1 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Eusebio v. Eusebio, et. al

Concepcion, J. Quickie: Eugenio filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for appointment as administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Andres. Illegitimate siblings of Eugenio, Amanda et al, opposed the petition contending that venue was improperly laid. CFI Pampanga, according to oppositors, is the correct venue since San Fernando was the true domicile of the deceased whose estate is being settled. CFI Rizal overruled the opposition and granted Eugenios petition. On appeal, the SC reversed CFI Rizal venue, indeed, has been improperly laid! Following Rule 75, Sec. 1 (now Rule 73, Sec.1), If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death xxx. Although it is true that shortly before his death Andres bought a house in QC and began moving his belongings from San Fernando thereto, the SC found that there was no clear showing of Andress intention to change domicile. The evidence weighed by the CFI Rizal actually proved that Andres still considers San Fernando as his true domicile and that he was moving to QC only for medical purposes without definite intention (animus) to change the same. Moreover, there is a presumption in law against changes of domicile. In other words, there is a presumption in favor of the continuance of an existing domicile. Therefore, the burden of proving a change of domicile lies on those who alleged that a change has occurred. Failing this, and absent any evidence of intention/animus, it is to be presumed that the party has retained the last domicile known to have been possessed by him. This follows from the principle that a domicile acquired is retained until another is gained. Nature: Appeal from an order of CFI Rizal (Quezon City) granting Eugenios petition for appointment as administrator of the estate of his deceased father Andres over the objection of his illegitimate siblings, Amanda et al. Facts: It is not disputed that up to Oct 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him resided at Quezon City, Andres bought a house and lot at latter City, located along Espaa Extension. While transferring his belongings to his new house, Andres suffered a stroke for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) residence, where Andres remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital sometime before Nov. 26, 1952 On the day of Nov. 26, Andres contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in UST hospital. Two days later, Nov. 28, he died of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of 74 years. Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in the house he just bought at QC. The domicile of origin of Andres was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years

100 Phil 593 (1956)

Almost a year later, on Nov 16, 1953, Eugenio, legitimate son of Andres, filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres. According to Eugenios petition, Andres was residing in the City of Quezon at the time of his demise Amanda, et al, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed By an order, CFI Rizal overruled this objection and granted Eugenio s petition~ Hence, this appeal taken by Amanda et al. The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence (domicile) of Andres at the time of his death on Nov 28, 1952

Issue/s and Held: WON venue was improperly laid with CFI Rizal - YES! Ratio: Rule 75 (now Rule 73), section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides: Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. It is clear from the above Rule that the CFI having jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of a deceased RESIDENT of the Philippines (citizen or alien) is the one in the province in which the decedent resides AT THE TIME OF DEATH From the facts, although Andres bought a house in QC and started moving his belongings thereto, the presumption is that he retained his original domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary. It is wellsettled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" Under the circumstances of the case at bar, if Andres established another domicile, it must have been one of choice. The following are the conditions essential in determining change of domicile: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently Admittedly, Andres was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently the answer to this last question is NO. There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does Andres appear to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in QC. Eugenio, who took the witness stand,

2 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 did not testify thereon, despite his allegation in his answer that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City" Eugenio also did not introduce the testimony of his brother Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot in QC was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on Andres's purpose/intention in buying the property The CFIs position that Andress acquisition of the QC property is proof enough of his intention to change domicile is UNTENBALE. Evidence shows that the QC house and lot were bought because Andres had been adviced to do so "due to his illness". Said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." Also militating against the claim of change of domicile is that fact that Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Additionally, in the deed of sale of the QC house and lot, Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, residence certificates used by Andres in acknowledging the deed of sale before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis at the UST Hospital two (2) days prior to his demise stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga Alfonso, one of the legitimate full brothers of Eugenio, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first marriage, including Eugenio, were represented on that occasion and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from Eugenio's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin has not been offset by the evidence of record AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court Appellants/oppositors were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to Eugenio's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Clearly, the lower court should have admitted their evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.

Side Issue 1: The CFI rejected the oppositors evidence and refused to entertain the same on the ground that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants/oppositors had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. But when appellants/oppositors sought during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge refused to hear the appellants/oppositors unless they agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the CFI the procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case is REPREHENSIBLE! To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-

Side Issue 2: It appears that CFI Pampanga received a petition of appellants/oppositors herein for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio" docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957 The children of Andres by first marriage moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case before the CFI Rizal. This motion was granted, relying upon Rule 75, section 1, to wit: "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Although said CFI Pampanga dismissal order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent Moreover, the quoted provision of the Rules of Court (Rule 75, Sec.1) refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties. In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that: The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue (Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan) Hence, should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court

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Fule v. CA
Martin, J. Quickie: Fule, as creditor of the estate of Amado, filed a petition for letters of administration in the CFI Calamba, Laguna and was appointed as special adminstratrix. Preciosa, the surviving spouse, opposed this petition. During the pendency of the Fules appeal before the SC, Preciosa filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Rizal, QC Branch over the same intestate estate of Amado. HELD: The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration merely constitute venue. Since the last place of residence of Amado was at Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna, the venue for Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the CFI of Calamba. Facts: 1st Petition Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI Laguna (Judge Malvar), a petition for letters of administration alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." She moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion. MR was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia contending that the order appointing Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado. She prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing. While the MR was pending resolution, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Fule as special administratrix alleging Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court. Fule filed a Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator. This modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of Amado, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Fule; and (4) that Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix.

74 SCRA 189 (1976)

The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa for the reason that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the CFI of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient. An omnibus motion was filed by Fule praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased." Judge Malvar issued an order denying the MR of Preciosa and admitting the supplementation petition. Preciosa moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado. Preciosa filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom Amado has no relation. 3 motions were filed by Preciosa: (1) to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado (2) to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and (3) filed in behalf of the minor Agustina, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue. Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa. o the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80, subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter o the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. o Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. o The issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order denying Preciosa's motion to reconsider the appointment of Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original

4 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. o Preciosa had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate. An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa (1) to clarify or reconsider the order in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory; (2)resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina; and (3) resolution her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix. Judge Malvar issued 2 separate orders: (1) denying Preciosa's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and (2) holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate. MR was filed by Preciosa of the orders insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing of Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Judge Malvar issued the 4 questioned orders (1) denying Preciosas MR; (2) directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; (3) directing Preciosa to deliver to Fule 2 motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and (4) directing Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado." During the hearing of this case, Fule presented the death certificate of Amado showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. Preciosa presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that 3 months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Fule also testified that Amado was residing in Calamba at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. Preciosa and Agustina commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CA primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned 4 orders of that court. CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Malvar for lack of jurisdiction. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Preciosa informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of the special proceeding before Judge Malvar and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the CA. She manifested her willingness to withdraw the present proceedings should the decision of the CA annulling the proceedings before the CFI of Laguna have not yet become final, it being the subject of a MR. Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings until Preciosa inform the court of the final outcome of the case. This notwithstanding, Preciosa an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations." Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance and calling attention that the decision of the CA and its resolution denying the MR had been appealed to SC Judge Pano (succeeded Judge Ericta) issued an order granting Preciosa "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in the CFI of Laguna. Fule instituted a petition for certiorari with TRO to annul the proceedings in CFI Rizal and to restrain Judge Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued.

Issues/Held: (1) WON the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. YES (2) WON the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means actual residence or legal residence. ACTUAL RESIDENCE (3) Who should be the special admistratix? PRECIOSA Ratio: (1) The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration refers to the venue. Section 1, Rule 73: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the

2nd Petition However, even before Fule could receive the decision of the CA, Preciosa had already filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch over the same intestate estate of Amado. Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa upon a bond of P30k. Preciosa qualified and assumed the office.

5 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. Section 1, Rule 73, specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. It means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The Judiciary Act of 1948 confers upon CFI jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous CFI, the Rules of Court purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado's last place of residence was at Quezon City. The venue for Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4: When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived. CA had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Fule as special administratrix, Presocia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the CFI of Calamba but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent. This Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to QC and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the CFI of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

(2) The word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means actual residence The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. The last place of residence of the deceased Amado was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado, which was presented in evidence by ule herself and also by Preciosa, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained 3 months before his death;

(3) Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. Preciosa claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse and maintains that Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. Fule disputes the status of Preciosa as the widow of the late Amado. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or

6 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. Fule disputes the status of Preciosa as the widow of the late Amado. Preciosa maintains that Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. The preference of Preciosa is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by Amado in favor of Agustina, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa. In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa as his spouse. Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

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Malig v. Bush
Makalintal, J. Quickie: Malig et al were saying that they were acknowledged natural children of decedent John Bush, and that defendant falsely alleged that she was the legal wife of John. Because of such false allegations, Bush was appointed administratrix of deceaseds estate, whereby she presented a will purportedly made by John which bequeathed his properties only to Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger. Malig et. al. now wants to recover their alleged inheritance. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. She says that probate court and not trial court has jurisdiction over the case. However, the trial court dismissed on the ground of prescription, even though such ground was not raised by defendant. SC said TC was wrong in dismissing on prescription. On jurisdiction issue, court said that Rule 75 Sec. 1 (now R73S1) really concerns venue, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived. Nature: This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 51639, the first dismissing the complaint and the second denying the motion to reconsider the order of dismissal. Facts: September 19, 1962 Malig, et. al. filed the complaint, alleging that: o they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born of the common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941; o said John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of the plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to marry each other; o They lived with their alleged father during his lifetime and were considered and treated by. him as his acknowledge natural children; o said John T. Bush, at the time of his death, left several real and personal properties; o the defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; she submitted to the court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will whereby he bequeathed his estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger;

28 SCRA 449 (1969)

that the defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the deceased; o they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962. They prayed that the project of partition be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting of all the properties left by the deceased and another project of partition adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of all or part of the estate, that she be ordered to pay them the market value thereof; and that the defendant be ordered to pay for the value of the fruits received, damages and attorney's fees. The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations. The plaintiffs opposed and the defendant filed a reply to the opposition. January 10, 1963 the lower court denied the motion, "it appearing that the grounds upon which said motion is based are not indubitable." In time, the defendant filed her answer specifically denying all the material averments of the complaint and invoking laches, res judicata and statute of limitations as affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereof the hearing was postponed upon the defendant's manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss. The motion, when filed, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the action was one to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.

Issues/Held: 1) Procedural: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss? No. 2) Whether or not the case must be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. No. Ratio: 1) It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations, was denied because those grounds did not appear to the court to be indubitable. The second motion reiterated none of those grounds and raised only the question of jurisdiction. In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court in effect did so motu proprio, without offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point.

8 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 In fact the court did not even state in its order why in its opinion the action had prescribed, and why in effect, without any evidence or new arguments on the question, it reversed its previous ruling that the ground of prescription was not indubitable. In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al, it was held: Section 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion to this end be filed. In the light of this express requirement we do not believe that the court had power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly presented. The fact that the parties filed memoranda upon the court's indication or order in which they discussed the proposition that the action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and independently of the case for libel did not supply the deficiency. Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed, and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the familiar maxims, inclusio unius est exclusivo ulterius. The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when the 'plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The foregoing ruling is applicable in this case, because although a motion to dismiss had been presented defendant the resolution of the court granting the same was based upon a ground not alleged in said motion. But assuming that the lower court could properly consider the question of prescription anew, the same still did not appear to be indubitable on the face of the allegations in the complaint. The defendant cites Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides that an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, except in two instances not obtaining in this case, and that the present action was commenced after the death of the putative father of the plaintiffs. The said provision is not of indubitable application, since the plaintiffs do not seek acknowledgment but allege as a matter of fact that they "are the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the late John T. Bush." Whether or not this allegation is true will, of course, depend upon the evidence to be presented at the trial. The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground posed in her motion to dismiss, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court formerly in force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which says: SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate." o The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived. Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, this Court believes that the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.

2)

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Rodriguez et. al. v. Borja et. al.

Reyes, JBL, J. Quickie: On March 4, 1963 ,Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. On M a r c h 1 2 , 1 9 6 3 petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On the same day, Apolonia Pangilinan and AdelaidaJacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. The Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question and the intestate proceedings in the Rizal Court should be discontinued. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later. Facts: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; Petition was withdrawn; on March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things: o that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, o and died without leaving a will and o praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. Argument of movants: since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. Argument of petitioners: the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

17 SCRA 418 (1966)

Held: The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later. Ratio: Because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules): Argument of petitioners: section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. Held: The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court o We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan

o o

Minor issues: o their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Issue: Which court has jurisdiction?

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Cuenco v. CA
Teehankee, J. Quickie: Surviving Spouse v Children of first marriage. Child filed in Cebu petition for Letters of Administration saying dad died intestate. Spouse filed in QC for probate of will and her being executrix of the will, saying dad died testate. Cebu Court said it did not want to decide on the case until after QC court made a decision. QC Court admitted probate. CA issued writ of prohibition against QC Court. CA was wrong. The court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals Facts: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu. On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. 1st order: On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu. 2nd order: The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court.

53 SCRA 360 (1973)

3rd order: On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following: o It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration. 2 Week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator. Cebu Court: issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts. Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. Quezon City Court :denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. 1st and 2nd MR denied Hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at halfhour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence. Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds: o That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;

11 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 o That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit; o That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last Quezon City court: admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898. CA: decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner MR denied; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition. URIARTE V CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL- upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The exception in part of the section, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

Issue/Held: WON the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order YES Ratio: The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. (SY OA V CO HO) It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent

12 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja v Tan (used by CA) ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province." This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court. It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate. For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction. Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.

Barredo, concurring: I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the laying of the venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the Court of First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches, for which reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the present petition.

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De Borja v. Tan
Montemayor, J. Quickie: (This might be a wrong case since it doesnt discuss venue at all. But the citation provided checks out. So here it goes anyway) Petition for probate of a will of his deceased wife was filed with the CFI by Francisco de Borja. Will was probated and Francisco was appointed executor/administrator. War broke out. Thereafter, Francisco qualified as administrator. But he was weak and going blind. Thus, by petition, a coadministrator was appointed (Crisanto, another heir). Subsequently, Judge Tan ordered the inclusion of Jose de Borja as another co-administrator. Francisco and Crisanto resisted said appointment but Judge Tan did not budge. They filed record of appeal but Judge Tan also denied the same, hence this petition for mandamus. The SC ruled that the appointment of Jose as co-administrator is appealable contrary to Judge Tans position. The co-administrator performs the tasks of a regular/general administrator and not those by a special administrator, whose appointment being provisional is not appealable. Nature: Petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge Bienvenido A. Tan to approve and admit the record on appeal filed before him and to give due course to the appeal Facts: On Oct 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated and named Francisco as executor thereof One of the heirs, who is now one of the respondents herein, Jose de Borja, appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. But later he moved for dismissal of the appeal, and this was granted. All the records of the case were destroyed or lost during the last Pacific war but were on Jan 1946, reconstituted. On March 1946 Francisco qualified as executor and administrator Due to the physical inability of Francisco to fully administer the estate, he being quite weak and unable to see, on August 1951, on petition of Matilde, one of the heirs, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-administrator On April 1952, the trial court yet again, but this time without petition of or notice to anyone, appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator, after holding in abeyance consideration of Francisco's amended account dated March 25, 1952 Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose de Borja but respondent Judge Tan indirectly denied the motion for reconsideration. Acting upon an alleged ex-parte petition of the heirs Jose, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, Judge Tan also revoked the appointment of Crisanto as coadministrator and directed administrator Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account filed by Francisco

97 Phil 872 (1955)

From the aforesaid orders, Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appeal. Later they filed the corresponding record on appeal. Respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was not appealable~ Hence, this petition

Issue/s and Held: WON mandamus should be granted YES! Ratio: An order appointing a REGULAR/GENERAL administrator is appealable. On the other hand, according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a SPECIAL administrator is not appealable Judge Tan contends that a co-administrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake those of a special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal UNTENABLE The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81, section 1, a special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of the estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed Further, under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration Taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one only due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole administrator there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular or general administrator. In view of the foregoing, the appointment of a co-administrator is appealable. The petition for mandamus is granted and respondent Judge is hereby directed to approve the record on appeal and to give due course to the appeal

14 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Macias v. Uy Kim et. al.

Makasiar, J: Quickie: The settlement of the estate of Rosina is before Branch 8 of the CFI Manila and the presiding judge authorized and ordered the sale of properties of the estate. Macias filed a complaint before branch 10 of the CFI Manila for annulment of the sale and prayed for issuance of title claiming to be the beneficiary of the estate of Rosina. HELD: Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, delegate or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties Nature: petition for review by certiorari Facts: Manuel Macias he filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale, reivindicacion and damages against against Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong and Reliable Realty Corporation assigned to Branch 10 of the Manila CFI(Judge Moya) alleging that: (1) he is a beneficiary of the estate of Julian Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings No. 57405 before Branch 6 of the Manila CFI and also a beneficiary of the estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch 8 of the Manila CFI. The court in the first proceeding appointed Ricardo Vito Cruz as as ancillary administrator which he appealed to the SC. (2) he has been named as special administrator of the estate of Rosina but presiding judge dismissed said proceedings, which he also appealed to the SC. (3) to protect his interest as such beneficiary in the estates of Rosina and Julian, he caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on TCTs all issued in the name of Rosina covering five adjacent lots in Tondo, Manila; (4) in an order, Judge Barcelona presiding in Special Proceedings No. 63866, authorized Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator of Rosina's estate, upon the latter's motion, to sell the real properties of the estate for the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes, realty taxes of the estate and expenses of administration; (5) Vito Cruz negotiated for the sale of the aforesaid lots with the Reliable Realty Corporation, which was willing to buy the properties for P400k provided the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles covering said lots is cancelled (6) Judge Barcelona ordered the cancellation of the said notice of lis pendens. (7) Vito Cruz executed a deed of sale over the aforesaid properties in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation, organized by Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nicasio Co, Nemesio Co, and Manuel Sosantong, and Judge Barcelona issued an order approving the said deed of sale.

45 SCRA 251 (1972)

(8) that the aforesaid orders were issued without due notice to petitioner and without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge in Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the reason that he had been divested of jurisdiction of said proceedings by reason of his appeal (9) prays for judgment (a) declaring the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots as null and void, (b) directing the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of Reliable Realty Corporation, (c) declaring that the aforesaid five lots as his distributive share in the estate of Rosina as well as directing the register of deeds of Manila to issue in his name new transfer certificates of title, and (d) sentencing respondents jointly and severally to pay him actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees plus legal interests. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Macias' complaint in on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the suit; that the complaint states no cause of action; that there is another action of the same nature pending in court; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to prosecute the present suit; and alleging specifically that: (1) Branch 10 of the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case since the subject matter involved properly belongs exclusively to and is within the competence of Branch 8 and Branch 4 before which courts Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405 are pending and Macias's alleged claim of beneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina depends on a recognition thereof by the probate court. (2) that upon the face of the complaint, the same does not contain a cause of action; because Branch 10, which is coordinate with Branch 8, has no authority to annul the questioned orders issued by Branch 8, aside from the fact that he appealed to the SC from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch 8 dismissing Special Proceedings No. 67302 which was then pending before Branch 4 and subsequently transferred to Branch 8, from the order denying Macias' claim of beneficiary interest in Rosina's estate and appointing Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator of the estate of Rosina in the same Special Proceedings as well as from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch IV also denying Macias' petition for relief from the order approving the partial distribution of the estate of Julian and denying his motion for the removal of Vito Cruz as administrator and appointment of Macias in his place. (3) Macias is not a real party in interest; because he is not the beneficiary, nor legatee nor creditor, much less an heir, of Rosina. He bases his alleged interest in the estate of Julian who died intestate solely on the latter's memorandum to his sister Rosina wherein he hoped that his sister Rosina will, after his estate is settled, give at her convenience to Macias the sum of P500; to Faustino A. Reis and Severino Baron the amount of P10k each; and to Dominador M. Milan and Vicente D. Recto P1k each. The said memorandum is not a will. Unfortunately, Rosina died without being able to comply with the memorandum of her brother Julian. Since Macias has not been declared an heir or legatee of Julian nor of Rosina, he has no legal standing to file the present action. The aforesaid motion

15 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 to dismiss was followed by supplement alleging that since the buyer, the Reliable Corporation, has a distinct personality from those of its incorporators, there is no cause of action against Uy Kim, Nemesis Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong, its incorporators. Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion for intervention reiterating the ground of the motion to dismiss advanced by the other respondents and emphasizing that this petition for relief from judgment seeks the nullified classification by the Presiding Judge of Branch X of the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866 dated April 15 and April 24, 1969, as admmitted by petitioner's motion in praying that this Case No. 76412 should not be assigned to Branch IV or Branch VIII as his petition seeks to nullify the orders of Presiding Judge Manuel Barcelona of Branch VIII in said Special Proceedings No. 63866 (Annex "B", pp. 96-97, rec.). Judge Moya sustained the motion to dismiss and forthwith dismissed the complaint but denied the prayer of the motion to dismiss for cancellation of the notice of adverse claim, which Macias caused to be annotated on the titles issued in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation, from which order Macias interposed his appeal, and accordingly filed this petition for review on certiorari. Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on the ground that Branch 10 has no jurisdiction over Macias complaint, for the said Branch is without authority to review the decisions of Branch 4, a coordinate branch; that Macias is not a beneficiary, heir or creditor of the estate of Julian or Rosina; and that Macias had already appealed the order of Judge Barcelona of Branch 8 authorizing and approving the sale of the lots in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation which appeal is now pending before the SC. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, delegate or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties Maningat vs. Castillo - The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. In order to settle the estate of a deceased person it is one of the functions of the probate court to determine who the heirs are that will receive the net assets of the estate and the amount or proportion of their respective shares. It is not disputed that the orders sought to be annulled and set aside by Macias is his complaint against respondents which was assigned to Branch 10 were issued by Judge Barcelona presiding over Branch 8. Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the branch of the court of first instance that first acquired jurisdiction over the case retains such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other branches of the same court of first instance or judicial district and all other coordinate courts. De Leon vs. Salvador - the various branches of a Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with the respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments, by means of injunction. Justice Fernando - any other view would be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful orders. This is to preclude an undesirable situation from arising one, which if permitted, as above pointed out, would be fraught with undesirable consequences, as already indicated, for the bench, no less than for the litigants. To such an eventuality, this Court cannot give its sanction. The Presiding Judge of Branch 10 cannot legally interfere with, nor pass upon the validity of said orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch 8, which court, as the probate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue thereof. Macias insistence that in his complaint, he seeks to recover his distributive shar e of the estate of the decedent Rosina, all the more removes the said case from the jurisdiction of Branch 10; for the distribution of the estate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. Guilas vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, et al., - the better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court

Issues/Held: WON orders of a court in a special proceeding can be challenged in another branch in a ordinary action. NO Ratio: Under Section 1 of Rule 73, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina should be filed before Branch 8 of the Manila CFI, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the CA, Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Wolfson was filed and is still pending. The settlement of the estate of a deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to two or more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay. The provision of section 602, giving one court exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, was not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant, but in the public interest for the better administration of justice. For that reason the parties have no control over it.

16 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of Macias to file several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is unduly burdening the courts. Coming from a neophyte, who is still unsure of himself in the practice of the law, the same may be regarded with some understanding. But considering Macias's ability and long experience at the bar, his filing identical suits for the same remedy is reprehensible and should merit rebuke. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

17 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Bernardo v. CA
Barrera, J. Quickie: Dispute between heirs of deceased husband and heirs of deceased wife. Husband died first; he had a will constituting wife and his cousins. Then, wife died. Wife was substituted by her collateral relatives. There was a question of whether or not the estate of the husband included wifes share in the conjugal partnership, so there was an issue on the jurisdiction of the probate court. SC held that while as a general rule, probate court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the title of the properties, this case falls under the exception, which is: when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced Nature: petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein. Facts: Eusebio Capili (EC) and Hermogena Reyes (HR) were husband and wife. o EC died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. o His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. HR died on April 24, 1959. o Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. June 12, 1959 the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned . June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

7 SCRA 367 (1963)

The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action. The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will. September 14, 1960 the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." September 27, 1960 the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.

Issue/Held: 1) W/N probate court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively

18 Ratio: 1) General Rule: Question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings Exception: where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. o There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. o It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testatorhusband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator. Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. o This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners cannot be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". o In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the probate court and just because of an opposition thereto, they cannot thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. They cannot be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. o Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.

19 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Falcatan v. Sanchez
Nature: appeal from a decision providing for the summary settlement of the estate of Patricio Sanchez, deceased Issue: the manner in which the lot in question shall be divided Argument of appellant: in proceedings for the summary settlement of the estate of a deceased person under section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of title to real property. Held: This is true only where the title is disputed by a third person, not by the surviving spouse or heirs of the deceased, as successors of the latter. Ratio: There are two conjugal partnerships involved here. Under the circumstances, it would be fair to hold that the property in question belongs to the two conjugal partnerships, share and share alike.

101 Phil 1238 (1957)

20 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Ermac v. Medelo
BARREDO, J.: Quickie: Apo v anak of deceased spouses. Anak says settlement must be reconsidered because the lot in question belongs to him. Court approved settlement despite objection. Court is correct. Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the results of the suit. For the protection of the claimant the appropriate step is to have the proper annotation of lis pendens entered. Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: Spouses both died leaving as the only property to be inherited by their heirs a parcel of land, Lot 1327 with an assessed value of P590.00. Accordingly, herein respondent Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren of the said spouses, (being one of the children of their predeceased daughter Digna Ermac) filed a petition for summary settlement of said estate. All requirements having been complied with, and there being no opposition thereto, respondent court issued an order granting the same, enumerating all the heirs entitled to participate in the inheritance and ordering petitioner to present the proper project of partition of the lot aforementioned. However, petitioner Pedro Ermac, one of the children of the deceased spouses, moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement, praying for the elimination of Lot 1327 from the estate on the ground that it belongs to him and his wife. MR denied; the court ruling that the proper remedy is a separate suit. Accordingly, petitioner, together with his children, filed the corresponding action, Civil Case No. 1564 of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. Court approved the same settlement despite his objection (predicated on the pendency of Civil Case No. 1564), petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence, the present petition. Issue/Held: WON respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in approving the project of partition covering Lot No. 1327 notwithstanding that it is being claimed by petitioners in a separate civil action to be their property and not of the estate. - NO Ratio: The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time.

64 SCRA 358 (1975)

This is specially true with small estates for which the rules provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with the appointment of an administrator together with the other involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination of the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to inhirit therefrom and the payment of his obligations. Definitely, the probate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the decedents estate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular administration proceedings, it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him. Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the results of the suit. For the protection of the claimant the appropriate step is to have the proper annotation of lis pendens entered.

21 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011

PCIB v. Escolin
Barredo, J. Quickie: We are here concerned only on the matter of dissolution of marriage and its consequences respecting the special proceeding of settlement of a deceaseds estate. As a rule, upon the death of a spouse, properties continue to be conjugal property in the hands of the surviving spouse. But it is provided in the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and in the event of the death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the affairs of the partnership without delay. Facts: *Sobrang malabong kaso. Gusto ko hukayin mula sa libingan ni Justice Barredo para lang batukan siya dito sa bulok niyang ponencia. I'm afraid no amount of quickie could simplify what happened in this case. I will try, nonetheless. Here it is Spouses Linnie and Charles Hodges are Americans but have long settled in Iloilo. They owned an office building along with several businesses and assets there. Linnie died first. She left a will instituting Charles as her sole heir. In her will, she also instituted a simple substitution (not fideicommissary substitution nor legacy of a usufruct, recall succession), such that when Charles dies, the remainder of her estate shall pass on to her siblings. At the probate of Linnies will, Charles was appointed administrator-executor. While performing functions as such, Charles continued his buy-and-sell business (of real and personal property). As appointed executor, Charles filed an inventory where he listed all the assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie and then stated expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as executor was one -half of all the items listed (nothing further was done respecting the conjugal partnership property) Meanwhile, in an estate tax return filed by Charles in Texas, USA, he declared that Linnies estate did not have any income and that all that was left to him were enough for the payment of debts, taxes and liabilities. In the same document, moreover, Charles declared intention to distribute the remaining property and interests of Linnie in their community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid. Then the time came for Charles to meet his creator and join Linnie. He had his own will but the same cannot be accessed, it being locked inside a vault no one can open. Even his lawyer only knew of the existence and due execution of Charless will but did not know the contents thereof. Thus, said lawyer petitioned the probate court to appoint MAGNO as administratrix of Linnies estate (in Charless stead) and, at the same time, as special administratrix of Charless estate. The lawyer pointed out that AVELINA MAGNO is the Hodges spouses most trusted employee (for around 30 years) and that there is an urgent need to appoint administratrix for their properties which are in danger of being lost or damaged if not managed immediately. For Charless estate, MAGNO shall act only

AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN as special administratrix in view of the inaccessibility of his will. Court approved, appointed MAGNO accordingly Later in the life of this god-forsaken legal dispute, relatives of Charles began to fly in from the US to Iloilo as representatives of the other heirs and wanting participation in the settlement of his estate. They became co-administrators along with MAGNO. Same goes true with the relatives of Linnie. In short, dumami ng dumami ang mga administrators ng mga estate. As as result, dumami rin ng dumami ang bangayan! In the meantime, MAGNO, as administratrix of both spouses estate had a central role in the management of their combined estate. She had performed and authorized several questionable acts (sold, mortgaged, disbursed basta lahat na ang masamang gawain ng isang administratrix inimpute sa kanya) which the other participants in the administration of the Spouses Hodgess estate complained of on this point, sobrang haba ng discussion. But for our purposes for MTG #2, feeling ko di pa to relevant. For now, suffice it to say that from the complaints against MAGNOs acts as administratrix sprung the controversy that led to the filing of cases now under consideration

PCIBs Involvement- PCIB was originally an occupant of the Hodges Office Building at Guanco Street, Iloilo City. At some point, PCIB was in dispute with MAGNO. The case just says that PCIB in one instance petitioned the trial court to allow it to open all doors and locks in the building, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its own locks and keys for security purposes. It alleged that Administratrix Magno refused to open the Hodges Office where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and prejudice as a result of said act Magno was ultimately ordered by the court to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office in order that the office of said estates could operate for business. It is not explained how, but PCIB eventually became one of the administrators of Charles' estate. Sabi lang, the co-administrators of Charles estate (Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol) were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court. There was also a similar agreement between PCIB (admin of Charles estate) and Magno (admin of Linnies estate) to jointly administer the combined conjugal assets of the Sps. Hodges After PCIB's inclusion in the dispute, sobrang gumulo ulit ang magulo nang kaso! (may issues on payment of compensation, retainers for lawyers, approval of deeds of sale, mortgages by Charles before he died, by Magno as former special administratrix of Charles property after he died, etc. But I will not include them here because they're not relevant for our purposes anyway.) Basta ang contention ng PCIB ay yung acts daw ni Magno as administratrix of Linnies exclusiv e property frustrates the proper administration of Charles estate. Hindi pa daw tini -turn over ni Magno yung possession of some of Charles properties; binanayaran daw ni Magno yung estate taxes ni Linnie out of Charles estate, etc. AFTER all the convoluted issues, PCIB finally moved for Avelina Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to Linnie and Charles Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she has done with them; for her to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of Charles all of the funds, properties and assets of any

22 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 character remaining in her possession; and for Avelina A. Magno to stop administering Charless estate Aside from the above motion, PCIB also filed a motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate. Recall that in Linnie's will, she provided that after Charles' death, all of the rest, residue and remainder of her estate shall be equally divided among her brothers and sisters. Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Charles, as executor of his wifes will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death, the rest, residue and remainder thereof could be determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. No such liquidation was done. Furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a national PCIB moved for the official declaration of Linnies heirs in connection to their claim that Charles, after Linnie predeceased him, owns 100% of the conjugal estate, or at the least, of those found in Philippine territory. With respect to the conjugal property worldwide, at the least, Charles should own 75%. Heres how I understood PCIBs position: Assume first that Linnie and Charles did not own considerable exclusive, paraphernal property at the time of marriage. Their property relation is CPG. All their substantial assets and businesses (in Iloilo and in the US) were acquired during marriage, thus, these properly pertains to the conjugal partnership. All the property now in dispute are CPG properties. None pertains exclusively to any spouse Also, Philippine law will apply (there is a conflict of laws discussion, but I will not elaborate. Basta ang sabi, according to the Renvoi Doctrine, Philippine law should apply with respect to the property located in the Philippines. For our purposes, forget first that some of the CPG properties are located in the US. Assume that all the property in dispute are located in the Philippines) Now, at the time of Linnies death, under the Civil Code , the CPG was dissolved. Automatically, the conjugal property is split in half, 50% pertaining to Linnies estate and the other 50% to Charles. This 50% of the conjugal property was acquired by Charles not by succession but by dissolution of the CPG On Linnies part, the 50% of the CPG she got now constitutes 100% of her estate. Following the rules of succession (legitime), the surviving spouse (when there is no other direct compulsory heir, i.e. ascendant/descendant) gets of the estate. Adding now his legitime, the total share of Charles in the original CPG property is 75%. (50% he got by dissolution of the CPG and the 25% he got as legitime from Linnies 50% CPG share) The remaining 25% CPG share (free portion of Linnies estate) shall be disposed by will. In Linnies will, Charles was her sole and exclusive heir. This means that, Charles actually gets 100% Linnies estate or 100% of the original CPG property. Because of the facts above stated, no rest, residue, remainder (at least with respect to the Philippine properties of Sps. Hodges CPG) of Linnies estate AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN allegedly owing to her siblings (recall her substitution provision in her will) exists. With respect to rents, income and emoluments earned by the CPG property, these all belong to Charles since he owns the full 100% of the CPG property, half by being part owner of the CPG from dissolution and the other half by compulsory and testamentary succession Magno resisted by filing her own motion for the declaration of Linnies heirs where she insisted that Charles does not have basis to claim ownership, to the exclusion of Linnies siblings, over the estate of the deceased.

Issue/s and Held: WON there is still any part of the Testate Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her estate? YES Ratio: **SITUATIONER: It is the position of PCIB that the respondent court (Judge Escolin, CFI Iloilo) exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in recognizing the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. The main ground for such posture is that by the orders of respondent court, Charles was already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, hence, nothing else remains to be done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then. UNTENABLE The declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function Pronouncements in probate proceedings should be definite, plain and specific so that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, should know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing from the inheritance would begin or cease, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications similar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have already actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect The law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 90, in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have

23 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Be sides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court. It is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the residue. What brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased IN THE CASES AT BAR, the cited indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been complied with by the order of Judge Escolin. We cannot see in that order anything more than an explicit approval of all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges plus a general advance authorization to enable said Executor to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law There is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever. In this connection, it may be stated further against PCIB, by way of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion prayed inter alia that the court declare that C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the previous order of by Judge Escolin was already the order of adjudication and distribution of her estate It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wifes estate as he might possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges intention, the trial courts orders (allowing Charles to sell, dispose conjugal property) could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Charles of the whole estate of his wife AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Additionally, there are enough circumstances extant in the records indicating that Charles had no intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. Thus, he recognized the separate identity of his wifes estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself (as intimated in his tax return in the United States)

ON DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE The surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable for any fraud committed by him with relation to the property while he is charged with its administration. The surviving husband in the administration and liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. Under Section 2 of Rule 73, When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. FINAL POINTS At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was the failure of Charles Hodges to secure, as executor of his wifes estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings. Instead, there are enough indications that he had intentions of leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question, which would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as constituting

24 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among themselves. All things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Charles Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators (PCIB and Magno) of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

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Calma v. Taedo
Avancena, C.J. Quickie: Daughter became adminstratrix of the properties during the pendency of the probate proceedings. The creditor of the spouses filed a complaint against the surviving spouse during the pendency of the case. To satisfy the judgement in favour of the creditor, the property belonging to the conjugal property of the spouses was sold by the sheriff. HELD: Eulalio (husband) having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims. Facts: The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also indebted to Esperanza Taedo, chargeable against the conjugal property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10% per annum. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the commencement of the corresponding probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending, Esperanza Tanedo filed a complaint against Eulalio for the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta, the property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as administratrix, brings this action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof. Issue/Held: WON action for the collection of money chargeable against the conjugal property of the spouses was properly filed? NO, the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims. Ratio: The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 reading: SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.

66 Phil 594 (1938)

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made. Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Caragay vs. Urquiza - the amendment introduced by this Act consists in authorizing the institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership. It should be understood that these remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that they cannot be availed of at the same time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic situation would result if conjugal property were administered, liquidated and distributed at the same time in a testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary action for liquidation and partition of property. The testamentary proceedings of Fausta having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose. Cruz vs. De Jesus - when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. When Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio for the payment of debts chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio, legal administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta was living, had ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria appointed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta. Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this amount had to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the administration and liquidation of properties of deceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the corresponding CFI, in an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix.

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Ocampo v. Potenciano
Reyes, J: Quickie: Pacto de retro sale of conjugal house and lot. Right to repurchase continually extended. After last extension, Ocampo not having repurchased, Potenciano had title issued in his and wifes name. When Edilberto and Rufnia died, Conrado gave Paz option to repurchase. Paz was able to exercise such option, but tender was refused so she consigned the money. Potenciano children intervened saying that right to repurchase by Paz was null and void as to their deceaseds moms share. SC held that contract was not pacto de retro but an equitable mortgage. <For specpro-related stuff, see Ratio. Its a very short case, so quickie not really needed> Nature: This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to convey to his relative, Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,500, a town a lot with a house as strong materials standing thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that, for an annual rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price, the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption period. The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the poblacion of Bian, Laguna, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, worth between 20 and 25 pesos. Though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal property. The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to another year," but several extensions were granted, with the vendor paying part of the principal in addition to interests. The last extension granted was for year from February 3, 1937 The period having elapsed without the repurchase having been made, Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, on the strength which the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title no. 18056 in the name of Potenciano and his wife. On February 28, 1939, with Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase the property for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon for the same period of time at annual rental of P300 which, as may again be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price.

89 Phil 159 (1951)

On or about February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000 an amount sufficient to cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected, deposited the money in court and brought an action in her own name and as judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated in her name and that of her husband. Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a crosscomplaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father to plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and void as to the share of their deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the same property they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint. To meet these allegations, plaintiff amended her complaint by including the intervenors as defendants and alleging, in effect, that the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the rental contract thrown in to cover the stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that the option agreement for the repurchase of the property within five years from February 28, 1939, and for the payment of rental for that period in an amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was also meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the tender of payment was valid, the same having been made within the extended period. The Court of First Instance, after trial, upheld these allegations and gave judgment in favor of the children of Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death. When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a somewhat different view and rendered judgment declaring: (a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and Conrado Potenciano was one of mortgage, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum; (b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and E-1) were validly executed by defendant Conrado Potenciano and binding upon the property in litigation; (c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of one-half of the same from their deceased mother Rufina Reyes; (d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto legal) of the other half of the property belonging to their father Conrado Potenciano; (e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in litigation within the time she had to do so; (f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in payment of the property in

27 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 question, was in accordance with the law and relieved the heirs of the spouses Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said purchase price; (g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer the title of the property in litigation to the heirs of the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco; and (h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 (Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, upon payment by appellees of the corresponding fees and the registration in his office of the deed of conveyance mentioned in the next preceding paragraph. Issue/Held: W/N the CA was correct in its decision YES and NO. Ratio: 1) First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not disputed that the pacto de retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Such being the case, the lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both them, to consolidate title in themselves over the property given as security. The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in this case was, therefore, null and void. 2) The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded, through novation, by the option agreement for the repurchase of the property mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this war error because Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after the death of his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176 (approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324). 3) Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option agreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgagee debt, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction had between them was that of loan with security, or equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form of sale with right to repurchase. 4) It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said contract of loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal currency (Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229), the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which is that of AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN relieving the debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code; Limkako vs. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.) 5) Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants Victor Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring them owners of the property in question, they having inherited onehalf of it from their mother and acquired the other half from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these appellants acquired nothing. 6) Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be entered, declaring the obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby held to be mere contract of loan with security or equitable mortgage, already discharged, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco upon payment of the corresponding fees. With costs against the appellants. Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur. Tuason, J., concurs in the result.

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Reyes v. Ysip
Labrador, J. Quickie: petitioner wants to submit evidence regarding her claim that she is a natural daughter of the deceased whose will was being probated. According to the TC judge, something like lets talk about the will first, then we talk about filiation of the petitioner later. Considerations of convenience and expediency, therefore, support the ruling of the court in refusing to admit evidence of petitioner's filiation and postponing the same at a later stage in the distribution proceedings. Nature: petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus to compel the judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan to permit and allow petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that she is a natural daughter of the deceased, Juan Reyes Panlilio, enjoying her status as such continuously up to the time of the latter's death Facts: A petition was presented for the probate of the last will and testament of decedent Juan Reyes Panlilio. Leonor P. Reyes, petitioner herein, filed an opposition thereto. The special administratrix, who had presented the will for probate, objected to the personality and right of the petitioner herein to contest the will and asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before the hearing thereon. the trial judge, the Hon. Bonifacio Ysip, held that only the probate of the will was at issue and that the question of the presentation of evidence as to the filiation of the oppositor, petitioner herein, was out of place. Counsel for petitioner made attempts to have the court reconsider its order but the court refused to do so. So her counsel begged the court to suspend the proceedings, and he instituted the present petition for a writ to compel the respondent judge to permit her to prove her alleged filiation as a recognized natural child of the testator.

97 Phil 11 (1955)
Held: The order of the court did not amount to a prohibition to the petitioner to take part in the hearing for the probate of the will and was motivated by a desire to avoid a multiplicity of the issues thereat and the limitation thereof to the execution and the validity of the execution of the will. The court, therefore, did not deprive the petitioner of any right which she is entitled to under the law or rules, nor did it abuse its discretion in refusing the submission of evidence as to filiation in the hearing for the probate. Ratio 1. 2. In distribution proceedings the stage at which the determination of the persons entitled to inherit may be made is after, not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, . . . is effected. In distribution proceedings where a will is sought to be admitted to probate, a person who can have no interest in the succession cannot be allowed to intervene and oppose such probate. o trial judge ruled that only evidence as to the execution of the will or in opposition to the probate could then be admitted, postponing reception of evidence as to the filation of the petitioner to another occasion or hearing, and perhaps on the occasion of the hearing for the declaration of heirs. In this respect the judge's ruling finds support in the circumstances. To allow petitioner, oppositor in the probate, to prove her filiation would be injecting matters different from the issues involved in the probate, which in this case were the alleged non-execution of the will, or the execution thereof under pressure or influence or by threat, or the alleged forgery of the signatures of the testator.

Considerations of convenience and expediency, therefore, support the ruling of the court in refusing to admit evidence of petitioner's filiation and postponing the same at a later stage in the distribution proceedings.

Argument of petitioner: the consistent policy of this Court, embodied in several of its, decisions, is to allow a duly acknowledged natural child to intervenue in the proceedings for the probate of the will and establish his or her status as such in said proceedings. Issue: In the hearing of a petition for the probate of a will, is the court obliged to accept or receive evidence of the filiation of an oppositor to the probate, or may the said court postpone reception of such evidence of filiation later?

29 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Torres v. Javier
Moreland, J.: Quickie: 2 women claiming to be the lawful wife of the deceased. Probate court appointed 3rd person as administrator. Court did the right thing. The court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time. Nature: appeal in proceeding to appoint an administrator of the estate of Tan Po Pic Facts: TC: refused to appoint Marta Torres who claimed to be the lawful wife of the deceased, and, instead, appointed Juan L. Javier administrator. The appeal is taken by Marta Torres from that order of appointment. It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic, deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng New. Marta Torres objected to the appointment of any one except herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator. Issue/Held: WON the probate courts decision must be affirmed- YES Ratio: Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as the court may appoint. It appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed administrator of the said Tan Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the misapprehension that Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of Manila at the time of his death. After it had been ascertained that the deceased was a resident of the Province of Rizal, the Court of First Instance of Manila transferred the case to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In that court, as we have already seen, the appointment by the Court of First Instance of Manila was disregarded the proceedings were begun for the appointment of an administrator by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

34 Phil 382 (1916)

It must be remembered that the probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a third person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the part of this court. The court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time.

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Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo
Gutierrez, Jr., J. Quickie: VITO Borromeo died without issue, leaving behind substantial properties. A fake will was submitted for probate purporting to contain VITOs dispositions. The probate court declared the will fake and the proceedings were converted into an intestate proceeding. TC eventually declared who VITOs intestate heirs are and ordered partition. BUT here comes Fortunato Borromeo (allegedly illegit son of VITO) claiming to be an heir. TC denied his claim. On MR, Fortunato changed his ground to claim a share in VITOs estate by way of a Waiver of Hereditary Rights allegedly signed by 5 of the 8 declared heirs in favor of Fortunato. The TC reconsidered and granted Fortunato s claim on the basis of the wiaver. The petitioners opposed and appealed the TC order, questioning the validity of the wiaver itself and the jurisdiction of the TC to entertain and rule on Fortunatos claim. SC ruled that the wiaver is of no effect since it does not comply with the requisites of a valid waiver under the Civil Code. Particularly, the waiver does not purport to show that the signatories truly intended to part with their rights. The TC, however, has jurisdiction to entertain and rule on Fortunatos claim, considering that the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate. Nature: Appeal from the decision and order of trial court in SP. PROC. NO, 916-R of the then CFI Cebu. Facts Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paraaque at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in Cebu. Jose Junquera filed with the CFI Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by VITO, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery. On appeal, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the will was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera, et al. v. Crispin Borromeo, et al. (19 SCRA 656). Following the SC ruling, the testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came before the probate court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.

152 SCRA 171 (1987)

But the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order declaring, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo only 9 heirs. Thus, the court ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs. Thereafter, the declared heirs (except Patrocinio B. Herrera) signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court. In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition Respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion. Fortunato Borromeo filed an MR. In the memorandum he submitted to support his MR, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by five of the nine heirs declared by the court, relinquishing their share to Fortunato The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is 30topped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter After due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared Fortunato as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo! Whoa! A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied. Hence, the present petition. The petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial courts order declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedents estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of Fortunato, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is improper

31 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Petitioner also alleges that the claim of Fortunato was filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only after there had been a declaration of heirs, an agreement of partition and an order directing the administrator to partition the estate It is further argued by the petitioner that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights , aside from having been cancelled and revoked some of its signatories is without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer As for Fortunato, he contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver, the signatories were certain that Vito was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Fortunato asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it was executed in the course of the proceedings. He further maintains that the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the same. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights. The following are some of such circumstances: Some signatories (namely, Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo) filed a pleading entitled Compliance wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. This shows that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased The majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court The petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera s) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00

Issue/s and Held: 1. WON the waiver is effective NO 2. WON the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of Fortunato YES Ratio 1. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code. According to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion. The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969. In this case, however, the purported Waiver of Hereditary Rights cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, 3 elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right

2.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.

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Morales et. al v. CFI

Paras, J Quickie: In the settlement of the intestate estate of his husband and son, the probate court ordered the redemption of the Simonas foreclosed property, the redemption money being Simonas share from the estate of his husband and son. When Simona died, the 3 proceedings were consolidated and the mortgagee intervened as creditor of Simonas estate. The property has been included in the inventory of properties. The probate court ordered the Sheriff to issue a certificate of redemption justifying that the full redemption price was already paid. HELD: A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. Nature: special civil action of certiorari and prohibition Facts: The property is a saltbedfishpond located at Dulongbayan, Bacoor, Cavite and described in the tax declaration as owned by one Simona Pamuti. Simona mortgaged the property in favor of Princesita Santero Morales in consideration of the sum of P15k. The property, following extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was sold at public auction to Princesita. The certificate of sale was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds with the redemption period set to expire on August 4, 1975. Simona was the spouse of Pascual Santero with whom she begot a son named Pablo. During the lifetime of Pablo, he cohabited and had children with 3 women, namely, Adela, Anselma and Feliberta. Pablo had a child with Adela, 7 children with Anselma and 5 with Feliberta. Morales is Pablo's eldest natural child with Feliberta. Simona survived both her husband Pascual and son Pablo. The records do not show when Pascual and Pablo died, but the petitions for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Pascual and Pablo were filed by Juanito, Pablo's eldest natural child with Adela.. Morales was an oppositor in these proceedings whereas the Clerk of Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz, was appointed, first, as special administrator and later as regular administrator. During the pendency of the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estates of Pascual and Pablo, Juanito filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of Simona. The Clerk of Court was appointed legal guardian of Simona. The Clerk filed a motion to use the funds of the estates of Pascual and Pablo to redeem Simona's property that had been sold at auction to Morales based on the theory that the ward, Simona, is an heir of Pablo and is entitled to a share of the money in the possession of the guardian in his capacity as administrator of Pascual's and Pablo's estates.

146 SCRA 373 (1986)

Morales opposed the motion on the ground that the funds that are in the possession of the Clerk of Court in his capacity as administrator are held by him in trust for the benefit of Pascual's and Pablo's heirs who have not yet been judicially determined. CFI, on the finding that Simona is a forced heir of both Pablo and Pascual, reiterated and ordered the Clerk of Court to redeem the property. The date of the Order, August 4, 1975, is the same date on which the redemption period was set to expire. August 6, 1975 - Deputy Sheriff of Cavite, Mario Abueg, tendered to Morales a check dated July 17, 1975 in the sum of P16, 342.00 by way of redemption of the property in question. The tender was not accepted on the ground that the check was not a certified check, that the amount tendered was insufficient and that the tender was made after the lapse of the redemption period. Morales executed an affidavit of Consolidation and requested the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite to execute the final deed of conveyance. The provincial sheriff did not issue the final deed. Neither did he issue any certificate of redemption in favor of the legal guardian of Simona. Simona died intestate. In the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Simona, Morales was allowed to intervene not as heir but as "creditors of the intestate estate of the late Simona, or as co-owners, together with said intestate estates, of certain properties as the interests of said oppositors may appear. The same Clerk of Court was appointed Administrator and eventually, the 3 special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estates of Pascual, Pablo and Simona were consolidated. Clerk of Court filed a "Motion to Order the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite To Issue Certificate of Redemption" alleging that on July 17, 1975, before the expiration of the redemption period, payment of the redemption amount had been tendered and accepted by the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite; that the sheriff having received the full redemption price, is duty bound to issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona. CFI granted the motion stating that on July 17, 1975, the amount of P16,342 was deposited with the provincial sheriff, that the provincial sheriff requested Morales to get the check but the latter refused to do so because the check was neither a cashier's-check or a manager's check and because the amount was insufficient; that the insufficiency was due to the "misinformation erroneously furnished by the sheriff', that the deficiency which represented interests in the amount of P964.24 was deposited on August 25, 1975; and that in view of the refusal of Princesita to accept payment, "the check in the amount of P16,324.00 covering the principal together with interest in the amount of P964.24 in cash or a total of P17,306.24 were deposited with the Rural Bank of Kawit. Morales filed a MR on the grounds that the respondent probate court does not have jurisdiction to resolve the validity of the redemption of the property in question; that there was no valid redemption and that the motion was resolved without giving them a chance to be heard. Morales also filed a motion for the removal of the administrator on the grounds that such administrator does not have enough time to attend to his duties because of his official duties as Clerk of Court; that appointment of Clerks of Court as administrators is disfavored by the SC and that the

33 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 administrator has shown his bias for Felisa Jardin and that the administrator was being represented by the same counsel engaged by Felisa Jardin. MR was denied. CFI justified its order for the issuance of the certificate of redemption as within its power "to inquire regarding the proper implementation" of the previous order requiring the immediate redemption of the property. That sitting as a probate court was acting upon a mere incident of redemption that arose in the settlement of the estates under reference and that, as such, this court did not rule categorically as to which party is the rightful owner of the property in question as the right of ownership could and should be ruled upon in case of any dispute in a separate action before the proper court. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN estates. The petitioners, are, therefore, outside parties claiming title to property included in the inventory of properties under administration. There definitely is some doubt as to when the redemption price was tendered, considering, additionally, the submission of Morales in the reply that the supposed completion of the redemption price was made only on March 10, 1976 and not August 25, 1975 and that the check for the sum of P16,342.00 issued by the Rural Bank of Kawit is dated March 3, 1976. Section 27 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to the provisions of Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118 is decisive of the above issue. It provides that the payment of the redemption money should be made "to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale." The tender should be made within the period and in the correct amount. Such basis is precisely the bone of contention in the instant case. Apart from the uncertainty of the factual basis of the order, it may be mentioned additionally that the asserted fact of payment on July 17, 1975 cannot be, insofar as the records submitted to this Court are concerned, beyond doubt because the respondent Court still had to order the Clerk of Court to redeem the property "immediately.

Issue/Held: WON probate court has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the redemption by the estate under administration of a parcel of land which while it was originally owned by the decedent and has as such been included in the inventory of properties. NO Ratio: Cuizon vs. Ramolete - a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals - for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties The question regarding the validity of the redemption which was supposed to have been made by the clerk of court as guardian and then later as administrator of the estate of Simona Pamuti, is determinative of the ownership of the property in question. The Order wherein the validity of the redemption was upheld is effectively a judgment that the property is owned by the estate of Simona. At that time, Morales had already asserted ownership having executed the affidavit of consolidation and the administrator of Simona's estate, on the other hand had likewise asserted his redemption of the property, having deposited with the sheriff the check in the amount which was believed to be the proper redemption price. Since the sheriff did not issue a final deed in favor of the petitioners, and neither did he issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona, there was, then, a clearly existing ownership contest between the parties. The controversy was not whether or not the redemption ordered by the respondent court was done, but whether or not such redemption, as done, was valid. According to settled jurisprudence, such controversy is outside the jurisdiction of the probate court. Parenthetically, it must be mentioned that the respondent court itself had, at that time, already determined that Morales are intervenors in the settlement proceedings of Simona's estate not as heirs but as "co-owners" with the intestate

34 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

In re: Intestate Estate of Ismael Reyes | Heirs of Oscar Reyes v. Reyes

Gonzaga-Reyes, J. Quickie: Dispute on who owns the Arayat property. Ismael Reyes defaulted in payment of taxes so BIR levied, sold and forfeited in favor of the government the property in dispute. Oscar Reyes redeemed the property through tax amnesty. When Ismael and wife died, son Cesar was appointed administrator of estate. In the inventory, Cesar included the Arayat property. Oscar, and later on his heirs, opposed, saying that the property was now entirely Oscars because of his having redeemed the same. Probate court rul ed that Arayat property be included in the inventory, SUBJECT to the outcome in the regular courts of whoever really owns it. SC says probate court was correct in not ruling on the title of the property, since probate court is with limited jurisdiction. Exception to the general rule does not apply in this case. Nature: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46761 which affirmed the Order dated January 26, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, in Special Proceeding No. 89-2519, a petition for issuance of letters of administration, and the resolution dated July 28, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration. Facts: Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes. April 18, 1973 Ismael died intestate. o Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. o For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government. Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983 upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000. May 18, 1982 Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981. December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes.

345 SCRA 541 (2000)

May 10, 1989 private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase. The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit o a true and complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased and o the special powers of attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his appointment as administrator. o Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters. o On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds. A hearing on the inventory was scheduled where administrator Cesar Reyes was required to present evidence to establish that the properties belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes and the oppositor to adduce evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory. After hearing the parties respective arguments, the probate court issued its Order dated January 26, 1994 modifying the inventory submitted by the administrator and declaring to belong to the estate of the late Ismael Reyes the following properties, to wit: 1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing an area of 31,054 square meters, covered by TCT 72730 with an approximate value of P405,270.00; 2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City, with total area of 1,009 square meters, more or less, covered by TCTs No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303), with an approximate value of P3,027,000.00; but this determination is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the issue of ownership of the properties; and, 3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental income from the inception of the lease, whether such income be in the possession of oppositor, in which case he is hereby directed to account therefor, or if such income be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which case the administrator should move to collect the same. o Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa R. Reyes, in her personal capacity as apparent co-owner of the Arayat Street properties, may commence the necessary proper action for

35 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 settling the issue of ownership of such properties in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and to inform the Court of the commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible. o The administrator is hereby directed to verify and check carefully on whether other properties, particularly the real properties allegedly situated in Montalban, Rizal; in Marikina, Metro Manila (near Boys Town); and in Bulacan, otherwise referred to as the Hi-Cement property truly pertained to the estate; to determine their present condition and the status of their ownership; and to render a report thereon in writing within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order. o The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby denied for being unwarranted, except whatever incomes he might have received from Sonny Bernardo, which he is hereby directed to turn over to the administrator within thirty (30) days from finality of this Order. Oscars MR denied. CA affirmed the probate courts order. It ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership of the properties ; that the provisional character of the inclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of intestate court. Petitioners MR denied. Hence this petition AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within the probate courts competence. Thus, when private respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed as administrator of the properties in the courts Order dated July 26, 1989, he was ordered to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal properties of the estate which may come into his possession or knowledge which private respondent complied with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his objection to the inventory on the ground that it included the subject properties which had been forfeited in favor of the government on April 21, 1975 and which he subsequently redeemed on August 19, 1976. Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits of accounting and inventory , thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine for purposes of inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that for resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included. There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively. In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the ownership was merely provisional and suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted that it was not competent to pass upon the ownership of the subject properties, thus: Although the testimony of the oppositor should have greater persuasive value than that of the petitioner/administrator, mainly because it agrees closely with the recitals of facts found in the several public documents submitted as evidence in this case and is corroborated to the greatest extent by the fact that the properties were, indeed, abandoned in his possession since 1975 until the present, his alleged ownership of the Arayat Street properties cannot still be sustained in a manner which would warrant their exclusion from the administrators inventory. We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Notwithstanding his clarifying statements on redirect examination, the impression of the Court on the issue is not entirely favorable to him. Apart

Issues/Held: 1) W/N CA erred in ruling that the court a quo correctly included one half (1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes NO. 2) W/N CA erred in upholding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership NO. Ratio: 1) The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.

2)

36 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 from the absence of a specific document of transfer, the circumstances and factors he gave may not suffice in and by themselves to convey or transfer title, for, at best, they may only be the basis of such transfer. They may be considered as proof of the intention to dispose in his favor or as evidence of a set off among the heirs, which seems to be what he has in mind. There might also be substance in his assertions about the abandonment in his favor, which, if raised in the proper action, could constitute either prescription or laches. It is hardly needed to stress, therefore, that more than these are required to predicate the exclusion of the properties from the inventory. Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on the property covered in TCT 4983 and did not include the property covered in TCT 3598 (39303). This somehow detracts from the logic of the oppositors assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat Street properties; even if his assertion is valid and true, it can encompass, at most, only the property subject of the BIRs levy and declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the property covered by TCT 3598 (39303). These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor of whatever rights or properties he believes or considers to be rightfully his. Although the circumstances and factors he has given to the Court herein may have legal consequences that could have defeated opposing-claims and rendered oppositors claim on the properties unassailable, this Courts competence to adjudicate thus in this proceedings is clearly non-existent. In Baybayan vs. Aquino (149 SCRA 186), it was held that the question of ownership of a property alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal ownership of the properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for the purpose of having his claims or rights established over the properties. If he still cares hereafter to prosecute such claim of ownership adversely to the estate and the apparent co-owner, his mother Felisa. As stated in Valera, et al. vs. Judge Inserto, et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction; accordingly, its determination that property should be included in the inventory or not is within its probate jurisdiction, but such determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of ownership ventilated elsewhere. Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two lots known as the Arayat property (i.e., the half that could pertain to the estate) could be settled herein, there was the realization that the evidence adduced so far (including that bearing on the oppositors basis for excluding from the estate the property) was inadequate or otherwise inconclusive. A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an intestate court, does not consider itself competent to rule on the ownership of the entire Arayat property. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

37 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Cunanan v. Amparo
Tuason, J. Quickie: Soriano filed a money claim against decedents estate. When Cunanan, the administratix, was paying Soriano, the latter refused to accept it because the money she offered was Japanese notes without value. TC judge authorized the administratix to deposit with the clerk of court P880 in full payment of the obligation in favor of Bonifacio Soriano and ordered Soriano to deliver the property in his possession to the administratix. Court has jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate. This power is a mere consequence of the power to approve Soriano's claim; a power which the court undoubtedly had. Facts: In a special proceeding, Bonifacio Soriano, one of the present respondents, under date of September 26, 1940, filed a money claim for P880 against the decedent's estate. o He alleged that on various dates in 1937 and 1938, the deceased received from him diverse sums of money aggregating P880. Rosalina Cunanan, the administratix, filed a motion setting out Bonifacio Soriano's claim and two others totalling P2,054, besides a debt of P1,600 in favor of one Filomeno Santos bearing 12 per cent interest per year. she asked the court for authority to negotiate a loan in such amount or to sell so much of the property described in the inventory as might be sufficient to satisfy the said obligations. Judge granted the motion. Later on, Rosalina Cunanan manifested to the court that she had tendered to Bonifacio Soriano in March of that year P880 but that Soriano refused to accept it on the ground that the money she offered was Japanese notes and had no value. o She prayed that the creditor be ordered to accept the amount tendered, to execute the necessary deed of cancellation, and to return the possession of two parcels of land which had been conveyed to him. Judge, authorized the administratix to deposit with the clerk of court P880 in full payment of the obligation in favor of Bonifacio Soriano and ordered Soriano to deliver the property in his possession to the administratix. Ratio:

80 Phil 227 (1948)

This power is a mere consequence of the power to approve Soriano's claim; a power which the court undoubtedly had and which Soriano himself invoked with full knowledge of then facts. As a general rule, with the consent of the parties matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the intestate proceeding provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced. Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The respondent Soriano's objection relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice which may be waived. The Court's ruling that the repurchase of the lots should have been effected in Commonwealth currency is bereft of reason and justice and is not the law. Japanese war notes were the only money in circulation in March, 1944. It seems to us extremely unjust and unreasonable to expect the administratix at that time to repurchase the lots in any other means of exchange. Thus given a grace, the administratix had until within reasonable time after liberation to repurchase the property.

Issue/Held: WON the court has jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate YES.

38 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Valero et. al. v. Inserto et. al.

Narvasa, J. Quickie: Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of deceased spouses, on the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their lessee, on the other, have given rise to the proceedings . Nature: separate appeals to this SC by certiorari Facts: Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included in any inventory of the estate. CFI: viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. CFI: accordingly set said incidents for hearing during which the parties presented evidence in substantiation of their positions; issued an Order commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question *to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from the testimony of the two administrators that the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to Rafael Valera in his lifetime; Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin; but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she might use the property to provide for her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Teresa Garin's Children; and with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of Title issued in their favor. Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa Garin's heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance with Articles 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code

149 SCRA 533 (1987)

The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the estate having been filed well within ten (10) years from June 30, 1980, the date on which Teresa Garin's heirs allegedly acquired title over it. It was made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate. Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, Fabiana voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators. Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. Complaint dismissed.

G.R. No. 56504 Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction. The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the temporary restraining order, averring that the action was barred by the Probate Court's prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had already been accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. Judge Inserto : failed to act on their motion within what the administrators believed to be a reasonable time, considering the circumstances of the Case, the administrators filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for Preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order. G.R. Nos. 59867-68 In the meantime, Jose Garin filed a notice of appeal from said Order. But he quickly abandoned the appeal when Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus )with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action for certiorari and injunction, this, notwithstanding the pendency in judge Inserto's sala of the case he had earlier filed. 26 These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the petitions.

39 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this Court by certiorari, AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property. Parenthetically, ithe Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead.

Issues/Held: 1) WON THE PROBATE COURT CAN DECIDE ON THE ISSUE OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY CLAIMED BY ATHIRD PERSON ADVERSELY TO THE DECEDENT- NO 2) WON THE FISHPOND IN QUESTION CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF EXECUTIONNO 3) WON A SEPARATE ACTION IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE TITLE OF THE PROPERTY- YES Ratio: Jurisdiction of Probate Court As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. The reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond. The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate.

Possession of Fishpond Pending Determination of Title Thereto Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others. Primary Jurisdiction over Title issue in Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined in a separate action, 36 the actual firing of such a separate action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. Moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledge judgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the exercise of what may be, regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.

40 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Dinglasan v. Ang Chia et. al

Bautista Angelo, J. Quickie: Dinglasan et al filed civil case against Ang Chia et al (as heirs of Lee Liong) to recover a parcel of land. As provisional remedy, Dinglasan sought appointment of a receiver and only in the course of hearing for receivership did Dinglasan et al know of the on-going proceeding for the intestate estate of Lee Liong. Thus, Dinglasan et al, in order to protect their interest, filed in the intestate proceeding a claim in intervention and prayed to be appointed as co-administrator. Dinglasan, in their intervention at the intestate proceedings also requested that a higher bond be paid by the administatrix Ang Chia. Ang Chia moved to dismiss the intervention and motions of Dinglasan. TC raised bond but refused to rule on the claim of Dinglasan until motion for closing of intestate proceedings shall have been filed. Ang Chia did not appeal raising of bond and instead moved to close intestate proceedings. Dinglasan opposed Ang Chia's motion and sought holding in abeyance of the intestate proceedingsa until Civil Case for reconveyance shall have been decided. TC agreed with Dinglasan. Ang Chia appealed contending that TC's taking cognizance of the civil case is tantamount to its assuming jurisdiction over a case it does not have authority to hear and decide. SC held that the TC's taking cognizance of the Civil Case is not assuming jurisdiction but merely a recognition and makes of record its existence considering that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the ONLY property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution Nature: Appeal by Ang Chia et al from an order of the CFI Capiz, issued in the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Lee Liong, holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extrajudicial partition and the closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of Civil Case No. V-331 of the same court, entitled Rafael Dinglasan, et al., vs. Ang Chia, in her personal capacity and as administratrix of the estate of Lee Liong. Facts: Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a case in the CFI Capiz against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land and damages Subsequently, Dinglasan et al (plaintiffs) filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver to which counsel for the defendants objected, and it was only at the hearing of said motion when plaintiffs discovered that there was pending in the same court a case concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong In view thereof, the motion for the appointment of a receiver was withdrawn and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of the estate, who is the same widow Ang Chia, who was already a party-defendant in her personal capacity

88 Phil 476 (1951)

In order to protect their interests, the plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix in the amount of P500 be increased to P20,000 By their claim in intervention, the plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the aforesaid civil case No. V-331 and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. Ang Chia filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motion for the increase of her bond and for the appointment of a co-administrator CFI Capiz issued an order denying the petition for a co-administrator but increased the bond to P5,000, and as regards the petition not to close the intestate proceedings until after civil case No. V-331 shall have been decided, the court stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. CFI however took cognizance of the pendency of said civil case No. V-331 Ang Chia, the administratrix, did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion the petitioners (plaintiffs) objected, whereupon the court issued an order holding in abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the decision in said civil case has been rendered. From this order the administratrix and the heirs appealed

Issue/s and Held: 1) WON CFI erred in taking cognizance of and being guided by the supposed "claim" of Dinglasan, et al NO 2) WON CFI erred in holding in abeyance probate proceedings until Civil Case has been resolved NO Ratio: 1)

Ang Chia contends that by taking action on Dinglasan's claim, the court assumed jurisdiction over the case which it cannot do because its jurisdiction as probate court is limited and especial. According to Ang Chia, probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions are limited to the control of the property upon the death of its owner and cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral questions Dinglasan et al, on the other hand, claim that said order is not the subject of this appeal, as no appeal has been taken by the appellants from said order and the same has long become final; so that the present appeal is only from the order of the lower court which denies the motion of the appellees to terminate the intestate proceedings on the ground that they have already agreed on the extrajudicial settlement of the estate and to relieve the administratrix of the obligation of filing an increased bond.

41 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 There is merit in the claim of DINGLASAN. It really appears from the record that when the order increasing the bond of the administratrix to P5,000 was issued, no appeal has been taken by ANG CHIA which has become final long ago It is true that the lower court in its later order reiterated its order to the administratrix to file a new bond in the amount of P5,000 within 30 days after receipt thereof, but this cannot have the effect of receiving the former order, nor does it give the appellants the right to question in this instance the validity of said order, which has long become final Moreover, an order requiring the filing of a new bond by the administratrix is interlocutory in nature and is solely addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Contrary to ANG CHIA's claim, the act of the lower court in taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 is not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate the ruling of this court which says that "when questions arise as to the ownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a Court of First Instance to try and determine ordinary actions. . . ." If DINGLASAN filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests, it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the ONLY property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution THUS, the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory

2) ANG CHIA's claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot entertained Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator" What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares

42 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Ortaez-Enderes et. al. v. CA et. al.

Ynares-Santiago, J. Quickie: A complaint was filed before the SEC seeking the annulment of transfer of shares of stocks, annulment of sale of corporate properties, annulment of subscriptions and accounting and inspection against respondents on the ground that the shares of stocks lawfully belonged to the estate of Dr. Ortaez. HELD: It is admitted that the special proceedings are still pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed. Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of respondents are still future and unsettled rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. The jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction of the decision of the CA Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint before the SEC for the annulment of transfer of shares of stocks to respondents, annulment of sale of corporate properties authorized by respondents who compose the management of the corporation, annulment of subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting and inspection of corporate books and records, and damages. They alleged that: o Philippines International Life Insurance Co., Inc. (Philinterlife) is a registered corporation founded in 1954 by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez; that at the time of his death in 1980, Dr. Ortaez owned at least 51% of the capital stock of the company; that special proceedings were pending with the RTC of QC for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Dr. Ortaez, where Rafael and Jose Ortaez were jointly appointed as special administrators. o after the death of Dr. Ortaez and without the prior authorization of the intestate court, 1/2 of the shares of stock of Dr. Ortaez were transferred in the names of respondents through the manipulations, devices and machinations of the latter; that the shares of stocks of respondents lawfully belonged to the estate of Dr. Ortaez and hence, they are not entitled to enjoy and exercise their rights and privileges as stockholders of the company. o

321 SCRA 178 (1999)

Jose C. Lee misrepresented himself as president of Philinterlife and sold the parcel of land owned by the corporation without the indispensable requisites prescribed by the Corporation Code; that respondents obtained additional subscriptions without consideration by way of unlawful corporate machinations; and that respondents had been conveying and disbursing corporate properties and funds as well as preventing petitioners from inspecting the corporate books and records. Private respondents answer - stated that the subject matter of the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the SEC but with the RTC; that petitioner Novicio and children represented themselves to be the common law wife and illegitimate children of the late Dr. Ortaez; that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse Juliana Ortaez, on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio, executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and Jose, both surnamed Ortaez, dividing the estate of the deceased composed of his 1/2 share in the conjugal properties; that in the said Memorandum of Agreement, Jose S. Ortaez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329 shares of stock in Philinterlife; Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares of stock in Philinterlife to Jose; respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife when Jose S. Ortaez, the principal stockholders at that time, executed a deed of sale of his shares of stock to the respondents; and that the right of petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement and the acquisition of shares of stock of respondents is barred by prescription. Private respondents also alleged that they did not violate the provisions of the Corporation Code in the sale and disposition of the parcel of land and improvements owned by Philinterlife. SEC Hearing Officer issued an Order denying petitioners application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioners failed to make a valid cause to entitle them to the relief applied for, and the pretended rights of the petitioners are still contentious, unsettled and of doubtful character. SEC En Banc issued a resolution dismissing the petition and stating in part that one of the pieces of evidence submitted is the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife which showed that respondents are owners of Philinterlife shares. Hence, as stockholders of Philinterlife, they are entitled to exercise all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stocks owned by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, we rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular court where the intestate proceedings are currently pending. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the denial by the SEC of petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction was proper and valid. MR denied. Hence, this petition was filed stating that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) not holding that the ownership of the shares of stocks of Philinterlife is still an issue to be resolved by the SEC, hence, private respondents have not yet been declared as stockholders thereof, and (2) not finding that the private respondents' claim as stockholders of Philinterlife has no legal and/or factual support.

43 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Issue/Held: WON had not established clear existing legal rights to entitle them to a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philinterlife. NO Ratio: Petitioners - respondents cannot rely on the deeds of assignment of shares of stock in their favor because the same are void, no evidence being adduced to show that the transfer taxes were paid. Respondents cannot exercise the rights and privileges of stockholders of Philinterlife because there was no valid disposition or transfer to the latter of the shares of stock belonging to the estate of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez. They claim to possess legal personality to bring this suit on the ground that they are stockholders of the corporation and that co-petitioner Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes is the Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez with regard to Philinterlife shares. Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the property pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right, over his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Petitioners failed not only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing the right to be protected. On the mere contention that the shareholdings of respondents belong to the estate of the late Dr. Ortaez which is still the subject of settlement before the RTC of QC, petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private respondents. Records show that neither the estate of Dr. Ortaez nor the Special Administratrix Ma. Divina Enderes was a party in the main case before the SEC. SEC denied the Motion to Intervene filed by the estate of Dr. Ortaez represented by the Special Administratrix on the ground that the estate is not a stockholder of Philinterlife. When the case was elevated to the SEC En Banc and later to CA, the estate of Dr. Ortaez was not included as petitioners. Not being a party in the proceedings below, the Special Administratrix does not have any legal personality to seek a review by this court of the decisions of the SEC and the Court of Appeals. Petitioners cited the issuance of an Order by the intestate court declaring that the shares of stock of Philinterlife belong to the estate. It is admitted that the special proceedings are still pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed. Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of respondents are still future and unsettled rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The intestate court may AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties. The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. Therefore, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere damnum absque injuria. Moreover, the grant or denial of an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the lower court. Petitioners failed to show a clear and positive right to the questioned shares of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez in Philinterlife from which respondents allegedly acquired their possible respective shareholdings. The issue of heirship has to be established in the probate court particularly in the settlement of estate of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez. As it is now, petitioner have mere expectance on the properties of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez. The judicial protection of a writ of preliminary injunction does not cover contingent or future right. SEC found that respondents are bona fide owners of shares of stock in Philinterlife constituting the majority thereof or 94% of the outstanding capital stock of the company. Records show that they have been stockholders of Philinterlife since 1983 up to the present. It was only in 1994 that petitioners sought the annulment of the shareholdings of private respondents before the SEC.