, but in reality no one would believe it. It is naive, to put it mildly, to think that accusing journalists who are known for their stance against coups of being part of Ergenekon would not cause a row. In such a case, prosecutors cannot hide behind legal arguments and ask everyone to be patient. If they cannot show the evidence that they are basing their arrests on, they have lost the first battle to convince a skeptical audience and are in danger of losing the whole war. It would be a drama for Turkey if the real culprits in the Ergenekon case at the end of the day walked free because the prosecutors lost touch with reality and did not realize there are certain limits. The only way to restore trust among democrats and bring this historic case to a good end is to skip the legal niceties and explain now to the public in clear terms why k and ener have been detained. If z cant or wont do this, then both journalists should be set free immediately. Gven bitiyor Son birka gne ve Ergenekon davasndaki en son tutuklama dalgasna dair ynla yoruma dnp bakldnda, bu soruturmalarn snra gelip dayand aka grlyor. Davay daha nce karanlk gemile yzleme ve Trkiye'yi demokratikletirme abasnn paras olduuna inand iin kuvvetle destekleyenlerin idrakinin ve hogrsnn snr bu. Ergenekon savclarnn att her adm hl savunanlar Trkiye'de ve dardaki demokratlarda hasl olan hsran ve kzgnl yabana atmamal. Cumhurbakan Gl'n bile bulunduu makamn snrlarn zorlayp kayg beyan ettii bir ortamda byk bir eyler oluyor demektir. Bu gazete de sregiden soruturmalar, mantkl sebeplerle daima destekledi. imdi gazetenin baz ke yazarlar niye endie duymamamz ve savclarn ilerini yapmasna izin vermemiz gerektiini izah etmeye alyor. ne srdkleri argmanlardan bazlarna katlyorum. Tutuklanan gazetecilerin hepsinin yazlar yazmakla veya televizyon programlar yapmakla yetinmedii doru. OdaTV'deki baz gazetecilerin itigal ettii dier iler okunduunda, gazetecilikle pek de ilgisi olmayan kimi aibeli faaliyetler yrttkleri bariz ekilde grlyor. Gazeteci olmanz size dokunulmazlk vermez, bilhassa da yanl iler iinde olduunuza dair gl gstergeler varsa. Geen hafta tutuklananlar OdaTV'deki gazetecilerden ibaret olsayd, eminim u anki hararetli tepkilere tank olmazdk. Trkiye'deki yorumcularn byk ounluu, bu kanaln baz Ergenekon zanllaryla balantlarn yakndan incelemenin geerli sebepleri olabileceinin farknda. Fakat korkarm ki Zekeriya z ve ona bal Ergenekon savclar ekibini savunmay srdrenler kilit noktay gzden karyor. Artk z ve ekibinin doru eyi yaptna gven duyulmuyor. Bu gven bir gnde tkenmedi. Soruturmalarn banda Veli Kk ve ultra milliyeti avukat Kemal Kerinsiz gibilerin ok byk ihtimalle perde arkasndaki komplolarda dahli bulunduu ve gemiteki baz zlmemi cinayetlerle balantl olabileceinden kimsenin kukusu yoktu. Cumhuriyet'in Ankara temsilcisi Mustafa Balbay tutuklanp gnlkleri yaynlandnda, insanlarn byk ounluu gazeteci olmasna ramen Balbay'n baz kirli oyunlarn da paras olabileceini anlad. General etin Doan ve dier eski ordu komutanlar sulandnda da hibir demokrat sesini ykseltmedi, zira birou onlar aleyhindeki iddialarn doru olabileceine inanyordu. Geen ylki baz tutuklamalar sonras iddianamelerde yer alan ve 'yardm yataklk' noktasna varan mulak ifadeler nedeniyle kukular olumaya balad. Fakat ounluk, uzun

tutukluluk srelerine ve davalardan ceza kmamasna ynelik eletiriler giderek artarken bile savclara kredi tanmaya hl istekliydi. Artk byle deil. Ahmet k ve Nedim ener'in tutuklanmalar bu gvene ar darbe vurdu. Bu adeta Saadet Partisi ynetim kurulunun ikili ara kullanmaktan tutuklanmas gibi bir ey. Teoride doru olabilir, gerekte ise kimse buna inanmaz. Darbelere kar durularyla bilinen gazetecileri Ergenekon'un paras olmakla sulamann hararetli tartmalara yol amayacan dnmek, en hafif tabiriyle naiflik olur. Byle bir davada savclar hukuki argmanlarn arkasna saklanp herkesten sabrl olmasn isteyemez. Dayandklar kantlarn ne olduunu gsteremezlerse, kukucu bir kitleyi ikna etme savan kaybederler ve sava hepten kaybetme tehlikesine girerler. Ergenekon davasndaki gerek sulular, savclar gereklikle balarn kaybettii ve belli snrlar olduunu idrak etmedii iin srecin sonunda serbest kalrsa, bu Trkiye iin bir dram olur. Demokratlar arasndaki gveni yeniden tesis etmenin ve bu tarihi davay mspet bir sonuca vardrmann tek yolu, hukuki incelikleri geip kamuoyuna k ve ener'in niye tutuklandn sarih bir dille izah etmektir. Eer z bunu yapamazsa veya yapmayacaksa, iki gazeteci de bir an nce serbest braklmaldr.

Is the Ergenekon case self-destructing? Until now most liberals and democrats in Turkey and abroad have tended to support the investigation into Ergenekon, a clandestine gang accused of plotting to overthrow the government. They would agree with the way the European Commission put it in its last progress report: The case is an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is important that proceedings in this context fully respect the due process of law, in particular the rights of defendants. The last sentence refers to the growing criticism, also among Ergenekon backers, of the long periods of detention of some suspects and the vague wording of many of the accusations leveled against them. Let me be clear on my own position. I have always defended the search for the persons responsible for the killings of thousands of leftist Turks and Kurdish activists in the 1990s. I strongly believe there is such a thing as the deep state in Turkey, a network of members of the military, ultranationalist civil servants and people in key positions in Turkish society. I still welcome all efforts to shed light on illegal actions undertaken in the past including recent attempts to undermine and eventually topple the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government. Democracy in Turkey will be strengthened when these allegations are checked and brought before the court if there is enough convincing evidence. I have repeatedly underlined the need to conduct all of these inquiries and searches on the basis of the highest possible legal standards. It was obvious from the start that every mistake made would be used to discredit the whole Ergenekon investigation. Unfortunately, there have been several gaffes and errors since the case began in 2007. The first indictments were full of sloppy evidence and in four years time prosecutors have not been able to finalize one single case, not even against people like Veli Kk who many, even among Ergenekon skeptics, believe was involved in a great deal of dirty business. Supporting the good intentions of the case has become more difficult with each new wave of arbitrary arrests. While the list of suspects was growing, few people were able to keep track of who was connected to whom and what exactly it was the defendants were accused of. Most of the detainees are known for their sometimes extreme nationalist opinions. But having

these views is, in itself, no reason to put people in prison. I am afraid we are getting close to the point where the Ergenekon case is in danger of losing its support among liberals and democrats. Last weeks raids on several journalists could prove to be a turning point. How to explain the arrests of Ahmet k and Nedim ener? k was instrumental in starting the Ergenekon case in the first place. As a journalist for the weekly Nokta he revealed the so-called Coup Diaries which proved to be key pieces of evidence in the original Ergenekon indictment. ener is an investigative reporter at the Milliyet daily and was chosen as a World Press Freedom Hero following the publication of his book on the murder of Hrant Dink, in which he revealed the many lies and mistakes of the Turkish police and gendarmerie. Without a doubt, these arrests play into the hands of those who have always claimed that there was no such thing as Ergenekon and that this case was being used by the government to silence its opponents. The only way to prevent the Ergenekon case from losing credibility among its present advocates is to stop expanding the scope of the investigations into the periphery of the alleged network, thereby running huge risks of involving people such as k and ener, who nobody believes could be plotting together with the likes of Veli Kk. My advice: Concentrate on the hard core already in jail and try to get them convicted on the basis of solid evidence that cannot be denied by anybody. If that does not happen quickly, the Ergenekon investigation will destroy itself. It will go down in history as an honest and decent endeavor that got out of hand and turned into a campaign of intimidation -- a golden opportunity missed to deal with the dark sides of Turkeys past. Ergenekon davas kendi kendini tahrip mi ediyor? Bugne kadar Trkiye iinde ve dndaki liberallerle demokratlarn byk ounluu, gizli bir ete halinde hkmeti devirmeyi planlamakla sulanan Ergenekon'a ynelik soruturmay destekleme eilimindeydi. Avrupa Komisyonu'nun son ilerleme raporunda yer alan ifadelerle hemfikirdiler: "Dava Trkiye'nin demokratik kurumlarnn dzgn ilemesi ve hukukun stnl noktasnda zgvenini glendirmek iin bir frsattr. Bu balamda dava srecinin hukuka uygun yrmesi, bilhassa yarglananlarn haklarna sayg gsterilmesi nemlidir." Son cmle baz zanllarn uzun tutukluluk sreleri ve onlara isnat edilen birok sulamann mulaklna dair (Ergenekon davasn destekleyenler arasnda da) artan eletirilere atfta bulunuyor. ahsi kanaatimi aka ifade etmek isterim. 1990'larda binlerce solcu Trk'n ve Krt aktivistin ldrlmesinden sorumlu tutulan insanlarn peine dlmesini her daim savundum. Trkiye'de ordu mensuplar, ultra milliyeti kamu grevlileri ve Trk toplumunda kilit mevkilerde bulunan insanlardan oluan bir ebeke, yani "derin devlet" denen bir yaplanma olduuna kuvvetle inanyorum. AKP hkmetlerine zarar verip nihayetinde devirmek ynndeki yakn dnem giriimler de dahil, gemiteki yasa d eylemleri aa karmay hedefleyen tm abalar hl memnuniyetle karlyorum. Trkiye'de demokrasi, bu iddialar aratrlp yeterli kant bulunduu takdirde faillerinin mahkemeye karlmasyla glenecektir. Btn bu soruturma ve aratrmalarn mmkn olan en yksek hukuki standartlara dayal olarak yrtlmesi gerektiinin altn tekrar tekrar izdim. Bandan beri, her hatann Ergenekon soruturmasnn btnn itibardan drmek iin kullanlaca belliydi.

Ne yazk ki davann balad 2007'den bu yana eitli gaflar ve yanllar yapld. lk iddianameler yarm yamalak kantlarla doluydu ve drt yl zarfnda savclar tek bir davay bile sonulandramad. Ergenekon'a kukuyla bakanlarn bile birok kirli ie kartna inand Veli Kk gibi insanlarn davalar dahi bitirilemedi. Davann tad iyi niyetleri desteklemek, her yeni geliigzel gzalt dalgasyla daha da zorlat. pheli listeleri arttka, kimin kimle balantl olduunu ve zanllarn tam olarak neyle sulandn pek az insan adamakll takip edebilir hale geldi. Tutuklularn byk ounluu bazen ar milliyeti fikirler ortaya koymalaryla tannyor. Fakat bu fikirlere sahip olmak tek bana insanlar hapse atmann gerekesi olamaz. Korkarm ki Ergenekon davasnn liberaller ve demokratlarn desteini kaybetme tehlikesinin ba gsterecei bir noktaya doru ilerliyoruz. Geen hafta baz gazetecilere ynelik basknlar ilerleyen srete bu adan bir dnm noktas olabilir. Ahmet k ve Nedim ener'in tutuklanmas nasl izah edilebilir? k, Ergenekon davasnn balamasnda en nemli rol oynayan gazetecilerden biri. Nokta Dergisi iin alt dnemde mehur "darbe gnlkleri"ni Ahmet k ifa etti ve o gnlkler sonradan ilk Ergenekon iddianamesindeki kilit nemde kantlardan biri oldu. ener, Milliyet Gazetesi'nde alan bir aratrmac gazeteci ve Hrant Dink cinayetiyle ilgili, Trk polisi ve jandarmasnn birok yalann ve yanln aa vuran kitabn yaymlamasnn ardndan Dnya Basn zgrl Kahraman seildi. Bu tutuklamalarn, srekli Ergenekon diye bir ey olmadn ve davann hkmet tarafndan muhalifleri susturmak iin kullanldn iddia edenlerin deirmenine su tayacana hi kuku yok. Ergenekon davasnn mevcut savunucularnn gznde gvenilirliini kaybetmesini nlemenin tek yolu, soruturmann leini iddia edilen ebekenin en d eperine yayp, Veli Kk gibileriyle komploculuk yaptna kimsenin inanmad k ve ener gibi insanlar iin iine katmak gibi byk bir riske girmekten vazgemektir. Tavsiyem u: Halihazrda hapiste olan ekirdee odaklann ve onlar kimsenin reddedemeyecei somut kantlara dayanarak cezalandrmaya gayret edin. Eer bu hzla yaplmazsa, Ergenekon soruturmas kendi kendini tahrip edecek. Rayndan kan ve bir yldrma kampanyasna dnen drst ve temiz bir macera olarak tarihe gmlecek. Trkiye'nin gemiinin karanlk taraflaryla yzlemek ynnde altn bir frsat da karlm olacak.

Unilateral gestures work, package deals dont I am sure that if I had put Cyprus in the title of this column, most of you would have turned the page without reading this article. Hardly anybody is interested anymore in a conflict that seems unsolvable. All the arguments have been made over and over again. Perpetual negotiations have not produced a solution. The Cyprus problem has ended up in the category of inevitable nuisances that are part of Turkish political life. In an ideal world these inconveniences should be removed, but daily life in Ankara continues with this pain in the neck. Nobody seems to be bothered any longer. I must warn you: This article is about Cyprus. Last week the International Crisis Group (ICG) came up with a paper on the Cyprus problem which I believe should not go unnoticed. The ICG is one of the most well-respected independent global organizations trying to prevent and resolve conflicts. One of their main instruments is timely and well-documented reports by experts outlining a particular problem and listing possible solutions. Based on my experience with European institutions I can tell you that the ICG reports on the Balkans were extremely influential in shaping policies in Brussels for that region. The ICG also has a great record of advocating a positive EU approach for Turkey based on the conviction that both have a huge interest in eventual full membership. One of the conflicts the ICG has focused on most is Cyprus. Since 2006 they have produced four detailed reports showing that the interests of all Cypriots and all outside parties would be best met with a

comprehensive political settlement. But even the tenacious troubleshooters at the ICG had to come to the conclusion that an ideal solution is not on offer today. Instead of giving up on Cyprus, the ICG last week came up with a proposal that tries to overcome the present stalemate. The paper calls for unilateral steps from both Turkey and Greek Cypriots to build confidence that is crucial now to finding an overall agreement later. Key elements of the balanced package include recommendations that Turkey should open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot sea and air traffic, and meet its 2005 obligation to implement the Additional Protocol to its EU customs union, while Greek Cypriots should allow the port of Famagusta to handle Cypriot, including Turkish Cypriot, trade with the EU, allow charter flights to Ercan Airport and end their practice of blocking Turkeys EU negotiating chapters. The ICG realizes very well that all of these steps have been discussed before but failed because they were bundled into topheavy negotiated packages, with each side conditioning its one step for every two by its counterparts. It is obvious that in the Cyprus context package deals have little chance. Unilateral gestures did work in the past and, according to the ICG, they could be successful again because they address known needs of both communities, fulfill pledges made by Turkey and the EU in the past and do not prejudice the ultimate outcome of future talks. I am sure that the usual suspects will come up with the same worn-out arguments against any steps by Turkey. They will rightfully criticize the Greek Cypriots and the EU and conclude that Turkey should not budge now. The problem overlooked by all these staunch defenders of Turkeys refusal to move is that neither Turkey nor the Turkish Cypriots have any long-term interest in the status quo. The Turkish part of Cyprus will remain little more than a backwater of Turkey. By refusing to come to terms with the Greek Cypriots, Ankara will freeze its EU accession and will hurt its own reform agenda, prosperity and regional attractiveness. I am happy the ICG is both clever and stubborn enough to keep reminding Turkey that being stuck on Cyprus is extremely problematic. Yes, it sounds very tough to proclaim that Cyprus is more important for Turkey than the EU. But please keep an eye on the political and economic realities of today and tomorrow. They clearly indicate that self-delusion can easily turn selfdestructive. Better change tactics sooner rather than later. Tek tarafl jestler ie yarar paket anlamalar deil Eminim bu keyazsnn balna "Kbrs" kelimesini koysaydm, byk ounluunuz okumadan sayfay evirirdi. zlmez grnen bu ihtilaf artk pek kimsenin ilgisini ekmiyor. Btn argmanlar tekrar tekrar ne srlyor. Sonu gelmez mzakereler zme varmyor. Neticede Kbrs sorunu, Trk siyasi hayatnn paras olan daimi ba arlarndan biri olup kt. Drt ba mamur koullarda bu skntlarn ortadan kaldrlmas gerekir, fakat Ankara'daki gnlk hayat hep ayn dertle srp gidiyor. Artk kimse meseleye dnp bakmaya zahmet etmiyor. Sizi uyarmam lazm: bu yaz Kbrs hakknda. Geen hafta Uluslararas Kriz Grubu, Kbrs konusunda zerinden atlanmamas gerektiini dndm bir rapor yaynlad. Kriz Grubu, ihtilaflar nlemeye ve zmeye abalayan en saygn bamsz kresel rgtlerden. Bu erevede en nemli faaliyetlerinden biri belli bir sorunu ele alan ve olas zmleri sralayan vakitli ve iyi allm uzman raporlar yaynlamas. Avrupa kurumlarndaki tecrbelerime dayanarak size Kriz Grubu'nun Balkanlar'a dair raporlarnn Brksel'in bu blgeye ynelik politikalarn ekillendirmesinde son derece etkili olduunu rahatlkla syleyebilirim. Kriz Grubu ayrca Trkiye'nin AB'ye tam yeliinin iki tarafn da ok iine yarayaca

inancyla, yelik srecine sk destek vermesiyle biliniyor. Grubun en fazla odakland ihtilaflardan biri de Kbrs. 2006'dan bu yana btn Kbrsllarn ve dardaki tm taraflarn karna en uygun seenein soruna kapsaml bir siyasi zm bulunmas olduunu gsteren drt ayrntl rapor yaynlad. Fakat Kriz Grubu'nun dili sorun zcleri bile bugn ortada Kbrs'a ynelik ideal bir zm bulunmad sonucuna vard. Grup Kbrs konusunda pes etmek yerine, geen hafta mevcut tkanmay amay amalayan bir neri ortaya koydu. Rapor hem Trkiye'ye hem Kbrsl Rumlara, sonradan kapsaml bir zm bulunmas asndan hayati nem tayan gven ortamnn ina edilmesi iin tek tarafl admlar atmas arsnda bulunuyor. Gayet dengeli hazrlanm paketin kilit unsurlar unlar: Trkiye, AB ile Gmrk Birlii'nin Ek Protokol'ne dair 2005'te verdii taahhd yerine getirip limanlarn ve havaalanlarn Kbrsl Rumlarn deniz ve hava trafiine amal. Kbrsl Rumlar Gazimausa limannn (Kbrsl Trkleri kapsayacak ekilde) Kbrs-AB ticaretine almasna, Ercan Havaalan'na charter seferleri yaplmasna izin vermeli ve Trkiye'nin AB ile mzakere fasllarn bloke etme politikasna son vermeli. Kriz Grubu btn bu admlarn daha nce tartldn, fakat hayata gemediini, zira taraflarn ataca her bir adm kardakinin iki adm atmas artna balad ok ar paketlerin paras olarak mzakere edildiklerini gayet iyi biliyor. Kbrs balamnda paket anlamalarn az ans olduu aikar. Tek tarafl jestler ise daha nce ie yarad ve Kriz Grubu'na gre, yine baarl olabilirler, zira iki toplumun bilinen ihtiyalarna hitap ediyorlar, Trkiye ve AB'nin gemiteki taahhtlerini yerine getiriyorlar ve mstakbel grmelerin nihai sonucuyla bir alp veremedikleri yok. Malum evrelerin Trkiye'nin ataca her adm aleyhinde ayn bayat argmanlar ortaya atacandan hi kukum yok. Kbrsl Rumlar ve AB'yi eletirecek (ki haksz da deiller) ve Trkiye'nin u an yerinden kprdamamas gerektiini savunacaklar. Trkiye'nin adm atmamasn cansiperane savunan btn bu evrelerin zerinden atlad mesele u: Statko uzun vadede ne Trkiye'nin ne de Kbrsl Trklerin karna. Kbrs'n Trk kesimi Trkiye'nin durgun arka bahesinden ibaret bir yer olmay srdrecek. Kbrsl Rumlarla anlamay reddetmekle Ankara, AB yelii srecini dondurmu ve kendi reform programna, refahna ve blgedeki cazibesine zarar vermi olacak. Kriz Grubu'nun Trkiye'ye Kbrs'a aklp kalmann ziyadesiyle sorunlu bir tutum olduunu srekli hatrlatacak inad ve zeky gstermesi mutluluk verici. Evet, Kbrs'n Trkiye iin AB'den daha nemli olduunu iddia etmek kulaa ok sert geliyor. Fakat ltfen bugnn ve yarnn siyasi gerekliklerine dikkatle bakalm. O gereklikler aka unu iaret ediyor: Kendi kendini kandrmak, kolayca kendi kendini ykmaya dnebiliyor. iten gemeden taktikleri deitirmekte hayr var.

A psychopath in the desert It was one of the weirdest trips I ever made. At the end of 2003, I flew to Tripoli with a handful of colleagues from the European Parliament. We were supposed to meet with Libyas leader, Muammar Gaddafi, with the intention of convincing him to move closer to the European Union. After years of being isolated by the rest of the world, Libya was coming out of the cold. UN sanctions had just been removed, and the EU was planning to do the same soon. A few years before, the EU had set up the so-called Barcelona Process, a loose form of cooperation between the EU and the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Libya was hesitant to join this Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and we thought the time had come for Libya to move to full membership. Most people in Brussels at the time agreed that it would be better to have Gaddafi at the table than to have him continue blocking or frustrating this new form of cooperation. For two days it remained uncertain whether we would be able to meet the Guide of the Revolution, as he likes to be called. On the eve of our departure we suddenly got the news: The Guide wants to meet you. The next morning we flew out of

Tripoli into the desert. After landing in the middle of nowhere, we continued our trip in cross-country vehicles until we reached our destination: a huge encampment close to a desert oasis. After a tight security check we were allowed to enter the tent of the Guide. There he was, surrounded indeed by female guards, showing no particular interest at all for his European guests. That attitude did not really change in the next 30 minutes. The head of our delegation did his utmost to convince the Libyan leader of the benefits of stronger ties with Europe. The only sign of life that we could detect was the swing of his arm when he used a gigantic leaf to keep away the many flying insects. In a brief reply Gaddafi made it clear that he had no intention of giving up his distance to the EU. Their rules and laws on democracy, human rights and a capitalist economy were not compatible, according to the Guide, with the revolutionary democracy he had introduced in Libya. It would take a long time to overcome these differences. Watching Gaddafi live was really an experience. Sitting in front of us was the personification of megalomania. His attitude, his posture, the whole setting; it was both intimidating and laughable. As a Dutch newspaper put it this week, Gaddafi is both Richard III and Mr. Bean. He does not need to act to be the perfect Shakespearean king, convinced of his own invulnerability, able and willing to use all the rotten tricks to get his way and to survive. But at the same time he resembles Rowan Atkinson, the actor, dressing up in fancy opera-like costumes with silly hats and idiotic robes. This man was not interested in complicated compromises with European politicians in 2003. The same unrestrained ruler has no intention whatsoever of listening to his fellow countrymen who are fed up with his dictatorship in 2011. It is the drama unfolding in Libya right now: a psychopath who uses all his power and force to crush the revolt against him in the cruelest way. The stories coming out of Libya are horrific. Thousands of people are being killed, and theres hardly any media coverage because journalists, as always, have been kept out. Maybe, hopefully, when you are reading this column, Gaddafi is history. Before he goes, he will not hesitate one second to inflict maximum pain and suffering on his people who are showing an intolerable ingratitude in the eyes of the Guide. Gaddafi really thinks he is Libya and that without him the country cant survive. The poor Libyans had to live for decades with a ruler who did not recognize any limits on his ludicrous behavior and his crazy ideas. That absolute reign is reflected in the dying days of his dictatorship. Gaddafis end is proving as violent and unpredictable as the previous 40 years have been. Lets hope it is over soon. lde bir psikopat Yaptm en garip yolculuklardan biriydi. 2003 sonunda Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndan bir avu mesaidamla birlikte Trablus'a utum. Libya lideri Muammer Kaddafi ile grecek, onu Avrupa Birlii'yle yaknlamaya ikna etmeye alacaktk. Dnyann geri kalan tarafndan dlanmakla geen yllarn ardndan Libya yava yava kabuundan kyordu. BM yaptrmlar daha yeni kaldrlmt ve AB de ksa sre sonra aynsn yapmaya hazrlanyordu. Birka yl nce AB, birlik ile Akdeniz'in gney ve dou kylarndaki lkeler arasnda gevek bir ibirlii zemini nitelii tayan Barcelona Sreci'ni balatmt. Libya bu AvrupaAkdeniz Ortakl'na katlmakta tereddtlyd ve Libya'nn da srece tam katlm vaktinin geldiini dnyorduk. O dnemde Brksel'de birok insan Kaddafi'nin masada olmasnn, bu yeni ibirlii zeminini engellemeye veya kartrmaya devam etmesinden daha iyi olaca konusunda hemfikirdi. ki gn boyu, kendisine dair kullanlmasndan holand tabirle Devrimin Rehberi'yle grp gremeyeceimiz muallakta kald. Artk ayrlmak zereydik ki haber geldi: "Rehber sizinle grmek istiyor." Ertesi sabah Trablus'tan le utuk. Bilinmeyen bir yere indikten sonra yolculuumuza hafif arazi aralaryla devam ettik ve nihayet hedefe vardk: Bir vahann

yaknnda kurulmu devasa bir kamp. Sk gvenlik kontrolnn ardndan Rehber'in adrna girmemize izin verildi. te karmzdayd, gerekten de etraf kadn muhafzlarla evriliydi ve Avrupal misafirleri pek de umurundaym gibi grnmyordu. Bu tavrn sonraki 30 dakikada da hi deitirmedi. Heyetimizin bakan, Libya liderini Avrupa ile daha gl ilikilerin getirecei faydalara ikna etmek iin elinden geleni yapt. Kaddafi'de tespit edebildiimiz tek hayat belirtisi, bir sr uan bcei uzak tutmak iin dev bir yapra sallarken kolunun ileri geri hareket etmesiydi. Verdii ksa cevapta Kaddafi, AB ile aradaki mesafeyi ortadan kaldrmaya niyeti olmadn aka syledi. Rehber'e gre Avrupa'nn demokrasi, insan haklar ve kapitalist ekonomiye dair kurallar ve yasalar, Libya'da bizzat mimar olduu devrimci demokrasiye uygun deildi. Bu farkllklarn stesinden gelmek ise uzun zaman alacakt. Kaddafi'yi 'canl' izlemek gerekten mhim bir tecrbeydi. Karmzda oturan, megalomaninin bir insanda cisimlemi haliydi. Davran, duruu, btn o dekor. Hem rktc hem glnt. Bir Hollanda gazetesinin bu hafta yazd gibi: Kaddafi hem III. Richard hem de Mr. Bean. Kendi yklmazlndan emin, yoluna devam etmek ve ayakta kalmak iin btn kirli taktikleri kullanmaya muktedir ve istekli kusursuz Shakespearyen kral olmak iin rol kesmesine hi gerek yok. Fakat ayn zamanda, gln apkalar ve aptalca cbbeleriyle ar ssl operavari kostmler giyen aktr Rowan Atkinson' da hatrlatyor. Bu adam 2003'te Avrupal siyasetilerle karmak uzlamalara varmakla ilgilenmiyordu. Ayn dizginsiz muktedirin, 2011'de diktatrlnden bkan vatandalarna kulak vermeye de zerre niyeti yok. u an Libya'da bir dram yaanyor. Kaddafi btn iktidarn ve imknlarn kendisine kar patlak veren isyan en acmasz yollarda bastrmak iin kullanyor. Libya'dan gelen haberler dehet verici. Binlerce insan ldrld, bunlar medyaya pek yansmyor, zira her zamanki gibi gazeteciler lkeye sokulmuyor. Umut edilir ki siz bu satrlar okurken Kaddafi tarih olsun. Gitmeden nce, Rehber'in gznde ho grlemez bir nankrlk sergileyen halkna azami ac ve strap yaatmakta bir saniye olsun tereddt etmeyecektir. Kaddafi hakikaten Libya'nn kendisi olduunu ve lkenin onsuz hayatta kalamayacan dnyor. Zavall Libyallar, sama sapan davranlar ve lgn fikirlerinde zerre snr tanmayan bir hkmdara on yllarca katlanmak zorunda kaldlar. Bu mutlak iktidar diktatrln can ekitii u gnlerde de tezahr ediyor. Kaddafi'nin sonu, en az bundan nceki 40 ylda olduu kadar iddet ykl ve kestirilemez ekilde cereyan ediyor. Umalm ki o son ok gecikmesin. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Revolutionary soccer A few years ago I read a remarkable book on soccer and globalization called How Soccer Explains the World. It was written by Franklin Foer, a journalist for the American magazine The New Republic. The book is a collection of stories and reports about the world of soccer and its fanatical followers. Foer takes you to the streets and stands of Glasgow and tries to explain the extreme passion linked to the classic rivalry between the two local clubs, Celtic and the Glasgow Rangers. The part of the book I remember best is one on a game between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade in May 1990, which set the stage for the war between Croatia and Serbia that was to break out shortly thereafter. I had to think of Foers book when I was reading an amazing story this weekend in the Dutch weekly De Groene Amsterdammer. Like many other media, the left liberal magazine tried to make sense of what happened in Egypt since the start of the uprising on Jan. 25. Not surprisingly, several academic specialists did their utmost to explain that the proper question was not whether or not Islam would play a role in the new Egyptian democracy but how that influence would be shaped. The article that really got me excited, though, was not about religion or Facebook or the new constitution. It was about the

fans of Egyptian football team Al-Ahly, who played a crucial role in the street protests against Mubarak. I could not believe my eyes when I read how the so-called ultras, the most fanatical supporters of the countrys biggest football club, had been in the front line at Tahrir Square, putting up some of the stiffest resistance to attacks organized and paid for by friends of the Mubarak regime. Many hardcore Al-Ahly fans belong to the groups in Egyptian society that suffered most during the 30 years of dictatorship by the last pharaoh. They are poor, without jobs or the prospect of a better life. On top of these demographic and sociological reasons to stand up against the Mubarak regime, there is another one directly linked to the passion of soccer. The archenemy of Al-Ahly is Zamalek, the club of the upper classes and the army. During the protests, Zamalek openly supported the staggering dictator, reason enough for Al-Ahly not to remain neutral and for many of its fans to join the revolution. These ultras have a long tradition of fighting with police and it is this experience in violent street protests that made them an invaluable part of the resistance that had to be organized when demonstrators were in danger of being swept out of Tahrir Square. Someone who is not at all surprised by the heroic role of the soccer fans in defending the uprising is James Dorsey, an American journalist who writes an Internet blog with the intriguing title The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. According to him, under an authoritarian Arab regime there are basically two places where one can express his frustration: the mosque and the stadium. Everybody is always talking about the importance of the religious factor. Dorsey claims that the impact of frustrated soccer fans has been underestimated in the Egyptian revolt. Not by other dictators in the region, though. In order to prevent soccer fans from sparking further protests, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi suspended the Libyan football competition. His Algerian colleague, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, did the same in Algeria. In Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reluctantly ordered a stop, too, knowing that slogans against the regime have been heard in many stadiums since 2009. At the moment, there is good reason for many threatened autocrats in the region to prevent soccer fans from gathering in and around stadiums. It is recognition of the extremely powerful and potentially subversive role that soccer fans can play in an unstable society governed by an unpopular leader. Under normal circumstances, it makes sense to keep the worlds of soccer and politics apart. In extraordinary situations, the two sometimes clash violently. Present score at half time: 1-0 for the democrats.

Devrimci futbol Birka yl nce futbol ve kreselleme zerine "Futbol Dnyay Nasl Aklar?" adl ahane bir kitap okumutum. Yazar, Amerikan dergisi 'The New Republic'te alan gazeteci Franklin Foer. Kitap, futbol dnyas ve fanatik taraftarlarla ilgili hikyeler ve rportajlardan oluan bir derleme.

Foer, okuru Glasgow'un sokaklarna ve tribnlerine gtryor ve kentin iki futbol kulb Celtic ve Glasgow Rangers arasndaki ezeli rekabetten doan ateli duygular aklamaya alyor. Kitabn hatrladm en iyi blm, Mays 1990'da Dinamo Zagreb ile Kzlyldz Belgrad arasndaki maa dair olan; karlama, ksa sre sonra Hrvatistan ile Srbistan arasnda patlak verecek olan savaa zemin hazrlamt. Foer'in kitab, bu hafta sonu Hollanda dergisi 'De Groene Amsterdammer'de arpc bir haber okurken aklma geldi. Birok baka medya kuruluu gibi liberal solda yer alan dergi de isyann balad 25 Ocak'tan bu yana Msr'da neler olduunu kavramaya alyordu. Haliyle birok akademisyen ve uzman, doru sorunun slam'n yeni Msr demokrasisinde rol oynayp oynamayaca deil, bu etkinin nasl ekillenecei olduunu anlatmak iin rpnyordu. Fakat haberde beni asl heyecanlandran din veya Facebook ya da yeni anayasa deil, Msr futbol takm El-Ahli'nin taraftarlarnn Mbarek'e kar sokak protestolarnda oynad ok nemli rold. lkenin en byk futbol kulbnn 'Ultralar' adyla mehur en fanatik taraftarlarnn Tahrir Meydan'nda n saflarda olduunu ve Mbarek rejimi yandalarnn parayla tutup rgtledii haydut etelerinin saldrlarna kar en sk direnilerden birini gsterdiini okuduumda gzlerime inanamadm. Birok ateli El-Ahli taraftar, Msr toplumunun, son firavunun 30 yllk diktatrlnde en ok strap eken kesimlerine mensup. Yoksullar, isizler, daha iyi bir hayattan yana umutlar yok. Mbarek rejimine kar ayaa kalkmalarnn, bu demografik ve sosyolojik sebeplerin tesinde dorudan futbol tutkusuyla ilgili bir baka sebebi daha var. El-Ahli'nin ezeli rakibi, st snflarn ve ordunun takm olan Zamalek. Protestolar srasnda Zamalek, alenen koltuu sallanan diktatr destekledi. Bu, El-Ahli'nin isyan karsnda tarafsz kalmas ve birok taraftarnn devrime katlmas iin kfi sebepti. Ultralarn yllara dayanan polisle kavga gelenei vard ve iddetli sokak protestolaryla ilgili edindikleri bu tecrbe onlar, Tahrir Meydan'nn gstericilerden temizlenmesi tehlikesi ba gsterdiinde rgtlenmesi gereken direniin ok nemli bir paras haline getirdi. te yandan isyan savunmak konusunda futbol taraftarlarnn oynad kahramanca role hi armayanlar da var. Bunlardan biri, "Ortadou Futbolunun Frtnal Dnyas" gibi ilgi ekici bir ad olan internet blogunu yazan Amerikal gazeteci James Dorsey. Ona gre otoriter bir Arap rejiminin hkm altndayken insann rahatszln ifade edebilecei esasen iki yer var: cami ve stadyum. Herkesin srekli din faktrnn neminden dem vurduuna dikkat eken Dorsey, dzene fke duyan futbol taraftarlarnn Msr devrimindeki etkisinin hafife alndn iddia ediyor. Ancak blgedeki dier diktatrler bunu hafife almyor. Kaddafi, futbol taraftarlarnn daha byk protestolar atelemesini engellemek iin Libya futbol ligini askya alm durumda. Cezayirli muadili Buteflika, aynsn Cezayir'de yapt. ran'da Cumhurbakan Ahmedinecad da gnlszce ligin durdurulmas talimat verdi, zira 2009'dan bu yana birok statta mevcut rejim aleyhinde sloganlarn hl duyulabildiini biliyor. u an blgede koltuu tehlikede olan birok otokrat futbol taraftarlarnn statlarn iinde ve etrafnda toplanmasn engelleme telanda. Bu, fke duyulan bir liderin hkmettii istikrarsz bir toplumda futbol taraftarlarnn oynayabilecei son derece gl ve potansiyel olarak ykc roln idrak edildiini gsteriyor. Normal koullar altnda futbol ve siyaset dnyasn ayr tutmakta beis yok. Olaanst koullarda ise bu ikisi bazen iddetle arpyor. Devre aras skoru: demokratlar 1-0 nde.

Eroding the rock Everybody knows that even the most solid rock will eventually be eroded if drips of water keep falling incessantly on the same spot. This law of physics also applies to politics and law. One of the most rock-hard pieces of European legislation is the body of rules and regulations on granting visas to people from outside of the European Union who want to visit one of the EU member states for a maximum of three months. Every Turkish businessman, student and tourist who wants to enter the EU is affected negatively by these cumbersome visa procedures that sometimes turn into humiliating confrontations. Many have lost business opportunities, failed to attend conferences or even missed the chance to study abroad just because visas were not issued in time. Having this system still in place for Turkish citizens even as the country has been in negotiations with the EU for full membership for five years is

incredibly frustrating for many Turks. It has often been pointed out to me, during private conversations or at public discussions, as the most obvious example of European insincerity and unreliability. Although many European politicians and policymakers know very well that in the long run the present situation is untenable, they are still doing their utmost to resist change or postpone adjustments to the present visa regime. Especially in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, defending the existing restrictive rules is seen by conservative politicians as the best way to show that they have understood the populist anti-migration demands from a growing part of the electorate. But the visa rock is suffering from a growing number of legal drips that threaten to create major holes. Last week a Dutch court in Haarlem ruled that Turkish businessman Cahil Ylmaz, who lives and works in the Netherlands, does not need a visa to enter the country. The court based its ruling on a crucial decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2009 in the so-called Soysal case. Mehmet Soysal and brahim Savatl worked as drivers for a Turkish company, driving trucks owned by a German company. When their visa renewal applications were denied by a Berlin court, they filed an appeal at a higher court, which decided to refer the case to the ECJ. In February 2009 the ECJ ruled that visas were not required for Turkish citizens for whom such a restriction did not apply in 1973 when an Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey entered into force. To put it simply, this agreement stipulated that if an EU member state did not have a visa regime in 1973, it was not allowed to introduce one after that date. Because no country in 1973 obliged Turks to get visas, all the new restrictive rules that were put in place in the 80s and 90s are not, according to the ECJ, legal and should therefore be abolished. I was still a member of the European Parliament at that time and organized a meeting concerning the repercussions of the ECJ rule in Strasbourg. The lawyers in the Soysal case were there, and of course Professor Haluk Kabaaliolu, the dean of the Faculty of Law at Yeditepe University and a long-time defender of visa-free travel for Turkish nationals to the EU. The European Commission, which is supposed to uphold these kinds of ECJ rulings, did not want to comment in public, while the German and Dutch representatives that we invited declined to come. All of the absentees knew that the Soysal case could be a turning point, but nobody dared say so. Since then, both the commission and the most affected member states have tried to postpone formulating clear conclusions. Legal experts are disputing some of the details in the ruling. Policymakers in Brussels and Berlin hope to be able to combine this dossier with a discussion on the readmission agreement that Turkey and the EU have recently concluded. The drips keep falling on the rock. It will take some more court rulings in individual cases to keep up the pressure. The EU might be able to stall for some more time. But the visa rock has started to be eroded. Theres no stopping it. Kayay andrmak Su damlalar kesintisiz olarak ayn noktaya dtnde en sert kayann bile eninde sonunda anacan herkes bilir. Bu fizik yasas, siyaset ve hukuk alanlarnda da geerli. Avrupa hukukunun en kat ksmlarndan biri, Avrupa Birlii dndan gelip birlik yesi lkelerden birine gitmek isteyenlere azami ay vize verilmesine ynelik kurallar ve dzenlemeler btn. AB'ye girmek isteyen her iadam, renci veya turist, bazen aalayc srtmelere de dnen bu bktrc vize prosedrlerinden olumsuz etkileniyor. Srf vizeler vaktinde verilmedii iin birou i frsatlarn karyor, konferanslara katlamyor, hatta darda eitim grme ansndan mahrum kalyor. Trkiye be yldr AB ile tam yelik mzakereleri

yrtrken, lkenin vatandalarna bu sistemin hl uygulanyor olmas birok Trk'n asabn fena halde bozuyor. Katldm zel sohbetlerde veya ak tartmalarda vize meselesi sk sk gndeme geliyor ve Avrupa'nn samimiyetsizlii ve gvenilmezliinin en bariz rnei olarak gsteriliyor. Pek ok Avrupal siyaseti ve siyasi karar alc, uzun vadede bu durumun devam edemeyeceini gayet iyi bilse de, mevcut vize rejiminin deimesine direnmek veya gereken dzenlemeleri ertelemek iin hl elinden geleni ardna koymuyor. Bilhassa Almanya ve Hollanda gibi lkelerde var olan kstlayc kurallar savunmak muhafazakr siyasetiler tarafndan, semenlerin giderek artan bir kesiminden gelen g kart poplist talepleri anladn gstermenin en iyi yolu addediliyor. Fakat vize kayas, zerinde byk ukurlar aabilecek hukuk damlalarnn karsnda gn getike yumuuyor. Geen hafta Haarlem'deki Hollanda mahkemesi, Hollanda'da yaayan ve alan Trk iadam Cahit Ylmaz'n lkeye girmek iin vizeye ihtiyac olmadna hkmetti. Mahkeme hkmn, Avrupa Adalet Divan'nn (AAD) 2009'da mehur 'Soysal' davasnda verdii hayati nemdeki karara dayandrd. Mehmet Soysal ve brahim Savatl, bir Trk irketinde ofr olarak alyor, bir Alman irketine ait TIR'lar kullanyordu. Vize yenileme bavurular Berlin'deki mahkeme tarafndan reddedilince, bir st mahkemeye gittiler ve o mahkeme de davann AAD'ye gnderilmesine karar verdi. ubat 2009'da AAD Trk vatandalar iin vizeye gerek olmad, zira byle bir kstlamann AB ile Trkiye arasnda imzalanp 1973'te yrrle giren Ortaklk Anlamas Ek Protokol'yle alakas bulunmad kararna vard. Daha basit sylersek, 1973'te bir vize sistemine sahip olmayan AB yesi bir lkenin bu tarihten sonra byle bir sistemi devreye sokmasna izin verilemezdi, nk bu Trklerin seyahat etmesini zorlatracakt, ki bu tam da protokollerde saylan yasaklardan biriydi. 1973'te hibir lke Trklere vize alma mecburiyeti koymad iin de seksenler ve doksanlarda getirilen btn yeni kstlayc kurallar AAD'ye gre yasal deildi ve kaldrlmas gerekiyordu. O dnemde hl Avrupa Parlamentosu yesiydim ve Strazburg'da AAD kararnn yol aaca sonulara dair bir toplant dzenledim. Soysal davasnn avukatlarnn yan sra, elbette Yeditepe niversitesi Hukuk Fakltesi dekan olan ve Trk vatandalarnn AB lkelerine vizesiz gidebilmesinin uzun yllardr savunuculuunu yapan Profesr Haluk Kabaaliolu da toplantdayd. Bu tr AAD kararlarnn ardndan harekete gemesi gereken Avrupa Komisyonu kamuoyuna aklama yapmak istemedi, davet ettiimiz Alman ve Hollandal temsilciler de toplantya katlmay reddetti. Gelmeyenlerin hepsi Soysal davasnn bir dnm noktas olabileceini biliyordu, fakat bunu dile getirme cesaretleri yoktu. O zamandan beri hem Komisyon hem en etkili ye lkeler karar paralelinde ak sonular formle edilmesini ertelemeye gayret ediyor. Hukuk uzmanlar karardaki baz detaylara itiraz ediyor. Brksel ve Berlin'deki siyasi karar mercileri bu dosyay, Trkiye ve AB'nin geenlerde sonulandrd geri alm anlamasna dair tartmayla birletirebilmeyi umuyor. Velhasl damlalar kayann zerine dmeye devam ediyor. Basnc artrmak iin bireysel davalardan yeni kararlar kmas gerekecek. AB biraz daha zaman kazanabilir. Fakat vize kayas anmaya balad ve devam gelecek.

Post Mubarak Let me start by reflecting on some of the reactions I got after my column last Sunday in which I made the argument that the Egyptian revolution is homemade and that it does not make sense to portray this uprising in one way or the other as a Western plan. Many readers did not dispute the prominent role of Egyptian youngsters in sparking this event and agreed that it was supported by ordinary citizens from all walks of life. Still, to conclude that the CIA had not been involved apparently was one bridge too far for some. They told me I was nave and recalled the many occasions in the past when it was obvious from the start or was revealed later that the American secret service had been the driving force, always in the background, of course, behind many coups all over the world. What made me so sure that this time they were not?

As I said last Sunday, there is no mistake about the extremely negative role played by the US in suppressing popular revolts all over the world in the last 50 years. For my generation, the coup against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973 was one of the defining moments in our political maturing. So yes, always be on the alert for American attempts to manipulate homegrown opposition movements. But please do not believe that there is a hidden American hand behind each and every major event in the world. Looking back at the American reactions over the last three weeks, it is crystal-clear that neither the CIA nor the State Department nor the White House had any clue of what was happening. Nobody in Washington expected this to happen. After Jan 25, every day was a new challenge to try and understand who was going to do what in Cairo and how to react to it. I am sure Obama and Clinton did their utmost to get a grip on the Egyptian president and used their good contacts with the Egyptian army to influence the course of events. But they even got it wrong on the exact timing of Mubaraks departure. America had a hard time getting it right, and the amazing thing was that most people out on Tahrir Square were not even too concerned about it. For Time commentator Fareed Zakaria, this was reason enough to call the ousting of Mubarak the first post-American revolution. Undoubtedly, the Americans are now trying to catch up with the new realities in Egypt and will want to play a role in shaping the future of the biggest Arab country. Be sure that the Europeans, the Chinese and the Russians are doing the same. Egypt and the region it dominates are simply too important for the rest of the world to pull their hands off completely. What worries me more is the risk of a post-revolutionary trauma among pro-democracy demonstrators. The reason is purely domestic. Mubarak is out, but the main pillar of his regime is still there -- the Egyptian army. In the absence of a wellorganized and united opposition and in an effort to create stability, the armed forces are supposed to guide the country to democracy. True, they have announced constitutional amendments that will be voted on shortly to allow for democratic elections before summer, and they have promised a reshuffling of the caretaker government to bring in opposition figures. The army even arrested some of the most well-known corrupt ministers from the last Mubarak cabinet. But I still find it difficult to believe that the present military-guided transition will really lead to a change in some of the old undemocratic fundamentals. Is the army prepared to accept a substantial reduction of its own powers on all levels of the state? Will the role of independent judges be upgraded again, including the opportunity for serious investigations into shady operations by the army itself? As political risk consultancy STRATFOR put it: The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal powers than Mubarak had. Reasons enough to keep a close eye on how the new Egypt is taking shape. Mbarek sonras Geen haftaki yazmda Msr devriminin yerli mal olduunu ve bu isyan o veya bu ekilde bir Bat plan gibi sunmann mantkl olmadn yazmtm. O yazya gelen baz tepkilere dair dncelerimi ifade ederek balamak isterim. Birok okuyucu olayn kvlcmn akmak konusunda Msrl genlerin oynad nc role itiraz etmiyor ve hayatn her alanndan sradan vatandalarn desteini aldn kabul ediyor. Fakat grne gre CIA'nn isyanda dahli olmad

dncesi bazlarna fazla uzak geliyor. Bana naif olduumu sylyorlar ve gemite, en bandan aleni ekilde veya sonradan aa kt zere, dnyann drt bir kesinde birok asker darbenin itici gcnn (her daim perde arkasnda kalarak elbette) Amerikan gizli servisi olduunu hatrlatyorlar. Bu kez Amerikallarn parma olmadndan nasl bu kadar emin olabildiimi soruyorlar. Geen pazar da sylediim gibi, ABD'nin son elli ylda dnya apnda halk ayaklanmalarn bastrmak konusunda ziyadesiyle olumsuz bir rol oynad aikar. Benim kuam iin 1973'te ili'de Salvador Allende'ye kar yaplan asker darbe siyasi olgunlamamzda belirleyici anlardan biriydi. Yani evet, Amerika'nn yerelden gelien muhalefet hareketlerini maniple etme gayretlerine kar daima uyank olalm. Fakat dnyadaki her byk olayn arkasnda Amerika'nn gizli eli olduuna da ltfen inanmayalm. Geriye dnp son haftadr Amerika'dan gelen tepkilere baktnzda, ne CIA, ne Dileri Bakanl ne de Beyaz Saray'n ne olup bittiine dair ipucuna sahip olduu ak seik grlyor. Washington'da hi kimse bunlarn olacan beklemiyordu. 25 Ocak'tan sonra her gn, Kahire'de kimin ne yapacan ve buna nasl bir karlk verilmesi gerektiini idrak gayretiyle geen zorlu bir snavd. Obama ve Clinton'n Msr devlet bakannn kafasndan geenleri anlamak iin akla karay setiinden ve olaylarn gidiatn etkilemek amacyla Msr ordusundaki gl balantlarn kullandndan hi kukum yok. Fakat Mbarek'in gidi tarihinde bile isabet kaydedemediler. Amerika yaananlar doru anlamakta zorland ve artc olan Tahrir Meydan'ndaki insanlarn byk ounluunun ABD'yi zerre kadar kale almamasyd. Time dergisi yazar Ferid Zekeriya'nn Mbarek'in devrilmesini "ilk Amerika sonras devrim" diye nitelemesi bouna deil. Kukusuz ki Amerikallar imdi Msr'daki yeni gerekliklere ayak uydurmaya alyor ve en byk Arap lkesinin geleceini ekillendirmekte rol oynamak isteyeceklerdir. Avrupallar, inliler ve Ruslarn da aynsn yapp istediinden pheniz olmasn. Msr ve hakim olduu blge dnyann geri kalan iin, ellerini tamamen ekemeyecekleri kadar nemli. Beni daha ziyade endielendiren, demokrasi yanls gstericilerin devrim sonras travmasna kaplma tehlikesi. Sebebi tamamen lke ii. Mbarek gitti, fakat rejiminin esas payandas, yani Msr ordusu hl yerli yerinde. Silahl kuvvetlerin, iyi rgtlenmi ve birleik bir muhalefetin yokluunda, yan sra istikrar salama abas dahilinde, lkeye demokrasi yolunda rehberlik edecei syleniyor. Doru, yaz ncesinde demokratik seimlere imkn verecek ve ksa sre sonra oya sunulacak anayasal deiiklikler ilan ettiler, ayrca gei srecine nezaret edecek hkmeti muhalif isimlerin katlmyla yeniden ekillendirmeye de sz verdiler. Hatta ordu son Mbarek kabinesinden yolsuzluklar ayyuka km baz bakanlar tutuklad. Fakat ben ordu rehberliindeki mevcut gei srecinin demokratik olmayan baz eski esaslarda gerek deiiklie yol aacana inanmakta hl zorlanyorum. Ordu devletin btn kademelerinde sahip olduu gcn ciddi lde azalmasn kabule hazr m? Yarglar bamszlklarna tekrar kavuturulacak ve onlara bizzat ordunun kukulu operasyonlarn ciddi ciddi soruturma imkn tannacak m? Siyasi risk danmanl Stratfor'un da belirttii gibi: "Hafta Msr' yneten yal bir askerle balad. Bittiinde Msr' resm yetkileri Mbarek'in bile fevkinde olan farkl yal askerler ynetiyordu." Velhasl yeni Msr'n nasl ekilleneceini yakndan takip etmek iin yeterince sebep var.

Egyptians and the West It is Friday morning now. I am in Berlin. Since I arrived last night, I have been glued to the TV set in my hotel room, trying to keep up with the latest developments in Egypt, waiting for Mubarak to step down. And extremely disappointed that he did not. Probably over a million people will show up today at Tahrir Square to make it clear that what the Egyptian president announced last night was far too little and much too late. Of course, nobody knows what will happen between now and Sunday morning when you read this column. Sometimes it is really frustrating to be a

columnist and not a journalist who can report from the spot, every moment of the day. As a columnist I should try to take a step back and analyze events, present an unconventional way of looking at things. That is difficult when a revolution is taking place before your eyes, knowing that what I write now might already be outdated in two days. Anyway, in an effort to bridge the gap, I decided to start reading a book I bought two years ago: Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World by Bruce K. Rutherford. It was a fascinating read yesterday on the flight to Berlin. I was not able to finish the book, of course, but it is really remarkable to read Rutherfords observations and analyses, based on fieldwork in Egypt in 2006 and 2007. He is quite positive on the changes that are taking place inside Egypt, already preparing the country for the post-Mubarak era. He focuses on reformers within the regime, the business community, the Islamist movement and, very interestingly, the judiciary. According to Rutherford, these domestic forces are already pushing for liberal reforms. His advice to the US: Do not get involved too much, and leave it to these Egyptian proreform advocates to further strengthen the rule of law, increase private sector autonomy and improve protection of basic rights, thereby gradually moving the country form authoritarianism to democracy. Rutherfords conclusions underline the observation by most followers of the Egyptian revolution: This uprising is home-made, by young Egyptians who are fed up with a status quo that gives them neither jobs nor rights, supported by people from all walks of life who want the same as Turks, Americans and Dutch want: a decent life in freedom for them and their children. What is happening today has deep roots in a society that wont accept being bullied anymore in obedience to a dictator who is totally out of touch with the realities on the ground. I would advise Ali Bula to read the Rutherford book. My colleague on these pages last week wrote a column in which he basically accuses me of being part of the perfidious efforts of the West to impose its vision of the world on the poor Egyptians. Being cautious on the Muslim Brotherhood and having little sympathy for the Iranian model is part of that imperialist plan. Let me explain my two basis objections to such an approach. In the tradition of eastern occidentalism, Bula talks about a monolithic West to which all Westerners belong because apparently they are all of the same opinion. In that distorted way of thinking, my being Dutch puts me in the same box with, for instance, the CIA. It is true that the American clandestine service has been involved in numerous shameless attempts in the past to topple governments they did not like. But does that make every remark by an American or European suspicious or by definition untrue? It would be the same if I would accuse Bula of singing from the same song sheet as the Taliban or the Saudi royals for the simple reason that they are all easterners. Lets stop using these simplistic categories. But more importantly, by giving the West such an important role, he simply denies that this revolution is made by Egyptians. They need neither the CIA nor Western intellectuals to tell them that what they are longing for is a future without secular and religious autocrats -- Western or Eastern. Msrllar ve Bat u an cuma sabah. Berlin'deyim. Dn akam geldiimden beri otel odamdaki televizyona yapm, Msr'daki son gelimeleri takip etmeye alyorum. Mbarek'in gitmesini bekliyorum. Hl koltuunda olmas karsnda byk hayal krkl iindeyim. Bugn muhtemelen bir milyondan fazla insan Tahrir Meydan'nda toplanacak ve Msr devlet bakannn dn gece sylediklerinin yetmeyeceini ve

artk ok ge olduunu cmle leme duyuracak. Bugn ile sizin bu yazy okuyor olacanz pazar sabah arasnda geen srede ne olacan elbette kimse bilmiyor. Gnn her dakikasn bulunduu yerden haberletirebilen bir gazeteci deil de keyazar olmak bazen hakikaten asap bozucu. Keyazar olarak bir adm geriye ekilip olaylar analiz etmem, meselelere dair geleneksel olmayan bir bak as sunmam lazm. Gzlerinizin nnde bir devrim gerekleirken bunu yapmanz zor oluyor, zira u an yazdnzn iki gn sonra oktan eskimi olabileceini biliyorsunuz. Her neyse, aradaki mesafeyi kapatma abasyla, iki yl nce aldm bir kitab okumaya karar verdim: Bruce K. Rutherford'un 'Mbarek sonras Msr' adl kitab. Dn Berlin'e uarken baladm ve okuduklarmdan etkilendim. Henz bitirebilmi deilim elbet, fakat Rutherford'un 2006-2007 yllarnda Msr'da yapt saha almasna dayanan gzlemleri ve analizleri cidden arpc. Msr dahilinde yaanan ve lkeyi oktandr Mbarek sonras dneme hazrlayan deiimler konusunda gayet emin. Rejim, i dnyas, slamc hareket ve ok ilgin ekilde, yarg iindeki reformculara odaklanan Rutherford'a gre bu dahili kuvvetler zaten liberal reformlar istikametinde bastryor. ABD'ye tavsiyesi ise u: ok fazla burnunu sokma ve hukukun stnln glendirmeyi, zel sektrn bamszln artrmay ve temel haklara dair gvenceleri gelitirmeyi, yani lkenin adm adm otoriterlikten demokrasiye gtrlmesini bu reform yanls Msrllara brak. Rutherford'un vard sonular, Msr devrimini takip edenlerin byk ksmnn ortaya koyduu gzlemi dorular nitelikte: bu, kendilerine ne i ne de hak veren statkodan illallah demi gen Msrllarn, Trkler, Amerikallar ve Hollandallar ne istiyorsa onu, yani kendileri ve ocuklar iin zgrlk iinde onurlu bir hayat isteyen her kesimden insann desteiyle kalkt, yerli mal bir isyan. Bugn olan bitenlerin toplumda derin kkleri var; o toplum hayatn gerekleriyle ban hepten koparm bir diktatre korkutularak boyun emeyi kabul etmiyor artk. Ali Bula'a Rutherford'un kitabn okumasn tavsiye ederim. Meslektam geen hafta bu sayfalarda beni temelde, Bat'nn kendi dnya grn yoksul Msrllara dayatmak iin sergiledii haince abalarn paras olmakla sulayan bir yaz yazd. Bula'a gre Mslman Kardeler konusunda temkinli olmak ve ran modeline pek sempatiyle bakmamak emperyalist bir plann paras. Bu yaklama iki temel itirazm izah etmek isterim. Bula, dou 'Garbiyatlnn' gelenei dahilinde, btn Batllarn belli ki ayn fikri tad iin mensup olduu monolitik bir Bat'dan sz ediyor. Bu sorunlu dnce tarz uyarnca, Hollandal olmam sebebiyle beni de, szgelimi CIA ile ayn kefeye koyuyor. Amerikan gizli servisinin gemite istemedii hkmetleri devirmek iin saysz utan verici teebbste bulunduu doru. Fakat bu bir Amerikal veya Avrupalnn btn sylediklerini pheli ya da tanm gerei yanl klar m? Ben de tutup Bula' srf hepsi doulu olduu iin Taliban veya Suudi krallaryla ayn telden almakla sulasam bundan hibir fark olmaz. Ar basitletirilmi kategoriler kullanmay brakalm. Fakat daha da nemlisi u: Bula Bat'ya byle nemli bir rol bimekle, bu devrimi Msrllarn yaptn inkar etmi oluyor. Onlarn, zlemini ektiklerinin, (istikameti ister Bat ister Dou olsun) laik ve dinci otokratlardan arnm bir gelecek olduunu CIA'den veya Batl entelektellerden renmeye hi ihtiyalar yok. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

What is to be done? In Egypt, the popular uprising against President Hosni Mubarak and his regime goes on. After two weeks of protests, thousands of people still come and gather at Tahrir Square in Cairo and in other places around Egypt every day to show their contempt for the dictator who has ruled their country for 30 years. Their key demand is simple: Mubarak out! Nobody knows how long the demonstrators will be able to motivate enough Egyptians from all walks of life to go on with their protests. Some skeptics have already concluded that the revolution has run out of steam and that the authoritarian regime has shown how durable and adaptable it can be. The Egyptian military is still in full control and has apparently accepted that Mubarak has to leave only to be replaced by Vice President Omar Suleiman, cut from the same undemocratic cloth as

Mubarak, as Joshua Stacher put it on the Foreign Affairs website. According to Stacher, Egypts military did not hesitate or even break a sweat. In fact, the regime remained cohesive throughout by pursuing a sophisticated strategy of unleashing violence upon the people and then saving them from it. Others remain hopeful that in the end something will change. Activists at the central square and on the Internet keep expressing their hopes for a more democratic future in Egypt, believing that the country, after all that has happened, after almost 300 people have been killed, simply cannot ignore their demands. They do not want to accept that the only result of their struggle to oust Mubarak will be the coming to power of a Mubarak lite, who at the moment is skillfully co-opting part of the opposition by luring them into negotiations that, according to most pro-democracy activists, will lead nowhere. In that sense, we are now witnessing in Egypt the classic debate that takes place during or after each revolution between committed revolutionaries who do not want to give up on their basic demands and reformists who make the calculation that without some sort of compromise with the old regime, in the end all the blood and tears will have been shed to no avail. The mother of all revolutionary texts is What is to be done? by the Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin in 1902. In his pamphlet Lenin makes the argument that no movement can be durable without a stable organization of leaders to maintain continuity. Only a small and well-organized group of professional revolutionaries can guarantee that spontaneous actions of the masses, especially in countries with an autocratic government, will be successful in the long run. The problem in Egypt is that the masses are there but there is no accepted leadership, let alone a revolutionary vanguard that is able to reap the rewards of the peoples protests. Negotiations are going on between the regime and a group of opposition leaders. But many activists are afraid that Suleiman is leading the reform movement into a trap. Even the Muslim Brotherhood seems to be split on the question whether something good can come out of these talks. Young activists have criticized the cautious Brothers leadership that is sitting at the same table with the man who is not willing to lift the emergency laws, one of the key demands of the protestors. But also among the demonstrators huge differences of opinion exist about the best strategy. Some human rights activists have made the argument that Mubarak should only resign after signing several presidential decrees that would allow for an interim government and new elections according to the rules of the present Constitution. Others oppose this legalistic approach because they think that the Constitution is illegitimate, just like the government. Why bother with the present rules? The faculty of law at Cairo University came up with a compromise when they called for the instant dissolution of Parliament and the creation of a new constitution. At the same time, they also want a delegation of presidential powers to Suleiman, a proposal strongly opposed by activists who despise the vice president. In Tahrir Square the protests continue. On the Internet the debates go on. But nobody seems to know what is to be done to guarantee all these efforts will have the desired effect: a democratic Egypt. Ne yapmal? Msr'da Devlet Bakan Mbarek'e ve rejimine kar halk ayaklanmas devam ediyor. ki haftalk protestolarn ardndan hl binlerce insan, Kahire'deki Tahrir Meydan'nda ve Msr'n drt bir kesinde her gn toplanp lkeye 30 yldr hkmeden diktatre nefretini gsteriyor. Ana talepleri ise basit: Mbarek defol!

Gstericilerin, her toplumsal kesimden yeterince Msrly protestolar devam ettirmeye daha ne kadar sre motive edebileceini kimse bilmiyor. Baz kukucular oktan devrimin ivme kaybettii ve otoriter rejimin ne kadar dayankl ve duruma ayak uydurabilir olabileceini gsterdii sonucuna varm durumda. Onlara gre Msr ordusu duruma hl tam olarak hakim ve grne gre Mbarek'in gitmesini ancak yerine mer Sleyman'n getirilmesi artyla kabul etti, ki Sleyman, Foreign Affairs'n internet sitesinde Joshua Stacher'n syledii gibi, "Mbarek'le ayn anti-demokratik kumatan biilmi bir isim". Stacher'a baklrsa, "Msr ordusu tereddde dmedi, hatta doru dzgn ter bile dkmedi. Aslnda rejim halk zerinde iddet uygulayp ardndan insanlar o iddetten kurtarmak eklinde karmak bir strateji izleyerek btn sre boyunca birlik btnln korudu." Bazlar ise srecin sonunda bir eylerin deieceine dair umut beslemeye devam ediyor. Tahrir'deki ve internet zerindeki aktivistler Msr'da daha demokratik bir gelecek ynndeki umutlarn hl dile getiriyor ve lkenin btn bunlar yaandktan ve yaklak 300 insan ldrldkten sonra, taleplerini ylece grmezden gelemeyeceine inanyor. Mcadelelerinin tek sonucunun Mbarek'in devrilmesi ve iktidara bir 'light' Mbarek'in gemesi olduunu kabul etmek istemiyorlar. Sleyman u an muhalefetin bir ksmnn hzn, en demokrasi yanls aktivistlere gre hibir yere varmayacak mzakerelerin batana ekerek, becerikli bir ekilde kesiyor. Velhasl Msr'da u an btn devrimler srasnda veya sonrasnda ortaya kan tartmaya tank oluyoruz: Kararl devrimciler temel taleplerinden geri adm atmak istemezken, reformistler eski rejimle belli bir uzlamaya varlmakszn sonuta onca kan ve gzyann boa akm olacan dnyor. Btn devrimci metinlerin anas, Rus devrimci Vladimir Lenin'in 1902'de yazd "Ne Yapmal"dr. Bu kitapkta Lenin, hibir hareketin, sreklilii salayacak istikrarl bir liderler rgt olmakszn uzun mddet dayanamayacan savunur. Lenin'e gre kitlelerin, bilhassa otokratik ynetimlerin olduu lkelerdeki kendiliinden eylemliliinin uzun vadede baarl olmasn, ancak kk ve iyi rgtlenmi bir profesyonel devrimciler grubu garanti altna alabilir. Msr'daki sorun ise kitlelerin sokaklarda olmas, fakat brakn halk protestolarnn meyvelerini toplayabilecek devrimci bir ncy, kabul edilmi hibir liderliin olmamas. Mzakereler rejim ile bir grup muhalefet lideri arasnda devam ediyor. Fakat birok aktivist Sleyman'n reform hareketini tuzaa srklediinden endie ediyor. Mslman Kardeler bile bu grmelerden iyi bir eyler kp kmayaca konusunda blnm grnyor. Gen aktivistler, protestocularn balca taleplerinden biri mahiyetinde, olaanst hali kaldrmaya bile yanamayan biriyle ayn masaya oturan temkinli Mslman Kardeler liderliini eletiriyor. Fakat gstericiler arasnda da takip edilecek en iyi strateji konusunda muazzam fikir ayrlklar mevcut. Baz insan haklar aktivistleri Mbarek'in, geici bir hkmete ve mevcut Anayasa'nn kurallarna gre yeni seimlerin yaplmasna imkan verecek bir dizi bakanlk kararnamesi imzaladktan sonra sadece istifa etmesi gerektiini savunuyor. Dierleri ise bu yasalc yaklama kar kyor, zira tpk hkmet gibi Anayasa'nn da gayrimeru olduunu dnyor. 'Mevcut kurallarla niye vakit kaybedelim?' diye soruyorlar. Kahire niversitesi Hukuk Fakltesi, parlamentonun derhal lavedilmesi ve yeni bir anayasann yaplmas arsnda bulunurken, bir uzlama nerisi ortaya koydu. Ayn zamanda Sleyman'a belli bakanlk yetkilerinin verilmesini de istiyorlar. Bakan yardmcsndan hi hazzetmeyen aktivistler ise bu neriye kuvvetle kar kyor. Tahrir Meydan'nda protestolar sryor. nternet zerinde tartmalar devam ediyor. Fakat grnen o ki, btn bu abalarn arzu edilen sonuca, yani demokratik bir Msr'a varmasn salamak iin ne yaplmas gerektiini kimse bilmiyor.

What about the Muslim brothers? It is the million dollar question. Who will take over in Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak leaves, now or later? How big is the chance that the Muslim Brotherhood will be the largest, most popular and most effective opposition group? It is the question asked by all journalists to every academic expert on Egypt and, if possible, to each informal leader of the

Tahrir Square demonstrations. The Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant asked Tariq Ramadan, an influential Egyptian-Swiss philosopher at Oxford University, known for his work on reinterpreting Islam. But more importantly, Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Ramadan calls on the West to stop demonizing each and every Islamist movement and recognize that there are huge differences between Iran in 1979 and Egypt in 2011. In Iran, according to Ramadan, Ayatollah Khomeini was involved in the revolution from the start and Islam played a major role. In Egypt, religion is not an important factor in the uprising, which he characterizes as an informal, spontaneous peoples protest. Therefore, Ramadan is not afraid of Egypt becoming a second Iran. Interestingly, he focuses on Turkey, praising Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan for speaking out so clearly in favor of the protestors and expressing the hope that Egypt will be the next Turkey. Faced with the question on the future role of the Brothers, most activists on the spot or on the Internet get irritated. They see it as an underestimation of their own brave role in pushing Mubarak out and a typical Western approach to the Arab world, based on a fear of Islam that is used by all dictators in the region to legitimize their oppressive regimes. Although I understand the irritation about Western prejudices and I agree with the analysis that for the moment the Islamists do not play a dominant role in the protests, it would be nave to discard questions about the Muslim Brotherhood as being biased. Because of the weak position of secular opposition groups and its own deep roots in Egyptian society, the Brothers will inevitably be a key player in the post-Mubarak era, whether one likes it or not. Better be well prepared and know what to expect. On the very informative website of Foreign Affairs, the leading American magazine on foreign policy, several articles have been published on the Muslim Brotherhood. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham makes it clear that portraying the Brotherhood as eager and able to seize power and impose its version of sharia on an unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features of the Brotherhood while ignoring others, and underestimates the extent to which the group has changed over time. In a brief sketch of the Brothers recent history, she refers to the moderating influence that cooperation with other political movements and participation in parliament has had on the policies and strategies of the Islamists. She distinguishes three major groups within the movement of which the pragmatic conservatives who combine religious conservatism with a belief in the value of participation and engagement seem to be the biggest. The author is not surprised that the Brothers are backing Mohamed ElBaradei as the provisional leader of the anti-Mubarak camp because they realize that a smooth transition to democracy will require an interim government acceptable to the military and the West. Still, Wickham is not sure whether the Brothers will continue to exercise their pragmatic self-restraint further down the road. There are still many question marks on their willingness to accept a new constitution that does not refer to sharia. How will their ambiguous positions on women and non-Muslims develop and which group inside the movement will turn out to be the dominant one? It is because of these uncertainties that she calls on all domestic and foreign players not to isolate the Muslim Brotherhood but to include them in the political process, making sure there are checks and balances in place to ensure that no group can monopolize state power and that all citizens are guaranteed certain freedoms under the law. I guess most pro-democracy activists could agree with this balanced approach. Mslman Kardeler'i nasl bilirsiniz?

Milyonluk soru u: Mbarek bugn yarn gittikten sonra Msr'da iktidar kim alacak? ktidar en byk, en popler ve en etkili muhalefet grubu konumundaki Mslman Kardeler'in alma ans ne kadar? Btn gazeteciler Msr uzman akademisyenlere ve frsatn bulurlarsa, Tahrir Meydan gsterilerinin tm gayri resmi liderlerine bu soruyu soruyor. Hollanda gazetesi De Volkskrant da ayn soruyu Oxford niversitesi'nde grev yapan ve slam' yeniden yorumlad eserleriyle tannan, fakat daha nemlisi 1928'de Mslman Kardeler'i kuran Hasan el Benna'nn torunu olan saygn Msrl-svireli felsefeci Tark Ramazan'a yneltmi. Ramazan, Bat'ya btn slamc hareketleri kt grmekten vazgemesi ve 1979 ran' ile 2011 Msr' arasnda muazzam farklar olduunu idrak etmesi arsnda bulunuyor. Ramazan'a gre ran'da Humeyni bandan beri devrimin iindeydi ve slam nemli bir rol oynamt. Msr'da ise din, Ramazan'n gayri resmi, kendiliinden bir halk protestosu olarak niteledii isyanda nemli bir faktr deil. Ramazan, Msr'n bir ikinci ran haline gelmesinden korkmuyor. lgin olan Trkiye'ye odaklanyor, Erdoan' protestocular lehine gayet ak konutuu iin vyor ve Msr'n bir sonraki Trkiye olaca umudunu dile getiriyor. Gsterilerde veya internette Mslman Kardeler'in mstakbel rolne dair soruyla karlaan aktivistlerin byk ounluu rahatszlk duyuyor. Bunu Mbarek'i devirme mcadelesinde oynadklar cesur roln kmsenmesi ve Bat'nn Arap dnyasna ynelik, slam korkusuna dayanan (ki blgedeki btn diktatrler baskc rejimlerini merulatrmak iin bu korkuyu kullanyor) tipik yaklam olarak gryorlar. Bat'nn nyarglarndan duyulan rahatszl anlyor ve u an slamclarn protestolarda hakim bir rol oynamad analizine katlyorum, lakin Mslman Kardeler'le ilgili soru iaretlerini nyarg diyerek bir kenara itmek naiflik olur. Laik muhalif gruplarn zayf konumundan ve Msr toplumunda sald derin kklerden dolay Kardeler, beenseniz de beenmeseniz de Mbarek sonras dnemde kanlmaz olarak kilit bir aktr olacaktr. Hazrlkl olmak ve ne geleceini bilmek daha iyi. Amerika'nn nde gelen d politika dergisi Foreign Affairs'n gayet bilgilendirici internet sitesinde Mslman Kardeler hakknda eitli yazlar yaynlanyor. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Kardeler'i iktidar ele geirmeye ve kendi eriat versiyonunu halkn arzusu hilafna dayatmaya hevesli ve muktedir olarak tasvir etmenin, hareketin baz zelliklerini grmezden gelirken, bazlarn abartan ve grubun zaman iinde geirdii mhim deiimi hafife alan bir karikatr olduunu" aka ortaya koyuyor. Kardeler'in yakn dnem tarihine dair ksa bir zette Wickham dier siyasi hareketlerle ibirliinin ve parlamentoda yer almann slamclarn politikalar ve stratejileri zerinde yapt lmllatrc etkiye atfta bulunuyor. Hareket iinde ana grup olduunu belirten Wickham, bunlardan en byk grnen grubun dini muhafazakarlkla katlmn ve temsiliyetin deerine duyulan inanc birletiren pragmatik muhafazakarlar olduunu belirtiyor. Yazar Mslman Kardeler'in Mbarek kart kampn geici lideri olarak El Baradey'i desteklemesinin artc olmadn, zira demokrasiye yumuak bir geiin ordu ve Bat'nn da kabul edebilecei bir geici hkmeti gerektireceini anladklarn kaydediyor. Yine de Rosefsky Wickham, Kardeler'in kendilerini snrlamak ynndeki pragmatik tutumlarn sre iinde devam ettirip ettirmeyeceklerinden emin deil. eriata atfta bulunmayan yeni bir anayasay kabul etme niyetlerine dair hl birok soru iareti sz konusu. Kadnlara ve gayrimslimlere ynelik mulak tutumlar nasl geliecek ve srecin sonunda hangi grup harekete hakim olacak? te bu belirsizlikler sebebiyle Wickham btn i ve d aktrlere Mslman Kardeler'i dlamayp siyasi srece dahil etme, "bylece hibir grubun devlet gc zerinde tekel kuramayaca ve btn vatandalara yasal erevede belli zgrlklerin garanti edilecei bir gler ayrl sistemini oluturma" arsnda bulunuyor. Sanrm demokrasi yanls aktivistlerin byk ounluu bu dengeli yaklam kabul edebilir.

This is 1989 revisited, not 1979 -- it seems It is impossible not to write about Egypt today! For one week the Egyptians have been rebelling against the Hosni Mubarak dictatorship, and it is great to be a witness to this public uprising. Over the weekend I found it difficult to do anything other than watch Al Jazeera, CNN and BBC, and read hundreds of

messages on Twitter that kept pouring in, giving information on the latest developments around Tahrir Square in Cairo and the fate of ordinary Egyptians in downtown neighborhoods. I knew that so-called social media like Twitter and Facebook were playing an ever-growing role in organizing and informing new generations. But despite the fact that I have been quite active on Twitter myself for two years now, I never really felt part of that information revolution because I still gather most of my information from the old media (TV and newspapers) or regular websites. This is the first time Twitter became an invaluable source of information that you would never find anywhere else. From the US, American-Egyptian journalist Mona Eltahawy is providing her followers with tweets on her own mission to properly inform the world about what is going on in her native country. From Cairo, Sultan Al Qassemi and Ramy Raoof are only two of the numerous local Twitter heroes who keep on sending extremely informative short messages. If you really want to feel the pulse of revolt beating, please follow these people on Twitter. These days, I have to think back to my own visits to Cairo in the past. In 2005 I was part of a small team of unofficial election observers from the European Parliament, not welcomed but tolerated by the Egyptian authorities. We went around the city and were surprised that so few people showed up to vote. Egyptian journalists told us nobody really cared because everybody already knew the outcome: the Mubarak party would win an overwhelming majority. In a selected number of districts the Muslim Brotherhood had presented candidates, profiting from the then relatively tolerant attitude of the Mubarak regime that otherwise did everything to suppress the Islamists and present them to the West as the only alternative to the ruling party. At the poling station where secular opposition leader Ayman Nour was supposed to hand in his vote, thugs had created an aggressive atmosphere, trying to scare away voters, journalists and election observers. A few months later, in the spring of 2006, I went back to Cairo, together with my colleague from the parliament, Dutch social democrat Jan Marinus Wiersma. We were preparing for our book on the quest for democracy in some of Europes Muslim neighbors and how the EU should react to that. In the Egyptian capital we spoke to academics, journalists and politicians about the Muslim Brotherhood and its democratic potential and credentials. Our conclusion was that the jury was still out on the Brotherhood. There were clear differences between the old guard, traditionally focused on spreading a religious message and a new generation of practical Islamist politicians trying to use their seats in the Egyptian parliament to gradually improve the situation of the poor. Question marks remained with regard to their respect for constitutional democracy, the rights of women and religious minorities and their acceptance of previous agreements, like the one between Egypt and Israel. Our overall conclusion was quite gloomy: Without a strong secular opposition, free media and few institutional checks and balances, a democratic experiment could be a disaster because a possible Islamist government would be operating in an institutional vacuum, without opposition or coalition partners and without counterweights in a country not used to democracy. Glued to the television and my mobile phone, I am still trying to combine my enthusiasm for the present revolt against Mubarak with our skeptical conclusions of five years ago. For the moment, I want to believe that what is happening now in

Egypt is closer to what occurred in 1989 in Eastern Europe than to 1979, when the shah was chased out of Tehran, only for the ayatollahs to quickly outmaneuver the secular opposition and take over the Iranian revolution. Lets enjoy the fall of the Mubarak regime but also watch carefully what will follow next. Msr 1979'un deil 1989'un tekrar gibi Bugn Msr hakknda yazmamaya imkn yok! Msrllar bir haftadr Mbarek diktatrlne kar ayakta ve bu halk isyanna tanklk etmek byk bir tecrbe. Hafta sonu boyunca El Cezire, CNN ve BBC seyretmekten, Kahire'nin Tahrir Meydan civarndaki en son gelimelere veya kenar semtlerdeki sradan Msrllarn akbetine dair ard arkas kesilmeyen yzlerce Twitter mesajn okuyup bilgi almaya almaktan baka bir ey yapamadm. Twitter ve Facebook gibi sosyal medya alarnn yeni kuaklar rgtlemek ve bilgilendirmek hususunda giderek daha mhim roller oynadn biliyordum. Fakat Twitter'da iki yldr gayet faal olmama ramen, bu enformasyon devriminin gerek bir paras gibi hissetmedim hi kendimi, nk bilgilerimin byk ounluunu hl 'eski' medyadan (televizyonlar, gazeteler) veya internetteki haber sitelerinden alyorum. Twitter ilk kez baka hibir yerde bulamayacanz paha biilmez bir bilgi kayna haline gelmi durumda. ABD'den Amerikal-Msrl gazeteci Mona Eltahavi, anavatannda neler olup bittiine dair dnyay doru bilgilendirme misyonu dorultusunda takipilerine tweet'ler sunuyor. Kahire'den Sultan el Kasmi ve Rami Rauf, son derece bilgilendirici ksa mesajlar gndermeyi srdren saysz Twitter kahramanndan sadece ikisi. Eer devrimin kalp atlarn gmbr gmbr duymak istiyorsanz, ltfen Twitter'da bu insanlar izlemeyi ihmal etmeyin. Bugnlerde gemite Kahire'ye yaptm ziyaretleri hatrlamaktan kendimi alamyorum. 2005'te Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndan kk bir gayri resmi seim gzlemcisi heyetinin yesiydim; Msrl yetkililer bizi pek ho karlamasa da msamaha gstermiti. Kenti turlam ve sanda giden insanlarn azl karsnda aknla uramtk. Msrl gazeteciler seimin aslnda kimsenin umurunda olmadn, nk sonucun herkesin malumu olduunu anlatt: Mbarek'in partisi ezici ounlukla kazanacakt. Mslman Kardeler, o dnemde Mbarek rejiminin nispeten hogrl tutumundan yararlanarak setikleri bir dizi blgede aday gstermiti. Normalde Mbarek, slamclar bastrmak iin elinden gelen her eyi yapyor ve onlar Bat'ya iktidar partisinin tek alternatifi olarak sunuyordu. Laik muhalefetin lideri Eyman Nur'un oy vermesi gereken sandkta zorbalar saldrgan bir atmosfer oluturmu, semenlerin, gazetecilerin ve seim gzlemcilerinin gzn korkutup karmaya alyordu. Birka ay sonra 2006 ilkbaharnda tekrar Kahire'deydim, yanmda parlamentodan mesaidam, Hollandal sosyal demokrat vekil Jan Marinus Wiersma vard. Avrupa'nn baz Mslman komularndaki demokrasi araylarna ve AB'nin buna nasl karlk vermesi gerektiine dair yazmay dndmz kitabn hazrlklarn yapyorduk. Msr bakentinde akademisyenler, gazeteciler ve siyasetilerle Mslman Kardeler ve onun demokratik potansiyeli ve referanslar hakknda konutum. Vardmz sonu, henz Mslman Kardeler'le ilgili net bir kanaatin olmad ynndeydi. Yal kuan geleneksel olarak dini bir mesaj yaymaya odaklanan temsilcileri ile Msr parlamentosundaki glerini yoksullarn durumunu adm adm iyiletirmek ynnde kullanmaya alan yeni bir pratik slamc siyasetiler kua arasnda bariz farkllklar vard. Anayasal demokrasiye, kadn haklarna ve dini aznlklara sayg duyup duymadklar ve Msr-srail bar gibi nceki anlamalar kabul edip etmediklerine dair soru iaretleri sz konusuydu. kardmz nihai sonu ise pek i ac deildi: Gl bir demokratik muhalefet, zgr medya ve belli dzeyde oturmu bir gler ayrl olmakszn "demokratik bir deneyim felaket anlamna gelebilirdi, zira muhtemel bir slamc hkmet kurumsal bir bolukta, demokrasiye almam bir lkede karsnda muhalefet veya koalisyon ortaklar ve dengeleyici gler bulunmakszn i grecekti." Televizyona ve cep telefonuma yapm bir halde, hl Mbarek'e kar mevcut isyandan duyduum heyecan 5 yl nce vardmz o pheci sonula birletirmeye alyorum. u an iin Msr'da olanlarn 1989'da Dou Avrupa'da yaananlara daha yakn olduuna inanmak istiyorum. 1979'da ah'n Tahran'dan kovulduu, ancak ardndan ayetullahlarn laik muhalefeti

arabuk bertaraf edip ran Devrimi'ne el koyduu tarihin tekerrr etmeyeceine inanmak istiyorum. Mbarek rejiminin devrilmesine sevinelim, fakat ardndan ne geleceini de dikkatle izleyelim.

End of visa regime one step closer It almost went unnoticed. Last week, after years of negotiating, the European Union and Turkey finally agreed on a so-called readmission agreement. It means that Turkey has agreed to take back illegal migrants who are arrested in EU countries and who travelled to the EU via Turkey. Until recently, the problem was that Turkey was willing to accept responsibility for Turkish citizens who entered the EU without permission but was very reluctant to do so for thousands of migrants from Iraq, Central Asia and Africa who use Turkey as a relatively easy gateway to Europe. It seems that Turkey got the guarantee that the EU would help, also financially, in coping with all these migrants who are sent back and have to be taken care of, in one way or another. The European commissioner responsible for negotiations with Turkey on this agreement, Swedish Liberal Cecilia Malmstrm, welcomed the result and announced that the text will be brought for formal approval by EU member states to the next Justice and Home Affairs Council on Feb. 24. A readmission agreement with the EU is a condition that all candidate countries have to fulfill before they can make progress on lifting visa restrictions. In the past, with the countries of the Western Balkans, for example, after signing such an agreement, the EU started a process of so-called visa liberalization. That means that, in the end, citizens of the countries involved can travel to the EU for touristic or other short-term purposes without having to apply for a visa. For Turks this sounds like heaven. They are now faced with complicated and humiliating demands from EU member states when they apply for permission to travel to these countries. Despite all the rhetoric about improving economic relations between the EU and Turkey, Turkish businessmen are still subjected to cumbersome procedures that make it simply impossible to act and react quickly and efficiently. The same applies for students who discover that all the nice exchange programs are seriously hampered by the same obstacles to free travel. Regular Turkish citizens are even more worse off. Will all these problems come to an end after the readmission agreement is concluded? That is not yet clear. Commissioner Malmstrm, a strong defender of Turkish accession to the EU, is planning to ask EU member states on Feb. 24 not only to welcome the agreement but to also allow her to start a visa dialogue with Turkey, with the aim of eventual visa liberalization. This mandate will probably include all kinds of safeguard clauses that would allow the EU to reintroduce visa restrictions when there is a sudden strong increase in Turkish migrants. Still, despite all these additional guarantees, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands will find it difficult to start a process that would eventually lead to the abolishment of visas for Turks. We will have to follow the meeting on Feb. 24 closely to see whether the European Commission will be successful in convincing the usual suspects. The Turkish government will interpret the conclusions of that meeting very carefully anyway because they have already announced that Turkey will only sign and ratify the readmission agreement when the EU agrees on the final goal of visa-free travel. The most likely outcome will be that EU member states will agree on starting a slow process of gradual relaxation of the visa regime for Turkish citizens. The first step in that long process could be so-called visa facilitation. This means that first specific

groups, such as businessmen, students and academics, would be exempted from acquiring a visa. The EU has some experience in that field because this is how the Balkan countries were treated in the recent past as well. Only when that goes well would further steps be made. I can understand that many Turks are cynical about the EUs double standards and pessimistic about substantial improvements in the short run. Still, I believe that last week a significant and symbolic point was reached that will make it more difficult for the EU to keep the present discriminating rules in place. Vizesiz gnlere bir adm daha Neredeyse kimsenin dikkatini ekmedi. Geen hafta, yllar sren mzakerelerin ardndan Avrupa Birlii ve Trkiye u mehur Geri Kabul Anlamas'n nihayet sonulandrd. Anlamayla Trkiye, AB lkelerinde yakalanan ve AB'ye Trkiye zerinden giren yaad gmenleri geri almay kabul ediyor. Yakn zamana dek sorun Trkiye'nin AB'ye izinsiz giren Trk vatandalarnn sorumluluunu kabul etmeye raz gelirken, ayn sorumluluu Irak, Orta Asya ve Afrika'dan gelip Trkiye'yi Avrupa'ya nispeten kolay alan bir kap olarak kullanan binlerce gmen iin stlenmeye yanamamasyd. Grne gre Trkiye AB'den, geri gnderilen ve o veya bu ekilde baklmas gereken btn bu gmenlerle urarken maddi olarak da yardm edileceinin garantisini ald. Avrupa Komisyonu'nun Trkiye ile anlamaya dair mzakereleri yrtmekle grevli yesi, sveli Liberal Cecilia Malmstrm sonucun memnuniyet verici olduunu ve metnin 24 ubat'ta toplanacak olan Adalet ve ileri Konseyi'nde AB yesi lkelerin resm onayna sunulacan aklad. AB ile Geri Kabul Anlamas, vize kstlamalarnn kaldrlmasnda ilerleme salayabilmek iin btn aday lkelerin yerine getirmesi gereken bir koul. Gemite AB, szgelimi Bat Balkan lkeleriyle byle bir anlama imzalandktan sonra vizeleri kaldrma srecini balatt. Bu da sz konusu lkelerin vatandalarnn AB'ye turistik veya dier ksa sreli amalarla vize bavurusu yapmakszn seyahat edebilmesi demek. Trkler iin bu kulaa cennet gibi geliyor. u an AB yesi lkelere gitme izni iin bavururken karmak ve aalayc taleplerle yz yze kalyorlar. AB ile Trkiye arasndaki ekonomik ilikilerin gelitiine dair onca cafcafl lafa ramen, Trk iadamlar hl bitmez bilmez prosedrlere tabi tutuluyor ve bu da hzl ve etkili reaksiyon gstermelerini imknszlatryor. Ayns btn gzel deiim programlarnn serbest dolamn nne konan benzer engellerle ziyadesiyle zorlatrldn gren renciler iin de geerli. Sradan Trkiye vatandalarnn ii ise iyice zor. Geri Kabul Anlamas'nn sonulandrlmasnn ardndan btn bu sorunlar bitecek mi? Belli deil. Trkiye'nin AB yeliinin sk destekilerinden Malmstrm, 24 ubat'ta AB yesi lkelerden sadece anlamaya onay vermelerini deil, Trkiye'ye vize uygulamasnn nihai olarak kaldrlmas hedefiyle bir vize diyalou balatmasna izin vermelerini de isteyecek. Bu dzenleme muhtemelen, Trk gmenlerin saysnda ani bir art olduunda AB'nin vize kstlamalarn tekrar devreye sokmasna imkn verecek her tr ihtiyat hkmn de ierecektir. Yine de, btn bu ilave garantilere ramen Almanya ve Hollanda gibi lkeler, Trklere vizenin kaldrlmasyla sonulanacak bir srecin balatlmasna pek scak bakmayacaktr. Avrupa Komisyonu'nun olaan phelileri ikna edip edemeyeceini 24 ubat'taki toplantda greceiz. Trk hkmeti bu toplantdan kan sonular her halkarda ok dikkatli yorumlayacaktr, zira Trkiye'nin Geri Kabul Anlamas'n AB vizesiz seyahat nihai hedefini kabul ettiinde imzalayp onaylayacan oktan aklam durumda. En muhtemel sonu AB yesi lkelerin Trkiye vatandalar iin vize rejiminin aamal olarak gevetilecei yava bir sre balatmak ynnde anlamas. Bu uzun srete ilk adm vizelerin kolaylatrlmas olabilir. Yani ilk nce iadamlar, renciler ve akademisyenler gibi gruplar vize alma mecburiyetinden muaf tutulur. AB'nin bu alanda belli bir tecrbesi var, zira yakn gemite Balkan lkelerine de bu ekilde muamele edildi. Ancak bu ilk sre yolunda gittikten sonra daha ileri admlar atlacaktr.

Birok Trk'n AB'nin ifte standartlar karsnda gvensiz ve ksa vadede die dokunur ilerlemeler salanaca konusunda karamsar olmasn anlayabiliyorum. Fakat geen hafta AB'nin mevcut ayrmc kurallar olduu gibi korumasn daha da zorlatracak mhim ve sembolik bir noktaya varld kanaatindeyim.

Different reasons to visit Kars I visited Kars once. In the spring of 2005, while still a member of the European Parliament, I decided to explore Turkeys northeastern regions. To learn more about those parts of the country and to find out what people in those far away border areas thought about Turkeys accession to the EU, I travelled together with Ali Yurttagl, my parliamentary assistant. We started our journey in Trabzon, and via Hopa and Artvin we ended up in Kars where we were joined by our good friend Osman Kavala of Anadolu Kltr. I wanted our trip to end in Kars because I had been impressed by Orhan Pamuks novel Snow, situated in Kars. Trying to revive the memories of the book, we walked around the streets and enjoyed the combination of Ottoman and Russian architecture. At a meeting with local NGOs my main task turned out to be the defense of Pamuk and his novel against angry inhabitants who did not like the authors portrayal of their city as a hotbed for all kind of fundamentalists. Many were unwilling to accept the fundamental difference between a novel and a travel guide. Before we left, we met with the mayor, Naif Alibeyoglu, who made a strong argument in favor of opening the closed border between Turkey and Armenia, crucial for the revitalization of Kars and its surrounding region. He also showed us a scalemodel of a monument he wanted to build just outside the citys centre. Although all three of us tried to remain as polite as possible, we could not hide our negative appreciation of the planned construction, especially its militaristic and bombastic elements. The mayor noticed our reservations and, after some discussion, Ali and Osman suggested the mayor contact Mehmet Aksoy, their common friend and a famous Turkish sculptor, and ask him to design another statue. One year later I met Mehmet Aksoy for the first time in his Istanbul studio, together with Ali and my wife who had just made an item for NTV about him. When I asked him what had come out of his contacts with the Kars mayor, he showed us a scale-model of his proposed Kars monument, a divided human figure, and we could see that he had already started working on the gigantic hand that would symbolize the hope of reconciliation. At the end of that year, the actual construction could start after the Erzurum Cultural and Natural Heritage Protection Committee gave the green light, despite objections by the local Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) branch. That was 2005 and 2006. Two weeks ago the whole country learned about Mehmet Aksoys creation after a visit to Kars by the prime minister. He described the monument, whose construction has been stopped, as a freak, a monstrosity that should be demolished as soon as possible. A lot has happened between 2006 and 2011. The same Erzurum Committee that first saw no objections to building the monument at that particular place changed its opinion after the statue became ever more politicized by nationalists who disregarded Aksoys message of friendship and depicted the statue as some sort of Turkish apology toward Armenia. The 2006 mayor, Alibeyoglu, fell out of grace with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and was replaced by a more conservative mayor from the same party, Nevzat Akkus, who has made it his mission in life to erase all the statues that his predecessor erected. Minister of Culture Ertugrul Gunay tried to save the situation and the monument but has been

overruled, at least for the moment, by his party chief whose strong rejection, according to some critics, fits in perfectly well with the AK Partys electoral strategy to lure nationalist voters away from the MHP. Lets hope that, in a few years time, the reasons to visit Kars are its refurbished city center, its unique position close to a reopened border with Armenia and a monument that symbolizes those new relations between the two neighbors. A statue that managed to survive all the attacks by opportunistic politicians who came to realize that their personal taste is not what counts in a democracy and that demolishing statues should be left to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Kars'a gitmek iin farkl sebepler Kars'a bir kez gittim. 2005 ilkbaharnda, hl Avrupa Parlamentosu yesiyken, Trkiye'nin kuzeydou blgelerini kefetmeye karar vermitim. lkenin bu ksmlarna dair daha ok ey bilmek ve bu uzak snr blgelerinde yaayan insanlarn Trkiye'nin AB yelii ile ilgili ne dndn renmekti amacm. Yanmda parlamentodaki asistanm Ali Yurttagl vard. Seyahatimizi Trabzon'dan balattk, Hopa ve Artvin'den geip Kars'ta nihayete erdirdik. Orada bize Anadolu Kltr'den yakn dostumuz Osman Kavala da katld. Son duran Kars olmasn istememin sebebi, Orhan Pamuk'un bu kentte geen roman 'Kar'n zerimde yaratt etkiydi. Kitapta anlatlanlar bir kez daha hatrlamaya abalayarak caddeleri arnladk ve Osmanl ve Rus mimarisinden oluan esiz bileimin tadna vardk. Yerel sivil toplum rgtleriyle yaptmz toplantda balca vazifem Pamuk'u ve romann, yazarn kentlerini her trden kktenciliin yata olarak gstermesinden holanmayan fkeli Karsllara kar savunmak oluverdi. Birou bir roman ile bir seyahat rehberi arasndaki temel fark kabullenmek istemiyordu. Kentten ayrlmadan nce Belediye Bakan Naif Alibeyolu ile grtk. Bakan, Trkiye ve Ermenistan arasndaki kapal snrn almasna, bunun Kars ve civar blgelerin yeniden canlanmas asndan hayati nem tadna dair kuvvetli argmanlar ortaya koydu. Ayrca kent merkezinin hemen dna ina etmek istedii bir antn modelini de gsterdi. mz kibarl mmkn mertebe elden brakmamaya alsak da, planlanan anta, bilhassa militarist ve gsterili unsurlarna ynelik olumsuz grlerimizi ifade etmekten kendimizi alamadk. Alibeyolu ekincelerimizi dikkate ald ve biraz daha konutuktan sonra, Ali ve Osman, bakana, ortak arkadalar ve nl bir Trk heykeltra olan Mehmet Aksoy'la temasa gemesini ve ondan baka bir heykel tasarlamasn istemesini nerdiler. Bir yl sonra Mehmet Aksoy'la stanbul'daki stdyosunda tantm. Yanmda Ali ve NTV'ye ksa sre nce Aksoy'la ilgili bir haber yapm olan eim de vard. Aksoy'a Kars belediye bakan ile temaslarndan ne sonu ktn sorduumda bize Kars ant iin nerdii heykelin modelini gsterdi; ikiye blnm bir insan figryd bu ve uzlama umudunu simgeleyecek devasa el zerinde oktan almaya baladn grebiliyorduk. O yl sonunda, yerel MHP rgtnn itirazlarna ramen Erzurum Kltr ve Tabiat Varlklarn Koruma Kurulu'nun yeil k yakmasnn ardndan heykelin yapmna balanabildi. Bu anlattklarm 2005 ve 2006 yllarnda oldu. ki hafta nceyse, Babakan'n Kars ziyaretinin ardndan Aksoy'un eserini btn lke rendi. Erdoan yapm durdurulan ant 'ucube', bir an nce yklmas gereken bir 'irkinlik' olarak niteledi. 2006-2011 arasnda kprlerin altndan ok sular geti. Antn o mntkada yaplmasnda ilk bata hibir saknca grmeyen Erzurum'daki ayn kurul, Aksoy'un dostluk mesajn hie sayan ve heykeli Trkiye'den Ermenistan'a bir tr zr olarak sunan milliyetiler tarafndan iyice siyasiletirilmesi sonras fikrini deitirdi. 2006'daki belediye bakan Alibeyolu AKP ile anlamazla dt ve yerine ayn partiden daha muhafazakr bir isim olan ve selefinin diktii btn heykelleri yok etmeyi adeta hayatnn amac haline getiren Nevzat Akku geti. Kltr Bakan Erturul Gnay durumu ve heykeli kurtarmaya alt, fakat en azndan u an iin, baz tenkitilere gre heykele kar kuvvetli itiraz AKP'nin MHP'den milliyeti semen kapmak ynndeki seim stratejisine gayet denk den parti lideri tarafndan sindirildi.

Umalm ki birka yl iinde, yenilenen kent merkezi, Ermenistan'la alan snra yakn esiz konumu ve iki komu arasndaki yeni ilikileri simgeleyen ant Kars'a gitmenin sebepleri olsun. Ve umalm ki o heykel oportnist siyasetilerin btn saldrlarna ramen ayakta kalabilsin ve o siyasetiler de bir demokraside ahsi beenilerinin ehemmiyeti olmadn ve heykel ykmann Afganistan'daki Taliban'a braklmas gerektiini idrak eder hale gelsin. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Mr. Prime Minister, which side are you on? The plenary session of the European Parliament this week in Strasbourg was the scene of a fierce confrontation between European politicians on an issue that always leads to heated debates everywhere: the relationship between politicians and the media. The immediate cause this time came from Hungary where a widely criticized media law entered into force on Jan. 1, 2011, the same day Hungary assumed the rotating six-month EU presidency. The new law creates a media control body, with members appointed by the ruling party in parliament. All media outlets will be required to register with the body to operate lawfully. The panel will be able to impose fines of up to 700,000 euros (TL 1.4 million) on media outlets for imbalanced news coverage, material it considers insulting to a particular group or the majority, or which it deems to violate public morality. Gross violations can result in denial of registration. The law also removes legal protections against the disclosure of journalists sources, allowing the media authority grounds to do so. The law has been strongly criticized by international human rights organizations that are concerned about the vagueness of the concepts and about the independence of the regulating body. As Amnesty International put it: The breadth of the restrictions, the lack of clear guidelines for journalists and editors and the strong powers of the new regulatory body all risk placing unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on the freedom of expression in Hungary. One week ago, an estimated 10,000 Hungarians demonstrated in Budapest against what they consider to be Europes most restrictive media law, claiming that with this law the center-right government is turning Hungary into Orbanistan, a reference to prime minister Viktor Orban and autocratic Central Asian nations. The same Orban came to the European Parliament this week to present his plans for the EU for the next six months. He was met with an unprecedentedly hostile welcome, with members of the European Parliament venting strong criticism against Budapests new media law. Mr. Orban repeated his governments willingness to change the law if a European Commission legal opinion finds it to be at fault and not in line with EU legislation. But Socialist, Liberal and Green political leaders called for a complete scrapping of the legislation. In particular, the concept of balanced reporting was fiercely opposed. In the words of Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the European Greens: Do you think Mr. Berlusconi thinks research done on his life amounts to balanced reporting? No, he does not because there is no such thing as balanced information. The media should be a gadfly to politicians. That is why your law does not correspond with the values of the European Union. Sound familiar, these debates, dont they? Fortunately, Turkey does not have a similar media law. But as we all know, there are other ways in this country for politicians to force journalists to abstain from writing things they do not like. One of these tools is filing lawsuits. Last week Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan sued Ahmet Altan, editor-in-chief of the Taraf daily for remarks Altan made against him in one of his recent columns. In the criminal complaint, the lawyers argue that Altan

could have written a more effective column about the prime minister without using remarks that were perceived as insulting, not only by the prime minister but by all of society. In the language of the Hungarian media law, the column was not balanced enough. Lets leave aside for the moment the tactical mistake made by the prime minister in attacking a prominent liberal defender of most of the governments policies. Lets imagine that he got a phone call from the former prime minister of Belgium, and now Liberal leader in the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt, one of the big defenders of Turkeys accession to the EU, who said in the debate on the Hungarian media law: The aim of media governance is not to guarantee proper and adequate information. The aim is to uphold pluralism and to guarantee that any initiative in media can be developed. What would the prime minister say if he was asked by Verhofstadt: On which side are you in this debate? Are you with Orban or with me? Sayn Babakan, hangi taraftasnz? Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun bu hafta Strazburg'da yaplan genel kurulu, her yerde her daim hararetli tartmalara vesile olan bir meselede Avrupal siyasetilerin birbirine girmesine sahne oldu. Mesele siyasetilerle medya arasndaki ilikiydi. Bu defa tartmann fitilini ateleyen Macaristan'd, zira bu lkede 1 Ocak 2011'de, yani tam da Budapete'nin alt aylk AB dnem bakanln ald tarihte yaygn eletirilere konu olan bir medya yasas yrrle girdi. Yeni yasa, yeleri parlamentodaki iktidar partisi tarafndan atanan bir medya denetim kurulu oluturuyor. Buna gre yasal faaliyet gsterebilmek iin btn medya kurulularnn sz konusu kurula kaydolmas gerekecek. Kurul, "dengesiz haber yaynndan, belli bir grubu ya da ounluu aaladn" veya "kamu ahlakn" ihlal ettiini dnd ierikten dolay medya kurulularna 700 bin Avro'ya (1,4 milyon lira) varan cezalar kesebilecek. "Ar" ihlaller yayn izninin iptaliyle sonulanabilecek. Yasa ayrca gazetecilerin kaynaklarn aklamama hakkn garanti eden dzenlemeyi de kaldryor ve medya otoritesine bu ynde talimat vermek iin saysz gereke sunuyor. Yasa, kavramlarn mulakl ve denetim kurulunun bamszlna dair endieler duyan uluslararas insan haklar rgtlerinden sert eletiriler alyor. Af rgt'nn aklamasnda u ifadeler gze arpyor: "Kstlamalarn okluu, gazeteciler ve editrler iin sarih ilkelerin yokluu ve yeni dzenleyici kurulun geni yetkileri Macaristan'da ifade zgrlne gereksiz ve orantsz kstlamalar getirilmesi riski douruyor." Bir hafta nce yaklak 10 bin Macar, Avrupa'nn en kstlayc medya yasas addedilen dzenlemeye kar Budapete'de bir gsteri dzenledi ve merkez sa hkmetin Macaristan' (babakan Viktor Orban ve otokratik Orta Asya lkelerine atfla) "Orbanistan"a evirdiini iddia etti. te ayn Orban bu hafta Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda krsye karak gelecek alt ay iin yapt AB ile ilgili planlarn takdim etti. Orban' ei grlmemi lde hasmane bir atmosferde karlayan parlamento yeleri Budapete'nin yeni medya yasasna kar sert eletirilerde bulundu. Orban ise hkmetinin, Avrupa Komisyonu hukuk dairesinin kusurlu ve AB mevzuatyla uyumsuz olduu kanaatine varmas halinde yasay deitirmeye hazr olduunu tekrarlad. Fakat Sosyalist, Liberal ve Yeil siyasi liderler yasann klliyen iptal edilmesi arsnda bulundu. Bilhassa "dengeli habercilik" kavramna ate pskrdler. Avrupal Yeiller'in lideri Daniel Cohn-Bendit unlar sylyordu: "Berlusconi kendi hayat hakknda yaplan bir aratrmann dengeli habercilik olduunu dnr m sizce? Hayr, dnmez, nk 'dengeli habercilik' diye bir ey yoktur. Medyann iki eli daima siyasetilerin yakasnda olmaldr. te bu yzden kardnz yasa Avrupa Birlii'nin deerleriyle rtmyor." Bu tartmalar kulaa tandk geliyor deil mi? kr ki Trkiye'de benzer bir yasa yok. Fakat hepimizin bildii gibi, bu lkede siyasetilerin istemedikleri konularda gazetecileri yazmaktan kanmaya zorlamasnn baka yollar var. Bu yollardan biri dava amak. Geen hafta Babakan Erdoan Taraf Gazetesi'nin genel yayn ynetmeni Ahmet Altan', son ke yazlarndan birinde kulland aleyhte ifadeler sebebiyle mahkemeye verdi. Dava dilekesinde avukatlar, Altan'n Babakan hakknda, sadece Babakan'n deil btn toplumun 'hakaretamiz' sayd ifadeleri kullanmakszn daha etkili bir yaz kaleme alabileceini iddia ediyordu. Macaristan'daki medya yasasnn jargonuyla sylersek, ke yazs yeterince "dengeli" deildi. Babakan'n, hkmetin politikalarnn byk ksmnn nde gelen liberal bir savunucusuna saldrarak yapt taktik hatay imdilik kenara brakalm. Erdoan, Belika'nn eski babakan ve u an Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki Liberallerin lideri olan, Trkiye'nin AB yeliini de kuvvetle destekleyen Guy Verhofstadt'tan bir telefon alsayd ve Macaristan'daki medya yasasna

dair tartmada sylediklerini duysayd neler olurdu acaba? Verhofstadt'a kulak verelim: "Medya denetiminin hedefi 'dzgn' ve 'yeterli' bilgiyi garanti etmek deildir. Hedef oulculuu desteklemek ve medyada her tr inisiyatifin geliebilmesini garanti etmektir." Ve Belikal lider u soruyu sorsayd Babakan ne cevap verirdi: "Siz bu tartmada hangi taraftasnz? Orban'dan yana msnz, benden yana m?" j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Never forget 19-01-07 Today, Jan. 19, 2011, family and friends of Hrant Dink will gather again at the place where he was killed four years ago. It has become a ritual that revitalizes the anger and the sadness many still feel on this day. But its also the right moment to show the determination not to give up in the fight for justice. For the fourth time, the lawyers of the Dink family have produced a report with an overview of the things that happened during the last year in the court case against his murderers. To be more correct: of the things that did not happen. This years report focuses on the people and organizations that were involved in preparing and executing Hrants murder and the various methods used to protect these perpetrators from being tried. It is a long list of deliberate and unfortunately successful attempts to turn a blind eye to obvious pieces of evidence of direct involvement of some of the suspects in the Ergenekon case. It is a revealing record as well of numerous interventions by the prosecutors and the judges running this case to conceal and tamper with evidence. Legitimate demands by the Dink lawyers for additional information or witnesses are simply turned down, and the refusal of some key players to answer questions is accepted shamelessly by the court. It leads the Dink lawyers to a damning conclusion that I quote here: The facts described under separate headings above, the ideological partnership and harmony between the indicated institutions and mechanisms in the preparation and perpetration of the Dink murder, in concealing and tampering with the evidence following the murder, in burying the truth, in drawing the boundaries and limits of how far the trial proceedings could go and in ensuring that these boundaries are not crossed are all striking. In fact, this harmony and partnership corresponds to the existence of a powerful apparatus and mentality that not only legitimizes the murder but also makes impunity something ordinary. This powerful instrument is the state itself. All facts of the process, from the painting of Hrant Dink as a target for the judicial processes resulting in his conviction and murder, and the blockages in the murder trial, point at the state ideology and policy. Personally, I am not a big fan of conspiracy theories or explanations that are based on one big, all-powerful, central authority able to manipulate everything. But I must say that reading this report makes you wonder how else to explain the remarkable coherency in trying to bury this court case and make people forget about the dirty involvement of so many state employees. At the same time, reading the report has strengthened my conviction that if Turkey wants to become a first class democracy, these mechanisms and mentalities in and outside the state have to be demolished -- starting with the judiciary and politicians. On Sept. 12 the Turkish population voted, among other things, to have a new, democratic system of higher judicial bodies. In the past the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) tried to protect Ergenekon suspects by getting rid of prosecutors and judges that were seen as too anti-status quo. Why doesnt the new HSYK act more vigorously against the pro-status quo defenders in the Dink case and, after having already replaced the head of the court, kick out all the other jurists who are responsible for the miserable performance of the Turkish judiciary in this trial?

But it is not only the judiciary that is to blame. The lawyers report rightly claims that, unless there is a clear political will, it will not be possible to break the resistance of state institutions. In the past, the prime minister himself has shown his commitment by visiting the Dink family and having his own inspectors make a separate report -- that was subsequently shelved. Nowadays, we dont hear him speak on the Dink case anymore, thereby legitimizing the obstructionism of the judiciary. If the prime minister is powerful enough to remove a 35-mete-high statue in Kars, then why is he not able to guarantee that justice will be delivered in stanbul? 19 Ocak 2007'yi asla unutma Bugn 19 Ocak 2011. Hrant Dink'in ailesi ve arkadalar drt yl nce ldrld yerde bir kez daha toplanacak. Bu toplanma, 19 Ocak 2007'nin birok insanda yaratt fke ve znty canlandran bir ritel haline gelmi durumda. Fakat adalet mcadelesinde pes etmeme kararlln gstermek iin de doru bir zaman. Dink ailesinin avukatlar drdnc kez, onu ldrenlere kar alan davann son bir ylnda neler olduunu, daha dorusu neler olmadn ortaya koyan bir rapor yaynlad. Bu ylki rapor cinayetin hazrlanp gerekletirilmesinde yer alan insanlara ve kurumlara, yan sra cinayeti tertipleyenlerin yarglanmaktan korunmas iin kullanlan eitli yntemlere odaklanyor. Ergenekon davasnda yarglanan baz phelilerin dorudan dahline dair para para ve bariz kantlarn grmezden gelinmesine ynelik kasti ve ne yazk ki baarl abalara dair uzun bir liste sz konusu. Davaya bakan savclarn ve yarglarn kantlar saklamak ve tahrif etmek ynnde saysz giriimine dair de manidar bilgiler var. Dink avukatlarnn ek bilgi veya tanklar iin ortaya koyduu meru talepler ylece geri evriliyor ve baz kilit aktrlerin sorular cevaplamay reddetmesi mahkeme tarafndan utan verici ekilde kabul ediliyor. Dink avukatlar bu ahval ve eraitten u ac sonuca varyor: "Yukarda balklar halinde deinilen olgular, iaret edilen kurumlar ve mekanizmalarn Dink cinayetinin hazrlanmas, ilenmesi, cinayetin ardndan delillerin gizlenmesi, karartlmas, gerein stnn rtlmesi, yarg srelerinin snrlarnn ve erevesinin izilmesi ve bu snrlarn dna klmamasndaki uyumu ve ideolojik ortakl dikkat ekicidir. Esasen bu uyum ve ortaklk, cinayetin merulatrlmas yannda cezaszln da salayan ve olaanlatran gl bir aygtn ve zihniyetin varlna tekabl etmektedir. Bu gl aygt devletin ta kendisidir. Hrant Dink'in hedef gsterilmesi, mahkumiyetiyle sonulanan yarg sreleri ve ldrlmesi, cinayet yarglamalarnn tkanmas, yani srecin btn olgular, devletin ideolojisini ve siyasetini iaret etmektedir." ahsen her eye kadir olan ve her eyi maniple edebilen tek bir byk merkezi otoriteye dayal komplo teorilerinden veya izahlardan pek hazzetmem. Fakat unu da sylemem lazm: Bu raporu okuduunuzda, mevzubahis davay rtbas etme ve insanlara birok devlet grevlisinin kirli dahlini unutturma abasndaki dikkat ekici ahengin baka nasl izah edilebileceini sormadan edemiyorsunuz. te yandan raporu okurken, Trkiye birinci snf bir demokrasi olmak istiyorsa, devlet iindeki ve dndaki bu mekanizmalarn ve zihniyetlerin ortadan kaldrmas, ie yargdan ve siyasetilerden balamas gerektiine inancm pekiti. 12 Eyll'de Trkiye halk baka hususlarn yannda, yksek yargda yeni, demokratik bir sisteme sahip olmak lehinde oy kulland. Gemite Hkimler ve Savclar Yksek Kurulu (HSYK), fazla statko kart addedilen savclardan ve yarglardan kurtularak Ergenekon zanllarn korumaya almt. Peki yeni HSYK, Dink davasndaki statko yanllarna kar niye daha kuvvetli admlar atmyor ve mahkeme bakann deitirmesinin ardndan, Trk yargsnn bu davadaki iler acs performansndan sorumlu olan dier btn yarglar niye grevden almyor? Fakat kabahat sadece yargda deil. Avukatlar raporda u hakl iddiay ne sryor: Ak bir siyasi irade olmakszn devlet kurumlarnn direniini krmak mmkn olmayacak. Gemite bizzat babakan, Dink ailesini ziyaret ederek ve kendine bal mfettilere (sonrasnda rafa kaldrlan) ayr bir rapor hazrlatarak bu yndeki kararlln gstermiti. Bugnlerde ise artk

Dink davas hakknda konutuunu duymuyoruz, ki byle yaparak yargnn engelleme politikasn merulatrm oluyor. Babakan, Kars'taki 35 metrelik bir heykeli kaldracak kadar glyse, o zaman niye stanbul'da adaletin tecellisini garanti edemiyor?

Sleyman in Dutch eyes Was it a coincidence that I started reading a recently published Dutch book on Sleyman the Magificent just before a TV series about his life led to a fierce debate in Turkey? I guess not. A few months ago the Dutch journalist Henk Boom presented his book De Grote Turk (The Great Turk). It is not another classic biography on the ruler considered by many inside and outside Turkey as the most important and appealing of all the Ottoman sultans. Boom has read all the major biographies on Sleyman and quotes from them extensively. What makes his book different and special are two distinctive features: he travelled to all the important places in the sultans life, and he has tried to figure out the impact of Sleyman on the image and perception of Turkey and Turks, then and now. As a result of Booms following of the sultans footprints, the reader finds himself not only in Istanbul and Amasya but also in places such as Budapest, Vienna and Sarajevo. Being a journalist by profession pays off because the author talks in a lively and attractive way with local experts and discusses with them the importance of Sleyman there and then. But he also uses the opportunity to go into disputed topics among the sultans biographers, for instance on the real intentions behind conquering Hungary or laying siege to Vienna. A real eye-opener is the chapter on the influence of Sleymans confrontation with other European powers of the day on the perception of Turks in Europe. Among others, Boom uses the example of Erasmus, the great Dutch humanist thinker, to show how the fear of Ottoman domination in the 16th century had a long-lasting effect on European thinking on Turks and Turkey. Erasmus wrote a small book himself, De Turkenkrijg (The War with the Turks), in which he depicts the Turks as cruel barbarians and Islam as an obscure religion. Because at the same time Europeans had discovered the art of book printing, Erasmus views were reproduced in thousands of popular pamphlets that were distributed widely and warned the Europeans of the Turkish threat. Most of the Turk bashing was not based on real knowledge of the Ottoman Empire. But the ongoing negative conceptualization had a huge impact, until the present day. Boom quotes sayings and proverbs from several countries in which one can find a distant echo of the 16th century anti-Turkish propaganda of Erasmus and other influential thinkers. Another effect of the Ottoman assault was the growing feeling among Christians of all denominations that they should unite against a common enemy instead of fighting among themselves. Catholics and Protestants alike started emphasizing their shared values and mutual interest in resisting the rise of Islam in Europe. It is one of the first times Europe was imagined as a political and cultural entity that has nothing in common with the barbarian Turks at the gates. As you can see, Sleymans successes not only created pride and self-confidence among Turks. His towering presence also laid the foundations for antiTurkish discourses that still go down well with many Europeans who are as ignorant as Erasmus was and with certain

present-day European leaders who do know better but have other reasons to stick to the old clichs. By the way, in the present row on the TV series and its depiction of the sultans sex life, the Dutch journalist is definitively on the side of those who have criticized the trailer and the first episode for its vulgarity and distortion of the facts. He approvingly quotes the American historian Leslie B. Pierce, author of the book The Imperial Harem, who strongly denies that Sleyman was obsessed with sex and harem orgies: The harem system was not focused on erotic adventures but on organizing the sultans succession. The harem was in fact the guarantee for the dynastys survival. What was important in the harems dynamics was not the sex but the family planning policy. Of course, sex was an animating force inside the harem. But it was only one of many and of relatively little importance. Just wanted you to know. Hollandallarn gznde Sleyman Hollanda'da Muhteem Sleyman zerine yeni yaymlanan bir kitab, tam da hayatna dair dizinin Trkiye'de hararetli tartmalara vesile olmasndan hemen nce okumaya balamam tesadf myd? Sanrm deil. Birka ay nce Hollandal gazeteci Henk Boom'un "De Grote Turk" ("Byk Trk") adl kitab piyasaya kt. Kitap, Trkiye iinde ve dnda biroklar tarafndan Osmanl sultanlarnn en nemlisi ve ilgi ekicisi olarak grlen Sleyman'a dair yazlm dier klasik biyografilerden deil. Boom, Sleyman hakkndaki btn mhim biyografileri okumu ve onlardan epeyce de alnt yapyor. Boom'un kitabn zel ve farkl klan iki ayrt edici zellik var: Sultann hayatnda nem tayan her yere gitmi ve Sleyman'n gemite ve bugn Trkiye'nin ve Trklerin grlme ve alglanma ekli zerinde yapt etkiyi anlamaya alm. Boom'un sultann ayak izlerini takip etmesi sonucunda okur kendisini sadece stanbul ve Amasya'da deil, Budapete, Viyana ve Saraybosna gibi kentlerde de buluyor. Boom meslekten bir gazeteciye yakr ekilde, yerel uzmanlarla canl ve cazip bir slupla konuuyor ve onlarla Sleyman'n orada ve o dnemde tad nemi tartyor. Fakat sultann hayatn yazanlar arasnda var olan tartmal konularn (szgelimi Macaristan fethindeki veya Viyana muhasarasndaki gerek niyetleri) derinine dalma frsatn da kullanyor. Gerekten ufuk aan blmlerden biri, Sleyman'n dnemin dier Avrupa gleriyle atmasnn ktadaki Trk algs zerinde yapt etkiye dair olan. Boom, 16. asrdaki Osmanl hakimiyeti korkusunun Avrupa'nn Trkler ve Trkiye'ye dair dnme biiminde nasl kalc tesirler braktn gstermek iin byk Hollandal hmanist dnr Erasmus'u rnek alyor. Erasmus bizzat kaleme ald "De Turkenkrijg" ("Trklerle Sava") adl risalesinde Trkleri vahi barbarlar, slam' da karanlk bir din olarak tasvir ediyordu. O dnemde Avrupallar kitap basmay da kefettiklerinden, Erasmus'un fikirleri popler brorler halinde binlerce oaltlp yaygn ekilde datld ve Avrupallar Trk tehdidi konusunda uyarm oldu. Trkleri yerden yere vuran satrlar Osmanl mparatorluu'na dair gerek bilgilere dayanmyordu. Fakat sregiden olumsuz kavramsallatrmann bugne dek gelen muazzam bir etkisi oldu. Boom, Erasmus ve dier etkili dnrlerin Trkiye kart propagandasnn uzak bir yanksn bulabildii baka birok lkedeki szlerden ve deyimlerden de alntlar yapyor. Osmanl taarruzunun bir baka etkisi, her mezhepten Hristiyan arasnda, ortak bir dmana kar tek tek savamak yerine birlemeleri ynndeki hissiyat glendirmesiydi. Hem Katolikler hem Protestanlar, Avrupa'da slam'n ykseliine kar ortak deerlerini ve menfaatlerini vurgulamaya baladlar. Yani Avrupa'nn kapya dayanan barbar Trklerle hibir ortak noktas olmayan siyasi ve kltrel bir varlk olarak tahayyl edilmesinin k noktalarndan biri de budur. Grebileceiniz gibi, Sleyman'n baars Trkler arasnda gurur ve zgven oluturmaktan ibaret deildi. Yceltilen varl, Trk kart sylemlerin de temellerini att. O temeller en az Erasmus kadar bilgisiz olan birok Avrupalnn derinliklerinde hl yer buluyor; bugnn belli baz Avrupal liderleri de neyin ne olduunu biliyor, fakat eski klielere sarlmalarn ardnda baka sebepler var. Bu arada Hollandal gazeteci Boom, televizyon dizisi ve sultann cinsel hayatnn tasvir ediliine dair mevcut tartmada, kararl bir ekilde, tantm filmini ve ilk blm kaba olduu ve gerekleri arptt iin eletirenlerin safnda yer alyor. "mparatorluk Haremi" kitabn yazan ve Sleyman'n cinsellie ve harem partilerine dkn olduu iddiasn kuvvetle reddeden Amerikal Leslie B. Pierce'tan u onaylayc alnty yapyor: "Harem sistemi erotik maceralara deil, sultann halefsiz kalmamasn organize etmeye odaklyd. Harem aslnda hanedanln hayatta kalmasnn garantisiydi. Haremin

dinamikleri itibaryla nemli olan cinsellik deil, aile planlama projesiydi. Elbette cinsellik harem iinde harekete geirici bir gt. Fakat birok unsur arasnda sadece biriydi ve nispeten az neme sahipti." Siz de bilin istedim. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Mustafa and Sleyman After reading Ayse Karabats column in Sundays Zaman on the hotly debated TV series Magnificent Century, I came to the conclusion that she said all the right things so there was no further need for me to put my own thoughts in writing. Yes, it is true, as Karabat noted, that based on the trailer and first episode, the series seems to be tainted by some old fashioned Orientalism, especially in its depiction of life in the harem. But what is all the fuss about? Dont forget it is just a TV series. The fundamental problem is not with the series but with the fact that history is taught so poorly in Turkey and therefore people have difficulties discussing issues, like Ottoman history, from a broader perspective. Again, in my view, all valid points. Still, I kept reading the most extreme comments on the series and saw that angry demonstrators took to the streets, accusing Show TV of trying to split the country and degrading the Ottomans and therefore the Turks. What is going on here? I must admit, first and foremost, I have a feeling of dj vu. We have been here before. In 2008, when Can Dndar presented his movie Mustafa, one could hear the same sort of arguments used against his depiction of Atatrk. Then, staunch Kemalists accused Dndar of deliberately distorting the image of Mustafa Kemal. Now, overzealous defenders of the Ottoman legacy use the same kind of rhetoric to call for a ban of the series on Sleyman the Magnificent. The underlying pattern of thinking and arguing is the same: Both Mustafa and Sleyman are seen, albeit by different people, as sacred historical personalities that cannot and should not be criticized. According to their biggest supporters, efforts to portray them as men of their times or big statesmen who also had private lives, which included all the moral and ethical dilemmas that come with it, are doomed from the start. Basically, that mentality leads to the conclusion that the only way to talk or write about the countrys national heroes is to copy the already available hagiographies in which these great men only did great things. That is totally unacceptable from an academic or journalistic point of view. Every historian or journalist has the right to reexamine any historical person or event. They should be criticized when they make mistakes in doing so or when they distort the facts. But calling for a ban does not serve any purpose in a democracy and especially politicians and government representatives should be extremely careful in their public statements. On top of that, TV soaps should be judged in a totally different way from serious documentaries or specialized historical books. Do these rows occur in other countries as well? I called a friend of mine in the Netherlands who works for public TV and is responsible for buying and developing historical series. He send me a long list of Dutch TV series that had the potential of triggering the same kind of debates in the Netherlands because they dealt with the recent, sometimes very controversial, history of the royal family, an institution that is loved and admired by most Dutch citizens. In one mini-series, the father of the present queen is linked with dubious business transactions. In another, several unfavorable speculations about the wife of the queens second son are dealt with in detail. Both series are based on historical events but are works of fiction. Be sure, fans of the monarchy were furious about these programs and some of them raised their voices to criticize this rude treatment of the queen and her family. But most people accepted the fact that creating fiction allows for more freedom of interpretation. Maybe even more importantly, most of the controversial allegations were already known to most Dutch people because

journalists had written about them before. The reaction of the then-Dutch prime minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, on his contentious role in one of the royal affairs was telling. When asked to comment on the series, his press speaker just said: The prime minister wants to inform you that things went differently. Full stop. Mustafa ve Sleyman Aye Karabat'n hararetli tartmalara vesile olan televizyon dizisi "Muhteem Yzyl" zerine Sunday's Zaman'da yaymlanan ke yazsn okuduktan sonra btn doru noktalara temas ettiine, zerine kendi dndklerime dair daha fazla bir ey yazmama lzum olmadna kanaat getirdim. Evet, Karabat'n dizinin tantm filmine ve ilk blmne dayanarak yazdklar doru. Dizi, bilhassa harem hayatn yanstma biimi itibaryla biraz eski moda Oryantalizm'le malul gibi grnyor. Fakat btn bu yaygara neyin nesi, bunun sadece bir televizyon dizisi olduunu unutmayalm, diyor. Esas sorunun diziden deil, Trkiye'deki tarih eitiminin son derece kt olmasndan ve bu yzden insanlarn Osmanl tarihi gibi meseleleri daha geni bir perspektiften tartmakta sorunlar yaamasndan kaynaklandn vurguluyor. Bir kez daha, bence hepsi doru noktadalar. Yine de dizi hakknda en ar yorumlar okumaya ve Show TV'yi lkeyi blmeye almakla ve Osmanllar, haliyle Trkleri aalamakla sulayan fkeli gstericilerin sokaklara dkldn izlemeye devam ettim. Neler oluyordu byle? En bata bir deja vu duygusu yaadm kabul etmeliyim. Daha nce de bunlara tank olduk. 2008'de Can Dndar'n "Mustafa" filmi gsterime girdiinde, Atatrk'n yanstlma biimine dair ayn trde argmanlar duyabiliyordunuz. O dnemde kat Kemalistler Dndar', Mustafa Kemal'in imajn kasten arptmakla sulamt. Bugnse Osmanl mirasnn ar banaz savunucular, Muhteem Sleyman' anlatan dizinin yasaklanmas isteiyle ayn tr sylemi kullanyor. Dnme ve savunma eklinin temelde hi fark yok. Gerek Mustafa gerek Sleyman, farkl insanlar tarafndan da olsa, eletirilemeyecek ve eletirilmemesi gereken kutsal tarihi ahsiyetler olarak grlyor. En sk destekilerine baklrsa, onlar dnemlerinin insan veya zel hayatlar da olan, bunun beraberinde getirdii btn ahlaki ve etik ikilemleri yaayan byk devlet adamlar olarak izme abalar en bandan hatal. Bu zihniyet temelde u sonuca varyor: lkenin ulusal kahraman hakknda konumann veya yazmann tek yolu, bu byk insanlarn sadece byk iler yaptn vaaz eden mevcut methiyenameleri kopyalamak. Bu, akademinin veya gazeteciliin bak asndan tepeden trnaa kabul edilemez bir tutum. Her tarihi veya gazetecinin herhangi bir tarihsel ahsiyeti ya da olay tekrar ele alma hakk vardr. Bu mesai srasnda hata yaparlarsa veya olgular arptrlarsa eletirilmelidirler. Fakat o mesainin yasaklanmasn istemek, bir demokraside hibir amaca hizmet etmez ve bilhassa siyasetiler ve hkmet temsilcileri kamuoyu nnde aklamalar yaparken son derece dikkatli olmaldr. Dahas, televizyon dizileri ciddi belgesellerden veya uzmanlk tayan tarih kitaplarndan tamamen farkl ekilde deerlendirilmelidir. Peki baka lkelerde de bu tr yaygaralar kopuyor mu? Hollanda devlet televizyonunda tarihi diziler satn almak ve gelitirmekle sorumlu olan bir arkadam aradm. Orada yaynlanan ve kraliyet ailesinin (ki Hollanda vatandalarnn byk ksm tarafndan sevilen ve hayranlk duyulan bir kurumdur), bazen ok tartlan yakn tarihine eildii iin lkede benzer trde mnakaalar tetikleme potansiyeli tayan dizilere dair uzun bir liste gnderdi. Mini dizilerden birinde u anki kralienin babas aibeli i balantlaryla ilikilendiriliyordu. Bir bakasnda kralienin ikinci olunun eiyle ilgili baz naho speklasyonlar ayrntlaryla ele alnyordu. Monari yanllarnn bu programlardan dolay infiale kapldndan ve bazlarnn kralieye ve ailesine ynelik kaba bulduklar bu yaklam eletirmek iin seslerini ykselttiinden hi kukunuz olmasn. Fakat insanlarn byk ounluu hayal rn bir eserin daha fazla yorum zgrlne imkn verdiini kabul etti. Belki daha da nemlisi, tartlan iddialarn ou zaten Hollanda'nn byk ksm tarafndan biliniyordu, zira gazeteciler bunlar hakknda daha nce yazp izmiti. Dizilerden birinde anlatlan kraliyetle ilgili bir meseledeki tartmal rolne dair dnemin babakan Balkenende'nin verdii cevap gayet manidard. Diziyle ilgili yorumu sorulduunda, basn szcs sadece unu syledi: "Babakan sizi olayn farkl ekilde cereyan ettii hususunda bilgilendirmek ister." Nokta.

We need heroes As a professional follower of the news, I have developed my own most efficient daily way to learn as quickly as possible what is happening in Turkey, the Netherlands and the rest of the world. This familiar pattern of many short news articles, some background stories and quite a lot of columns and comments, is sometimes enriched by a portrait of someone who has been in the news or whose life story expresses something

symbolically in a way a regular news story would never manage. Journalists, especially foreign correspondents, are under constant pressure to produce, as fast as possible, short articles for multiple use on websites, newspapers and radio programs. They have hardly any time to sit down and talk to someone for hours in order to produce a portrait or interview that not only tells the story of that particular person but gives an invaluable insight into the society she or he lives in. Therefore, I was very excited when I heard about a new initiative taken by Dutch journalists that was presented as a New Years present on Jan. 1. It is a website called One11.nl (unfortunately only in Dutch) and each day a new article is presented about a person who has a story to tell. Someone who does not accept the huge problems she or he is facing and is willing, often under difficult circumstances, to stand up and act to prevent further distress or help victims of tragic events. To summarize: a hero. This does not mean that all the stories are so-called good news articles in which everything in the end is fine and the hero always comes out on top. We see the doubts and are faced with problems that cannot always be overcome. Sometimes you wonder how on earth people find the strength to carry on when solutions are not in sight. Let me give you two examples. The most popular story until now is about a Chinese man, Chen Si, who tries to prevent people from committing suicide. What he does is drive up and down a big bridge in Nanjing that is used by hundreds of desperate Chinese each year to bring an end to their miserable lives. When he sees someone about to jump from the bridge, he goes over and tries to prevent that person from doing so. Ever since he was successful in saving a young girl who was desperate after losing all her money in 2003, Chen Si has managed to convince almost 200 people to carry on with their lives. It is a heartbreaking story of a man who does not want to accept that so many of his countrymen seem to have given up on life under the pressures of a fast-changing society and economy in China. He is an unknown hero we met because a Dutch correspondent found out about him and sent in his portrait to One11.nl. Better known to most Europeans are the problems in the suburbs of Paris, the so-called banlieues. In 2005 huge riots and fighting broke out between young migrants of North African descent and the police after two youngsters were killed in a chase by the cops. In one of the neighborhoods, Clichy-sous-Bois, things were on the verge of really getting out of control. Then Mehdi Bigaderne stepped in. He grew up and still lived there and was working with youngsters at the time, trying to keep them in school and get them a job. He fully understood the frustrations that were vented about racism and discrimination by the French authorities, about poor housing and the criminality related to drug trafficking. But he was also aware that setting schools on fire would not help these young protesters. He managed to convince them to sit down and consider what would be in their long-term interests. The violence subsided and Mehdis role was greatly appreciated by all sides. To change things at a fundamental level, he decided to enter politics and for two years now he has been an alderman in Clichy-sous-Bois. Have things really improved since? No, they have not. His fight within the institutions to improve the lives of his fellow migrants has not paid off immediately. But he remains convinced that setting cars ablaze does not help anybody and that only by taking part in all levels of society will migrants be able to slowly change things. Would it not be a good idea for Turkish journalists from different media outlets to get together, develop a similar website called One12.tr and present their own heroes to a Turkish audience that is getting sick and tired of the usual cynicism and

superficial news stories? Kahramanlara ihtiyacmz var Meslek gerei gazeteleri gn gnne sk takip eden biri olarak, Trkiye, Hollanda ve dnyann geri kalannda neler olup bittiini mmkn olduunca abuk renmek iin gelitirdiim kendime has yntemler vardr. Bazen birok ksa haberden, baz arka plan hikyelerinden ve ynla ke yazs ve yorumdan oluan o bildik kalp, habere konu olan veya hayat hikyesi sradan bir haberde asla bulamayacanz simgesellikte bir eyleri ifade eden bir insann portresiyle zenginleiverir. Gazeteciler, bilhassa da d haberciler, internet sitelerinde, gazetelerde ve radyo programlarnda eitli ekillerde kullanlabilecek ksa yazlar mmkn olduunca hzla retmek ynnde daimi bask altnda. Oturup biriyle saatlerce konuacak ve sadece belli bir insann hikyesini anlatmakla kalmayp, yaad topluma dair paha biilmez bir kavray da sunan portreler retecek vakti pek bulamyorlar. Bu yzden Hollandal gazetecilerin 1 Ocak'ta yeni yl armaan mahiyetinde balatt yeni giriimi duyunca ok heyecanlandm. One11.nl adl (ne yazk ki sadece Hollandaca yayn yapan) bir internet sitesi bu ve her gn anlatacak hikyesi olan bir insana dair yeni bir yaz sunuluyor. Kar karya kald devasa sorunlar karsnda pes etmeyen ve genellikle ok zor artlar altnda ayaa kalkp daha byk aclar nlemeye veya trajik olaylarn kurbanlarna yardm etmeye gnll olan insanlar bunlar. zetle: onlar birer kahraman. Bu, btn hikyelerin mutlu sonla biten ve kahramann her daim galebe ald u bildik 'pembe haberler'e tekabl ettii anlamna gelmiyor. Kukulara ve stesinden her zaman gelinemeyen sorunlara da tank oluyoruz. nsanlarn ufukta en ufak bir zm grnmediinde bile devam edecek gc nasl olup da bulduunu merak ediyorsunuz bazen. ki rnek vermek isterim. u ana kadarki en popler hikye inli bir adamla ilgili. Ad Chen Si, insanlarn intihar etmesini nlemeye alyor. Bu amala, her yl yzlerce inlinin mutsuz hayatlarn sona erdirmek iin kulland Nanjing'deki byk bir kprnn zerinde aracyla bir aa bir yukar gidip geliyor. Kprden atlamak zere olan birini grdnde derhal oraya yneliyor ve onu engellemeye alyor. Chen Si, btn parasn kaybettikten sonra umutsuzlua kaplan gen bir kz kurtard 2003'ten bu yana yaklak 200 kiiyi hayatn srdrmeye ikna etmeyi baarm. ok sayda vatandann hzla deien in ekonomisi ve toplumunun yol at basklar altnda hayattan umudu kesmesini kabul etmeyi istemeyen bir adamn yrek burkan hikyesi. Hollandal bir muhabir kefedene ve portresini One11.nl'ye gnderene dek bihaber olduumuz, isimsiz bir kahraman. Banliyler olara da anlan Paris'in varolarndaki problemler ou Avrupal tarafndan yakinen bilinir. 2005 ylnda polisler tarafndan kovalanrken iki gencin ldrlmesi Kuzey Afrika kkenli gen gmenlerle polis arasnda byk atmalarn ba gstermesine sebep olmutu. Clichy-sous-Bois blgesinde, olaylar rndan kma noktasna gelmiti. Sonra, Mehdi Bigaderne devreye girdi. Mehdi orada bym, hl orada yaamaktayd ve olaylar srasnda genleri okulda tutmaya ve bir meslek sahibi olmalarna yardmc olmaya alyordu. Fransz yetkilileri tarafndan uygulanan rk ve ayrmc yaklamlar, kt yerleim artlar ve uyuturucu ticaretinden kaynaklanan su oranyla ilgili kzgnlklarn tmyle anlyordu. Bununla birlikte, okullar atee vermenin bu genlere herhangi bir fayda getirmeyeceinin de farkndayd. Genleri, bir sre oturup uzun vadede kendileri iin neyin faydal olacan dnmeye davet etti. iddet azald ve herkes tarafndan Mehdi'nin bu sreteki rol takdirle karland. Baz eyleri temelden deitirmek iin politikaya girmeye karar verdi ve 2 yldr Clichy-sousBois'da yerel ynetimde grev yapyor. Peki, bu srete iyi ynde bir deiiklik oldu mu? Hayr. Mehdi'nin gmenlerin yaam artlarn iyiletirme abalar yle hemen sonu verecek cinsten deil. Fakat, yine de Mehdi aralar atee vermenin kimseye bir fayda getirmeyeceini dnyor ve ona gre toplumun her kademesinde yer alarak, gmenler yava da olsa bir deiim gerekletirecekler. Farkl medya kurulularndan Trk gazetecilerin de bir araya gelip, mesela One12.tr diye benzer bir internet sitesi gelitirmesi ve bildik karamsarlktan ve yzeysel haberlerden rahatsz olup gna getiren Trk okurlara kendi kahramanlarn takdim etmesi ho olmaz myd?

A bridge too far A few days ago it was announced that soon, probably in February, the decision will be taken on which company is going to build Istanbuls third bridge over the Bosporus that will connect Sariyers Garipce village on the European side with Beykozs Poyrazky neighborhood on the Asian side. Despite all the protests and all the good arguments made against the construction of this bridge, the project seems

unstoppable. Or will the so-called environmental impact assessment eventually show that those urban development experts are right who claim that the bridge will create an environmental disaster and will only worsen the citys already enormous traffic problems? I am afraid it wont. The company that wins the tender will have to ask another specialized company, licensed by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, to make such an assessment. This assessment should make clear what the impact of building the bridge will be on the forestlands, the water resources and the agricultural lands in the north of the city. The ministry will check whether the assessment is correct and reliable and, most importantly, of course, will have to judge the overall environmental consequences that the report will map. If that evaluation is positive, the final green light for the start of construction will be given. In theory, an assessment can be a powerful tool in the hands of alarmed environmentalists. They can influence its content by coming up with data and projections that underpin their concerns. If those objections are contained in the final assessment, the assessment can be used to show to the ministry that the risks are simply too high and the project should be changed or abandoned. In practice, this hardly ever happens. Why would a company that is dependant on the ministry for its license go against the same ministry that has worked so hard to get this bridge built? Is it realistic to expect that such a huge and prestigious plan -- estimated costs around TL 9 billion and strongly supported by the prime minister -- will be stopped because some engineers come up with new arguments? I guess you know the answer. To be fair, this is not only a problem in Turkey. In all European countries, detailed and well-developed laws exist that force authorities to have an assessment before starting major infrastructural work. In 99 percent of all assessments, the outcome confirms the calculations of the initiators and the project goes ahead, confirming the suspicions of many citizens that, in the end, environmental concerns will always be overruled by commercial and political interests. Sometimes though, wellorganized and informed citizens manage to push for important changes in the plans that will benefit the natural environment or will reduce the negative effects for the affected neighborhoods. The likelihood of such a positive effect in Turkey is small, for two main reasons. Firstly, one of the major flaws of the present Turkish legislation is the lack of public consultation. Despite years of preparation in the case of the bridge, people whose lives will be seriously affected have not been involved or informed at all. This makes it very hard, of course, to organize a successful and timely campaign to challenge such plans. Secondly, although street protests have been organized and many specialists have spoken out against the proposals of the government, the impact is limited. There has been media attention, but no major newspaper or TV channel has made it a priority to put continuous pressure on the local and national authorities to reconsider their ideas. Despite the presence of some opposition politicians at the protest meetings, nongovernmental organizations and citizens initiatives seem unable to convince the major opposition parties to unite against the present plans and make it an election issue. That is a huge missed opportunity because millions of Istanbul inhabitants will be confronted with the negative consequences of a project that will seriously damage large parts of the citys remaining green zone, will negatively affect the quality of life in several neighborhoods, will not resolve the traffic jams on the other Bosporus bridges and will make no contribution to the

modern public transportation system that the city needs so badly. Orada bir kpr var uzakta Birka gn nce, ksa sre sonra, muhtemelen ubat aynda, Saryer'in Avrupa yakasndaki Garipe kyn Beykoz'un Asya yakasndaki Poyrazky semtine balayacak nc Boaz kprsn hangi firmann yapacana dair kararn alnaca akland. Bu kprnn yaplmas aleyhindeki onca protestoya ve ortaya konulan onca kuvvetli argmana ramen proje durdurulamaz grnyor. Peki evresel Etki Deerlendirmesi (ED) sonucunda, kprnn evre felaketine yol aacan ve kentin zaten muazzam boyuttaki trafik sorunlarn ktletirmekten baka ie yaramayacan iddia eden kentsel geliim uzmanlarnn hakl bulunma ihtimali var m? Korkarm ki yok. haleyi kazanan irket, evre ve Orman Bakanl'ndan (OB) ruhsatl bir baka uzman irketten byle bir ED yapmasn istemek durumunda olacak. Mevzubahis deerlendirme, kprnn inasnn kentin kuzeyindeki orman alanlarna, su kaynaklarna ve tarm arazilerine etkisinin ne olacan aka ortaya koymak zorunda. OB, bunun ardndan deerlendirmenin doru ve gvenilir olup olmadn kontrol edecek ve elbette en nemlisi, raporda bahsi geen evresel sonularn tamam zerinde bir hkme varacak. Sonu olumlu olduu takdirde, inaatn balamasna nihai yeil k yaklacak. Teoride ED, kayg duyan evrecilerin elinde gl bir ara olabilir. Kayglarn destekleyen veriler ve tahminler sunarak ieriine etki edebilirler. Eer bu itirazlar nihai deerlendirmeye dahil edilirse ED, bakanla risklerin ziyadesiyle yksek olduunu ve projenin deitirilmesi veya iptal edilmesi gerektiini gstermek iin kullanlabilir. Lakin pratikte pek de byle olmuyor. Ruhsat almak konusunda OB'a baml olan bir irket, bu kprnn yaplmas iin sk mesai harcayan ayn bakanlkla niye ters dsn ki? Byle devasa ve prestijli bir plann (tahmini maliyeti 9 milyar lira ve Babakan tarafndan da kuvvetle destekleniyor), baz mhendisler yeni argmanlar ne srd diye durdurulacan beklemek gereki mi? Sanrm cevab siz de biliyorsunuz. Dorusunu isterseniz bu sorun Trkiye'ye mahsus deil. Btn Avrupa lkelerinde resm makamlarn byk altyap projelerine balamadan nce ED yaptrmasn mecbur klan ayrntl ve gelikin yasalar var. Btn deerlendirmelerin yzde 99'u neticede proje sahiplerinin hesaplarn teyit ediyor ve mesai balyor; bu da evresel kayglarn eninde sonunda ticari ve siyasi karlar tarafndan daima bertaraf edileceine dair kukular besleyen birok vatanda hakl karan bir manzara. Ancak bazen iyi rgtlenmi ve bilgilenmi vatandalar planlarda, doal evreye fayda salayacak veya yakn blgeler zerindeki olumsuz etkileri azaltacak nemli deiiklikler yaptrmay baaryor. Trkiye'de byle olumlu bir etkide bulunma ihtimali zayf; bunun balca iki sebebi var. lki u: Trkiye'deki mevcut yasalarn en nemli kusurlarndan biri kamuoyuyla istiareden yoksun olmas. Kpr rneinde, yllardr hazrlk yaplmasna ramen, hayatlar ciddi ekilde etkilenecek insanlar srece hi dahil edilmedi veya bilgilendirilmedi. Bu da elbette bu tr planlar aleyhinde baarl ve zamannda bir kampanya rgtlemeyi olduka zorlatryor. kinci sebep: Sokak protestolar rgtlenmesine ve birok uzmann hkmetin nerileri aleyhinde konumasna ramen etkisi ok snrl kalyor. Medyann konuya ilgisi var, fakat hibir byk gazete veya televizyon kanal, fikirlerini tekrar gzden geirmeleri iin yerel ve ulusal makamlar zerinde srekli bask kurmay ncelikleri arasnda grmyor. Protesto gsterilerine baz muhalif siyasetiler katlyor olsa da, sivil toplum rgtleri ve vatanda inisiyatifleri byk muhalefet partilerini mevcut planlara kar birlemeye ve konuyu seimlerde gndeme getirmeye ikna edemiyor gibi grnyor. Karlan muazzam bir frsat bu, zira milyonlarca stanbullu kentin kalan yeil alanlarnn geni kesimlerine ciddi zarar verecek, eitli semtlerdeki hayat kalitesini olumsuz etkileyecek, dier Boaz kprlerindeki trafik skkl sorununu zmeyecek ve kentin fazlasyla ihtiya duyduu modern toplu ulam sistemine hibir katk salamayacak bir projenin olumsuz sonularyla kar karya braklacak.

Looking back This is that time of year when all around the world people start to look back at the events of 2010 that made it to the headlines. In the Netherlands, all major newspapers have done their utmost to select key personalities and interview them, and TV channels are offering programs that show all the highlights one more time.

Not surprisingly, the World Cup in South Africa is omnipresent. The Dutch team did not impress many foreigners but created a lot of enthusiasm at home and made it to the finals. According to one article full of melancholy, Holland was a champion for a brief five seconds during the 62nd minute of the game when Arjen Robben ran at Spanish keeper Iker Casillas and had the perfect chance to score 1-0. He did not, and Spain won the title in extra time. It left many Dutch fans frustrated but now, with some more distance in between, most analysts agree that the Netherlands did not deserve to win anyway. Looking back at more serious matters, there are two developments that stand out. One is the fight in the EU to save the euro. It is a deeply unsettling issue for most Europeans because it touches on two of the biggest fears among many citizens. They are afraid of the economic and political consequences if the euro does not make it. Specialists agree that, most probably, the common currency will survive. Still, even the remote chance of failure disturbs many. A euro meltdown would create enormous economic and financial problems for all European countries, including those, such as the UK, that are not part of it. On top of that, it might be the beginning of the end of the whole EU project. Even many EU critics get extremely uncomfortable with that prospect because nobody knows what renationalizing currencies and policies would lead to. On the other hand, the only way out of the euro crisis, most pundits agree, is a further strengthening of economic and fiscal cooperation and coordination in Europe. To prevent the present problems from continuing and new ones arising, national governments have to give up some of their budgetary sovereignty. If they fail to do so or violate the new rules, they will be punished by their fellow member states. That is not a very popular way forward. Most leaders seem to realize that there is no other solution available. But especially in member states that are doing relatively well now, like Germany and the Netherlands, many citizens still have a hard time accepting that the central authorities in Brussels will have a growing influence on their future incomes and pensions and that, if other countries fail to live up to the new standards, it will be they who will have to pick up the bill. The second development that worries many Dutch people is the growing presence and influence of the extreme right. As you probably remember, the Freedom Party of anti-Islam maverick Geert Wilders did very well in the June national elections. Because other options failed, the country ended up having a minority government of Liberals and Christian Democrats, supported in parliament by Wilders populists. After four months, it is clear that Wilders has become the key player in Dutch politics. Although his party has no ministers, all major decisions can only be taken when and if he agrees. The two governing parties hope to wear him out and make him responsible for unpopular budget cuts that will soon be felt by many of his voters as well. The regional elections in March will be the first opportunity to see whether this strategy works. Because the regional parliaments elect the members of the Senate, these elections are of crucial importance for the ruling coalition. If they dont get a majority in the Senate, it will be impossible to implement most of the legislation that is needed to satisfy Wilders desire to push back migration and make life more difficult for migrants already living in the Netherlands. The opposition parties are considering their options to bring down the government as soon as possible. Because looking back also means trying to learn from the mistakes of 2010 and use the new opportunities of 2011. Geriye dnp bakmak Bugnlerde dnyann her tarafnda 2010'un manetleri ssleyen olaylar hatrlanp gzden geiriliyor. Hollanda'da btn byk gazeteler yln nemli ahsiyetlerini seip onlarla rportaj yapmak iin var gcyle abalyor. Herkesin en gzde konusu haliyle Gney Afrika'daki Dnya Kupas. Hollanda takm oynad futbolla birok yabancya pek keyif vermedi; fakat lkesinde epey heyecan oluturdu ve finale kadar kt. Melankoliyle dolu bir yazya gre, final mann 62. dakikasnda spanyol kalecisi Iker Casillas'la kar karya kalan Arjen Robben o be saniye iinde yzde yzlk gol

pozisyonunu deerlendirip skoru 1-0'a getirseydi Hollanda ampiyon bile olurdu. Fakat yapamad ve spanya kupay uzatma blmnde kazand. Biti ddnn almas birok Hollandal taraftar iin hsran demekti; fakat imdi, aradan belli bir zaman geince, analizcilerin ou Hollanda'nn kupay hak etmediinde hemfikir. Daha ciddi yl deerlendirmelerinde iki gelime ne kyor. Biri AB iindeki Euro'yu kurtarma mcadelesi. Avrupallarn byk ksm iin bu, son derece huzursuz edici bir mesele, zira birok vatandan en byk korkularnn ikisine dokunuyor. Euro'nun baarl olmamas halinde bunun ekonomik ve siyasi sonularndan korkuyorlar. Uzmanlar ortak para biriminin ok byk ihtimalle ayakta kalaca kanaatinde. Yine de en ufak bir baarszlk ihtimali bile biroklarn tedirgin ediyor. Euro'nun k, ona dahil olmayan Britanya gibiler de dahil, btn Avrupa lkeleri iin muazzam ekonomik ve finansal sorunlara yol aacaktr. Daha nemlisi, bir btn olarak AB projesi iin sonun balangc olabilir. AB'ye kar olan birok evre bile bu ihtimalden ziyadesiyle rahatsz, zira para birimlerini ve politikalarn yeniden milliletirmenin neye yol aacan kimse bilmiyor. Dier taraftan, yorumcularn ou Euro krizinden tek k yolunun Avrupa dahilindeki ekonomik ve mali ibirliini ve koordinasyonu daha da glendirmek olduunda hemfikir. Mevcut sorunlarn devamn ve yenilerinin ortaya kmasn nlemek iin ulusal hkmetlerin bteyle ilgili egemenliklerinin bir ksmndan feragat etmesi gerekecek. Bunu yapmay baaramamalar veya yeni kurallar ihlal etmeleri halinde, dier ye devletler tarafndan cezalandrlacaklar. Pek popler bir yol deil. ou lider baka bir zmn mmkn olmadn idrak etmi grnyor. Fakat bilhassa Almanya ve Hollanda gibi u an nispeten iyi giden ye lkelerde birok vatanda Brksel'deki merkezi makamlarn mstakbel gelirleri ve emeklilikleri zerindeki nfuzunun artacak olmasn kabul etmekte hl zorlanyor; dier lkelerin yeni standartlar hayata geirememesi halinde faturay kendilerinin demek zorunda kalmasndan kayg duyuyor. Birok Hollandaly endieye sevk eden ikinci gelime ar san artan varl ve etkisi. Muhtemelen hatrlayacanz zere, slam kart asi siyaseti Geert Wilders'n zgrlk Partisi hazirandaki genel seimlerde nemli bir baar elde etti. Dier seenekler baarsz olduu iin sonunda Liberaller ve Hristiyan Demokratlar arasnda, Wilders'n poplistlerinin dardan destek verdii bir aznlk hkmeti kuruldu. Aradan drt ay gemiken Wilders'n Hollanda siyasetinde kilit bir aktr haline geldii aikr. Partisine verilen bakanlk olmamasna ramen, btn nemli kararlar ancak o tamam dediinde ve derse alnabiliyor. ktidardaki iki parti Wilders' ypratmay ve halkn hazzetmedii ve ksa sre sonra Wilders'n birok semeni tarafndan da hissedilir hale gelecek olan bte kesintilerinden sorumlu tutmay umut ediyor. Marttaki yerel seimler, bu stratejinin ie yarayp yaramadnn grlecei ilk snav olacak. Senato yelerini blgesel parlamentolar setiinden bu seimler koalisyon hkmeti asndan hayati nem tayor. Senato'da ounluk elde edemezlerse, Wilders'n g geriletme ve halen Hollanda'da yaayan gmenler iin hayat daha da zorlatrma isteini karlamak iin gereken yasalarn ounu uygulamak imknsz hale gelecek. Muhalefet partileri hkmeti mmkn olan en ksa zamanda drmek iin nlerindeki seenekleri gzden geiriyor. Zira geriye dnp bakmak 2010'un hatalarndan ders karmaya almak ve 2011'in getirdii yeri frsatlar kullanmak anlamna da geliyor. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

The Christmas feeling It is strange to realize that today is an ordinary Sunday in Turkey, be it the last one of 2010, while in the rest of Europe it is the second day of Christmas, a special day for everybody. It is one of those differences that you hardly think about until, like me, you are travelling between both worlds. Living and working in Turkey but with strong roots and family ties in the Netherlands. It was funny to hear my Turkish barber in Taksim wish me a Merry Christmas last week when I went there for a final hair cut. I am sure he wanted to be kind to me, but for him Christmas is an event taking place in another part of the world that he only knows about through famous songs from classic American movies and the images of big decorated Christmas trees. As most Turks, he does not have, how could he, the special Christmas feeling that most Europeans and -- for that matter -- most Americans and Canadians have. When I grew up in the 60s, Christmas was still very much related to religion. Dec. 25 was the actual birthday of Jesus Christ, the central figure of Christianity. As a family, we went to church on Christmas Eve and sang the hymns that celebrate that crucial event in the history of the religion that my parents felt strongly attached to. Even after 45 years, I can still remember most of those powerful songs about a small child that was born to save me and all the other Christians. It gave you a good

feeling to belong to that community of churchgoers because the mass was combined with the towering presence, all around, of all kind of symbols that came with the event: trees full of lights, cribs with the small Jesus and his parents, green branches, bells and some small presents. It was only later that I understood that on Dec. 25 and 26 Christians have incorporated in their celebrations many customs and practices that have nothing to do with their religion. Trees, evergreen boughs, lights to mark the start of longer days in the midst of winter, they were all part of pagan traditions, predating Christianity, that were cleverly taken on board to create an overwhelming feeling of new life being created in the middle of darkness and you being part of that unfolding story of salvation. When I write these words, melancholy and nostalgia dominate. For me personally, this is history, still able to create beautiful memories. But it is over. I do not go to church anymore and, on a more fundamental level, I do not believe any longer that religion, be it Christianity or another faith, has convincing answers to the questions that are important to me nowadays. But the Christmas feeling never disappeared. Being in the Netherlands now, I still enjoy the lights, the trees and the modern versions of the old religious songs. But what is more important these days is the getting together with family and friends, eating, talking and discussing the year that is almost over and the one that is yet to come. Despite the commercialization of Christmas over the last 50 years and the fact that today for many Europeans having Christmas means consuming as much as possible, these precious moments of contemplation have survived and are important for many, whether they are believers or non-believers. I guess the best comparison is with Ramadan Bayram in the Muslim world. A moment to sit and eat together with your loved ones, at best a moment of self reflection. Special for pious Muslims but recognized as a distinct moment by people who have no or only weak religious feelings. These are the kind of occasions that every civilization has created to underline community spirit and stimulate reflection. They have become rare in modern societies where individualization and growing skepticism about sharing common goals have undermined these traditions and have created the impression that one can do without. Christmas in the Netherlands, Bayram in Turkey. I am happy to participate in both. To cherish the good memories and make new plans for the future. Noel duygusu Bugnn Trkiye'de sradan bir pazar olduunu fark etmek tuhaf. 2010'un son pazar olmas dnda bir zellii yok, oysa Avrupa'nn geri kalannda Noel'in ikinci gn, yani herkes iin zel bir gn. Benim gibi iki dnya arasnda mekik dokumuyorsanz, bu gibi farkllklarn ayrmna pek varmyorsunuz. Trkiye'de yayorum ve alyorum, fakat Hollanda'da da kuvvetli kklerim ve aile balarm var. Geen hafta sa tra iin gittiim Taksim'deki berberimin, bana 'Hayrl Noeller' dilediini duymak pek hotu. Bana nezaket gstermek istediinden eminim, fakat onun iin Noel dnyann baka bir kesinde vuku bulan ve sadece klasik Amerikan filmlerindeki mehur arklardan ve sslenmi byk Noel aalarndan bildii bir olay. Trklerin byk ksm gibi berberimin de Avrupallarn, keza Amerikallarla Kanadallarn ounluunun hissettii trden zel bir Noel duygusu yok, zaten olmasn da bekleyemezsiniz. Altmlarda byme amdayken Noel hl dinle epey balantl bir olayd. 25 Aralk, Hristiyanln merkezindeki figr olan Hazreti sa'nn gerek doum gnyd. Ailecek Noel arefesinde kiliseye gider ve ebeveynlerimin gl bir aidiyet duyduu dinin tarihindeki bu hayati nemde olay kutlamak iin ilahiler sylerdik. 45 yl sonra bile, beni ve dier btn Hristiyanlar korumak iin domu kk bir ocukla ilgili o kuvvetli arklarn ounu hl hatrlayabiliyorum. Kiliseye giden o cemaate ait olmak size gzel bir duygu verirdi, zira ayine Noel'le ilgili her tr simgenin drt bir taraftaki ulvi varl elik ederdi: Iklarla

dolu aalar, ocuk sa'nn yatt beik ve evresinde anne-babas, yeil dallar, anlar ve baz kk armaanlar. Hristiyanlarn 25 ve 26 Aralk'taki kutlamalarnda dinleriyle ilgisi olmayan birok gelenei ve pratii birbirine baladn ancak ok sonralar idrak ettim. Aalar, her daim yeil dallar, kn ortasnda gnlerin uzamaya baladn gsteren klar... Bunlarn hepsinde Hristiyanlk ncesine ait pagan geleneklerinin gl izleri vard ve karanln ortasnda yepyeni bir hayatn doduuna ve sizin de zuhur eden bu kurtulu hikyesinin paras olduunuza dair sarsc bir duygu yaratmak iin zekice iin iine katlmlard. Bu satrlar yazarken melankoli ve nostalji arln hissettiriyor. ahsen benim iin bu, hl gzel hatralar akla getirebilen bir mazi. Fakat o gnler geride kald. Artk kiliseye gitmiyorum ve daha temel dzeyde, ister Hristiyanlk ister baka bir inan olsun, dinin bugn benim iin nemli olan sorulara ikna edici cevaplar olduuna artk inanmyorum. Fakat Noel duygusu hi kaybolmuyor. u an Hollanda'daym ve klardan, aalardan ve eski din arklarn modern versiyonlarndan hl keyif alyorum. Ama u gnlerde daha da nemli olan ey, aileyle ve dostlarla bir araya gelmek, yiyip imek, gitmekle ve gelmekte olan yl konuup tartmak. Son 50 yldr Noel'in ticariletirilmesine ve bugn birok Avrupal iin Noel'in mmkn olduunca fazla tketmek anlam tamasna ramen o paha biilmez tefekkr anlar hl varln srdryor ve ister inansn ister inanmasn, birok insan iin nem tayor. Bence Noel en iyi Mslman dnyasnn Ramazan Bayram'yla kyaslanabilir. Birlikte oturup sevdiklerinizle yiyip ime vakti; insann kendi iinde derin dncelere dalmas iin en uygun vakit. nanl Mslmanlar iin zel, fakat din duygularla hi ba kurmam veya ok zayf ba olan insanlar tarafndan da farkl bir vakit olarak grlyor. Bunlar, her uygarln topluluk ruhunu vurgulamak ve tefekkr tevik etmek iin yaratt vesileler. Bireysellemenin ve ortak hedeflere ynelik artan pheciliin bu gelenekleri zayflatt ve insann bunlarsz da yaayabilecei izlenimini yaratt modern toplumlarda bu vesileler giderek seyrekleiyor. Hollanda'da Noel, Trkiye'de Bayram. Her ikisinin de paras olmaktan ok mutluyum. Gzel hatralar sevgiyle yd etmek ve gelecee dair yeni planlar yapmak iin. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Two languages, multiple misunderstandings It is a clich to say that in Turkey huge differences exist between big cities in the west of the country and small villages in the east. Or to observe that in all parts of the country, the gap between the rich and the poor is enormous. On some issues, though, the country as a whole seems to be isolated from developments in the rest of the world: stuck in a rigid mindset or in a particular way of organizing the state; not able and not willing to learn from experiences abroad or to listen to reasonable advice at home. The most obvious example of such a narrow-minded attitude is the current debate on the use of the Kurdish language. Last week, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Co-Chairman Selahattin Demirta opened a new round of discussions when he announced that two languages, Turkish and Kurdish, should and will be used more and more in all aspects of life in the Southeast of the country. The examples he gave were bilingual signboards, shop owners giving Kurdish names to their shops and the restoration of Kurdish names to villages and neighborhoods. Many ruling party representatives felt the need to react immediately and condemn what they labeled as provocation. The army suddenly woke up from a deep sleep and announced that they would never accept the destruction of some of the foundations of the republic. Republican Peoples Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kilidarolu took the safe road and did not express himself at all on this issue at his party congress. These kinds of reactions make you wonder in which day and age we are living in Turkey. I had to think of a trip I made a couple of years ago to the south of Kosovo, a country recovering from a bloody ethnic war between Serbs and Albanians. We went to Prizren, a city where over the centuries different groups had lived together peacefully -- Serbs, Albanians, Turks

and Roma -- even after so many years of fighting in the rest of the country. I was totally surprised to see signposts in four, yes four, languages. We visited a studio where news items were recorded in several languages. When I asked people how this was possible, they looked at me with surprise, as if to say -- if people want to speak their own language, why not? Of course, most Prizren inhabitants spoke Albanian, the majority tongue. But next to that, other languages were spoken and visible. No problem. If tiny, war-torn and unstable Kosovo can accept this linguistic diversity, why is it that big, strong and relatively peaceful Turkey cannot even think in that direction? My guess is that eventually Kurdish signposts and village names will be accepted by most Turks. After years of heated debate, it will probably just be implemented without major repercussions. Look at what happened with the headscarf at universities. The major stumbling block will remain education in Kurdish. There, the best way out of the present stalemate is to bypass the extremes. One is the traditional position not to allow any teaching of Kurdish in public schools. The other, as a reaction, is to fully replace Turkish by Kurdish in majority Kurdish areas. Neither option is realistic and both conflict with all available examples abroad and reasonable suggestions by Turkish experts. There are many different models of bilingual education in the world. In some models, two languages are developed equally and some classes are offered in one language, others in the second language. In other models, a transitional program is used based on the language the child knows best in the first class. The important thing now is not to decide on a fixed model for Turkey right away. That can differ, even from one region to another. First, a well-informed national debate is needed and then a decision on the basic demands that all models have to comply with. For instance: All students in Turkey should learn Turkish, but some can learn a second language. It would show that Turkey as a whole is no longer lagging behind and has accepted the fact that diversity, when managed well, is an asset and not a threat. ki dil, ok yanl anlama Trkiye'de baz klieler var: Mesela batdaki byk ehirlerle doudaki kk kyler arasnda muazzam farkllklar olduunu sylemek gibi. Ya da lkenin btn blgelerinde zenginlerle yoksullar arasnda derin bir uurum olduu gzleminde bulunmak gibi. Lakin baz meselelerde lke bir btn olarak dnyann geri kalanndaki gelimelerden yaltlm grnyor. Kat bir zihniyete veya devleti rgtlemenin belli bir ekline saplanp kalm izlenimi veriyor. Dardaki tecrbelerden ders karmay ya da lke iindeki mantkl tavsiyelere kulak vermeyi beceremiyor ve istemiyor. Bu dar grl yaklamn en bariz rnei, Krtenin kullanmna dair sregiden tartma. Geen hafta BDP Ebakan Selahattin Demirta, iki dilin, yani Trke ve Krtenin lkenin gneydousunda hayatn her alannda ok daha fazla kullanlmas gerektiini ve kullanlacan syleyerek yeni bir tartma balatt. Verdii rnekler arasnda iki dilli tabelalar, dkknlarna Krte isimler veren esnaflar ve kylerle mahallelere Krte isimlerinin iadesi gibi hususlar vard. ktidar partisinin birok temsilcisi derhal tepki gsterme lzumu hissetti ve sylenenleri 'kkrtma' diye niteleyerek knad. Ordu da aniden derin uykusundan uyand ve cumhuriyetin baz temellerinin yklmasn asla kabul etmeyeceini aklad. CHP lideri Kldarolu ise emniyet eridinden gitmeyi tercih etti ve partisinin kurultaynda bu konuda hibir fikir beyan etmedi.

Bu tr tepkiler, Trkiye'de hangi ada yaadmz merak etmenize yol ayor. Birka yl nce Kosova'nn gneyine yaptm bir seyahati hatrlamadan edemedim. Srplarla Arnavutlar arasndaki kanl i savan yaralarn sarmakta olan bir lke Kosova. Asrlardr farkl gruplarn (Srplar, Arnavutlar, Trkler ve Romanlar) bar iinde bir arada yaad bir kent olan Prizren'e gittik. lkenin geri kalannda yllarca yaanan savatan sonra bile durum byleydi. Tabelalarn drt dilde, evet, drt dilde yazldn grdmde ok armtm. Sunulacak haberlerin eitli dillerde kaydedildii bir stdyoyu ziyaret ettik. Oradakilere bunun nasl mmkn olduunu sorduumda, bana hayretle baktlar. nsanlarn kendi dillerini konumak istemelerinde alacak ne vard ki? Elbette Prizren'de yaayanlarn byk ksm, ounluun dili olan Arnavutay konuuyordu. Fakat bunun yannda dier diller de hissedilir ekilde kullanlyordu. Sorun yoktu yani. Kk, sava yorgunu ve istikrarsz Kosova bu dilsel eitlilii benimseyebiliyorsa, byk, gl ve nispeten huzurlu Trkiye niye bu ynde dnmeyi bile baaramyor? Tahminim o ki en nihayetinde Krte tabelalar ve ky isimleri Trklerin byk ounluu tarafndan kabul edilecek. Hararetli tartmalarla geen yllarn ardndan, muhtemelen byk yaygaralar kopmakszn ylece uygulamaya konuverecek. niversitelerde barts meselesiyle ilgili ne olduuna bakn. Asl byk engel Krte eitim olmaya devam edecek. Bu noktada mevcut tkanmay amann en iyi yolu, ular baypas etmek. Bir uta, devlet okullarnda Krte eitime klliyen kar kan geleneksel tutum var. Dier uta ise, buna tepki mahiyetinde, Krt ounluklu blgelerde Trkenin yerini tmyle Krtenin almas talebi. ki seenek de gereki deil ve dardaki btn bilinen rneklerle ve Trk uzmanlarn mantkl nerileriyle eliki arz ediyor. Dnyada iki dilli eitimin birok farkl modeli var. Baz modellerde iki dil eit ekilde gelitiriliyor ve belli snflar tek dilde, dierleri ise iki dilde eitim veriyor. Baz modellerde de birinci snfta ocuun en iyi bildii dile dayanan bir gei program kullanlyor. Bugn mhim olan ey, Trkiye iin alelacele kark bir modele karar vermemek. Bu, bir blgeden dier blgeye bile farkllk gsterebilir. Yaplmas gereken ey, ilk nce bilgiye dayal bir ulusal tartma yrtmek ve sonrasnda btn modellerle badamas gereken temel taleplere dair bir karara varmak. Szgelimi: Trkiye'deki btn renciler Trke rensin, fakat bazlar bir ikinci dil de renebilsin. Bu, Trkiye'nin bir btn olarak artk geriden gelmediini ve iyi ynetildiinde, eitliliin tehdit deil zenginlik olduu gereini kabul ettiini gsterecektir. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Both EU and Turkey to blame for slowdown It almost went unnoticed. Last week, the EU foreign ministers made their annual evaluation of the ongoing enlargement process. Turkey was praised for the adoption of the constitutional reform package on Sept. 12, and the ministers offered to intensify the existing dialogue between the EU and Turkey on foreign policy issues of mutual interest such as the Balkans and the Middle East. Not surprisingly, the EU again expressed its disappointment with the refusal of Turkey to open its ports and harbors to Cypriot ships and airplanes and called upon Ankara to actively support the present negotiations. For reasons unclear to me, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said it was unhappy with the Cyprus-related criticism although the wording of the EU declaration on this issue is in line with all previous statements of the union. And that was it. No fuss, no angry comments in the Turkish press, about the fact that for the first time since the start of the negotiations in 2005, no new chapter was opened. The reasons for this lack of excitement are obvious. Most media have given up and no longer closely follow the accession process. The negotiations between Turkish civil servants and European bureaucrats on adapting Turkish legislation to European laws and regulations were never a very sexy subject to cover. They are technical and complicated, hard to follow for both journalists and citizens. But at least the opening every six months of one or two new chapters on issues like food safety and environment was presented as another small but symbolic step on the long road to EU membership. Does nobody care anymore when this slow process seems to have come to a total halt? I guess most Turks feel that it does not make a difference, anyway. Why bother about details such as opening new chapters when the bigger picture of future EU accession

has become so blurred? On top of that, everybody in Turkey seems to be convinced that, in the event of problems during the negotiations, it must be the EU that is creating them. Let me explain to you why this attitude is both incorrect and unhelpful. Yes, it is true that half of the chapters that should be negotiated are blocked by the EU, France and Cyprus. The two individual member states especially should be criticized for their obstructionism because it is based purely on political arguments and domestic calculations, undermining the credibility and predictability of the whole enlargement process. But Paris and Nicosia cannot be blamed for the present stalemate -Ankara should be. For a long time, the Turkish government knew what to do if they wanted to start negotiations on the remaining three chapters on competition policy, social policy and public procurement. Up until now, they were simply not willing to. And the reasons for that unwillingness are highly political. In order to open the chapter on competition, Turkey has to have its policy on state aid in place. In general, in order not to distort fair competition, the EU is not very keen on member states giving money to companies. There are strict rules on when and how to do that. In many respects, the same applies to public procurement, the rules and procedures used to determine which companies get the assignments to build roads, bridges and other public works. We are talking about billons of lira here that, for the moment, are distributed by the government in a fairly opaque way, allowing for friendly gestures to pro-government businesses. Like all previous administrations did before the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power. It is not in the interest of any ruling party to create more transparency here, certainly not in the run-up to elections. Therefore, I do not expect the government to be very active in the short term in complying with EU demands on clear rules and their fair application that would create a level playing field for all Turkish enterprises and value for money for Turkish taxpayers. The problem is that they can get away with it because of EU fatigue, a lack of informed public debate and the perception that the EU should be blamed for all delays. Yavalamann kabahati hem AB'de hem Trkiye'de Neredeyse kimsenin dikkatini ekmedi. Geen hafta AB dileri bakanlar devam eden genileme srecine dair yllk deerlendirme toplantsn yapt. Trkiye 12 Eyll'de anayasal reform paketinin kabul edilmesinden dolay methedildi ve bakanlar AB ile Trkiye arasnda Balkanlar ve Ortadou gibi ortak kara dayal d politika meselelerinde sregiden diyalou derinletirme nerisinde bulundu. Haliyle AB, Trkiye'nin havaalanlar ve limanlarn Kbrs uaklarna ve gemilerine amay kabul etmemesinden duyduu rahatszl bir kez daha ifade etti ve Ankara'ya mevcut mzakereleri faal ekilde destekleme arsnda bulundu. Bana anlalmaz gelen sebeplerden dolay Trk Dileri Bakanl, AB bildirgesinin slubu nceki aklamalardan farkl olmamasna ramen, Kbrs'la ilgili eletiriden memnuniyetsizliini dile getirdi. Ve mesele bu kadarla kald. Trk basnnda, 2005'te mzakerelerin balamasndan bu yana ilk kez hi yeni fasl almamas karsnda yaygara koparan, fkeli yorumlar denen kimse olmad. Bu heyecan noksanlnn sebepleri aikr. Medyann byk ksm pes etmi durumda ve artk mzakere srecini yakndan takip etmiyor. Trk memurlarla Avrupal brokratlar arasnda, Trkiye hukukunu Avrupa yasalar ve uygulamalarna adapte etmek ynnde yaplan mzakereler, zaten hibir zaman zerinde yazlp izilecek kadar cazip bir konu olmad. Teknik ve karmak meseleler bunlar, gerek gazeteciler gerek vatandalar iin takip etmesi hayli zor. Fakat en azndan alt ayda bir gda gvenlii ve evre gibi konularda birka yeni fasln almas AB yeliine giden uzun yolda ufak, ama sembolik bir yeni adm olarak sunulurdu. Bu yava ilerleyen sre tmyle durma noktasna gelmi gibi grnrken acaba artk kimse ne olup bittiini umursamyor mu? Sanrm Trklerin byk ounluu fark eden bir ey olmayacan dnyor. AB yeliinin geleceine dair byk resim bu kadar bulanklamken yeni fasllarn almas gibi ayrntlara kafa yormann ne lemi var?

Bunun da tesinde, grne gre Trkiye'de herkes, mzakerelerde ne zaman sorun ksa, msebbibi mutlaka AB'dir diye dnyor. Bu yaklamn neden hem yanl hem de faydasz olduunu izah etmek isterim. Evet, mzakere edilmesi gereken fasllarn yarsnn AB, Fransa ve Kbrs tarafndan bloke edildii doru. Bilhassa ad geen iki ye lke engelleme politikasndan dolay eletirilmeli, zira tmyle siyasi argmanlara ve lke ii hesaplara dayanyorlar, bylece bir btn olarak genileme srecinin itibarna ve kestirilebilirliine zarar veriyorlar. Fakat mevcut tkanmadan Paris ve Lefkoa sorumlu tutulamaz. Bunun sorumlusu Ankara. Trk hkmeti rekabet politikas, sosyal politika ve kamu almlarna dair kalan fasl zerinde mzakereleri balatmak istedii takdirde ne yapmas gerektiini uzun zamandr biliyordu. Bugne kadar bu ynde gereken admlar atmaya hi yanamad. Ve bu gnlszln ardndaki sebepler byk oranda siyasi. Rekabet fasln amak iin Trkiye'nin kendi devlet yardm politikasn yerli yerine oturtmas gerekiyor. Genelde AB, adil rekabeti zedelememek iin ye lkelerin irketlere para vermesine pek iyi gzle bakmaz. Bunun ne zaman ve nasl yaplacana dair kat kurallar vardr. Birok bakmdan ayns kamu almlar iin; yollar yapmak, kprler ina etmek ve dier kamusal ileri kotarmak konusunda ihaleleri hangi irketlerin alacan belirlemekte kullanlan kurallar ve prosedrler iin de geerli. u anki hkmet ve AKP'den nceki btn iktidarlarn yapt gibi kendi yanda irketlere iltimas geilmesine imkan verebilecek ekilde bir sis perdesi ardnda datlan milyarlarca liralk bir sistemden sz ediyoruz. Bu noktada daha fazla effaflk oluturmak hibir iktidar partisinin karna deil, hele seimler yaklarken hi deil. Bu yzden hkmetin ksa vadede, btn Trk giriimleri iin adil bir yar ortam yaratacak ve vergi mkelleflerinin parasn hakkyla deerlendirecek daha sarih kurallar ve bu kurallarn adilane uygulanmas ynnde AB'den gelen taleplere icabet etmesini beklemiyorum. Sorun u ki, AB'nin bitkinliinden, kamuoyunda bilgiye dayal tartmann eksikliinden ve btn ertelemelerden AB'nin sulanmas gerektii algsndan dolay at alan skdar' geebilir. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Its the politics, stupid! Before the WikiLeaks bomb exploded, the Obama administration had started a well-organized campaign to tell the rest of the world that although appearances might be deceptive, its foreign policy is guided by good intentions. The leaked cables have made this tough job even more challenging, but it is still interesting to see which arguments are being used to show that Washington realizes it has a perception problem that needs be urgently tackled. In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, the worlds leading magazine on foreign policy, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote an article titled Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development. She makes the point that the US has to rethink, reform and recalibrate its foreign and development policy. Global problems such as violent extremism, climate change and poverty require effective international cooperation. In order to solve them, according to Clinton, someone has to take the lead and mobilize action. The US is that nation. But it can only be successful if it manages to engage key partners in the rest of the world and if global structures exist for addressing shared problems and discussing potential differences of opinion. In a crucial paragraph the American secretary of state outlines her strategic aim: Although traditional diplomacy will always be critical to advancing the United States agenda, it is not enough. The State Department must expand its engagement to reach and influence wider and more diverse groups using new skills, strategies and tools. To that end, the department is broadening the way it conceives of diplomacy as well as the roles and responsibilities of its practitioners. In other words American diplomats have to explain better, to a wider audience, that the US is interested in their opinions and is willing to listen and take them into account. In order to get there, Clinton did not just write a stimulating article; knowing that the biggest perception problem is between

the US and Muslim-majority countries around the world, a new initiative was set up: Partners for a New Beginning (PNB). It is meant as a follow-up to the June 2009 Cairo speech of President Obama in which he called for a new beginning between the US and Muslims around the world. This renewed engagement should be based on mutual respect and partnership not only with governments but with the private sector, civil society and citizens worldwide. The chair of the PNB is one of Clintons predecessors, Madeleine Albright. She was in stanbul this week to present the new group and to explain its goal of advancing economic opportunities, science and technology cooperation, and education and exchange between the US and key countries in the Muslim world. Rather intentionally, the PNB is starting in Turkey, but it will also be implemented in Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan and West Bank/Gaza. It is easy to be cynical about Clintons article and the PNB and portray it as doomed efforts to mend fences with parts of the world that have suffered or are still suffering from American foreign policy mistakes. I am convinced Clinton and Albright are sincere in their plans to repair some of the damages of the past. My problem with their plans is the big elephant in the room that is not talked about: current American policies. Of course, it is good to improve business to business contacts. I am myself a big supporter of exchange programs between American and Turkish universities, especially the ones in Anatolia. More journalists from both countries should be allowed to see how the system in the US works and why Turkish realities are more nuanced than the black-and-white picture often painted in the American media. Fine, lets organize it. But none of these efforts will bear fruit if the US does not change its policy in the Israel-Palestine conflict or if Turkey and the US keep arguing about Iran. The US does indeed need to reach out to Muslims around the world and show that confrontation will be replaced by cooperation in many fields of common interest. But there will only be a new beginning when the root causes of the present disenchantment are tackled. It is the politics, stupid! Mesele politika, gerisi lfgzaf! WikiLeaks bombas patlamadan nce Obama ynetimi dnyann geri kalanna, tezahrleri aldatc olabilirse de d politikasna iyi niyetlerin klavuzluk ettiini anlatmak ynnde gayet iyi rgtlenmi bir kampanya balatmt. Szdrlan yazmalar bu ii daha da zorlatrm durumda, fakat Washington'n acilen stesinden gelinmesi gereken bir alg sorunu olduunu fark ettiini gstermek iin hangi argmanlar kullandna tanklk etmek yine de ilgin. Dnyann nde gelen d politika dergisi 'Foreign Affairs'n son saysnda ABD Dileri Bakan Hillary Clinton 'Sivil Gce Nfuz Etmek. Amerikan Diplomasisini ve Kalknmay Yeniden Tanmlamak' adl bir makale yazd. Clinton, makalesinde ABD'nin kalknma ve d politikasn 'yeniden dnmesi, reformdan geirmesi ve tekrar ayarlamas gerektiini' savunuyor. iddet ieren arlklk, iklim deiiklii ve yoksulluk gibi kresel sorunlarn etkili uluslararas ibirlii gerektirdiinden dem vuruyor. Clinton'a gre bunlar zmek iin birileri nderlik etmeli ve dierlerini harekete geirmeli. nderlik edecek lke ise ABD. Fakat o da ancak dnyann geri kalannda kilit nemde ortaklar bulabildii ve ortak sorunlarla itigal etmek ve muhtemel fikir ayrlklarn tartmak ynnde kresel yaplar var olduu takdirde baar salayabilir. Gayet mhim bir paragrafta ABD Dileri Bakan, stratejik hedefini yle ifade ediyor: "ABD'nin gndemini ileriye tamak bakmndan geleneksel diplomasi daima kritik nemde olacak, fakat bu yeterli deil. ABD Dileri Bakanl, yeni beceriler, stratejiler ve aralar kullanmak suretiyle daha geni yelpazedeki farkl gruplara ulama ve onlar etkileme gayretlerini younlatrmal. Bu amala bakanlk diplomasiyi kavray tarznn yannda, uygulayc kadrolarnn rollerini ve sorumluluklarn da geniletiyor." Dier bir deyile: Amerikal diplomatlar, ABD'nin farkl fikirlere nem verdiini ve onlar dinleyip hesaba katmaya istekli olduunu geni bir kitleye daha iyi anlatmak zorunda. Clinton, mevzubahis hedef dorultusunda merak uyandrc bir makale yazmakla kalmad. Dnya apnda en byk alg sorununun ABD ile Mslman ounluklu lkeler arasnda olduunu bilen Dileri Bakanl, yeni bir giriim de balatt: Yeni Bir Balang in Ortaklk (PNB). Giriimin amac, Obama'nn Haziran 2009'da Kahire'de yapt ve ABD ile dnyann her kesindeki Mslmanlar arasnda yeni bir sayfa ama arsnda bulunduu konumann gerisini getirmek. Bu yeni yaklamn, sadece hkmetler arasnda deil, dnya apndaki zel sektr, sivil toplum ve vatandalar arasnda karlkl sayg ve ortakla dayanmas gerektii belirtiliyor. PNB'nin bakan Clinton'n seleflerinden Madeleine Albright. Kendisi bu

hafta stanbul'dayd; yeni grubu takdim etti ve onun ekonomik frsatlar, bilim ve teknoloji ibirliini, ABD ile Mslman dnyadaki kilit lkeler arasnda eitim ve deiim programlarn gelitirme hedefini anlatt. PNB bilinli olarak Trkiye'de balyor, fakat Msr, Endonezya, Pakistan ve Bat eria/Gazze'de devam edecek. Clinton'n makalesine ve PNB'ye karamsarlkla bakmak ve bunu dnyann Amerikan d politikasnn hatalarndan mustarip olmu veya olmaya devam eden kesimleriyle aray dzeltmek ynnde nafile bir aba gibi grmek kolay. Ben Clinton ve Albright'n gemite meydana gelen baz hasarlar onarma planlarnda samimi olduklarna inanyorum. Bu planlarla ilgili sorunum ise odada bulunan ve hakknda hi konuulmayan byk fil: Yani mevcut Amerikan politikalar. Elbette i dnyasndaki ilikileri gelitirmek iyi. Amerika ile Trk niversiteleri (bilhassa da Anadolu'dakiler) arasndaki deiim programlarnn da sk bir destekisiyim. Her iki lkeden daha fazla gazeteciye ABD'deki sistemin nasl ilediini ve Trkiye'nin gereklerinin Amerikan medyasnda sk sk izilen siyah-beyaz resimden daha karmak olduunu grme imkn tannmal. Gzel, o zaman yapn. Fakat ABD srail-Filistin ihtilafna ynelik politikasn deitirmedike veya Ankara ile Washington ran konusunda ekimeye devam ettike bu abalarn hibiri sonu vermeyecektir. ABD'nin gerekten de dnyadaki Mslmanlara ulamas ve ortak karlara dayal birok alanda srtmenin yerini ibirliinin alacan gstermesi gerekiyor. Fakat yeni bir balang, ancak mevcut hayal krklklarnn kkenlerine inildii takdirde mmkn olacaktr. Mesele politika, gerisi lfgzaf!

The difference a dot makes In general I do not like columns in which the author uses the space allocated to him to put on display his personal adventures or worries. Why should I, as a reader, be bothered by these private matters? I am afraid to say that this column is based on some of my recent experiences, as a foreigner living in Turkey, with the local bureaucracy. I simply could not resist the temptation any longer. It all started when my wife and I decided to buy a car. At the age of 53, it is my first car. Although I have had a drivers license for 35 years, Ive never had a car of my own. Basically, I did not need one, having always lived in the center of big cities with huge parking problems and good public transport. After living for 18 months now in stanbul, I had to come to the conclusion that not having a car here sometimes makes life very complicated. So we looked around and bought a car three weeks ago. But then the problems started. First I had to sign a paper allowing the car company to deal with all the necessary paperwork. No problem, it seemed. But instead of signing this paper at the car dealership, I had to go to the notarys office to get myself an official version of the same paper. Again doable, it appeared. But because I am a foreigner who is not fluent in Turkish, the notary could only put his stamp on the document after a licensed interpreter had told me what I was signing. Of course I already knew because my wife had told me what was in the paper. But that does not count according to Turkish law. When I asked my Turkish language teacher, a Dutchman living in stanbul, who is a professional interpreter working for Dutch and Turkish legal authorities, to help me out quickly, I found out that he was not allowed to do so. Only Turkish citizens with a license are. A discriminatory practice that excludes all non-Turks even when, as in the case of my teacher, they are experienced specialists with all the required diplomas. So, in came the official interpreter, a nice guy who told me in 15 seconds what I already knew. Cost: TL 160, on top of the TL 110 for the notary. That is what I call easy money. The story continues. After a few days, we were informed that the traffic police dealing with my application were not able to proceed, the reason being they had discovered that there was a difference between the way my name was spelled in the police computer and on my residence permit. The dissimilarity? One dot in the i. On the computer my name was written in

capital letters without a dot on the I (as it should be according to Dutch spelling rules) but on my residence permit there is a dot on the capital I (as can be done according to the Turkish alphabet). At first, I thought someone was making a joke. But the person at the traffic police was deadly serious. We were told that we had to go to the foreigners department at police headquarters where my residence permit had been issued and sort it out with them. Only after the spelling of my name was exactly the same in all files and documents would the traffic police be able to finalize the application. At the foreigners department it took us some time to find somebody who was willing to explain on the phone to her colleague at the traffic police that there was no difference between the two registrations and that the dot on the i on my residence permit was a result of someone copying the spelling of my name in my Dutch passport where they use small letters, including a dot an the i. Are you still with me? The moral of this small story? Turkey is a country where last minute flexibility and an unprecedented ability to improvise can coexist with an extreme determination to stick to bureaucratic rules and the mental impossibility to distinguish between details and the bigger picture. I am still struggling to live with that confusing mix. Hopefully our car will arrive soon. Bir noktann yaratt fark Yazarlarn, kendilerine ayrlan keleri ahsi maceralarn veya dertlerini anlatmak iin kullanmasndan genellikle pek hazzetmiyorum. Bir okur olarak niye bu zel meseleleri okumaya zahmet edeyim ki? Ama korkarm okuyacanz yaz, Trkiye'de yaayan bir yabanc sfatyla, yerel brokrasi ile geirdiim son tecrbeler hakknda olacak. Bu hikyeyi yazmaktan kendimi alamadm. Her ey eimle birlikte bir araba almaya karar vermemizle balad. 53 yamdaym ve bu benim ilk arabam. 35 yldr src ehliyetim var, lakin hi kendime ait bir arabam olmad. Sebebi esasen arabaya ihtiyacm olmamasyd; ekilmez park sorunlarnn ve dzgn toplu tamann olduu byk ehir merkezlerinde yaadm hep. stanbul'da 18 ay geirdikten sonra burada araba sahibi olmamann bazen hayat epey iinden klmaz hale getirdii sonucuna vardm. Bylece araba bakmaya baladk ve hafta nce de aldk. te sorunlar da bundan sonra balad. lk nce, arabay satan firmann btn gerekli resm ilemlerle ilgilenmesine izin veren bir belge imzalamak zorunda kaldm. Sorun yok gibi grnyordu. Fakat bu belgeyi araba satcsnda imzalamak yerine, kendim iin ayn belgenin resm bir versiyonunu almak zere notere gitmeliydim. Yine mesele yok gibiydi. Fakat doru dzgn Trke konuamayan bir yabanc olduum iin noter, ancak yeminli bir tercman neyi imzaladm bana anlattktan sonra belgeye mhr basabilirdi. Belgede ne olduunu elbette ki biliyordum, zira eim bana anlatmt. Fakat bunun Trk hukukuna gre kymeti yoktu. stanbul'da yaayan ve Hollanda ve Trkiye makamlar iin profesyonel tercman olarak alan Hollandal Trke retmenimden bana acilen yardm etmesini istediimde, buna izni olmadn rendim. Belgeyi sadece gerekli izne sahip Trk vatandalar tercme edebilirdi. retmenim gibi lzumlu btn diplomalara sahip tecrbeli uzmanlar olsalar bile, Trk olmayan herkesi dlayan ayrmc bir uygulamayd bu. Velhasl resm tercman geldi, ho bir insand, 15 saniyede bana zaten bildiim eyi anlatt. cret: 160 lira, 110 lira da noter iin. Kolay para diye ben buna derim. Hikye bu kadarla kalsa iyi. Birka gn sonra bavuruyla ilgilenen Trafik Polisi'nden (TP) ilemlerin devam edemeyecei bilgisi geldi. Sebep: smimin polis bilgisayarndaki yazlyla oturma iznimdeki (O) yazl arasnda farkllk olduunu kefetmilerdi. Peki neydi bu fark? "" harfindeki tek bir nokta. Bilgisayarda ismim byk harflerle yazlm ve (Hollandaca imla kurallarna gre olmas gerektii gibi) "" harfi, "I" olmutu, fakat O'de (ki Trk alfabesine gre olabilecei gibi) byk "I"nn zerinde bir nokta vard. nce birilerinin aka falan yaptn sandm. Fakat TP'deki grevli gayet ciddiydi. O'yi veren Yabanclar Polisi'ne gitmek ve onlarla meseleyi halletmek zorundaydk. Ancak ismim btn dosyalar ve belgelerde ayn hale geldikten sonra TP prosedrleri tamamlayabilirdi. Polis karakolunda, TP'deki meslektana telefonda durumu izah etmeye gnll birilerini bulmak biraz zaman ald. Telefonun dier ucundaki grevliye iki kayt arasnda fark olmad ve O'deki ""nin ismimin kk harfle yazlm Hollanda pasaportumdan kopyalanmasndan kaynakland anlatld. Hl okuyorsanz, bu kssann hissesi u: Trkiye bir yandan son dakika esnekliinin ve esiz bir doalama yaama yeteneinin, dier yandan da brokratik kurallara sk skya uymak ynnde ar bir kararlln ve ayrntlarla byk resmi ayrt etmekte zihinsel bir imknszln hkm srd bir lke. Hl bu kafa kartrc bileimle yaamak iin mcadele ediyorum. Arabamz ksa sre sonra gelir diye de umut ediyorum.

Go green now I was in Essen, Germany, on Monday to take part in a seminar on climate change and the opportunities for renewable energy in Turkey. The meeting was organized by the Mercator Foundation, a German private fund interested in promoting low carbon development in Turkey. In preparing for this meeting, I read up on the latest research and policy papers on this topic. All come to the same conclusion: Turkey is at a crossroads. It has come a long way economically by following the traditional path based on an energy intensive development that has produced high growth rates but also low energy efficiency and a growing dependency on imported oil and gas. If the country continues along this road, it will miss out on one of the most important global trends: a paradigm shift in energy policy towards more security of supply and sustainability. For many analysts it is not clear whether the Turkish government has recognized these changes. Despite some encouraging speeches by the energy minister and the adoption of several laws and strategy papers intended to prepare Turkey for the new future, the jury is still out. In an article in the summer edition of Insight Turkey, one of the leading English language magazines on Turkey, Hasan Saygn from stanbul Aydn University and Fsun Cetin from stanbul Technical University give a good overview of global developments and Turkey's hesitant position. According to them, a sustainable energy policy for the 21st century is based on three pillars: 1. Improved energy efficiency, 2. An increased use of renewable sources, and 3. Exploitation of unsustainable resources using low-carbon technologies. Turkey lags behind in all three fields. Countries like Germany and Spain are the frontrunners in Europe, but China and India have also shown that rapid economic development can go hand in hand with the introduction of new technology and the development of successful ones like wind energy. Is Turkey totally absent in this field? No, it is not. But it is a follower, not a pioneer. The focus has been almost exclusively on building huge hydroelectric power plants. Unfortunately, this was done in such an environmentally hostile way that nowadays even some environmentalist groups have turned against it, although it is still potentially one of the most promising parts of a Turkish sustainable energy policy. Despite its enormous potential, wind energy has only recently been developed and solar energy is lagging behind dramatically. How to explain this failure? Why does Turkey let other countries take the lead in shaping the low-carbon economy of the future? I can see at least two reasons for this. One is the popular opinion in Ankara that Turkey can't afford to enter the clean energy future at this point in time. Its strength lies in doing the tricks of the old economic and energy model better and cheaper than the rest of Europe. Why give up on these advantages and enter a whole new ball game with still quite a lot of unknowns? According to this point of view, the rich (Europe and the US) and the very big (China and India) should do the exploring part. Turkey can join the club when the new model has been established and Turkey can afford to change paradigms. Secondly, in the present dominant liberal economic outlook, it should not be the government that takes the lead in this transformation but the private sector. That is one of the reasons why the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is so reluctant to introduce incentives, which have been crucial in countries like Germany and Spain, for companies to invest in renewable energies,

especially solar: guaranteed prices, VAT reductions and tax credits. The only way out is for the government to give up on its policy of denying and delaying. Climate change is not something that will only come to Turkey in 50 years. It is already there and it is not going to disappear. Standing at the crossroads, Turkey is well advised to step up its efforts and develop its own sustainable model of development, based on a full understanding of global trends that have long been recognized by others. *Due to technical difficulties, we were unable to print Joost Lagendijk's column on Wednesday, as we regularly do. We apologize for any inconvenience this might have caused to our columnist and our readers. Hemen imdi yeile dnn! Dn iklim deiiklii ve Trkiye'de yenilenebilir enerji imknlar zerine bir seminere katlmak zere Almanya'nn Essen kentindeydim. Toplant, Trkiye'de dk karbona dayal kalknmay tevik etmeyi amalayan bir Alman zel fonu olan Mercator Vakf tarafndan organize edildi. Bu toplantya hazrlanmak iin konuya dair bol bol son aratrmalar ve siyaset belgelerini okudum. Hepsi ayn sonuca varyor: Trkiye bir dnm noktasnda. Enerji-youn bir kalknmaya dayal geleneksel yolu takip ederek ekonomik adan hatr saylr bir mesafe kat etti; bu srete yksek byme oranlar yakalad, fakat ayn zamanda dk enerji verimlilii ve petrol ile doalgaz ithalatna giderek artan bir bamllk hasl oldu. Trkiye bu yolda devam ederse, en nemli kresel eilimlerden birinin, yani enerji politikasnda daha gvenli tedarik ve srdrebilirlie dair paradigma deiiminin gerisinde kalacak. Birok analizci Trk hkmetinin bu deiimleri idrak edip etmediinden emin deil. Enerji bakanndan gelen baz cesaret verici aklamalara ve Trkiye'yi bu yeni gelecee hazrlamaya niyet eden eitli yasalarn ve strateji belgelerinin kabulne ramen, henz somut bir ynelim ve karar yok. Trkiye'de ngilizce yaynlanan en nemli dergilerden 'Insight Turkey'in yaz saysnda yaynlanan bir yazda Aydn niversitesi'nden Hasan Saygn ve stanbul Teknik niversitesi'nden Fsun etin, kresel gelimelere ve Trkiye'nin mtereddit tavrna dair esasl bir genel deerlendirme yapyor. Yazarlara gre 21. asrda srdrlebilir bir enerji politikasnn sacayaklar unlar: 1. Gelitirilmi enerji verimlilii, 2. Yenilenebilir kaynaklarn daha fazla kullanm, 3. Dk karbon teknolojilerini kullanan srdrlebilir olmayan kaynaklardan faydalanlmas. Bu alanda da Trkiye epey geriden geliyor. Bu konuda Avrupa'da Almanya ve spanya gibi lkeler ba ekiyor. Fakat in ve Hindistan da hzl ekonomik kalknmann yeni tekniklerin devreye sokulmas ve rzgr enerjisi gibi baarl rneklerin gelitirilmesiyle el ele yryebileceini gsteriyor. Peki Trkiye'nin bu alanda hi mi esamisi okunmuyor? Hayr yle deil. Fakat nc deil, takipi konumunda. Neredeyse tmyle devasa hidroelektrik enerji santralleri yapmna odaklanyor. Ne yazk ki bu, evreye yle dman bir ekilde yaplyor ki, potansiyel olarak Trkiye'nin srdrlebilir bir enerji politikas yrtmesinin hl en vaatkr paralarndan biri olmasna ramen, baz doa dostu gruplar bile aleyhine dnm durumda. Barndrd muazzam potansiyele ramen, rzgr enerjisi ancak yeni yeni gelitiriliyor; gne enerjisi ise kaplumbaa hzyla ilerliyor. Bu baarszln izah nedir? Trkiye gelecein dk karbon ekonomisinin ekillendirilmesinde niye dier lkelerin ba ekmesine izin veriyor? En az iki sebebi var bence. Birincisi, Trkiye'nin u an iin temiz enerjiye dayal bir gelecee dahil olmann altndan kalkamayaca ynnde Ankara'da mevcut yaygn kanaat. Bu yaklamn gc, eski ekonomi ve enerji modelinin Avrupa'nn geri kalanndan daha iyi ve ucuz sonular vermesinden kaynaklanyor. 'Niye bu avantajlardan vazgeelim ve hl bir yn belirsizlik tayan tmyle yeni bir oyuna girelim ki?' diye dnlyor. Bu baka gre zenginler (Avrupa ve ABD) ile ok bykler (in ve Hindistan) iin keif ksmn yapsn. Trkiye, yeni model oturduunda ve paradigma deiiminin altndan kalkabilecek duruma geldiinde kulbe katlabilir. kinci sebep u: Halihazrdaki hakim liberal baka gre, bu dnmde ncl devlet deil, zel sektr yapmal. AKP'nin, Almanya ve spanya gibi lkelerde yenilenebilir enerjiye, bilhassa da gne enerjisine yatrm yapacak irketler iin hayati nem tayan almlar (fiyat garantileri, KDV indirimleri ve vergi kesintileri) devreye sokmak konusunda bu kadar gnlsz olmasnn sebeplerinden biri bu. Hkmet iin yegane k yolu, inkr ve erteleme politikasndan vazgemek. klim deiiklii elli yl zarfnda sadece Trkiye'yi etkileyecek bir mesele deil. oktandr var ve yok olmayacak da. Trkiye bir dnm noktasnda ve bu yndeki abalarn artrmas ve bakalarnn uzun zamandr farknda olduu kresel eilimlerin tam idrakine dayal kendi srdrlebilir kalknma modelini gelitirmesi hayrna olacaktr.

Merkel is right (on the EURO) I cant say I am a big fan of Angela Merkel. Thats not only because of her opposition to Turkeys EU membership; the German chancellor is not the kind of politician that arouses strong emotions. Her most important asset seems to be the ability to remain calm and composed when others panic and to stick to middle-ofthe-road solutions when friends and foes push her to take more daring steps. This innate boringness has served her well. First, she managed to sideline all her more outspoken male competitors inside the German Christian Democrats. After that, she successfully campaigned against her Social Democrat opponents, using her reputation for being reliable as a powerful tool. Now, for many years, she is the most influential politician in the EU. Without her approval, no important decision can be taken. It is only natural that most of the time she gets what she wants in Europe. Germany is the biggest economy and has been willing, at least until recently, to pay the bill when the EU decides to embark on new adventures. This commanding position has not always made her very popular among her European colleagues, but most of the time she gives the impression that she could not care less. Since the start of the euro crisis, Germany has been criticized by both politicians and economists. The country should export less to the rest of Europe and consume more domestically and Merkel should not have waited so long before she backed the plans to bail out the Greeks. This time, the lady was not amused. Countering the ongoing criticism, she came up with two ideas that, according to me, should be supported by all pro-Europeans, left, right and center. Her first proposal was to stop creating ad hoc financial mechanisms and funds to deal with the structural problems in the euro zone. As a response to the Greek crisis, the EU and the IMF have constructed an emergency fund that since has been used to save not only Athens but also Dublin. Merkel has indicated that she wants this kind of massive financial support among EU member states to be based not on political opportunism but on strict rules that are enshrined in the EU treaties. In order to do that, the new Lisbon Treaty needs to be changed. Most European politicians get nightmares when they even think of it, memorizing the long years and tough negotiations it took to get an agreement on the present treaty. They blame Merkel for giving in to the growing skepticism among German citizens who are getting fed up with paying for the economic mistakes of other Europeans. That is probably true. But it is also correct that the time has come to repair a crucial mistake that was made when the euro was introduced. You cannot have a common currency in a union with such huge economic and fiscal differences between the participating member states if there is no proper, legally binding mechanism to control, if necessary correct, and ultimately support national governments. It seems that most other European leaders have grudgingly accepted this first Merkel demand. Her second request has met with more resistance. The German chancellor is of the opinion that when a more permanent rescue mechanism is established, private investors should pay part of the bill. Under the present rules, for instance in Greece and Ireland, all banks and other financial players are saved without having to pay a penny even though those banks created problems in the first place by taking irresponsible risks. According to Merkel, taxpayers should not be taken hostage by investors who enjoy the benefits of high interest rates and who can, at the moment, rely on being bailed out once their

country gets into enough trouble. Again, a proposal that deserves to be supported by those who want a strong and social Europe that is able to put restrictions on the excesses of the financial markets. Boring Angela has stepped out of her own shadow and has revitalized the EU debate on a rule-based and fair economy. Maybe one day she can do the same with enlargement. Merkel hakl (Euro hakknda) Angela Merkel'den ok hazzettiimi syleyemem. Bu, sadece Trkiye'nin AB yeliine kar olmasndan kaynaklanmyor. Neresinden baksanz, Alman Babakan kuvvetli duygular uyandran trde bir siyaseti deil. En nemli avantaj, bakalar paniklerken soukkanl ve sakin kalabilme, dostlar ve hasmlar onu daha cretli admlar atmaya zorlarken lml zmlerde srar edebilme yetenei gibi grnyor. Bu tanr vergisi skclk Merkel'in iine epey yarad. En bata, Alman Hristiyan Demokratlar'ndaki daha ak szl erkek rakiplerini bertaraf etmeyi becerdi. Bunun ardndan gl bir ara olarak gvenilirliini kullanp Sosyal Demokrat muhaliflerine kar baarl bir kampanya yrtt. Yllar sonra bugn AB iindeki en etkili siyaseti konumunda. Onun onay olmadan hibir nemli karar alnamyor. Merkel, Avrupa'da isteklerini ou zaman kabul ettiriyor, ki bu gayet doal. Almanya en byk ekonomi ve en azndan son dneme dek AB yeni maceralara atlmaya karar verdiinde faturasn demekten geri durmad. Bu amirane konum Merkel'i Avrupal muadilleri arasnda her zaman ok popler biri yapmyor, fakat genellikle sorunlara kaytsz kalmad ynnde bir izlenim de veriyor. Euro krizinin bandan bu yana Almanya hem siyasetiler hem iktisatlar tarafndan eletirildi. Almanya, Avrupa'nn geri kalanna daha az ihracat yapmal ve kendi iinde daha fazla tketmeliydi; Merkel Yunanllar kurtarma planlarna destek vermek iin o kadar ok beklememeliydi. Bu kez Alman Babakan hakikaten ok fazla beklemedi. Sregiden eletirilere kar iki fikirle ortaya kverdi; ki bence sol, sa ve merkezdeki btn Avrupa yanllar bu fikirleri desteklemeli. Merkel'in ilk teklifi, Euro Blgesi'ndeki yapsal sorunlarla baa kmak iin geici finansal mekanizmalar ve fonlar oluturmay brakmak. Yunan krizine cevap mahiyetinde AB ve IMF bir acil durum fonu oluturdu ve sonrasnda bu fon sadece Atina'y deil Dublin'i de kurtarmak iin kullanld. Merkel, AB lkeleri arasndaki bu tr devasa mali desteklerin siyasi oportnizme deil, AB anlamalarnda ngrlen sk kurallara dayanmasn istediini sylyor. Bunu yapmak iin de yeni Lizbon Anlamas'nn deitirilmesi gerekiyor. Avrupal siyasetilerin byk ksm iin bunun dncesi bile bir kbus, zira mevcut anlamay balamak iin etin pazarlklarla geirdikleri onca yl unutmu deiller. Merkel'i, dier Avrupallarn ekonomik hatalarnn faturasn demekten bkm olan Alman vatandalarnn giderek artan pheciliine teslim olmakla suluyorlar. Bu muhtemelen doru. Fakat Euro srecini balatrken yaplan hayati bir hatay tamir etmenin vakti de gelmi durumda. yeler arasnda byle muazzam ekonomik ve mali farkllklarn olduu bir birlikte, doru dzgn ve hukuken balayc bir kontrol mekanizmas olmakszn, o mekanizma sayesinde gerektiinde ulusal hkmetlerin hatalarn dzeltip nihayetinde destek vermeksizin ortak bir para birimini srdremezsiniz. Grnen o ki dier Avrupal liderlerinin ou gnlszce de olsa Merkel'in ilk talebini kabul ediyor. Merkel'in ikinci teklifi daha fazla direnile karlanyor. Alman Babakan daha kalc bir kurtarma mekanizmas tesis edildiinde faturann bir ksmn zel sektrn demesi gerektii kanaatinde. Mevcut kurallar uyarnca szgelimi Yunanistan ve rlanda'da btn bankalar ve dier finans aktrleri bir kuru demeden kurtarlyor. Halbuki sorumsuzca riskler alarak sorunlar ilk bata onlar oluturuyor. Merkel'e gre vergi mkellefleri yksek faiz krlarnn keyfini sren ve borca batm bir lke dibe vurduunda kurtarlacaklarna bel balayabilen yatrmclar tarafndan rehin alnmamal. Bu da finans piyasalarnn arlklarn dizginleyebilen gl ve sosyal bir Avrupa isteyen herkesin desteini hak eden bir teklif. Skc Angela kendi glgesinden kt ve AB'de kurallara dayal ve adil bir ekonomi tartmasn canlandrd. Kim bilir belki gnn birinde ayn eyi genileme konusunda da yapabilir.

EuroLeaks These are the days of WikiLeaks. All over the globe, people are tucking into the leaked documents revealing how American diplomats see the world.

As renowned historian Timothy Garton Ash put it in The Guardian, one of the newspapers that got the 250,000 classified cables and started publishing them two days ago: It is the historian's dream. It is the diplomat's nightmare. Of course, it makes exciting reading to see Arab leaders begging the US to get rid of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as soon as possible. It is indeed amazing to look through the confidential reports by American diplomats in Ankara and the mix of gossip, wrong assessments and rightful criticism that they send to Washington. At the same time, it should not really come as a surprise to see Saudi King Abdullah telling the Americans to cut off the head of the (Iranian) snake because everybody knows the Saudis hate the present Iranian regime -- although they will never say so in public. We also know that, despite all those alarmist and negative cables sent from Ankara, the official US policy on Turkey has been much more balanced. The main question raised by all those leaked documents is how a post-WikiLeaks foreign policy should be conducted in which confidentiality remains a key part. No country can build up external relations with the rest of the world if all talks and deliberations are totally transparent. Nobody will be willing to inform any American diplomat anymore if one knows that the next day one might be quoted in The New York Times. As Garton Ash admits, it will be quite a challenge to find the right balance between informing the public what is done in their name abroad and the public interest in an effective foreign policy. One can witness the same tension these days in Europe when the subject is the efforts to save the euro. As you know, the European Union is going through a tough time after it had to save first Greece and now Ireland from going bankrupt. The end is not yet in sight, and there are speculations that Portugal might be the next country that has to ask the EU to step in and lend it billions of euros to keep the Portuguese economy up and running. To most Europeans it is not at all clear how we got here in the first place and why one EU member state should be entitled to receive amounts of money that are so high that they almost become surreal. In an interview last week with the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant, Thomas Klau, head of the Paris office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, used a very evocative comparison to describe the situation: For many Dutch and German citizens the euro has become a bitter pill to swallow. They realize that they have been misled by their politicians. They were never told what the euro would really mean. Politicians presented the euro zone as a pleasant street with detached houses in a quiet suburb. If one of the residents would neglect the maintenance of his garden, the neighbors would kindly remind him of that. In reality, the euro zone is an apartment building with thin walls. If there is a row in one of the apartments, the others also suffer. If the roof is leaking, all inhabitants have to deal with the water damage. Klau is right. It means that in the future decision makers, when entering into close cooperation with others, should be much more transparent about all the strings attached. We definitely need more openness, then. But what about more exposure now, in the middle of the crisis, when the vultures of the financial markets are on the fence, actively pushing another EU member state to the brink? I guess few people would like to publish the minutes of all these confidential meetings in Brussels where heads of state try to find a way out, knowing that each and every word they say will have a huge impact on the financial markets. No EuroLeaks now please. It is only one example of the complicated mix of transparency and secrecy that we need to run an international system that is becoming more closely interconnected every day.

AvroLeaks

WikiLeaks'le yatp WikiLeaks'le kalkyoruz. Dnyann her kesinde insanlar Amerikal diplomatlarn dnyay nasl grdn ifa eden szdrlm belgeleri okuyor itahla. Mehur tarihi Timothy Garton Ash'in, 250 bin gizli yazmay elde edip iki gn nce yaynlamaya balayan Guardian gazetesinde syledii gibi: "Bu belgeler tarihinin dnyas, diplomatn ise kbusu." Elbette Arap liderlerin ran Cumhurbakan Ahmedinecad'dan bir an nce kurtulmak iin ABD'ye dil dktn okumak heyecan verici. Ankara'daki Amerikal diplomatlarn gizli raporlarn; Washington'a gnderdikleri dedikodulardan, yanl tahlillerden ve doru eletirilerden mteekkil o karm gzden geirmek hakikaten ilgin. te yandan Suudi Kral Abdullah' Amerikallara "(ran) ylannn bann ezilmesini" grmek istediini sylerken bulmak aslnda kimse iin srpriz olmamal. Suudilerin mevcut ran rejiminden nefret ettii herkesin malumu, fakat bunu asla uluorta sylemezler. unu da biliyoruz ki; Ankara'dan gnderilen btn o ikaz edici ve olumsuz telgraflara ramen, ABD'nin resm Trkiye politikas ok daha dengeli. Szdrlan bunca belgenin ortaya kard esas soru u: WikiLeaks sonras, gizliliin kilit nemde bir paras olmaya devam edecei bir d politika nasl yrtlmeli? Hibir lke, yaplan tm grmeler ve istiareler tamamen effaf olduu takdirde dnyann geri kalanyla d ilikiler ina edemez. Ertesi gn New York Times'ta okuyabileceini bile bile kimse Amerikal diplomatlara bilgi vermek istemez. Garton Ash'in de teslim ettii zere, kamuoyunu darda onun adna ne yapld hususunda bilgilendirmekle, kamu yararna etkin bir d politika arasnda doru dengeyi bulmak ziyadesiyle etrefilli bir i. Bugnlerde ayn gerilime, konu Euro'yu kurtarmak olduunda Avrupa'da da tank olmak mmkn. Bildiiniz gibi, Avrupa Birlii nce Yunanistan, imdi de rlanda'y iflastan kurtarmak zorunda kaldktan sonra zor gnlerden geiyor. Sonunun nereye varaca henz belirsiz ve Portekiz'in de AB'den duruma mdahale edip lke ekonomisinin kmemesi iin milyarlarca Euro vermesini isteyebileceine dair speklasyonlar sz konusu. Avrupallarn byk ounluu nasl olup da bu noktaya geldiimizi ve AB yesi bir lkeye neredeyse gerekd saylabilecek miktarlarda parann niye verilmesi gerektiini anlayamyor. Avrupa Konseyi Paris D likiler Brosu Bakan Thomas Klau, geen hafta Hollanda gazetesi De Volkskrant'a verdii rportajda, durumu tarif etmek iin gayet zihin ac kyaslamalarda bulunuyordu: "Birok Hollanda ve Almanya vatanda iin Euro yutamayacaklar kadar ac bir ila haline geldi. Siyasetilerin kendilerini yanl ynlendirdiini idrak ediyorlar. Euro'nun aslnda ne demek olduu onlara hi sylenmedi. Siyasetiler Euro Blgesi'ni, sakin bir mahallede, iki yannda mstakil evlerin sraland irin bir cadde gibi sundular. Mahalle sakinlerinden biri bahesine bakmay ihmal ederse, komular bunu ona kibarca hatrlatacakt. Gerekte ise Euro Blgesi ince duvarlar olan bir apartman. Dairelerden birinde bir patrt ktnda dierleri de ceremesini ekiyor. at akyorsa, btn daire sakinlerinin suyun sebep olduu hasarla itigal etmesi gerekiyor." Klau hakl. Yani gelecekte siyasi karar mercilerinin, dierleriyle yakn ibirliine girerken, kabul edilen btn ykmllklerle ilgili ok daha effaf olmas lazm. Kesinlikle daha fazla akla ihtiyacmz var. Peki o aklk, krizin orta yerinde, finans piyasalarnn etrafa tnemi akbabalarnn bir AB yesi lkeyi daha uuruma srklemek iin elinden geleni yapt bugn de sergilenemez mi? Bence muhtemelen pek az insan devlet liderlerinin bir k yolu bulmaya alt Brksel'de yaptklar btn o gizli toplantlarn tutanaklarnn yaynlanmasn isteyecektir, zira onlarn sarf ettii her kelimenin finans piyasalar zerinde muazzam bir etki yapacan bilecektir. Ltfen, u an AvroLeaks'in hi lemi yok. Bu, lkelerin her geen gn daha da birbirine bal hale geldii bir uluslararas sistemi yrtmek iin gerekli effaflk ve gizlilikten mrekkep karmak bileimin rneklerinden sadece biri. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Who is a fascist? I have always been intrigued by the fact that in Turkey calling someone a fascist is an accepted part of political discourse. Turkish leftists would not hesitate to label Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leaders as fascists because of their extreme nationalism and tendency to use violence against political opponents. Determined anti-Kemalists have used the term fascist as well to describe the hardcore Kemalists inside and outside of the Republican People's Party (CHP) because of their attachment to a strong state that rules with an iron fist and crushes everybody that does not fit into the prescribed mould. At first, I was shocked when I heard respected academics and good

friends use the term when we were discussing politics in Turkey. It took me some time to understand why there is such a big difference between labeling someone a fascist in Turkey and, for instance, in the Netherlands. As a rule, nobody in Holland would call his political opponent a fascist. Even if one totally rejects the other person's views and thinks that implementing them would be a disaster for the country. The reason is clear to everybody. In the mind of almost all Dutch, fascism is what we had in the '30s and '40s of the last century. It started in Italy and Germany as an ideology and soon turned into a murderous submission of Europe. Millions were killed, including 6 million Jews in the Holocaust. Calling your opponent a fascist would mean that you accuse that person of wanting to repeat, in one way or the other, that terrible period in European history. Because no present-day politician has any intention of doing so, it would be morally and politically wrong to use a label that is so strongly attached to that historic event. On top of that, by suggesting a link between then and now, one runs the risk of downplaying the monstrosities of the past that, according to most Europeans, are a unique all-time low in human history. In Turkey the connotations are clearly different. Here, calling someone a fascist is the ultimate expression of dislike and sometimes hate. But it does not carry the same historic burden. Turkey did not enter World War II and for most Turks the Holocaust is an awful part of European history, but not of their own. It makes the threshold for using the emotionally charged term considerably lower in Turkey. But things are changing. The rise of new extreme-right populist parties in many European countries had led to a debate on how to analyze and label this new situation. Till now, at least in the Netherlands, commentators stuck to the old policy of not using the F-word. Geert Wilders, the leader of the Freedom Party that supports the new Dutch government, could be called a dangerous maverick or an Islamophobe. But he is not a fascist. Two weeks ago, Rob Riemen, an esteemed intellectual belonging to a respected think tank, the Nexus Institute, caused a big public row when he called Wilders and his party the prototype of present-day fascism. According to Riemen, we should not concentrate on the terrible outcomes of fascism in the last century but focus on how and why the movement started. For him, fascism is a deadly bacillus that can always pop up when societies are loosing their sense of direction and when elites stop defending high moral values. Contemporary fascism will not take the same shape as it did 80 years ago. As Riemen sees it, in the US it will be religious and anti-black, in Western Europe it will be secular and anti-Islam, in Eastern Europe Catholic or Orthodox and anti-Semitic. But there is always a charismatic, authoritarian leader, victimizing one part of the population and putting all the blame on another, strange, part. His analysis got strongly criticized. Some disagree totally. Others subscribe to Riemen's theory of the eternal return of fascism but think that, for strategic and tactical reasons, calling Wilders a fascist would not be clever. Based on the old taboo, he would only use the label to victimize himself and gain further popularity. I am sure the debate will go on in the Netherlands and other parts of Europe. So don't be surprised if you hear the F-word used more often, and not only in Turkey. Faist kime denir? Trkiye'de birine 'faist' demenin siyasi sylemin kabullerinden olmas karsnda daimi bir aknlk yayorum. Trk solcular MHP liderlerini, ar milliyetiliklerinden ve siyasi kartlarna ynelik iddet kullanma eilimlerinden dolay faist diye nitelemekte tereddt etmiyor. Keskin anti-Kemalistler de CHP iindeki ve dndaki adanm Kemalistleri, demir yumrukla hkmeden ve belirlenmi kalplara uymayan herkesi ezen gl bir devlete ballklar sebebiyle "faist" kavramyla tarif ediyor. lk balarda, saygn akademisyenlerin ve iyi arkadalarmn, Trkiye siyasetini tartrken kelimeyi kullandn

duyduumda oke olmutum. Birine Trkiye'de "faist" demekle, szgelimi Hollanda'da demek arasnda niye bu kadar byk fark olduunu idrak etmem zaman ald. Bir kural mahiyetinde, Hollanda'da kimse siyasi kartna faist demez. Biri tekinin fikirlerini toptan reddetse ve o fikirleri uygulamann lkeye felaket getireceini dnse bile demez. Sebebi de herkesin malumudur. Neredeyse btn Hollandallarn zihninde faizm, geen asrn otuzlu ve krkl yllarnda tank olduumuz eydir. Faizm talya ve Almanya'da bir ideoloji olarak ortaya kt ve ksa sre iinde Avrupa'ya ynelik canice bir boyun edirme abasna dnt. Holokost'ta yok edilen alt milyon Yahudi de dahil, milyonlarca insan ldrld. Kartnza faist demek, o kiiyi Avrupa tarihindeki bu korkun dnemi o veya bu ekilde tekrarlamak istemekle sulamak anlamna gelir. Gnmz siyasetileri arasnda bunu yapmaya niyetli kimse bulunmad iin de, sz konusu tarihsel olaya bu denli sk skya bal bir kavram kullanmak ahlaken ve siyaseten yanl olur. Bunun da tesinde, o dnem ile bugn arasnda ba kurmakla kii, Avrupallarn byk ksmnn insanlk tarihi asndan ei grlmemi bir dip noktas sayd bir mazinin canavarlklarn hafifseme riskine de girmi olur. Trkiye'de ise kelimenin armlar bariz ekilde farkl. Burada birine faist demek, sevmemenin ve bazen nefretin en u ifadesi. Fakat ayn tarihsel yk tamyor. Trkiye, kinci Dnya Sava'na girmedi ve Trklerin byk ounluu iin Holokost kendi tarihlerinin deil, Avrupa tarihinin vahim bir paras. Bu da gl duygularla ykl olan kavram kullanma eiini Trkiye'de ok daha dk klyor. Fakat durum deiiyor. Birok Avrupa lkesinde yeni ar sac poplist partilerin ykselii, bu yeni durumun nasl analiz ve tarif edileceine dair bir tartmaya kap ayor. Bugne kadar, en azndan Hollanda'da, yorumcular faizm kelimesini kullanmamak ynndeki eski politikaya bal kald. Yeni Hollanda hkmetini destekleyen zgrlk Partisi'nin lideri Geert Wilders'a tehlikeli bir hayta veya slamobofik denebilir. Fakat Wilders bir faist deil. ki hafta nce saygn dnce kuruluu Nexus Enstits iin alan nde gelen entelektellerden Rob Riemen, Wilders ve partisine gnmz faizminin prototipi diyerek kamuoyunda hararetli bir tartma balatt. Riemen, faizmin geen asrdaki korkun sonularna taklp kalmamamz, hareketin nasl ve niye baladna odaklanmamz gerektiini savunuyor. Ona gre faizm, toplumlar yn duygularn kaybettiklerinde ve sekinler yksek ahlaki deerleri mdafaa etmekten vazgetiklerinde daima u verebilecek lmcl bir bakteri. Gnmz faizmi seksen yl ncesiyle ayn ekli almayacak. Riemen'e gre faizm ABD'de dindar ve siyah kart, Bat Avrupa'da laik ve slam kart, Dou Avrupa'da Katolik veya Ortodoks ve Yahudi kart olarak zuhur edecek. Fakat ortada her daim, nfusun bir ksmn mazlum yerine koyarken, btn suu dier ksma, yani 'yabanc'ya ykleyen karizmatik, otoriter bir lider olacak. Riemen'in analizi sert eletiriler ald. Bazlar klliyen kar kyor. Bazlar ise Riemen'in faizmin ebedi geri dn teorisine katlyor, fakat stratejik ve taktik gerekelerle Wilders'a faist demenin aklc olmayacan dnyor. Eski tabuya srtn yaslayp bu etiketi olsa olsa kendisini mazlum gstermek ve daha fazla poplerlik kazanmak iin kullanacan savunuyorlar. Eminim tartma Hollanda'da ve Avrupa'nn dier lkelerinde devam edecek. Velhasl faizm kelimesinin sadece Trkiye'de deil, orada da daha sk kullanldn duyarsanz armayn. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

The Green Wave Last weekend, at the International Documentary Film Festival in Amsterdam (IDFA), I was present at the world premiere of The Green Wave, a film about the Iranian presidential elections in June 2009. These elections were supposed to bring about a change, and there were high hopes that Mir-Hossein Mousavi, seen as a reformer, could make it to the presidency. Contrary to all expectations, the ultra-conservative populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was confirmed in office. There were loud and justified accusations of vote-rigging. Thousands took to the streets asking, Where is my vote? These protests were brutally suppressed by government militia. Thousands were beaten, arrested and tortured and hundreds were killed or disappeared without a trace. The Green Wave tells the story of the people supporting Mousavi, fighting for a green revolution in Iran, green being both the color of hope and the color of Islam. I was deeply impressed. Firstly, it is a well-made film, based on hundreds of Internet blogs, Facebook reports and videos posted on the Internet by Iranians who took to the streets, before but especially after the elections. These fragments are combined with interviews with prominent Iranian personalities like human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi and the Shiite cleric Mohsen Kadivar, one of the most important critics of the Islamic Republic. Chilling are the

eyewitness accounts of bloggers and journalists who were tortured and had to flee the country to survive. But I was most struck by the story of two young students that runs through the film as the main thread. This fictional storyline has been animated as a sort of moving comic, based on beautiful drawings by Ali Reza Darvish. The second reason why this film is so inspiring is related to the motives and opinions of its director, Ali Samadi Ahadi, a 38year-old Iranian living in Germany. He was present at the international premiere of his new documentary in Amsterdam and explained his views on Iran and the green revolution that took place there last year. He is convinced that despite all the repression and the inhuman cruelty of the present regime, the desire of the Iranian people for more freedom and dignity is unbroken -- just as is their willingness to fight for it. At the same time, he underlined that the biggest challenge for the demonstrators and protesters is to remain patient. Change will not come to Iran overnight. He compared it with rain in the desert. The first rain falls on hard, impenetrable soil. But after a while, the water penetrates deeper and the earth becomes softer. Only then will plants be able to grow. According to Ali Samadi Ahadi, some fundamental changes have already taken place in Iran, one of them being the strong feeling among many that the present government does not represent the Iranian people anymore. In order for this evolution to continue, the director and author of the film called upon the West to keep up the pressure on Iran. Unfortunately, the US and the EU only seem to be interested in Iran because of its oil and its nuclear program. Not because of the flagrant violations of human rights that carry on till today. It is a criticism that could also be directed at the Turkish government. For understandable reasons, Turkey has always tried to keep good relations with the powers in Tehran. Even critics of the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan would agree that the ongoing sanctions against Iran most probably will not produce much change and might even strengthen the hard-liners in Iran. Therefore, it makes sense for Turkey to look for other ways to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, even if that sometimes includes going against Washington or Brussels. But why did the Turkish government immediately congratulate President Ahmadinejad on his re-election, knowing there were strong indications of electoral fraud and at a moment when all over Iran peaceful demonstrators were killed? Why does the Turkish prime minister call the Iranian president my good friend but never makes it clear publicly that he is extremely worried about the appalling situation of human rights in his friends country? I hope The Green Wave is shown on Turkish television soon and that Erdoan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu are watching. Yeil Dalga Geen hafta sonu Amsterdam'daki Uluslararas Belgesel Film Festivali'nde (IDFA), Haziran 2009'daki ran cumhurbakanl seimlerini anlatan "Yeil Dalga" adl filmin dnya prmiyerindeydim. Bu seimlerin deiim getirecei syleniyordu ve reformcu olarak grlen Mir Hseyin Musavi'nin cumhurbakanl koltuuna oturabilecei ynnde byk umutlar sz konusuydu. Btn beklentilerin tersine, ultra muhafazakr poplist Mahmud Ahmedinejad ikinci kez cumhurbakan seildi. Seime hile kartrldna dair yksek sesli ve hakl iddialar ortaya atld. Binlerce insan, "Oyum nerede?" slogan eliinde sokaklara dkld. Bu protestolar hkmete bal milisler tarafndan acmaszca bastrld. Binlerce insan dvld, tutukland ve ikence grd, yzlercesi ldrld veya zerre iz brakmadan kaybedildi. "Yeil Dalga" Musavi'yi destekleyen, ran'da bir 'yeil devrim' iin mcadele eden insanlar anlatyor; onlar iin yeil umudu ve slam' simgeliyor.

Film beni derinden etkiledi. Her eyden nce ok iyi yaplm bir film; yzlerce internet bloguna, facebook haberine ve seim ncesinde, ama zellikle sonrasnda sokaklara kan ranllarn sanal leme gnderdii videolara dayanyor. Bu paralar, ran'n nde gelen ahsiyetleriyle (szgelimi insan haklar aktivisti ve Nobel Bar dl sahibi irin Ebadi ve slam Cumhuriyeti'ni eletiren en gr seslerden ii din adam Muhsin Kadivar) yaplm rportajlarla birletirilmi. kence gren ve cann kurtarmak iin lkeden kamak zorunda kalan blogcularn ve gazetecilerin birinci elden tanklklar tyler rpertici. Fakat beni en ok arpan, iki gen rencinin ana tema mahiyetinde filmin omurgasn oluturan hikyesiydi. Bu kurgusal hikye dizgesi, Ali Rza Dervi'in izimleriyle, bir tr hareketli izgi-roman eklinde canlandrlmt. Filmin bu denli etkileyici olmasnn ikinci nedeni, Almanya'da yaayan 38 yandaki ranl ynetmen Ali Samedi Ahadi'nin saikleri ve fikirleriydi. Amsterdam'daki prmiyerde o da vard ve ran'a ve geen yl yaanan 'yeil devrime' dair fikirlerini dile getirdi. Mevcut rejimin olanca basksna ve insanlk d zulmne ramen ran halknn daha fazla zgrlk ve insanca yaam arzusunun krlmadndan emindi -keza bu uurda mcadele etme isteinden de. te yandan gstericiler ve protestocular iin en byk zorluun sabr korumak olduunun da altn izdi. Deiim ran'a bir gecede gelmeyecekti. Bunu lde yaan yamurla kyaslad. lk yamur damlalar sert, szdrmaz topraa derdi. Fakat bir sre sonra su daha derine szar ve toprak yumuard. Ancak ondan sonra bitkiler bymeye balayabilirdi. Ali Samedi Ahadi'ye gre ran'da halihazrda baz kkl deiimler olmutu; bunlardan biri, birok insan arasnda mevcut hkmetin artk ran halkn temsil etmediine dair gelien gl hissiyatt. Filmin ynetmeni ve yazar, bu geliimin devam etmesi iin Bat'ya ran zerindeki basky srdrme arsnda bulundu. Ne yazk ki ABD ve AB, ran'la sadece petrol ve nkleer program sebebiyle ilgilendikleri izlenimi veriyor. Sregiden bariz insan haklar ihlalleri ise umurlarnda deil. Bu eletiriyi Trk hkmetine de yneltmek mmkn. Trkiye anlalr sebeplerle, Tahran'daki muktedirlerle daima iyi ilikiler yrtme abasnda oldu. Erdoan hkmetini eletirenler bile ran'a uygulanan yaptrmlarn ok fazla ey deitirmeyecei, hatta ran'daki sertlik yanllarn glendirebileceini kabul edecektir. Bu yzden Trkiye iin mantkl olan, ran'n nkleer silahlar elde etmesini nlemek iin baka yollar aramas ve bunu yaparken bazen Washington veya Brksel'le ters dmekten kanmamas. Fakat Trk hkmeti, seim usulszlklerine dair gl emareler olduunu bile bile ve ran'n drt bir kesinde bar protestocularn ldrld bir anda niye Ahmedinejad'n ikinci kez seilmesini hemen kutlad? Trkiye Babakan, ran Cumhurbakan'na niye 'iyi dostum' diyor da, dostunun lkesinde insan haklarnn iler acs durumundan dolay derin endie duyduunu bir kez olsun aka dile getirmiyor? Umarm "Yeil Dalga" ksa sre sonra Trk televizyonlarnda da gsterilir ve Erdoan ile Davutolu da seyreder. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Liberal worries Last week I had dinner with an old acquaintance. We ended up at the same table during a conference we both attended. For many years I have known her as a person knowledgeable on Europe and Turkey-EU relations. Almost inevitably, we started talking about the situation in Turkey soon after sitting down. She laughed when she admitted that, although she read my columns in support of the constitutional amendments, in the end and after much hesitation, she had voted No on Sept 12, not because she opposed the content of the package, but because she simply did not trust the ruling party on the implementation of all the changes, especially the ones relating to the composition of the high judiciary. Based on the dominant winner takes all paradigm in Turkish politics, her fear was that this government would do the same as all the previous ones had done: bring their own people in. One unbalanced situation would be replaced by a different but equally biased one, this time in favor of the new elite on the rise. Immediately, she added that I should not misunderstand her. She did not want the status quo to continue and she agreed that military influence in politics should be pushed back. She was happy to see that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) had shown a better understanding of the different minority identities in Turkey and she had given up on the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) a long time ago. Headscarves should be allowed at universities and she strongly felt that fears about the ruling party wanting to introduce Shariah law in Turkey were totally exaggerated. Still, she was worried about the future of Turkey. Afraid that liberals like herself, especially

women, would be under growing pressure from self-confident conservatives intolerant of other lifestyles. I guess you could label my dinner companion as worried modern, using the terminology coined by Professor Binnaz Toprak and others. People who consider themselves democrats and pro-reform, but who, at the same time, do not subscribe to the conservative religious values of the majority in Turkey. Toprak received much praise and criticism last year when she published a report on neighborhood pressure in Anatolian cities. Her conclusion was that, as a result of the activities of AKP officials and religious communities like the Glen movement, there was a growing social pressure on people with different identities and lifestyles like Alevis, women and youngsters wearing less ordinary clothing. While the findings of the report were attacked on methodological grounds, most of the disapproval came from critics who claimed that Toprak was overstating her point, some even accusing her of playing into the hands of anti-democratic ultra-nationalists. I do not want to go into the pros and cons of that particular report here, but it would be a huge mistake to dismiss the kind of worries expressed by Toprak and my dinner acquaintance as being based on groundless fears or inspired by unjust opposition to necessary changes. I have heard many more worried modernists whom I trust and appreciate make the same point. Again, they welcome many reforms proposed by the ruling party. They recognize the discrimination and repression that worried conservatives had to suffer in the past. They agree that true democracy means that, most probably, a conservative majority will pull the strings in Turkey in the foreseeable future. But they also want that majority to respect their diverging opinions. They want to get together with all democrats, be they conservative or liberal, to eliminate existing prejudices and discrimination against people with contrasting identities. In his recent report for the influential German think tank Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Gnter Seufert comes to the same conclusion. For many years, Seufert lived in Turkey as a correspondent witnessing the rapid changes taking place. In a balanced paper he defends the constitutional amendments adopted on Sept. 12 and rejects the arguments of the opposition. He clearly believes in the potential for democracy in Turkey. But he also calls on Turks and other Europeans to take the popular discourse on democracy, pluralism and cultural rights seriously, saying that these values should be guaranteed, especially for those groups in society that could easily be pushed aside by the assertive conservative majority. Liberal endieler Geen hafta eski bir tandkla akam yemeinde bir araya geldik. kimizin katlmc olduu bir konferans srasnda ayn masaya denk dmtk. Onu yllardr Avrupa ve Trkiye-AB ilikilerine dair engin bilgiye sahip biri olarak tanrm. Haliyle, masaya oturduktan ksa sre sonra Trkiye'deki durumu konumaya baladk. Anayasal deiiklikleri destekleyen ke yazlarm okuduunu, fakat birok teredddn neticesinde 12 Eyll'de 'Hayr' oyu verdiini glerek anlatt. Hayr demesinin sebebi paketin ieriine kar olmas deildi. Tek sebep, btn bu deiiklikleri, bilhassa da yksek yargnn bileimiyle ilgili olanlar uygulamak hususunda iktidar partisine gvenmemesiydi. Trk siyasetinin "kazanan hepsini alr" eklindeki hakim paradigmasn gz nne aldnda, bu hkmetin de nceki btn hkmetlerin yaptn yapacandan, yani yksek yargya kendi insanlarn yerletireceinden korkuyordu. Dengesiz bir durumun yerini, farkl, ama ayn derecede tarafl bir durum alacak ve bu kez ykselen yeni sekinlerin lehine ileyecekti. Hemen ardndan kendisini yanl anlamamam istedi. Statkonun devamndan yana deildi. Ordunun siyaset zerindeki nfuzunun geriletilmesi gerektiine katlyordu. AKP'nin Trkiye'de farkl aznlk kimliklerinin varlna dair daha ileri bir kavray sergilediini grmekten memnundu ve CHP'den uzun zaman nce umudu kesmiti. niversitelerde bartsne izin verilmeliydi ve iktidar partisinin Trkiye'ye eriat getirmek istediine dair korkular kendisine de fazlasyla abartl geliyordu. Yine de Trkiye'nin geleceinden endie duyuyordu. Liberallerin, bilhassa da kendisi gibi kadnlarn, baka hayat tarzlarna hogr gstermeyen zgvenli muhafazakrlarn artan basks altnda kalmasndan korkuyordu.

Sanrm yemek arkadam, Profesr Binnaz Toprak ve dierlerinin gelitirdii terminoloji minvalinde, "endieli modern" olarak nitelemek mmkn. Bunlar, kendilerini demokrat ve reform yanls olarak gren, fakat Trkiye'deki ounluun muhafazakr din deerlerine de katlmayan insanlar. Toprak geen sene Anadolu kentlerindeki mahalle basksna dair bir rapor yaymladnda epey vg ve tenkit almt. Vard sonu uydu Toprak'n: AKP yetkilileri ve Glen Hareketi gibi din cemaatlerin faaliyetleri sonucu, farkl kimliklere ve hayat tarzlarna sahip (szgelimi Aleviler, kadnlar ve allmn dnda giyinen genler) insanlara ynelik artan bir toplumsal bask vard. Raporun bulgularna metodolojik gerekelerle yklenenler oldu, fakat eletirilerin byk blm Toprak'n ele ald meseleyi fazla abarttn iddia edenlerden geldi; hatta bazlar Toprak' demokrasi kart ultra-milliyetilerin deirmenine su tamakla sulad. Burada mevzubahis raporun artlarnn-eksilerinin derinine inmek niyetinde deilim. Fakat Toprak'n ve yemek arkadamn dile getirdii trden endieleri, temelsiz korkulara dayand veya gerekli deiikliklere haksz muhalefetten kaynakland gerekesiyle grmezden gelmek byk bir hata olacaktr. Gvendiim ve deer verdiim daha birok "endieli modern"den de ayn szleri iittim. Onlar da iktidar partisinin nerdii birok reformu sevinle karlyor. "Endieli muhafazakrlar"n gemite maruz brakld ayrmcln ve basknn farkndalar. Trkiye'nin iplerini yakn gelecekte ok byk ihtimalle muhafazakr bir ounluun elinde tutacan ve zaten gerek demokrasinin de bu demek olduunu kabul ediyorlar. Fakat ayn zamanda ounluun farkl fikirlere sayg duymasn da istiyorlar. ster muhafazakr ister liberal olsun, farkl kimliklere sahip insanlara kar mevcut nyarglar ve ayrmcl ortadan kaldrmak iin btn demokratlarla bir araya gelmeyi arzuluyorlar. Etkili Alman dnce kuruluu SWP iin geenlerde bir rapor hazrlayan Gnter Seufert de ayn sonuca varyor. Seufert, muhabir olarak yllarca Trkiye'de yaad ve bu srete hzl deiimlere tanklk etti. Dengeli raporunda Seufert 12 Eyll'de kabul edilen anayasal deiiklikleri savunuyor ve muhalefetin argmanlarna kar kyor. Trkiye'deki demokrasi potansiyeline can- gnlden inanyor. Fakat Trklere ve dier Avrupallara 'demokrasi', 'oulculuk' ve 'kltrel haklara' ynelik popler sylemi ciddiye almalar arsnda bulunmay da ihmal etmiyor: "Bu deerler, bilhassa kendine ar gvenen muhafazakr ounluk tarafndan kolayca kenara itilebilecek gruplar adna garantiye alnmaldr." j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

Stop telling EU fairy tales This week the European Commission presented its annual progress report on Turkeys EU accession negotiations. Although it got much less attention than previous reports, the most remarkable thing was the huge difference in style and content between the reactions of chief negotiator Egemen Ba and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Ba reacted the way any politician bearing the main responsibility for Turkeys performance would. He underlined the positive points, did not spend too much time on the considerable number of critical remarks and concluded that membership is now a much more achievable goal for Turkey than it ever was. The contrast with the response of the prime minister could not have been bigger. What worries me most was Erdogans use of an old and dangerous myth about the EU and Turkey. Expressing both anger and disappointment, he accused the EU of deliberately stalling Turkeys membership bid: We have been kept waiting at the gates of the EU for 50 years now. We are still waiting and waiting and still in the negotiating process. The prime minister was obviously referring to the 1963 association agreement between Turkey and the then European Economic Community (ECC) in which the potential future membership of Turkey is mentioned. The explicit implication was that Turkey has been working hard to get in for almost five decades but the deceitful Europeans have always found another excuse to keep the Turks out. My problem with this way of looking at recent history is that it is not true and the prime minister knows it. Lets get the facts straight here. The ECC had no intention to enlarge beyond its original six members until the beginning of the 70s when its close neighbors Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined. Only in the 80s did the ECC make bigger geographical steps by taking in Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986). By that time, Turkey had witnessed a military

coup that made it utterly unacceptable as an ECC member. It was only in 1987 that Turkey applied for full membership, at a moment in time when its economy had only just started to open up and the country was entangled in a violent struggle with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that resulted in thousands of people being killed every year. Does anybody really believe, then or now, that there ever was a real chance of Turkey becoming a member of the EU while the country was in that horrible situation? Lets be honest, only from the middle of the 90s, with the economy picking up and the armed fighting diminishing, did accession became a real possibility. In 1999 the EU nominated Turkey as a candidate country and in 2005 negotiations started. In other words, forget about 1963. For two decades, both the ECC and Turkey were not ready to get together and for another 15 years Turkey simply had too many domestic problems on its hands even to get close. I am stressing this point because sticking to the myth of poor Turkey waiting in front of the EU door for almost 50 years, serves a political goal that I fully oppose. By self-victimizing Turkey and blaming the EU, the prime minister tries to escape from his own responsibility for Turkeys underperformance during the last five years. Turkey could have solved many of its remaining problems years ago but the government decided not to do so for domestic reasons. I know, Ba reacting in a more conciliatory way and Erdogan beating the nationalist drums might well be a calculated division of labor, playing the classic game of good cop, bad cop. But the prime minister should know that there are limits to this strategy, especially with the European friends of Turkey. Most of them would fully understand and support Turkey when it blames the EU for being unable to deal effectively with Greek-Cypriot obstructionism and unwilling to end the present humiliating visa regime for Turks travelling to the EU, or when France is criticized for its hypocrisy and shortsightedness. But these appropriate points of criticism are undermined by telling fairy tales in which Turkey is portrayed as the eternal victim. It will not get the country anywhere. AB masallar anlatmay brakn Bu hafta Avrupa Komisyonu, Trkiye ile AB arasndaki yelik mzakereleriyle ilgili yllk ilerleme raporunu aklad. Daha nceki raporlara kyasla ok daha az yank uyandrm olsa da, en dikkat ekici husus Bamzakereci Egemen Ba ile Babakan Tayyip Erdoan'n rapora verdii tepkilerin tarz ve ierik asndan muazzam bir farkllk arz etmesiydi. Ba, her siyasetinin yapaca ekilde, Trkiye'nin performansnn esas sorumluluunu stlenerek tepki verdi. Mspet noktalarn altn izdi, hatr saylr miktardaki eletirel ifade zerinde ok fazla durmad ve "yelik u an Trkiye iin hi olmad kadar ulalabilir bir hedef" sonucuna vard. Babakan'dan ise Ba'nkiyle neredeyse taban tabana zt bir aklama geldi. Beni en fazla endielendiren mesele, Erdoan'n AB ile Trkiye'ye dair o eski ve tehlikeli bir efsaneye bavurmasyd. Hem fkesini hem hayal krkln dile getiren Erdoan, AB'yi, Trkiye'nin yelik srecini kasten srncemede brakmakla sularken, "Avrupa kapsnda 50 yldr bekletiliyoruz. Hl bekliyoruz, bekliyoruz, hl mzakere srecindeyiz." ifadelerini kulland. Ak ki Babakan, Trkiye ile Avrupa Topluluu (AT) arasnda 1963'te imzalanan ve Trkiye'nin mstakbel yelik ihtimalinden sz eden ortaklk anlamasna atfta bulunuyordu. Bariz ima, Trkiye'nin neredeyse elli yldr Birlik'e girmek iin elinden geleni yapt, fakat hilekr Avrupallarn Trkleri darda tutmak iin daima yeni bir bahane bulduu ynndeydi. Yakn tarihe bu tarz bir bakla sorunum var, zira doru deil ve bunu Babakan da biliyor. Gerekleri burada sralayalm. AT'nin ilk bataki alt yesinin tesine genilemek gibi bir niyeti yoktu, ta ki yakn komular olan Danimarka, rlanda ve Britanya'nn katld seksenlerin bana dek. AT ancak seksenlerde, Yunanistan' (1983) ve spanya ile Portekiz'i (1986) yelie kabul ederek daha byk corafi admlar att. O dnemde Trkiye, AT yesi olarak kabul edilmesini tmyle imknsz klan bir asker darbe yaad. Ancak 1987'de, ekonomisini yeni yeni dnyaya amaya balad ve her yl binlerce insann lmesiyle sonulanan PKK terryle iddetli mcadeleye giritii dnemde tam yelik bavurusunda bulundu. Bylesine vahim bir durumdayken Trkiye'nin AB yesi olmak ynnde ciddi bir ans bulunduuna gerekten inanan kimse var m? Drst olalm, yelik ancak doksanlarn ortalarndan itibaren, ekonominin toparland ve silahl atmann hafifledii artlarda gerek bir ihtimal haline geldi. 1999'da AB, Trkiye'nin adayln kabul etti ve 2005'te

mzakereler balad. Yirmi yl boyunca, gerek AT gerek Trkiye bir araya gelmeye hazr deildi ve sonraki 15 ylda da Trkiye yeliin kysna bile yaklamasna msaade etmeyecek bollukta i sorunla maluld. Bu noktay vurguluyorum, zira AB'nin kapsnda yaklak 50 yldr bekleyen zavall Trkiye efsanesine sarlmak, klliyen kar olduum bir siyasi hedefe hizmet ediyor. Trkiye'yi kurban yerine koyup AB'yi sulamakla Babakan, Trkiye'nin son be yldr sergiledii zayf performanstaki ahsi sorumluluundan kamaya alyor. Trkiye geriye kalan sorunlarnn birounu yllar nce zm olabilirdi; fakat hkmet i siyasetten kaynakl sebeplerle bunu yapmamaya karar verdi. Biliyorum, Ba'n daha uzlamac bir slupla tepki vermesi, Erdoan'n ise milliyetilik davullar almas, hesapl kitapl bir i blm, klasik iyi polis-kt polis oyunu olabilir. Fakat Babakan, bu stratejinin, bilhassa Trkiye'nin Avrupa'daki dostlaryla ilgili snrlar olduunu bilmeli. O dostlarn byk ounluu, Kbrsl Rumlarn engelleme politikasna etkili bir ekilde kar koyamad ve Trklerin Avrupa'ya seyahat imknlarn kstlayan mevcut aalayc vize rejimini sona erdirmeye gnlsz olduu iin AB'yi suladnda ya da Fransa'y ikiyzllk ve dar grllkle eletirdiinde Trkiye'yi can gnlden anlayacak ve destekleyecektir. Fakat Trkiye'nin daimi kurban olarak tasvir edildii masallar anlatmak, bu yerinde eletiri noktalarn baltalyor. Bu ekilde hibir yere varlmaz.

Common tastes in Rome I spent the past two days in Rome, participating in the seventh Italian-Turkish Dialogue Forum. It is one of those meetings that you dont read much about. To be honest, before coming here, I had never heard of it. Participants from the Turkish side are the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, for the first time, the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanc University, where I work. The idea behind the forum is to discuss issues that are of interest to both countries and, in doing so, keeping relations between them as good as they have been over the last decades. Italy is one of the EU member states that has always openly supported Turkeys accession to the EU. In fact, Turkish EU membership is not an issue in Italian politics. All major parties agree that it would be good for Turkey to join. Most Italian politicians recognize the strong commercial links between the two countries and both the center left and the center right are receptive to calls from Washington to take Turkey in. Add some vague form of Mediterranean solidarity and the Italian feelings that the enlargement of the EU to the north and the east should be compensated by strengthening the union in the south, and you have the perfect recipe for a good relationship. Turkish diplomats dont need to come here to convince the skeptics. Turkish academics and think tankers meet their Italian counterparts once a year to maintain friendly relations. They discuss, for instance, the advantages of increased cooperation between the two countries on renewable energy and information technology. That is exactly what happened on the first day of the forum. A report listing the benefits of combining Italian and Turkish efforts on the acquisition and use of sustainable energy was presented. Interestingly, the authors mention a number of shortcomings overlapping some of the problems found in the annual Progress Report of the European Commission, which was presented yesterday. Turkey has to adopt better laws on intellectual property and should also improve the transparency of its public procurement policy, meaning that the government must explain decisions regarding which companies get contracts to build roads, bridges and other big projects. The debate was useful for outsiders on this topic, such as myself, and it was fascinating to see how experts from both countries strove to find common ground, both intellectually and commercially. However, the real excitement among the participants started when we discovered that dinner was prepared by two famous chefs who tried to show the similarities between the Italian and Turkish cuisines in their dishes. From Istanbul it was Engin

Akin, a columnist at Vatan and working for Ak Radio, who presented some wonderful dishes. As I write this column, the political and economic relations between Turkey and Italy have yet to be discussed, and the two foreign ministers have not yet delivered their closing remarks. They will most probably confirm the good relations between the two countries and their prime ministers. Remember the wedding of Erdoans son in 2003 when Silvio Berlusconi turned out to be the best man? I have to recall that unusual intimacy between two leaders each time I see Berlusconi in the news for another scandal involving prostitutes or drugs. I cant imagine that Erdoan is very happy with this kind of publicity about one of his best friends in Europe. Despite the obvious differences, both men are extremely aware of the power of the media and like to stress the importance of traditional family values. Both from humble backgrounds, they are admired by ordinary Turks and Italians because of the money and power they have achieved. That explains their success in politics. Whether Berlusconi will get away with immoral behavior yet again remains to be seen. But even if he doesnt, the relations between Turkey and Italy will not suffer much. They are based on common tastes and cannot be changed so easily. Roma'da ortak tatlar Son iki gn, 7. talya-Trkiye Diyalog Forumu vesilesiyle Roma'da geirdim. Hakknda ok yazlp izilmeyen toplantlar vardr, bu da onlardan biri. Dorusu buraya gelmeden nce ben de hakknda hibir ey duymamtm. Trk tarafndan katlmclar Dileri Bakanl'nn Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi (SAM) ve ilk kez, benim de altm Sabanc niversitesi stanbul Politikalar Merkezi. Forumun ardndaki dnce, her iki lke asndan nem tayan meseleleri tartmak ve bylece on yllardr bahar havasnn hkm srd Trkiye-talya ilikilerindeki mspet rotay korumak. talya'nn, Trkiye'nin AB yeliini her daim desteklemi AB yelerinden biri olduu ortada. Gerekten de Trkiye'nin AB yelii, talyan siyasetinde tartlan bir mevzu deil. Trkiye'nin birlie katlmasnn hayrl olaca konusunda btn byk partiler hemfikir. talyan siyasetilerinin byk ksm, iki lke arasndaki gl ticari ilikilerin farknda ve hem merkez sol hem merkez sa Washington'n Trkiye'nin AB'ye alnmas lehindeki arlarna kulak veriyor. Buna bir tr igdsel Akdenizli dayanmasn ve talya'da AB'nin kuzeye ve douya doru genilemesinin bir ekilde birliin gneyde glendirilmesiyle 'telafi edilmesi' ynnde var olan hissiyat eklediinizde, iyi ilikiler iin ahane bir bileim ortaya kyor. Trk diplomatlarn, kukucular ikna etmek iin buraya gelmesi gerekmiyor. Trk akademisyenler ve dnce kurulularnn mensuplar, dosta ilikileri raynda tutmak iin talyan muadilleriyle ylda bir kez bir araya geliyor. Szgelimi iki lke arasnda yenilenebilir enerji ve biliim teknolojisi alanlarnda daha sk ve etkili ibirliinin avantajlarn tartyorlar. Forumun ilk gnlerindeki tartma konusu da buydu zaten. talya ve Trkiye'nin enerjinin elde edilmesi ve kullanmn daha srdrlebilir hale getirme abalarn birletirmesinin yararlarn sralayan bir rapor sunuldu. lgin olan, raporu hazrlayanlarn, Avrupa Komisyonu'nun dn sunduu yllk ilerleme raporunda zikredilen baz sorunlarla akan bir dizi eksiklikten dem vurmas. Buna gre Trkiye, fikri mlkiyet haklarna ynelik daha salam yasalar karmal ve yan sra kamu almlar politikasn iyiletirmeli; yani hkmetin yollar, kprleri ve dier byk projeleri yapacak irketlere ihalelerin nasl verildiini daha iyi izah etmesi gerekiyor. Tartma, benim gibi bu konuya pek aina olmayanlar iin faydalyd ve iki lkeden uzmanlarn entelektel ve ticari adan ortak zemin bulma gayretine tank olmak epey ilgin bir tecrbeydi. Ancak katlmclar arasndaki asl heyecan akam yemeinde yaand; zira iki mehur a, hazrladklar tabaklarda talyan ve Trk mutfaklarnn benzerliklerini yanstmaya almt. stanbul'dan gelen a, Vatan gazetesinde yazan ve Ak Radyo iin alan Engin Akn'd; bize ahane yemekler sundu. Bu yazy yazdm srada Trkiye ve talya arasndaki siyasi ve ekonomik ilikilere dair tartlmas gereken daha ok ey var ve iki lkenin dileri bakanlar henz kapan konumalarn yapm deil. Muhtemelen iki lke ve iki babakan arasndaki iyi ilikileri bir kez daha teyit edecekler. Erdoan'n olunun 2003'teki nikhnda ahitlerden birinin Silvio Berlusconi olduunu hatrlarsnz. Berlusconi, kadnlar veya uyuturucularla ilgili yeni bir skandalla ne zaman tekrar gndeme gelse, iki lider arasndaki bu allmadk yaknlk zerine dnmekten kendimi alamyorum. Erdoan'n, Avrupa'daki en iyi dostlarndan birinin bu ekilde tannmasndan ok da mutlu olduunu sanmyorum. Aralarndaki bariz farkllklara ramen, iki lider de medyann gcnn fazlasyla farknda ve geleneksel aile deerlerinin nemini vurgulamay seviyor. Yoksul ailelerden gelip paraya ve gce ulam olmalaryla, sradan Trklerin ve talyanlarn hayranln kazanm durumdalar. Bu, siyasetteki

baarlarn aklyor. Berlusconi'nin gayri ahlaki davranndan bu kez de paay kurtarp kurtaramayacan ise zaman gsterecek. Fakat kurtaramasa bile Trkiye ile talya arasndaki ilikiler bundan ok fazla etkilenmeyecektir. O kadar da kolay deitirilemeyecek ortak tatlara yaslanyorlar nk.

Turkey-EU cooperation on the Balkans I am sure the Kosovars were happy and proud when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan visited their country last week. For many years I was the rapporteur of the European Parliament on Kosovo and I was present in Pristina when the country declared its independence in 2008. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the new state and Turkish diplomats have worked hard over the last two years to convince more countries to accept the inevitability of Kosovos separation from Serbia. During his visit, Erdoan said Turkey is ready to mediate peace talks between Kosovo and Serbia. It is another example of the active Balkan policy of this government, which has developed good relations with almost all key players in the Balkans. It is also a good example of a problem that could be solved through well coordinated cooperation between Turkey and the European Union. Already in 2003, the EU offered full membership to all the countries in the Balkans. Now, seven years later, the region has not really moved that much closer to the EU. Croatia started negotiations on accession the same day that Turkey did in 2005 and most observers agree that Zagreb will probably join the EU in 2012. But, apart from that, all the other candidates have a hard time in meeting the standards set by the EU. According to the European Commission, the EU could start accession negotiations with Macedonia, but that will not happen as long as Greece keeps having insurmountable objections to its neighbors name. It is a crazy situation but, because of these Greek sensitivities, the Macedonians have been waiting for over a year and a solution is not in sight. The only other country that has made considerable progress on its road to EU membership since 2003 is Serbia. Despite strong Dutch hesitations, EU member states recently asked the European Commission to prepare a recommendation on Serbias membership application. It will take at least one year before that opinion is finished. All other countries in the region are stuck and it does not seem likely that any of them will apply for membership, for the simple reason that they know they dont stand a chance. This gloomy situation has led some European analysts to question whether EU enlargement to the Balkans is still a viable option. In the last issue of Europes World, the only Europe-wide policy journal, a long list of Balkan politicians and EU experts was asked for their ideas on how to get the accession process back on track. Many of the answers sound familiar. Of course, the countries should look for more regional cooperation. It is true that the EU should offer tangible benefits and no one can disagree with the advice to the Balkan governments to be courageous and to explain to their citizens that EU accession is an opportunity that should not be missed. Some of the replies touch upon the real difficult issues at stake. One of the dilemmas is how tough the EU should be on the conditions that have been set to start negotiations and to enter the union. It is no surprise to see EU Commissioner Stefan

Fle stick to the present model: The same conditions should apply to all countries and each countrys progress should be based on its own merits. If not, the EU would lose its credibility. Others take a more practical approach. Erhard Busek, one of the most experienced Balkan connoisseurs, expects that in the end several Balkan countries will enter the EU at the same time, even if they may not all be able to meet each and every EU condition. It is the only way to avoid bilateral tensions and even vetoes, he says. According to Busek, Serbia should, for instance, not be allowed to block Kosovos EU membership. It is clear that both Turkey and the EU have an interest in reviving the EU accession process of the countries of the Balkans. The EU has made a promise that, when broken, could create a black hole on the map of Europe. Turkey can show its mediation skills, help the EU save its credibility and establish friendships that can be useful in overcoming some of Turkeys own problems on the road to the EU. Trkiye-AB arasnda Balkan ibirlii Kosovallarn Babakan Erdoan'n geen haftaki ziyaretinden mutluluk ve gurur duyduuna hi kuku yok. Yllar boyu Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun Kosova raportrln yaptm ve lke 2008'de bamszln ilan ettiinde Pritine'deydim. Trkiye yeni devleti tanyan ilk lkelerden biriydi ve Trk diplomatlar son iki yldr Kosova'nn Srbistan'dan ayrlmasnn kanlmazln daha fazla lkenin idrak etmesi ynnde sk mesai yrtyor. Erdoan ziyareti srasnda Trkiye'nin Kosova ile Srbistan arasndaki bar grmelerine arabuluculuk yapmaya hazr olduunu syledi. Bu teklif, Balkanlar'daki neredeyse btn kilit aktrlerle iyi ilikiler gelitiren mevcut hkmetin aktif Balkan politikasnn bir baka rnei. Yan sra Trkiye ile Avrupa Birlii (AB) arasnda iyi koordine edilmi ibirliiyle zlebilecek sorunlara da iyi bir rnek tekil ediyor. Daha 2003'te AB, Balkanlar'daki btn lkelere tam yelik teklif etti. Aradan yedi yl geti ve bugn blge AB'ye ok da yaklam saylmaz. Hrvatistan 2005'te, Trkiye ile ayn gn mzakerelere balad ve gzlemcilerin byk blm Zagreb'in muhtemelen 2012'de AB yesi olacanda hemfikir. Fakat onun haricindeki btn adaylar AB'nin ne srd standartlar karlamakta zorlanyor. Avrupa Komisyonu'na baklrsa, AB Makedonya ile yelik mzakerelerine balayabilir; fakat Yunanistan komusunun ismine kar alamayan itirazlarn koruduu mddete bu gereklemeyecek. Abes bir durum sz konusu; fakat Yunanistan'n bu hassasiyetlerinden dolay Makedonlar bir yldan fazla sredir bekliyor ve ufukta bir zm de grnmyor. Dierleri arasnda AB yelii yolunda 2003'ten bu yana hatr saylr ilerleme kaydeden yegane lke Srbistan. Hollanda'nn esasl tereddtlerine ramen, AB yesi lkeler geenlerde Avrupa Komisyonu'ndan Srbistan'n adaylk bavurusuyla ilgili tavsiyede bulunmasn istedi. Komisyonun tavsiyesini tamamlamas en az bir yl alacak. Blgedeki dier btn lkeler aklp kalm durumda ve yelik bavurusunda bulunmalar pek muhtemel grnmyor, zira bu konuda anslar olmadn biliyorlar. Bu naho vaziyet baz Avrupal analizcilerin AB'nin Balkanlar'a doru genilemesinin hl geerli bir seenek olup olmadn sorgulamasna yol ayor. Avrupa odakl tek yaygn politika dergisi "Europe's World" (Avrupa'nn Dnyas) son saysnda pek ok Balkan siyasetisi ve AB uzmanna yelik srecinin nasl tekrar rayna sokulacana dair fikirlerini sormu. Cevaplarn ou kulaa aina geliyor. Elbette lkeler daha fazla blgesel ibirlii iin aba gstermeli. AB'nin elle tutulur avantajlar sunmas gerektii doru; Balkan hkmetlerine ynelik nasihatlere (cesur olmak ve vatandalarna AB yeliinin karlmamas gereken bir frsat olduunu anlatmak) itiraz etmek de mmkn deil. Baz cevaplar ise hakikaten zorlu birtakm meselelere deiniyor. kilemlerden biri, AB'nin mzakerelere balamak ve birlie ye olmak iin ne srd artlar konusunda ne kadar kat davranmas gerektii noktasnda ortaya kyor. Avrupa Komisyonu yesi Fle'nin mevcut modele sk skya sarlmas artc deil: "Ayn artlar btn lkelere uygulanmal ve her lkenin ilerlemesi kendi liyakati zerinden deerlendirilmeli." Fle'ye gre byle olmazsa AB gvenilirliini kaybeder. Dierleri ise daha pratik bir yaklam sergiliyor. En tecrbeli Balkan uzmanlarndan Erhard Busek nihayetinde birok Balkan lkesinin, AB'nin btn artlarn hepsi karlayamasa bile, birlie ayn zamanda katlaca beklentisi iinde: "Bu, karlkl gerilimleri, hatta vetolar nlemenin tek yolu." Busek'e baklrsa, szgelimi Srbistan'n Kosova'nn AB yeliini bloke etmesine izin verilmemeli. Trkiye ve AB'nin Balkan lkelerinin AB yelii srecini canlandrmakta kar olduu ortada. AB, tutulmamas halinde Avrupa haritasnda kara delik aabilecek bir sz verdi. Trkiye bu hususta arabuluculuk yeteneklerini sergileyebilir, AB'nin gvenilirliini korumasna yardmc olabilir ve AB yolunda yaad kendi sorunlarnn bazlarnn stesinden gelmekte faydas dokunabilecek dostluklar kurabilir.

The disappointment of Hasan Cemal As I wrote in my previous column, for the last two days the Green Group in the European Parliament has met in Istanbul to discuss Turkey-EU relations. For me it was a pleasant reunion with some of my old friends and colleagues from Brussels. But it was also a sad reminder of the fact that things have indeed changed quite dramatically since the last time the Greens visited Istanbul in 2004. During the first round table, many Turkish participants voiced their concerns with regard to the sustainability of the present accession process. In Turkey support for EU membership has gone down from around 80 percent in 2004 to a maximum 50 percent now. Most Turks blame the EU for not being able to deal effectively with the delaying tactics and obstructionist policies of the Greek Cypriots. Based on impressive economic growth figures and an active foreign policy that has enhanced Turkey's role in the region, many Turks have started considering other options. They are basically fed up with the EU and its unwillingness to really commit itself to full Turkish membership. They hate being seen as beggars on the union's doorstep while so many other attractive alternatives seem to be on offer. You don't need to be an experienced pollster to know that these feelings are on the rise, and it was no surprise that they were heard loudly and clearly during the meeting of the Greens. What struck me the most, though, was the contribution of Hasan Cemal to the debate. Everybody in Turkey knows him as one of the most respected columnists, writing for Milliyet, a long-time defender of Turkey's accession to the EU and the liberal values that come with it. Speaking calmly and fully composed, every inch the gentleman, Cemal made it very clear that he was extremely disappointed with the meeting, the arguments exchanged and, most importantly, with the whole EU accession project. Yes, he admitted, I have always supported membership and all the reforms that are necessary to get there. But since the negotiations started in 2005, the whole process seems to be going nowhere, and the few discussions that still take place about it are dull, technical and unattractive. On top of that, Cemal explained, EU member states appear to be becoming more and more xenophobic, causing many Turks to feel uncomfortable. His words went down well with many in the room. But I felt extremely unhappy, being confronted with the disenchantment of a committed pro-European. When I had the chance to react, I tried to convince him he absolutely had a point but that it would be extremely sad if that

observation would lead him and other skeptics to get off the EU boat and leave it to others to continue the struggle. I fully understand these feelings of disillusionment after five years of slow reforms in Turkey and growing resistance in the EU. The problem is, there is no way back, except when you are willing to give up the dream of Turkey in Europe. A few years ago, I spoke to the chief Polish negotiator after his country got into the EU. He told me very frankly that there had been many moments during the negotiations that he wanted to give up, sick and tired of the ongoing demands of EU officials and public doubts inside the EU concerning whether Poland would be able to make it in or not. The EU, he underlined, is not a nice partner for any candidate country. Most of the time, she is rude and ungrateful, always asking for more reforms and nagging about the remaining shortcomings. After five years of endless reforms but with no light at the end of the tunnel, the support for EU accession among the Polish population had gone down to around 40 percent. It is exactly at this stage in the process that Turkey finds itself in now. I don't know whether I was able to convince Cemal to hang on and not give up. But I am convinced that Turkey, on its bumpy road towards the EU, needs people like him: democrats who are able to recognize the long-term benefits of EU membership, even if sometimes the EU drives them crazy. Hasan Cemal'in hayal krkl nceki yazmda da sylediim gibi, Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun Yeiller Grubu Trkiye-AB ilikilerini tartmak zere stanbul'da iki gnlk bir toplant dzenledi. Benim iin Brksel'den baz eski dostlarm ve mesaidalarmla keyifli bir hasret giderme frsatyd. Fakat ayn zamanda, Yeillerin stanbul'a son geliinden (2004) bu yana ilerin hakikaten epey ciddi ekilde deitiinin de znt verici bir gstergesiydi. lk tur toplantda birok Trk katlmc, mevcut yelik srecinin akbetine dair phelerini dile getirdi. Trkiye'de AB yeliine destek yzde 80 civarndan azami yzde 50'lik bir seviyeye inmi durumda. Trklerin byk ounluu AB'yi, Kbrsl Rumlarn erteleme taktikleri ve engelleme politikalarna etkili ekilde kar koyamamakla suluyor. Birok Trk, arpc ekonomik byme rakamlar ve Trkiye'nin blgedeki roln glendiren aktif d politikaya dayanarak, baka seenekleri gzden geirmeye balyor. Esasen AB'den ve Trkiye'nin tam yeliine dair taahhtlerini yerine getirme isteksizliinden gna getirmi durumdalar. nlerinde birok baka cazip alternatif var grnrken, birliin kapsnda dilenci gibi grlmekten nefret ediyorlar. Bu hissiyatn ykselite olduunu bilmek iin tecrbeli bir kamuoyu aratrmacs olmanz gerekmiyor. Yeillerin toplantsnda da bu hissiyatn yksek sesle ve aka dile getirilmesi srpriz olmad. Bununla birlikte beni en ok arpan, Hasan Cemal'in tartmaya yapt katkyd. Trkiye'de herkes onu en muteber keyazarlarndan biri ve Milliyet'teki yazlar itibaryla, Trkiye'nin AB yeliinin ve ona elik eden liberal deerlerin uzun zamandr savunucusu olarak tanyor. Tam bir centilmen olan Hasan Cemal, serinkanl ve sakin edasyla yapt konumada, toplantdan, ortaya konulan argmanlardan ve en nemlisi de, bir btn olarak AB yelii projesinden byk bir hayal krkl duyduunu gayet ak dile getirdi. yelii ve o noktaya ulamak iin yaplmas gereken btn reformlar daima desteklediini kabul ediyordu. Fakat mzakerelerin balad 2005'ten bu yana btn sre hibir yere gitmiyor grnyordu ve bununla ilgili hl yaplan az sayda tartma kt, teknik ve iticiydi. Hasan Cemal'e gre, hepsinin tesinde, AB yesi lkeler giderek yabanc dmanlna meyleden bir izlenim veriyor ve bu da birok Trk'n rahatszlk duymasna sebep oluyordu. Hasan Cemal'in syledikleri, salondaki birok insann duygularna tercman oldu. Fakat sk bir Avrupa yanlsnn yaad bu hsrana tank olmaktan byk znt duydum. Cevap verme ans bulduumda ise Hasan Cemal'i una ikna etmeye altm: Syledikleri kesinlikle yerindeydi, fakat sz konusu gzlem onun ve dier kukucularn AB gemisinden inmesine ve mcadeleye devam etmeyi bakalarna brakmasna yol aarsa, bu son derece hazin olurdu. Trkiye'de ar ilerleyen reformlarla ve AB iinde artan direnle geen be yln ardndan bu hsran duygusunu fazlasyla anlyorum. Ama mesele u: Trkiye'nin Avrupa ryasndan vazgemek haricinde, bu yoldan dn yok.

Birka yl nce, Polonya'nn AB yesi olmasnn ardndan lkenin bamzakerecisiyle konumutum. Gayet dobra bir ekilde, mzakereler srasnda birok kez brakp gitmek istediini anlatt. AB yetkililerinin bitmek bilmez isteklerinden ve Polonya'nn bu iin altndan kalkp kalkamayacana dair AB iinde uluorta dile getirilen kukulardan bkm, usanmt. AB'nin aday lkeler iin hi de nazik bir muhatap olmadnn altn izdi. ou zaman kaba ve vefaszd, srekli daha fazla reform istiyor ve kalan eksikliklerle ilgili drdr ediyordu. Be yl boyu tnelin ucunda zerre k grmeksizin durmadan reform yapmlar ve bu sre zarfnda Polonya halknn AB yeliine verdii destek yzde 40'n altna inmiti. te Trkiye bugn, mevzubahis srecin tam da bu aamasnda bulunuyor. Hasan Cemal'i yelik srecinde srarc olup vazgememeye ikna edebildim mi bilmiyorum. Fakat ben Trkiye'nin, AB'ye giden inili kl yolda onun gibi insanlara ihtiyac olduuna inanyorum. AB bazen onlara sa ba yoldursa da, yeliin uzun vadeli faydalarn grebilen demokratlara ihtiya var.

Moods change, goals do not Tomorrow, the Green Group in the European Parliament (EP) will gather for two days in stanbul to discuss relations between Turkey and the EU. Among the visitors are Dany Cohn Bendit, chairman of the Greens in the EP and long-term critical supporter of Turkish EU membership and Helne Flautre, my successor as chair of the Turkey delegation of the EP. It is a copy of a meeting held in October 2004. Six years ago, it was a real event. There was a huge crowd following the debates and the media reported about every speech. Then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gl was there, as were Yaar Kemal and Orhan Pamuk. I remember sitting in a taxi and hearing one of the panels being broadcasted live on the radio. It was two months before the EU had to decide whether or not to start accession negotiations with Turkey. In Turkey, 80 percent of the population was in favor. Inside the EU, even in countries like Germany and the Netherlands, opinion polls indicated a positive attitude after two years of encouraging news about Turkey. These were the golden years in Turkey-EU relations and the Green meeting was the symbol of the hopes and high expectations on both sides. These days are over. To put it mildly. Over the last couple of weeks, I was invited to several meetings on five years of official negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Over all, the mood was gloomy. Many have lost faith that Turkey will ever get in. The EU seems to have other things on its mind: getting out of the economic crisis and dealing with the pros and cons of a multicultural society. Turkey on the other hand displays a growing confidence, based on a booming economy and an expanded role as regional player. At the panels and conferences, many Turks expressed their frustrations about the EU and suggested that, maybe, it would be good for Turkey to change policies, forget about EU membership and become a strong autonomous power, focusing on rising stars such as China, India and Brazil. Although I fully understand Turkish frustrations, I dont think giving up on the EU is the right thing to do. First, the negotiations between Turkey and the EU will not be stopped. Yes, the pace is slow and we might soon end up in a situation where there is nothing to negotiate because all remaining chapters are blocked by the EU, Cyprus or France. At the same time, few people realize that for political and procedural reasons, the EU will never decide to stop talking to Turkey about future membership. In Turkey, there is always a lot of attention given to the negative opinions of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel but one tends to overlook the fact that 22 out of 27 governments still support Turkeys EU accession. To suspend accession negotiations, you need the support of two-thirds of the member states. To stop the process, unanimity is required. That will simply never happen. The only country that can stop the negotiations is Turkey. But I cannot imagine any politician who is willing to go out and tell the Turkish public that the 200-year-long march

towards the West has ended and that Turkey will go on its own or side with autocratic Russia or China. Even if some party leaders might be tempted to go that way, the Turkish business community will tell them to reconsider. Yes, the economy is doing fine but that is because of massive European investment, which is directly related to the prospect of EU membership. In other words, despite all the negative feelings on both sides, the accession process will continue. It makes much more sense for Turkey to make the best out of it. That means continue with reforms that will make the country more democratic and the economy more competitive. In the meantime, the EU will hopefully get its act together and start realizing that giving up on Turkeys membership will be a mistake the union cant afford to make. I am sure the Greens agree. Ruh halleri deiir, hedefler deimez Yarn Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki (AP) Yeiller Grubu, Trkiye ile AB arasndaki ilikileri tartmak iin iki gnlne stanbul'da toplanacak. Gelenler arasnda AP'deki Yeiller'in bakan Dany Cohn Bendit ve uzun zamandr Trkiye'nin yeliine eletirel destek veren, AP'nin Trkiye delegasyonu bakan sfatyla halefim olan Helne Flautre de var. Ekim 2004'te de benzer bir toplant yaplmt. Alt yl nceki toplant epey ses getirmiti. Tartmalar takip eden byk bir kalabalk vard ve medya her konumay haber yapyordu. Dnemin dileri bakan Abdullah Gl oradayd, keza Yaar Kemal ve Orhan Pamuk da. Bir takside giderken, panellerden birini radyodan yaplan canl yaynda dinlediimi hatrlarm. AB'nin Trkiye ile yelik mzakerelerini balatp balatmama kararnn iki ay ncesiydi. Trkiye'de halkn yzde 80'i mzakerelerin balamasndan yanayd. AB iinde, Almanya ve Hollanda gibi lkelerde bile kamuoyu yoklamalar, Trkiye hakknda iki yldr gelen cesaret verici haberlerin ardndan olumlu bir yaklamn iaretini veriyordu. Trkiye-AB ilikilerinin altn yllaryd bunlar ve Yeiller'in toplants her iki taraftaki umutlarn ve yksek beklentilerin simgesiydi. O gnler, hafif tabiriyle sylersek, mazide kald. Son birka haftadr Trkiye ile AB arasndaki resmi mzakerelerin be yln ele alan eitli toplantlara davet edildim. Hepsinde kasvetli bir ruh hali vard. Biroklar Trkiye'nin gnn birinde ye olacana inancn yitirmi durumda. AB'nin aklnda ise baka meseleler var gibi grnyor: Ekonomik krizden kmak ve okkltrl bir toplumun artlarna-eksilerine kafa yormak. Dier yanda Trkiye, patlama yapan ekonomisine ve blgesel bir aktr olarak glenen rolne dayal, giderek artan bir zgven sergiliyor. Panellerde ve konferanslarda birok Trk, AB'ye dair d krkln ifade ediyor ve belki politikalarn deitirmesinin, AB yeliini unutmasnn ve in, Hindistan ve Brezilya gibi ykselen yldzlara odaklanan hatr saylr bir zerk g haline gelmesinin Trkiye iin daha iyi olacan sylyor. Trklerin hsrann gayet iyi anlasam da, AB'den vazgemenin doru tavr olmad kanaatindeyim. Birincisi, Trkiye ile AB arasndaki mzakereler durdurulmayacak. Evet, sre yava ilerliyor ve ksa sre sonra kendimizi, kalan btn fasllar AB, Kbrs veya Fransa tarafndan bloke edildii iin mzakere edecek hibir eyin olmad bir durumda da bulabiliriz. te yandan, siyasi ve prosedrle ilgili sebeplerden dolay, AB'nin mstakbel yelik konusunda Trkiye ile grmeyi brakmak gibi bir karar asla almayacann pek az insan farknda. Trkiye'de dikkatler hep Fransa Cumhurbakan Sarkozy ve Almanya Babakan Merkel'in olumsuz fikirlerine younlayor; fakat bu 27 hkmetin 22'sinin Trkiye'nin AB yeliini hl destekledii gereini es geme eilimi douruyor. yelik mzakerelerini askya almak iin ye lkelerin te ikisinin desteine ihtiyacnz var. Sreci durdurmak iinse oybirlii gerekiyor. Bunun asla olmayaca besbelli. Mzakereleri durdurabilecek tek lke Trkiye. Fakat ortaya kp Trkiye kamuoyuna 200 yllk uzun Bat yrynn sona erdiini ve lkenin kendi yolunda gideceini veya otokratik Rusya ya da in ile saf tutacan sylemek isteyecek bir siyaseti olacan tahayyl edemiyorum. Baz partilerin liderleri bu yola meyledebilir; fakat Trk i camias onlara tekrar dnmelerini syleyecektir. Evet, ekonomi iyi gidiyor; fakat bu AB yelii ihtimaliyle dorudan balantl olan muazzam Avrupa yatrmndan kaynaklanyor. Dier bir deyile, her iki taraftaki bunca olumsuz hissiyata ramen, yelik sreci devam edecektir. Mevzu bahis sreten en iyisini kartmak Trkiye iin ok daha anlaml ve aklc bir tutum olacaktr. Bu da lkeyi daha demokratik ve ekonomiyi daha rekabeti klacak reformlara devam etmek anlamna geliyor. Bu sre zarfnda umulur ki AB de kendine ekidzen versin ve Trkiye'nin yeliinden yz evirmenin birliin kaldramayaca kadar byk bir hata olacan idrak etmeye balasn. Yeiller'in idrak ettiinden kukum yok.

Germanys multiple faces Last week Germany was at the center of the Turkish media. It started when German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave a speech in which she declared that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany had failed.

Her statement came after weeks of intense debates triggered by the publication of a controversial book. The author, a German banker, claims that the presence of millions of migrants poses a grave danger to Germanys future because most of them are not well integrated. Opinion polls showed that many Germans agree with this gloomy analysis. The discussion that followed focused on two issues: one, on which allegations does he have a point and where does he exaggerate and two, if so many Germans agree with the guy, why is there no political party that represents these views in parliament? Merkels remarks should be seen and judged against this background. She is under pressure to take a position in the ongoing dispute because many members of her own conservative party apparently support the popular negative views of migrants. On top of that, till now the Christian Democrats have managed to prevent an extreme right-wing party from winning seats in the national parliament. But if and when such a party would be able to successfully copy the Danish, Swedish and Dutch examples, it would be Merkels party that would suffer most. That is why she had to speak and she had to speak tough. It confirmed the perception in Turkey of an anti-migration virus spreading over Europe, now reaching the last country that seemed to be immune. But then, there were the other faces of Germany as well. The most visible one being the new German president, Christian Wulff, who visited Turkey on one of his first foreign trips. Before he left, he made his position in the German debates clear when he said that Islam was part of Germany, just like Christianity and Judaism. Also after landing, he sounded distinctly different when he said that diversity should be respected and is a source of richness. Although he is a member of the same party as Merkel, the president appeared to be sticking to old fashioned multiculturalism when he declared in an address to the Turkish Parliament that nobody is expected to give up their cultural identity or deny their roots. I am sure these words did not go down very well in the Chancellery in Berlin. Last Thursday, I found myself all of a sudden sitting just behind the German president at a memorable ceremony at the stanbul Conrad Hotel. Wulff was there to give his symbolic blessing to the start of a remarkable initiative that shows yet another face of present day Germany. Gathered in the hall were representatives of the German region of Hessen and Turkeys Bursa province. A deal was signed by Bursa Governor Sahabettin Harput and Jrg-Uwe Hahn, Hessens deputy prime minister and minister for justice, integration and Europe. The aim of the initiative, among other things, is to bring Turkey closer to the European Union and to participate together, as much as possible, in EU programs. Whats so special about this? It was the first time that a Turkish province identified itself as a region in the European meaning of the word and started cooperating with a region in the EU. Many cities set up similar projects in the past, but never before has such a joint action been taken at the regional level. It could mean a first step in the direction of a more decentralized administration in Turkey, a policy supported by the EU and many in Turkey who believe that the country cannot be ruled only from Ankara anymore. But there is more to it. It also shows that there are German politicians who want to speak out and act decisively against the growing skepticism about Turkeys future in the EU and the chances of a successful integration of Turks in Germany. We need more Wulffs, Harputs and Hahns in Turkey and in the EU to show that the future is for those who accept differences and want to cooperate to overcome common problems. Almanya'nn trl yzleri Geen hafta Almanya, Trk medyasnn odandayd. Sebebi, Almanya Babakan Angela Merkel'in Almanya'da okkltrl bir toplum ina etme gayretlerinin baarszla uradn sylemesiydi.

Sz konusu aklama, youn tartmalar yaratan ses getirici bir kitabn yaynlanmasndan haftalar sonra geldi. Kitabn bir bankac olan Alman yazar milyonlarca gmenin varlnn Almanya'nn gelecei asndan hayati tehlike arz ettiini, nk bu insanlarn byk ounluunun yeterince entegre olmadn ne sryor. Kamuoyu yoklamalar birok Alman'n bu kasvetli analizi doru bulduunu gsteriyor. Akabindeki tartma iki meseleye odaklanyor: Birincisi, yazarn hakllk pay tayan ve abartya kaan iddialar hangileri? kincisi ise, bu kadar ok Alman yazarla hemfikirse, niye parlamentoda bu grleri temsil eden bir siyasi parti yok? Merkel'in sarf ettii szler bu temelde grlp deerlendirilmeli. Alman lider, sregiden tartmayla ilgili bir tutum sergileme basks altnda, zira belli ki kendi muhafazakr partisinin pek ok yesi gmenlere ynelik bu popler olumsuz fikirleri destekliyor. Bunun da tesinde, bugne kadar Hristiyan Demokratlar ar sac bir partinin ulusal parlamentoda sandalye kazanmasn engellemeyi baard. Fakat byle bir parti Danimarka, sve ve Hollanda rneklerini baaryla taklit edebilirse ve edebildiinde, bundan en byk zarar Merkel'in partisi grecek. te Merkel bu yzden konumak ve sert konumak zorundayd. Bylece Trkiye'deki u algy da teyit etmi oldu: Avrupa apnda g kart bir virs yaylyor ve imdi bundan muaf grnen son lkeye de sirayet ediyor. Fakat ayn sre zarfnda Almanya'nn baka yzlerine de tank olduk. Bunlardan en grnr olan, ilk d ziyaretlerinden birini Trkiye'ye gerekletiren yeni Almanya Cumhurbakan Christian Wulff'tu. lkesinden ayrlmadan nce, tpk Hristiyanlk ve Yahudilik gibi, slamiyet'in de Almanya'nn paras olduunu syleyerek, tartmalara dair tutumunu aka ortaya koydu. Trkiye'ye geldikten sonra da bu ayrt edici tutumunu srdrerek, farkllklara sayg duyulmas gerektiini ve bunun bir zenginlik kayna olduunu syledi. Anlalan o ki Wulff, Merkel'le ayn partiden olmasna ramen, eski moda okkltrlle balyd, zira Trkiye Meclisi'nde yapt konumada da, "Kimseden kltrel kimliinden vazgemesi veya kklerini inkr etmesi beklenemez." ifadelerini kulland. Bu szlerin Berlin'deki Babakanlkta pek de iyi karlanmadndan eminim. Geen perembe, stanbul Conrad Otel'deki unutulmaz bir trende kendimi aniden Alman cumhurbakannn yannda otururken buldum. Wulff, bugnk Almanya'nn bir baka yzn gsteren arpc bir giriimin balangcna nezaret etmek zere oradayd. Salonda Alman eyaleti Hessen ile Bursa vilayetinin temsilcileri toplanmt. Bursa Valisi ahabettin Harput ile Hessen'in babakan yardmcs ve Adalet, Entegrasyon ve Avrupa bakan Jrg-Uwe Hahn bir anlama imzalad. Hedef, baka birok hususun yannda, Trkiye'yi Avrupa Birlii'ne yaklatrmak ve AB programlarna mmkn mertebe ortak katlm salamakt. Bu anlamay bylesine nemli klan ey ne? lk kez bir Trk vilayeti kendisini kelimenin tam manasyla Avrupa'nn bir blgesi olarak tanmlyor ve AB iindeki bir eyaletle ibirliine balyor. Birok kent gemite benzer projeler oluturdu, fakat daha nce blgesel dzeyde bunun gibi bir ortak faaliyete hi giriilmemiti. Bu, Trkiye'de daha ademi merkeziyeti bir idare dorultusunda atlan bir ilk adm anlamna gelebilir; AB ve Trkiye'de, lkenin artk sadece Ankara'dan ynetilemeyeceine inanan biroklarnn da destekledii bir politika bu. Fakat dahas var. Bu anlama, Trkiye'nin AB'deki geleceine ve Almanya'daki Trklerin baarl entegrasyon ihtimaline dair artan kukulara kar sesini ykseltmek ve kararllkla harekete gemek isteyen Alman siyasetiler olduunu da gsteriyor. Gelecein farkllklar kabul edenlere ve ortak sorunlarn stesinden gelmek ynnde ibirlii yapmak isteyenlere ait olduunu gstermek iin Trkiye'de ve AB'de daha fazla Wulff'lara, Harput'lara ve Hahn'lara ihtiyacmz var. j.lagendijk@zaman.com.tr

What is happening in the Netherlands? (2) A profound process of soul searching is taking place in the Netherlands. I spoke to many people in the last couple of days, family, friends, acquaintances. At a certain moment, in all conversations, the same questions pop up. What to think of the new coalition government and its dependence on the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders? How big will his influence be? How to explain the success of the extreme right-wing populists? Which people voted for them? Is it possible to solve some of the real problems Wilders constantly highlights without copying his polarizing style? The answers, even among friends, are quite diverse. According to some, the liberals and Christian Democrats did not have many other options and did the right thing by taking the Wilders party, the big winner of the June elections, on board. Only in this way can they contain and control their main electoral rival. By making him responsible for the survival of the most right-wing Dutch government in 65 years, they hope to weaken his anti-establishment appeal. Others are appalled by all these tactical and strategic motives and speak out strongly

against what they consider to be the start of a process of gradual legitimization of abject views. They fear that bit by bit the two center-right coalition parties will copy parts of Wilders program in order to regain segments of his voters. Looking at the government program, the influence of Wilders is clearly visible in the chapter on migration and integration. The message is explicit and unmistakable: We want fewer migrants to enter the Netherlands, and those who are allowed in have to live up to higher standards. The problem that the government will most certainly face is the fact that most measures that are proposed to reach these aims go against EU regulations and rulings of the European court. Wilders goal of pushing back the immigration of what is called non-Western migrants by 50 percent will most probably be deeply frustrated by European limits and restrictions. It is one of the reasons why the extreme right-wing populists have developed such a deeply felt dislike for the EU. Wilders did not manage to get any reference in the coalition program to his extremist ideas on Islam such as forbidding the Quran and the construction of new mosques. The liberals and Christian Democrats have explicitly stated that for them unrestricted migration and failing integration are the problems -- not Islam. There is a clear link here with the ongoing debate on the reasons why people have voted for the Wilders party. Some analysts argue that the dominant factors are fear of the uncontrollable effects of globalization, including migration, and lost trust in the capacity of the traditional political parties to understand and protect them. Others claim that on top of these anxieties comes a heartfelt dismay of Islam, regarded by Wilders and many of his voters as a repressive political ideology and not as a religion. A considerable number of Dutch citizens -- but the same applies to many Danes, Swedes and Germans -- have mixed bits and pieces of all these considerations in a big bowl, full of poisonous feelings and frustrations. For them it all boils down to one big problem with migrants, Muslims and Islam: from Moroccan gangs and migrants who dont speak their language at home to violent jihadists in Afghanistan and the disgraceful treatment of gays in Iran. My dilemma is how to explain this fear, anger and confusion in the Netherlands to non-Dutch observers who are extremely worried that the once tolerant country is in danger of ending up in the gutters. On the one hand, I feel that things are blown out of proportion by those who suggest that most Dutch have become Islamophobes. Never forget: 85 percent of the Dutch electorate did not vote for the Wilders party. On the other hand, I do not want to play down the seriousness of some real problems with migration and the sincere worries of many of my countrymen. To be continued. Hollanda'da neler oluyor? (2) Hollanda'da esasl bir kendini aray sreci yaanyor. Son birka gnde birok insanla konutum. Ailemle, arkadalarla, tandklarla. Btn konumalarn belli bir noktasnda ayn sorular pat diye ortaya dklyor: Yeni koalisyon hkmeti ve onun Geert Wilders'n zgrlk Partisi'ne bel balamasyla ilgili ne dnyorsun? Bu partinin etkisi ne boyutta olacak? Ar sac poplistlerin kazand baarnn izah ne? Hangi insanlar onlara oy verdi? Wilders'n srekli gndeme getirdii baz gerek sorunlar, onun kutuplatrc slubunu taklit etmeden zmek mmkn m? Cevaplar, dostlar arasnda bile epey eitlilik arz ediyor. Bazlarna gre liberaller ve Hristiyan Demokratlar'n nnde ok fazla seenek yoktu ve haziran seimlerinin byk galibi konumundaki Wilders'n partisini gemiye almakla doruyu yaptlar. Seimdeki balca rakiplerini ancak bu ekilde dizginleyebilir ve kontrol edebilirlerdi. Wilders' 65 yln en sac Hollanda hkmetinin ayakta kalmasndan sorumlu klarak, kurulu dzen kart syleminin yaratt etkiyi zayflatmay umuyorlard. Bazlar ise btn bu taktik ve stratejik nedenler karsnda dehete dm, utan verici grlerin adm adm merulamas srecinin balangc olarak grdkleri vaziyete ate pskryordu.

Hkmetin programna bakldnda, Wilders'n etkisi g ve entegrasyon bahsinde bariz ekilde grlyor. Mesaj gayet ak: Hollanda'ya daha az gmen gelmesini istiyoruz ve burada yaamasna izin verilenler de daha yksek standartlara ulamal. Hkmetin yz yze geleceine kesin gzyle baklabilecek gerek u: Bu hedeflere varmak iin nerilen tedbirlerin byk ounluu AB mevzuatna ve Avrupa nsan Haklar Mahkemesi kararlarna aykr dyor. Wilders'n 'Batl olmayan' diye nitelenen gmenleri yzde 50 azaltma hedefi, ok byk ihtimalle Avrupa'nn koyduu snrlara ve engellere arpp hsrana urayacak. Ar sac poplistlerin AB'ye kar bylesine derin bir nefret beslemesinin sebeplerinden biri de bu. Wilders koalisyon programnda, Kur'an' ve yeni camilerin inasn yasaklamak gibi arlk fikirlerine atfta bulunulmasn salayamad. Liberaller ve Hristiyan Demokratlar kendileri iin sorunun slam deil, snrsz g ve baarsz entegrasyon olduunu aka ifade ediyorlar. Bu noktada, insanlarn Wilders'n partisine oy vermesinin sebeplerine dair tartma asndan bariz bir balant var. Baz analizciler baskn faktrlerin kresellemenin kontrol edilemez etkilerinden (g de buna dahil) duyulan korku ve geleneksel partilerin sz konusu etkileri anlayp nleme kapasitesine gvenin yitirilmesi olduunu savunuyor. Bazlar ise bu endielerin banda, Wilders ve ona oy veren birok semen tarafndan bir din deil, baskc bir siyasi ideoloji olarak grlen slam'a kar derine sinmi bir korkunun geldiini iddia ediyor. Hatr saylr miktarda Hollanda vatanda (ki ayns birok Danimarkal, sveli ve Alman iin de geerli) btn bu dncelerin arkasndaki gerekelerin hepsini, zehirleyici duygular ve d krklklaryla dolu byk bir anakta birbirine kartryor. Onlara gre mesele gmenler, Mslmanlar ve slam'la ilgili tek bir byk sorundan ibaret: lke iinde kendi dillerini konumayan Fasl eteler ve gmenlerden, Afganistan'daki iddet ykl cihatlara ve ran'da geylere ynelik vahim muameleye kadar her ey o tek byk sorunun tezahr. Benim ikilemim ise Hollanda'daki bu korku, fke ve kafa karklnn, vaktiyle hogrl olan bir lkenin yoldan kma tehlikesi karsnda ciddi endieler duyan Hollandal olmayan gzlemcilere nasl izah edilebilecei noktasnda ortaya kyor. Bir yandan meselenin, Hollandallarn byk ounluunun slamobofik olup ktn syleyenler tarafndan ar abartldn dnyorum. unu hi unutmayalm: Hollandal semenlerin yzde 85'i Wilders'n partisine oy vermedi. Dier yandan gle ilgili baz gerek sorunlarn ve birok vatandamn samimi endielerinin ciddiyetini hafife almak istemiyorum. Bu konuya devam edeceim.

What is happening in the Netherlands? (1) Let me start by welcoming all of my new readers. This is my first column for Zaman and Sundays Zaman. I am happy to be able to write a regular column, twice a week, which will be published in Turkish and in English for the readers of both newspapers. Most people in Turkey have known me from the years when I was a member of the European Parliament. It is obvious that I will write in my columns about the many aspects of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union and on the developments in specific EU member states. Since July 2009, I have been living in Turkey and working for the stanbul Policy Center, a think tank at Sabanc University. I closely follow Turkish domestic politics and will comment on it in my articles as well. But life is about more than just politics. If I come across beautiful music or read a book that should not be missed, I will inform you about it. Being a big soccer fan, I am sure I will sometimes be unable to resist sharing my thoughts with you on Turkish football, at home and in Europe. I am looking forward to your comments. There is no escape today. I have to write about what is taking place in the country I know best. I arrived in the Netherlands a few days ago, the same day that the new Dutch government was presented. It is the start of a political experiment that will be observed by many inside the country and abroad, out of curiosity by some, with anxiety and concern by many others. For the first time in over 50 years, the Netherlands will be ruled by a coalition government of liberals and Christian democrats that does not have a majority in parliament. It is a minority cabinet that can only survive because it has a deal with a third party, the Freedom Party of extreme-right populist Geert Wilders.

Nobody really knows what to expect, especially with regard to the position and influence of Wilders party. It does not participate in the government; there are no Freedom Party ministers. But the program of the new administration is strongly influenced by the anti-migration policies of the populists that managed to get 15 percent of the votes in the June elections. What is happening now in the Netherlands is a further example of a trend that is visible in other parts of Europe. The traditional center right and center left parties are losing ground. In the Netherlands, for instance and until recently, these parties used to collect around 80 percent of the votes at national elections. Now almost half of the electorate has lost trust in the capacity of those traditional parties to deal with the problems of today. It has led to the growth of green and (liberal) left parties that want to reform the welfare state, have accepted multiculturalism as a fact of life and are pro-European. At the same time, there is the rise of a new generation of extreme right-wing populists that is different from the racist and extremist parties in Europe in the 70s and 80s of the last century with their fascist roots. The new radicals like Geert Wilders are keen on distancing themselves from the violent and often marginal extremists of the past. No anti-Semitism anymore, no homophobia. Wilders and his European colleagues are strong defenders of the state of Israel and present themselves as the true defenders of the rights of women and gays. Both changes in ideology are directly connected with the overriding anti-Islamism that serves as the new rallying cry of the populists. To make matters even more complicated, the new right wingers often side with the classic leftist in their defense of the present welfare state and their resistance to further European integration. In my next column, I will show the repercussions of this new mix of ideologies for the current Dutch government and what it might mean for future relations between Turkey and the EU Hollanda'da neler oluyor? (1) Yeni okurlarmn hepsini selamlayarak balamak isterim. Bu benim Zaman ve Today's Zaman'daki ilk ke yazm. Bugnden itibaren bu kede haftada iki kez yazabilecek olmaktan mutluyum; yazlar her iki gazetenin okurlar iin Trke ve ngilizce yaymlanacak. Trkiye'deki insanlarn byk ounluu beni Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun mensubu olduum yllardan tanyor. Haliyle de bu kede Trkiye ile Avrupa Birlii arasndaki ilikinin eitli vehelerine ve belli AB yesi lkelerdeki gelimelere deinen yazlar bulacaksnz. Temmuz 2009'dan bu yana Trkiye'de yayorum ve Sabanc niversitesi'ne bal faaliyet gsteren dnce kuruluu stanbul Politikalar Merkezi'nde alyorum. Trkiye'nin i siyasetini yakndan takip ediyorum ve yazlarmda bu konuda da yorumlarda bulunacam. Fakat hayat, siyasetten ibaret deil. Gzel mziklere rastgelirsem veya karlmamas gerektiini dndm bir kitap okursam, bunlar da sizinle paylaacam. Sk bir futbol dkn olarak, arada bir Trk futbolunun ieride ve Avrupa'daki macerasna dair fikirlerimi paylamaktan kendimi alamayacamdan da eminim. Yorumlarnz her daim drt gzle bekliyor olacam. Bugn ka yok. En iyi bildiim lkede olan bitenlerle ilgili yazmam gerek. Hollanda'dan ksa sre nce, tam da yeni Hollanda hkmetinin takdim edildii gn dndm. Bu, lke iinde ve dnda biroklarnn dikkatle takip edecei bir siyasi deneyin de balangc. Bazlar iin merak, bazlar iinse endie dolu bir takip olacak bu. Hollanda, 50 yl akn bir sredir ilk defa liberaller ve Hristiyan demokratlardan oluan ve parlamentoda ounluk tekil etmeyen bir koalisyon hkmetiyle ynetilecek. Bir aznlk kabinesi bu ve ancak bir nc partiyle, ar sac poplist Geert Wilders'n zgrlk Partisi'yle yaplan anlama sayesinde kurulabildi. Bilhassa Wilders'n partisinin pozisyonu ve nfuzu bakmndan gelecek gnlerin neler getireceini kimse tam olarak bilmiyor. zgrlk Partisi hkmette yer almyor, bakan da yok. Fakat yeni hkmetin program, haziran seimlerinde oylarn yzde 15'ini almay baaran poplistlerin g kart politikalarnn gl etkisi altnda. u an Hollanda'da yaananlar, Avrupa'nn dier kesimlerinde de gzle grlr olan bir eilimin ileri bir rnei. Geleneksel merkez sa ve merkez sol partiler g kaybediyor. Szgelimi Hollanda'da yakn zamana dek bu partiler ulusal seimlerde oylarn yaklak yzde 80'ini toplard. Gelinen noktada ise semenlerin yarsna yakn bu partilerin gncel sorunlara zm getirme kapasitesine gvenini yitirmi durumda. Bu, refah devletinde reform isteyen, okkltrll hayatn bir gerei olarak kabul eden ve Avrupa yanls olan yeillerin ve (liberal) sol partilerin glenmesine yol ayor. te yandan yeni bir ar sac poplistler kua da ykselite ve geen asrn yetmili ve seksenli yllarnda Avrupa'da var olan, faist kkenlere sahip rk ve arlk partilerden farkllk arz ediyorlar.

Geert Wilders gibi yeni radikaller, gemiin iddet ykl ve genellikle marjinal arlklaryla arasna mesafe koymaya dikkat ediyor. Anti-semitizme, homofobiye hayr diyorlar artk. Wilders ve Avrupal muadilleri srail devletini kuvvetle destekliyor ve kendilerini kadnlarn ve ecinsellerin gerek savunucusu olarak sunuyor. deolojideki her iki deiim de, poplistler iin yeni toplanma ars grevi gren arlkl anti-slamclkla dorudan balantl. leri daha da iinden klmaz hale getiren eyse, yeni saclarn mevcut refah devletini savunmak ve daha ileri Avrupa entegrasyonuna direnmek noktasnda sk sk klasik solcularla ayn saf tutmalar. Bir sonraki yazmda, ideolojilerin bu yeni karmnn mevcut Hollanda hkmeti asndan etkilerini ve Trkiye ile AB arasndaki ilikilerin gelecei asndan ne anlama gelebileceini ele alacam.

On death When one hears of someone's death, one is prompted to ask oneself: What would s/he be doing if s/he were alive now? As a matter of fact, we may invert the question and ask: "What would I be seeing on the other side if I were in his/her shoes?" This question has the potential to make us realize that those crucial items on our agendas we are hurriedly following are actually trivial, and then we may derive lessons on the true meaning of life. It was heart-rending for me to hear the death of Mehmet Ali Birand. I thought about those who were left behind: his relatives, kin, friends, colleagues. An ember burns where it falls; it is true. No one can feel the pungent sorrow close relatives feel after a person's death. As we console ourselves with "Life goes on," allow me to ask another question. What would the seasoned journalist be doing if he hadn't died on Thursday? In modern times, people die first on the Internet. Birand, too, died such a death. "He died," people posted on the Internet, but his son objected from the hospital, "No, my father lives," and everyone started to wait for the good news to come from the hospital. But the sad news came in the evening: Birand had died. Imagine he left the hospital in good health -- as he has done before-- and mingled with us. What would be our perception about him? It is not difficult to predict. "Let's eat fish in the evening," his wife quotes him as saying. He would certainly go to the TV station. He would prepare his program. Cengiz andar, one of his close colleagues, says, "We had talked about who would be a guest on the program." As andar noted, Birand was preparing to make a program on death had he lived. He would discuss the deaths of three Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) members, who were inexplicably murdered in Paris. He would try to find out who might have pulled the trigger and who might be involved in the shadowy organization behind those contract killers and what ends they might be trying to achieve and, finally, he would try to keep alive hopes for a luminous future for Turkey. Of course, the matter would not be restricted to the Paris killings as the corpses of the assassinated women had been brought to Diyarbakr for burial. As usual, Birand would be prompted to ask new questions. The questions he might ask in this program include: Who gave a message to whom for these killings? Were the women assassinated for lending support to or undermining the mral process, which involves brokering peace via negotiations with the PKK leader Abdullah calan, who is currently serving his life term in mral Island off the coast of stanbul? Will the powers that rely on terrorist attacks in the region allow the solution of the problem via negotiations between the PKK and the state? Many other questions would certainly be asked and those who would watch the program would find their minds dizzy with questions. Even some viewers would hurl serious charges at the guests and even at Birand for some of the remarks they would make during the program; he might even be accused of treason. More cool-headed viewers might post "Birand's gaffes" on websites that would be waiting expectantly for such pieces of information. Columnists would hastily pen down articles about the views voiced during that program, sparking speculations or controversies. Birand would laugh off these remarks, most of which would be utter nonsense and, instead, he would feel sorry for his favorite team Galatasaray's defeat by Kasmpaa on Friday, and he would lend enthusiastic support to his team for its matches on the Champions League. None of these happened. If he had lived, he would have attended the ceremony to commemorate Hrant Dink, who was assassinated six years ago. Yet his own funeral ceremony coincided with that ceremony. An unexpected death claimed the life of a man who would discuss three deaths. The most crucial agenda items became meaningless for him. Now, his sole achievement consists of what he did during his life, the good things he did for humanity... As a matter of fact, a similar end

awaits each of us. With our last breath, we will see our whole life roll before our eyes. Our hatreds, disappointments or offenses will become meaningless. When death comes, life will become more meaningful, and then we will understand that self-questioning is more important than the agenda items of daily life... I am not suggesting that an "agenda" is insignificant. I just want to remind you that there is a greater agenda that directly relates to every individual. Every death is a warning lesson. With Birand's death, we should think about the good deeds we will take with us to the other side when we die as we will build a new world there with what we take with us from this world.

Which one is the sheep? Which one is the wolf? The last week was rife with interesting developments, but most of them were obscured by a quickly changing agenda. I hope a brief mention of some of them will contribute to the understanding of a few plots being put in place in the country. For some years now, the houses of Alevis have been defaced. Those who seek to spark a conflict between Alevis and Sunnis have been marking the houses of Alevis and they have been making sure that certain media outlets make news stories about them. The investigation had revealed that those who marked the houses of Alevis were Alevis themselves. Now, we have a new piece of information about this incident. It has recently been discovered that it was the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) that forced its members to make those marks. Given its past deeds, one can easily guess the organization's aim. Another "sheep and wolf" story came out of the Zirve massacre. It was discovered that suspect Varol Blent Aral, who pretends to be a nationalist and conservative person and who is accused of masterminding that hair-raising massacre of several Christian missionaries, had previously been detained in connection with an attack conducted by the DHKP/C in 1995. The suspect accepted being detained in the face of the evidential documents sent to the court. engl Akkurt, whom he referred to as "my close friend," had died of a prematurely exploding bomb as she was preparing to assassinate former Justice Minister Hikmet Sami Trk in 2008. A big operation was conducted in stanbul and many people including lawyers were detained. Our conventional media organizations are putting the spotlight on the "detention of lawyers," but there is more to it. Suspects are accused of involvement in six armed attacks, killing three police officers and wounding six people. It is reported that the police entered the secret rooms of the DHKP/C and its new leader was detained. Of course, these are currently mere accusations. It is wrong to incriminate or acquit the suspects at this phase of an operation under which more than 50 people were detained. We should wait in anticipation and review the picture in the light of the evidence. There are many wolves disguised as sheep in this country, and dens of wolves tend to merge into the labyrinths of organizations.

lm ah lm Her lm haberinde akla yle bir soru gelir: Acaba merhum, hayata tutunabilseydi imdi ne yapyor olacakt? br leme yryp gidenler hakknda byle bir sual sorabildiimiz gibi Onun yerinde ben olsaydm imdi orada nasl bir durumla kar karya kalacaktm? diye de sorular oaltabiliriz. Ve ou kez bin bir telala takip ettiimiz gndemin ne kadar yavan, ne kadar bo olduunu grr, oradan hayatn gerek anlam zerine dersler karrz. Mehmet Ali Birandn vefat haberinde de yreim szlad. Geride kalanlar dndm. Yaknlar, dostlar, akrabalar, meslektalar Ate dt yeri yakar derler; dorudur. Hibir znt, vefat edenin en yaknndaki hicran kadar keskin olamaz Bir zaman sonra Hayat devam ediyor tesellisiyle yryeceimize gre yle bir soru yneltebilir miyim: ayet o duayen, perembe gn hayat ile memat arasnda gidip gelmeseydi neler yapyor olacakt? Modern zamanlarda insanlar

nce sanal lemde lyor. Birand da yle oldu. nce vefat etti dediler; olu hastaneden Hayr babam yayor deyince herkes pr dikkat hastaneden gelecek haberi beklemeye balad. Ve akamst ac haber geldi: Mehmet Ali Birand vefat etmiti. Farz edin ki merhum, hastanenin kapsndan -daha nce olduu gibi- elini kolunu sallayarak kt, aramza kart; onu nasl grecektik? Bunu tahmin etmek hi de zor deil. Ei, Akama balk yiyelim... dediini naklediyor. Soluu televizyonda alaca aikr. Program yapaca belli. Yakn arkadalarndan Cengiz andar o yzden Programa kimi konuk alacamz konumutuk. diyor. andarn anlattna gre Birand, hayatta olsayd lm zerine bir program yapacakt. Parisin gbeinde esrarengiz bir ekilde ldrlen PKKl zerine yaplacak program izleyecektik. O programda tetii kimin ekmi olaca zerine kafa yorulacak, tetikinin arkasndaki heyla zerine karanlk senaryolar dile getirilecek, oradan aydnlk bir Trkiye umudu diri tutulmaya allacakt. Tabii ki mesele Paris ile snrl kalmayacakt; nk o program yapldnda cenazeler nce stanbula getirilmi, sonra da Diyarbakra nakledilmi olacakt. Birand bu; sormadan, sorgulamadan edemez ki! Muhtemel programda yle sorular yneltmesi kanlmazd: Bu cinayetle kim kime mesaj vermiti, mral srecinin devam iin mi yoksa bu srecin baltalanmas iin mi, bu korkun cinayet ilenmiti, blgede tasarruf hakkn terr eylemlerine borlu gler meselenin zmn PKK-devlet arasndaki grmelere terk eder mi?.. Sorular uzayp gidecek, program seyredenler yeni bir beyin frtnas yaayacakt. Hatta programda sarf edilen baz szlerden dolay baz seyirciler konuklara, hatta ok defa olduu gibi Biranda ar ithamlarda bulunacak; dahas, onu ihanetle sulayacaklard. Soukkanl izleyiciler ise merhum ile ilgili internet sitelerinin hafiye gibi bekletii Biranddan gaf haberlerini rutin gndemleri haline getireceklerdi. O programda zikredilen baz dnceler zerine hazrlop yazlar kaleme alnacak, tokuturmalar ve atmalar dzenlenecekti. Merhum, yllardr yapt gibi ou deli samas olan itirazlarn geneline glp geecek, cuma akam oynanan Kasmpaa-Galatasaray mandan Galatasarayn malup ayrlmasna zlecek, ancak Cim Bomun ampiyonlar Ligi malarnda sergiledii baarl grafiin devam iin yrei gm gm atacakt. Bunlarn hibiri olmad. Yayor olsayd 6 yl nce kalle bir kurunla ldrlen Hrant Dinkin anma treninde olacakt. Belki nceki gn vefat eden Prof. Dr. Toktam Atele ilgili bir yaz yazacakt. Toktam Hocann demokrasi mcadelesinden, diyaloa ak bir bilim adam oluundan dem vuracakt. Oysa ayn gn Birandn cenazesi Tevikiye Camiinden uurlanyordu. Anszn gelen bir lm, lm konuacak adam ald gtrd. En hayat gndem maddelerinin her biri merhum iin anlamsz hale geliverdi. Artk tek sermayesi geride braktklar, ald dualar, insanln hayrna yapt icraatlar... Aslnda hepimizin akbeti ayn. Bir gn aniden vereceimiz son nefes ile hayatmz, bir film eridi gibi geip gidecek gzlerimizin nnden. Kzgnlklar, krgnlklar, dargnlklar bir bir anlamszlaacak. lm kapmz aldnda hayatn manas daha bir anlalr hale gelecek ve greceiz ki aslnda d gndemlerden nemli olan kalp ve ruh hayatmzn hesaba ekilmeden nce kendini hesaba ekmesi... Gndemin hibir nemi yok demiyorum; lkin scak gndem maddelerinin paralelinde her bireyi dorudan ilgilendiren bir byk gndem olduunu hatrlatmak istiyorum. Her lm bir ders-i ibret, bir ders-i hikmettir. Birandn lm zerine bir kez daha dnmeliyiz ki arkada braktmz gzel ilerle br leme gidiyoruz ve buradan gtrdklerimizle orada yeni bir dnya ina ediyoruz. Hangisi koyun hangisi kurt? Hafta iinde birbirinden ilgin hadiseler yaand; ancak sk sk deien gndem nedeniyle o olaylar gzden kat. Umarm burada birkan hatrlatmak, bu lkede dnen dolaplarn anlalmasna yardmc olur. Birka yldr Alevi vatandalarmzn evleri iaretleniyor. Bir Alevi-Snni atmasnn temelini atmak isteyenler Alevi evlerini iaretliyor; sonra da medyada haber yaptryordu. Yaplan soruturmada o iaretleri kaplara yazanlarn Alevi olduu ortaya kmt. imdi yeni bir bilgiyle kar karyayz. Meer ocuklarn kendi evlerine bile arp iareti attranlar DHKP-C adl rgttenmi. Sabkas bir hayli kabark olan bu rgtn nihai hedefini anlamamak iin ok saf olmak gerekiyor herhalde.

Bir baka koyun-kurt hikyesi Zirve Katliamndan kt. Kendini milliyeti muhafazakr olarak tantan ve misyonerlerin ldrld o korkun cinayette azmettirici olmakla sulanan zanl Varol Blent Araln 1995te DHKP-C adna yaplan eylemde gzaltna alnd renildi. Yakn arkadam dedii engl Akkurt, 2008de eski Adalet Bakan Hikmet Sami Trke saldr hazrl iindeyken yanllkla bombay patlatm ve bu yzden lmt. stanbulda byk bir operasyon yapld ve aralarnda ok sayda avukatn da bulunduu kiiler gzaltna alnd. Bizim kadim medya olay, Avukatlar gzaltna aldlar diye veriyor; ancak olay hi de yle gzkmyor. 6 silahl saldr eylemi gerekletirmek, 3 polisi ehit etmek, 6 vatanda yaralamak gibi bir ksm ar ithamlar var. DHKP-C rgtnn kozmik odasna girildii, yeni liderinin gzaltna alnd gelen bilgiler arasnda. Tabii ki mahkeme safhasna gelmemi bir dosya ile kar karyayz. O yzden toplam 50den fazla kiinin gzaltna alnd bir soruturmada zanllar sulu ilan etmek de, aklayp paklamak da doru deil. Belki merakla beklemek, somut deliller eliinde karmza kacak manzaraya bakmak gerekiyor. nk bu lkede koyun postuna brnm ok kurt var ve o kurtlarn ini ou kez rgtlerin dehlizine kyor.

Finding a solution through a minefield The latest talks between National Intelligence Organization (MT) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, who represents the state, and Abdullah calan -- the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader who has been serving his life imprisonment in a prison on mral island off the coast of stanbul since 1999 -- has formed a wave of excitement. We have to understand those who are curious about and have expectations for these talks. It may sound unbelievable but this country has been struggling with terrorism for over 30 years. This is why these talks refresh people's hopes for a solution and strengthen the idea of "let terrorism end, let arms be silenced." However, since the expectations are so high, the potential disappointment is high, too. We have experienced similar events before. "The hope for peace" has transformed into social anger because of provocations such as the Habur incident, when the PKK turned over a group of its members to Turkish authorities at the Habur border gate on Oct. 19, 2009, which was at the time seen as a groundbreaking move that might have led to the disarmament of the PKK. However, PKK supporters turned the militants' return into a major show of power, with massive demonstrations in the Southeast, offending nationalist sentiments in Turkey and also the families of soldiers killed in clashes with the PKK. The majority of people have supported the Oslo Process-- secret talks between government officials and PKK leaders to broker peace in Oslo -- but the Oslo process also ended up in smoke since the PKK has continued to carry out bloody attacks. Once again, hopes for peace have been refreshed. The media has also created an optimistic atmosphere. Indeed, the government has called on members of the media to be more sensitive about this issue. For example, the kind and appropriate warnings of the prime minister's chief adviser, Yaln Akdoan, were not made without reason. Moreover, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan has urged members of the media to adopt a cool-headed approach to the matter. Why? Because it is not possible to reach the desired point at one stretch. Everyone is certain that talks led by Fidan are wellintentioned; however, the process is also open to provocations and sabotage. The country's previous experiences are obvious examples. In fact, the optimistic atmosphere created hot on the heels of the meeting between calan and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) executives was short-lived. Some 100 PKK militants staged a violent attack on a gendarmerie outpost in ukurca, a district of the southeastern province of Hakkari, on Jan. 8. It is known that no one within the PKK can fire even a single shot without taking an order from senior PKK executives as their action can cost them their lives. Who, then, commanded the 100 PKK militants to attack a military outpost? It seems that there are some groups that want to sabotage the process of peace talks and these groups are powerful enough to eliminate calan. Then three Kurdish women were killed in Paris even before the gray cloud over the military outpost attack was cleared. Somebody entered a building which had been locked from the inside with a sophisticated lock and executed three Kurdish women with a gun fitted with a silencer without facing any problem. One of the victims is Sakine Cansz, a co-founder of the

terrorist PKK. This execution has created anger among PKK supporters. It seems that those who committed the murders also calculated the reaction of PKK supporters. And this assassination was a message not only to the PKK but also to all actors involved in the peace process. Which dark forces committed this assassination? In fact there are too many possible dark forces which can commit such a professional assassination both inside and outside the PKK. And even if the hitman is caught, it will not be easy to find the masterminds behind the attack. This is because even the one who committed the murder does not know who he works for. This is why the question that we should ask in order to come to correct conclusions is "What was the intention of those who masterminded this?" not "How did they commit the assassination?" It seems that the terrorism issue cannot be solved via negotiations between only the state and the jailed PKK leader. It is not only the groups within the organization who oppose the peace process that will not allow calan to take steps without consulting them, but neither will the PKK's strategic partners. The PKK's partners, who never spared their military, political and financial support from the organization, do not want to let this armed Marxist terrorist organization, which is the last of its kind, come down from the mountains. Those who benefit from the existence of the PKK within Turkey or its neighboring countries do not want the terrorism to stop. Who would want to see Turkey solve the terrorism issue, stand on its own two feet and become a balancing factor in its region? We should be neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic about the process. What we have before us is an organization that is wrapped by a giant octopus, one whose every arm reaches a different dark labyrinth. It is sure that Turkey will get rid of terrorists, but the common sense and endurance of the people will be tested throughout this challenging process. Sledgehammer case pressure on at Supreme Court of Appeals The court recently issued its reasoned decision concerning the case against the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup plan. The reasons why the court sentenced some defendants and released others have become much clearer. Or this is what we should have understood. However, the traditional mainstream media organizations do not pay too much regard to anything when the deep state and its shady activities are in question. Once again, many of them try to dilute, twist and obscure the court decision about the case with their publications and broadcasts. Faik Tarmcolu, a former military prosecutor and judge says that there is enough evidence to punish the suspects. Why does he say that? We also know that since the start of the case against the Sledgehammer coup plan, a certain media group has been distorting the prosecutors' claims by only selecting sections from the suspects' testimonies that are in line with their aims in order to sabotage the trial period. However, indictment concerning the Sledgehammer coup plan has not been prepared based on concrete evidence. The plan, which was drawn up in 2003, and discussed in a seminar held at the General Staff's Selimiye barracks in March of that year was recorded by the suspects. The senior-level military officials of the time admitted that the suspects committed a crime since the Sledgehammer plan cannot merely be a war game because it is based on real persons and incidents. Then some groups claimed that the documents had been fabricated by third parties with the motive of discrediting the Turkish military in the eyes of the people. But then the copies of the documents have been found at Glck Naval Base, hidden under the floor tiles in a room. The General Staff confirmed that original copies of the Sledgehammer documents were at the offices of the staff. Then some media organization's news reports saying, There are no documents" show their intentions. Since the day the case against the Sledgehammer coup plan started, some media organizations tried to exert pressure on the judge and the prosecutors hearing the case and sabotage the trail. But they failed to do it. Now, they are trying to exert pressure on the Supreme Court of Appeals members. They are trying to disregard the court's reasoned decision by highlighting some certain parts that serve their plan, while ignoring all the evidence. In order to ignore all the evidence, one

should either suffer from an eclipse of reason or

zm yolunda maynl tarla Devleti temsilen MT Mstear Hakan Fidan'n mral ile yapt son grmeler byk bir heyecan uyandrd. Dalga dalga yaylan merak ve beklentiyi anlayla karlamak gerekiyor. Dile kolay; bu lkenin insan, 30 yl akn bir sredir terr belasyla kar karya. Bu nedenle grmeler insanlara umut veriyor ve artk bitsin' fikrini glendiriyor. Ne var ki beklenti ok byk olduka hayal krkl da o derece byk olabiliyor. Daha nce de yaand benzer hadiseler. Bar umutlar', Habur Kaps'nda yaplan provokasyonlar yznden derin bir fkeye dnt. Oslo grmelerine de toplumun byk bir ounluu destek verdi; lakin terr rgt eylemlerine vahetle devam etti; umutlar tketti. imdi toplum yeniden kan duracak' diye umuda kapld. Medyada fevkalade iyimser bir atmosfer oluturuldu. Hatta yle iyimser bir rzgar estirildi ki, hkmet, adeta medyay sakin olmaya davet etti. Babakan'n Badanman Yaln Akdoan'n kibar ve yerinde uyarlar bouna deildi mesela. Nitekim Babakan Erdoan da daha soukkanl yaklalmasna vurgu yapt. Neden? nk istenen noktaya gelmek, bir rpda alnacak bir mesafe ile mmkn deil. Yrtlen grmelerin iyi niyetle yapldndan kimsenin kukusu yok; lakin srecin sabote edilmemesi mmkn deil. Tecrbeler ortada... Nitekim calan'n, BDP yetkilileri ile grmesinin hemen ardndan esen iyimserlik uzun srmedi. 100 PKK'l karakol basmaya kalkt. PKK dediimiz rgtte st ynetimden emir almadan hibir fert bir el ate bile edemez; ederse canyla der. Kim emir verdi ki karda kta 100 terrist karakol basmaya yeltendi? Belli ki srecin devam etmesini istemeyen gler var ve o gler rgt iinde calan' tasfiye edecek kadar gl grnyor. Daha karakol basknnn zerindeki sis perdesi kalkmadan Paris'te esrarengiz bir cinayet ilendi. ifreli kaplardan sessiz sedasz geerek rgt karargahna giren birileri susturucu silahlarla kadn infaz etti. ldrlenler arasnda PKK'nn kurucularndan Sakine Cansz da vard. Bu feci ve ibretmiz infaz, rgt sempatizanlarn fkeye bodu. Anlalan o ki cinayeti ileyen, rgt iindeki tepkiyi de hesap etmiti. Bu profesyonel suikastla sadece rgte deil, sre iindeki btn aktrlere mesaj verildii anlalyor. Cinayeti hangi karanlk odak iledi? Bu profesyonel cinayeti ileyebilecek rgt iinde de dnda da ok odak var aslnda. Hatta tetikiler bulunsa bile uzantlarnn kim olduunu bilmek ok zor olacak. Zira bu tip siyasi cinayetlerde katil bile ou kez hangi karanlk g iin altn bilemez. O yzden nasl yapld' sorusundan ziyade niin yapld' sorusuna ynelmek daha doru sonulara gtrecektir bizi. Grnen o ki terr meselesinin zm sadece devlet ile hapishanedeki rgt lideri arasnda zlemeyecek. rgt ii gler buna msaade etmeyecei gibi, rgtn stratejik ortaklar da kendilerinden bamsz adm atlmasna izin vermeyecek. Onca senedir asker, siyas ve mal desteini rgtten esirgemeyen baz odaklar, trnn son rnei Marksist bir silahl rgtn sessiz sedasz dadan inmesine gz yummak istemiyor. Trkiye'nin iinde ve Trkiye'nin hitap ettii blgede PKK'nn varl kimin iine yaryorsa, o odaklar terrn bitmesini istemiyor. Kim ister Trkiye'nin terr illetinden kurtulup da kendi ayaklar zerinde durmasn ve blgede denge unsuru haline gelmesini? Ar iyimserlie de gerek yok, umutlar tketmeye de. Ahtapotlarn kskvrak sarmalad bir rgt var karmzda; her kol baka bir derin dehlize doru uzanyor. Tabii ki bir gn bitecek terr belas; ancak etin srelerden geilecek toplumun saduyusu, tahamml gc defalarca test edilecek...

Balyoz iin Yargtaya bask Balyoz davasnn gerekeli kararlar akland. Mahkeme kime hangi gerekeyle ceza verdi ya da vermedi; bu daha net anlald. Daha dorusu anlalmas gerekiyordu. Ancak kadim medya, sz konusu devlet iindeki derin yap ve onlarn antidemokratik eylemleri olunca sylenen hibir lafa itibar etmiyor. Yine sulandrma, bulandrma, kartrma faaliyeti yapt pek ou... zal dneminde siyaset de yapan emekli asker hkim Faik Tarmcolu diyor ki: Elde bu kadar delil varken 50 kere ceza verilir. Neden byle diyor? Balyoz davas balad gnden beri ii sulandrmaya pek hevesli meslektalarmz iddialar cmbzla seiyor; setii kk paray davann temel meselesi haline getirerek onu rtmek istiyor. Oysa Balyoz davas, birka delile indirgenemeyecek kadar somut verilere dayanyor. Ta bata Selimiye Klas'nda bir seminer dzenleniyor ve kanun dna klarak hkmete el koymann konuulduu toplant sanklar tarafndan kaydediliyor. Bu konumalarn harp oyunu' olamayacan, gerek kii ve olaylar zerinden siyas bir planlama yapld iin Balyoz sanklarnn su ilediini dnemin asker yetkililerinin tamam kabul etti. Daha sonra elde edilen belgelere sahte' ve sonradan dzenlenmi' dendi. Ancak Glck'teki asker istihbarat odasndan da ayn belgeler kt. Genelkurmay, Balyoz dosyasna giren baz belgelerin asllarnn kendilerinde olduunu mahkemeye bildirdi. Bunu bile, Hibir belge yoktur. eklinde okuruna/seyircisine nakleden medyann ne yapmak istedii ortada. Mahkeme balad gnden beri baz gazeteciler mahkeme heyeti zerinde bask kurarak darbe davasnn srmesine engel olmak istedi. Baaramadlar. imdi de Yargtay yelerine bask yapmaya alyorlar. Gerekeli karar cmbzla setikleri birka noktaya indirgeyerek btn delilleri yok saymaya abalyorlar. Onca delili yok farz etmek iin ya akl tutulmas yaanmal ya da...

Hey guys, take it easy Is there tension between the Community and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)? This issue has been discussed for a long time. Both those who know the truth and those who do not comment on this issue. And some of those who speak or write on this issue are confident in neither the political groundwork that the AK Party stands for nor the social reality that the Community is rooted in. They just repeat the same old clichs. Even worse, some groups are doing their best to escalate this so-called tension into a conflict. Last week, two important statements were made by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and Islamic scholar Fethullah Glen, two individuals most affected by this debate. Let's look at what they said. Speaking during a TV program he attended last week, Erdoan, when asked about the tension between the Community and the AK Party, said: We see that these claims are being covered by the media. It is a nasty situation. These news reports hurt our friends, and some of them have even been convinced by these news reports. We warned them not to believe these claims. This is because once we start to believe these claims, we will be the ones seeing the greatest damage. Our primary goal is providing a high-quality service to the country. His remarks show that his thoughts are quite clear on this issue. Underlining that there is no tension between the AK Party and the Community, Erdoan noted that it is wrong to believe that there is, and that everyone is being negatively affected by such a view. Glen also made a statement via his lawyers last week. When a newspaper ran the headline "Did the Community wiretap Erdoan?" and pointed at Glen, he had to issue a disclaimer. Citing the previous attempts of several ill-intended groups, Glen shared Erdoan's concerns and said, They are now trying to incite a clash between the Community and the AK

Party. Both Erdoan and Glen adopted the same approach and exhibited great sensibility toward this issue. However, this socalled tension being escalated by certain groups may have an impact on both the members of the AK Party and the Community. Of course the Community and the AK Party are not one and the same. In other words, neither is the Community the youth branch of the party not is the AK Party the political extension of the Community. But there is an alliance between the Community and the AK Party when it comes to improving the democratic standards in the country and making sure that Turkey has a place in the international arena that it deserves. It is natural that there would be some disagreements on certain topics between them. However, since the Prophet Muhammad considered disagreement among his followers a reflection of God's mercy, we also take these disagreements as our richness in the intellectual context. Indeed, there is no big difference between the AK Party and the Community in terms of basic beliefs and attitudes about certain issues. We can at the very least not talk about a gap which would create animosity between the AK Party and the Community. Despite these facts, why do some groups try to trigger tension and make it appear as if there is a conflict between the two via social media and columns or television programs? Mr. Prime Minister said he pays no heed to claims that there is a conflict between the AK Party and the Community and notes that he has already warned his friends who have been influenced by these claims. He is perfectly right. It is not only within the AK Party but also within the Community that these friends are doing the wrong thing to deepen this so-called tension. Of course we cannot say that the friends of both sides who contribute to the deepening of this so-called tension are ill-intentioned. Some of them are defeated by their enthusiasm or do not realize the truth about this issue. Sometimes jealousy and ambition, or sometimes schism or intolerance, are the driving force behind these ill-intentioned efforts. Thus, although our immune system is very resistant to external attacks, our body sometimes can be shaken by viruses that have infiltrated our body. It is perhaps for this reason that everyone should ask their "friends" not to lose their common sense by recalling that we are all in the same boat. I also have to underline that some people who recently became our "friends" have never been our real friends. If we have made a mistake, God forbid, the costume party will end and the truth will become much clearer. How do I know? We will have a clearer picture if we look at these friends' previous acts. For example, a few days before the last general election, someone told me, "I hope the AK Party will win more than 30 percent of the popular vote because in such a case Erdoan will become a dictator." Now that person has forgotten what he said and became a friend of the AK Party. Another person, who said some very inappropriate things about the AK Party government, accusing Erdoan of being a villager and a reactionary, is acting as if he has devoted his writings to the party with which he has no common denominator. I can give dozens of examples, but there is no need. It is obvious that we are going through a difficult time. Turkey's progress which is a product of a cooperation of the masses that have experienced a host of problems and difficulties was not an easy one. Those who did not suffer from injustices would not understand the greatness of this process. Thankfully, Erdoan's and Glen's call for moderation create an atmosphere which would eliminate all seditions. And not only does Turkey need this atmosphere, but so does the whole world.

Arkadalar sakin olun artk Cemaat ile AK Parti arasnda kavga var m? Uzun zamandan beri tartlyor bu konu. Bilen de konuuyor bilmeyen de. Hatta yle konuanlar kyor ki meydana, ne AK Partinin durduu siyas zemine vkf; ne cemaatin ykseldii sosyal gereklie. Bir ezberdir srp gidiyor. Daha kts, baz evreler byle bir kavgann var olabilmesi ve daha iddetli hale gelebilmesi iin canhrne bir eforla kendini yerden yere atyor. Hafta iinde AK Parti-cemaat kavgas zerine iki nemli aklama geldi. kisi de mevzuun birinci dereceden muhatab. Babakan Recep Tayyip Erdoan ve Fethullah Glen Hocaefendi. Bakalm ne demiler?

Babakan Erdoan, katld bir televizyon programnda Cemaat-AK Parti kavgas ile ilgili bir soruya muhatap olunca aynen yle sylyor: Tabii biz de bunlar dorusu zellikle yazl ve grsel medyadan reniyoruz. Buna da zlyoruz. Zaman zaman da tabii ciddi manada yaralyor, hatta zaman zaman baz arkadalarm inanmaya da balyor. Diyoruz; Aman ha! nk byle bir eye inanmaya baladnz anda biz kaybederiz. Byle bir ey olamaz. Olaymz bizim bu lkede hizmettir. Bu ifadelere bakldnda Sayn Babakann zihni gayet berrak. Byle bir kavga yok diyor ve dnem dnem medyada estirilen havadan herkesin etkilendiini ancak byle bir eye inanmann yanl olduunu ok net bir ekilde ifade ediyor. Fethullah Glen Hocaefendi de avukatlar araclyla bir aklama yapt hafta iinde. O aklama da bir zaruretten kaynaklanyordu. Bir gazetenin Cemaat mi dinledi? diye ortaya kark att bir manete tekzip gnderiyordu Hocaefendi. er odaklarnn teden beri tezghlad kirli planlara atfta bulunan aklamada u satr Babakanla ayn yaraya parmak basmann ifadesiydi: imdi de parti ile cemaat arasnda sava projesi sahneye konuluyor... Yaklam ayn, duyarllk ayn. Ne var ki bazen belli odaklarn krkledii kavga her iki kitle arasnda da mkes bulabiliyor. Tabii ki cemaat ile parti ayn deil. Yani biri, partinin genlik kollar falan olmad gibi; dieri de sosyal bir hareketin siyas bir uzants deil. Ancak Trkiyenin dnya dengeleri arasnda hak ettii yerini almas ve demokratik tann ykseltilmesi konusunda bu iki kitle arasnda doal bir ittifak bulunmakta. Tabii ki baz konularda farkl dnebilirler. O farkllk, mmetimin ihtilaf rahmettir. nevinden bir dnce zenginliidir. Kald ki ortada temel inan ve yaklam konusunda byk bir farkllk gzkmyor. En azndan fitne kmasna neden olacak kadar byk bir uurumdan sz edilemez. Bu duruma ramen sanki kanl bakl bir ihtilaf varm gibi Twitter zerinden, gazete stunlar araclyla, ya da canl yayn kazalarna kurban giden TV programlaryla niin kavga krklenmektedir? Sayn Babakan, kavga iddialarna glp geiyorum diyor ve zaman zaman kendini medyadaki sylemlere kaptran arkadalar uyardn sylyor. Yerden ge kadar hakl. Sadece parti evresinde deil bu arkadalar bazen cemaat yaknlarnda da dolayorlar ve kavgann derinlemesi iin yanl bir yol izliyorlar. Her iki tarafta da var olan ve tavrlaryla kavgay kkrtan kiilerin bir ksm art niyetli deil kukusuz. Kimisi heyecanna malup, kimisi mevzularn knhne vkf deil. Bazen kskanlk ve hrs, bazen de hizipilik ve hazmszlk devreye giriyor. Dolaysyla dtan yaplan hcumlara kar direnli olmasna ramen ie szm virslere kar baklk sistemi zayf bnyelerimiz kimi zaman sarslyor. Belki de bu yzden herkes kendi arkadalarn aklselime davet etmeli, ayn gemide yer aldmz, herkes en yaknndakine hatrlatmal. u noktay da yazmasam iime dert olur: Bugnlerde arkada gibi pozisyon alanlarn bir ksm aslnda hibir zaman ne arkada oldu ne de dost. lk srmede (Allah korusun) maskeli balo bitecek ve ac gerek o zaman daha net anlalacak. Daha birka yl ncesinde kimin nerede hangi pozisyonu aldna baknz; o zaman ne demek istediimi daha net anlarsnz. Mesela birisi bana son seimden birka gn nce yle dedi: Aman yzde 40 gemesin, geerse bu adam bamza diktatr olur. imdi o dediini unutmu arkada rolne soyunmu. Bir bakas ucube heykel benzetmesi yapld gn aza alnmayacak laflar sarf ediyor, kyllkten girip yobazlktan kyordu. imdi kalemini kapsnn nnden gemedii partinin emrine vermi gibi gzkyor. Onlarca rnek sayarm ama demez. Ayn sknt cemaati kendine siper yapp sorumsuzca konuan kiiler iin de geerli. Trkiyenin gereksiz kavgalarla kaybedecek zaman yok... Zor bir dnemeten getiimiz aikr. Hlbuki bugnlere kolay gelinmedi. Istraplar iinde kvranan kitlelerin kader birlii, tarihin ve taliin bir cilvesidir. Bu srecin azametini ilesiz, dertsiz, gamsz insanlar bilemez. Neyse ki zirvelerden ykselen itidal sesi fitneleri boacak kadar gl bir atmosfer oluturuyor. Bu atmosfere sadece Trkiyenin deil; dnyann ihtiyac var...

It is not possible to live with so many questions Despite the fact that it's been 19 years, the death of Turgut zal is still being discussed. His body was exhumed and then an autopsy was performed.

It was first argued that he was poisoned, then it was denied. Some grave mistakes at the time of his death were reported, and it was also noted that some suspicious persons traveled abroad. Whether he was murdered or died naturally still remains a question. Where did it come from just when it was about to be forgotten? In the light of the growing doubts, President Abdullah Gl assigned the State Audit Institution (DDK) to conduct a thorough investigation. Did this investigation eliminate the questions? Sadly, no. The agency, which has remained unnoticed up until recently, has performed critical and scientific inquiries on sensitive matters. Take the death of the Grand Unity Party (BBP) leader Muhsin Yazcolu. Was it an assassination or an accident? Was it a deliberate murder? His death in a helicopter crash raised many questions in people's minds. In the end, the DDK assumed the role and revealed that there were many unanswered questions in relation to his death. His body was initially searched for far away from the accident site. It became evident that a black box that had previous been said to be nonexistent in the helicopter was indeed there. It was also argued that he was rescued by the police and taken to the hospital, but it became obvious that no such thing had happened. This last sentence of doubt and outrage makes the final point: Can you believe that this issue was closed at Parliament? However, the black box of the helicopter that crashed, which recorded all the information, is now missing. Well, the goats could not have taken it away. It was President Abdullah Gl who made this critical statement. The DDK's performance in the Yazcolu case was so impressive that it was also assigned to deal with the Hrant Dink murder, which people feared would be covered up. It should be noted that it did an excellent job in this case as well. The public's reaction to the argument that no trace of any organization was found in the murder was relevant to the negligence of some information and documents. Now the DDK will review the Madmak disaster in Sivas. Some circles, which have raised some doubts and discussions on the heinous incident in Sivas, seem displeased with this development. Why is that? A group of people who buried their pain in their hearts have asked the DDK for a review of the Babalar massacre committed in revenge of the horror in Madmak Hotel. The DDK will review this case as well. It is the right decision. Both cases should be investigated thoroughly so that those who played a part in the bloody scenarios to ignite a sectarian fight can be exposed. Of course, the DDK cannot replace the courts, but it may assume a great role to shed light on a better understanding of what happened. It is like the commission of inquiry into coups. This commission, set up in Parliament, does not replace the courts, but it does an enormous job of revealing some facts on some critical matters. The judicial aspect of the incident points to a different process anyway. What really matters is reviewing unresolved matters through independent bodies because unless it faces some brutal facts, Turkey will not be able to embrace the future. The cases with crucial questions and unresolved matters are not limited to the files under the review of the DDK. For instance, the murders of Ahmet Taner Klal, Uur Mumcu and Bahriye Uok still remain unsolved. The murder of Necip Hablemitolu is another case. It was argued that Col. Kazm Cilliolu committed suicide. When his body and grave were examined, it became evident that it had been murder. Official authorities told us that the helicopter carrying Gen. Eref Bitlis crashed and he died in this incident. However, an inquiry into this case revealed that even those who undersigned the report indicated that it was not an accident. Was this case resolved? No. Like many other mysterious cases, this one awaits a thorough investigation. In fact, the list is quite extensive. The people were not fully informed about how and why Tark mit, Cem Ersever, mer Ltfi Topal and many others were murdered and what role the deep state assumed in this process. Maybe they will never be informed. Was the bloody May 1 incident resolved? Were those who murdered more than 100 people in Kahramanmara by igniting a sectarian fight implicated? Was the Susurluk case resolved? For God sake, we are talking about 17,000 unresolved murders in this country. Recently, in a TV program aired on NTV and Star TV, Prime Minister Erdoan, in response to questions posed by journalists, said: We cannot argue that the deep structure within the state has been fully eliminated. He is telling the truth. The preliminary report by the 13th High Criminal Court delivered to the lawyers of the defendants extensively reveals the gravity

of the matter. The involvement of the AK Party in a case into propaganda websites allegedly devised to discredit the AK Party has been discussed. According to information found in the computer records of the General Staff that was submitted to the court, a number of methods including the use of weapons -- to ensure the dissolution of the AK Party and even to suspend the democratic process were mentioned by those involved in setting up the propaganda websites. Now there is another concern: that some of the cases investigated may be shelved without being solved. Eref Bitlis' son has recently said that everything is becoming obscure again while we were thinking that everything would be resolved. Ahmet zal made similar statements, basically implying that the death of his father is being covered up. Muhsin Yazcolu's family and his close friends also emphasize that the case is being covered up. No country can live with such grave suspicions and doubts.

Wouldn't you be angry at those who profiled you? It has become apparent that the court hearing the propaganda websites case requested some information and documents from the General Staff. The General Staff transferred all the computer records covering the relevant period to the court. At this point, we should congratulate the General Staff. In the past, it used to refuse to respond to such requests. Or they would deliver useless information to the courts. Now the records referred to the court reveal what really happened for those who would like to understand. A frequent problem in the Ergenekon case reappeared in the preliminary report released by the 13th High Criminal Court. Those whose names were included in documents referred to the court reacted adversely to the reports on this matter. It is only normal; this has an annoying aspect. Similar reactions were made in the Ergenekon investigation as well. Those who reacted negatively raised some justifiable points as well because certain military officers profiled certain people to use this information against them in the future. If these people were unaware of what happened, it is only understandable and even justifiable for them to react against the inclusion of their names in the reports prepared by psychological operation units. It could be said that during the reporting process, the proper attention was not paid and some misleading information was publicized, leading to confusion. However, if the relevant report was made and drafted by the General Staff and it was officially recorded in the court files, you cannot simply believe that this information will remain secret and confidential. Those who believe that they have been victimized by this process should file a lawsuit against whomever drafted the document causing victimization and hold them accountable before the public. Let me be clear: the people who were profiled by the General Staff or the units engaging in psychological warfare within the General Staff should start a legal process against the drafters of that document. I have never heard of a criminal complaint or lawsuit filed by those who were profiled by the relevant state institution so far. Those whose names appeared in these documents should have at least minimally reacted negatively to the drafters of these documents instead of reacting adversely to those who published the already public information on the files held by the lawyers that was included in the court records. If they had done so, there would not have been so many questions. Would you not cover up a file if you do not publish the court records? This is delicate issue because the whole picture is not captured when you do not have a comprehensive look at it.

Bu kadar ok soru iaretiyle yaanamaz 19 yl gemesine ramen merhum Cumhurbakan Turgut zal'n vefat hl tartlyor.

Mezar ald, otopsiler yapld, zehir var' dendi, yok' dendi, vefat esnasndaki lmcl ihmaller rapor edildi, pheli kiilerin yurtdnda olmalar dile getirildi... ld m, ldrld m, ar ihmaller mi sz konusu?.. Tam unutulmuken nereden kmt zal dosyas? Kukular devam edince Cumhurbakan Abdullah Gl, Devlet Denetleme Kurulu'nu (DDK) grevlendirmi, enine boyuna derin bir inceleme yaptrmt. O inceleme sonrasnda sorular azald m? Maalesef hayr. Ancak birka sene ncesine kadar varlndan bile haberdar olunmayan Kurul, ok kritik mevzularda ok titiz ve bilimsel aratrmalar yapt. Mesela BBP lideri Muhsin Yazcolu'nun vefat. Kaza myd, suikast myd? hmal mi vard, yoksa kast m? Efsane liderin bir anda helikopter kazasna kurban gitmesi kafalar kartrmt. Sonunda DDK devreye girdi. Meer ne kadar ok karanlk nokta varm Yazcolu'nun vefatnda... Muhsin Bey'in olay yerinden srarla uzakta aranmas, helikopterde yok' denen cihazn var olduunun anlalmas, valilik ve emniyet yetkilisi tarafndan, kurtarld ve hastaneye gtrld sylenmesine ramen byle bir vakann hi yaanmamas ve zaman kaybedilmesi... Son noktay, phe ve isyann kart u cmle zetledi: Dnebiliyor musunuz, Meclis'te bu mesele kapanmt. Ama den helikopterin beyni, yani her eyi kaydeden o hafzas yok imdi ortada. Keiler gelip skp gtrmedi onu... Bu kritik tespiti yapan bizzat Cumhurbakan Abdullah Gl'd. Yazcolu dosyasnda DDK'nn ortaya koyduu performans o kadar etkileyiciydi ki st rtlecek diye insanlarn prdikkat kesildii Hrant Dink cinayeti iin de bu Kurul'a bavuruldu. El-hak, Kurul o konuya da ciddi sahip kt. Kamu vicdannn cinayette rgt bulunamad' hkmne itiraz somut baz bilgi ve belgelerin gz ard edilmesi ile ilgiliydi. imdi DDK, Sivas'taki Madmak faciasn inceleyecek. teden beri Madmak'ta yaanan feci olay zerine atp tutan birileri bu gelimeden hi de memnun grnmyor. Neden acaba? Yllardr acsn yreine gmen bir grup vatandamz, Madmak Oteli'ndeki vahetin misillemesi olarak yaplan Babalar katliamnn da DDK tarafndan incelenmesini istiyor. DDK onu da inceleyecekmi. Doru bir karar. Her iki olay da, derinden derine incelensin ve mezhep kavgas karmak iin kimlerin hangi kanl senaryoda korkun roller stlendii anlalsn. Tabii ki DDK, mahkemelerin yerini alamaz; ama hadiselerin i yznn anlalmas konusunda byk bir rol stlenebilir. Tpk, Darbeleri Aratrma Komisyonu gibi. Meclis ats altnda kurulan o komisyon da mahkemelerin yerini tutmuyor ama baz gereklerin anlalmas ve kamuoyuyla paylalmas konusunda muazzam iler yapyor. Zaten meselenin yargya bakan yn baka bir sreci iaret ediyor. nemli olan, bamsz yaplarn verdii gle karanlk hadiselerin zerine gidilmesi. nk o karanlkla yzlemedike Trkiye aydnlk ufuklara ynelemeyecek... zerinde kocaman soru iaretleri bulunan hadiseler DDK'nn inceledii dosyalarla snrl deil. Mesela Ahmet Taner Klal, Uur Mumcu, Bahriye ok cinayetleri zerinde hl esrarengiz birer glge duruyor. Necip Hablemitolu cinayeti bir trl aydnlatlamyor. Albay Kazm illiolu'nun intihar ettii syleniyordu. Kabri alp incelendiinde cinayetle yz yze gelindi. Resm makamlar tarafndan yllarca Orgeneral Eref Bitlis'i tayan uan buzlanmadan dolay dt sylenmiti. Hadise yeniden aratrlnca buzlanma raporuna imza atanlar bile aslnda buzlanmann kaza nedeni olmadn syleyiverdi. Hadise zld m? Hayr. Tpk 93 ylndaki onca karanlk hadise gibi aratrmalar, soruturmalar, incelemeleri bekliyor. Aslnda liste uzun. Tark mit'in, Cem Ersever'in, mer Ltfi Topal'n ve daha pek ok kiinin nasl ve niin ldrldn, 'derin yap'nn burada nasl bir rol stlendiini tastamam renemedi kamuoyu. Belki de hi renemeyecek. Kanl 1 Mays zlebildi mi ki? Kahramanmara'ta mezhep kavgasn tezghlayp 100'den fazla insann lmne neden olanlar bulunabildi mi ki? Susurluk olay aydnlatlabildi mi ki? Hangi lkede hl 17 bin faili mehul cinayetten sz edilebiliyor Allah akna... Geenlerde Babakan Erdoan, NTV ve Star TV'de gazetecilerin sorularna cevap verirken, Devletteki derin yap tamamen temizlendi diye bir iddiann iinde olamayz. dedi. Doru sylyor. Hafta iinde 13. Ar Ceza Mahkemesi'nin sank avukatlarna verdii n rapor, meselenin dehetini yeterince gzler nne seriyor. nternet andc davasna AK Parti'nin mdahil olmas ok konuulmu, ok tartlmt. Bouna deilmi; Genelkurmay'n bilgisayar kaytlarnda yer alan ve mahkemeye sunulan bilgilere gre AK Parti'nin kapatlmas, hatta demokrasinin askya alnmas iin silahl ya da silahsz' pek ok metoda yer verilmi.

imdi baka bir endie balad: Soruturulan baz konularn sonu alnmakszn tekrar raflara kaldrlmas. Eref Bitlis'in olu geenlerde, Her eyin aydnlanacan dndmz bir anda her ey tekrar karanla gidiyor. dedi. Ahmet zal da canhra bir eda ile feryat ediyor ve, Babamn lmnn zerini kapatyorlar. eklinde zetleyebileceim eyler sylyor. Muhsin Yazcolu'nun ailesi ve dava arkadalar, olayn zeri rtlyor' diye lk stne lk atyor... Hibir lke, ruhunu kemiren vahim kukularla yaayamaz. Seni fileyene hi mi kzmayacaksn? Hafta iinde anlald ki, internet andc davasn yrten mahkeme, Genelkurmay Bakanlndan bilgi ve belge talebinde bulunmu; stelik olumlu cevap da alm. Genelkurmay Bakanl, bahsi geen dneme dair bilgisayarlarndaki btn kaytlarn mahkemeye ibraz etmi. nce tam bu noktada durup Genelkurmay kutlamak lazm. Vaktiyle hibir soruya cevap verilmezdi malum. Ya da hafzas defalarca silinmi kaytlar gnderilirdi mahkemelere. imdi mahkemeye sunulan kaytlar bir dnem Trkiyede neler yaandn gzler nne seriyor; tabii grmek isteyenlere... Ergenekon davasnda ska yaanan bir problem 13. Ar Cezann kaleme ald n raporda da karmza kt. Mahkemeye intikal eden belgelerde ad geenler, bu mevzuda yaplan haberlere tepki gsterdi. Normaldir; sinir bozucu bir yan var bu durumun. Ergenekon soruturmasnda da benzer tepkiler hep gzlendi. Tepki gsterenler bazen hakl sebepler de ileri srd. nk kapal kaplar ardnda bir ksm askerler oturmu baz kiileri filemi, onlar tasnif etmi hatta bazlarn kullanmak maksadyla tavzif etmi. ayet bu kiilerin bu durumdan haberi yoksa psikolojik harekt birimlerinin hazrlad raporlarda isimlerinin gemesine ierlemesi, hatta onun kamuoyu ile paylalmasna kar isyan etmesi anlalabilir bir reaksiyon. Haberletirme srecinde, bazen, maalesef, zensiz davranld, sehven bile olsa bilgilerin doru balk altnda verilemedii ve kafa karklna yol at da sylenebilir. Lakin bahsedilen konu ayet Genelkurmay tarafndan kaleme alnmsa; stelik resmen mahkeme kaytlarna geirilmise bu bilgilerin gizli kalmas dnlemez; hele resm yollarla bu bilgiler aleniyet kesbetmise. Madur edildiini dnen kiilerin yapmas gereken asli bir i var: Maduriyete neden olan belgeyi kim dzenlemise ona dava amak, kamuoyunun huzurunda onlardan hesap sormak. Daha ak syleyeyim: Vaktiyle Genelkurmay tarafndan ya da ona bal psikolojik harp yrten birimler tarafndan filenen kiiler, o belgeyi hazrlayan kiilerden hesap sormaldr. lgili devlet birimlerinin kullanma msait diye filedii, haber yaptrma ya da yaz yazdrma thmeti altnda brakt kiilerden, Beni nasl byle filersiniz? diye bir dava aldn grmedim, duymadm. smi geen kiiler, mahkeme zabtlarna gemi ve avukatlarn elindeki dosyalar vastasyla aleniyet kesbetmi bilgileri yaynlayanlara gsterdii tepkinin binde birini, o evrak dzenleyenlere gsterseydi bugn kafalar bu kadar karmazd. Mahkeme kaytlarn da yaynlamazsanz bir dosyay rtbas etmi olmaz msnz? Hassas bir konu; drt bir yandan baklmadka fotorafn tamam grlmyor nk... e.dumanli@zaman.com.tr

For a freer Turkey Rapid changes may create vertigo. This is because there is the risk of falling from a cliff while trying to create progress. Steep rises may result in illusions and hallucinations. Every change that does not have a firm footing will face trouble ahead. For instance, the actors involved in the change may be haunted by enthusiastic fancies. Those who seek to disrupt the stability from the outside may adulate the processes of change in order to make them hit rock bottom. The guarantee of change is common wisdom and conscience. People/groups should come together and ponder on problems of today and the future and make plans without prejudices. Fear from the views of opposing camps makes you unable to manage change well. The key is to adopt a sincere approach to diverse ideas and use them to boost Turkey's dynamism. The Zaman daily's Ortak Akl Toplants (Common Wisdom Meeting) offers a venue for discussing the most crucial topics with the utmost freedom. As you may remember, a very noteworthy meeting on the financial crisis had previously been held to discuss concrete suggestions to escape from the chaos. The common wisdom meeting on the Kurdish issue, on the other

hand, was published both as a series of articles and as a book. One of the most effective common wisdom meetings was held to discuss a bill on Turkish trade laws. That meeting was truly a good opportunity as the groups who would directly be affected by the bill were able to express them freely. In attendance as the guest of honor, Customs and Trade Minister Hayati Yazc and his team did the right thing by taking into consideration the criticisms and suggestions voiced by the stakeholders. Thanks to their interest, certain plans that might have introduced wrong policies into our business life were reassessed. Changes and new arrangements were made. On Saturday, another vital meeting was held by the paper. Higher Education Board (YK) President Professor Gkhan etinsaya was the guest of honor at this meeting which was also attended by rectors, board of trustee heads and academics of various universities. The representatives of many civil society organizations (CSOs) were also there. The high-profile participants who had examined the YK bill in painstaking detail provided a good example of discussing one of the most fundamental issues in the country in a civilized manner. Everyone freely voiced their opinions, trying to be more constructive and pave the way for positive developments. The end result was another typical common wisdom meeting from the Zaman daily. There were criticisms, proposals and observations. Everyone had a unique perspective about the YK bill. From their vantage point, everyone was certainly referring to a certain fact. The crucial thing is to bring these pieces together and assemble the big picture. The brainstorming session on the YK bill offers us a mind-blowing landscape. The Zaman daily will share the results of this important meeting that assessed a crucial topic in the context of dynamics of change. The minutes of the meetings, titled As the YK law is being amended, how should we reorganize our universities? will be published as a book and sent to all the parties concerned. To ponder on and discuss the YK bill means not only discussing the future of our universities, but also putting the spotlight on the future of science, art and intellectual life in our country. I hope these common wisdom meetings will be another quest for reflection.

As Ergenekon trial nears end As the case against a clandestine organization nested within the state trying to manipulate and overthrow the democratically elected government is nearing its end, pro-Ergenekon groups have stepped up their efforts to discredit the lawsuit, creating confusion in the minds of people and distorting facts. Those who were complaining about the lengthy trial processes or the arrests being used to penalize the defendants are now in a hurry. They hold press conferences and show up on TV to say, The trial is being conducted hurriedly. However, there are hundreds of documents of evidence in the case files of the Ergenekon trial. Meanwhile, they resorted once again to a specific type of black propaganda campaign which they once used to try and discredit the Ergenekon trial, but failed. Thus, they attempt to defame Fethullah Glen, a well-respected TurkishIslamic scholar, by bringing back onto the agenda a trite accusation which had been voiced many times before in connection with Tuncay Gney in the past, which had been refuted. They should not beat around the bush. The place to settle accounts is in court. Meanwhile, the main opposition party's tough test with Ergenekon continues. The Republican People's Party (CHP) is unable to make up its mind. On one hand, the party exhibits democratic reflexes but on the other, it cannot or does not take steps to change the party's pro-coup image. Last week, the party's leader criticized a former Maoist group, saying: When did you emerge as Atatrkist? Weren't you pro-Apo [an abbreviation used for jailed PKK leader Abdullah calan]? But, several days later, he partnered with that group to visit Silivri prison. What urges the CHP to partner with a shady former Maoist and proApo group?

Daha zgr bir Trkiye iin

YK yasasn dnmek/tartmak sadece niversitelerin geleceini konumak deil; ayn zamanda lkemizin bilim, sanat, fikir hayatnn istikbalini mercek altna almak demektir. Umarz dzenlenen Ortak Akl Toplants lkemizin tefekkr burcunda yeni bir bayrak olacaktr. Hzl deiimler ba dnmesine sebep olabilir. Mesafe alyorum derken bir anda bolua dme ihtimali de var nk. Ani ykseliler illzyonlara da neden olabilir, halsinasyonlara da. Ayaklar yere basmayan her deiimi sancl gnler bekliyor. Mesela deiimin iindeki aktrler cokun bir hayale esir debilir. Dardan denge bozmak isteyenler, deiim srelerini baltalamak iin pohpohlayarak dibe vurdurmay salayabilir. Deiimin sigortas ortak akl, ortak vicdandr. Bir utan bir uca savrulmamak iin insanlarn/kitlelerin bir araya gelmesi, kafa kafaya vermesi ve nyargsz dncelerle yarnlar planlamas gerekiyor. Kart dnceden rkenler, deiimi salkl ynetemez. nemli olan, farkl dnceleri samimiyetle deerlendirmek ve onu Trkiye'nin dinamizmine vesile klmaktr. Zaman'n Ortak Akl Toplantlar, en hayati konular en u noktalarda tartmaya ayor. Hatrlanaca zere daha nce finans krizi zerine ok nemli bir toplant yaplm ve kaostan k yollar somut neriler eliinde tartlmt. Krt sorunu zerine yaplan ortak akl toplants sadece bir yaz dizisi olarak yaynlanmad; ayrca kitap haline getirilip kamuoyuna arz edildi. En etkin ortak akl toplantlarmzdan biri hi phesiz Trk Ticaret Kanunu tasla zerine yapld. yi ki de yapld o toplant. Kanun Meclis'e gelmeden yasadan dorudan etkilenecek kitleler kendilerini ifade etti. O toplantnn konuu olan Gmrk ve Ticaret Bakan Hayati Yazc ve ekibi, ok gzel bir icraata imza att ve paydalardan gelen tenkit ve teklifleri dikkate ald. O dikkat sayesinde ticaret hayatmz yanl bir noktaya tayacak baz dzenlemeler dikkatle tekrar ele alnd. Deiiklikler ve dzenlemeler yapld. Cumartesi gn ok hayat bir toplant daha yapld gazetemizde. Yksekretim Kurulu (YK) Bakan Prof. Dr. Gkhan etinsaya'nn konuk olduu toplantya niversitelerin mtevelli heyet bakanlar, rektrleri ve akademisyenler katld. Sivil toplum kurulularn temsil eden katlmclar da ortak akl platformundayd. YK yasas zerine hazrlanan tasla en ince ayrntsna kadar incelemi ok st dzey katlmclar, bu lkenin en temel meselelerinden birinin nasl seviyeli bir ekilde tartlabileceini de ispat etti. Herkes tespitlerini zgrce ifade ederken; hep yapc olmay, olumlu gelimelere nclk yapmay hedefledi. Ve ortaya bir Zaman Ortak Akl Toplantlar klasii kt. Tenkitler, teklifler, tespitler... Herkes YK yasa teklifine ayr bir pencereden bakt. Her pencereden grlen manzarann ayr bir gereklii vard kukusuz. Asl nemli olan, farkl perspektiflerden grlen paralar bir araya getirip fotorafn tamamn resmedebilmek. YK yasa teklifi zerine yaplan beyin frtnas, ufuk ac bir manzara sunuyor bize. Bu hayat konuyu deiimin dinamikleri iinde deerlendiren toplantmz siz deerli okurlarmzla paylayoruz. Yaz dizisi halinde okuyacanz YK Kanunu Deiirken... Nasl Bir niversite?' balyla sunulan toplant tutanaklar kitap haline de getirilecek ve ilgili btn kurumlarla paylalacak. YK yasasn dnmek/tartmak sadece niversitelerin geleceini konumak deil; ayn zamanda lkemizin bilim, sanat, fikir hayatnn istikbalini mercek altna almak demektir. Umarz bu Ortak Akl Toplants' lkemizin tefekkr burcunda yeni bir bayrak olacaktr. Ergenekonda sona yaklarken Ergenekon davas sona doru yaklatka Ergenekon-sever gler sulandrma, bulandrma, arptma faaliyetine hz verdi. Daha dne kadar Dava ok uzad! ya da Dava uzad ve tutukluluk cezaya dnt. diyenler imdilerde bir tela iinde. Basn toplants yapyorlar, ekranlarda arz- endam ediyorlar ve srarla Dava aceleye getiriliyor. diyorlar. Oysa Ergenekon davasnn somut delillerini ifade eden dosyalarda yzlerce belge bulunuyor. Bu arada Ergenekon davasna glge drmek iin vaktiyle piyasaya srdkleri ama sonu alamadklar kara propagandaya snmay da unutmuyorlar. Mesela Tuncay Gney zerinden 50 kez gndeme getirilmi ve cevab defalarca verilmi bayat bir yaktrmay tekrar gndeme getirerek Fethullah Glen Hocaefendiyi sulamaya yelteniyorlar. Kvrmaya hi gerek yok. imdi adalet huzurunda hesap verme zaman Dava sreciyle birlikte anamuhalefet partisinin Ergenekonla etin snav devam ediyor. CHPdeki savrulmuluk bir

trl karardde olamyor. Parti, bir yandan demokratik refleksler ortaya koyuyor, bir yandan da darbeci algsnn deimesi konusunda adm at(a)myor. Daha geen hafta eski Maocu bir gruba siz ne zaman Atatrk oldunuz; Apocu deil miydiniz? diyordu; imdi o ekiple el ele verdi, Silivriyi yol etti. CHPnin Eski Maocu ve Apocu karanlk bir grupla ne ii olabilir ki!

Grief or patience? There is a huge transformation taking place. Turkey's domestic matters and international crises are intertwined. As one problem is being resolved, another is erupting. Unless you have a comprehensive roadmap and action plan, you would be trapped by hopelessness. Of course, Turkey's most immediate problem is the Kurdish issue. Every second the problem remains unresolved makes the issue more complicated and turns it into a global dilemma. This also applies to the Syrian crisis. As time goes by, the risk of taking unplanned action and unwise decisions increases. Reconciliation or war? Making it possible to eventually remove [Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)] members from Parliament by stripping them of their immunity, forcing them to take action within democracy, disabling the hand that holds a gun or blocking the path that resorts to weapons. There are many others questions that have no single or simple answer. Maybe we need a coordinated strategy. Negotiations within the framework of fundamental rights and freedoms should be held and the agents of global terrorism in our lands should also be destroyed at the same time. Regardless of the method you employ, there is one thing that should always be noted: that the rule of law should always be observed and combating terrorism should be executed without compromising democratic rights. Those who want to undermine Turkey's power seek to manipulate its reaction through provocation. Those who burn schools, who kill and intimidate others through terrorism, expend efforts to test the patience of the people because they are aware that grief will eventually take the place of patience. There will be those who take unconstructive paths out of grief, those who riot and who commit mistakes out of grief. However, this country needs wise policies that will be realized by patience and long-lasting roadmaps. It is impossible for those who react rashly to consider the consequences of their actions. We don't know how to think with models. It is necessary to think about how a miniscule and seemingly insignificant issue could become a huge problem within two decades or what a seemingly important development could portend in the future. Most of the time, we forget how a stone tossed into a lake generates waves that reach its shores. An event that could be used as a metaphor for this ripple effect should be evaluated through models. However, conceptualizers who are exhausted from dealing with daily events and considerations are unable to make comprehensive plans for the future. The Middle East is trembling with change; many states have already been altered in the region. It seems difficult that joy and grief make it to nightfall; these emotions change as constantly as the situation. It is time for models based on patterns seen in history, the natural course of the future and a closer look at the events. It is necessary to force Turkey to navigate the horizon for the issues it is dealing with by removing the popular components. For instance, it would be wrong to only consider the positive or negative results over the short term of taking the BDP deputies out of Parliament. It is essential to employ a multidimensional perspective and pluralistic platform of thinking. We need model thinking not only in politics but also in all other fields. A number of issues including the actions and policies in the fields of education, urbanization and others should be re-evaluated and reconsidered. For instance, urban transformation

is a popular issue. However, it needs to be analyzed properly, and the logic or urbanization should be redesigned within the philosophy of civilization without being strongly affected by the fear of an earthquake. For instance, it is also essential to think about what would happen if you shut down extracurricular college prep institutions. What kind of problem will the families, students and schools deal with in Turkey in such a case? It is our obligation to plan our future and restructure the Higher Education Board (YK) for a better educational environment. Turkey is experiencing a huge transformation. While taking new steps, it is also essential to administer the process wisely. The human resources and capital of this country are sufficient to manage the problems properly. Turkey could make huge achievements unless society wastes its internal dynamism on useless matters. When you do not take steps with patience, grief will be the eventual outcome; but God forbid, this country has no strength to bear new disappointments.

Uludere incident will reappear on the agenda It has been almost a year since the Uludere incident. On Dec. 28, a Turkish military jet dropped a bomb over a group of people killing 28 out of suspicion that they were terrorists. However, it became evident that these people were not members of a terrorist organization and that they were not attempting to cross the border with arms. It was argued that the people killed in this incident were smugglers who were transporting gasoline and cigarettes from Iraq to Turkey. This was a horrible incident. It appears that this issue will become a matter of discussion in the coming days on its anniversary. It is possible that the Kurdish issue will becomes more complicated in the light of this incident. Unfortunately, strong language and discourse do not offer any lasting solutions to the problem. Nonetheless, the truth is that failure to do things properly makes the issue more complex. In fact, it is not proper to say that or act as if that nothing has been done regarding the Uludere incident. It is known that the general staff has initiated an administrative and judicial inquiry and that the specially authorized prosecutor in Diyarbakr has started the investigation. Political figures including Prime Minister Erdoan have since the beginning admitted that the bombing was a mistake. For this reason, the state has paid compensations to the relatives of the victims. A state that has paid compensation has acknowledged the mistake. Offering an apology and admitting the mistake does not undermine the image of the state. Ignoring what has been done so far appears to be an attempt to make the incident part of domestic political discussions. However, despite the steps taken in the Uludere matter, there are two major groups of critics: the first group includes people who exploit this incident and the mistake made for the attainment of their political goals regardless of what the government does to address the problem. The voice of the other group should be heard as well, though. The processes of inquiry and investigation in relation to the error perpetrated in Uludere should be completed as soon possible. As long as this process is protracted, the manipulators raise their voices to influence the people. The mystery behind the incident should be resolved immediately so that speculative comments can be prevented. As the anniversary of the Uludere incident approaches, Ayhan Sefer stn from the parliamentary commission of inquiry made an interesting statement in which he argued that the decision of confidentiality prevents us from taking further steps. This has already produced interesting results. The commission chair makes these remarks out of sincerity. This creates opportunity for those who attempt to manipulate the matter, though. It is necessary to take constructive and conclusive steps with regard to the Uludere incident which will apparently be discussed in the days to come. It is also necessary to rely on a more transparent mode of communication and to accelerate the process in order to prevent destructive comments. Besides, it is not only a matter of negative remarks; the people also want to see this problem resolved. The belief that justice has been delivered will consolidate brotherhood in this country.

Ya sabr, ya kahr Deiim, ba dndrc bir ivmeyle devam ediyor. Trkiye'nin i meseleleri ile uluslararas krizler birbirine karm durumda. Bir mevzuu zelim derken baka birisi krdm oluveriyor. Kuatc bir nazar ve planl bir eylem haritanz yoksa umutsuzlua kaplmanz an meselesi. Trkiye'nin en acil konusu hi phesiz Krt Sorunu. zmsz srecin her saniyesi hem kanayan yaray derinletiriyor, hem meseleyi global bir bilmeceye dntryor. Suriye meselesi de yle. Sre uzadka bkknlk, ylgnlk nksediyor ve alelacele yaplacak bir hamle ile her eyin altst olma riskini artryor. Uzlamak m, savamak m, Meclis'ten koparmak m, demokrasi iinde zorlamak m, silah eken eli krmak m, silaha giden yollar tkamak m? Byle yzlerce soru var ki hibirinin basit ve tek bir cevab bulunmuyor. Belki de ezamanl, egdml bir stratejiye ihtiya duyuluyor. Hem masa banda temel hak ve zgrlkler erevesinde mzakere yaplacak hem de kresel terrizmin taeronluunu yapann beli krlp beyni datlacak. Hangi yol tercih edilirse edilsin, unutulmamas gereken bir husus var: Asla hukuk erevesinden klmayacak ve demokratik haklardan taviz verilmeden terrle mcadele devam edecek. Trkiye'nin akln bandan almak isteyen gler, tahrikler vesilesiyle onun fkesini kontrol etmek ve tepkisini ynlendirmek istiyor. Okul yakanlar, molotof atanlar, insan ldrenler, terrn her klna girip korku salanlar, insanlarn sabrn tketmek iin azami bir gayret gsteriyor. nk biliyorlar ki sabr tkenenin kahr devreye girer. Kahrndan ksenler, kahrndan isyan edenler, kahrndan yanl i yapanlar. Oysa bu lkenin sabrla yrtecei akll politikalara, kuaklar boyunca srecek yol haritalarna ihtiyac var. Gnlk dnp anlk tepki verenlerin, brakn yzyl sonrasn, birka gn sonrasn bile hesaba katmas mmkn deil. Dnce disiplinimizde simlasyon (modelleme/benzetim) eksiklii var. Bugn ok kk gibi grnen bir olay yirmi yl sonra nasl bir hal alr diye sormak ya da bugn ok aaal grnen bir hadise, yarna ne tayabilir diye dnmek gerekiyor srekli. Denize atlan bir tan halka halka nasl yayldn, nice zaman sonra sahillere nasl vurduunu ou kez unutuveriyoruz. Kck bir ta dediimiz vak'ann simlasyon yoluyla hesaplanmas gerekiyor. Heyhat! Gncel hadiselerin labirentlerinde laf yartrmaktan yorgun den fikir sahipleri, istikbale dair planlama yapamyor; yapamaz da... Ortadou kaynyor, talar oktan yerinden oynad bile. Gnlk sevin ve hznlerin akam saatine erimesi ok zor grnyor. Meselelere daha yakndan bakmann, tarihin derinliklerinden gelen kodlarla istikbalin tabii ynelileri arasnda simlasyon yapmann tam zaman. Trkiye'nin btn meselelerini, popler atafattan arndrarak, ufuk turuna tamak gerekiyor. Mesela BDP'lileri Meclis dna itmenin artsn-eksisini birka yla sktrmak yanl olur. oklu bir perspektiften, ok sesli bir dnce platformundan durumu deerlendirmek art. Sadece siyaset deil her alanda simlasyon ihtiyacmz var. Milli Eitim'den ehircilik Bakanl'nn icraatlarna kadar pek ok mesele mercek altna yatrlmal. Mesela kentsel dnm bugnn en popler konusu; lkin zerinde ok iyi dnlmesi, bugnk deprem korkusunun altnda ezilmeden bir medeniyet felsefesi iinde ehircilik mantnn yeniden kurgulanmas gerekiyor. Okullarda nlk meselesini, sadece aktel tepkilere hapsetmek yanl sonular dourabilir. Mesela dershanesiz bir Trkiye'de aileleri, ocuklar ve okullar nasl bir karmaann beklediini iyi hesap etmek art. YK yasasn daha zgr bir niversite ve daha ufuk ac bir bilim dnyas zlemiyle yapmak iin yarnlar planlamak boynumuzun borcu deil mi? Trkiye byk bir deiim yayor. Ba dndrc bir hzla yeni admlar atarken iradeli bir sabrla hareket etmek, salim bir aklla sreci ynetmek gerekiyor. Bu lkenin insan kaynaklar, meseleleri doru biimde ele almaya yetecek kadar k sayor; yeter ki kendi glgesiyle kavga eden ehsuvarlar gibi toplum, i dinamizmini yanl yerlerde harcamasn. Sabrla yol alnamadnda kahrla kar karya kalnr ki, Allah korusun, bu lkenin yeni bir hayal krklna dayanacak gc kalmamtr.

Uluderede dnm noktas Uludere hadisesinin zerinden neredeyse bir yl geti. Malum, Trk Hava Kuvvetleri'ne ait uaktan 28 Aralk'ta bombalar atlm, 35 kii hayatn kaybetmiti. Terrist sanlarak ate alan kiilerin rgt yesi olmad, silahlarla snrdan szma giriiminde bulunan terristler olmad anlalmt. Hayatn kaybeden kiiler, Irak'tan Trkiye'ye mazot ve sigara getiren kaaklard. Nereden baklrsa baklsn, Uludere'de byk bir insanlk facias yaand. Grnen o ki yldnm vesilesiyle konu, nmzdeki gnlerde tekrar alevlenecek. Bu olayn zerinden Krt sorununun daha da derinletirilmesi sz konusu. Keskin bir dille yazlanlar, konuulanlar derde deva olmuyor maalesef; ancak gerek u ki, baz eylerin tastamam yaplmamas meseleyi daha karmak hale getiriyor. Aslnda Uludere konusunda hibir ey yaplmad. demek ya da yaplmam gibi davranmak doru deil. Genelkurmay'n idar ve adl inceleme karar ald, Diyarbakr zel Yetkili Savcl'nn soruturma balatt biliniyor. Babakan Erdoan bata olmak zere siyas irade, bombalamann hata olduunu daha ilk gnden kabullendi. Zaten o yzden devlet, yaknlarn kaybeden vatandalara tazminat dedi. Tazminatn para deerinden ok, hukuk anlam zerinde durmak lazm. Tazminat deyen devlet, hatay kabullenmi demektir. Hata olduunu sylemek de zr dilemek de devletleri kltmez, saygnln azaltmaz. u ana kadar yaplanlar tamamen grmezden gelmek meseleyi i siyasete alet etmek abas gibi duruyor. Ancak Uludere konusunda atlan onca adma ramen eletirileri srdren iki zmre var. lki, hkmet ne yaparsa yapsn, Uludere'deki korkun hatay dilinden drmeyip bunu siyas bir suistimal malzemesi haline getiriyor. Dier bir kitle var ki oradan ykselen sese kulak vermekte fayda var. Uludere'deki hata ile ilgili balatlan btn inceleme ve soruturma srelerinin bir an nce bitirilmesi gerekiyor. Bu hukuk sre uzadka art niyetli yaklamlar ayrl-gayrl krkleyecek ok laflar retiyor. Bir an nce olayn zerindeki sis perdesinin kalkmas gerekiyor ki speklatif yorumlarn nne geilebilsin. Uludere'nin yldnm yaklarken Meclis nceleme Komisyonu Bakan Ayhan Sefer stn'den Gizlilik karar bizi engelledi. aklamasnn gelmesi, daha imdiden artc sonular douruyor. AK Partili Komisyon Bakan, bu szleri drste sylyor; ancak konuyu baka bir yere savurmak isteyenlere de gn douyor. nmzdeki gnlerde daha da hararetle tartlaca imdiden belli olan Uludere hadisesi ile ilgili admlar atlmasnda fayda var. Art niyetli yorumlarn nn kesmek iin sreci hzlandrp daha effaf bir iletiim yolu bulmakta fayda var. stelik mesele sadece art niyetli yaklamlar deil; kamu vicdan da bu konunun hakkaniyet iinde tastamam sonulandrlmasn bekliyor. Hak ve adalet yerini buldu dncesi bu lkenin kardeliini pekitirecektir.

Choosing a coup among the coups Former Chief of General Staff Gen. Kenan Evren and former Air Forces Commander Gen. Tahsin ahinkaya, who are the only survivors of the top brass of the Sept. 12, 1980 coup, testified Wednesday in the Ankara 12th High Criminal Court, which is hearing the 1980 coup trial. The most powerful generals of that time were questioned by the court via teleconference from their hospitals. The young generations cannot know how these two ill and bed-bound men, who are trying to answer questions, spread fear among the public. These two men, whose every word was once law, spoke in faltering low voice and with appeared weak. Sometimes, they tried to lash out as they did in the old days. For example, Evren said: In the past that coup junta hanged people from both the right and left wings to be fair.' We did so because we did not want people to think we favored either side. So we hanged one from the right and one from the left, then one from the right and one from the left and so on. We did so to show that we were fair. Within his logic, Evren was right; however, his personal rightness is not appropriate conscientiously and in terms of legality. Hanging people, one from the right and one from the left, just for the sake of being fair and manipulating people's perceptions, is not the true way to establish justice.

Then Evren summoned up his courage and voiced an interesting theory that disclosed the mentality of all military coups that Turkey has faced. Yet, interestingly, Evren's lawyers have focused on this defense, which does not make any sense in terms of universal legal criteria. Should we take this as a joke or irony? If Evren is right, we need to ask the generals who staged the May 27, 1960 coup d'tat, "Why did the military court decide to hang Talat Aydemir, who had been tried for his coup attempts in the 1963, and his team? Evren said: "We made a 'revolution', we did not attempt to stage a coup. Everybody should know that making a revolution and attempting to stage a coup are different things." This simple but assertive theory indicates an important separation in his mind. What is Evren trying to say? He says: "I did make a revolution, and I was successful. Then I prepared a new constitution and new laws. Thus, according to these laws, you cannot try me with such charges." First of all, we need to discuss the term "revolution." We need to discuss whether we can define the thing that Evren made as a revolution by looking at the contemporary examples, staring from French Revolution. Revolution, reform, coup, gang... These terms are usually used interchangeably in Turkish, but they have different meanings. Sept. 12 was an act by the military aiming to capture the people by using weapons that are entrusted to them to protect the people. It was an imposition of Kemalist ideology that was poorly developed, rather than a reflection of the social and political demands of society. They assumed that they would raise a new generation via unending brainwashing in schools. They assumed that they would ensure social change by making peace between the left and the right by beating both sides. Anyway, whether Sept. 12 was a revolution or a coup is the topic of another discussion. The issue that we need to discuss today is: Can we try coups whether the coup attempt is successful or unsuccessful? The shady incidents that occurred in the pre-coup period have become more complicated since the coup. No one has dared to investigate the torture cases. What have the suspects of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases said? "We did not stage a coup. You cannot try us because of a failed attempt." In other words, what the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer suspects are saying is the complete opposite of Evren's theory. In fact, the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer suspects are charged with plotting to overthrow the government. However, the suspects and their lawyers claim that an attempted coup cannot be used as evidence in the trial. These two extreme arguments cause confusion in public opinion. One says, "I made a revolution, and I was successful; thus, you cannot try me," while the others say, "Even if I attempt to stage a coup, I failed; thus, you cannot try me because of my failed attempt. According to the coup plotters, what they are saying is regardless of whether the attempted coup was successful or unsuccessful, we cannot try them! The coup plotters should not be offended by us, but a coup is first and foremost a crime against humanity in every part of the world. Now, irrespective of their rank or position, age and health conditions, those who seized control over the country or who attempted to do this have been called to account for coup changes in a court. The fate of coup plotters in countries that have experienced many coups in their history such as Argentina, Chile, Greece and Spain is known. Now, Turkey is on the right track. This is why coup supporters are trying to discredit and sabotage the ongoing coup case investigations and cause the courts to slip. Indeed, the Turkish people will not allow attempts to send the coup perpetrator to oblivion and leave an open door to the coups. Otherwise, God forbid, if the conditions are changed in the future, they would spread fear among the public and lay the groundwork for a coup. As long as a group of people who consider coups as a legitimate right continues to exist, we have to strengthen our democracy within the legal boundaries. As long as the gray cloud over the death of zal is not cleared up When the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office recently issued a warrant to exhume the remains of former President

Turgut zal for toxicological testing, we all felt a strong stab of sorrow in our hearts. I am sure that everybody said, "If only it had not been needed!" Although everybody was sorry for the exhumation of his body, there is a wide consensus that the court's decision was correct because the question that boggled the minds of people was, "What if zal was poisoned, or he was a victim of assassination?" Finally, upon the demand of the prosecutor, zal's body was exhumed, and the Council of Forensic Medicine (ATK) started the tests. Then we learned that when zal's body was exhumed -- 19 years later after his death -- his body was in a condition suitable for [forensic] examination. This would eliminate ever-increasing suspicions concerning his death. If the officials from the ATK had said: "We did not detect any poisonous substances in the late president's remains. He died of natural causes," we would have been happy; but that didn't happen. It is clear that the late president was poisoned. Otherwise, how can we explain the four different poisonous substances detected in his remains? Then the next questions that we need to ask are much more challenging: "Who killed zal? What was the reason? Who was the hit-man? zal may rest in peace only if we can answer these questions. An important process has been started to ensure his eternal peace, but also to promote Turkish democracy. Who was not happy with the steps that Turkey had taken? Who wanted to prevent the change and transformation process that Turkey has undergone? We need to clear up the gray cloud over the death of zal in order to understand the real value of Turkey's lost years.

Darbelerden darbe been 12 Eyll davasnda dnemin Genelkurmay Bakan Kenan Evren ve Hava Kuvvetleri Komutan Tahsin ahinkaya ifade verdi. Bir devrin en muktedir generalleri hastaneye kurulan telekonferans sistemiyle hesaba ekiliyordu. O yorgun ve bitkin halleriyle yatana uzanp sorulara cevap yetitirmeye alan bu iki adamn, bir zamanlar bast yeri nasl titrettiini gen nesiller bilemez. Ast astk, kestii kestik iki adam, imdi silik grntleri, ksk sesleri, aciz ifadeleri iinde kem km etmeye mecburdu. Arada bir eski gnlerdeki gibi kkremeyi denediler. Mesel Evren dedi ki: Ben sa sol zerinde ayrm yapmadm. Hatta o kadar yapmadm ki! Mahkm olan idam cezas alanlar var. Sadan alnm bir tane bekletirdim soldan da olsun. Bir tane sadan bir tane soldan astk. Denge olsun diye. Kendi mant iinde Evren doruyu sylyor; ancak o ferd dorunun hukukta ve vicdanda yeri yok. Srf grnt olusun, alg ynetilsin diye Bir sadan asn bir soldan asn denerek adalet salanmaz. Evren Paa cesaretini toplayarak ilgin bir tezi savunuyor ki ite o cmle btn asker darbelerin felsefesini ifa ediyor. Ne tuhaftr ki Evren'in avukatlar da evrensel hukukta hibir anlam ifade etmeyen bu savunmaya kendilerini odaklam durumda. Gler misin, alar msn? Evren haklysa 1960 darbesini yapan generallere u soruyu sormak gerekiyor: Darbe teebbsnde bulunan ama baaramayan Talat Aydemir ve adamlarn asker mahkeme neden ast? Demek ki, darbe baarl olunca adamlar kurucu irade oluyor, baarsz olunca darbeciler tarafndan bile aslacak birer suluya dnyor. Diyor ki Paa: Biz ihtilal yaptk, ihtilale teebbs etmedik. Herkesin ihtilal ile ihtilale teebbsn ayn ey olmadn bilmesi gerek. Bu basit ama iddial nerme, paann kafasndaki nemli bir ayrac iaretliyor. Evren Bey ne demek istiyor? Ben ihtilal yaptm, baarl oldum. Sonra anayasa ve yasalar yaptm. Dolaysyla bu yasalarla beni yarglayamazsnz. Bu bile tek bana 12 Eyll Referandumu'nda darbecileri koruyan yasann kaldrlmasnn ve darbe anayasasndan belli bir mesafe almann nemine iaret ediyor. Darbecilerin zihniyetini grmek iin ncelikle ihtilal lafndan balamak lazm belki de. Fransz htilali'nden balayarak ada rneklerine baktnzda Kenan Bey'in yaptna ihtilal denir mi denmez mi bunu tartmak lazm. htilal, inklp, darbe, ete Birbirine yakn ama birbirinden ayran kavramlar. 12 Eyll, kendisine grevi gerei emaneten verilen silahlarla halk esir

alma ameliyesidir. Hibir sosyal ve siyas deiim talebinin karl olmad gibi en dk IQ hesaplaryla en apsz Kemalizm dayatmasdr. Her derste Atatrk ve Biyoloji, Atatrk ve Kimya gibi ezberlerle beyin ykannca bir nesil yetieceini sandlar. Saclar ve solcular dve dve bartrnca sosyal deiim yaanacak sandlar. Her neyse ihtilal mi, darbe mi, igal mi vs. baka bir tartma konusu. Bugn tartlacak asl mevzu u: Darbeler ne zaman yarglanabilir? Baarl olunca m; baarsz olunca m? Darbe ncesinde yaanan karanlk iler darbe sonrasnda daha da karanlk hale geldi. kencelerin haddi hesab bilinemedi. Ergenekon davalarnda, zellikle Balyoz Davas'nda sanklar ne diyordu? Biz darbe yapmadk. Teebbs aamasnda kalm bir eylemi yarglayamazsnz... Yani Kenan Evren'in sylediklerinin tam tersi bir pozisyondu bu. Zaten dava da eksik teebbs sulamasyla ald. Ancak sanklar ve avukatlar, bunun da doru olmadn teebbs aamasnda olan ve gereklememi bulunan bir davann somut delil tekil etmediini ifade etti. Bu iki u dncenin tam ortasnda kalyor kamuoyu. Biri ihtilal yaptm, baarl oldum, yarglayamazsn diyor; br de teebbs etmi olsam bile baarl olamadm diyor. Yani? Onlara gre baarrsa da yarglayamazsn baaramazsa da! Darbeciler hi kusura bakmasn; darbeler dnyann her kesinde hl bir insanlk suu. Yana bana baklmakszn demokrasiye fiilen el koyanlar da, el koymaya teebbs edenler de hesabn adalet huzurunda verdi; veriyor. Darbe sabkas kabark lkelerde, mesela Arjantin'de, ili'de, Yunanistan'da, spanya'da darbecilerin akbeti malum. Trkiye de doru yola girdi. O yzden ibirlikiler davalar sulandrmak, itibarszlatrmak, bolua drmek iin rpnp duruyor. Ne var ki bu lkenin insan darbecilerin peinin braklmasna raz deil, darbe kaplarnn hl ak tutulmasna da. Yoksa, Allah korusun, yarn artlar deise bir gn karnza yine heylalar kp krk satr m, krk katr m diye soracaktr. Darbeyi meru hak gibi gren bir zmre var olduka demokrasinin hukuk iinde glendirilmesi art zaln lm zerinden sis perdesi kalkmadka -Cumhurbakan Turgut zaln mezarnn almasna karar verildiinde hepimizin yrei cz etmiti. Keke hi ihtiya duyulmasayd! demeyen yoktur sanrm. Kabrinde huzur iinde yatmas iin her daim duac olduumuz merhum Cumhurbakannn kabrinin almas herkesi zse de kararn doru olduuna dair geni bir mutabakat olutu. nk hepimizin aklnda bir soru vard: Ya gerekten zehirlemilerse, ya gerekten suikasta kurban gitmise? Sonuta savcnn talebi zerine zaln mezar ald. Adli Tp tahlillere balad. Ve rendik ki 19 yl sonra kabri alan zaln cesedi hl birka ay nce vefat etmiesine korunmu. organlarnn her trl tahlile msait olmas, beynimizi kemiren phelerden kurtaracakt bizi. Zehirlenme falan yok; vefat tabii srele gereklemi dense hepimiz derin bir oh ekecek, bu sonutan mutluluk duyacaktk. yle olmad. Gayet net anlalyor ki rahmetli Cumhurbakann zehirlemiler. Vcudundan drt ayr zehir kmasnn baka bir manas olabilir mi? Artk bu saatten sonra karmzda daha derin ve etin bir kavak kyor: zal hangi g odaklar ldrd, sebebi neydi, tetikileri kimdi? zaln kabrinde huzur iinde yatmas yukardaki sorularn cevaplanmasna bal. Sadece onun huzur iinde kabir hayatna devam etmesi deil; ayn zamanda Trk demokrasisinin yaatlmas iin de nemli bir sre balam oldu. Trkiyenin hangi adm kimi rahatsz ediyor, deiim ve dnm kimler tarafndan engellendi? Trkiyenin kayp yllarnn anlalabilmesi iin zaln lm zerindeki sr perdesinin tamamen kalkmas, sis bulutlarnn tamamen datlmas gerekiyor.

Are you Gandhi or Stalin? One crisis ends and another starts in Turkey. Because there is no intermittence between crises, it is hard to pick which incident teaches us a lesson. For instance, there is a lot to say about the ongoing hunger strikes. But we see the familiar clichs because of the usual positions all stakeholders have adopted in this case. Above all, we have to make this point first: Those who place emphasis upon fundamental rights and freedoms have two major options: They either rely on terrorist activities to promote their cause

despite this causing the deaths of innocent people or they resort to legitimate and legal options by utilizing democratic rights. It is impossible to use terrorism and democratic options at the same time. Sometimes some may leave one of these options to embrace the other. But you cannot say you will use both simultaneously. In other words, a method reminiscent of a human being in daytime and of a wolf at nighttime would lead to an amorphous creature which has no credibility at all. Pharaohs, tyrants and dictators emerge out of violence and horror. History turns into a parade of heroes when peaceful demands are raised through peaceful methods. Stalin, who has been sanctified by an ideology, murdered 40 million people. Statistics refer to 45 to 70 million for Mao. Hitler is another example. This list may include many others. However, Gandhi did not choose the way of violence. He became a silent scream and defeated a huge empire. Stalin cannot be Gandhi; likewise, you cannot make Gandhi Stalin. You cannot take one's head and implant it onto the other's body because there will be no chemistry or harmony. Martin Luther King Jr. did not fire a single bullet while defending the rights of black people who were oppressed and humiliated for centuries; but he did destroy the established dogmas of the status quo. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its supporters are trying an unusual and impossible method. They savagely kill, bomb and burn; but they also seek to create an image by which they present themselves as victims and leave the impression that they are part of a civil society movement. This is unacceptable! We cannot help but ask, considering how mral has the power to end these hunger strikes through a single sentence, why does he not assume an effective role in incidents of violence, including the kidnapping of innocent people or their murder. You would speak to the hearts of people holding a hunger strike, but then burn schools without hearing the screams and sorrow of the little kids inside. You would speak to the conscience of the people by making reference to the people who have been on strike for 50 days, but then remain indifferent to footage of two kids trying to get out alive of a market set on fire by PKK militants. You would pay attention to a civilian protest like the hunger strike, which raises passions and mercy, but then attempt to burn innocent people alive by throwing Molotov cocktail at them. You would seek the support and sympathy for the people who have given up their basic needs, including eating and drinking, but then fire bullets, kill people and destroy families every day. Is this type of protest acceptable? It is neither convincing nor humane to argue that I would hold civilian and peaceful protests while also organizing bloody attacks at the same time. Are you considering the attention and mercy exhibited by the people vis--vis the hunger strikes in the absence of violence and terrorism? Without these bloody and vicious attacks, would the people of Turkey not ask for remedies to ensure that these inmates are not left alone and desperate? The PKK is at a crossroads at this point. It has to stop acting hypocritically by hiding behind the image of leadership. So far the PKK has followed a Stalinist style and approach. It has been brutal to the people in the region and the security forces, but also to its own militants. Let me give you some further notes on this matter: I asked leading PKK figures on the executions of their militants. They gave me an extensive list of names. I then asked, Would you answer if I raise a technical question? These leading figures confirmed they would. I asked, Would you call your leader a Stalin considering how those from the PKK who criticized it are killed and that all members obey his orders like slaves and those who do not are murdered? I thought this would provoke them to object to my analogy between their leader and Stalin, who is responsible for the murder of 40 million people. But this did not happen. They said, Yes. So what would you say if I argue that you administer this organization by Stalinist methods? They did not hesitate, stating: True. It could technically be said that it is administered via Stalinist methods. I had the final word, saying: Is there any other Stalinist organization in the world? You are destined to fail and collapse like the others. The reason is obvious: The state has changed its position on the Kurdish issue and taken many democratic steps despite domestic opposition. And it is still doing the same. However, the PKK relies on human blood like a Frankenstein without giving up on killing men. This will not last long. The wise Kurds, including Kurdish intellectuals, have to take action and teach a lesson to the Stalins of the PKK. When this is done, the non-Kurdish majority will come to a more democratic stance on the Kurdish issue and put further pressure on the state for additional steps of democratization.

When the Palestinian issue is resolved Israeli elections are approaching; bombs are raining on Gaza, enraging the Muslims there. This has not changed for decades. And, unfortunately, it does not seem possible that a constructive outcome will be obtained out of this inconclusive loop because the case is always the same: Israel throws bombs on the Palestinians; the Muslim world is enraged and the Western world remains indifferent to its reactions. The despair of the Muslim world leads to two grave outcomes: People become hopeless and rely on non-Islamic methods, including terrorism, out of despair. Secondly, the Muslim world fails to develop a method towards integration with the new world due to the rage and loss of energy. Due to a lack of balancing elements between the states or the partial approach of these elements, a problem that needs to be resolved by diplomatic means remains unresolved. Because of imbalance, notions like right and wrong cannot offer hope to the people. Worse, the people reacting to clear injustices are made into pawns by the circles causing this state of outrage. It is obvious at this point that the media have acted partially, presented only part of the overall picture and promoted Islamophobia through these images. Painful experiences of the past show that everyone should express him or herself properly, remain calm and cautious during this process of expression, and not be deceived by the schemes and plots of others. If the victims are unable to find proper ways to express themselves and promote their cause in the world and rely on appropriate means and modes of diplomacy, the forces that will resolve the Arab-Israeli issue will have to draw its path without being trapped by the scenarios of the image makers. That approach has to be based on the fairness within international legitimacy and to be plausible for all. Otherwise, it is impossible to resolve this problem through a trapped image and paralyzed will.

Stalin mi, Gandi mi? Trkiyede bir kriz bitiyor, dieri balyor. Krizler aras mola verilemedii ve durum deerlendirmesi yaplamad iin nereden, ne ders karlaca hususu da bolukta asl kalyor. Mesela alk grevi ile ilgili sylenecek ok sz var; ancak herkes ald pozisyon gerei ezbere devam ediyor. ncelikle u tespiti yapmak zorundayz: Hak ve zgrlk iddiasyla yola kanlarn tarih boyunca tercih ettii temel iki metot var. Ya hak-hukuk demeden terr estirip korku ve dehet salarak dmanl derinletirmek; ya da demokratik haklar sonuna kadar kullanp kendine demokratik bir eksen izmek. Ezamanl bir ekilde hem terr hem demokratik yollar kullanmak imknsz. Her ikisi birden olmaz. Bazen ikiyzl hak talebi size mevki kazandrm gibi gzkr; ama eninde sonunda gerek ortaya kar ve tarih sizi kara listesine kaydeder; kahramanlar kadrosuna deil... Terr ya da demokrasi! Bazen birini brakp dierine sarlan kabilir. Mesela Mandela, silah brakp demokrasiye ynelmeseydi bugnk saygnln asla kazanamazd. Hem kadn-erkek, ocuk-yal demeksizin adam ldrrm, hem de sivil toplum rgt gibi alrm demek, gndz insan, gece kurt rolne soyunmak demektir. yle bir ucubenin inandrcl da olmaz. iddet ve dehetin barndan Firavunlar, tiranlar, diktatrler kar. Bar talepler bar metotlarla istendiinde ise kahramanlar geidine dner tarih. Bir ideolojiyle kutsallatrlan Stalin, 40 milyon insann katlinden sorumludur. Mao iin istatistikler 45 ila 70 milyon diyor. Hitler onlardan geri deil. Uzayp gider liste... Oysa mesela Gandi, iddeti tercih etmedi. Sessiz bir lk oldu, koca bir imparatorluu dize getirdi. Martin Luther King, yzlerce yldr ezilen, horlanan, aalanan zencilerin haklarn savunurken tek kurun atmad ama yerleik dzenin dogmalarn parampara etti. Stalin asla bir Gandi olamaz; Gandiyi de Stalin yapamazsn. Birinin kafasna dierinin vcudunu monte edemezsin; kimyalar uymaz, dokular uyumaz nk...

PKK, yandalar ve paydalar hi olmayacak bir metodu sahici klmaya alyor. Hem vuruyor, kryor, ldryor, bombalyor, yakyor; hem de sivil toplum kuruluuymu gibi bir hava oluturarak sempati toplamak istiyor. nsanlar merak ediyor, madem mral bir cmle ile gnlerdir devam eden alk grevlerini bitirmeye muktedir; neden okullarn yaklmas, masum sivillerin karlmas ve ldrlmesi gibi hadiselerde de etkin bir rol oynamyor? Neden alk grevini durdurun arsnnn hemen ardndan Hakkride saldr yaplmasn engelleyemiyor? Kh yle kh byle grnerek verilen mcadelede olsa olsa Firavunlam egolar tatmin olur; sorunlar zlmez. Olacak ey deil! Bir yandan alk grevi yapp insanlarn yreine hitap edeceksin; dier yandan minnack ocuklarn feryadu figanna aldrmaksnz okullar cayr cayr yakacaksn. Bir yandan 50 ksur gndr bu insanlar alk ekiyor diye vicdanlar dalayacaksn; dier yandan marketleri alev alev kundaklayp iki ocuun korkuyla birbirine sarlp o ateten kurtulma abasn eylem gerei sanp zevkle seyredeceksin. Bir yandan alk gibi her insan efkat ve merhamete davet eden sivil bir eyleme tutunacaksn; dier yandan masum insanlarn zerine molotof atp susuz gnahsz kiileri diri diri yakmaya kalkacaksn. Bir yandan yemekten imekten vazgeip Ey insanlar aresizlik iinde size sesleniyorum. diyerek sempati ve destek arayacaksn; dier yandan her gn canl bombalar insanlarn zerine salacak, arkada binlerce yetim ve ksz brakacaksn. Var m byle bir eylem tr! Bir de yle dnn: iddet ve terr olmasayd, alk grevlerinin toplumun tamamnda uyaraca dikkat ve rikkat ne olurdu? O kanl ve meum eylemler btn hzyla devam ediyor olmasayd, Trkiye topyekn ayaa kalkp Bu insanlar bu kadar madur ve aresiz brakmayn! diye kkremez miydi? PKK tam da bu noktada ciddi bir yol ayrmnda. nderlik heyulasnn arkasna saklanarak ikiyzl davranmaktan vazgemek zorunda. u ana kadar rgt, Stalinist bir yol seti kendine. Sadece gvenlik gleri ve halka zulmetmekle kalmad; rgt iin alanlar da gzn krpmadan katletti. Devlet Krt sorununda pozisyon deitirdi ve pek ok demokratik adm (onca i muhalefete ramen) att. Hl da atyor. Ancak rgt adam ldrmeden bir milim geriye atmakszn, Franketayn gibi insanlarn kan ile besleniyor. Bu byle srmez. Akl banda Krtlerin (tabii ki en bata Krt aydnlarn) terliklerini hazrlamas, PKKnn Stalinciklerine gereken dersi vermesi art. O zaman Krt olmayan byk ounluun da Krt Sorununa yaklam daha demokratik bir izgiye gelecek ve devlet zerindeki demokratikleme basks artacaktr.

Filistin sorunu ne zaman zlr? srail'de seimler yaklat; Gazze'ye bomba yayor. slam dnyasnn fkesi kabaryor. O vurduka protesto eylemlerinin ard arkas kesilmiyor. Onlarca yldr bu manzara hi deimedi. Ve maalesef sonu alnamayan bu manzaradan bu kez de mspet ve somut bir netice elde edilemeyecek. Manzara hep ayn: srail, Filistinlilerin zerine bomba yadryor, slam dnyas ayaa kalkyor, Bat dnyas o tepkileri duymazdan, grmezden geliyor. slam dnyasnn aresiz ve aciz durumu iki ykma neden oluyor: ncelikle umutsuzlua kaplp iradesi kreliyor ve acziyete dmenin getirdii fke ile, bazen de slam olmayan yollardan medet umabiliyor. kincisi, urad i enerji kayb ve biriktirilmi fke yznden kendi iradesi ile yeni ve dnya ile entegre bir mecra icat edemiyor. Maalesef ortada devletler aras denge unsurlar olmadndan; ya da unsurlarn tarafgir tutumundan dolay diplomatik yollarla zlmesi gereken bir konu mtemadiyen srncemede kalyor. Terazinin kefeleri denklemediinden hak ve ihkak- hak gibi kavramlarn toplumlara umut alamas imknsz. Daha kts, yaplan aikr hakszlklar karsnda tepki gsteren kitlelerin o fkeye neden olan mihraklar tarafndan bir figre dntrlme srecidir. Bu noktada dnya medyasnn yanl bir tutum sergiledii, byk fotorafn sadece bir ksmn takdim ettii ve o grntler zerinden yeryzne slam fobisini yayp canl tuttuu aikrdr.

Onca ac tecrbe bize gsteriyor ki herkes kendini doru ifade etmedike bakalar diledii gibi bir imaj almas yapp hakly haksz gsterecek. Denklik duygusunun olmad yerde adalet duygusu da gelimiyor. Eer madur kitleler kendilerini dnya kamuoyuna doru anlatacak etkili ve meru yollar bulamazsa, manzara deimeyecek. Diplomatik dilin eitliki, uzlatrc, etkileyici yollarna bavurabilmek iin hem meseleye daha ok kafa yormak gerekiyor; hem de iletiim yollarnn tamamn dnya tecrbesine dayanarak yeniden dzenlemek. Arap-srail sorununu zecek irade, global imaj yapclarn izdii senaryolara mahkm olmadan kendini doru ifade etmeye mecbur. k yolunun uluslararas merutiyet iinde hakkaniyet esasna dayanmas ve sylemiyle herkesi ikna edecek bir ksm deliller barndrmas gerekiyor. Yoksa meflu bir irade ve mahkm bir imajla bu sorunu zmek mmkn deil.

Paris assassinations and the mral processes The murder of three senior female executives of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Paris implies that the new "peace process" that was initiated with the talks with PKK leader Abdullah calan, serving a life sentence in a prison on mral Island off the coast of stanbul, will be a tough one. The professional nature of the assassination of these three women in a European capital also signifies the international aspect of the problem we are dealing with. The fact that there is not a single, monolithic PKK will place a heavy burden on the process. Everyone agrees that the Kurdish issue is closely related to the PKK issue. However, the Kurdish matter is basically a leg cuff that binds Turkey through cooperation between internal and external malevolent forces. These forces don't want Turkey to become powerful in its region. They don't want Turkey to be the rising star of the Muslim world and the Turkic world or to be a global player. Strong US lobbies, the powers that seek to keep the European Union as a Christian-only club, Israel, Iran and Syria are all involved in this issue. For this reason, if we invest high hopes in the talks with calan and expect the weapons to become silent in a short time, we may be in for a huge disappointment. Indeed, we face a very tough, challenging and intricate problem. The Paris assassinations suggest that we may face unprecedented provocations. I must note that if about 100 terrorists, who were preparing to attack the Karata gendarmerie outpost in the ukurca district of Hakkari province around 7 p.m., had not been noticed beforehand and if this attack had not been thwarted by killing 14 terrorists, the new process would already have been aborted. Indeed, this provocation might have resulted in a far greater death toll than the slaying of 33 soldiers in 1993. Despite the ukurca and Paris provocations, the new process must be maintained with resolve. However, another danger, which is as risky as these provocations, is the rhetoric used by the players involved in the process. Actually, this problem does not relate only to words or remarks. It is also about the stances, attitudes and actions. Certain people and groups say that the government should also engage in dialogue with them and act in a certain manner. Are we supposed to strive for making peace or satisfy those who try to steal the show, though? No one should parrot the same old arguments that have no relevance to the government's attitude. The government is talking about a new atmosphere and a new target that is different from those involved in the Habur and Oslo processes. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan recently called on the terrorists to lay down their weapons and leave Turkey. Isn't this a clear target? On the other hand, the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) insists that both sides should lay down their weapons. This is one of the frequently parroted remarks. A great majority of the public, including some families of the Turkish soldiers killed by the terrorists, is lending its support to the new process. Everyone, including the government and the opposition, must act in a sincere and responsible manner. We should be able to sweep aside our political gains, but make the best use of the new opportunity. As noted by Fethullah Glen, a well-respected Turkish-Islamic scholar, we must do what needs to be done for our future, stability and peace despite provocations. Yet we must not forget that our main shortcoming is our failure to adopt a culture of peace, consensus and tolerance. There is no valid reason for us to fight one another in this country. Nevertheless, the tutelage mentality of the rulers has stripped us of tolerance, consensus and peace by othering diverse groups and forcing them to obey the tutelage. We must remember what we have lost, forget the negative events and return to peace and

reconciliation.

Paris suikast ve mral sreci Pariste PKK st yneticisi kadnn ldrlmesi, calanla balayan grmelerin iaret ettii yeni bar srecinin zorluunu bir daha hatrlatyor. Avrupann bakentinde, hem de kadnn profesyonelce katledilmesi, uratmz problemin uluslararas boyutunu iaret etmesi asndan da ayrca anlamldr. Bir tane PKK yok gerei yeni sreci ok zorlayacak. Tamam PKK, Krt sorunu ile balantldr. Ama temelde Krt sorunu, ierinin ve darnn ibirlii ile Trkiyenin geleceini karartma, bu milletin nnn kesilmesi adna ayamza taklm bir prangadr. Trkiyenin, blgesinde glenmesi istenmiyor. Trkiyenin slam corafyasnda, Trk dnyasnda parlayan bir yldz olarak kresel bir aktr olmas istenmiyor. Bu iin ierisinde Amerikann gl lobileri de, Avrupann Hristiyan Birlii olduunda srarc g odaklar da, srail, ran ve Suriye de var Tam da bu yzden, mralda calan ile balayan grmelerden hareketle, artk silahlar susacak diye byk umutlar yaymak, hayal krkl dourabilir. nk zorlardan zor bir mesele ile kar karyayz. Paristeki cinayetler, akla gelmeyen provokasyonlarn da devreye gireceini anlatyor. unu da syleyeyim; eer Hakkrinin ukurca ilesindeki Karata Jandarma Karakoluna 7 Ocakta, saat 19.00 sularnda saylar yz civarndaki terristlerin saldr hazrl nceden fark edilmeseydi, 14 terrist ldrlerek bu saldr pskrtlmeseydi, yeni sre, oktan bitmi olurdu. Zira bu provokasyonun sonucu, 1993te 33 erin otobslerden indirilip ehit edilmesinden daha ar olurdu. ukurca ve Paris provokasyonlarna ramen evet, yeni sre kararllkla devam ettirilmelidir. Ancak provokasyonlarn verecei zarar kadar bir tehlike de, srecin aktrlerinin slubudur. sluptan kastmz sadece laf deil. Duru, tavr, beyan hepsi sluba dhil. imdi birileri kp diyor ki, bizimle de konuulsun, falanlar da konuulsun, yle yaplsn, byle edilsin Bar iin mi uraacaz, rol kapmaya alanlar m tatmin edilecek? kincisi, hkmetin tutumuyla hi alakas olmayan krk plaklar kimse yeniden almaya kalkmasn. Hkmet, Haburdan da, Oslo srecinden de farkl yeni bir zeminden, yeni bir hedeften sz ediyor. te Sayn Babakan, nceki gn Nijerde; blc terr rgt kadrolar, silah brakmak suretiyle Trkiyeyi terk etsin dedi. Bundan daha net bir hedef olur mu? Buna karlk BDP kalkp, herkes elini tetikten eksin diye tutturuyor. Krk plaklardan biri bu. u anda ehit ailelerinin bir blm de dhil, kamuoyunun byk bir kesiminde yeni srece destek var. ktidaryla, muhalefetiyle herkes samimi ve sorumlu hareket edebilmelidir. Siyasi hesaplar bir kenara koyarak bu yeni frsat deerlendirmemiz lazm. Provokasyonlara inat, Muhterem Fethullah Glen Hocaefendinin iaret ettii gibi, geleceimiz adna, istikrar ve huzurumuz adna, kan kusup kzlck erbeti itim deme tahamml ile yaplmas gerekeni yapmak lazm. Ancak unutmamak gerekiyor, temelde eksiimiz bar, uzlama ve hogr kltrne dnemeyiimizdir. Bu lkede birbirimizin boazna sarlmay gerektiren makul bir sebep yok. Ama devleti yneten vesayeti zihniyet iki asrdr, ille de bizim dediimiz olacak, herkes bize benzeyecek, ya sev, ya terk et diyerek iledii tekiletirme zulm ile ne msamaha brakt bu topraklarda, ne hogr, ne uzlama, ne muhabbet Asl, kaybettiklerimizi hatrlayarak, olumsuzluklar unutarak bar ve sulh izgisine dnebilmeliyiz.

A Muslim society no impediment to democracy The main problem both for Turkey and the globalizing world is polarization. In this context, the polarization between civilizations, cultures, ideas and beliefs is more serious than the polarization between the rich and the poor, associated with

income inequality and colonialism. The United Nations has been sponsoring an alliance of a civilizations project to bridge the gap, but we are yet to see the concrete and tangible results of it. I emphatically note that any project for promoting the alliance of civilizations, coexistence and a culture of sharing would be more successful and meaningful if it were carried out at the level of peoples and civil society organizations rather than at the level of governments. Today, the question, Is an alliance of civilizations possible? quickly reminds one of another question, Can Muslims peacefully coexist with Christians? This question echoes another question, Can Islam coexist with democracy? The answer to the second question is yes. Muslims can peacefully live together with practitioners of other religions, particularly Christians. There are numerous examples of this coexistence in the past, particularly from Anatolia. Moreover today, a mentality that attaches greater importance to humane values is becoming popular across the globe. A notion of democracy which is based on universal human values such as the freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of religion and conscience, rule of law, and accountability has become attractive to all countries and governments. To live together peacefully under a democratic rule where human dignity is safeguarded and everyone is endowed with equal citizenship rights has become easier than previous ages. The answer to the third question, too, is yes. Islam and the form of democracy I described above can coexist. (We must not forget that democracy is form of governance while Islam is a religion). First, democracy is human-oriented. Democracy preaches the significance of man. Likewise, our religion declares man as the most dignified of all creatures. Our human identity comes before our Muslim identity. Indeed, minors are not held culpable for their deeds under Islam. In the Quran, God swears by man. Both democracy and Islam seek to ensure peace and the welfare of human beings. The principles of democracy are endorsed also by Islam. In the Quran, three basic principles are set for administration: justice, consultative decision-making processes and assigning positions to those who deserve them. Furthermore, rulers are supposed to be honest, morally upright, clement, merciful, relenting and affectionate. Are justice, lack of favoritism, and popular participation in the decision-making processes not the virtues exalted in a democracy? Moreover, the freedom of expression and thought, the freedom of religion and worship, the protection of the rights of minorities, the importance of individuals (a person who wrongly kills a person is deemed to have killed the entire humanity), the prohibition of violence, pressure and oppression (there is no compulsion in religion), the participation of those ruled in the election of the ruler (monarchic governments emerged long after the end of the initial Islamic state) are all glorified both by democracy and Islam. So the problem is whether to respect everyone's identity as and sincerely desire peaceful coexistence.

Mslman toplum, demokrasiye mani deildir Trkiyenin de, kreselleen dnyann da problemi kutuplamadr. Gelir adaletsizliinin, smrgeciliin getirdii zengin-yoksul kutuplamasn da aan bir medeniyetler, kltrler, fikirler ve inanlar kutuplamas var. Her ne kadar Birlemi Milletler emsiyesi altnda bir medeniyetler ittifak projesi varsa da, u ana kadar bu projenin ciddi, somut neticelerini grebilmi deiliz. unu hemen belirtmeliyiz ki, hkmetler dzeyinden ziyade, medeniyetler ittifak, bir arada yaama ve paylama kltr, halklar arasnda, sivil toplum arasnda salanr ve derinleirse bir anlam ifade eder. Bugn, Medeniyetler ittifak mmkn m? sorusunun akla ilk getirdii, Mslmanlarla Hristiyanlar bar iinde bir arada yaayabilir mi? sorusudur. Bu sorunun artrd ikinci soru, slam ve demokrasi bir arada olabilir mi? sorusudur.

Birinci sorunun cevab, evet Mslmanlar, bata Hristiyanlar olmak zere baka din mensuplar ile bir arada bar iinde yaayabilir. Tarihte, zellikle Anadoluda bunun rnekleri ok. Kald ki bugn, deien, insana, insan deerlere nem veren bir anlay, zihniyet btn dnyada ne km bulunuyor. Fikir ve ifade hrriyeti, din ve vicdan zgrl, hukukun stnl, herkesin hesap verebilmesi, ksaca evrensel insan deerler temelinde bir demokrasi anlay, btn lkeleri, ynetimleri ekim alan iine katmtr. nsan onurunun korunmas ve eit yurttalk temelinde, demokratik ynetimlerde bir arada yaamak bugn, btn asrlardan daha fazla kolaylamtr. kinci sorunun cevab da evettir. Evet, slam ve temellerinin ne olduunu yukarda hatrlattmz demokrasi bir arada olabilir. (Demokrasinin bir ynetim biimi, slamn ise bir din olduu hakikatini unutmamalyz.) Birincisi, demokrasi insan temellidir. Demokrasi, nemli olan insandr diyor. Dinimiz de insan, eref-i mahlukat, yaratlmlarn en ereflisi ilan ediyor. Biz nce insanz, sonra Mslmanz. Belli bir yaa kadar ocuklar dinen mesul tutulmuyor. Allah (cc), Kuran- Kerimde insan zerine yemin ediyor. Demokrasi, insann huzurunu, refahn, bar salamay esas alyor, slam da bunu istiyor. Demokrasinin temelini tekil eden prensipler, slamn reddettii deil, tavsiye ettii prensiplerdir. slamn, ynetime getirdii ve Kuranda ifadesini bulan esas var: Adalet, yneticilerin kararlarn istiare ile (danarak, hr bir ortamda tartarak) almas ve emanetin (makamlarn) ehline (layk olanlara) verilmesi. Ayrca yneticilerin drst, ahlakl, merhametli, efkatli, affedici ve sevgi insan olmas ynetimi talandrc bir erdemdir. Demokrasilerde de en bata adalet, adam kayrmama, kararlarn halkn her kademede katlm ile alnmas istenmiyor mu? Ayrca, fikir ve ifade hrriyeti, din ve ibadet zgrl, aznlklarn haklarnn korunmas, bireyin nemi (bir kiiyi haksz yere ldrenin, btn insanl ldrm saylaca), iddet ve basknn, tahakkmn asla kabul edilmemesi (dinde zorlama yoktur), yneticilerin seilmesinde halkn sz sahibi olmas (sultanlk, padiahlk asr- saadetten sonra grld ve btn dnyada o devirlerde krallklar, imparatorluklar vard); bunlarn hepsi demokrasi ve slamn talep ettii deer ve prensiplerdir. Btn mesele herkesin, birbirinin konumuna saygl kalarak bir arada yaamay samimiyetle istemesinde ve paylamay kabul etmesinde dmleniyor

Ergenekon is just the means The Turkish Parliaments Coup and Memorandum Investigation Commission completed its work and presented its report to Parliament Speaker Cemil iek. Almost all the advice contained in the report echoed information heard earlier from those supporting further democratization in Turkey. Of course, the work done by the commission cannot be disparaged. After all, for Parliament, which is the greatest victim of the coups throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, to take this step in backing its own law is in fact a turning point worthy of note. Also, let us not forget that there are those who remain in circles in Turkey who would prefer to see the coup supporters and junta members hidden, who want to dilute the issues, and who persist in creating purposeful confusion regarding these matters. In such a climate, the value of a parliamentary commissions work, when it comes to raising public consciousness, is great. It is not sufficient, though. The most concrete step, which now needs to be taken, is the creation of a civil or democratic constitution. It is during the process of creating this constitution that it will become clear just who stands where, and who is sincere in their desire to see democracy triumph. One of the suggestions in the report from the commission, that a commission be formed which can enter the cosmic chamber, should definitely be realized. The 150-year-old deep state is still standing, and still strong. In Italy, Felice Casson, the justice commissioner who led the fight against the Italian version of Ergenekon, called Gladio, was only able to take real strides once he entered the cosmic chamber. Zaman newspaper journalist Ali hsan Aydn had two successful interviews with Casson -- now a senator -- in his office in Rome. The words spoken during these interviews by Casson should be read

and re-read by everyone. Let me remind you of some of what he said: We found those responsible for the massacres. We got rid of the organization whose very presence was a danger to a democratic society. I do not think we were able to completely eliminate them, though. It is possible that they are functioning under a different structure now. Gladio is not the only illegal secret organization in Italy. There are parallel organizations, like the Rose of the Wind, the Avanguardia Nazionale and the P2 Masonic lodge, which are also still functioning. The Gladio structure is not one that administers these other groups from the top down. In fact, Gladio was just one of these organizations. As for the tension strategy that is driven forward and implemented, it is something greater. Gladio is just a means to an end. The greatest difficulty we encountered during the investigation was actually accessing Gladios international connections. For a prosecutor, accessing these was very difficult. They had ties not only to the secret services of some NATO members, but also to those of other countries. While doing research in the archives of the Italian Military Intelligence and Security Service, I came across ties to Turkey. Turkey is a country with its own particular, more complicated problems. The political, economic, and cultural structure in Italy is simpler. Turkey is a border country. It is important both for Europe as well as the Middle East. This is not only true today, but in the past as well. Casson sees Turkey as having a very expansive horizon. When one looks at PKK terrorism, Syria, Iraq, Israel, US policies and all the developments in our region as a whole, it is quite clear that we are not just dealing with coups and junta members. No matter what happens in our region, it concerns Turkey on a first-degree level. At the same time, Turkey is the country in the region which some would like to see impeded. The game is clear to us, though: polarizing Turkey through tension-increasing strategy and provocations. This is why our youth was pushed into such bloody clashes during coup periods, divided into rightist and leftist groups. The children of the people of the nation were shot and struck down during ideologically based confrontations. Assassinations aimed at triggering polarizations between secular and non-secular factions, Sunnis and Alevis, and Turks and Kurds. Unsolved murders and massacres, all planned with this aim. No one needs to provide any more grist for the mill among those who want to see Turkey polarized

Ergenekon sadece bir ara TBMM Darbe ve Muhtralar Aratrma Komisyonu almalarn tamamlad ve hazrlanan rapor Meclis Bakan Sayn Cemil ieke sunuldu. Rapordaki nerilerin hemen hepsi, daha nce Trkiyenin demokratiklemesinden yana olanlarn srarla syledikleri eylerdir. Komisyonun almas elbette kmsenemez. Darbelerin en byk maduru Parlamentonun, kendi hukukuna sahip kma adna att bu adm, tarihe kayt dme adna bir dnm noktasdr. Ayrca darbelere ve cuntaclara kar belli evrelerin srarla devam eden perdeleme, meseleyi sulandrma, kafa karkl hsl etme adna hl direndiklerini unutmayalm. Byle bir ortamda, kamuoyunda demokratikleme adna bir uur uyandrma adna da komisyonun almasnn deeri byktr. Ama yetmez. Somut admlar nemli. En somut adm da sivil ve demokratik bir anayasa yapmaktr. Kim nerede duruyor, demokrasi konusunda kim samimidir, kim deildir bu srete ortaya kacaktr. Komisyonun sonu blmndeki neriler arasnda; kozmik odaya girebilecek bir komisyon kurulmas mutlaka gerekletirilmelidir. 150 yllk derin yap, hl ayaktadr ve gldr. talyada, bizdeki Ergenekona benzer Gladyonun davasn yrten yarg Felice Casson ancak kozmik odaya girince mesafe alabilmitir. Zamandan Ali hsan Aydn, imdi senatr olan Casson ile Romadaki ofisinde iki defa rportaj yaparak byk bir gazetecilik baarsna imza att. Cassonun szleri defalarca okunmaldr. Bazlarn hatrlataym: Katliamlarn sorumlularn bulduk. Varl demokratik toplum iin

tehlikeli olan rgt ortadan kaldrdk. Ama tamamen ortadan kalktn zannetmiyorum. Belki, deiik bir yap altnda iliyordur. Gladyo, talyadaki tek yasad gizli rgt deildi. Paralel olarak alan, Rzgar Gl, Avanguardia Nazionale ve P2 mason locas gibi ok sayda farkl yaplanma vard. Gladyo, bunlarn tepesinde her eyi idare eden rgt deil. Onlardan bir tanesi. Gdlen gerginlik stratejisi ise daha byk bir ey. Gladyo sadece bu amaca ulamak iin kullanlan bir ara. Soruturma esnasnda karlatm en byk zorluk, Gladyonun uluslararas balantlarna erimek oldu. Bunlara ulamak bir savc iin ok zor. NATO yeleri ve bunlarn dndaki ok sayda lkelerin gizli servisleriyle balantlar bulunuyordu. talyan gizli servis arivlerinde aratrma yaparken, Trkiye ile de balantlara rastladm. Trkiye, kendine zg zorluklar olan bir lke. Bizdeki siyasi, ekonomik ve kltrel yap daha basit. Trkiyede daha karmak sorunlar var. Trkiye bir snr lkesi. Avrupa iin de, Ortadou iin de nemli. Sadece bugn iin deil, gemite de byleydi. Casson, bizimle ilgili daha geni bir ufuk iziyor. PKK terr, Suriye, Irak, ran, srail, ABD politikalar, blgemizdeki gelimeler hepsi birlikte dnldnde, sadece cuntaclar ve darbelerle uramadmz daha net grlecektir. Blgemizde ne oluyorsa, birinci derecede Trkiyeyi ilgilendiriyor. Bu corafyada n kesilmek istenen lke Trkiyedir. Bize er ebekesinin oyunu belli. Gerilim stratejisi ve provokasyonlarla Trkiyeyi kutuplatrmak... Genlik, darbe dnemlerinde sa-sol diye kanl bir atmann iine bunun iin itildi. deolojik kutuplamalar ile halk ocuklar vuruturuldu. Laik-anti laik, Snni-Alevi, Trk-Krt kutuplamalar iin fitne atei olan suikastlar, faili mehul cinayetler ve katliamlar bunun iin tezghland. Trkiyeyi kutuplatrmak isteyenlerin deirmenine kimse su tamamal

Gazas heavenly children Oh Gazas innocent infants, little children. For days we have been looking at your photos. Actually, we cannot look at them but pretend to do so. Something is squeezing our hearts. We feel pressed, short of breath and exhausted. Your straggly hair seems to wave in the deadly winds. How beautiful your hair is. How beautiful your dull eyes that seem to be alive are. What do you tell us in whispers? I am trying to understand. How good-looking your faces are. Your cheeks can apparently drive away even the traces of death. How curious your expressions are. What do they say about the petrified, blackened and rotten consciences of people? Are you the greatest response to the bombs and bullets of the oppressors? How quickly you have slipped out of our lives even before your parents can love and caress you to their hearts content. When you went away, you left behind a heap of questions for the children of the world. As they look at your innocent faces, they ask their parents at home: Why are children being killed, mom? Why do they kill the children? There is no answer. There is a lump in our throats. What can we say? What should we say? At first I didnt have the courage to look at your tender faces. I couldnt muster the courage. Then I couldnt hold back any longer. You must look, I told myself, at their heavenly faces. My eyes were fixed on your straggly hair. How beautiful the hair of martyred infants was. I wanted to caress them. I wanted to smell them as there must be heavenly smells on them. Did I have the courage to do so? Were my hands capable of doing it? We are all guilty. Then we sought consolation. In paradise, our Prophet will caress that hair, those innocent heads. The Prophets clemency, I said to myself. Then I pondered if our Prophet would caress the children of Gaza as if he were caressing Qasim, Abdullah or Ibrahim. There, everyone would envy them. They would ask: Who are they? Who are you whom the Prophet Muhammad, the pride of humanity, has befriended? And you would reply, We are the children of Gaza. You were hand-in-hand, queued up, your tiny bodies, wrapped in small shrouds, were placed next to each other. With your innocent faces and your heavenly swaddles all lined up, and your expressions that make us question the very meaning of life, you havent died in vain. The message you send with your deaths is far greater than the message we give

with our words. Like droplets of compassion and pity that revive oases out of deserts of oppression, you send rains of clemency and affection to hearts. You have melted away so much ice from petrified hearts. You have made the egocentric people of our time remember the presence of other people. Your bodies bled, but with it you have made the consciences of other people bleed as well. As we shamefully looked at your faces, so many dry eyes were filled with tears. Like the seeds of wheat sown in soil, you have resurrected as millions. And you have revived us with our true humanness. If another spring will come to this old world, it wont come to our petrified hearts. First, compassion, clemency and fairness must come to this world. If the human race is to be revived, humanity must first be revived. It appears this task has been assigned to your innocence. How can those cruel, merciless, heartless men kill you? Why is it that they dont feel ashamed? Why are they so fearless? Why dont they regret what they did? You, the heavenly children of Gaza, have exposed them. You have made the whole world see their supporters. You have revealed how those advocates of human rights, peace and democracy have withered away. They have been caught in the act thanks to your expressions. You, the heavenly infants of Gaza, have sent tremors to blackened consciences. You have made Muslims who are lured by mundane attractions of this world remember that they are actually in a wretched state and they must regain their awareness of being true believers. You straggly hair and your lively eyes have told us many things. Your deaths will surely be avenged.

Gazzenin cennet ocuklar Gazzenin masum bebekleri, kck ocuklar. Gnlerdir sizin cennet fotoraflarnza bakyoruz. Bakamyoruz, bakar gibi yapyoruz. Yreimiz, yreklerimiz daralyor. Daralyor, skyor, bitiyoruz. O dank salarnz. Ecel rzgrnda dalgalanr gibi. Ne gzel salarnz var sizin. Ne de gzel, yaar gibi bakan donuk gzleriniz. Anlamaya alyorum, bize neler anlatyor, neler fsldyorsunuz. Yzleriniz ne gzel. lmn izleri tutunamaz m sizin yanaklarnzda? Siz nasl bakyorsunuz yle? Ne diyorsunuz katlam, katran srnm, pas tutmu vicdanlara? Zalimin bombalarna, mermilerine en byk cevap siz misiniz? Anneleriniz size doyamadan, babalarnz doya doya koklayamadan, nasl da kayp gittiniz ellerinden, ellerimizden. Giderken, btn dnyann ocuklarn sorulara bodunuz. Sizin masum yzlerinize bakarken evde annelerine, babalarna sorup durdular: ocuklar neden lyor anne? ocuklar neden ldryorlar? Cevap veremedi kimse. Boazlara bir dm atld. Ne diyecektik? Ne demeliydik? Ben o gzel yzlerinize nce cesaret edip, bakamadm. Toplayamadm kendimi. Sonra dayanamadm. Bak dedim, onlar cennet yzleri. Bir de dank salarnza takldm. Ne gzelmi ehit bebeklerin salar. Okamak isterdim. Cennetten kokular srnmtr imdi onlara diye koklamak isterdim. Yzm olur muydu? Elim gider miydi? Suluyuz hepimiz... Sonra teselli aradm. Cennette Peygamberimiz okayacak o salar, o masum balar. Peygamber efkati dedim. Dndm sonra, Kasm, Abdullah, brahimi okar gibi okayacak Gazzenin cennet ocuklarn. Nasl da zenirlerdi size orada kim bilir. Sorarlard sizi, bunlar da kim? Kim byle nsanln ftihar Tablosuna arkada olanlar? Siz cevap m verirdiniz: Biz Gazzenin ocuklaryz. Yan yanayd kck kefenlere sarl bedenlerimiz. El eleydik, sra sraydk, ellerdeydik, havalardaydk. O masum yzleriniz, o sra sra cennet kundaklarna sarlm halinizle siz, bize btn hayat sorgulatan baklarnzla siz, bouna lm olamazsnz. Anladklarmzdan, daha byktr anlattklarnz. Siz kurumu llere can veren rahmet damlalar gibi, yreklere efkat, merhamet yadryorsunuz. Siz, bilseniz ne ok talam kalbi zdnz, erittiniz. Siz, sadece ben diyen insanlara, yrei hatrlattnz. Kanayan bedenlerinizle, vicdanlar kanattnz. Kurumu nice gz pnarna ya yrd, bakarken o baklamaz gzlerinize... Siz buday tohumu gibi hatta ondan da te, bir dnce topran barna milyon

dirildiniz. Bizi, insanlmza dirilttiniz. Eer ihtiyar dnyamz bir bahar daha yaayacaksa, talam kalplerle gelmez o bahar. Merhamet, efkat, vicdan gelmeli nce. nsan dirilecekse, insaniyet dirilmeli nce. Demek size dt, sizin masumiyetinize dt bu grev. Size o zalim, o merhametsiz, o kalpsiz adamlar nasl da kyyorlar. Nasl da utanmyorlar.. korkmuyorlar.. piman olmuyorlar... Siz, Gazzenin cennet ocuklar, siz onlar tehir ettiniz. Onlara destek verenleri tehir ettiniz. nsan haklar, bar, demokrasi diyenlerin suskunluunu, ortadan kaybolularn tehir ettiniz. Nasl da yakalandlar, masum baklarnzda... Gazzenin cennet ocuklar, kararan vicdanlar sarstnz. Dnyaya dalan Mslmanlara, perian hallerini ve mmin olma uurunu hatrlattnz. Dank salarnz ve yayormu gibi bakan gzleriniz, ne ok ey anlatt bize. Ahnz, kalmaz dtnz yerde... h.gulerce@zaman.com.tr

13 (THIRTEEN) Two thousand and thirteenth years The calendar has turned to a new year. According to the Gregorian calendar we are in the two thousand and thirteenth year. Nothing has changed but the calendar on the wall on the night of 31 st of December. Those who claimed that 2012 would be the end of the world, based on the Mayan calendar were wrong. One needs to stand on certain numbers and not on others. The two thousand and thirteenth year may live up to the reputation of the number thirteen. It maymind you, it not necessarily will. Playing with numbers and running calculations is fun. Sometimes it can drive a person away from the facts. Perhaps this is why it is fun, but once fun comes before clear reasoning, the results are hardly desirable. According to the Gregorian calendar we are in the two thousand and thirteenth year. We think this due to the particular calendar we use and its system of calculation. We formulate opinions based on this idea. If you were to ask the first man in the street what year we are in, he is likely to say 2013, content with knowing the answer. If you were to ask him whether he is sure, he would maintain the same expression while replying that he is. This is not surprising. Calendars are not debated. They do not vary from person to person. Someone sets the calendar and everyone else follows. This is reasonable. But let us be honest. The fact is that clocks do not measure the time, they measure each other. Calendars do not measure the time either. Whether they are paper, cardboard or digital, calendars only display whatever meaning you have imbued them with and whatever numbers you have put on them. If the person you want to talk to about 2013 happens to live according to the Armenian calendar, he will say no, there is long to go until 2013, we are in 1461. Then you will have to object that they are wrong, that 1461 is long in the past. The Ethiopian calendar shows 2005 and the Bahai calendar shows 170. Your 2013 is 1419 in the Bengalese and 2963 in the Berber calendar. Buddhist calendars now show 2557. Similarly the Hindus, the Chinese, the Koreans, the Arabs, the Japanese, the Jews, the Coptics and others have different calendars. What does the label 2013 matter then? Pragmatism is assumed to be the most appropriate method in these circumstances. If everyone or the majority decides that a point is correct, it is taken to be correct as per common law and the opinions of the Scottish philosopher David Hume. If something is agreed to be not the case, it is not the case. From then on, the agreed matter is either the case or not in subsequent reasoning, discussion and calculation. Everything depends upon human perception. But it is not easy to solve the issue with pragmatism or Hume. We are face to face with a radical issue. Who can claim that time has been correctly calculated since the first calendars? Who has the knowledge to prove this? The first Babylonian calendars took the 29.5 day lapse between two full moons, the lunar moon as their unit of measurement. Egyptians developed the first solar calendar. Mayans had developed a calendar calculating past, as well as future periods. All probably thought their own to be the correct, proper form of calculation. The Egyptians wanted to measure the time due to the impact of the inundation of the Nile on agriculture. The y wanted to settle the boundaries of fields which changed after every flood. There was a need. To go back to our calendar, it was begun with the Julian calendar introduced by Julius Caesar in 46 B.C. This calendar, which was prepared by the Alexandrian astronomer Soisigenes forms the basis of our current calendar. The Julian calendar was given its final form in 8 B.C. under Emperor Augustus. Just as Julius Caesar had given his name to the seventh month, Augustus gave his to the eight. As he saw himself the equal of Julius, Augustus made the number of days in both months equal. Pope Gregory the 13th had the calendar reorganised in 1582 with the bull Inter gravissimas. The Julian calendar had shifted by a day every 128 years. It began in March due to the solar calendar and the course of observed nature. January the 1 st had become the first day of the year in a decision taken by the Romans in 153 B.C. It is said that todays Gregorian calendar begins with year zero taken as the birth of Christ. But for Orthodox Christians the New Year begins on the 14 th of January according to the Gregorian calendar. Hence they celebrate Christmas not on the 25th of December as in Western Christianity but on the 7 th of January. The New Year began on the 25th of March in England

until 1752 and in Scotland until 1600. The Thais celebrate the New Year on the 13 th of April. Celts took it to be the 1 st of November. To come back to 2013 let us say all other calendars are wrong. Those who live and work according to such calendars make a mistake. Only our calendar is correct. It is not possible to prove this. Even if we seem to be in 2013 according to the calendar reorganised by Pope Gregory the 13th, this may not be true. The present Pope Benedict the 16th has announced that it is possible 2012 is not actually 2012. Accordingly we took 2018 or 2019 to be 2012. Now we might be in 2019 and 2020. We cannot be sure. This is why the fear of the number thirteen is not rational. Following the Mayan calendar, the fear of number thirteen might become the new craze. Fear of thirteen fits the anxiety and scepticism of the post-modern period just fine. It would be surprising were it not. Bankrupt countries, burnt out economic models, wars, conflicts, constantly rising regional and global instability and chronic poverty and the fear of famine present even in industrial countries could make blaming the number thirteen a bit unjust, but fear of the number might calm people down somewhat. There are already buildings without a 13 th floor, residences without number 13, hotels and hospitals without the 13 th room, theatres and planes without the seat number 13. There are also stables, subway lines and the like which are not given the number 13. It is as though what is happening is not due to neo-liberalism but the poor number 13. As though all this is not the effect of an insatiable greed for profit but of the secret power of numbers. As though the whole fault in greed overcoming virtue, the doom of morality and the collapse of human values and virtue can be blamed on a number. 13 (ON ) kinci bin yln on nc yl Takvim dnd ve yeni bir yla girdik. Miladi takvime gre Milattan Sonra ikinci bin yln on nc ylna geldik. Aslnda 31 Aralk gecesinde duvara aslan takvim dnda hibir ey deimedi. Yeni yl iin beslenen umutlar da, tanan kayglar da bir nceki yl ile ayn. Maya takvimi nedeniyle 2012 ylnda dnyann sonunun geleceini savunanlar haksz kt. Rakamlar zerinde bazen ok, bazen az durmak gerekir. Ama ikinci bin yln on nc yl gerekten de on n anna uygun da olabilir. Ltfen dikkat buyurun; olur deil, olabilir... Rakamlar ve harflerle oynamak, hesaplar yapmak genellikle keyiflidir. Ama bazen kiiyi gereklerden de uzaklatrabilir. Belki de bu yzden keyiflidir, fakat keyif akln nne getiinde, yaanan neticeler nadiren faydal olabilir. Mevcut takvime gre, ikinci bin yln on nc ylndayz. Kullandmz takvime ve onun hesaplama sistemine gre bunu dnyoruz. Bu dnceyle de fikir retmeye alyoruz. ayet sokaa karsanz ve karlatnz kiilere hangi ylda olduumuzu sorarsanz, yzlerinde cevab bilmenin verdii gurur ifadesiyle 2013 derler. Eer emin misiniz diye de sorarsanz, ayn yz ifadesini birka kk kasn hareketiyle pekitirip eminim diye cevap verirler. Buna armamak gerekir. nk takvimler tartlmaz. nk takvimler kiiye gre deimez. Birisi takvimi belirler ve herkes ona uyar. Makul olan da budur. Fakat yine de drst olmak lazm. Bu dnyann gerei udur; saatler zaman lmez, saatler birbirini ler. Takvimler de zaman lmez. Takvimler ister kttan, kartondan isterse dijital olsun; Siz ona ne anlam yklediyseniz, siz oraya hangi hesaplamay ve rakamlar yazdysanz, sadece onu gsterir. Eer 2013 yl zerine konumak istediiniz kii Ermeni takvimine gre yayorsa, size itiraz edecektir. Hayr diyecektir. 2013e daha ok var. Biz 1461 ylndayz. O zaman da siz itiraz edersiniz. Yanlyorsunuz. 1461 geeli ok oldu Etiyopya takvimi 2005 yln, Bahailerin takvimi 170 yln gsteriyor. Sizin 2013 yl, Bengal takviminde 1419a ve Berberi takvimde 2963 ylna tekabl ediyorlar. Budistlerin takvimi 2557 yln yaadmz savunuyor. Ayn ekilde Hindularn, inlilerin, Korelilerin, Araplarn, Japonlarn, Musevilerin, Kptilerin ve daha bakalarnn da baka takvimleri var. O zaman ne nemi kald 2013n?... Byle durumlarda pragmatik davranmak en uygun yntem saylr. Nihayetinde ngiliz hukuk sisteminde olduu gibi ve sko filozof David Humeun savunduu gibi; herkes veya ounluk bir hususun doru olduuna karar verirse, o husus artk dorudur. ayet bir olgunun olmad karar alnrsa, o olgunun olmad sonucuna varlr. Ondan sonraki dncelerde, fikirlemelerde, hesaplamalarda o husus dorudur ve o olgu ise zaten yoktur. nk her ey insann alglarndan ibarettir. Ve fakat sorunu pragmatizm ile veya Hume ile de zmek hi kolay deil. nk ok kkl bir sorun ile kar karyayz. lk takvimlerden bu yana zamann doru hesaplandn kim iddia edebilir? Kimin bunu ispat eden bir bilgisi var? lk Babil takvimleri kameri ay, yani birbirini izleyen iki dolunay arasndaki 29,5 gnlk dnemi temel alan bir sistemdi. Gne ylna dayal takvimi ilk gelitirenler, Msrllard. Mayalar da hem gemie hem de gelecee ynelik bir takvim sistemi kurmulard. Muhtemelen her biri iin en doru, en gereki hesaplama kendi takvimiydi. rnein Msrllarn zaman lmek istemesinin nedeni Nil nehrinin taknlarnn her yl tarma getirdii yarar ve zararlarla ilgiliydi Ayrca her takndan sonra deien tarla snrlarnn getirdii mlkiyet sorunlarn amak iindi. Yani bir ihtiya vard. Biz yine miladi takvime dnelim. Miladi takvim M.. 46 ylnda Jl Sezar tarafndan kullanma sokulan Jlyen takvimi ile balad. skenderiyeli astronomi bilgini Sosigenes'in hazrlad bu takvim bugnk takvimimizin de temelini tekil ediyor. Jlyen takvimi, imparator Augustus dneminde son ekline M.S. 8 ylnda kavutu. Nasl Jlyen takvimini yapan Jl Sezar yedinci aya kendi adn verdiyse, Agustus da sekizinci aya kendi adn verdi. Hatta Agustus kendisini Sezara denk grd iin, her iki ayn gn saysn eitletti.

Ama Papa 13. Gregor 16 Asrda, 1582 ylnda takvimi Inter gravissimas ferman ile yeniden dzenledi. Jlyen takvimine gre her 128 ylda bir gnlk bir kayma vard. Yln balangc ise gne takviminden ve doa hareketlerinden dolay Mart idi. 1 Ocak tarihi ise Romalarn Milattan nce 153 ylnda ald kararla yeni yln ilk gn oldu. Bugn kullanlan Miladi takvimin Hz. sa'nn doumunu tarih balangc kabul ettii iddia edilir. Ama btn Hristiyan alemi Hz. sann doum gnn 25 Aralkta kutlar. Ortodokslar iin yeni yl 1 Ocakta deil, 14 Ocakta balar. O nedenle Ortodokslara gre sann doumu 25 Aralk deil, 7 Ocak gndr. ngilterede 1752ye ve skoyada 1600 ylna kadar yeni yln balangc 25 Mart idi. Taylandllar 13 Nisanda yeni yla girer. Yeni yl Keltlere gre 1 Kasmd. Yine 2013 ylna dnmeyi deneyelim ve diyelim ki, dier btn takvimler yanltr. O takvimlere gre yaayanlar, alanlar da hataldr. Sadece bizim takvimimiz dorudur. Bunu ispat etmek pek mmkn deil. Ama Papa Gregorun yeniden dzenledii takvime gre 2013 ylnda olsak da, aslnda olmaya da biliriz. nk imdi ki papa, Papa 16. Benediktus da 2012 ylnn 2012 yl olmama ihtimalinin yksek olduunu aklad. Buna gre ya 2018 ya da 2019 yln biz 2012 yl zannettik. O halde imdi de ya 2019 ya da 2020 ylnda olabiliriz. Yani onu da tam bilemiyoruz O nedenle Triskaidekafobi ok da mantkl bir ey deil. Triskaidekafobi, on saysndan korkmak anlamna geliyor. Maya takviminin ardndan on korkusu yeni yln yeni modas olabilir. Post modern dnemin bireysel ve toplumsal ruh hali olan kronik boyutta akisiyete ve septizm, yani tedirginlik ve takntllk iin triskaidekafobi yeni moda olabilir. Aslnda olmamas artc olur. flas eden lkeler, tkenen ekonomi modelleri, savalar, atmalar, srekli artan blgesel ve kresel riskler, hatta endstri lkelerinde ba gsteren kronik fakirlik ve alk korkusu toplandnda, bu yla bakldnda belki suu on rakamnda aramak hakszlk olur, ama yine de triskaidekafobi insanlar bir yere kadar rahatlatr. 13. kat olmayan gkdelenler, 13 numaral konutun olmad apartmanlar, 13 numaral odann olmad oteller, hastaneler, 13 numaral koltuun olmad tiyatrolar ve uaklar var. Hatta 13 ile numaralanmayan ahrlar, metro hatlar ve saire. Sanki yaananlar neoliberalizmin suu deil de, zavall on rakamndan kaynaklanyormu gibi. Sanki olup bitenlere bankalarn ayarsz kar ihtiras deil de, rakamlarn gizli laneti yol am gibi. Dnyada yaanan temel sorunda, yani eyyamn erdemi alt etmesinde, ahlakn kyametinde, insani deerlerin ve erdem ahlaknn maherinde kabahat bir rakamnm gibi. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN 2013 A difficult year begins It is possible to come up with a few practical diagnoses for 2013. In 2013 we will come to miss 2012. 2013 will definitely be more difficult than 2012. It will be a bad year politically and economically. As 2013 ends, we will say 2012 was better, everything was better back then. No problems were solved around the world in 2012. Wars did not come to an end. Regional tensions were not lowered. Uprisings and rebellions did not cease. Global crises were not over. The risk of a global recession continues. There is global unemployment and poverty. Hunger continues. On the first day of 2013 the council presidency of the European Union passed from Southern Cyprus to Ireland. Thus the term presidency of the European Union shifted from a country on the verge of bankruptcy to Ireland, which is one of the first victims of the crisis and which has barely begun to recover itself. In Germany there will be state elections in Lower Saxony in January and local elections in Schleswig-Holstein on the 26 th of May. Both elections are critical. Both elections are critical. There will be German federal parliament elections on the 22 nd of September. On the 22nd of January there parliamentary elections will be held in Israel. On the 9 th of April, it will be the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, one of the most problematic countries of 2012. Given the tensions between the regional Kurdish administration and the central government in Baghdad as well as rising reaction in Sunni Arab regions, the near future may be painful for Iraq. On the 1st of June Croatia will become a member of the European Union. The same day Lithuania will become the new term president. The elections in Germany will be the main event of 2013 in Europe. However, problems inherited from 2012 will continue. The recession in Europe seems set to deepen. Elections will be held in Italy but are unlikely to solve any major issues. It is certain that 2013 will be a fearful ride for Southern Cyprus, Portugal, Spain and Italy. For Greece the worst is yet to come. Due to the institutional shortcomings of the UN, the murderous Assad regime in Syria continues to kill its own people. The regime in Damascus may extend the conflict to Turkey and Lebanon in order to lengthen its lifespan. In Egypt stability has not yet been ensured and Cairo will for a while be described as a risky place. The dust of the Arab Spring has not yet settled down in Tunisia and Libya. In Afghanistan the problems are great and continue to grow. There is the risk of civil war in Iraq as well as the on-going conflict in Syria. Palestine might just be the most stable place in the Middle East in 2013, as the developments experienced during the last quarter of 2012 might allow for both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to breathe easy in 2013. Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia are in a situation best deemed a global security issue. Furthermore there are serious regional tensions in Congo, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic. Conflicts are growing throughout Africa.

The recent sensitivity over women rights and reaction recently experienced in India is connected with the hunger, poverty and unhappiness in the country. Pakistan is unlikely to have an easy ride in 2013. In 2012 many separatist and terrorist organisations have chosen to settle for various reasons. The Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front have signed a framework agreement. The ETA organisation in Spain, which fought for Basque independence announced that it was ready to lay down arms and dissolve itself. Peace talks have begun between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). FARC will probably lay down arms. On the other hand, the Flemish region in Belgium, Catalonia in Spain and Scotland in Great Britain are nearing separation. Scotland will hold a referendum in 2014. Belgium is in a critical situation. There seems no way that Brussels can avoid splitting up. The most suitable development in Belgium might be a weak confederation. There might be exciting developments throughout 2013. Spain is concerned over Catalonia and the Basque country. Both wealthy regions want to break away from Castile. In Italy Southern Tyrol is increasingly vocal about its demands for autonomy. Turkey seems set for important developments in this respect. The European Unions regions policy and Kosovos declaration of independence from Syria have impacted directly on the political fortunes of the old continent. In Latin America 2013 will be an important year. The condition of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez might lead to a destabilisation of prevailing political conditions in the country. Bolivarism, which has overtaken much of Latin America might be heard of more often in the coming year. The Bolivarian Alliance for Our America (ALBA) set up by those countries which defend Bolivarism is becoming more effective. Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Equator, Cuba, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and Grenada and Venezuela have rapidly developed cooperation. There are also organisations such as Unasur, Telesur, Petrosur, Petrocaribe and Banco del Sur which were founded to advance regional cooperation in various fields. Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil are also in dialogue with these cooperation mechanisms. Another organisation which will be talked about often in 2013 will be the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This is indicated by the rising importance of China in world politics and trade. Another important indicator is the increasingly aggressive foreign policy pursued by Russia. Other than the Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members of this organisation. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation may also be a significant actor in changes of balance to be experienced in 2013. As Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia act together, they might succeed in increasing their effectiveness. 2013 might not be a very fast year for Iran. Yet the possibility of tensions rising remains depending on Israels approach and the official/semi-official statements Israel makes use of to test the water. The agenda for 2013 will be determined by the financial sector. The actors and actions of the financial markets will decide on many things. Neo-liberalism will stay strong in 2013. We are in a difficult year of world history. Nothing will come easily. 2013TE NELER OLACAK? Zor bir yl balad 2013 yl iin hemen birka pratik tehiste bulunmak mmkn. 2013 ylnda 2012 yln ok zleyeceiz. 2013 kesinlikle 2012ye gre ok daha zor bir yl olacak. Hem siyasi hem de iktisadi adan kt bir yl olacak. 2013 biterken, aslnda 2012 ok iyi bir yld. Her ey daha iyiydi diyeceiz 2012 ylnda yeryznde hemen hemen hibir sorun zlmedi. Mevcut savalar sona ermedi. Blgesel gerilimler drlemedi. Ayaklanmalar ve isyanlar durdurulamad. Kresel krizler bitirilemedi. Kresel resesyon riski sryor. Kresel boyutta isizlik krizi var. Kresel boyutta fakirlik riski var. Alk artyor. 2013 ylnn ilk gnnde Avrupa Birliinin konsey dnem bakanl Gney Kbrstan rlandaya geti. Bylece Avrupa Birliinde srayla yaplan konsey dnem bakanl iflasn eiindeki bir lkeden, kresel mali krizin ilk kurbanlarndan olan ve kendisini henz yeni toparlamaya balayan rlandaya geti. Almanyada Ocak aynda Aa Saksonyada eyalet seimleri ve 26 Maysta Schleswig-Holsteinda yerel seimler var. Her iki seim de kritik. nk Almanyada 22 Eyllde federal parlamento seimleri olacak. 22 Ocakta da srailde parlamento seimleri var. 2012 ylnn en sorunlu lkelerinden Irakta 9 Nisan gn Saddamn devrilmesinin onuncu yldnm yaanacak. Irakta blgesel Krt ynetimi ve merkezi Badat hkmeti arasndaki gerilim ve Snni Arap blgelerinde artan tepkiler dikkate alndnda Irak iin yakn gelecek ok sancl olabilir. 1 Haziranda Hrvatistan Avrupa Birliine katlm srecini tamamlayacak. Ayn gn dnem bakanl Litvanyaya geecek. Almanyadaki seimler n plana kacak 2013 ylnda. Ama 2012den kt miras olarak gelen sorunlar da devam ediyor. Avrupada resesyon var ve derinleecek gibi grnyor. talyada seimler var ve sorunu zmeyecei anlalyor. Gney Kbrs, Portekiz, spanya ve talya 2013 yln da korku tnelinde geirecekler, bu imdiden belli. Yunanistan iin ise kt gnler daha balamad bile. Birlemi Milletlerin kurumsal yetersizlii yznden Suriyede katil Esad rejimi halkn ldrmeye devam ediyor. amn rejimin mrn uzatmak iin atmalar Lbnana ve Trkiyeye yaymas denemesi ihtimali ok yksek. Msrda istikrar henz salanamad ve uzun bir sre daha Kahire iin en uygun deyim, riskli olacak. Tunus ve Libyada Arap Bahar ayaklanmalarnn ardndan istikrar henz salanamad. Afganistanda sorunlar byk ve byyerek devam ediyor. Irakta hem mezhepler hem de blgeler arasndaki gerilimler artarak devam ediyor. Suriyenin yan sra Irak iin de i sava tehlikesi var. Muhtemelen btn Orta Douda 2013 yln en istikrarl biimde geirecek olan yer Filistin olacak. 2012 ylnn son

eyreinde yaanan gelimeler hem Bat eriann hem de Gazze eridinin 2013 ylnda daha rahat nefes alabileceine iaret ediyor. Yemen, Sudan, Eritre, Somali ve Etiyopya da durum kresel gvenlik sorunu boyutunda. Ayrca Kongo, Nijerya, Fildii Sahilleri ve Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti bata olmak zere Afrikann ou blgesinde ok ciddi blgesel gerilimler var. Afrikada atmalar artyor ve byyor. Hindistanda en son kadn haklar konusunda artan hassasiyet ve toplumun ortaya koyduu tepkiler, esasen lkedeki alk, fakirlik ve mutsuzluk ile irtibatl. Ayrca Pakistanda da 2013 ylnn kolay gemeyecei kesin. 2012 ylnda -her ne olduysa- birok ayrlk ve terrist hareket uzlama yoluna girdi. Filipinler hkmeti ile Moro slami Kurtulu Cephesi (MILF) arasnda ereve anlamas imzaland. spanyann Bask blgesinin bamszl iin silahl mcadele veren ETA rgt, silah brakarak kendini lavetmeye hazr olduunu aklad. Kolombiya hkmeti ile Kolombiya Devrimci Silahl Gleri (FARC) arasnda bar grmeleri balad. ok byk olaslkla FARC da ayn yola devam edecek. Dier taraftan Belika Flaman blgesinin, spanya Katalonyann ve Byk Britanya skoyann ayrlna hazrlanyor. skoya 2014 ylnda bunun iin referandum yapacak. Belika da ok kritik durumda. Brksel iin blnme kanlmaz son gibi grnyor. Belikada yaanabilecek en uygun sonu, gevek konfederasyon olabilir. 2013 yl boyunca heyecan verici gelimeler olabilir. spanya ise hem Bask blgesi hem de Katalonya iin kaygl. nk her iki zengin blgede artk yola Kastilya ile devam etmek istemiyor. talyada da Gney Tirol otonomi talebini eskiye gre daha yksek sesle dile getiriyor. Trkiyede de bu konuda nemli bir veya birka gelime olaca grlyor. Avrupa Birliinin izledii blgeler politikas ve bilhassa Kosovann Srbistandan bamszln tanmas yal ktann siyasi kaderini dorudan etkiledi. Latin Amerikann tarihinde de 2013 yl nemli yer tutacak. Venezella Devlet Bakan Hugo Chavezin salk durumu, bu lkedeki mevcut siyasi yapnn istikrarn bozabilir. Ayn ekilde Latin Amerikann ok byk blmn etkisine alan Bolivarizm bu yl adn daha fazla duyurabilir. Bolivarizmi savunan lkelerin kurduu Bizim Amerikamz iin Bolivarc ttifak (ALBA) giderek daha etkili hale geliyor. Antigua ve Barbuda, Bolivya, Dominik Cumhuriyeti, Ekvator, Kba, Nikaragua, St. Vincent ve Grenada ve Venezella blgesel ibirliini son yllarda hzla gelitirdiler. Ayrca Halklar Ticaret Anlamas ad altnda bir belge imzaladlar. Bunun yan sra blgesel ibirliini eitli zeminlerde daha ileriye tamak iin kurulmu Unasur, Telesur, Petrosur, Petrocaribe ve Banco del Sur adl kurulular da var. Arjantin, Uruguay ve Brezilya da sz konusu ibirlii mekanizmalar ile diyalog halinde. 2013 ylnda ad oka geecek bir dier rgt de angay birlii rgt olacak. zellikle dnya ticaretinde ve siyasetinde inin neminin hzla artmas bunun bir gstergesi. Keza Rusyann da giderek artan bir ritimle agresif bir d politika takip etmesi de, bunun ok nemli bir iareti. in Halk Cumhuriyeti ve Rusya Federasyonunun yan sra Kazakistan, Krgzistan, Tacikistan ve zbekistan bu rgte yeler. Ama Kolektif Gvenlik Anlamas rgt de 2013 ylnda yaanacak dengelerde ve denge deiimlerinde gndeme gelebilir. Gerekten de Rusya, Kazakistan, Krgzistan, Tacikistan, Beyaz Rusya ve Ermenistan beraber hareket ederken, etkinliklerini artrmakta baarl olabilirler. 2013 yl ran konusunda ok fazla hareketli olmayacak gibi. Ama her durumda srailin tutumuna gre ve Tahrann zaman zaman adeta bir meteorolojik test balonu gibi kulland resmi/yar resmi aklamalaryla tansiyonu ykseltebilir. 2013 ylnda gndemi yine finans sektr belirleyecek. Mali piyasalarn aktrleri ve tutumlar yine pek ok eye karar verecek. Neoliberalizm 2013 ylnda da gcn koruyacak. Dnya tarihinin zor, etin ve meakkatli bir ylna girdik. Bu yl hibir ey kolay olmayacak. A HORROR MOVIE: THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN 2012 The global system could not overcome the crisis in 2012 either. If every year is taken to be a score point, the crisis is ahead 5-0. Nothing has been accomplished in the struggle with the crisis so far. 2012 began as a lost year and ended as a lost year. No one claims any longer than the crisis will be over in 2013. The crisis will last longer. The main characteristic of neo-liberalism is that it does not recognise the concept of a crisis or that it does not evaluate any development of possibility as a crisis. Neo-liberalism aims at manipulating and profiting from every new development. Although the real sector might be in trouble around the world and every sector might be losing blood, the financial sector continues to reap high profits. Therefore we may claim that this phase of the world economy has been marked by the superiority and pressure of the financial sector and by losses incurred on other actors. Credit Rating Agencies One of the most discussed topics in the world of economics in 2012 was about credit rating agencies. The slashing of the ratings of European countries became one of the basic indicators of the world economy. In January 2012 Standard and Poors (S&P) lowered the credit ratings of nine Eurozone countries while Fitch lowered ratings for five countries. The credit ratings of Austria, France, Malta, Slovakia, Southern Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Spain fell. Following S&P and Fitch, Moodys lowered ratings of six Eurozone members. Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta were affected. In following months S&P and Moodys continued to lower Spains credit rating. Towards the end of the year Moodys lowered Frances credit rating of Aaa by a grade to Aa1 and its outlook to negative. The impact of credit rating agencies on national economies was high throughout the year. 2012 had hopes of 2013

Of course, the most determinant actors in the global economy were not credit rating agencies. The European Commission, the World Bank and the International monetary Fund were all effective in 2012 with their reports as well as statements by their higher level officials. All three organisations gave cautious and concerned signals throughout the year. Pessimism was the common note in the communications of all three organisations The World Banks main concern during the year was the global system becoming blocked as a result of falling growth in developing economies such as China, India and Brazil. The World Bank lowered its forecast for global growth from 3.6 to 3.1 percent due to the slowdown in developing economies. Meanwhile the IMF lowered its forecast from 4 percent to 3.3 percent. OECD data ran in parallel to data from both the World Bank and the IMF. It should be noted that given the current conjecture, not every value above 0 percent equals growth. Even 3 percent growth might not represent a net gain. For giants such as China, growth rates between 7 and 8 percent signal a slowdown. In any case, it was forecasted that 2013 would see better figures than 2012, when the growth of the US economy slowed down, negative growth was experienced in the European Union and the global rate of growth slowed. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Although Greece caused concerns for the European Union in 2012, Spain and Italy were the real scare. Rising unemployment, contraction of the real sector, recession, concerns over political stability combined have rendered the situation in these two countries nerve wreaking for the European Union. Another important development in 2012 was the decision to raise the resources of the IMF by USD 430 billion, taken at a G20 summit meeting. Another was the realisation of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with resources amounting to EUR 500 billion by the finance ministers of the Eurozone. The ESM has replaced the European Fiscal Stability Fund (EFSF). The EFSF had been used to salvage Greece, Ireland and Portugal, using resources worth EUR 192 billion. The Eurozone, mindful of the dark clouds on the horizon, probably designed the ESM for Spain and Italy. The ESM may lend directly to governments facing a crisis. It will also intervene on bonds markets and directly capitalise banks. Until mid-2013 the ESM will operate jointly with the EFSF. The ESM will have capital amounting to EUR 700 billion. The ESM, which was founded in 2012 after long bargaining and debate and which was expected to become functional in 2014 is a more critical issue than it looks. The implementation of the ESM has meant a mutation of the European Union. The European Union is not what it used to be for a long time now. The approachable European Union of the early years, which was human focused and peace centred, which cherished diversity and looked for cooperation over every issue has since the 90s become quite something else and has surrendered to markets and lobbies. Europe has given up on democracy The debt crisis in Europe has highlighted a problem which Europe has to solve at the intellectual level. The identity problems of the European Union are now a thing of the past. Perhaps such an issue was never at stake. The European Union has given up on defining itself. It no longer cares what its references are. The European Union has given up on the matter of interpreting the fundamental principles. It became apparent in 2012 that the European Union is an alliance of financial markets and associated lobbies. It was realised in 2012 that the European Union is not run by European institutions, voters, taxpayers or citizens. Five or six people run the European Union. They are EU President Herman van Rompuy, EU Foreign Policy High Representative Catherine Ashton, Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and IMF president Christine Lagarde. This is poor indeed. It shows that the European Union has given up on democracy, that it is in the post-democracy period and that the rule of technocrats has begun. This may be explained through a tangible example. The general public, voters, governments, parliamentarians and ministers who they have elected might think that it is not correct to pay back Greek debt. They may think that the European Union has no place in this issue. However, the interests of those markets and lobbies which dominate the European Union might require Europeans to dish out for aid to Greece. In this case, even though Europeans do not want it and Greeks rebel against the idea, technocrats might ensure that aid is sent to Greece. Technocrats deem it practically necessary for the greater good. In the true elections of the European Union, only a handful of officials have a vote. All those measures taken in 2012 against the crisis in Europe have served to increase Greek debt. Later on, Merkel decided, probably in the name of the other officials named, that the European Union needed joint fiscal policy and regulation. Thus, though every member was not pleased, the finance ministers dutifully signed the documents. Now every member will have its budget, its deficit and its budget practices approved. Whatever euphemism is used, this is the truth. KT BR KORKU FLM; AVRUPA EKONOMS VE 2012 Kresel sistem 2012 ylnda da kresel krizi yenemedi. Eer her yl bir set olarak dnrsek, kresel kriz ilk setten bu yana btn setleri ald ve 5-0 ne geti. Krizle mcadele ise u ana kadar hibir ey yapamad. 2012 yl kayp bir yl olarak balad ve kayp bir yl olarak sona erdi. Hi kimse artk 2013 ylnda krizin sona ereceini iddia etmiyor. nk kriz ok daha uzun srecek. Neoliberalizmin belki de byk zellii, esas itibariyle kriz kavramn tanmamas veyahut baka bir deyile hibir gelimeyi veya olasl kriz olarak deerlendirmemesi. Neoliberalizm hemen her gelime karsnda, onu kendi lehine kullanmann bir yolunu aryor ve hemen her gelimeden kar retiyor. Btn dnyada reel sektr byk sorun yaasa da, hemen her i kolu ciddi kayplar kaydetse de, mali sektr muazzam llerde kar etmeye devam ediyor.

O nedenle dnya ekonomisinin bu evresinin finans sektrnn stnlnde ve basksnda geen, finans sektrn dndaki herkesin kaybettii bir dnem olduunu savunabiliriz Kredi Derecelendirme Kurulular 2012 ylnda ekonomi dnyasnda en ok konuulan ve tartlan konu kredi derecelendirme kurulularyd. zellikle Avrupa lkelerinin lke notlarnn dmesi, bir bakma kresel ekonominin temel gstergesi halindeydi. Nitekim Ocak 2012de Standart & Poor's (S&P) Avro Blgesi'ndeki 9 lkenin ve Fitchde 5 lkenin notunu drd. Bu gelime 2012nin nasl bir yl olacana da k tutuyordu. Buna gre Avusturya, Fransa, Malta, Slovakya, Gney Kbrs, talya, Portekiz ve spanya'nn kredi notlar dt. Standart & Poor's ve Fitchin ardndan Moodys de ubat aynda alt Avro Blgesi ye lkenin notunu drd. Moodysin bu hamlesinden yine talya, Portekiz, Slovakya, Slovenya ve Malta ile spanya etkilendi. Sonraki aylarda da zellikle Standart & Poor's ve Moody's de spanya'nn kredi notunu drmeye devam ettiler. Moody's yln sonuna doru Fransa'nn ''Aaa'' olan kredi notunu bir kademe drerek ''Aa1''e ekti, notun grnmn negatifte brakt. Kredi derecelendirme kurulularnn lke ekonomileri zerinde belirleyici etkisi btn 2012 yl boyunca yksek oldu. 2012de Umut 2013 idi Elbette kresel ekonomik sistem zerinde en yksek seviyede belirleyicilii olan sadece kredi derecelendirme kurulular deildi. 2012 ylnda Avrupa Komisyonu, Dnya Bankas ve Uluslararas Para Fonu da hem raporlar ve hem de st dzey yneticilerinin aklama ve beyanatlaryla etkili oldular. Her kurulu da btn yl boyunca dikkatli ve tedirgin mesajlar verdiler. Her kuruluun da verdii mesajlarn toplamnn zeti, ktmserlik idi. Dnya Bankasnn yl boyunca tad kayg; in, Hindistan ve Brezilya bata olmak zere gelimekte olan lkelerdeki bymenin yavalamas halinde kresel sistemin bloke olmasyd. Dnya Bankas gelimekte olan lkelerde grlen yavalama nedeniyle 2012 yl kresel byme tahminini %3,6 seviyesinden %3,1 seviyesine indirdi. Uluslararas Para Fonu da ayn konudaki tahminini %4 seviyesinden %3,3 seviyesine indirdi. OECDnin verileri de hem Dnya Bankasnn hem de Uluslararas Para Fonunun ngrleri ile paralellik gsterdi. Burada elbette belirtmekte fayda var; Mevcut konjonktrel deerler dikkate alndnda %0n zerindeki her saysal veri byme anlamna gelmiyor. %3 dahi bazen gn kurtarmaya yetmeyebiliyor. Hatta in gibi devler iin %7-%8 dahi patinaj anlamna gelebiliyor. Her durumda 2012 iin kresel ekonomide bymenin azalmas, ABD ekonomisinde byme hznn yavalamas, Avro Blgesinde de negatif bymenin yaanmas ve 2013 ylnda 2012 ylna kyasla daha iyi rakamlar kaydedilmesi ngrld. Avrupa stikrar Fonu- ESM Fakat Avrupa Birlii iin 2012 ylnda Yunanistan kayg kayna olsa da, spanya ve talya byk korku oldu. Her iki lkede de artan isizlik, reel sektrde daralma, resesyon, siyasi istikrarszlk endiesi ve elbette bunlarn toplamnn arpan etkisi Avro Blgesi iin soukkanllkla karlanmas zor bir durumdu. 2012deki nemli gelimelerden bir tanesi de G-20 doruk toplantsnda Uluslararas Para Fonunun kaynaklarnn 430 milyar USD artrlmas karar alnmasyd. Bir dieri de phesiz Avro Blgesi maliye bakanlar, 500 milyar EUR tutarnda daimi kurtarma fonu Avrupa stikrar Mekanizmas'n (ESM) hizmete sokmas oldu. ESM Avrupa Mali stikrar Fonu'nun (EFSF) yerini ald. EFSF 192 milyar EUR harcayarak Yunanistan, rlanda ve Portekiz'in kurtarlmasnda kullanlmt. Muhtemelen ufuk izgisindeki kara bulutlara bakan Avro Blgesi, gelecek iin -2013 de olabilir- spanya ve talyay dnerek ESMyi tasarlad. ESM krizdeki hkmetlere dorudan kredi verecek. Ayrca tahvil piyasalarna mdahalede bulunacak ve hatta bankalara dorudan sermaye enjekte edecek. ESM 2013 ylnn ortasna kadar EFSF ile birlikte faaliyet gsterecek. ESM 700 milyar EUR sermaye gcne sahip olacak. 2012 ylnda uzun sren pazarlklarn ve tartmalarn ardndan kurulan ve aslnda 2014 ylndan itibaren ilerlik kazanmas ngrlen ESM grndnden ok daha kritik bir konu. nk ESMin devreye girmesi, Avrupa Birliinin bir mutasyon yaad anlamna geldi. Avrupa Birlii uzun zamandr, bir zamanlar olduu gibi deil. Balarda insan merkezli ve bar odakl odakl olan, farkllklar zenginlik ve her konuyu ibirlii olana sayan sevimli Avrupa Birlii 90larla beraber bu grnmden hzla uzaklat ve her geen yl giderek fazla piyasalara ve lobilere teslim oldu. Avrupa Demokrasiden Vazgeti Avrupada yaanan bor krizi, Avrupann entelektel boyutta zmesi gereken bir sorunu da ortaya koydu. Avrupa Birlii iin artk kimlik sorunu geride kald. Belki de hi olmamt. Avrupa Birlii kendisini tanmlamaktan vazgeti. Avrupa Birliinin kime ve neye gre tarif edileceini artk umursamyor. Avrupa Birlii temel ilkelerin yorumu ve yorumlarn gelitirilmesi hususundan da vazgeti. nk 2012 ylnda grld ki, Avrupa Birlii mali piyasalarn ve o piyasalarla alan sektrlerin lobilerinin ittifakdr. Ayrca 2012 ylnda anlald ki, Avrupa Birliinin Avrupa kurumlar veya Avrupal semenler, vergi deyenler, vatandalar ve saire ynetmez. Avrupa Birliinin ynetenler 5-6 kiidir; AB Bakan Herman von Rompuy, AB D Politika Yksek Temsilcisi Catherine Ashton, Avrogrup Bakan Jean-Claude Juncker, Avrupa Merkez Bankas Bakan Mario Draghi, Almanya anslyesi Angela Merkel ve Uluslararas Para Fonu bakan Christine Lagarde Esasen bu durum son derecede vahim bir durum. nk Avrupa Birliinin demokrasiden vazgetiini, demokrasi sonras dneme getiini ve teknokratlar ynetimini balattn ortaya koyuyor. Bunu somut bir rnekle izah etmek yerinde olabilir; Avrupa Birliinde yaayan semenler, kamuoyu ve hatta onlarn setii yneticiler, parlamenterler ve bakanlar Yunanistann borlarn demenin doru olmadn dnebilirler. Bu konuyu Avrupa Birliinin haricinde bir mesele olarak deerlendirebilirler. Fakat Avrupa Birliine hakim olan piyasalarn ve lobilerin karlar ise Avrupallarn ellerini ceplerine atp Yunanistana yardm gndermelerini gerektirebilir. O halde, Avrupallar bunu istemese de, hatta btn Yunanistan buna isyan

etse de, teknokratlar uygun grd karar alr ve uygular. nk teknokratlar bunun teknik olarak herkes iin faydal olduuna hkmeder. Avrupa Birliinde artk gerek seimlerde sadece bir masann etrafn dolduracak sayda yetkili oy kullanyor! Avrupada 2012 ylnda yaanan krizle mcadele srecinde alnan btn tedbirler sadece Yunanistann borcunu artrd. Devamnda ise Merkel -muhtemelen dier sz konusu isimleri temsil ederek- krizden k yolu iin Avrupa Birliinde ortak maliye politikas ve ortak mali denetim gerektiine karar verdi. Bylece -her Birlik yesi bundan memnun olmasa da- Avro Blgesinin maliye bakanlar nlerine konulan ktlar imzalad. Artk her ye lke btesini, bte an, bte uygulamalarn onaylatacak. Kim hangi kelimelendirmeyi tercih ederse etsin, gerek bu! THE LONGEST TRAGEDY The Bad Course Continues in Greece The struggle with the crisis was undoubtedly the most important subject of the world economic agenda in 2012. The greatest problem in the context of the global crisis was the debt crisis in the Eurozone. Throughout 2012 Greece, Italy and Spain experienced major problems. The Union has tried to stop the journey to the bottom by pouring money down the bottomless well of Greece. Despite the efforts, Greece has continued to weaken. The debt burden as well as the proportion of the debt to the GDP continued to rise in Greece. Today Greece has unemployment approaching 30 percent, new austerity measures to be implemented and is almost certain to end 2013 on a worse note than 2012. In 2012 Greece continued to remain afloat thanks to help from the European Union. It was only through this means that it could make salary and other payments. In 2013, as well as in coming years Greece will continue to live on life support. Nevertheless, Greece is far from being a frightening prospect for the European Union. The impact the Greek economy can have on the European or the world economy is limited. The transfers and conjectural aid made to Athens serve to pay Greeces debtors, rather than Greeces interests. The poor people of Greece are no longer anybodys concern. Throughout 2012, Greece answered to the Troika formed by representatives of the EU Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. The Troika constantly regulated Greece. The representatives of the IMF and the European Central Bank travelled to Greece on the 17 th of January to discuss the details of the second recovery plan with the government. Athens realised savings measures and as a result gained the right to receive the recovery package from the European Union and the IMF. On the 22nd of January the Troika and Greece started negotiating for EUR 50 billion worth of privatisation. The Troika sat down at the table with the Greek government, which held simultaneous talks with its creditors. During the first round of talks no agreement was reached on lowering Greek debt by EUR 100 billion and the exchange of government bonds for debt. The Eurogroup demanded that talks continue until an agreement was reached between Greece and private creditors. On the 26th of January debt exchange talks began anew. On the 30 th of January German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble said that unless Greece implemented the reforms and savings it promised, they would not lend anymore aid. On the 5th of February the Athens administration met once more with representatives of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, without any conclusive results. Four days later Greek politicians secured full agreement for the austerity measures proposed in exchange for the new bailout package. In continuation, the second credit agreement between Athens and the Troika was signed. All 17 main measures proposed by the Troika were accepted at a midnight meeting of the leaders of the three main political parties in Greece. On the 10 th of February the finance ministers of the Eurozone asked for a guarantee from Greek leaders that they would abide by the promises they made in exchange for recovery funds worth EUR 130 billion. Finance ministers of the Eurozone asked Athens to establish a special mechanism for debt repayment. Greece completed the procedure on additional fiscal measures required in exchange for the second international bailout package on the 12th of February. The European Union did not find the austerity measures approved by the Greek government in exchange for the second recovery aid worth EUR 130 billion to be sufficient. The EU Commission announced that there were still obligations Greece had to fulfil in exchange for the recovery package. The meeting of the European Union Finance Ministers scheduled for the day after this statement was cancelled for this reason. Greece renewed its 2012 budget to accommodate the extra savings measures worth EUR 3.2 billion demanded by the Troika. Meanwhile the projected budget deficit increased from 5.4 percent of the GDP to 6.7 percent. Later the bond exchange agreement which would allow for EUR 107 billion was ratified. Greece accepted to lower spending so as to ensure EUR 325 million additional resources and thereby to have the new recovery package worth EUR 130 billion approved. The proposed law on cuts to retirement pensions was passed as part of the new austerity measures. Retirement pay over EUR 1,300 was cut by 12 percent, seamens pay was lowered by 7 percent and cuts between 10 to 35 percent were made to all pensions over EUR 200 per month. The finance ministers of the Eurozone met upon this new development and approved the recovery package worth EUR 130 billion. In this context a part of Greek debt was cut as it was clear that Greece would not be able to pay back all of its debt in the light of the high amounts of aid it had received in the past. This practice was dubbed the haircut. A bond exchange programme was also implemented under the name Private Sector Involvement (PSI). Greece ratified the measures leading to the second recovery package worth EUR 130 billion in February 2012. At the beginning of March, 85.8 percent of public sector creditors backed the crucial bond exchange agreement. The creditors accepted wiping away 75 percent of Greeces outstanding bonds worth EUR 206 billion. The finance ministers of

the Eurozone then met in Brussels and gave their final approval to the EUR 130 billion worth of recovery aid to be given to Greece. On the 20th of March the Greek parliament approved the second recovery package agreement. Later agreement was found between Athens and public sector creditors on the restructuring of debt. As a result, Greece carried out bond exchange amounting to EUR 177 billion. In the next phase of the process, in April 2012, a second aid package for Greece worth EUR 130 billion was approved. Although the European Union thus intended to support the present government in Greece and to ensure it a comfortable electoral process, a new crisis was experienced during elections in May. The elections were then renewed and the parties supporting the recovery package founded the new government. This was of course not all. On the 24th of July, Greece announced that it could not realise the reforms it promised for the next instalment of the recovery package and demanded extra time. The European Commission then declared that there would be no payments made to Greece until September. The Troika delegation immediately went to Athens and started negotiating whether Greece would get the remainder of the recovery package, in a sense they started negotiating Greeces fate. About a month later Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras met Eurogroup President Jean Claude Juncker in Athens. Austerity measures which Athens promised to implement until 2014 were agreed on during the meeting. In talks which continued into September Greece proposed numerous alternative austerity measures. The Troika refused all of them out of hand. Negotiations between the sides remained inconclusive in September. The new austerity package prepared by the coalition headed by Prime Minister Antonis Samaras was ratified by parliament on the 7th of November. The government in Athens passed the EUR 13.5 billion worth package from parliament in order to be eligible for the next instalment of the recovery package worth EUR 31.5 billion. The next week the Greek government approved the 2013 budget which includes savings worth EUR 9.2 billion. Following the tough negotiations which went on through November, the Eurozone finance ministers and the IMF representatives who held their third meeting in a week came to an agreement on the 26 th of November. EUR 43.7 billion worth of recovery aid to Greece was released according to this agreement. During the summit meeting of Eurozone finance ministers held on the 13 th of December it was announced that the release of EUR 49.1 billion worth of bailout funds had been approved and that EUR 34.4 billion worth of funds would be delivered to Greece in December. EN UZUN TRAGEDYA Yunanistan iin Kt Yol Sryor 2012 ylnda kresel ekonominin en nemli gndem maddeleri arasnda kukusuz krizle mcadele de vard. Kresel kriz kapsamnda en byk sorun -btn yl boyunca- Avro Blgesindeki bor krizi idi. 2012 boyunca Avrupa Birliinde Yunanistan, talya ve spanya ok byk sorunda. Birlik yl boyunca dipsiz kuyu Yunanistana milyarlarca Avro aktararak dibe gidii durdurmaya alt. Ama bu abalara ramen Yunanistan batmaya devam etti. Yunanistan bor stoku ve toplam borcunun gayri safi yurt ii retimine oran artmaya devam etti. Bugn Yunanistan %30a yaklaan isizlik oran ve srada uygulamaya konulmay bekleyen yeni tasarruf tedbirleri ile 2013 yln 2012 ylna gre daha kt bir yerde bitirecek. 2012 ylnda Yunanistan Avrupa Birliinden gelen yardmlarla ayakta kalmaya devam etti. Bu sayede maa databildi ve dier demelerini yapabildi. Yunanistan 2013 ylnda da, sonraki yllarda da makineye bal yaama devam edecek. Ama yine de Yunanistan Avrupa Birlii iin korkutucu olmaktan ok uzak bir konumda. nk Atinann siyasi gc de, hem dnya ekonomisinde hem de Avrupa ekonomisinde etkisi ortada. Atinaya gnderilen havaleler ve konjonktrel yardm paketleri ise zaten Yunanistana deil, Yunanistana bor verenlerin tahsilatna fayda salyor. Zavall Yunan halk ise uzun zamandr hi kimsenin umurunda deil. Yunanistan 2012 yl boyunca AB Komisyonu, Avrupa Merkez Bankas ve Uluslararas Para Fonu temsilcilerinden meydana gelen Troykaya hesap verdi. Troyka Yunanistan srekli denetledi. 17 Ocakta Uluslararas Para Fonu ve Avrupa Merkez Bankas yetkilileri ikinci kurtarma plannn detaylar ile ilgili olarak hkmet ile mzakereler iin bu lkeye gitti. Atina tasarruf nlemlerini hayata geirdi ve bunun sonucunda Avrupa Birlii ve Uluslararas Para Fonundan yeniden kurtarma paketini almaya hak kazand. 22 Ocakta Yunanistan Troyka ile 50 milyar EUR deerinde zelletirme yaplmas konusunda mzakerelere balad. Troyka Yunan hkmetiyle ve Yunan hkmeti de e zamanl olarak zel alacakllaryla da masaya oturdu. Grmelerin birinci etabnda Yunanistann borlarnn yaklak 100 milyar EUR azaltlmas konusunda kreditrlerle ve tahvil takasn konusunda uzlama temin olmad. Avrogrup, Yunanistan ile zel sektr kreditrleri arasndaki grmelerde anlamaya varlmas iin mzakerelere devam edilmesini talep etti. 26 Ocakta bor takas grmeleri yeniden balad. 30 Ocakta Almanya Maliye Bakan Wolfgang Schauble bir aklama yapt ve Yunanistann taahht ettii reformlar ve tasarruflar uygulamaya sokmamas durumunda daha fazla mali yardm almayacan aklad. 5 ubatta Avrupa Birlii ve Uluslararas Para Fonu yetkilileriyle bir kez daha bir araya gelen Atina hkmetinin mzakereleri yine sonusuz kald. Drt gn sonra Yunan politikaclar, yeni kurtarma paketi iin ne srlen kemer skma nlemleri konusunda tam anlamaya vard. Devamnda Atinann Troyka ile yrtt ikinci kredi anlamas tamamland. Yeni kredi anlamasnda Troyka'nn alnmasn istedii 17 ana nlemin tamam, koalisyonu oluturan 3 parti liderinin gece yars sona eren toplantsnda kabul edildi. 10 ubatta Avro blgesinin maliye bakanlar, 130 milyar EUR deerinde yeni kredi erevesinde talep edilen tasarruf nlemlerinde anlaan Yunan siyasi liderlerden verdikleri sz tutacaklar hususunda

garanti istedi. Avro Blgesi maliye bakanlar, Atinadan bor geri demesinde zel mekanizma oluturulmasn istedi. Yunanistan 12 ubatta ikinci uluslararas kurtarma yardmn alabilmesi iin uygulamas gereken ek mali nlemler konusunda prosedr tamamlad. Fakat Avrupa Birlii, Yunanistana 130 milyar EUR tutarndaki ikinci kurtarma paketi iin parlamentonun onaylad tasarruf tedbirlerini yeterli bulmad. Hatta AB Komisyonu Yunanistann kurtarma paketi iin hala karlamas gereken artlar bulunduunu aklad. Hatta ertesi gn Avrupa Birlii Maliye Bakanlar toplants bu nedenle iptal edildi. Yunanistan, 2012 btesini Troykadan gelen 3,2 milyar EUR deerinde ek nlem talepleri iin yeniledi. Bu arada bte a hedefi gayri safi yurt ii retimin %5,4nden %6,7sine karld. Bunun devamnda Yunanistann toplam borcunun 107 milyar EUR tutarnda ksmnn silinmesini salayacak tahvil takas anlamasn onaylad. Yunanistan 130 milyar Avroluk yeni yardm paketinin Troyka tarafndan onaylanmas iin, harcamalarn 325 milyon Avro ek kaynak yaratacak ekilde azaltlmasn kabul etti. Yeni tasarruf nlemleri erevesinde ek emekli maalarnda kesinti yaplmasn ieren kanun tasarsn da onaylad. kinci 1.300 EUR snrn aan Avroyu emekli maalarna %12 orannda kesinti uygulanmas, denizcilerin emekli maalarnn %7 drlmesini ve ayda 200 EURu geen ek emeklilik maalarnda da %10-%35 aras kesinti yaplmas karara baland. Bunun zerine Avro Blgesi maliye bakanlar topland ve 130 milyar EUR deerindeki kurtarma paketini onaylad. Bu kapsamda Yunanistan -daha nceki yllarda da ald ok byk boyutlardaki yardmlara ramen- borlarnn tamamn deyemeyecei belli oldu iin, borlar ksmen silindi. Bu uygulamaya sa tra ad verildi. Ayrca zel sektr katlm (PSI) ad altnda bir tahvil takas program uyguland. Yunanistan, 130 milyar EUR tutarnda ikinci kredi anlamasnn yolunu aacak tasarruf nlemlerini ubat 2012de onaylad. Mart aynn balangcnda kritik tahvil takas anlamasna zel sektr kreditrlerinin %85,8i destek verdi. Kreditrler Yunanistann 206 milyar EUR deerinde tahvilinin%75 kesintisini kabul etti. Bunun devamnda Brkselde toplanan Avro Blgesi Maliye Bakanlar, Yunanistana yaplacak 130 milyar EUR deerindeki ikinci mali yardma son onay verdi. 20 Martta da Yunan parlamentosu, ikinci kurtarma kredisi anlamasn onaylad. Devamnda Atina ile zel sektr kreditrleri arasnda borlarn yeniden yaplandrlmas konusunda mutabakat saland. Bu sayede Yunanistan, 177 milyar EUR tutarnda tahvil takas gerekletirdi. Srecin bir sonraki admnda Nisan 2012de Avrogrup doruk toplantsnda Yunanistan'a 130 milyar EUR seviyesinde ikinci bir yardm paketi karar alnd. Her ne kadar Avrupa Birlii bu sayede Yunanistan'da mevcut hkmeti destekleyip, ona konforlu bir seim sreci yaatmay hedeflemi olsa da, Mays'taki seimlerde yeni bir kriz yaand. Bunun zerine seim yenilendi ve bu defa kurtarma paketini destekleyen partiler yeni hkmeti kurdu. Elbette bununla kalmad. 24 Temmuzda Yunanistan mali yardmn bir sonraki dilimini alabilmek yerine getireceine sz verdii reformlar gerekletiremediini aklad ve ek sre istedi. Avrupa Komisyonu bunun zerine Yunanistana Eyll ayna kadar hibir deme yaplmayacan ilan etti. Hemen devamnda Troyka heyeti Atinaya utu ve Yunanistann kurtarma paketinin kalann alp almamas konusunda, dier bir deyile Yunanistann kaderi hakknda mzakerelere balad. Yaklak bir ay sonra Yunanistan Babakan Antonis Samaras, Atinada Avrogrup Bakan Jean Claude Juncker ile grt. Grmede Atinann 2014e kadar yerine getirmeyi taahht ettii tasarruf tedbirleri ele alnd. Eyll aynda da devam eden mzakerelerde Yunanistan defalarca alternatif tasarruf tedbirleri teklif etti. Troyka hepsini sert bir dille ret etti. Eyll aynda taraflar arasnda mzakereler sonusuz kald. Babakan Antonis Samaras liderliindeki koalisyon hkmetinin hazrlad yeni tasarruf paketi 7 Kasmda parlamentoda onayland. Atinadaki hkmet 13,5 milyar EUR seviyesindeki paketi, sz verilen kurtarma yardmnn 31,5 milyar EUR deerinde bir sonraki yardm dilimini alabilmek iin parlamentodan geirdi.Bir sonraki haftada Yunan parlamentosu, 9,2 milyar EUR tasarruf ngren 2013 btesini onaylad. Kasm ay boyunca yaanan sert mzakerelerden sonra 26 Kasmda haftada nc defa toplanan Avro Blgesi maliye bakanlar ve Uluslararas Para Fonu yetkilileri uzlama salad. Bu uzlamaya gre Yunanistana kurtarma kredisinin 43,7 milyar EUR deerindeki ksm serbest brakld. 13 Aralkta yaplan Avro Blgesi maliye bakanlarnn doruk toplantsnda 49,1 milyar EUR tutarnda yardm diliminin serbest braklmasnn onayland ve 34,4 milyar EUR deerindeki ksmnn Aralk ay iinde Yunanistana verilecei akland. WHO CARES ABOUT THE GREEK PEOPLE? From the cradle to the tomb of democracy Greece is going through the most difficult crisis in its history. Greece is also experiencing one of the deepest crises seen in finance history. The Greek state is bankrupt. The economic system in Greece has collapsed. Athens is trying to survive on foreign aid. As everyone knows, in Greece those who have caused the debt and those who have to repay it are not the same set of people. The future of the Greek people is in shambles. Greece is frequently said to be the cradle of democracy. This is meant to say that Greece is where democracy was born and developed. Although there is scant evidence in the history of Greece to back up this claim, it may still be thought that a European Union member state would have a well rooted and sufficiently advanced democracy. There is no need here to define the conceptual framework of democracy. The simplest components of democracy are selfrule and the rule of the country through the will of the people. More can be said about democracy of course, but this much suffices for our purposes. For the Greek people do not enjoy either principle today.

The sorry state of Greece was witnessed in elections held in May and June. Elections in Greece were held on the 6 th of May 2012. The electorate punished the two main parties which led the country to ruin. PASOK and New Democracy suffered severe setbacks. While the two parties had together won 80 percent of the valid vote in elections held in 2009, this time they totalled around 30 percent. In elections held on the 6th of May New Democracy got 18.85 percent of the vote, the Radical Left-wing Alliance (SYRIZA) got 16.78 percent, PASOK got 13.18 percent, ANEL got 10.60 percent, the Greek Communist Party got 8.48 percent, Golden Dawn got 6.97 percent and DIMAR got 6.10 percent of the vote. This is how the electorate punished PASOK and New Democracy for their policy of balance which had been going on for decades. Someone had to pay the political bill for cuts to the minimum wage which is currently EUR 750, to worker and retiree salaries, to healthcare and education expenditure and to the laying off of 150,000 public personnel. According to the results, Greece did not seem too keen on the Eurozone. Everyone knew that had Greece not been in the Eurozone, it could have devalued its currency Drachma, diminish its debt through inflation, increase public spending and household income, promote consumption and overcome this crisis with some wounds. A cabinet could not be established after the elections on the 6 th of May. PASOK and NEW Democracy should have admitted their share in the national disaster. They should have respected the views and preferences of the electorate. Instead they blocked efforts at forming a government and the country had to hold elections again. With new elections on the 17th of June, they sent out a message loud and clear; it is not the man in the street who determines the government or the electoral results in Greece, nor does he borrow heavily. But he has to pay back the debt and accept whatever government is established. In the renewed elections of 17 th of June, either New Democracy or PASOK had to come out victorious. Either of them singly or both of them together had to found the new government. For there were promises made, which had to be kept without intervention from the Greek people. Among these promises was axing 15,000 public jobs in 2012 and 150,000 public jobs until 2015. Promises had already been made to lower minimum pay by 22 percent and lower pensioner salaries. The government to be founded was to promise EUR 3 billion worth of cuts in spending and EUR 15 billion worth of privatisation. To this needs to be added amendments to labour laws to make firing easier and rising taxation. In the renewed elections of 17 th of June, New Democracy came out on top by a margin. New Democracy got 29.7 percent of the vote while SYRIZA got 26.9 percent, PASOK got 12.3 percent, ANEL got 7.5 percent, Golden Dawn got 6.9 percent and DIMAR got 6.2 percent and the Greek Communist Party got 4.5 percent of the vote. The announcement by New Democracy party leader Antonis Samaras that the elections represented a victory for Europe was apt, as the government which was later set up was to serve the European Union and not the Greek people. Had the Greek people been simply ignored during the elections but accorded significance at other times, there may still have been hope. But other than going to the election booth twice in 2012, the Greeks spent their time in protest on the streets. They gained no results. In January doctors went on strike for 72 hours in protest of the new pay policy. Pharmacists closed down their shops for 48 hours because they could not receive payments owed. They were followed by farmers. In the region on Viotia farmers distributed potatoes and onions to the public for free. They also held rallies. Nothing was thus obtained. In February too the Greeks rose up in protest as usual and held event after event. There was another strike in February. Public and private sector workers decided to go on strike for 48 hours against austerity measures prepared due to the demands of the Troika formed of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. There were pitched battles on the streets during the strike. There was much disturbance in Athens and other cities. Cars were torched and shops and banks were targeted by Molotov cocktails. Official announcements claimed that 93 buildings, of which nine were of historical or architectural significance, were heavily damaged, 150 buildings were lightly damaged and 40 tonnes of stone and marble rubble had to be collected off the streets. Nevertheless, social opposition was not heard by government or parliament. The government answered the Troikas bidding. The parliament accepted every demand from the government. Neither peaceful protests, nor violent attacks of the Greek people mattered, even if they kept it up from dusk till dawn. Thousands of people fought the police multiple times in 2012. The symbol for the recent conditions in Greece and its people came to the fore on the 4 thof April. Dmitris Christoulas was neither an opposition leader nor a protestor. He was a 77 year old retired pharmacist. He committed suicide in Sintagma Square, which is where protestors usually fight the police in Athens. He left behind a note saying I wanted to end my life honourably before having to search for food in the garbage. Statistics show that 1,500 people have committed suicide in Greece since the beginning of the crisis. Suicide rates have increased by 40 percent in the last 3 to 4 years. Suicide follows the death of hope. Among the desperate Greek people, those contemplating suicide are increasing in number. Maritime workers whose lives have been ruined held a two day protest. The government has lowered their pay, pension pay and the healthcare services they have access to. But their two day strike was not heard in parliament or in government buildings in Athens. As made clear on the 26th of July, the Greek government sees itself as being responsible to the Troika of the European Union Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF, and not the Greek people. For Samaras, remarks by Troika representatives over coffee carry greater weight than chanting streets, exploding squares and an uprising of the people. Neither Athens nor Thessaloniki could stop Samaras. 15,000 unionists marching against public spending cuts worth EUR 11.5 billion could not sway the government. The marches on parliament and official buildings around Sintagma Square in Athens could not change the governments ideas.

The unprecedented level of security and the ban on public protests in Athens during German Chancellor Merkels visit in May did not work. There were major clashes between the people and the police. Despite this, and the general strike on the 18 20th of October, the government did not back down or listen to the people. 100,000 people fighting the police cannot be seen as an ordinary situation. If this is the number of people willing to take part in clashes, it would be simply overlooking the problem to call it a disturbance of order or a protest. The Greek people are being overlooked in Greece. Their decisions, reactions, fears, anger and concerns are given the cold shoulder. The process in Greece seems to indicate that this state of affairs will continue unchanged for years to come. This probably contributes to mental disorders plaguing the Greek people. German psychotherapist Georg Pieper evaluated the mental conditions of the Greek people to the German Junge Welt newspaper and used some disturbing expressions. Pieper has carried out investigations in Athens. He has worked on trauma therapy. He studied the increasing number of cases in Greece and met with Greek colleagues. Pieper states that there is a rise in the need for psychotherapists in Greece. Pieper states that the state does not cover psychotherapy costs in Greece and those who cannot afford private practices are victimised. According to Piepers claims to the Junge Welt there has been an increase in the number of assault and violence victims in Greece. The number of sexual abuse cases are rising. More people are injured in heavy accidents and fires. Pieper says that as disappointment rising in Greece aggression and tendency to violence are very high. Anxiety disorders and depression is rising among Greek men. Psychological damage done by houses warmed with wood unlawfully harvested from forests, entire neighbourhoods without heating, and of mass layoffs is a daily occurrence. People feel worthless when they lose their jobs. Millions are out of a job. Those still employed make less money than before the crisis. Cases of suicide have doubled in the last three years with 75 percent of suicide cases being male. Depression and anxiety disorders increase alcohol consumption and propensity to domestic violence. Among the half employed youth, street gangs are becoming more prominent. Support for fascist organisations such as the Golden Dawn is rising. The Greek state no longer controls certain streets and neighbourhoods. In the country where the healthcare system has collapsed and finding medicine is a profession on its own, those admitted to hospital have to bring bedding and food from their homes. As cleaning staff in hospitals have been laid off, doctors and nurses are trying to ensure hygiene. As private hospitals are too expensive, many people have to go without treatment. In other words, Greeks are unhealthy bodily and mentally. Greece is paying its debts with its soul. YUNAN HALKI KMN UMURUNDA? Demokrasinin beiinden demokrasinin mezarna Yunanistan tarihinin en ar krizini yayor. Ayrca Yunanistan finans tarihinin de en ar krizlerinden birisini yayor. Yunanistanda devlet iflas etti. Yunanistanda ekonomik sistem kt. Atina d yardmlarla ayakta kalmaya alyor. Herkesin bildii gibi, herkesin grd gibi; Yunanistanda bor alan, borca neden olan baka, borcu demek zorunda olan baka! Yunan halknn gelecei bitti Yunanistan sklkla demokrasinin beii olarak tanmlanr. Yani Yunanistann demokrasinin doduu ve gelitii yer olduu anlamnda bu ifade kullanlr. Elbette Yunanistann tarihinde bu iddiay teyit eden veri dikkat ekecek derecede az. Ama yine de Avrupa Birlii yesi bir lkenin kkl ve kafi derecede gelikin bir demokrasiye sahip olduu dnebilir. Demokrasi kavramnn anlam erevesi zerinde ok durmaya gerek yok. nk demokrasinin en basit tanm olan kendi kendini ynetme ve lkenin halk iradesiyle ynetilmesi ilkesi yeterli. Elbette demokrasi hakknda daha birok sz edilebilir. Ama bu ikisi yeterli. nk Yunan halk bugn bu iki ilkeden mahrum. Yunanistandaki ackl tablo Mays ve Haziran aylarnda yaplan seimlerde de belli oldu. Yunanistanda seimler 6 Mays 2012 tarihinde yapld. Semen lkeyi ke gtren iki byk partiyi cezalandrd. PASOK ve Yeni Demokrasi Partisi ar oy kaybna uradlar. 2009 ylnda yaplan seimlerde geerli oylarn yaklak % 80'e yakn ksmn alan iki parti, sert bir dle toplamda %30'lar seviyesinde kaldlar. 6 Mays seimlerinde Yeni Demokrasi Partisi %18,85, Radikal Sol ttifak (SYRIZA) %16,78, PASOK %13,18, ANEL %10,60, Yunanistan Komnist Partisi %8,48, Altn afak %6,97 ve DMAR %6,10 oy ald. Semen hem PASOKu hem de Yeni Demokrasi Partisine on yllardr devam eden karlkl denge politikasnn hesabn byle sordu. Nihayetinde 750 EUR dzeyindeki asgari crette, maalarda ve emekli maalarnda yaplacak kesintilerin, azaltlacak eitim ve salk harcamalarnn, ayrca 150.000 kamu personelinin iten karlmasnn bir faturas olmalyd. Bu tabloya gre Yunan kamuoyu Avro Blgesi konusunda srarc deildi. nk herkes biliyordu ki, ayet Yunanistan Avro Blgesinde olmasayd, eski milli para birimi Drahmiyi devale eder, daha sonra borlarn enflasyonla eritir, hem kamu harcamalarn hem de hane bana geliri artrp, tketimi kkrtarak bu sreci yaral da olsa atlatrd. 6 Mays seimlerinden sonra hkmet kurulamad. Halbuki PASOK ve Yeni Demokrasi Partisi yaanan milli felakette paylar olduunu kabul etmeliydiler. Semenin tepkisine ve tercihine sayg gstermeliydiler. Ama onun yerine seimlerin ardndan hkmet kurma almalarn bloke ettiler ve lke yeniden seime gitti. 17 Haziranda yaplacak seimler ile kamuoyuna bir mesaj vermi oldular. Yunanistanda kurulacak hkmeti de, seim sonularn sokaktaki adam tayin etmez. Borcu da o almaz. Ama borcu da o der, kurulacak hkmeti de o kabul eder 17 Haziran seimlerinde ya Yeni Demokrasi Partisi ya da PASOK zafer kazanmalyd. Hkmeti ya biri ya da ikisi beraber kurmalyd. nk verilen szler vard, o szler tutulmalyd ve Yunan halk da buna engel olmamalyd. Verilen szlerin

arasnda 2012 ylnda 15.000ve 2015 ylna kadar 150.000 kamu grevlisinin iten karlmas vard. Ayrca Asgari maan %22 drlmesi ve emekli maalarnn indirilmesi de. Kurulacak hkmet harcamalarda 3 milyar EUR d salamay ve 2015 ylna kadar 15 milyar Euroluk zelletirme yapmay taahht edecek ve uygulanacakt. Buna ie alm ve kovulmay kolaylatrmak iin i kanunlarnda deiiklii, artacak vergileri de eklemek lazm. 17 Haziranda yenilenen seimlerden Yeni Demokrasi Partisiaz farkla birinci kt. Yeni Demokrasi Partisi %29,7, SYRIZA %26,9, PASOK %12,3, ANEL %7,5, Altn afak %6,9, DIMAR %6,2 ve Yunanistan Komnist Partisi de %4,5 orannda oy ald.Yunanistan'da Yeni Demokrasi Partisi, PASOK ve DMAR koalisyon hkmetini kurdu. Aslnda Yeni Demokrasi Partisi lideri Antonis Samarasn seimin ardndan yapt aklamadaki Avrupann zaferi ifadesi gerekten doruydu. nk bu seim sreci ve sonunda kurulan hkmet Yunan halknn deil, Avrupa Birliinin zaferiydi Yunan halk sadece seimlerde gz ard edilseydi, dier zamanlarda nemsenseydi belki iyimser olmak iin hala bir nedenin varlndan sz edilebilirdi. Ama Yunan halk iki defa sandk bana gitmesinin yan sra 2012 yln sokakta, meydanda, eylemde ve gsteride geirdi. Ama yine de hibir sonu elde edemedi. Ocak aynda doktorlar yeni maa politikasn protesto etmek iin 72 saat greve gitti. Ayrca eczaclar da alacaklarn tahsil edemedikleri iin 48 saat grev yapt. Onlar iftiler takip etti. Viotia blgesindeki iftiler halka bedava patates ve soan datt. Ayrca gsteriler dzenlediler. Hibir ie yaramad. ubat aynda Yunan halk her ay olduu gibi yine sesini ykseltti, eylem zerine eylem yapt. ubatta bir grev daha oldu. Kamu ve zel sektr alanlar hkmetin, yeni yardm karlnda Avrupa Birlii, Avrupa Merkez Bankas ve Uluslararas Para Fonunun temsil edildii Troykann taleplerini yerine getirmek iin yeni tasarruf tedbirlerine kar 48 saatlik grev karar ald. Grev srasnda sokak sava meydanna dnd. Atinada ve pek ok ehirde yer yerinden oynad. Arabalar yakld, maazalara ve bankalara Molotof kokteylleri atld. Resmi aklamada dokuzu tarihi ve mimari adan deere sahip toplam 93 binann ciddi, 150 kadar binann hafif hasar grd ve caddelerden 40 ton ta ve mermer parasnn topland belirtildi. Toplumsal muhalefet yine de sesini hkmete de, parlamentoya da duyuramad. Hkmet Troykann her dediini yapt. Parlamento hkmetin her istediini kabul etti. Yunan halknn bar eylemleri de, sert protestolar da, geceleri sabahlara kadar sokaklarda olmas da hi deerindeydi. 2012 yl boyunca Yunanistanda binlerce kii defalarca binlerce polisle att. Yunanistann son halinin ve halkn durumunun simge ismi 4 Nisan gn belli oldu. O bir muhalefet lideri veya renci deildi. Dimitris Christoulas yal, emekli bir eczacyd.77 yandayd. Atina'nn sava meydan olan Sintagma meydannda intihar etti. Ardnda brakt notta, plerden yiyecek arama durumuna gelmeden nce onurlu bir ekilde hayatma son vermek istedim yazlyd. statistikler, Yunanistanda krizin balangcndan bu yana yaklak 1.500 kiinin intihar ettiini gsteriyor. Yunanistanda intiharlar son 3-4 ylda %40 artt. ntihar umudun ld yerde olur. nce umut lr, ardndan insan kendisini ldrmeyi dnr. Umudu len Yunan halknda lmeyi dnenlerin says da artyor. Nitekim hayat mahvolan denizcilik sektr alanlar da iki gnlk grev yapt. nk hkmet onlarn hem maalarn hem emekliliklerini ve emekli maalarn hem de yararlandklar salk hizmetlerini azaltt. Ama onlarn yapt iki gnlk grevde Atinada hkmet ve parlamento binalarnda duyulmad, grlmedi nk 26 Temmuzda da grld gibi Yunanistanda hkmet iin esas sorumlu olduu kimseler Yunanistann vatandalar deil, Avrupa Birlii Komisyonu, Avrupa Merkez Bankas ve Uluslararas Para Fonu temsilcilerinden oluan Troyka heyeti. Samaras iin sokaklarn yanmas, meydanlarn patlamas veya halkn infiali deil, Troykann kahve ierken sohbet srasndaki muhtemel imalar daha belirleyici Samaras Atina da durdurmad, Selanik de durduramad. 11,5 milyar EUR tutarndaki kamu kesintisine kar yryen 15.000 sendikal da hkmeti vazgeiremedi. Atinada Sintagma meydannda hkmet ve parlamento binalarna kar dzenlenen yryler de hkmetin fikrinden dnmesini salamad. Hatta Ekim aynda Almanya anslyesi Angela Merkelin Atina ziyareti srasnda kentte o gne kadar grlmemi sk gvenlik nlemleri uygulanmasna ramen ve protesto gsterilerinin yasaklanmas ie yaramad. Atinada halkla polis arasnda byk atmalar yaand. Buna ramen ve 18-20 Ekimdeki genel greve ramen, Atina hkmeti geri adm atmad ve halka kulak vermedi. 100.000 kiinin polisle atmas sradan bir durum olarak grlmemeli. Eer atanlarn says bu seviyeye geldiyse, buna asayi sorunu ya da protesto eylemi demek sadece sorunu yok saymak olur. Yunanistanda Yunan halk yok yerine konuluyor. Kararlar, tepkileri, korkular, fkeleri ve endieleri gz ard ediliyor. Sre, bu halin daha uzun yllar bu ekilde aynen devam edeceini gsteriyor. Muhtemelen Yunan halkn ruh halinin bozuk olmasnda bunun etkisi de var. Alman psikoterapist Georg Pieper Almanyada yaynlanan Junge Welt adl gazeteye Yunan halknn psikolojik durumunu deerlendirirken, gerekten tyler rpertici ifadeler kullanyor. Georg Pieper Atinada da incelemeler yapm. Travma terapisi konusunda almalar yrtm. Yunanistanda krizle beraber artan vakalar aratrm ve Yunan meslektalaryla grm. Georg Pieper Yunanistanda psikoterapistlere olan ihtiyacn kesinlikle arttn ifade ediyor. Pieper Yunanistanda devletin psikoterapi bedelini demediini ve zel kliniklere gidemeyen ihtiya sahiplerinin madur olduunu sylyor. Pieperin Junge Weltte aktardna gre Yunanistanda darp ve iddet saldrs kurbanlarnn saysnda ciddi bir art var. Ayrca cinsel istismar vakalarnn says da artyor. Ar kazalarda ve yangnlarda yaralananlarn says da ykseliyor. Pieper Yunan toplumunda hsrann arttn, saldrganln ve iddet potansiyelinin de ok yksek seviyelere ktn kaydediyor. Yunan erkekleri arasnda anksiyete bozukluklar ve depresyon giderek yaylyor.

Ormandan kaak kesilen aalarla stlan evler, stma sistemi tmden devre d olan mahalleler, toplu iten karmalarn getirdii psikolojik tahribat gnlk hayatn paras. nsanlar iini kaybedince kendisini deersiz hissediyor. Milyonlarca insan iini kaybetti. Halen ii olanlar ise kriz ncesine gre yar yarya az para kazanyorlar. Erkeklik gururu krlyor. Yunanistanda yl ncesine gre intihar vakalar iki kat artt ve intihar edenlerin %75i erkeklerden meydana geliyor. Alkol tketimini de artran depresyon ve aksiyete bozukluu erkeklerin aile iin iddete eilimini artryor. Yars isiz olan genlik arasnda da sokak eteleri artyor. Altn afak (Hrisi Avgi) gibi faist rgtlere sempati duyanlarn says ykseliyor. Yunanistanda devlet baz sokaklarda ve mahallelerde artk sz sahibi deil. Salk sistemi ken ve hastanelerinde ila bulmann bile mesele haline geldii lkede, hastaneye yatanlar yemeklerini ve nevresimlerini evden getirmek zorunda. Hastanelerdeki temizlik personeli iten karld iin hijyeni doktor ve hemireler salamaya gayret ediyor. Dier taraftan zel hastaneler de ok pahal olduu iin, pek ok kimse tedavi veya terapi gremiyor. Dier bir deyile Yunan halknn akl ve ruh sal bozuldu. Yunanistan borlarn ve bunun faturasn gerek anlamda ruhuyla dyor FEAR OF FISCAL CLIFF DISPELLED The first great fear of 2013 for the USA has been overcome and the Republican controlled House of Representatives has accepted the law which will increase taxation on the wealthy, an Obama election pledge, by 257 for and 167 against. The same law has been approved by the Senate is a separate vote. For now the US economy has been saved from a premature recession. The future, however, is not very clear. The fact that the fiscal cliff has been avoided means that automatic tax hikes and spending cuts have been averted in the USA. However, the most indebted country in the world will sooner or later increased taxation. There will be cuts to spending. It might be lower in scope and over a longer term, but these will happen. The proposed law for averting the fiscal cliff has tax hikes for the wealthy and a postponing of spending cuts for two months. On the other hand it should not be forgotten that the USA has to make its budget next. As budget talks begin, Republicans and Democrats will once more come to blows. In the two month period, it will become clear which sources of income and expenditure will change. The avoidance of the fiscal cliff and the last minute settlement between the sides was presented to world public opinion sugar coated, almost as a New Years present. However, measures need to be taken while preparing the budget in order to lower the budget deficit. There might be major problems in the USA as the budget is prepared. Economist Nouriel Roubini claims that the agreement signed to avert the fiscal cliff is no victory. In an article in the Financial Times, Professor Nouriel Roubini wrote that the agreement to avert the fiscal cliff has brought the USA back from the verge, but that a new crisis will emerge soon. According to Roubinis claims, as of the 1 st of March 2013, USD 110 billion worth of spending cuts will come in to force in the USA. Thus the USAs debt ceiling will be reached. Roubini claims that throughout 2013, there will be many disputes between Republicans and Democrats over medium term fiscal consolidation. American economist Morici claims that the agreement on the fiscal cliff will not serve towards recovering the economy. Peter Morici from the University of Maryland School of Management has told Bloomberg that the US economy is suffering from insufficient demand, and that growth will continue at around 2 percent, adding that the tax and spending agreement approved by Congress does not represent progress in this respect. Writing in the New York Times Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman said If you think it is the beginning of the end of the Obama administration, wait for the debt ceiling debate. One should mark the date the 1st of March 2013 UURUM KORKUSU GET ABDnin 2013 iin ilk byk korkusu ald ve Cumhuriyetilerin ounlua sahip olduu Temsilciler Meclisi, Barack Obamann seim vaadi olan en zenginlerin vergilerinin artrlmasn ngren yasay 167'ye kar 257 oyla kabul etti. Ayn yasa ayr bir oylamayla Senato'da da kabul edildi. Bylece ABD ekonomisi resesyona girmekten kurtarld. Bu aamada byk bir skntnn nne geildi, ama gelecek halen ok net deil Mali uurumun ald bilgisi, ABD'de byk vergi artlar ve harcama kesintilerinin devreye girmesinin nlenmesine balanyor. Ama dnyann en borlu lkesi er ya da ge vergileri artracak. Muhakkak harcamalarda kesinti olacak. Belki planlandndan daha az veya daha uzun vadede gelecekleecek, ama olacak. nk mali uurumun nlenmesi iin hazrlanan nerge zenginlere uygulanan vergilerin arttrlmasn ve harcama kesintilerinin iki aylna ertelenmesini ieriyor. Dier taraftan unu da unutmamak lazm. ABDde srada bte var. Bte hazrlanrken Cumhuriyetiler ve Demokratlar bir kez daha kozlarn paylaacaklar. ki aylk srete btede hangi gelir ve giderlerin ne nispette artaca ve azalaca netleecek. Mali uurumun -yani ABD ekonomisini resesyona itecek olan vergi artrmlar ve harcama kesintilerinin- ABD btesi ierisinde yer almas mmkn. Mali uurumun nlenmesi ve taraflarn son dakikada uzlamas ABD ve dnya kamuoyuna ok gzel sslenerek ve paketlenerek, adeta bir yeni yl hediyesi gibi sunuldu. Bte yaplrken byk bte an azaltmak iin muhakkak tedbir alnmas gerekiyor. ABDde bte yaplrken ok sorun yaanabilir. Nitekim krizin kahini Nouriel Roubini de mali uurumun nlenmesi iin imzalanan anlamann zafer olmadn ifade ediyor. Profesr Nouriel Roubini, Financial Timestaki yazsnda mali uurumun engellenmesi iin salanan anlamasnn ABD ekonomisini uurumdan dndrdn, ama uzun zaman gemeden yeni bir kriz olacan yazd. Roubininin iddiasna gre

1 Mart 2013 tarihi itibariyle ABDde 110 milyar USD miktarnda harcama kesintisi yrrle girecek. Bylece ABDnin resmi borlanma limiti dolacak. Roubini 2013 yl boyunca Cumhuriyetiler ile Demokratlar arasnda orta vadeli mali konsolidasyon konusunda sklkla anlamazlk yaanacan da savunuyor. Amerikal ekonomist Morici, mali uurum anlamasnn ekonomiyi toparlamaya yardmc olmayacan ileri sryor. Bloombergin haberine gre Maryland niversitesi Robert H. Smith letme Fakltesi profesr Peter Morici, ABD ekonomisinin yetersiz talep sknts iinde olduuna ve bymenin yllk yzde 2'lerde seyredeceine dikkat eken Morici, Senato ve Temsilciler Meclisi'nin onaylad vergi ve harcama anlamasnn, bu surette bir ilerleme tablosu sunmadn belirtti. Nobel sahibi ekonomist Paul Krugman da, New York Times'ta yer alan yazsnda Obama'nn bakanlnda sonun balangc m geldi derseniz bor tavan tartmalarn beklememenizi neririm dedi. Galiba saatleri 1 Mart 2013 gnne ayarlamak lazm. WHAT DID MERKEL MEAN? German Chancellor Angela Merkel: The crisis is not yet over, reform decisions are beginning to have effect, much patience is needed. In her New Year message, German Chancellor Angela Merkel sent out some important messages. Merkel openly said a right balance is needed for welfare and solidarity. This analytical approach shows how the crisis can be stopped and how the damage from the side effects of the crisis can be mitigated. Angela Merkel repeated in her New Year message what she has said throughout 2012, that fiscal markets need better regulation. Merkel said that there are further steps needed at the international level for the better regulation of markets. From this it becomes clear that Merkel does not view fiscal regulation to be limited to the mandate of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and joint fiscal policy and regulation in Europe. It was interesting that Merkel should say the world has not learned its lesson from the financial crisis of 2008 and that such irresponsibility should never be repeated. A more interesting detail was Merkels remark that in a social market economy, the state protects the system and that people should have confidence in this. What is being done today in Europe to fight the crisis is due to Berlin. Whatever progress has been made has Merkels influence. Since 2007 the impact of the global financial crisis has been felt in Europe. The scope of the debt crisis is clear. In the time passed, Greece has arrived at an even worse state. Despite the aid given to the country, Greek debt and deficit have risen. Greece was supposed to pay back its debts. Not only did it not pay back anything, but its debt was cleared twice and one bond exchange was carried out. The bond exchange was another method of debt reduction. Merkel was the architect of all this. Therefore it is not very meaningful for her to say that the world has not learned its lesson from the global crisis Similarly, it is disturbing that she should remark in a social market economy, the state protects the system and that people should have confidence in this. The system implemented in Greece, Spain and even Germany for paying back the debts incurred from imaginary transactions carried out over non-existent profits and funds is not in keeping with a social market economy or a social state at all. In such a system, the state is of course the guardian. But its guardianship is not limited to looking after profit obsessed fiscal markets. The state also protects the people. It does not shut down schools and hospitals because they are expensive. It does not try to cut pensioner pay in order to pay back tens of billions of Euros worth of debt. Chancellor Angela Merkel has claimed that 2013 will be a tough year. Then we should ask why her Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble claimed that the worst of the crisis was over as of the end of 2012. That Merkel should invite everyone to greater efficiency and solidarity implies that there might be some surprise problems in 2013. The German Central Bank has warned that there is the possibility of approaching recession in early 2013. The Federal government predicts only 1 percent growth for Germany in 2013 and this will have ramifications. If Europes most stable economy begins taking risks in 2013, this might trigger new developments. MERKEL NE DEMEK STED? Almanya Babakan Angela Merkel, kriz henz almad, reform kararlar etkisini gstermeye balad, ok sabr gstermek gerekiyor... Almanya anslyesi Angela Merkel yeni yl mesajnda ok nemli mesajlar verdi. Angela Merkel aka unu syledi; refah ve beraberlik iin doru bir dengeye ihtiya var. Bu analitik yaklam, esas olarak hem krizin nasl durdurulabileceini hem de krizin yan etkilerinin getirdii zarar nasl snrlanabileceini ortaya koyuyor. Angela Merkel yeni yl mesajnda -2012 ylnn tamamnda olduu gibi- mali piyasalar daha iyi denetlemek gerektiini syledi. Merkel mali piyasalar daha iyi denetlemek iin iin uluslararas alanda daha ok adm atlmas gerektiini syledi. Bu szlerden Angela Merkelin dncelerinin sadece Avrupa stikrar Mekanizmas (ESM) ve Avrupada ortak mali politika ve ortam mali denetim ile snrl olmad anlalyor. Nitekim Merkelin dnyann 2008 ylnda balayan mali krizden yeterince sonu karmadn ve byle bir sorumsuzluun bir daha olmamas gerektiini sylemesi de dikkat ekiciydi. Daha da dikkat ekici detay Merkelin sosyal piyasa ekonomisinde devletin dzenin koruyucusu olduunu, insanlarn buna gvenmesi gerektiini sylemesi oldu. Bugn Avrupada krizle mcadele iin her ne yaplyorsa bunlar Berlinin eseri. Avrupada her ne gelime salandysa, bunda da Merkelin etkisi var. 2007 ylndan bu yana Avrupa Birliinde kresel mali krizin etkileri grlyor. Yaanan bor krizinin

erevesi de ortada. Geen zaman zarfnda Yunanistan ilk bata olduundan daha da kt hale geldi. Yunanistana yaplan yardmlara ramen bu lkenin a da, borcu da artt. Gya Yunanistan ald yardmlar geri deyecekti. Hibir ey deyemedii gibi iki defa borcu silindi, bir defa da tahvil takas yapld. Aslnda tahvil takas da bor silmenin bir baka yoluydu. Btn bu sistematiin mimar da Merkel idi. O nedenle Angela Merkelin dnyann kresel krizden yeterince sonu karamadn sylemesi pek fazla bir anlam tamyor. Ayn ekilde sosyal piyasa ekonomisinde devletin dzenin koruyucusu olduunu, insanlarn buna gvenmesi gerektiini sylemesi de aslnda rahatszlk verici. nk Yunanistanda, spanyada ve dier benzer lkelerde -hatta Almanyada bile- krizle mcadele ad altnda, aslnda hi olmayan paralarn hayali karlarndan yaplan farazi ilemler zerinden yaplan borlanmalarn gerekte geri denmesi iin uygulanan sistem hi de sosyal pazar ekonomisine ve sosyal devlete benzemiyor. Elbette sz konusu sistemde devlet dzenin koruyucusudur. Ama devlet dzeni korumak denildiinde sadece daha fazla kar saplantsyla kudurmu mali piyasalar korumaz. Devlet dzeni korurken insan da korur. Okullar pahal diye, hastaneleri masrafl diye kapattrmaz. Emeklilerin gelirinden yapaca kesintilerle on milyarlarca Avroluk borlar detmeye almaz anslye Angela Merkel 2013 ylnn zor bir yl olacan ifade etti. O halde Maliye Bakan Wolfgang Schaeuble'nin 2012 ylnn sonunda neden krizin en kt gnlerinin aldn ifade ettiini zmek lazm. Merkelin herkesi daha verimli olmaya ve beraberlie davet etmesi ise -onun bizden daha fazla bilgili olmas gerektiini de dnnce- 2013te srpriz sorunlar grleceine iaret ediyor. Alman Merkez Bankas Almanya'nn 2013 balarnda resesyona yaklaabilecei uyarsnda bulundu. Federal hkmetin 2013 yl iin tespit ettii byme hedefi de sadece %1 ve bunun baz etkileri olabilir. Nihayetinde Avrupann en salam ekonomisi de 2013 ylnda risk stlenmesi birtakm gelimeleri de tetikleyebilir. IT WILL BE A BAD YEAR FOR EUROPE Manufacturing output is falling in Europe. Strong manufacturing is needed for Eurozone countries to overcome stagnation. The fall in demand is lowering output. According to the DW only Ireland saw its manufacturing output rise in 2012, while France, Italy and the Netherlands maintained their output levels, manufacturing fell in Spain, Austria and Greece. Loss of demand for manufactured goods from third countries due to falling power of purchasing and spending cuts has resulted in export orders falling for 18 consecutive months. The economic press keeps reporting that firms are constantly postponing their investment plans in Europe. Firms are in difficulty due to insufficient internal and external demand. The position of firms which export to large markets such as China and the USA is good and firms investing in China are pleased. However, hopes of recovery in the Eurozone in 2013 are slim. Reuters claims that Eurozone will attain positive growth during the second quarter of the year, a prediction which for now looks very optimistic. On the other hand, the most popular proposal for fighting the crisis is that the European Union should implement joint taxation and economic policies as well as a joint fiscal policy. In other words, Europe seeking further integration in this process and attaining greater concurrence over rules and principles is being offered as the recipe for solving the crisis. Yet to solve a problem, one must tackle its causes. The reason for the crisis was not insufficient European integration or the acquis. Perhaps there were not enough sanctions for not following the rules in the European Union. Many rules were indeed violated. But, to put it simply, for the last five years Greece has been following the rules to the letter and is the most regulated country. Despite this, it is in a pitiful state. In 2013 there might be new recovery operations for Portugal, Spain and Italy. It is not yet certain how well prepared the European Union is for this possibility. On the other hand if Germany, which already has low growth expectations, slips into recession due to falling external orders for example, or if credit ratings agencies slash Germanys credit rating, it is difficult to imagine what will happen. According to the calculations of the European Union Commission, the number of citizens over 60 years of age increases by 2 million every year in the 27 member states. According to the DW the population over 60 has doubled in a decade. European Union member states spend 10 percent of their national income on retirement pay. In the European Union, which has a population of 500 million, 120 million people are retired. In other words, one in four citizens are past working age. The active population is therefore falling. As time passes in Europe, the demographic problem alone makes it more difficult to exit the crisis. According to the predictions of international regulation and consultancy agency Ernst & Young, in 2013 Eurozone unemployment will hit the record level of 20 million people. In 2010, there were 15.9 million people unemployed in the Eurozone. AVRUPA N KT BR YIL OLACAK Avrupada sanayi sektr zayflyor. Avro Blgesi lkelerinin ekonomik durgunluu atlatmas iin gl sanayi retimi gerekiyor. Ama talepteki gerileme, retimi de aaya ekiyor. DWnin aktardna gre 2012 yln bymeyle kapatan tek lke rlanda ve Fransa, talya ve Hollanda retim dzeyini korurken, spanya, Avusturya ve Yunanistan'da sanayi sektr daralmaya devam ediyor. Satn alma gcnde azalma ve harcamalarda yaplan kesintiler gibi nc lkelerden sanayi rnlerine gelen talepteki gerileme de 18 aydr ihracat irketlerin siparilerinin azalmasn srdryor. Ekonomi basnnn da dile getirdii gibi, Avrupada iletmeler yatrm planlarn ertelemeye devam ediyorlar. Yetersiz i ve d talep yznden firmalar zorlanyor. in ve ABD gibi byk pazarlara ihracat yapan irketlerin durumu iyi ve inde yatrm yapan irketler halinden memnun. Fakat

Avro Blgesi lkelerinde 2013 ylnda iyileme umudu ok dk. Reuters Avro Blgesinin yln ikinci eyreinde pozitif bymeye geeceini savunuyor. Ama bu tahmin imdilik ok iyimser grnyor. Dier taraftan krizle mcadele iin en ok masaya getirilen teklif Avro Blgesinin ortak finans politikasnn yan sra, ortak vergi ve ekonomi politikalar da uygulamas. Dier bir deyile Avrupann bu srete daha fazla entegrasyon elde etmesi ve ortak ilkeler ve kurallar konusunda daha fazla ahenk salanmas krizin zm reetesi gibi sunuluyor. Hlbuki bir sorunu zmek iin onu reten etkenler ortadan kaldrlmal. Krizin nedeni de, sebebi de Avrupa entegrasyonun yetersizlii veya Avrupa mktesebat ile ilgili deildi. Belki Avrupa Birliinde ou kurala uymak balayc deildi. Gerekten Birliin gemiinde kurallar srekli ihll edildi. Ama sade bir bak asyla dnrsek, herhalde Avrupa Birliinin tarihinde Yunanistan son be yldr kurallara en ok uyan ve en ok denetlenen ye durumunda. Ama buna ramen Yunanistann ackl hali ortada. 2013 ylnda Portekiz, spanya ve hatta belki de talya iin yeni kurtarma operasyonlar gndeme gelebilir. Avrupa Birliinin buna ne derecede hazrlkl olduu kesin deil. Dier taraftan 2013 ylnda dk byme hz beklentisi olan Almanya -rnein d talepte daralma yznden- resesyona girerse veya kredi derecelendirme kurulular Almanyann kredi notunu krarsa, sonrasn tahmin etmek bir hayli zor. Avrupa Birlii Komisyonu'nun hesaplamalarna gre 27 ye lkede 60 yan zerindekiler her yl iki milyon artyor. DWnin aktardna gre, 60 yan zerindeki nfus on yl ncesine gre katland. Avrupa Birlii yesi lkeler milli gelirlerini %10unu emekli maalarna ayryor. 500 milyon nfuslu Avrupa Birlii lkelerinde 120 milyon emekli yayor. Dier bir deyile her drt Avrupaldan biri alma an kapatm. Dolaysyla aktif nfus azalyor. Avrupada zaman hzla akarken, demografik sorun dahi tek bana krizden k zorlatryor. Uluslararas denetim ve danmanlk irketi Ernst & Young'n tahminlerine gre Avro Blgesinde isizlik 2013 ylnda rekor artla 20 milyona ykselecek. Bu rakam 2010 ylnda 15,9 milyon idi. THE GREAT DESPAIR OF ARMENIANS Being Armenian is very difficult, especially in Armenia Significant numbers of Armenians live in Syria. Various sources put the number of Armenians in Syria, who form an important part of the Diaspora, between 80,000 and 120,000. Armenians in Syria live under the heavy pressure of civil war. Conditions are shaping against them. Syrian Armenians suffer from a contradiction. Life in Syria, already difficult, is becoming very hard. Armenia keeps inviting Armenians in Syria. Erevan is calling on them to return home. But for Armenians in Syria Armenia has never been a home. For them, Syria is their home and country. Although Erevan keeps inviting Armenians in Syria to immigrate, very few have moved to Armenia so far, despite tough conditions under civil war. Armenians in Syria prefer not to go to Armenia despite the civil war and the fear for their lives. No one can blame them for it. The situation is not strange or surprising. Though there may be no war in Armenia, economic conditions are very difficult. Unemployment is very high. No one knows the true figure. The lack of transparency of the Armenian state renders the given statistics dubious. Still, statistics as are available show that the real sector in Armenia is in grave difficulties. In recent years, standards of living in Armenia have fallen rapidly. Not that standards of living were ever very high. The Erevan regime has never given the people a high standard of living. But there had been no other period in which conditions were so difficult. Armenians in Syria know very well that immigrating to Armenia or gaining Armenian citizenship will not solve any of their problems. For they need partisan ties to find employment in Armenia, like everyone else. Even to solve their housing problems, they will need to have an ally in the regime. Life for Armenians in Armenia will not be much different from life in Syria. Sometimes an outside opinion is clearer. Armenians in Syria can better observe Armenia. Armenia is a country which is managed by men backed by Russia, where politicians preferred by Russia are effective and where the regime is financed by Russia. An artificial stability might therefore prevail in Armenia today, but what will happen tomorrow is not clear. There are still many years before Armenia gains the position it deserves in the world states schematic. Therefore, Syria offers a safer and better future for Armenians there than does Armenia. The regime problem in Damascus and internal security issues will be solved sooner or later. It is certain that Syria will become the pearl of the Mediterranean once the dictatorship ends. But even when the regime problem is overcome, a new state and system is established and the new state obtains stability and power in Syria, the situation in Armenia is likely to be the same as it was twenty years ago when the country was founded. Therefore, Armenians in Syria have many reasons to be patient and wait it out. Sources indicate that 4,000 Armenians have arrived in Armenia from Syria to demand citizenship upon the great insistence of Erevan. This figure has been given by the Armenia Diaspora Ministry. In other words, between 96 and 99 percent of the target population have ignored Erevans call. The Ministry claims that in 2012, 4,000 citizenship applications by Armenians from Syria have been accepted. The figure was later raised to 7,000 in one day. This sudden rise is part advertising and part end of season sale. There is an important detail to the matter. There is undoubtedly contact between Armenians who have emigrated from Syria and those who stayed behind. Many Armenians in Syria must be acting according to reports from people they know who have immigrated to Armenia. Therefore it is almost certain that there will be no noticeable movement of people from Syria to Armenia from now on.

Armenians in Armenia look at the world as much as they are allowed by the regime and through its filters. Erevan, which places great importance on the donations made by the Diaspora, cannot offer Armenians from Syria even those opportunities they have left behind. The Erevan regime offers its people excuses instead of bread, historical traumata instead of freedom and state oppression instead of liberty. So the situation in Syria might be very bad, but still between 96 to 99 percent of Armenians there prefer that the boss be Assad and not Sarkisyan. The fact is that after Syria which is their land, the closest place, indeed the second home of Armenians in Syria is Turkey. Armenians in Syria are closer to Turkey than Armenia in terms of culture, cuisine, traditions and other similar factors. Armenians in Syria have always had varying degrees of contact with Anatolia, but they have had little or no contact with Caucasia. Armenia thinks that it is home to all the Armenians in the world. This claim is false. Very few of the Armenians around the world have ever seen Armenia. Home is where one is born or where one is looked after. This is why emigration from Armenia is very high. The current regime in Armenia sees itself at the centre of the world. But every development in every field since Armenia was founded shows that Armenia is not at the centre of the universe. The latest developments over Syria have shown that Armenia is not at the centre for many Armenians around the world. Armenians in Syria are searching for a future for themselves and for coming generations. When the difficult period in Syria is over, those Armenians who had enough patience and strength to endure will begin a better life. For them Armenia poses a risk in terms of future prospects and standard of living. ERMENLERN BYK ARESZL Ermeni Olmak ok Zor, en ok da Ermenistanda Suriyede nemli sayda Ermeni yayor. Ermeni diasporasnn nemli bir ksmn tekil eden Suriye Ermenilerinin says baz kaynaklara gre 80.000 baka kaynakla gre 100.000 hatta 120.000. Suriye Ermenileri i savan ar basks altnda yayor. artlar hzla onlarn aleyhine geliiyor! Suriye Ermenileri ciddi bir eliki yayor. Onlar iin Suriyede kalmak giderek zorlayor. Suriyede zaten zor olan hayat giderek zorlayor. Ermenistan Suriye Ermenilerini srekli davet ediyor. Erivan Suriye Ermenilerini yuvaya aryor. Ama Suriye Ermenileri iin yuva hibir zaman Ermenistan olmad. Onlar iin yuva ya da vatan Suriye. Erivan Suriye Ermenilerini srekli ge davet etse de, ar i sava atlarna ramen Ermenistana tananlar ok az. Ne gariptir ki, Suriye Ermenileri i savaa ramen, can korkusuna ramen Ermenistan tercih etmiyorlar. Kimse onlara bunun iin kzamaz. Bu durum hi de tuhaf veyahut artc deil. nk Ermenistanda belki sava yok, ama ekonomik artlar ok ar. Her eyden nce Ermenistanda ok yksek bir isizlik oran var. Gerek rakam kimse bilmiyor. Ermeni devletinde effafln az olmas, mevcut rakamlarn inanlrln ve gvenilirliini dk tutuyor. Yine de rakamlar Ermenistanda reel sektrn zor durumda olduunu gsteriyor. Son yllarda Ermenistanda yaam standartlar hzla dmeye balad. Aslnda Ermenistanda yaam standartlar hibir zaman yksek deildi. Ermenistanda rejim halkna hibir zaman yksek kaliteli bir yaam sunmad. Ama artlarn bu denli ktye gittii baka bir dnem de olmamt. Suriye Ermenileri gayet iyi biliyorlar ki, Ermenistana g etmeleri ve hatta Ermenistan vatandal almalar hibir sorunlarn zmeyecek. nk onlarn da -tpk herkes gibi- Ermenistanda i bulabilmeleri iin partizan balantlara ihtiyalar var. Hatta konaklama sorununu zmek iin dahi rejimden, ynetimden birilerini araya sokabilmeleri gerekiyor. Dolaysyla hayat Suriye Ermenileri iin Ermenistanda da Suriyede olduundan ok farkl deil. Baz lkelerin durumunu ve konumunu anlamak dardan bakldnda daha kolaydr. Suriye Ermenileri de Ermenistan daha iyi gzlemleyebiliyorlar. Ermenistan, Rusyann destekledii adamlarn ynettii, Rusyann tercih ettii siyasilerin etkili olduu ve Rusyann finanse ettii bir rejimin lkesi... O nedenle Ermenistanda suni istikrar belki bugn var ama yarn pheli. Ermenistann dnyadaki devletler sistematiinde hak ettii pozisyonu kazanmasna daha uzun yllar var. Bu nedenle Suriye Ermenileri iin Suriye Ermenistana gre daha gvenli ve daha iyi bir gelecek vaat ediyor. Nihayetinde amdaki rejim sorunu ve Suriyenin i gvenlik meselesi er ya da ge zlecek. Suriyede diktatrln sona erdirilmesinin ardndan, Akdenizin incisi olaca kesin. Ama Suriyede rejim sorunu zlp, yeniden bir devlet ve sistem kurulduunda ve yeni sistem ve devlet istikrar kazanp glendiinde dahi, Ermenistan hala bugnk -yani bundan 20 yl nce kurulduu zaman ki- gibi olacak! O nedenle Suriye Ermenileri sabr etmek ve beklemek iin ok fazla nedene sahip. Baz kaynaklara gre Erivann byk srarna uyup bu lkeye giden ve vatandalk talep eden Suriye Ermenilerinin says yaklak 4.000. Bu rakamn kayna Ermenistan Diaspora Bakanl Dier bir deyile Erivann arsn grmezden gelenlerin oran %96 ila %99 arasnda Bakanlk 2012de Suriyeli Ermenilerin 4.000 vatandalk bavurusunun kabul edildiini belirtiyor. Geri bu sayda bir gnde ve bir anda 7.000e karld. Ama bu ani ykseli bir para reklam gibi, bir para sezon sonu cazip indirimi iin son ar gibi. Elbette bu konunun ok dikkat ekmeyen ama ok nemli bir detay da var; Kukusuz Ermenistana g eden Ermeniler ile Suriyede kalan Ermeniler arasnda temas var. phesiz birok Suriye Ermenisi Ermenistana g eden tandklarndan alacaklar habere gre hareket ediyorlar. O nedenle bundan sonra Ermenistana kayda deer bir gn olmayaca kesin saylr.

nk Ermenistandaki Ermeniler dnyaya rejimin kendilerine verdii izin lsnde ve onun filtreleriyle bakyor. Diasporadan gelen balara byk nem veren Erivann Suriye Ermenilerine Suriyedeki olanaklar -dahi- sunmas pek mmkn deil. Erivanda rejim halka ekmek yerine avuntu, eitlik yerine tarihi travma ve zgrlk yerine devlet basks sunuyor. Yani Suriyede de durum kt, hatta ok kt, ama yine de Suriye Ermenileri %96 ila %99u patron Sarkisyan olacana, Esad olsun diyor! Gerek u ki, Suriye Ermenileri iin vatanlar olan Suriyeden sonra en yakn yer, hatta ikinci vatan Ermenistan deil, Trkiyedir. Hatta Suriye Ermenileri kltr, mutfak, gelenekler ve benzer hususlar bakmndan Ermenistana deil, Trkiyeye daha yakn saylr. Nihayetinde Suriye Ermenilerinin Anadolu ile daima, az veya ok ama srekli temas oldu, fakat Kafkasya ile ya hi olmad ya da hiten biraz fazla Ermenistan dnyadaki btn Ermenilerin vatan olduunu dnyor. Ama bu iddia doru deil. nk dnyadaki Ermenilerin gerekten ok, ama ok kk bir blm Ermenistan grd. Ayrca herkes iin vatan ya doduu yerdir ya da doyduu yerdir. Nitekim bu sebepten dolay Ermenistan yurtdna byk g veriyor. Ermenistandaki mevcut rejim kendisini dnyann merkezi kabul ediyor. Ama Ermenistann kuruluundan bu yana her konuda yaanan her gelime Ermenistann dnyann merkezi olmadn teyit etti. Hatta Suriye konusunda yaanan son gelime Ermenistann dnyadaki btn Ermenilerin merkezi olmadn da kantlad. Suriye Ermenileri kendilerine ve gelecek nesillere bir istikbal aryor. Suriyenin yaad bu zor dnem bittiinde sabr ve gc yeten Ermeniler daha rahat ve daha iyi yeni bir hayata balayacak. Onlar iin gelecek kaygs ve yaam kalitesi asndan bakldnda Ermenistan daha riskli THE BAD FATE OF ARMENIANS Armenian President Serge Sarkisyan announces that they will help Armenians in Syria Armenian President Serge Sarkisyan has announced that they will aid Armenians in Syria, making Erevan once more the usual suspect. Now, it is more suspect than before. One should not say the final word at the beginning. It is not considered correct. But honesty is important. Honesty is not always approved or liked. But being honest is truly good. The truth is Armenia is trying to manipulate the Armenians in Syria. Armenia is trying to play with the individuals of the nation from which it derives its name. It is trying to profit from their desperation. It hopes to benefit from their fears. Armenian President Sarkisyan made the following statement in Moscow: Afghanistan, rising tension over Iran and the situation in Syria shows us that conditions are not hopeful. There is large Armenian community in Syria. Thousands of Armenians are an integral part of Syrian society. We will aid the Armenians there. Sarkisyan thus tries to show himself as powerful and capable. Erevan is trying to put itself forward as a regional actor with such statements. How successful the efforts of the Yerevan government are in this respect is dubious. But those who believe in Sarkisyans words will be bitterly disappointed. Sarkisyans Dream is a Second Israel Sarkisyan has invited all Armenians in Syria to Armenia. This cal might be seen as appropriate and positive. However, Sarkisyan probably secretly fears that this call is taken up in earnest. had Erevan such means at hand, it may have improved standards of living in its own country. Unemployment in Armenia continues to rise. Food prices are climbing. The average household in Armenia spends 52 percent of its income on food. Rent and other necessary expenditure has to be met with what remains. While Sarkisyan cannot provide for the welfare of his own people, it is not for naught that he has invited the Armenians in Syria to Armenia. Various sources estimate that there are between 80,000 and 120,000 Armenians in Syria, who may not be aware that Sarkisyan has a special plan in mind for them. Sarkisyan hopes before all else that Armenians in Syria bring with them a lot of wealth to Armenia. Since even under the most pessimistic assumption, the Armenians in Syria are better off than their counterparts in Armenia, Sarkisyan does not expect a loss. With what intention Sarkisyan has invited the Armenians in Syria and what he expects of them can be seen from the price increase of Armenian state airline flights from Damascus to Erevan. What sort of a state calls on people to take refuge under its protection while increasing the price of tickets they are likely to buy? It is very much possible that should Sarkisyan manage to draw a significant population to Armenia, he will call on the Diaspora for aid or will go on a tour of addresses where he is welcome, Moscow foremost, to ask for support. He will thus have all the more reason to increase the donations made by the Diaspora to support the authoritarian and autocratic regime in Yerevan. But that will not be all. Sarkisyans real intentions concern Upper Karabagh which is under occupation. Sarkisyan is probably planning to settle down Armenians arriving from Syria on land which belongs to Azerbaijan but which is kept under occupation by Armenia in colonies. Thus Sarkisyan will make Upper Karabagh Armenian through population transplantation. Erevan is trying to draw a parallel between the Azerbaijani Upper Karabagh it keeps under occupation and the Arab lands Israel has occupied. Sarkisyan wants legal, political and conjectural common points to be formed between the new settlements he will seek to establish and the settlements founded by Israel on occupied land. Just as most Jews around the world feel a connection with Israel and act accordingly, Sarkisyan wants most Armenians around the world to feel a connection with Armenia and act accordingly. Sarkisyans sole aim is political gain.

Therefore a bad future awaits those Armenians who believe in Armenias invitation to settle there. It will be just like those Jews who have had to settle down in Jewish settlements, who are seen as occupiers and as enemies by the Palestinians who want their land back. Sarkisyan, who is trying to follow the same policy in bad faith as Israel is yet to realise a fact. The Armenians in Syria feel safe under the Assad regime, despite the oppression and the civil war. They have not armed and they have not become party to the fighting. They seem adamant to maintain this position. The Armenian community in Syria is acting rationally. However, those who move to Armenia for peace and quiet might find the Armenian army distributing arms to them after having been planted in Upper Karabagh. For Sarkisyans tactics will eventually result in anger and reaction from Azerbaijan. In order to justify the occupation in Upper Karabagh, Sarkisyan will not refrain from such a move. Serge Sarkisyans move shows that the bad fate of Armenians, who have been used throughout history, has not yet ran its course. If Sarkisyans plan works, Armenians from Syria will be armed in Upper Karabagh, on Azerbaijani land occupied by Armenia. They will have to fend for themselves once more. From that point onwards, it is hard to be optimistic. The potential developments regarding this matter can be very bad. Sarkisyans manipulation of concerns of the Armenians in Syria and his hopes for political gain by doing so is hardly appropriate. One cannot know where those Syrians fleeing the war and following their hopes for a better life will find it. Where they will not find it is clear though: The peace quiet and welfare they are looking for is not to be found in the ghettos of Erevan or the trenches of Upper Karabagh. ERMENLERN KARA KADER Ermenistan Cumhurbakan Serj Sarkisyan, Suriye'de bulunan Ermenilere yardm edeceklerini aklad Ermenistan Cumhurbakan Serj Sarkisyan, Suriye'de bulunan Ermenilere yardm edeceklerini aklad, ama burada Erivan yine olaan pheli Hatta imdi eskisinden daha pheli Son sz bata sylemek her zaman iyi deildir. Hatta nadiren doru kabul edilir. Ama drst olmak nemlidir. Drstlk her zaman beenilmez, takdir de edilmez. Ama drst olmak gerekten iyidir. Gerek u ki; Ermenistan Suriye Ermenilerini kullanmaya alyor. Onlar istismar etmeye alyor. Ermenistan adn ald milletin fertlerini kendi emellerine oyuncak etmeye alyor. Onlarn aresizliinden faydalanmaya gayret ediyor. Onlarn korkularndan fayda umuyor. Ermenistan Cumhurbakan Sarkisyan Moskovada yapt aklamada aynen yle dedi; Afganistan, ran'da artan tansiyon ve Suriye'deki durum bizlere durumun iyimser olmadn gsteriyor. Suriye'de yaayan byk bir Ermeni toplumu var. Binlerce Ermeni, Suriye toplumunun ayrlmaz bir paras. Orada bulunan Ermenilere yardm edeceiz. Sarkisyan kendisini bylece gl ve muktedir gstermeye gayret ediyor. Ayrca Erivan bu yndeki aklamalaryla kendisini blgesel aktr gibi gstermek istiyor. Erivan hkmetinin bu abasnn ne derecede baarl olduu pheli Ama Sarkisyann szlerine inananlar byk bir hayal krkl bekliyor. Sarkisyann Hayali; kinci srail Sarkisyan Suriyedeki btn Ermenileri Ermenistana aryor. Bu ar nesnel olarak iyi ve olumlu bir ar gibi grlebilir. Ama Sarkisyan herhalde gizliden gizliye de bu arsnn ciddiye alnmasndan korkuyordur. nk Ermenistann gerekte bu kadar gmene bakmasna, onlarn rahatn salamasna imkan yok. Erivann byle bir olana olsa kendi lkesindeki yaam artlarn iyiletirir. Ermenistanda isizlik srekli artyor. Ayrca gda fiyatlar da trmanyor. Ermenistanda aileler toplam gelirlerinin %52sini gda iin harcyor. Geriye kalan para ile de kira ve dier zorunlu giderler karlanyor. Sarkisyan kendi halknn geimini temin edecek durumda deilken, Suriyedeki Ermenileri bouna Ermenistana armyor. Says eitli tahminlere gre 80.000 ila 120.000 arasndaki Suriye Ermenileri ok farknda deil, ama Sarkisyann onlar iin zel bir plan var. Sarkisyan bir defa her eyden nce Suriye Ermenilerinin Ermenistana beraberinde byk servet getirmelerini umuyor. Sarkisyan en kt ihtimalde dahi Suriye Ermenilerinin durumu Ermenistandaki Ermenilerden iyi olduu iin burada bir kayp olasl grmyor. Sarkisyann Suriye Ermenilerini hangi niyetle Ermenistana ard veya onlardan ne bekledii, Ermeni devlet havayollarnn am-Erivan biletlerine hemen zam yapmasndan belli! Nasl bir devlet hem insanlar kendisine snmaya arp, hem de onlarn alaca biletlere zam yapar? ok byk olaslkla Sarkisyan lkesine ynelik bir nfus hareketi salarsa, hemen ardndan ya diasporaya yardm ars yapacak ya da bata Moskova olmak zere iyi karland btn adresleri dolap destek isteyecek. stelik dnyadaki Ermeni diasporasnn Erivandaki otoriter ve otokrat rejimi beslemek iin yapt balar artrmak iin bylece daha byk bir sebebi olacak. Ama muhakkak bununla da yetinmeyecek. nk Sarkisyann asl hedefinde igal altnda tutulan Yukar Karaba var. Sarkisyan -ok byk bir olaslkla- yeni gelen Suriye Ermenilerini Azerbaycana ait olan, ama Ermenistann igal ettii Yukar Karabaa koloniler halinde yerletirecek. Bylece Sarkisyan nfus tama yntemi ile Yukar Karaba Ermeniletirecek. Erivan igal ettii Azerbaycan topra Yukar Karaba ile srailin igal ettii Arap topraklar arasnda paralellik olumas iin abalyor. Sarkisyan kuraca yeni yerleimler ile srailin kurduu yerleimler arasnda hukuki, siyasi ve konjonktrel ortak noktalar gelimesini istiyor. Her nasl yeryzndeki ou Musevi kendisini sraile bal hisseder ve yle de davranrsa, Sarkisyan da yeryzndeki ou Ermeninin kendisini Ermenistana bal hissetmesini ve yle de davranmasn istiyor. Sarkisyan bunlar sadece siyasi menfaat iin istiyor.

Dolaysyla Ermenistann davetine inanan ve Ermenistana g eden, g edecek olan Ermenileri kt ve tatsz bir gelecek bekliyor. Tpk Yahudi yerleimlerine yerlemek durumunda kalan ve igalci diye yaftalanarak, topraklarn geri isteyen Filistinlilerin dman grd Museviler gibi srailin izledii kt niyetli politikay taklit etmeye abalayan Sarkisyan bir gerein farkna henz varmad. Suriyede Ermeniler, baskc olmasna ramen ve i savaa ramen Esad rejimi altnda kendilerini gvende hissediyor. Suriyedeki Ermeniler silahlanmadlar ve atmalarda taraf olmadlar. Bu tutumlarn devam ettirme konusunda da kararllar. Suriyedeki Ermeni toplumu aklc hareket ediyor. Ancak bar ve huzur ortam iin Ermenistana g edenler, Yukar Karabaa yerletirildikten sonra, bir sabah kaplarnda kendilerine silah datan Ermeni ordu kamyonlarn grebilirler! nk Sarkisyann bu taktii er ya da ge Azerbaycann sert tepkisine ve fkesine neden olacak. nk Sarkisyan Yukar Karabadaki igali hakl hale getirebilmek iin bunu denemekten kanmaz. Serj Sarkisyann bu hamlesi tarih boyunca kullanlan Ermenilerin kt kaderinin sona ermediine iaret ediyor. Sarkisyann plan baarl olursa, bunun sonucunda Suriye Ermenileri Yukar Karabada -Ermenistann igal altnda tuttuu Azerbaycan topranda- yine silahlandrlacak. Yine kendilerini korumak zorunda kalacak. O noktadan sonras ise kaderin ellerinde. yimser olmak ok zor Bu konuda yaanabilecek olas gelimeler ok kt olabilir. Sarkisyann Suriyeli Ermenilerin kayglarn istismar etmesi ve bundan siyasi avantaj salamay ummas ok uygun ve yerinde bir tutum deil. Savatan kaan, lmekten korkan ve kendisine verilen sze inanarak umudun peinden gidecek olan Ermenilerin yeni ve mutlu hayat nerede bulacan kimse bilemez. Ama nerede bulamayacaklar ok ak; Aradklar huzur, zledikleri bar ve bekledikleri refah Erivann gettolarnda ve Yukar Karabada siperlerde olmayacak! THE INTIFADA IS 25 YEARS OLD The Palestinian people had begun the First Intifada in 1987 and they have not yet finished it. In December 1987 an Israeli truck in Gaza hit a Palestinian vehicle on purpose, killing four Palestinians. Students of the Gaza Islamic University called on all Palestinians to gather around the hospital where the Palestinian wounded were being taken. Thus the Intifada began. Since then it has been declared to have ceased, to be over, to have been split into the first and the second, that there will be no third, but on the ground the honourable struggle of the Palestinian people continues. The Intifada began in 1987 and escalated in strength until 1991. Later in 1993, with the Oslo Accords the autonomous Palestinian Authority was recognised. Tensions fell for a while. Before the signing of the Oslo Accords, 1.162 Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops. During the same period, 160 Israeli soldiers were killed. Once the Intifada had begun, the Palestinians not only died but were hurt to the bottom of their hearts. Before receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Isaac Rabin was known as the bone breaker for as defence minister he had said of the Palestinians we will break their legs so that they will never run again and we will break their hands so that they will never again throw stones. Soon afterwards, televisions around the world began showing how Israeli troops were breaking civilian Palestinians knees and elbows with stones. An organisation for the protection of children estimated that between 1988 and 1990, 23,600 to 29,900 Palestinian children were treated for bone fractures. 30 percent of these children were younger than 10 years old and 20 percent were younger than five. Broken bones set sooner or later and do not break again at the same spot. But miserable souls can never get to see the light and always follow darkness. In September 2000, Ariel Sharon went to the Masjid al-Aqsa with a giant army of bodyguards, despite foreseen consequences. The Intifada was reignited and violence escalated. During protests held on the very day Sharon went to the Masjid al-Aqsa Israeli police shot dead four Palestinian protestors. In another demonstration held the next day, Israeli police fired on peaceful protestors, killing 13 civilians. At the end of this process in 2005, Ariel Sharon and Mahmud Abbas signed a ceasefire in the Egyptian town of Sharm al-Sheikh. By the time the ceasefire was signed, a heavy price had been paid according to official Israeli data. According to the data, the period known as the Second Intifada lasted 1558 days. Palestinians carried out 20,406 attacks during this period. 138 of these attacks included 160 suicide bombers. 13,730 of these attacks were armed. 460 missile attacks were carried out. A total of 1,036 Israelis, of which 715 were civilians died as a result of these attacks. 7,054 Israelis were injured. The 143 suicide attacks left 513 Israelis dead and 3,380 injured. At the same time Israeli attacks killed between 3,336 and 3,592 Palestinians of whom 985 were civilians. 621 of the killed were not yet of age. Israel made 128,000 arrests on terrorism charges. Palestinians protected their broken honour and occupied land with stones against tanks and slings against aircraft. Israel continue to carry out assassinations as part of this war. Israel continues to build new settlements. Every Palestinian who protested these offences has been exposed to Israels unreasonable anger, use of disproportionate force and unrelenting persecution. But they have continued resisting and never given up on the Intifada. The student whose school had been shut down, the father whose shop burned down, the mother who saw her house demolished, the grandfather whose fields were trampled by tanks and the grandmother whose relatives graves were bombed from the air did not give up. The word intifada has meanings similar to resistance or uprising. But Intifada is not just a word. It is an important milestone in political sociology. Intifada means an honourable fight against oppression. Intifada means the stone defying the tanks and the sling defying the fighter plane. It means the barefooted child looking down on the general in a tank. It is a devastated city not giving in to the most modern army. It is the trial of a nation with hunger, thirst, poverty and despair. Intifada is hope never giving up.

The Intifada is a blanket for the cold, a reassuring father for the fearful and a mother for the child going hungry. The Intifada is the future for the child covered by the smoke of gunpowder and a duty of the younger towards the elder. It is the responsibility of the parent towards the child. It is the only source of hope for a generation raised behind barricades. It is the medal for lives spent under siege. It is the night view lit up by Israeli missiles instead of moonlight. It is the answer of fields to bombs raining down at dawn. It is the resistance put up by the earth wall against the bulldozer. It is the ethics of the doctor who cannot cure the patient brought to hospital with phosphorus bomb burns. The Intifada is furthermore the response of human morality, national and cultural pride to real politics. The Intifada is the anger the innocent person feels towards the butcher, the knife and the uncaring east which licks the butchers knife. The Intifada is the shield against racist aggression which hides behind religious dogma. It is the refusal of an occupation which is justified with divine messages and spiritual texts. It is last respects being paid to those massacred. The Intifada will definitely come to an end one day. Many things will happen until that day comes. For example the Israeli army will withdraw from the lands it occupies. Israel will abandon all settlements founded unjustly on Palestinian land. Israel will give the right to return to all Palestinian immigrants and exiles. Israel will return to pre-1967 borders and officially recognise the Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem. The moment Israel has fulfilled all of its lawful obligations, the Intifada will end. For Palestine, the Intifada is the road to justice, freedom and peace. The Intifada is the torch the Palestinians have lit up in the darkness imposed by Israel. It is the heat of that flame which warms up the cold nights in refugee camps and in Israels painful torture rooms and dark dungeons. The Intifada is the expression of the necessity of every Palestinian to live and not die for their cause. It is the eye defying tear gas, the heart defying batons and reason defying cruelty. For this reason the Intifada is the wall which remains standing despite gaping bullet holes. It is the kite which shakes its tail in the wind, despite being caught in barbed wire. The Intifada is the fight of the true David against the Goliath. NTFADA 25 YAINDA... Filistin halk ilk intifaday 1987 ylnn Aralk aynda balatmt ve henz bitirmedi. Aralk 1987 'de Gazze blgesinde bir srailli kamyoneti Filistinlileri tayan bir araca bilerek arpt ve drt Filistinli ld. Gazze slam niversitesi'ndeki renciler bunun ardndan btn Filistinlileri yarallarn gtrld hastanenin etrafnda toplanmaya ard. Bylece intifada balad. Arada bitti denilse de, durdu denilse de, birinci, ikinci denilse de, nc yok denilse de Filistin halknn onur sava ntifada devam ediyor. ntifada 1987 ylnda balad ve 1991 ylna kadar iddetini artrarak devam etti. Daha sonra Austos 1993te Norvete srailin "zerk Filistin Ynetimini tand Oslo Anlamas imzaland. Tansiyon bir sre iin dt. Oslo Anlamasnn imzalanmasnda nce btn srete toplam 1.162 Filistinli srail tarafndan katledildi. Ayn dnemde len srail askerlerinin says ise 160 idi. Ama ntifada baladnda Filistin halk sadece lmedi, yreinden, yreinin en derindeki yerinden de yaraland. zak Rabin Nobel Bar dl almasndan birka yl nce 1988 ylnda, henz Nobel ile deil de, kemikkran lakab ile tannrken, savunma bakan sfatyla Filistin halk iin bacaklarn kracaz bir daha koamayacaklar, ellerini kracaz bir daha ta atamayacaklar demiti. Ksa sre sonra dnya televizyonlar srailli askerlerin Filistinli sivillerin dizlerini ve dirseklerini talarla nasl krdklarn gsteren grntler yaynlad. ocuklar korumak iin kurulan bir sivil toplum kuruluu 1988 ve 1990 yllar arasnda 23.600 ila 29.900 arasnda ocuun kemik krlmas nedeniyle tbbi yardm aldn tespit etti. Bu ocuklarn %30u 10 yandan kkt. Hatta %20si 5 yandan kkt. Krlan kemikler er ya da ge kaynar ve asla bir daha ayn yerden asla krlmaz. Ama sefil ruhlar hibir zaman a kavuamaz, hep karanla kaar, nk ktan hep korkar. Ariel aron Eyll 2000de olas sonular nceden belli olduu halde dev bir koruma ordusuyla beraber Mescid-i Aksaya gitti. Bunun zerine ntifada atei yeniden alevlendi ve blgede iddet trmand. Daha aronun Mescid-i Aksaya gittii gn dzenlenen protesto gsterilerinde srail polisi drt Filistinliyi vurarak ldrd. Hemen ertesi gn dzenlenen baka bir gsteride de srail polisi barl gsteri yapan silahsz halka ate at ve 13 sivil gsterici can verdi. Bu srete ubat 2005te Msrn arm El-eyh kentinde, Mahmud Abbas ve Ariel aron arasnda atekes anlamas imzaland. Atekes anlamas imzalandnda son be ylda -resmi srail verilerine gre- kabark bir bilano vard. Bu verilere gre, ikinci ntifada diye de anlan bu be yllk dnem 1558 gn srd. Filistinliler bu evrede 20.406 saldr dzenledi. Bunlardan 138 adedinde 160 intihar komandosu kullanld. Ayrca sz konusu saldrlardan 13.730 adedi silahl saldr idi. Ondan baka 460 adet fze saldrs da gerekletirildi. Sz konusu saldrlarda 715i sivil olmak zere 1.036 srailli ldrld. Ayrca 7.054 srailli yaraland. Bu kapsamda yer alan toplam 143 intihar saldrsnda 513 srailli ldrld ve 3.380 srailli yaraland. Ayn dnemde srail saldrlarnda da 3.336 - 3.592 Filistinli ldrld. Bunlarn 985i sivildi. Onlarn 621i de henz reit bile deildi. srail terr sulamasyla 128.000 Filistinliyi tutuklad. Filistinliler inenen onurlarn ve kirlenen topraklarn tanka kar tala, uaa kar sapanla korudular. Bu savata srailin suikastlar devam ediyor. srail Filistin topraklarnda yerleimler kurmaya da devam ediyor. Bu saldrlar protesto eden her Filistinli ise srailin lsz fkesine, orantsz g kullanmna ve insafsz tepkisine maruz kald. Ama yine de direniine devam etti. ntifadadan asla vazgemedi. Okulu kapatlan renci, dkkn yaklan baba, evi yklan anne, tarlas tankla ezilen dede, akrabalarn mezar uakla bombalanan nine vazgeemezdi.

ntifada kelime itibariyle direni, ayaklanma ve benzeri anlamlara geliyor. Ama ntifada sadece bir kelime deil. ntifada gerekte siyaset sosyolojisinin ok nemli bir kilometre ta. ntifada onurun zulme kar sava anlamna geliyor. ntifada aslnda tan tanka, sapann uaa kafa tutmas anlamna geliyor. plak ayakl ocuun, tankn stndeki generale stten bakmasdr. Harap bir kentin en modern orduya teslim olmamasdr. Bir milletin alkla, susuzlukla, fakirlikle, yoklukla ve geleceksizlikle imtihan olmasdr. ntifada umudun asla teslim olmamasdr. ntifada yenin yorgandr, korkann sarlaca babasdr, yataa a giren ocuk iin annedir. ntifada barut kokan ocuk iin gelecektir ve byk iin ocuuna devidir. ntifada babann ocuuna sorumluluudur. Barikatlarda byyen nesillerin hayata dair tek hazinesidir. Kuatma altnda tkenen mrlerin madalyasdr. Gnden geen yldrmlarn yla deil, srail fzeleriyle aydnlanan pencerelerin manzarasdr. Tarlalarn afakta yaan bombalara cevabdr. Yklan kerpi evin boyasz duvarnn saldran buldozere bardr. Fosfor bombasndan yanklarla gelen hastaya are bulamayan umutsuz doktorun ahlakdr. Ayrca intifada insan ahlaknn, milletin onurunun, kltrn erefinin reel politikaya karldr. ntifada masum insann kasaba da, gamszl da, baa da fkesidir, ayrca gamszlktan kasabn ban yalayan inee nefretidir. nk ntifada dini dogmalarn arkasnda saklanan rk saldrganla kar duran kalkandr. lahi mesajlarla, ruhani metinlerle hakl gsterilmeye allan igalin rettidir. Katliamlarda ldrlenlere sayg duruudur. Velhasl ntifada bir gn muhakkak bitecek. Ama o gn gelinceye kadar pek ok ey olacak. rnein srail ordusu igal altnda tuttuu topraklardan ekilecek. Ayrca srail Filistin topraklarnda hakszca kurduu btn yerleimleri terk edecek. srail btn Filistinli gmenlere ve srgnlere yurduna dnme hakk verecek. Ayrca srail 1967 ylndaki snrlarna dnecek ve bakenti Kuds olan bamsz Filistin Devletini resmen tanyacak. srail hukuka kar bu sorumluluklarn yerine getirdiinde ntifada sona erecek. nk Filistin iin ntifada adalet, zgrlk ve bar iin yrnen patikann addr. En nihayetinde ntifada Filistin halknn srailin karanlnda yakt mealedir. O mealenin alevleri mlteci kamplarnda ve srailin ac dolu ikence tezghlarnda, strap dolu zindanlarnda korkuyla geen souk geceleri stan umuttur. ntifada her Filistinlinin davas iin lmek deil, ayakta kalmak zorunda olduunun ifadesidir. Gzn biber gazna, yrein asker copuna, akln vicdanszla barmasdr. O nedenle ntifada byk kurun deliklerine ramen ayakta duran duvardr. Takld tel rgye ramen kuyruu rzgrla salnan uurtmann telin dikenine tavrdr. nk ntifada hakikatte gerek Davut ile gerek Golyatn kavgasdr. INCOME FALLS, FASCISM RISES Economic crisis in Greece provokes racism Democracy is the regime for well fed societies. A society is democratic when it is well fed and only when it is well fed. If a society has to go hungry, it is not interested in democracy. Then what is deemed necessary from society is bread and not rights, freedoms, rules or responsibilities. This is a sad process which rarely ends well and Greece has entered this ride of horror. Greece was never a country where different groups lived in harmony. Athens was generally not good at establishing good relations with its neighbours. Whatever anyone might say the fact remains that along with the Vatican, Greece was one of the two religious states in Europe. Greece is also the only European state which has race based official policies. Greece was not a country for which one often used the words concord or harmony. But now circumstances are worse. The people are becoming poorer. The state has gone bankrupt. The system relies on Europe wiping off old debt and lending anew at regular intervals. Unemployment in Greece continues to rise and the economy continues to contract. Debts continue to mount in Greece. Social tension is very high. Everyone is unhappy, upset and reactive. During extraordinary times fringe ideas and parties attract more attention. Under unusual circumstances, unusual people and groups come to be preferred. The collective subconscious reacts. The diseases which were kept hidden and masked in society begin to fester like a wound. Societies rarely accept their own faults. It is always someone else who is at fault. Sometimes it is the neighbouring household, sometimes it is the neighbouring country that is to blame, depending on the scale. A guilty party is selected and collectively detested. Reactions target that party. In some countries the guilty party is selected among the especially weak groups such as minorities, foreigners and immigrants. For some reason the faulty party was not selected from among those who caused the debts which led to Greece going bankrupt. African immigrants became targets as if it was they who had done the borrowing and the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and the Aegean Islands as though they had ill spent the funds. There were even those who blamed Turkey for the crisis. It was claimed that Greece carried out unnaturally high expenditure on its military and armaments because of Turkey. Those who voiced such a claim must not know that both Greece and Turkey are members of the NATO. Her nedense borca batp iflas eden Yunanistanda sulu o borca neden olanlar arasndan seilmedi. Racist attacks have been on the rise in Greece in recent years. The number of attacks targeting foreigners and immigrants has increased. In Greece one can easily become a target due to skin colour or choice of clothing. It is not only those who live in Greece but are not from Greek or Orthodox origin who think this. Internationally respected human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International share these concerns. The fact that the police has arrested 1,500 immigrants and taken 6,700 into custody fans these concerns. Nikos Dendias, Minister for Public

Safety and Protection of Citizens has announced that a presidential decree has been issued for the establishment of a special unit within the Greek police force tasked with preventing racism. This method may protect victims from the racists. But who is going to protect the victims of the police? It is said that most of the racist attacks and the inhuman and racially motivated harassment and assaults by the police go unrecorded in Greece. Therefore the present frightening numbers are probably the tip of the iceberg. It is known that organisations such as the Golden Dawn have become increasingly popular among civil servants in Greece and that the far right political views are on the rise. The European Union and the United Nations are watching rising fascism in Greece with increasing concern. Perhaps it is more than just the state coffers which have become bankrupt in Greece. The state coffers may be filled with transfers with many zeros from Brussels and Berlin, but the moral bankruptcy in Greece cannot be so easily healed. GELR DNCE FAZM BYR Yunanistanda ekonomik kriz rkl kkrtyor Demokrasi tok toplumlarn rejimidir. Bir toplum tok iken demokrat olur ve sadece tok ise demokrat olur. Eer bir toplum a kalrsa demokrasi ile ilgilenmez. nk o zaman o toplum iin gereken haklar, zgrlkler, kurallar ve sorumluluklar deildir, ekmektir. Bu ok ackl bir sretir ve sonu nadiren iyi gelir; Yunanistan bir korku tneline girdi Yunanistan zaten hibir zaman farkllklarn uyumunun grld bir lke olmay baaramad. Atina genellikle komu lkeleriyle dostluk ilikisi kurmakta baarl olmad. Kim ne derse desin, nasl yorumlarsa yorumlasn, Yunanistan btn Avrupada iki din devletinden birisi. Dieri de Vatikan. Yine itiraz edenler muhakkak olur, ama Yunanistan rka dayal resmi politikalar olan tek Avrupa devleti. Dolaysyla Yunanistan zaten uyum, ahenk, harmoni ve saire gibi szckler iin bir hayli zor bir lkeydi, her zaman. Ama imdi artlar daha da kt. Halk giderek fakirleiyor. Devlet ise zaten iflas etti. Sistem Avrupann dzenli olarak eski borlar silip, yeni bor vermesi sayesinde yryor. Btn rakamlar ok kt. Yunanistanda isizlik artmaya devam ediyor. Yunanistanda ekonomi klmeye devam ediyor. Yunanistanda retim dmeye devam ediyor. Yunanistanda borlar da artmaya devam ediyor. lkede sosyal tansiyon da ok yksek Herkes mutsuz, herkes fkeli ve herkes tepkili... Sra d dnemlerde sra d fikirler ve partiler daha ok tevecch grr. Normal olmayan artlarda normal olmayan insanlar, gruplar, topluluklar takdir edilir. Bir de elbette kolektif bilinalt kendisini gsterir. Toplumda gizlenen, saklanan, maskelenen hastalklar -tpk cerahat gibi- ortaya kmaya balar. Toplumlar nadiren kendi kabahatini kabul eder. Sulu ve sorumlu daima bir bakasdr. Bazen komu aile bazen de komu lke suludur, yerine gre. Bir sulu seilir ve o suludan topluca nefret edilir. Ona tepki de gsterilir. Baz lkelerde ise sulu veya kabahatli zellikle zayf olanlardan seilir. rnein aznlklardan, yabanclardan ve gmenlerden Her nedense borca batp iflas eden Yunanistanda sulu o borca neden olanlar arasndan seilmedi. O borcu alanlar Afrikal gmenlermi gibi, o paray batranlar Bat Trakyadaki ve adalardaki Trk aznlkm gibi, onlar hedef oldu. Hatta Trkiyenin bu krizden sorumlu olduunu da iddia edenler oldu. nk Yunanistann ar yksek askeri harcamalar ve silah ithalat Trkiyenin yzndenmi. Belki de bu iddiay dile getirenler hala Trkiye ve Yunanistann -her ikisinin de- NATO yesi olduunu bilmiyordur Velhasl Yunanistanda rk saldrlarda son yllarda ciddi bir art yaanyor. zellikle yabanclar ve gmenleri hedef alan saldrlarn says artyor. Yunanistanda ten rengi ve kyafet bir kiiyi kolaylkla hedef haline getirebilir. Bunu dnenler sadece Yunanistanda yaayan, ama Yunan asll veya Ortodoks kkenli olmayanlar deil. Ayn zamanda Human Rights Watch ve Amnesty International gibi uluslararas sahada saygn sivil toplum kurulular da ayn endieye sahipler. Polisin 6.700 gmeni gzaltna almasnn ve 1.500 gmeni tutuklamasnn bunda etkili olduu kesin. Kamu Gvenlii ve Vatanda Koruma Bakan Nikos Dendias, rk saldrlarla mcadele iin Yunan polisi iinde zel bir birim oluturulmasn ngren bir Cumhurbakanl kararnamesi karldn aklad. Ama bu yntemle kurbanlar rklardan korunabilir. Fakat dier kurbanlar Yunan polisinden kim koruyacak? Yunanistanda vuku bulan rk saldrlarn ve polis tarafndan yaplan gayri insani, kt niyetli ve rk motivasyonlu taciz ve saldrlarn ounluunun kaytlara gemedii belirtiliyor. O nedenle hlihazrda rktc olan rakamlar gerein kk bir paras. Yunanistanda devlet mensuplar arasnda Altn afak gibi rgtlerin giderek daha popler olduu ve ar sa siyasi grn giderek yayld biliniyor. Avrupa Birlii ve Birlemi Milletler de Yunanistanda yaanan faizm trblansn kayg ile izliyor. Galiba Yunanistanda yolun sonunda olan veya iflas eden devlet kasasndan daha fazlas. Belki iflas eden devlet kasas Berlinden, Brkselden yaplan bol sfrl online havaleler ile yenide dolar, ama Yunanistanda iflas eden toplum vicdan -bolca sfr tarafndan ynetilen lkede- bir daha telafi olmaz. ISRAEL KNOWS NO LIMITS Israel is moving to found new settlements Israel is to set up new settlements in territories it occupies. This issue, which is also on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, may cause new tensions in the Middle East in 2013. The USA has prevented Israel from being condemned by the Security Council. However, this move could trigger a wave of violence in the unstable Middle East under Arab Spring conditions. The US veto has trumped the votes of other 14 members of the Security Council and Israel was not condemned. Not that a condemnation would have made a great impression on Israel. It would not have been sad or repentant. The Security Council

which is supposed to defend the rule of the law in the world and represent the global conscience could have fulfilled its duty, but it was not to be. Israel is building new roads in the West Bank and starting new residential projects. Israel will continue to take over Palestinian land as it has done up until now. Israel will continue to cleanse Palestinian land from Palestinians in 2013 and the years to come. Under the circumstances, peace talks are impossible. As Israel continues the occupation of Palestinian land and sets up unjust and unlawful new settlements on these lands, it completely ignores the existence of Palestinians and shows its contempt for them. This being the case it is impossible for the sides to sit around a table or negotiate. Israel is gradually making Eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank Israeli. Today, around 200,000 settlers live in Eastern Jerusalem. The number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank is estimated to be at least 340,000. The United Nations and the Security Council are losing their relevance with each passing year. The Security Council can no longer take strong decisions on any matter. It cannot be determinant in important matters. One should spend some time thinking about the Security Councils inability to stop the violence in Syria which has been going on for two years and to take a decisions to condemn Israels blatant contempt for the law. Although the Security Council has not condemned the open crime and legal transgression of Israel, the countries which for it should form a new approach together or on their own. For it is certain that the Security Council cannot establish nor protect security. For that reason one should cease expecting anything further from the Security Council and those states which are of one mind regarding international law should set up a common manner of action. For example, the European Unions Catherine Ashton has criticised the Israeli decision to build new settlements in strong language. She said that the move has no precedent and that she rejects this policy. If such is the case, the European Union with its 27 members should be able to respond more concretely to Israels aggressive expansionist policies. If the international community does not act soon, it will be too late. Israel is beginning the construction of 523 residential units out of the 6,000 projected total. 6,000 residential units do not make a small and insignificant settlement. When the aid project is completed, Palestinians will find it more difficult to move from one point to another within the West Bank. It will become impossible to get to some areas. Israel is beginning to found cities on occupied Palestinian land. If no one moves to stop this process the day will come when Palestinians will not be able to find any space outside cemeteries. SRAL DURMUYOR!... srail yeni yerleimler kurmak iin harekete geiyor srail yine igal altnda tuttuu topraklarda yeni yerleimler kuracak. Birlemi Milletler Gvenlik Konseyinin de gndeminde yer alan bu konu, 2013 ylnda Orta Douda yeni gerilimli srelere sebep olabilir. ABD srailin Gvenlik Konseyi tarafndan knanmasn nledi. Ama istikrarszln hzla yayld Orta Douda -bilhassa Arap Baharnda- byle bir gelime ciddi bir iddet sarmal balatabilir. Dier 14 lkenin oyuna karlk ABDnin vetosu yeterli oldu ve srail bir kez daha knanmaktan kurtuldu. Geri Gvenlik Konseyi sraili knasa da srail bunu fazla nemsemeyecekti. Ne knand iin zlecekti ne de bundan dolay pimanlk duyacakt. Ama yine de dnyada hukukun varln savunan ve yeryz halknn vicdann temsil eden Gvenlik Konseyi grevini yerine getirebilirdi, ama olmad. srail Bat eriada yeni caddeler ayor ve yeni konut projeleri balatyor. Yani srail bundan sonra da -imdiye kadar olduu gibi- Filistin topraklarn gasp etmeye devam edecek. srail 2013 ylnda da, sonraki yllarda da Filistin topraklarn Filistinlilerden arndrmaya srdrecek. Bu artlar altnda bar grmeleri imknsz. nk srail Filistin topraklarndaki igalini srdrrken ve o topraklarda haksz biimde, hukuksuz biimde yeni yerleimler kurarken zm olmaz. srail bu tutumuyla Filistinlileri yok sayyor, onlara sayg duymadn gstermek istiyor. Taraflarn bir masann etrafnda toplanmas da, mzakere etmeleri de olanaksz. srail Dou Kuds ve Bat eriay adm adm srailletiriyor. Bugn Dou Kudste 200.000 civarnda yerleimci yayor. Bat eriadaki yerleimlerde yaayan srailli yerleimcilerin says ise en az 340.000 diye tahmin ediliyor. Birlemi Milletler de, Gvenlik Konseyi de her sene biraz daha anlamn ve nemini yitiriyor. nk Gvenlik Konseyi artk hibir konuda ciddi bir karar alamyor. nemli konularda belirleyici rol stlenemiyor. Eer Gvenlik Konseyi iki yldr Suriyede devam eden vaheti durduramyorsa ve srailin hukuku aka inemesine kar knama karar bile alamyorsa, bunun zerinde dnmek gerekir. Her ne kadar Gvenlik Konseyi srailin ak suunu ve hukuk ihlalini knayamadysa da, onu meydana getiren dier lkelerin Gvenlik Konseyi ats altnda olmasa, ayrca beraber veya mstakil bir hareket tarz meydana getirmeleri lazm. nk Gvenlik Konseyinin gvenlii salayamad kesin, gvenlii koruyamad da belli. O halde Gvenlik Konseyinden bundan sonras iin haksz bir beklentiye girmeyip, uluslararas hukuk konusunda hemfikir olan devletlerin ortak hareket biimi gelitirmesi lazm. rnein Avrupa Birlii adna aklama yapan Catherine Ashton srailin yeni yerleimler kurmasn ok sert bir dille eletirdi. Bu hareketin emsali olmadn ifade etti. Bu politikay ret ettiini beyan etti. O halde 27 yeli Avrupa Birliinin srailin agresif ve yaylmas siyasetine daha somut tepkiler gsterebilmesi gerekir. Eer uluslararas toplum acilen harekete gemezse, yarn ok ge olacak. srail 523 konutun inaatna balyor ve bu proje toplam 6.000 konut ieriyor. 6.000 konut iin sradan ve kk bir yerleim denilemez. Zaten sz konusu proje tamamladnda, Filistinlilerin Bat eria iinde bir yerden dier yere gidileri de zorlaacak. Hatta baz blgelerden

dierlerine gei olanaksz hale gelmi olacak. srail igal ettii Filistin topraklarnda ehirler kurmaya balyor. Kimse bu srece dur demezse, bir gn gelecek ve Filistinde Filistinlilere mezarlklar dnda yer kalmayacak. MANY WEAPONS IN THE USA, MANY MASSACRES Six gun attacks in the USA in half a year First there was an attack in a movie theatre in Colorado and 12 people were killed. An attack on a Sikh temple in Wisconsin left six people dead. The next attack took place in Connecticut a few weeks later and 26 people, 20 of them children, were killed in the targeted school. The US President Obama refrained from opposing the arms lobbies since his election in 2009 and therefore shied away from taking any meaningful measures against the proliferation of individual arms. Opponents of individual arming demand the reintroduction of the ban on the sale of assault weapons which ended in 2004. The regulation which became effective in 1994 under former Democrat President Bill Clinton has banned the sale of semi-automatic assault weapons to civilians. It further prevents magazines from featuring arms advertising. It is seen that Obama has increasingly been pushed in to a corner over the proliferation of individual arms. This situation lends some hope to those who have been struggling for a limit to the use of individual arms in the USA for a long time. In the wake of the latest armed attacks, Obama has established a task force headed by his deputy Joe Biden to investigate steps regarding gun control. It is thought that a law will be discussed in the newly elected Congress. However, it does not seem very feasible for Obama to confront arms manufacturers. Obama will not want to anger the arms lobby. Similarly he has no need to anger gun loving Americans. That Democrats have not taken any steps on the matter since the relevant legislation expired in 2004 goes to support this claim. It is also clear that Obama prefers to be quiet on the matter and prefers a low profile politics. Obama knows that the gun issue is very dangerous in many respects. The gun trade in the USA means business, money circulation, employment and income for subsidiary sectors. Furthermore, according to dominant reasoning in the USA, a ban or limitation on guns does not present a solution. It is argued that those looking to murder people will access guns anyway. But those targeted as victims will be left defenceless. Gun owners will also feel victimised. At the moment the National Rifle Association has 4.3 million members and a budget of USD 307 million. In the USA, which has experienced more than 60 shooting massacres in the past 30 years, every year 31,000 people are shot dead. That means 2,583 people per month, 86 per day, 3.5 per hour and 1 person approximately every twenty minutes on average. The number of those injured as a result of gun attacks in slightly more than double the number killed. The respected New York Times claims that the number of people killed as a result of gun attacks in the USA during the past 40 years is 1 million. This number does not include soldiers killed in action. The same source states that more people have been shot dead in Chicago this year than US troops killed in Afghanistan. It is estimated that around 4.5 million firearms change hands in the USA every year. The process will be long, difficult and bloody in the USA. Should President Obama listen to the markets, he will not take any new measures. If he does not listen to the markets, he may lose lobby support. The USA will thus continue to be a dangerous place. It might even make it into the list of most dangerous places in the world. ABDDE OK SLAH, OK KATLAM ABDde yarm yl ierisinde defa silahl saldr oldu nce Temmuz aynda Coloradoda bir sinemaya saldr dzenlendi ve 12 kii ld. Onu ksa bir sre sonra Wisconsinde bir Sih tapnana yaplan saldr takip etti. Sih tapnanda da 6 kii ldrld. Sonraki saldr ise birka hafta nce Connecticutta oldu ve hedef seilen okulda 20si ocuk 26 kii ldrld. ABD Bakan Obama 2009 ylnda bakan seilmesinden sonra 4 uzun yl boyunca silah lobilerini karsna almaktan ekindi ve bu nedenle bireysel silahlanmay snrlamaya ynelik anlaml admlar atmaktan uzak durdu. Silahlanma kartlar sresi 2004 ylnda biten saldr silahlarna ynelik yasan yeniden yrrle konulmasn talep ediyorlar. 1994 ylnda eski Demokrat Bakan Bill Clinton dneminde yrrle giren yasal dzenleme, saldr silah vasfna sahip yar otomatik silahlarn sivillere satnn yasaklanmasn ngryor. Ayrca dergilerde silah reklamlarnn yaynlanmasna da izin vermiyor. Obamann son dnemde bireysel silahlanma konusunda giderek artan biimde keye skt grlyor. Bu durum uzun zamandr ABDde bireysel silah kullanmnn snrlandrlmas iin mcadele veren rgtleri umutlandryor. Nitekim Obama son silahl saldrnn devamnda silah kontrolne ynelik admlar konusunda yardmcs Joe Biden liderliinde bir grev gc kurdurdu. Hatta yeni Kongrede konunun youn biimde gndeme geleceine de kesin gzyle baklyor. Ama Obamann silah reticileri karsna almas aklc bir olaslk deil. Obama silah lobisini elbette kzdrmak istemeyecektir. Keza Obamann silah tamay seven Amerikallar fkelendirmek istemesi iin de bir nedeni yok. Nihayetinde Demokratlarn ilgili yasal dzenlemenin sresinin dolduu 2004 ylndan bu yana hibir giriimde bulunmamas da bu gerei ispatlyor. Ayrca Obamann bu konuda mmkn olduu kadar sessiz olmay tercih ettii ve dk profilli bir siyaseti tercih ettii de ortada. Nihayetinde Obama silah konusunun her anlamda ok tehlikeli olduunun bilincinde nk silah ABDde ayn zamanda ticaret, para sirklasyonu, istihdam ve yan sektrlerin para kazanmas anlamna da geliyor. Ayrca ABDdeki egemen mantna gre, silahlarn yasaklanmas veya snrlandrlmas kesin bir zm anlamna gelmiyor. nk zaten adam ldrmek ve katliam yapmak isteyenler silaha eriecek. Ama hedef veya kurban olanlar

savunmasz kalacak. Ayrca silah sahibi olanlar da madur edildiini dnecek. rnein Ulusal Tfek Birliinin 4,3 milyon yesi ve 307 milyon USD btesi var. Son 30 ylda 60tan fazla katliam yaayan ABDde her yl ortalama 31.000 insan silahla ldrlyor. Yani ayda 2.583, gnde 86, saatte 3,5 ve yaklak 20 dakikada 1 kii silahl saldr sonucunu hayatn kaybediyor. Silahl saldr sonucunda yaralananlarn says ise lenlerin iki katndan biraz daha fazla ABDnin saygn gazetesi The New York Times lkede son 40 ylda silahl saldr sonucu lenlerin toplam saysnn 1 milyon olduunu iddia ediyor. Bu sayya savalar ve askerler dahil deil. Yine ayn kaynaa gre bu yl Chicagoda len ABDli says, Afganistanda len ABD askeri saysndan daha fazla! ABDde her yl yaklak 4,5 milyon ateli silahn el deitirdii tahmin ediliyor. Bu sre ABDde uzun, zor ve kanl geecek. nk ABD Bakan Obama ayet piyasalarn sesine kulak verirse, hibir ciddi nlem alamayacak. Eer kulak vermez ise, zaten lobilerin desteini yitirebilir. O nedenle ABD tehlikeli bir yer olmaya devam edecek. Belki de dnyadaki en tehlikeli yerler listesine de girebilir. GOLDEN DAWN TERRORISM BEGINS ONCE MORE IN GREECE The Golden Dawn (Hrisi Avgi) organisation has resurfaced in Greece. The people who have been tried by the systems collapse due to the economic crisis, the tragic situation approaching state bankruptcy and heavy pressure from Europe now have to suffer Golden Dawn terrorism. The Golden Dawn mostly targets leftists and immigrants. Though it may sound strange, if you are a foreigner and you do not look like a Greek, if you cannot speak good Greek without an accent, you may not be able to enter every neighbourhood or pass through every street in Greece. The Golden Dawn might be waiting for you there. Those who think that this cannot happen in the European Union and in the 21st century may heed the Human Rights Watch organisation. Conditions have deteriorated so much in Greece that foreigners make use of city maps. Those maps show neighbourhoods to be avoided and neighbourhoods which are safe. In those neighbourhoods young men wearing black and carrying, sticks, pipes, chains, knives and bottles prowl for a target. The victim may be an immigrant, a Muslim or a leftist. Before the crisis, Greeces bankruptcy and Athens having to rely on European Union funds to make payments, the Golden Dawn had less than 1 percent vote. It now has 10 percent.. The Golden Dawn believes that Greek blood and country are sacred. They hate everyone and everything including foreigners, immigrants, leftists, Jews, Gypsies, Albanians, Bosnians and Turks. The European press claims that the Golden Dawn is popular within the Greek police organisation. Given the Greek polices approach to foreigners and minorities it is not surprising. As the decline of the country continues, Nazi wannabes will continue to strengthen. National pride which was flattened by Europe and the European Union is reacting. But since the crisis is likely to last many years in Greece, measures need to be taken. The best option might be to do what Germany is doing with regard to the NPD and outlaw the Golden Dawn. Health Infrastructure Collapsing in Greece Hospitals are closing down. Medicine is increasingly difficult to find. As Greece implements harsh austerity measures in education and healthcare and as retirement pensions are slashed, the funds lent by the European Union to Athens have only been used to pay back debt. However, patience is running thin in Greece. The health system is running a loss of EUR 3 billion in Greece. Thus only 82 of the 132 hospitals in Athens are still functional. The Greek people cannot afford private healthcare and public hospitals are finding it difficult to meet demand. The state healthcare insurance firm EOPYY owes pharmacies, domestic and foreign drug firms more than EUR 1 billion. Finding certain kinds of medicine is not easy in Greece. Pharmacies which are not paid what they are owed by the EOPYY do not want to give out cancer treatment drugs. Because they cannot receive what they are owed, they are having difficulty making payments to drug firms. Although they do not get paid the cost of the medicine upon sale to the EOPYY, they still have to pay income tax and VAT for the transaction. YUNANSTANDA ALTIN AFAK TERR YENDEN BALADI Yunanistanda Altn afak (Hrisi Avgi) yine sahneye kt. Ekonomik krizle ken sistem, devlet iflasna noktasna yaklaan trajik durum ve Avrupann ar basksyla bunalan halk imdi de Altn afakn terryle imtihan oluyor. Altn afak en ok solcular ve gmenleri hedef alyor. Kulaa garip gelebilir, ama eer yabancysanz ve tipiniz Yunana benzemiyorsa, iyi derecede aksansz Yunanca konuamyorsanz, Atinada her mahalleye giremezsiniz, Atinada her caddeden geemezsiniz. nk Altn afak rgt oralarda bir yerde sizi bekliyor olabilir. Avrupa Birliinde ve 21. Asrda bunun gerek olamayacan dnenler, nsan Haklar zleme rgtne (HRW) inanabilirler. Yunanistanda artlar o kadar bozuldu ki, yabanclar ellerinde ehir haritasyla dolayorlar. O haritalarla gvenle gidebilecekleri ve asla gitmemeleri gereken semtler iaretli. O semtlerde elinde sopa, muta, demir ubuk, zincir, bak, ie tayan, siyah giyinen gen adamlar gruplar haline dolap kendilerine av aryorlar. Av bazen bir gmen, bazen bir Mslman ve bazen de bir solcu oluyor. Krizin yani Yunanistann iflasnda nce, Atinann Avrupa Birliinden gelen paralarla maa datmaya balamasndan nce Altn afakn oy oran %1 seviyesinin dahi altndayd. Ama Altn afak artk %10 oya sahip bir parti. Altn afak Yunan kannn ve lkesinin kutsal olduuna inanyor. Yabanclardan, gmenlerden, solculardan, Musevilerden, ingenelerden, Arnavutlardan, Bonaklardan, Trklerden, herkesten ve her eyden nefret ediyor. Avrupa basn Altn

afakn Yunan polis tekilat ierisinde de popler olduunu gsteriyor. Yunan polisinin yabanclara ve aznlklara kar tutumunu dnnce, armamak lazm. lkede k devam ettii srece elbette 3.Reich zentisi nazi msveddeleri de glenmeye devam edecek. Avrupa ve Avrupa Birlii karsna kaldrmdaki sakz gibi inenen milli gurur bir yerde reaksiyon gsteriyor. Ama krizi Yunanistan iin daha ok uzun sre devam edecei iin, buna kar tedbir alnmas lazm. En doru tedbir Almanyann NDP konusunda izledii rotay izlemek ve Altn afak yasaklamak olabilir. Yunanistanda Salk Altyaps da kyor Hastaneler kapatlyor. la bulmak gittike zorlayor. Yunanistan salk ve eitim konularnda sert tasarruf tedbirleri uygularken, emekli maalarn daha azaltrken, Avrupadan Atinaya akan paralar sadece eski borlarn denmesinde kullanld. Ama Yunanistanda artlar tahamml giderek daha zor bir hal almaya balad. Yunanistanda salk sistemi 3 milyar EUR zararda. Bu nedenle Atina 132 hastaneden sadece 82 adedini ayakta tutmaya karar verdi. Yunan halk zel hastanelere gidemiyor ve kamu hastaneleri de youn talebi karlamakta zorluk yayor. Bu arada devletin salk sigortas EOPYYnin eczanelere ve yerli ve yabanc ila firmalarna bir milyar avrodan fazla borcu var. Bu nedenle Yunanistanda her ilac bulmak kolay deil. Eczaneler ve ila firmalar EOPYYnin borcunu deyememesinden dolay kanser ilalarn vermek istemiyorlar. Zaten EOPYYden alacan tahsil edemeyen eczaneler ila firmalarna olan borcunu yine de demek zorunda olduu iin byk sknt ierisindeler. Eczaneler EOPYYden alacan tahsil edemese de, ilacn EOPYYye sat ilemini yapm olduu iin yine de gelir vergisini ve katma deer vergisini demek zorunda.