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Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the Bucharest Summit

Travis L. Bounds a;Ryan C. Hendrickson a a Eastern Illinois University,

To cite this Article Bounds, Travis L. andHendrickson, Ryan C.(2009) 'Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications

of the Bucharest Summit', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22: 1, 20 30 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13518040802695233 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040802695233

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Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22:2030, 2009 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1351-8046 print/1556-3006 online DOI: 10.1080/13518040802695233

1556-3006 1351-8046 FSLV Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Studies Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan 2009: pp. 00

Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the Bucharest Summit

TRAVIS L. BOUNDS and RYAN C. HENDRICKSON
Eastern Illinois University

Georgian T. L. Bounds Membership and R. C. in Hendrickson NATO

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This article examines Georgias efforts to gain NATO membership, focusing primarily on how closely Georgia meets NATOs political and military standards for applicant states as suggested in NATOs 1995 Study on Enlargement. In addition, this article assesses the transatlantic debate over enlargement at NATOs 2008 Bucharest Summit, and provides updated analysis of Georgias military capabilities after its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. The findings indicate that Georgia falls short of NATOs requested baseline measures for democratization and military modernization, and that the recent war in Georgia raises additional complications in Georgias ambitions for alliance membership.

As was clear at the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) recent summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATOs open-door membership policy remains alive and well. The twenty-six NATO allies extended new membership invitations to Albania and Croatia, and also indicated their support for Macedonias entry upon the resolution of the dispute over its formal name with Greece. In addition to these developments, Georgia and Ukraine received considerable attention at the summit, as some of the allies pushed aggressively for NATO to extend membership offers to these states to participate in NATOs Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the summit, the allies agreed that these two states will eventually become NATO members, but at the same time, hesitated on

Travis L. Bounds earned his M.A. in political science at Eastern Illinois University in 2008. Ryan C. Hendrickson is professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University. He is author of Diplomacy and War at NATO. The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War, and The Clinton Wars. Address correspondence to Ryan C. Hendrickson, Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University, 600 Lincoln Avenue, Department of Political Science, Charleston, IL 61920-3099. E-mail: rchendrickson@eiu.edu 20

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offering a formal invitation to join the MAP.1 Since the summit, Georgian membership in NATO has taken on heightened attention due to its military conflict with Russia in August 2008. While much has been written on the policies and impact of NATO expansion, including some assessments of recently admitted members to the alliance, very little analysis exists specifically on the history of Georgias relationship with NATO and its current efforts to gain admission into the alliance. This research fills that void by offering an analysis of this relationship, and provides an assessment of its current political and military reform efforts. In addition, this article provides some analysis on the intra-alliance diplomacy that shaped the Bucharest Summit, especially with regard to Georgias membership ambitions. We find that Georgia has made important progress in its military and political reforms, yet still has serious domestic problems that run directly counter to the initial conditions set forth for aspiring members in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. Given Georgias need for considerable political reforms, the politics of the Bucharest Summit demonstrate another element of the Bush administrations unilateral tendencies, but also indicates how peripheral NATOs admission standards have become in the current enlargement process. The recent war in Georgia now complicates Georgias ambitions to join the alliance, and at a minimum produced considerable damage to Georgias military infrastructure and raises further questions about the potential problems with full membership. We begin with a short literature review of NATO expansion, and follow with an analysis of Georgias aspirations to join the alliance.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Since NATO initiated its post-cold war reform efforts, much research has been devoted to the alliances membership enlargement. In the first expansion round at the Madrid Summit in 1997, membership offers were extended to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Much of the analysis of this expansion round focused on American leadership in guiding the enlargement process and the eventual decision.2 In the aftermath of the Madrid Summit, much analysis turned to the political impact of NATOs open-door policy and significance of this expansion decision. A number of studies noted that these new states had failed to continue with meaningful defense reforms, and simultaneously

1 NATO Press Release (2008) 049, Bucharest Summit Declaration (April 2, 2008) at http://www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html 2 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATOs Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press. 2003) and James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1999).

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raised serious policy qualms with another round of expansion.3 Despite the rather limited military capabilities, and ongoing challenges in civil-military relations across nearly all of the applicant states, NATO moved forward at the Prague Summit in November 2002 with membership offers to seven Central and East European states.4 Since this time, while many studies continue to note the rather small military capabilities of the Prague invitees, much research points to the positive impact NATO expansion has had on promoting democratic civil-military relations, and to some extent on the implementation of much needed defense reforms.5 More recently, as NATO again began to consider another round of membership expansion, other research examined the defense reform efforts implemented by Albania and Croatia. This research found that NATO has continued to be a catalyst for meaningful democratic reforms and military modernization, yet at the same time these aspiring member states still suffer in significant ways when measured against NATOs 1995 Study on Enlargement.6 Nonetheless, NATO moved forward with its expansion plans at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, which raises new questions about the policy impact of this decision. One of the more interesting developments in the days leading up to the Summit was the willingness of U.S. President George W. Bush, along with a few other allies, to push the alliance to offer Georgia and Ukraine invitations to join the Membership Action Plan, which was created at NATOs 1999 Washington Summit and is viewed as a significant step toward eventual membership. Within the current scholarship on NATO expansion, no analysis exists on Georgias efforts to join the alliance, specifically when measured against the political and military reforms all applicant states are expected to implement.7 Although some research exists on its foreign policy ambitions to join the alliance, the research presented here fills an important void in the
Celeste A. Wallander, NATOs Price: Shape Up or Ship Out, Foreign Affairs (November/December, 2002) pp. 28; Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 20002015 (Washington, D.C.: RAND 2000); Dan Reiter, Why NATO Enlargement Does not Spread Democracy, International Security 25 (Spring 2001) pp. 4167. 4 These states include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. For example, see Natalie L Mychajlyszyn and Harald von Reikhoff, eds. The Evolution in Civil-Military Relations in East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger 2004). See also Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Developing Mature National Security Systems in Post-Communist States: The Czech Republic and Slovakia, Armed Forces & Society 28 (May 2002) pp. 40325. 5 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the New Europe (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press 2005); Rachel A. Epstein, NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations, Security Studies 14 (Autumn 2005) pp. 5998; Timothy Edmunds, NATO and Its New Members, Survival 45 (Autumn 2003); Zoltan Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion (London: Cambridge University Press 2003). 6 Ryan C. Hendrickson, Jonathan Campbell, and Nicholas Mullikin, Albania and NATOs Open-Door Policy: Alliance Enlargement and Military Transformation, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 19 (June 2006) pp. 24357, and Ryan C. Hendrickson and Ryan P. Smith, Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership, Comparative Strategy 25, 4 (2006) pp. 297306. 7 Some previous research exists on Ukrainian civil-military relations within the context of NATO expansion. See Natalie L Mychajlyszyn, The Euro-Atlantic Strategic Culture, Democratic Civil-Military Relations, and Ukraine, in Natalie L Mychajlyszyn and Harald von Reikhoff, eds. The Evolution in CivilMilitary Relations in East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger 2004).
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scholarship on alliance expansion, just as Georgia membership aspirations heighten and NATO seems set to expand beyond Albania and Croatia.8

GEORGIA AND NATO

Georgia formally began diplomatic relations with NATO in 1992 when it joined NATOs Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In 1994, Georgia took the next step and joined NATOs Partnership for Peace program.9 Since that time, Georgia has maintained a close military partnership with the United States, which arguably culminated at the Bucharest Summit when the United States pushed for Georgias inclusion in the Membership Action Plan, despite considerable opposition raised by a number of allies, and certainly Russia. In the days leading up the Summit, it was clear that a number of allies, most notably, Germany and France, opposed discussion of Georgia and Ukraine as future members. Yet when the summit began, the Bush administration continued to push for both of these aspiring states to be considered as future allies. Others at the summit, including Italy, Hungary, Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands similarly sided with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was most public in her opposition to the American position.10 Nonetheless, Bush stated, Georgia and Ukraine is a very difficult issue for some nations here. Its not for me. I think that these nations are qualified nations to apply for membership application.11 In the United States Senate, in the aftermath of the Summit, bipartisan support also existed for the general direction of the Bush administration, which culminated in the Biden/Lugar Resolution, which expressed its general support for building closer ties between Ukraine, Georgia, and NATO.12 Apart from the United States, several other NATO members supported Georgias endeavors, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia.13 Even though it is not a member of the alliance, Sweden also supported Georgian membership. Yet at the summit, and up until the August 2008 conflict, no other member of the alliance,

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8 David Gudiashvili, NATO Membership as Georgias Foreign Policy Priority, Central Asia and the Caucasus 4 (2003) pp. 2432. 9 See aspects of Georgias NATO policy implementation record at http://www.nato.int/isues/natogeorgia/index.html 10 Steven Erlanger and Steven Lee Myers, Bush Effort Jolts Allies in NATO, New York Times (3 April 2008) p. A6. 11 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, President Bush Meets with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2 April 2008). 12 Press Release from Senator Richard Lugar, Biden/Lugar Resolution Supporting Ukraine and Georgia Admission to NATO Unanimously Passes the Senate (29 April 2008) at http://lugar.senate.gov/press/ record.cfm?id=296936 13 BBC Monitoring Europe, Regional Club Supporting Georgias NATO Bid to Meet in Poland on June 25 (24 June 2008).

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including Canada, The Netherlands, or the United Kingdom openly supported the American position.14 Although the geo-strategic issues have evolved considerably since the Summit, the question remains over how closely Georgia actually meets the general standards for NATO membership, which may also give some insight on why the American position received such little support at Bucharest. For this assessment, we employ two broad measures of analysis: democratic political reforms and electoral development, and military modernization/professionalization. These two measures were highlighted in NATOs 1995 Study on Enlargement, and have been used by others in assessing NATO applicant states.15 We begin with an analysis of Georgias trends in democratic reform and modernization.
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DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL REFORMS

The Soviet Unions breakup caused political turmoil across much of the Transcaucus region, and accordingly, Georgia has faced several political crises in the short time it has been a sovereign state. Among its challenges, the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the large ethnic Russian minority in those regions as well as in Georgia proper have been most prominent. In this regard, Georgia and Ukraine have some analogiesthe politics within both states have developed along similar lines. Much like Ukraine, two diametrically opposed ideologies exist in Georgia: the Pro-Western ideology of the current and recently re-elected President Mikheil Saakashvili under the United National Movement, and the pro-nationalist sentiments espoused by Davit Gamqrelidze under the New Right Party.16 Since 1992 there has been an Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observer mission in Tbilisi. The OSCE mission has monitored every election that has taken place in the Republic and has since expanded to observe the situation in the breakaway republics as part of the broader mandate.17 Since that time while Georgian officials have made progress towards having free and fair democratic elections, they have yet to meet the criteria set out by most election observation organizations. However, much progress has been made since its first elections since the Soviet

Colin Brown, EU Allies Unite Against Bush over NATO Membership for Georgia and Ukraine, The Independent (London) (3 April 2008). 15 See Thomas S. Szaynas, NATO Enlargement 20002015: Determinants and Implication for Defense Planning and Shaping (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2001). 16 For information on Georgian political parties see the Georgian Electoral Commission http://cec.gov.ge/ ?que=eng/elections-2008/home 17 Ibid.

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Unions fall, albeit incrementally they have gone from cronyism and farcical returns to competition with somewhat lopsided results.18 In 2008, Georgia had two national elections; the president and parliament were elected in two contests. The presidential election occurred on 5 January, and the Parliamentary election took placed on 21 May.19 As it had done before, the OSCE observed both elections with several other organizations, including observers from the European Union. The OSCE stated that while the January presidential election was the most democratic in the countrys history, there were still several problems. The problems highlighted by the OSCE included that the Central Election Commission (CEC) acted in an unprofessional and partisan manner, and there were several reports of voter intimidation via the threat to eliminate social welfare programs based upon how one voted in the election; people feared that their pension claims could either get a boost or would simply disappear depending on how one pledged to vote. In the parliamentary elections that followed, similar problems were again identified, although some improvements were noted. Observers noticed an overall decrease in intimidation and malicious balloting. The largest single problem, however, was that the government changed the electoral law at the last minute. This change was from a scheme that was in accordance with Western standards to one in which the main opposition argued that the implemented change favored the ruling party.20 The main change was literally the date of the election itself that the CEC had only loosely set a few weeks in advance of when polling was supposed to take place.21 Other indicators of democratic development are evident in Freedom House rating scores, who downgraded Georgias political rights and human liberties score from a 3 to a 4 in 2008 due to protests in the latter part of 2007. Yet in comparison to other countries in the caucuses Georgia fares better than others. The only other state in the region that is classified as partial free is Armenia with a political score of 5 and a human liberties score of 4. As compared to other members of NATO Georgia falls towards the bottom of the list, falling slightly behind Turkey and Albania, both with scores of 3.22

18 For more information on the history of Georgian elections see the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human RightsElections, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Election Documents at http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/documents.html 19 Information on the recent Georgian elections can be found at http://www.results.cec.gov.ge/ index.php?lang=eng 20 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Georgian Election in Essence Consistent with Most Commitments but Challenges Must Be Addressed Urgently, (January 6, 2008) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Despite Efforts to Conduct Election in Line with Standards, Observers Identify Problems (22 May 2008). 21 C. J. Chivers, Georgian Presidents Party Has Wide Lead in Voting, New York Times (23 May 2008) p. A16; Andrew E. Kramer, Georgias President Narrowly Wins Vote, New York Times (7 January 2008): p. A8. 22 Freedom Houses 2008 report on Georgia can be found at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7398

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The U.S. State Department annual report on human rights also gave mixed results for Georgia in 2007. There was some progress made in the judiciary, such as the legislature banning inappropriate communication between judges and political parties on ongoing litigation. The legislature also passed a general code of ethics for judges. Conversely, there were some negative developments. There was at least one reported instance of a death from police brutality and some evidence of general torture and mistreatment of detainees, as well as an inability for some citizens to avail themselves of defense attorneys during trial.23 Also, there was a general worsening of political freedoms during the latter half of 2007, such as additional restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech and general corruption in the government. Perhaps most troublesome is that despite government efforts there still remains a problem with human trafficking.24 Finally, the problem of breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia prior to the war also highlights Georgias problems in its inability to democratically resolve these secessionist movements. Prior to the war, both regions had immense Russian support and backing, and in many respects functioned as de facto independent states, albeit with the presence of Russian peacekeepers. Prior to the war, in an attempt to alleviate mounting pressure and the ever-increasing chance of open warfare, the United States proposed an international peacekeeping force in an attempt to stave off potential war, all of which highlighted the real potential for ongoing instability and conflict.25 When considered in total, Georgia has made important steps to democratize over the last decade, but at the same time still has considerable hurdles to overcome in order to meet the standards of western democratization and liberalism. Its downward slide in 2008 raises additional doubts about its democratization trends, and prior to the 2008 war with Russia, it was clear that South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained serious sources of potential conflict that had been unresolved in a democratic fashion. At the same time, a number of current and forthcoming NATO members similarly score poorly on some democratization measures. For example, while Turkey generally faired better in the political-democratization arena than Georgia, there were marked problems with torture beatings and abuse by its general security forces in 2007. While the security forces did not partake in any politically motivated murders, there were several reported deaths via Turkish security forces. Similar to Georgia, Turkey also has a problem with human trafficking and Albania similarly suffers from considerable

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23 For more on the reports of police brutality, see Amnesty International at http://www.amnesty.org/ en/news-and-updates/news/georgian-government-urged-introduce-police-id-20080313 24 See U.S. State Department Annual report on human rights at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2007/100560.htm 25 Associated Press, Abkhazia Rejects US-Proposed International Force (8 July 2008).

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levels of corruption, so it is not as if NATOs current and forthcoming members are immune to these democratic challenges.26 Nonetheless, it is still clear that Georgia has important challenges to overcome before it will be viewed as a fully democratized state.

GEORGIAS MILITARY REFORMS

Georgia has inherited several legacies from the Soviet Union including the large military structures that are endemic of the former Soviet Republics. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that the Georgian government has begun the process of implementing meaningful reforms to bring the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) more closely into compliance with NATO standards. Prior to its 2008 conflict with Russia, the modernization process was set to be implemented over three phases. Phase one begins with a general assessment of existing capabilities, which was to be completed in 2008. Phase two is dissemination of the information gathered from phase one and is slated to be finished around 2010. Phase three is contingent on developing near, mid- and long-term force structures and will determine the total cost and feasibility of implementing these reforms. This phase is not slated to be completed for at least a decade.27 Presently, the GAF consists of the Georgian Land, Air, Naval, and Special Forces along with the National Guard. Currently the total size of the GAF is 28,666 forces. The modernization goal is to reduce that size to 18,755 by 2015. Perhaps most interesting is the reorganization process that is currently underway. The modernization process has seen some radical changes occur within the structure of the armed forces, going from a large stationary Soviet-modeled military towards smaller, more state of the art and maneuverable armed forces.28 In addition to these reforms, Georgia also plans to examine how the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) deal with their responsibilities to evaluate the potential for any institutional overlap. In its own internal reports, Georgia notes that interoperability problems still exist, chiefly among them is the relative lack of English language training for Georgian troops and personnel, as well as the absence of a standing Land Forces headquarters and a human resources management system.29 Yet despite these problems, Georgia has played a unique role in the world with regard to its military deployments, and certainly is much different
26 The U.S. State Department Annual Report on Human Rights for Turkey can be found at http:// www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100589.htm. See also Hendrickson et al., op. cit., note 6. 27 See Georgian Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review: Final Report 2007 (English version). 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid: For analyses of the challenges of interoperability and English language training in previous enlargement rounds, see David M. Glantz, Accomplishments, Strengths and Weaknesses of the U.S. Military (Security) Assistance Program, 11, 4 Journal of Slavic Military Studies (1998) pp. 171.

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from the rest of the former Soviet Republics. First, it must be highlighted that Georgia has a long-standing and close relationship with the United States, which only grew closer during the recent Bush administration. In 2002, the United States initiated a $64 million training program to train and equip four specialized battalions. The United States Department of Defense stated that the modernization effort is being done not only to aid in interoperability efforts but at the time, to also combat terrorism, as intelligence at the time indicated that terrorist forces were hiding in Georgias Pankisi Gorge, which is located in the north part of the country and borders along Chechnya.30 It is also clear that in the aftermath of the 2008 conflict, both NATO and the United States continue to remain interested in rebuilding and assisting the Georgian Armed Forces.31 Georgia has also increasingly gained troop deployment experience. Georgia has played an important role in European, NATO and American military endeavors, which has included the deployment of peacekeeping forces to the Balkans in 1990s, including 184 troops in the NATO Kosovo Protection Force.32 In Iraq, Georgia has provided up to 2,000 troops to assist the United States, which has made them the third largest contributor to the operation; most of its troops are deployed near the Iranian border. This cooperation is especially noteworthy given that many states have reduced or completely left Iraq, although Georgia significantly reduced its presence in August 2008, literally closing out operations in Iraq in response to Russian military maneuvers in South Ossetia. In contrast, however, in Afghanistan, which NATO has repeatedly emphasized is its number one priority, Georgia currently has only one troop. In this respect, where NATO is engaged in sustained military combat abroad, Georgia has clearly preferred to support the American operation in Iraq, rather than NATO.33 Nonetheless, Georgia sees its military commitments abroad as a route to NATO membership. Its deployment in Iraq has allowed the Ministry of Defense to highlight its military modernization and Western training. Georgians argue that the combination of their rapidly modernizing military and their strategic location in the Caucusus make them a prime candidate for NATO membership.34

U.S. Department of Defense http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43997 American Troops, Training; Equipping Georgian Military Kathleen T. Rhem (2002 May 30). See also Ken Stier, A $64-Million US Training Program for Georgian Troops Begins This Month, Christian Science Monitor (17 May 2002). See also S. Neil MacFarlane, Russia, NATO Enlargement and the Strengthening of Democracy in the European Space, in Aurel Braun, ed. NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge 2008) p. 47, and Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Russia, in Aurel Braun, ed. NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge 2008) p. 105, note 39. 31 Headquarters, United States European Command, See EUCOM Commander Assesses Georgian Needs, (22 August 2008) at http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=1801 32 See http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=121 33 Collin Matthew Georgia to Double Troops in Iraq BBC News (March 9, 2007). International Security Assistance Force (1 September 2008) at http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf 34 Neil Arun, op. cit.

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Apart from its military deployments, another sign of its modernization efforts, at least in the days prior to the 2008 conflict with Russia, is that Georgia possessed approximately 40 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which the Georgian Ministry of Defense purchased from Israel. Prior to the war with Russia, Georgia employed these UAVs in the breakaway regions to do surveillance and counterinsurgency operations.35 The conflict with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia provided additional insight on Georgian military capabilities. The Georgian air defenses were able to shoot down at least six Russian aircraft, which indicates some air defense capabilities, although Russia was flying its Sukhoi-25, which is quite dated as a ground attack aircraft. Georgia was also dependent upon American air transport to get 2000 of its combat forces back home from Iraq, which clearly indicates its inability to have national aircraft troop projection capabilities, even at a time of national emergency. In this regard, Georgia would be able to contribute little to the wider alliance needs in the event that a rapid military response was required. In addition, Russian troops did considerable damage to much of Georgias military infrastructure, which included the seizure of a base in Senaki that was well beyond the Abkhazia and South Ossetia borders. This base was constructed with American military assistance and was intended to comport with NATO standards. Moreover, in actual combat operations it appears that Georgian military forces suffered from internal communication problems.36 In addition, Russian troops captured American Humvee vehicles, destroyed coast guard vessels, and destroyed Georgia air defenses and radars. Other journalistic information indicates that Russia captured Georgia tanks and other weapons and munitions.37 Thus, while the American-Georgian military relationship has grown, especially since 2002, and its deployment experience is unique compared to other NATO applicant states, it is also clear that the Georgian Armed Forces offer limited benefits to the wider alliance, especially in the aftermath of the war. While Georgia had been making progress in terms of its military modernization plans, its ongoing deficiencies were highlighted quite profoundly in the 2008 conflict.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GEORGIA AND NATO EXPANSION

Our analysis indicates that Georgia fails to meet the 1995 alliance membership standards across a number of political and military measures. The

35 36

BBC News, Press Summary for Georgias Breakaway Region of Abkhazia (13 June 2008). Thom Shanker, Russians Melded Old-School Blitz with Modern Military Tactics, New York Times (August 17, 2008) p. A8; Peter Finn, Russia Pushes into Georgia; In Undisputed Area, Troops Seize Town and Military Base, Washington Post (12 August 2008) p. A1. 37 Jan Cienski, Tbilisi Admits It Miscalculated Russian Reaction, Financial Times (22 August 2008) p. 7.

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United States support for Georgia at the Bucharest Summit also exposes how little the 1995 measures apply to current American foreign policy. This is not the first time that the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement has been ostensibly disregarded, but the American position on Georgia highlights the studys irrelevance in new ways. It is certainly obvious that Georgia has made impressive strides in military modernization, and that important advances in democratization have occurred as well, yet its electoral difficulties in 2008 and the recent conflict with Russia indicate just how far Georgia has to go before it could be considered a security producer rather than a security consumer for the allies. Moreover, given the ostensibly close diplomatic and military relationship between the United States and Georgia, and Georgias repeated and unanswered calls for American, European, and NATO military assistance during the 2008 conflict, it does not appear that the NATO allies are willing, at least at this time, to provide a meaningful promise of collective defenseall of which raises doubts over the wisdom of further NATO expansion to Georgia. It is difficult to gauge the long-term impact of Georgias war with Russia on NATO enlargement decisions. On 19 August 2008, NATOs North Atlantic Council agreed to the creation of a NATO-Georgia Commission that would assess the damage done in the war, and work to assist Georgia in its recovery efforts. At the same time, the diplomatic response across Europe remained mixed to Russias military strikes. While a consensus existed across Europe that Russian military actions against Georgia must end, many in Eastern Europe were far more critical of Russia than other European states.38 What seems clear is that if Georgia is invited to join the alliance, this decision will be made without a meaningful application of NATOs political and military metrics for expansion.

38 John Thornhill and Daniel Dombey, NATO in Display of Unity over Georgia, Financial Times (August 18 2008); NATO Press Release, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 19 August 2008 (August 19, 2008) at http:// www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-104e.html