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1 Michael W. Stamp, State Bar No. 72785
Molly E. Erickson, State Bar No. 253198
2 LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL W. STAMP
479 Pacific Street, Suite One
3 Monterey, California 93940
Telephone: (831) 373-1214
4 Facsimile: (831) 373-0242
5 Attorneys for Plaintiff
Jane Kingsley Miller
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FILED
JUN 1 7 2009
CONNIE MAZZEI
CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
- - ~ ~ - - - - - - D ~
S.HANS
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF MONTEREY
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JANE KINGSLEY MILLER.
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. H 9 9 5 1 3
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COMPLAINT
CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA, and
13 DOES 1 through 100,
14 Defendants.
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Plaintiff Jane Kingsley Miller ("Plaintiff) alleges as follows:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
1. Plaintiff is an adult female employed by the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea.
She is 62 years old. Since 1999, Plaintiff was employed by the City, first as the
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Personnel Specialist and, since August 2003, as the Human Resources Manager. Her
personnel evaluations have been outstanding, she has provided exemplary service to
the City and the public, and she has provided human resources and risk management
services to the City with the highest degree of professionalism and integrity. At all times
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mentioned herein, she reported directly to the City Administrator, who is the highest-
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ranking executive of the City, and is the decision-maker for the City on personnel
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issues. The City Administrator reports to the Mayor and City Council.
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MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THF-ilFA
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1 2. Defendant City of Carmel-by-the-Sea (City) is a municipal corporation,
2 organized under, existing by, and subject to the laws of the State of California. The
3 Mayor and the City Council are the governing board of the City, and they supervise the
4 operations of City government. The Mayor serves as the chief spokesperson for the
5 City, and represents the City in all ceremonial and official affairs.
6 3. Richard Guillen (Guillen) is an adult male employed by the City of Carmel-
7 by-the-Sea as City Administrator.
8 4. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued
9 herein as DOES 1 through 100 and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious
10 names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities if
11 and/or when ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that
12 each of these fictitiously named defendants is in some manner responsible to Plainttff
13 for the relief requested therein.
14 5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, at all times
15 mentioned herein, defendants DOES 1 through 100 were the agents, joint venturers,
16 partners, servants and/or employees of all other defendants identified herein, acting
17 within the purpose and scope of their agency, authority and/or employment with the
18 permission, consent, and ratification of each other defendant. Each and every act,
19 omission, and statement of Guillen, of DOES 1 through 100, and of the City described
20 herein has been ratified, adopted, endorsed, or approved by the City of Carmel-by-the-
21 Sea, and by the Mayor and City Council. The Mayor and City Council, and their
22 officers, agents, and attorneys had actual and/or constructive notice of the actions,
23 omissions, and statements of Guillen, including a continuous course of conduct and
24 continuing violations directed at Plaintiff by Guillen from 2004 to the present, and did
25 not take reasonable, prudent, or effective steps to prevent the conduct of Guillen or to
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26 prevent the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. The Mayor and City Council delegated to
27 Guillen the power to make any and all personnel-related decisions, and did so without
28 retaining reasonable oversight and review by the Mayor and City Council.
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MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL -BY-THE-SEA
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1 6. On July 16, 1999, Plaintiff was hired by the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea as
2 the City's Personnel Specialist. From the date she was hired, and continuing throughout
3 Plaintiffs service with the City, Plaintiff acted with the highest regard and respect for the
4 public and for Plaintiffs duties to the City, its representatives, its staff, and the public.
5 7. In approximately September, 2000, when City Administrator Jere Kersnar
6 left the City, the City Council stated publicly that it would begin a search for a new city
7 administrator. In October 2000, the Mayor and City Council hired Guillen as an interim
8 city administrator. In or about November 2000, the Mayor and City Council decided not
9 to continue with an executive search and instead hired Guillen as City Administrator.
10 8. Plaintiff reported directly to Guillen within the City government structure.
11 9. From January 2001 to 2003, Guillen forced out several long-time City
12 directors and employees, including the Assistant City Administrator, Community and
13 Cultural Director, Public Works Director, and Financial Services Coordinator. Guillen
14 negotiated with those employees, and combined the negotiations with threats to
15 terminate certain of those employees, all of whom were significantly over the age of 40.
16 Guillen made it clear to Plaintiff and to others that he was acting with the full support of
17 the Mayor and City Council in his decisions to oust these older administrators, and that
18 Guillen had the absolute power to unilaterally make and implement any personnel or
19 other decisions he chose to make, including the decision to terminate any or all of the
20 positions described above.
21 10. During the period that Guillen was forcing out these older directors and
22 employees, Guillen developed a close personal relationship with a Program Supervisor,
23 a female employee of the City, identified here as Female A. Guillen gave Female A
24 significant, preferential, favorable treatment in her employment that was not provided to
25 other female employees or to male employees. The preferential treatment was based
26 not upon merit. but upon Female A's close personal relationship with Guillen. The
27 favorable treatment included a transfer of Female A to a different and better location
28 without following standard City procedures, which was followed by a decision by Guillen
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MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
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1 to have Female A report directly and personally to Guillen. Female A became the only
2 person at her level of the organization chart to report directly to Guillen.
3 11. The favorable treatment of Female A also included several other
4 favorable actions by Guillen, including the following: a reclassification to a managerial
5 position specially created by Guillen for the employee; significant pay raises arranged
6 by Guillen and not based upon job performance or merit, but upon the employee's
7 favored status with Guillen; frequent and private access to Guillen; access to
8 confidential personnel information not related to Female A's job duties; Guillen's
9 support of Female A in authorizing Female A to have special status among City staff;
10 and Guillen's actions to include Female A in decisions and discussions that were
11 outside her job responsibilities and affecting the rights of other less-favored female and
12 male employees. In addition, Guillen arranged and "negotiated" with Female A for a
13 taxpayer-paid salary for Female A in excess of that which would have been provided to
14 another employee with the same education, job-related experience, training, and skills.
15 Guillen's favoritism to Female A was made known and demonstrated at work by Guillen
16 and by Female A, and created a hostile and sexually charged work environment for
17 other female employees who did not have the same sort of relationship with Guillen.
18 Guillen's preferential treatment of Female A continued throughout her employment with
19 the City, and was severe and pervasive enough to adversely affect and alter the
20 conditions of employment in the work environment The conduct of Guillen and Female
21 A conveyed a demeaning message to female employees in a manner that had a
22 negative effect on the productivity and professionalism of the office as a whole.
23 12. In August 2003, Guillen changed Plaintiffs job title to Human Resources
24 Manager. Guillen set Plaintiffs salary at the 4'h Step of a comparable Manager's
25 position, but at a salary lower than the amount of the prior Personnel Officer, a male
26 employee with less education, training and experience in personnel matters than
27 Plaintiff.
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1 13. By Spring of 2004, Guillen was giving preferential treatment to Female A.
2 At that time, Guillen at times became cold and distant to Plaintiff and other women in
3 the City workplace. In the social and professional context of employment at City Hall,
4 Plaintiff and other female employees affected by the change in working conditions
5 reasonably attributed Guillen's behavioral changes to Guillen's close personal
6 relationship with Female A. Several female employees began to talk openly about the
7 relationship of Guillen with Female A and the favoritism based upon inappropriate
8 activity, along with the ways in which the favoritism imposed significant burdens upon
9 the work environment.
10 14. Guillen's favoritism toward Female A was based upon a personal
11 relationship inappropriate for the workplace. The benefits conferred on Female A, such
12 as pay, bonuses, responsibility, and professional advancement, were not bestowed on
13 female employees who chose not to engage in that type of relationship with the City's
14 top administrator or who chose not to accept Guillen's inappropriate comments and
15 actions. The Mayor and City Council were made aware of Guillen's conduct and/or had
16 constructive knowledge, and took no action of any kind.
17 15. Guillen altered the professional work environment at City Hall that had
18 existed before Guillen took office, and created in its place an environment where
19 females were considered valuable and protected by Guillen when they engaged in an
20 inappropriately flirtatious and sexually-charged manner, and when they accepted his
21 inappropriate words and conduct without challenging any of it.
22 16. As Guillen continued his relationship with, and favoritism towards,
23 Female A, he gradually and persistently created a hostile work environment for other
24 female employees, including Plaintiff. Guillen frequently demonstrated his absolute
25 control of the workplace, and emphasized how he had been delegated by the Mayor to
26 exercise the authority of the City, and was able to override standards applicable to other
27 persons and to the procedures and policies in effect at the City. He demonstrated how
28 he was able to dismiss or make derogatory remarks about others in the City, including
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1 elected officials, with impunity. He demonstrated how he was able to make decisions in
2 the workplace that were not based upon legitimate work-related bases, but which were
3 personal, unchecked and not challenged by others in City government, including the
4 Mayor, City Council, and City Attorney. Guillen instructed City employees, including
5 Plaintiff, that they were not allowed to contact the Mayor and City Council, except when
6 Guillen personally gave permission to do so. Guillen's decisions and statements as to
7 personnel, staffing, salaries, classifications, assignments, working conditions, planning,
8 and other matters, demonstrated to Plaintiff and to other City employees that as the
9 City's top administrator he had complete power, was not bound by the constraints
10 applicable to others at the City, was the City's decision-maker, and was not reined in by
11 existing City policies or by any effective or meaningful mechanism or formula for
12 supervision.
13 17. Guillen engaged in a course of conduct toward Plaintiff that reflected
14 Guillen's desire to become personally close to Plaintiff, treating her as a female that he
15 singled out for attention. Guillen made numerous comments about his feelings of
16 attraction to Plaintiff. As part of his continuing course of conduct toward Plaintiff,
17 Guillen sent hundreds of emails and text messages to Plaintiff, and made comments
18 directed at Plaintiff, frequently combining an unrestrained willingness to state his
19 physical, sexual attraction to Plaintiff with a parallel and self-described role as Plaintiffs
20 "boss." In addition, Guillen made repeated references to Plaintiffs age, and to Guillen's
21 stated expectation that Guillen and Plaintiff would be together, "especially" after their
22 "retirements from the City.
23 18. Guillen frequently used words of physical attraction toward Plaintiff. He
24 did so while acknowledging that Plaintiff did not want to hear such words and
25 considered the remarks unwelcome and unprofessional. Guillen described Plaintiff as a
26 "hattie," a "blonde worker bee," "beautiful", and a "blonde hattie," and made several
27 remarks about how attractive he found Plaintiff to be. Guillen called Plaintiff "Missy,"
28 "Girlfriend," "Good Looking." and "Pretty," along with other phrases, nicknames, and
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MILLER V. CITY Of CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 terms of endearment that might be common for a girlfriend or sexual partner, but which
2 were offensive, demeaning, harmful, and inappropriate when made to Plaintiff and
3 when made in or about the workplace, and which were directed specifically at Plaintiff.
4 19. Guillen called himself Plaintiffs "secret admirer," told Plaintiff he "think[s]
5 about her all the time," and pointed out that Plaintiff was letting work "interfere" with
6 Guillen's "friendship" with Plaintiff. He told Plaintiff that he "adored" her. Guillen's
7 comments diminished Plaintiffs professional status, and conveyed Guillen's message
8 that Plaintiffs continued employment was directly tied to her status as an object of
9 physical and social attraction to Guillen, who repeatedly emphasized his status as
10 Plaintiffs direct supervisor at work. Guillen frequently reminded Plaintiff that he was
11 Plaintiffs "boss. Guillen characterized himself to Plaintiff as "a burden you will carry
12 the rest of your life."
13 20. Guillen stated that he was free to comment on Plaintiffs looks, clothing,
14 hair styles, and appearance, all the while coupling his remarks with his reminders that
15 he was Plaintiffs "boss."
16 21. Guillen made many other offensive and inappropriate statements directed
17 at Plaintiff specifically, and made by Guillen despite Plaintiffs protestations. Guillen
18 specifically acknowledged that Plaintiff did not want, solicit, or enjoy such statements
19 about her appearance or his attraction for her, and that she was embarrassed by his
20 unwelcome statements and advances, yet he insisted upon his right to make such
21 comments and references. Guillen asserted a right to tell Plaintiff anything he wanted
22 to say. He made unsolicited and unwelcome comments to Plaintiff that were childish
23 and offensive.
24 22. Guillen's continuing course of conduct toward Plaintiff included making
25 numerous phone calls and other transmissions to Plaintiff to "chit chat" about personal
26 matters or non-urgent matters tangentially related or not related to work, frequently
27 before or after work, including late at night or early in the morning, or even while he was
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MILLERV. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 on the way to work and even while Plaintiff was engaged in other work projects that
2 required her full attention.
3 23. Guillen's continuing course of conduct toward Plaintiff included unwanted
4 touchings by Guillen at work, including Guillen hugging Plaintiff and messing up
5 Plaintiffs hair in a flirting way, among other physical actions. In addition, Guillen came
6 into Plaintiffs office and tried to distract her from her work by trying to put his arm
7 around Plaintiff so she would get off the phone and pay attention to him. Guillen
8 conveyed the message to Plaintiff that he viewed Plaintiff and other female employees
9 as playthings, creating an atmosphere that was demeaning to Plaintiff and to other
10 women who were targeted by Guillen for such attention and to women who Guillen
11 chose not to favor with his attention. Guillen set a tone of harassment and
12 discrimination within the workplace.
13 24. Guillen was careful to avoid being seen by third parties in his activities
14 toward Plaintiff. On at least one occasion, Guillen acknowledged that he should not try
15 to hug Plaintiff in the presence of Plaintiffs female co-workers, so he told her he would
16 give her a "virtual hug."
17 25. Guillen made unwanted and unwelcome comments that Plaintiff
18 reasonably understood in context to be sexual in nature, which included an unwelcome
19 effort by Guillen to get together with Plaintiff. Plaintiff rejected every solicitation by
20 Guillen. Plaintiff did not engage in any inappropriate conduct of any kind with Guillen.
21 26. During this same continuing course of conduct and violations of law,
22 Guillen demonstrated to Plaintiff that Guillen had complete power over Plaintiffs
23 employment and compensation, and that Guillen's power at City Hall was unchecked.
24 27. Guillen frequently commented on Plaintiffs age, saying that she was "that
25 age," that he envisioned himself and Plaintiff retiring at the same time, and that he knew
26 they would be together in some way after retirement Guillen emphasized that he
27 believed that Plaintiff was approaching retirement age, indicating that he controlled how
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MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 long Plaintiff could work for the City and therefore determine her career and how much
2 money she would receive in her retirement.
3 28. Guillen intimidated Plaintiff at work and in his dealings with her, and she
4 reasonably believed that she had no adequate or effective remedy to address Guillen's
5 conduct, statements, and hostile workplace. Plaintiff reasonably believed that if she
6 challenged Guillen for his conduct and statements, her position and professional status
7 would be injured, her career would be jeopardized, and she would lose all or part of her
8 salary and benefits.
9 29. In early 2006, after lengthy private meetings behind closed doors with
10 Female A, Guillen told Plaintiff that he would give a retroactive salary increase to
11 Female A. Plaintiff, the City's Human Resources Manager, analyzed the proposed
12 increase and determined, based upon her review and the City's policies and practices,
13 that the retroactive salary in effect was a bonus, and it was both unusual and
14 unnecessary. Guillen unilaterally decided that he would give a retroactive 10% salary
15 bonus (going back three years) to Female A, which resulted in an unprecedented bonus
16 payment for work already performed by Female A. There was no legitimate
17 governmental reason for the City to pay the bonus. The funds were not budgeted or
18 approved after a public hearing as required by City policy. The bonus was authorized
19 only by Guillen. Plaintiff and other females who did not have relationships such as
20 Female A's relationship with Guillen were not offered such increases of bonuses by
21 Guillen.
22 30. As Human Resources Manager, Plaintiff met in face to face meetings with
23 Guillen and objected to the retroactive bonus payment. On January 7, 2006, Guillen
24 sent Plaintiff an email in which he explained that Plaintiff should not "concern herself
25 with Female A's bonus and compensation. Guillen stated that the payments were
26 being provided by Guillen at this time because Plaintiff allegedly made a "mistake."
27 Guillen stated that he had already told Female A that Plaintiff was responsible and had
28 made the mistake. Guillen told Plaintiff that Female A "understands" that Plaintiff made
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1 the mistake. Guillen falsely blamed Plaintiff and impugned her professionalism.
2 impairing Plaintiffs ability to perform her job with the City.
3 31. There was no "mistake." Guillen was the only person who was allowed to
4 supervise Female A. and Guillen was directly in charge of fixing her salary. Guillen's
5 statement that he blamed Plaintiff was followed immediately by another statement by
6 Guillen in writing that. "You know that I completely adore you and nothing I mean
7 nothing will ever interfere with that." That statement. and Guillen's continuing course of
8 conduct toward Plaintiff with its messages of Guillen's power as the "boss" and his
9 physical attraction toward Plaintiff. continued to be unwelcome to Plaintiff and
10 inappropriate in the workplace. Plaintiff reasonably understood that Guillen's favoritism
11 toward Female A was more important to Guillen than the professional reputation of
12 Plaintiff as the Human Resources Manager or the integrity and transparency of the
13 City's classification and budgeting systems or the City's resources and taxpayer dollars.
14 The message to Plaintiff from Guillen was that Plaintiff was prohibited from questioning
15 Guillen's conduct with Female A.
16 32. Later in 2006, Guillen made the decision, without consulting the Human
17 Resources Manager, that he would reclassify Female A into an even higher-paid
18 Director position. By that point, Guillen had eliminated approximately six Director
19 positions using a pretext of budgetary savings. He was in the process of eliminating
20 another Director position as well, held by a female who had not received favoritism from
21 Guillen, while at the same time increasing pay for Female A.
22 33. Guillen created a new Director position for Female A, with a job
23 description prepared and created by Female A and Guillen in private. The job
24 description proposed by Female A and submitted to Guillen was professionally
25 inadequate and did not meet City job description standards or criteria for a Director
26 position. The description was tailored solely for Female A. and was intended to make
27 her a Director despite her lack of qualifications for the position. Plaintiff objected to the
28 significant deviations from policy and practice and modified the job description. advising
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1 Guillen that Female A should work toward meeting the minimum qualifications if he
2 intended on recommending her for this reclassification. Shortly thereafter, Guillen gave
3 Female A the position. Plaintiff then insisted that under standard City practices, Female
4 A should only be placed at Step 1 of the salary scale because Female A did not meet
5 the minimum qualifications for the job description. The new Director position did not
6 meet City practices for such a position.
7 34. Also in late 2006, Guillen decided to force from employment a female
8 career management employee over the age of 40 who had been employed for many
9 years. The employee was professional and independent of Guillen, had not formed any
10 kind of personal relationship with Guillen, and was aware of Guillen's favoritism toward
11 certain female employee(s). The employee was a talented, capable, competent and
12 well-regarded City employee. Guillen told Plaintiff that Guillen personally did not like
13 this employee, and that Guillen and the Mayor wanted the employee out of City service.
14 35. As with other employees that Guillen wanted to force out, Guillen began a
15 series of actions designed to make the management employee uncomfortable and
16 discredited in order to force her from employment. He then made threats of
17 termination, even though there was no basis for termination, and offered a severance
18 payment ifthe management employee resigned.
19 36. Guillen and the City then were advised in writing by the employee that the
20 employee "has been concerned about equal treatment within the workplace, including
21 equal treatment [for women]" as a result of events at the City, "especially over the past
22 few years." The employee explained that the City's settlement offer was inadequate to
23 compensate for the hardships caused by Guillen's favoritism. Shortly thereafter,
24 Guillen on behalf of the City agreed to increase the severance payment to the
25 employee.
26 37. Guillen withheld the management employee's written comments about his
27 violations of "equal treatment" for female employees from Plaintiff, the Human
28 Resources Manager. and he did not report them or ask that they be investigated.
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1 38. By May 2007, the talk at City Hall increased about Guillen's relationship
2 with Female A and, recently, with another female employee. Female B. The talk was
3 open and widespread and was known to City employees and others, including the
4 Mayor and City Attorney. Guillen at that time knew that the comments were being
5 made about him and Female A and Female B. Guillen knew that the comments were
6 adversely affecting the workplace, particularly in regard to women in the workplace, for
7 whom the relationships with Female A and Female B were perceived as inappropriate.
8 unprofessional and based on favoritism.
9 39. In May 2007, Guillen found a small newspaper article about a male city
10 administrator in Hooksett, New Hampshire, who reportedly was having an affair with a
11 female subordinate. The city administrator in that case summarily fired four female
12 employees who talked about the affair. Attaching the newspaper article, Guillen wrote
13 an email to six City female employees, including Plaintiff, and two male employees,
14 including the police chief, instructing the recipients that there was "reason to be careful
15 what we say in the workplace!" Guillen's email was an acknowledgment by Guillen that
16 he knew that his relationships with certain females were adversely affecting the work
17 environment. The email was reasonably perceived by Plaintiff as a threat to Plaintiff
18 that if she challenged Guillen or commented upon Guillen's relationships with Female A
19 and/or Female B, she would suffer adverse employment actions, including summary
20 termination by Guillen.
21 40. Guillen then followed up with Plaintiff specifically, instructing her to obtain
22 a legal opinion from the City's labor law attorney, Cynthia O'Neill of the Liebert Cassidy
23 law firm. O'Neill was the attorney Plaintiff most often worked with in order to carry out
24 Plaintiffs day to day professional duties with the City. Guillen ordered Plaintiff to have
25 Attorney O'Neill provide "the case law and other opinions on this matter" because "it's
26 time we put a stop to" the "rumors in this City." O'Neill then provided a written legal
27 opinion to the City at City expense, which Plaintiff provided directly to Guillen.
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1 41. Plaintiff and others reasonably considered Guillen's email threat and the
2 follow up with Plaintff and O"Neill to be an effort by Guillen to use City resources, the
3 threats of termination, and the City's outside law firm to silence the workers about
4 Guillen's conduct. Guillen put the City's labor law attorneys in position to enforce
5 Guillen's efforts. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that
6 Attorney O'Neill did not report the incident to the Mayor, City Council, or City Attorney,
7 did not investigate whether the law firm was being used by Guillen to threaten or scare
8 female employees who were concerned about inappropriate activity by Guillen, made
9 no effort in regard to investigating whether Guillen was involved in any inappropriate
10 relationship with any subordinate employee, and did not take steps to evaluate whether
11 the "rumors" that concerned Guillen were true or a matter of concern to the female
12 employees.
13 42. Guillen was involved in an inappropriately close relationship in the
14 workplace with Female B, who had been hired by Guillen in 2005 and who had received
15 a favorable and non-standard pay raise from Guillen within the first six months of her
16 employment. By March 2007, Guillen had "reclassified" Female B's position and
17 provided her with favorable salary, benefits, and working conditions, including
18 responsibility for actions that she had never performed previously and for which she
19 needed training to perform. Female B's work activities involved spending private time
20 with Guillen, going to meetings with Guillen, taking steps to deceive other employees
21 about her activities. and jointly undertaking City tasks with Guillen.
22 43. In or about May 2007, Guillen continued to make inappropriate comments
23 and suggestions to Plaintiff, including comments about whether Plaintiffs husband was
24 in town or away from home. Guillen invited himself over to Plaintiffs house, telling
25 Plaintiff she could watch a sporting event with him and eat dinner together at her house
26 while her husband was gone. Plaintiff rejected the solicitation.
27 44. In May 2007, Guillen created a new job title for Female B. via the draft
28 City budget, giving her power and responsibility not approved by the Human Resources
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1 Manager and not approved at the time by the City Council. Contrary to standard City
2 policy, Guillen and Female 8 did not create a job description and Female B was not
3 given a performance evaluation. Plaintiff, the Human Resources Manager, was
4 excluded from personnel/human resources decisions involving Female 8, because
5 Plaintiff had objected to Guillen's similar favoritism toward Female A. Female B's salary
6 had been increased by about 70% since 2005, far above that for other employees and
7 positions of a similar nature in the City, including Plaintiff's.
8 45. In Spring 2007, Guillen told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was "that age" where she
9 would want to retire. He told Plaintiff that he was going to eliminate her position in the
10 future, and that once he eliminated her position, he would be interested in bringing her
11 back as a consultant to do risk management services for the City on a part-time, hourly
12 basis. Plaintiff was surprised by Guillen's comments about an involuntary "retirement"
13 and about being "that age," and did not support Guillen's plans for Plaintiff to be forced
14 into retirement by Guillen. Plaintiff did not agree with Guillen's comments, or agree to
15 "retire."
16 46. In July 2007, Guillen made sure that Female B was officially reclassified
17 with a 19% raise.
18 47. In October 2007, Female A's husband was working for an employer other
19 than the City. The husband was notified that his position could be eliminated.
20 48. Within days of the notice for Female A's husband, Guillen unilaterally
21 authorized a raise for Female A from Step 1 to Step 5, retroactive to July 1, along with
22 an additional adjustment. Before making the upward and retroactive change, Guillen
23 did not consult with Plaintiff, the Human Resources Manager charged with the
24 responsibility for personnel matters. Guillen made it clear to Plaintiff that his decision
25 was not open for discussion, that Plaintiff had no role in the decision, and that Plaintiff
26 could not challenge it. Guillen had overtly taken over Plaintiff's job responsibilities, and
27 he did so out of favoritism toward Female A.
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1 49. This latest raise boosted Female A's retirement benefits by giving her the
2 increase for the entire 2007-2008 fiscal year, which would serve as the base year for
3 calculating retirement payments. The total raise for Female A since 2003 was
4 approximately 83%, far above that for other female and male employees and positions
5 of a similar nature in the City, including Plaintiffs. The raises, the timing, and the
6 unilateral process used by Guillen were far more favorable to Female A than for other
7 women in the workplace, including Plaintiff, who did not establish similar personal
8 relationships with Guillen.
9 50. In October 2007, Plaintiff asked for routine authorization to use leave time
10 to care for a family member. Guillen said he approved the leave in discussions directly
11 with Plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, Female B challenged Plaintiffs leave, singling out
12 Plaintiff. City staff then contacted Attorney O'Neill in an effort by Female B to challenge
13 Plaintiffs routine entitlement to leave and embarrass or humiliate Plaintiff. In December
14 2007, Female B challenged Plaintiffs right to a small reimbursement under a benefit
15 provision that had been in place for years, again singling out Plaintiff. Plaintiff was
16 advised by the City that Guillen had been the instigator of the challenge, and Plaintiff
17 reasonably understood that Female B was acting with the consent of Guillen in both
18 cases. Plaintiff was being ostracized and isolated by Guillen, while he continued to
19 undercut her role in the office.
20 51. In November 2007, Plaintiff arranged an on-line sexual harassment
21 training program for City supervisors. Of the thirty-six City employees enrolled in the
22 program, only Guillen never completed the program. Guillen never even started it
23 52. In January 2008, Guillen began to take steps to force out another
24 longtime, female employee (over the age of 50) in City Hall. Guillen considered the
25 employee to be too old and not loyal enough to Guillen. This employee had worked for
26 the City for many years, was well regarded by others including members of the public,
27 and was privy to certain aspects of Guillen's conduct and ways of doing business. She
28 earlier had witnessed the Mayor's statement about Guillen's relationship with Female A,
15
MILLERV. CIT'I OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 when the Mayor stated at City Hall that Guillen "should take it out of town." Guillen
2 hired a younger "temporary" worker to take over the duties of this long time, female
3 employee and to effectively isolate her in order to force her from employment.
4 53. After a few weeks of employment for the "temporary worker, Guillen told
5 Plaintiff that he had a secret intent of replacing the long time employee with the
6 "temporary" worker, and that his plan was "not to leave this room." The plan was illegal
7 under governing law and City policies and ordinances. The "temporary" worker,
8 recently laid off from her job working for Female A's husband, was considerably
9 younger than the worker that she was hired to replace. The temporary worker was
10 assigned to provide support for Female Band was the means of forcing the long time
11 employee from her position.
12 54. In or about January 2008, Female A's husband's position was eliminated
13 from another City. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Female A blamed Plaintiff for
14 not preventing that lay-off, because Plaintiff's husband was in a position to oppose the
15 lay-off before it happened.
16 55. In March 2008, Guillen gave Female B another 5% raise. Guillen claimed
17 that Female B should get another raise because she had been successfully performing
18 her management job, which was not a standard City rationale for such raises.
19 56. On April15, 2008, Guillen completed his effort to force out the long time
20 employee who had been effectively replaced by the "temporary worker. Guillen
21 negotiated and approved a financial settlement for the long time employee without first
22 notifying the City Attorney or working with Plaintiff on compliance requirements that
23 normally would have been within Plaintitrs job responsibilities. The settlement was
24 contrary to established City policies and regulations binding on the City.
25 57. On April 16, 2008, Guillen told Plaintiff that he was eliminating Plaintitrs
26 position. Plaintiff objected. At Guillen's direction, Plaintiff was directed to be the person
27 who would prepare a payroll budget that eliminated Plaintiff's own job. Guillen claimed
28 to Plaintiff that her termination was intended so Guillen would pay for new firefighter
16
MILLERV. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 positions for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. After that, Guillen did not work with Plaintiff, did
2 not respond to her communications, and went through other staff in order to
3 communicate with Plaintiff.
4 58. The decision to force Plaintiff out of her employment was part of a course
5 of events of Guillen's continuing violations of the law toward Plaintiff.
6 59. On April 28, 2008, Guillen and Female B met with a new consultant who
7 introduced herself to City staff as the "HR person" for the City, although Plaintiff was still
8 in her position. The new "HR person" appeared to have a pre-existing relationship with
9 Female A, and demonstrated the relationship by hugging Female A in the
10 Administration office of the City, near Guillen's office. There were no City funds
11 budgeted for the new HR person, who began work on a consultant basis at $90 per
12 hour. The new HR person was directed to meet with Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could help
13 her do an HR audit that facilitated Plaintiffs own termination.
14 60. Between April16, 2008 and May 20, 2008, Guillen continued to isolate,
15 embarrass. and stigmatize Plaintiff. Guillen removed Plaintiffs responsibilities, duties,
16 status, and ability to perform her job. He demonstrated to the other workers in the
17 workplace his control and dominion over Plaintiff and over her career in such a way as
18 to force Plaintiff from her position with the City, and he did so on the basis of gender
19 and age discrimination, harassment, and retaliation against Plaintiff, including Plaintiffs
20 resistence to Guillen's favoritism toward Female A and Female B.
21 61. On May 20, 2008 Guillen presented the elimination of Plaintiffs position to
22 the City Council at a public meeting without comment or public discussion, by
23 presenting the draft budget for fiscal year 2008/2009. Within the draft budget, Guillen's
24 introductory remarks included his intent to eliminate Plaintiffs position. Guillen added
25 no firefighter positions to the budget.
26 62. On or about May 20, 2008, Plaintiffs legal counsel wrote to the Mayor and
27 City Council of the City, formally advising them of Guillen's sex-based discrimination
28 and harassment and Guillen's age-based discrimination in forcing Plaintiff from her
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1 position. Plaintiff asked that the City Council take prompt and effective action to reduce
2 the injury to Plaintiff, to prevent Guillen from taking action in regard to her Complaint,
3 and to preserve documentary evidence, including Guillen's emails and phone records,
4 some of which Guillen kept at his home even though they were official City records.
5 63. On May 21, 2008, Plaintiff was placed on sick leave after she was
6 evaluated and treated for symptoms caused by the illegal actions of the City.
7 64. Plaintiffs May 20, 2008 letter also was sent to the City Attorney. On May
8 22, 2009, the City Attorney's Office promised to prepare "a response" to the May 20
9 letter of Plaintiffs counsel.
10 65. The Mayor, City Council, and City Attorney did not respond further, and
11 took no prompt or effective action in reaction to Plaintiffs May 20, 2008 letter. Instead,
12 they referred Plaintiffs letter to Guillen for him to handle, without any investigation or
13 evaluation of the conduct of Guillen or the assertions of Plaintiff, all in violation of state
14 law and other policies and procedures designed to prevent retaliation and injury to
15 workers who complain of inappropriate sex and age-based violations.
16 66. On May 23, 2008, Guillen wrote directly to Plaintiff at her home. Guillen
17 knew that Plaintiff was away from work for medical reasons, that Plaintiff was claiming
18 harassment and discrimination carried out by Guillen on behalf of the City, that Plaintiff
19 had retained counsel, and that Plaintiff had requested that Guillen not contact her.
20 Guillen declared that Plaintiff was required to report for work. It was clear from the face
21 of the May 23 letter that Guillen was authorized by the Mayor, City Council and City
22 Attorney to continue to directly supervise Plaintiff in her employment, despite the
23 serious nature of Plaintiffs complaint. The Guillen letter of May 23 showed that Guillen
24 was actively and directly discriminating, harassing, and retaliating against Plaintiff.
25 67. On or about May 29, 2008, Plaintiff objected in writing to Guillen's
26 direction that she return to work under his supervision. She advised the Mayor. City
27 Council, and City Attorney that their actions in authorizing Guillen's actions were
28 contrary to law and showed that the City stood behind Guillen's "behavior and tactics."
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1 The City never responded to Plaintiffs May 29, 2008 letter, and took no prompt or
2 effective action in response to the letter.
3 68. In June 2008, Female A announced her pending retirement from the City.
4 Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that Guillen allowed
5 Female A to stay on the payroll and to receive additional salary and benefits in another
6 act of favoritism by Guillen, although the amounts were not budgeted by the City
7 Council and the financial arrangement was not consistent with standard City practice.
8 69. On or about July 28, 2008, Plaintiff made a formal complaint with the
9 California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) in regard to the City
10 and Guillen. Plaintiff alleged sex discrimination and harassment, preferential treatment,
11 inappropriate language and touching, hostile work environment, retaliation, and sex-
12 based and age-based discrimination.
13 70. DFEH issued a right to sue letter on or about July 28, 2008, advising
14 Plaintiff of her right to sue by filing a Complaint in Superior Court no later than July 28,
15 2009.
16 71. On or about July 30, 2008, Plaintiff served the DFEH complaint and
17 related documents on the City and City Attorney. The City did not respond for several
18 weeks, and the City took no prompt or effective action, or provided any remedy to
19 Plaintiff. The City Attorney's long-promised "response" to Plaintiffs May 20, 20081etter
20 was never provided ..
21 72. In or about October 2008, the City advertised for applicants for a position
22 which would essentially replace Employee A's position, at a part time salary which was
23 about one-third the hourly rate of Employee A, and without benefits.
24 73. On October 17, 2008, Plaintiffs counsel wrote to the Mayor and City
25 Council, summarizing Plaintiffs complaint and the City's failure to provide a prompt and
26 effective remedy. The Mayor and City Council did not respond.
27 74. On October 23, 2008, Plaintiff sent a 13-page letter to the City and City
28 Attorney in regard to the conduct of Guillen, providing additional specific information to
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1 the City, quoting inappropriate emails from Guillen, recommending that the City
2 interview eight identified persons, and referencing other persons with direct knowledge
3 of Guillen's actions. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the City did not interview all
4 of those persons or analyze the documentary evidence in the City's actual or
5 constructive possession, and did not take reasonable steps to acquire material
6 information. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on that basis alleges that Guillen put
7 Female B in charge of the City's actions as to Plaintiffs claims, including the alleged
8 retention of documents and communicating with City employees about the matter,
9 effectively allowing Guillen to control and monitor the City's actions in regard to claims
1 0 about Guillen's conduct, and providing notice to the employees that Female B was
11 authorized by the City and Guillen to monitor the City's actions.
12 75. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the City, Plaintiff remains
13 away from work and is unable to pursue her career with the City as a Human
14 Resources professionaL She has exhausted her leave, been denied wages and
15 benefits, continues to lose wages and benefits, and has and continues to incur other
16 losses directly and proximately caused by Plaintiff, including but not limited to back pay,
17 front pay, job opportunities, medical costs, benefits, lost interest, loss of retirement
18 opportunities and amounts, and emotional distress. Plaintiff has been constructively
19 discharged by the City from her employment with the City.
20 76. The City's acts and omissions created an intimidating, oppressive, hostile.
21 and offensive working environment that interfered with Plaintiffs emotional well-being
22 and adversely affected the terms and conditions of employment
23 77. The acts and omissions of Guillen and the City constitute a continuing
24 violation of the law against Plaintiff, as part of the discrimination, harassment, and
25 efforts by Guillen ultimately to force Plaintiff from her employment and career. The City
26 engaged in successive acts of harassment over the course of years of Plaintiffs
27 employment that constituted an actionable continuing violation and course of conduct
28 under the law.
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MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 78. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the City, Plaintiff has
2 suffered other consequential losses and damages in the nature and amount to be
3 proved at trial.
4 79. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the City her attorney fees and litigation
5 expenses.
6 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seeks relief as described below.
,
7 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
8 (Sex-Based Discrimination in Employment)
9 80. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations
10 as iffully set forth herein.
11 81. The City had a duty not to discriminate against Plaintiff in the terms and
12 conditions of her employment on the basis of her gender and had a duty to prevent
13 such discrimination from occurring.
14 82. The City subjected Plaintiff to discrimination based on Plaintiffs gender.
15 Plaintiff suffered adverse employment actions including but not limited to a hostile work
16 environment created by discrimination based on gender and the loss of Plaintiffs
17 employment and career.
18 83. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and
19 omissions, Plaintiff has suffered substantial emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
20 mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses of the nature
21 and type commensurate with the City's acts and omissions.
22 84. Plaintiff has suffered and continued to suffer lost earnings and other
23 employment benefits, future lost earnings, lost interest, medical expenses, mental
24 distress and mental suffering, and other general and special damages, all to Plaintiffs
25 damage in an amount to be proven at trial.
26 85. Plaintiff has been required to retain legal counsel to vindicate her statutory
27 rights and is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses.
28 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as described below.
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1 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
2 (Age-Based Discrimination in Employment)
3 86. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations
4 as if fully set forth herein.
5 87. The City had a duty not to discriminate against Plaintiff in the terms and
6 conditions of her employment on the basis of her age and to prevent discrimination and
7 harassment from occurring.
8 88. Plaintiff was subjected to a continuing discrimination by the City based on
9 her age that is in violation of the law.
10 89. Plaintiff was discriminated against with respect to her compensation,
11 terms. conditions, or privileges of employment.
12 90. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and
13 omissions. Plaintiff has suffered substantial emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
14 mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses of the nature
15 and type of commensurate with the City's acts and omissions.
16 91. Plaintiff has suffered and continued to suffer lost earnings and other
17 employment benefits, future lost earnings, lost interest, medical expenses. mental
18 distress and mental suffering, and other general and special damages, all to Plaintiffs
19 damage in an amount to be proven at triaL
20 92. Plaintiff has been required to retain legal counsel to vindicate her statutory
21 rights and is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses.
22 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as described below.
23 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
24 (Sexual Harassment in Employment)
25 93. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations
26 as if fully set forth herein.
27
28
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MILLERV. CiTY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 94. The City had a duty to not harass Plaintiff in the terms and conditions of
2 her employment on the basis of her gender. The City had a duty to take all reasonable
3 steps to prevent sexual harassment from occurring.
4 95. The City subjected Plaintiff to unwelcome, degrading and harassing
5 comments, as described above, based on Plaintiffs gender.
6 96. The City's harassing comments were so severe and pervasive that they
7 created a hostile work environment and adversely affected the terms and conditions of
8 Plaintiffs employment.
9 97. The City's harassment of Plaintiff based on her gender, and failure to
10 prevent the harassment are in violation of the law.
11 98. The City's comments and acts of harassment were willful and intentional
12 with disregard for the rights and reasonable sensibilities of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was
13 subjected to unwelcome sexual pressure and verbal conduct of a sex-based nature.
14 Guillen's behavior with favored female employees conveyed a demeaning message to
15 Plaintiff and other female employees that personal favors would be rewarded with
16 higher pay, bonuses and other job benefits. Plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome
17 sexual advances by Guillen, whose conduct towards Plaintiff and other females was
18 sufficiently pervasive and offensive so as to also alter the conditions of employment and
19 create an abusive, intimidating and hostile work environment.
20 99. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and
21 omissions, Plaintiff has suffered substantial emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
22 mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses of the nature
23 and type commensurate with the City's acts and omissions.
24 100. Plaintiff has suffered and continued to suffer lost earnings and other
25 employment benefits, future lost earnings, lost interest, medical expenses, mental
26 distress and mental suffering, and other general and special damages, all to Plaintiffs
27 damage in an amount to be proven at trial.
28
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MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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1 101. Plaintiff has been required to retain legal counsel to vindicate her statutory
2 rights and is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as described below.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Failure to Take All Reasonable Steps to
Prevent Sexual Harassment from Occurring)
102. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations
as if fully set forth herein.
103. The City had a duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent sexual
harassment from occurring.
104. The City and its agents, officers, officials and/or employees, failed to take
all reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment in employment from
12
13
14
occurring, and to act promptly and effectively to prevent and remedy the harassment.
105. The City had a duty to provide City employees with a confidential, secure
and effective way to voice and resolve their complaints. The City provided no such
15
16
17
18
system.
106. The City delegated its personnel decisions to Guillen and unreasonably
allowed him to engage in inappropriate and unethical employment-related actions that
allowed for favoritism, created a hostile work environment and put Guillen outside the
19
20
21
22
law. The Mayor and other top City officials set a tone that allowed, permitted, and
effectively encouraged Guillen's actions.
107. The City failed to reasonably prevent Guillen's abuse of his power, failed
to investigate and prevent Guillen's continuing violation of Plaintiff and other employees'
23
rights by forcing employees from City employment on the basis of sex and gender,
24
failed to remedy the complaints or timely and adequately investigate complaints, failed
25
to take appropriate action or oversight in regard to Guillen's actions, and endorsed,
26
27
28
ratified, and sanctioned Guillen's actions.
MILLERV. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
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COMPLAINT
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1 108. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and
2 omissions, Plaintiff has suffered substantial emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
3 mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses of the nature
4 and type commensurate with the City's acts and omissions.
5 109. Plaintiff has suffered and continued to suffer lost earnings and other
6 employment benefits, future lost earnings, lost interest, medical expenses, mental
7 distress and mental suffering, and other general and special damages, all to Plaintiff's
8 damage in an amount to be proven at trial.
9 110. Plaintiff has been required to retain legal counsel to vindicate her statutory
10 rights and is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses.
11 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as described below.
12 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
13 (Failure to Take All Reasonable Steps to Prevent
Discrimination and Harassment Based on Age from Occurring)
14
15
111. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations
as if fully set forth herein.
16
17
112. The City had a duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination
and harassment based on age from occurring.
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19
20
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113. The City and its agents, officers, officials and/or employees, failed to take
all reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment in employment based on age
from occurring, and to act promptly and effectively to prevent and remedy harassment.
114. The City failed to reasonably prevent Guillen's abuse of his power, failed
to investigate and prevent Guillen's continuing violation of Plaintiff and other employees'
rights by forcing employees from City employment on the basis of age, failed to remedy
the complaints or timely and adequately investigate complaints, failed to take
25
appropriate action or oversight in regard to Guillen's actions, and endorsed, ratified, and
26
27
28
sanctioned Guillen's actions.
MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY THE-SEA
25
CoMPLAINT
0027
0 0
1 115. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and
2 omissions, Plaintiff has suffered substantial emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
3 mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses of the nature
4 and type of commensurate with the City's acts and omissions.
5 116. Plaintiff has suffered and continued to suffer lost earnings and other
6 employment benefits, future lost earnings, lost interest, medical expenses, mental
7 distress and mental suffering, and other general and special damages, all to Plaintiff's
8 damage in an amount which will be proven at triaL
9 117. Plaintiff has been required to retain legal counsel to vindicate her statutory
1 0 rights and is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses.
11 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as described below.
12 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
13 (Retaliation in Violation of Law)
14 118. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as if
15 fully set forth herein.
16 119. Plaintiff's expression and activities in questioning Guillen and opposing
17 the unwarranted and extraordinary pay. working conditions, and benefits for Female A
18 and Female B, in rejecting Guillen's inappropriate advances, in refusing to engage in
19 inappropriate conduct with Guillen, in complaining to the City about Guillen, and in other
20 respects relating to Plaintiff's performance of her duties were expression and activities
21 protected by law.
22 120. The Ctty retaliated against Plaintiff for her protected expression and
23 activities. The retaliation included falsely blaming Plaintiff for Guillen's actions in regard
24 to the pay and benefits of Female A and Female B; stigmatizing and isolating Plaintiff in
25 her professional duties and responsibilities; advising Plaintiff and others that her job
26 had been terminated; proposing and approving the elimination of Plaintiff's position;
27 allowing and permitting Guillen to punish and threaten Plaintiff for reporting her claims
28 and for speaking out; taking the actions described above in forcing Plaintiff from her job
26
MILLERV. CITY OF CARMEL-BY THE-SEA COMPLAINT
0028
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1 and her profession; and denying Plaintiff any prompt or effective remedy after Plaintiff
2 communicated her complaints to the City. Other employees, including Female A and
3 Female B, who did not engage in the expression and activities of Plaintiff, did not suffer
4 the same or similar retaliatory acts.
5 121. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and
6 omissions, Plaintiff has suffered substantial emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
7 mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses of the nature
8 and type commensurate with the City's acts and omissions.
9 122. Plaintiff has suffered and continued to suffer lost earnings and other
10 employment benefits, future lost earnings, lost interest, medical expenses, mental
11 distress and mental suffering, and other general and special damages, all to Plaintiff's
12 damage in an amount to be proven at trial.
13 123. Plaintiff has been required to retain legal counsel to vindicate her statutory
14 rights and is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses.
15 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as described below.
16 PRAYER FOR DAMAGES
17 Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
18 1. For damages for loss of wages, benefits, and other compensation or
19 compensatory damages, interest on lost wages, benefits and
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2.
3.
4.
compensation, and back pay and front pay relating to Plaintiff's
employment, along with all amounts necessary to make Plaintiff whole;
For damages for emotional and physical injuries proximately caused by
Defendant's conduct, acts and omissions, including medical expenses
and other special damages;
For attorney fees and litigation expenses, as permitted by law; and
For prejudgment interest and other interest as provided by law;
27
MILLERV CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA COMPLAINT
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Q
5. For such other relief as is necessary and just, and as the Court may
direct.
Dated: June 17 2009
MILLER V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL W. STAMP
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Jane Kingsley Miller
28
COMPLAINT