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Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013 Stephen Marrin.

Intelligence Education: Towards What Ends? Romanian SRI Conference Proceedings. Forthcoming 2013. Intelligence studies and associated degrees in higher education are part of the wild west of academia; a place where there is much opportunity and few rules. It also has a bit of the gold rush thrown in, as academic institutions have taken advantage of the recent increase in funding that has been devoted to the intelligence and security sectors since the 2001 terrorist attacks. Over the past ten years, many new and different kinds of academic intelligence studies programs have been created at both the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. The one kind of degree that has not yet been created is the intelligence studies doctorate. As the doctorate is the end of education, what are the potential benefits and problems associated with the creation of different kinds of intelligence doctorates? Stephen Marrin. Evaluating CIAs Analytic Performance: Reflections of a Former Analyst. ORBIS. Vol. 57. Issue 2. (Spring 2013). 325-339. Many people point to high profile failures like 9/11 and Iraq as indicators that CIAs analytic performance is inadequate or flawed. Flawed by design. A legacy of ashes. A culture of failure. Or so goes the conventional wisdom. Fortunately this conventional wisdom is wrong. These so-called failures more accurately represent the perennial dilemmas and tradeoffs associated with the analytic function and, most importantly, the inappropriate expectation that these observers hold of CIAs ability to prevent surprises. As a matter of fact, there is much that people do not fully understand about the CIA. This article evaluates CIAs analytic performance from the perspective of a former analyst. Stephen Marrin. Why Teach About Intelligence. Guide to the Study of Intelligence. Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO). 2013. Intelligence studies gain a lot of attention because of the links to spies and spying. The subject influences popular culture through action-packed books, television shows and movies, and consequently people become curious about the real world of intelligence. The success of the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC, demonstrates the overlap between myth and reality. Teaching about intelligence provides an opportunity to bring James Bond and Jack Ryan into the classroom, but the actual substance of intelligence studies can be much, much more than what Hollywood depicts. This article provides an overview of the field of intelligence education, including methods, approaches, and resources used to teach intelligence.

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013 Stephen Marrin. Rethinking Analytic Politicization.Intelligence and National Security. Vol. 28. No. 1. 2013. 32-54. Politicization as a term used in intelligence studies is poorly defined, conceptualized, and operationalized. Despite the negative connotations associated with the word politicization that equate it with a form of corruption, it is not entirely clear what it is a corruption of. In short, the concept of politicization is for the most part analytically useless. This article critiques the existing status quo conceptualization for being overly broad and insufficiently nuanced, explores the nature of analytic politicization as a subset of politicization writ large, and replaces it with a narrower conceptualization that explains what makes analytic politicization bad and deserving of condemnation. Based on this evaluation, one can conclude that much of what is considered to be politicization in a corrupted sense is really just a naturally-occurring consequence of analysis and interpretation in a policy or political context. Stephen Marrin. Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence Analysis: By What MisMeasure?Intelligence and National Security. Vol. 27. No. 6. (December 2012). 896912. Each of the criteria most frequently used to evaluate the quality of intelligence analysis has limitations and problems. When accuracy and surprise are employed as absolute standards, their use reflects unrealistic expectations of perfection and omniscience. Scholars have adjusted by exploring the use of a relative standard consisting of the ratio of success to failure, most frequently illustrated using the batting average analogy from baseball. Unfortunately even this relative standard is flawed in that there is no way to determine either what the batting average is or should be. Finally, a standard based on the decisionmakers perspective is sometimes used to evaluate the analytic products relevance and utility. But this metric, too, has significant limitations. In the end, there is no consensus as to which is the best criteria to use in evaluating analytic quality, reflecting the lack of consensus as to what the actual purpose of intelligence analysis is or should be. Stephen Marrin. Is Intelligence Analysis an Art or a Science? International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 25. No. 3. Fall 2012. 1-17. A discussion, sometimes portrayed as a debate, has been taking place for decades addressing the issue of whether intelligence analysis is an art or a science. In 2009 and again in 2010, this debate over the question of whether intelligence analysis is an art or science was engaged through the e-mail list of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE). In total, the discussion involved over 30 participants and well over 50 messages, reflecting a wide range of perspectives on the issue. Insights gleaned from this discussion about the nature of intelligence analysis can have implications for the future of practicing, teaching, and learning intelligence analysis.

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013
Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Studies Centers: Making Scholarship on Intelligence Analysis Useful. Intelligence and National Security. Vol. 27. No. 3. June 2012. 398-422. Intelligence Studies Centers have much to offer in terms of bridging the gap between intelligence analysis scholarship and practice. Just as there is a much discussed gap between theory and practice in political science which can be closed through a number of mechanisms described by a variety of authors, the more specialized discipline of intelligence studies has a similar gap that also needs to be closed. Ideas drawn from political science for closing the gap between theory and practice may also have relevance in doing so for intelligence studies as well. In particular, academic Intelligence Studies Centers hold particular promise for bridging that gap by providing an institutional bridge between the kinds of knowledge resident in the scholarship and the informational or conceptual needs of analytic practitioners. Stephen Marrin. Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice. Routledge. June 2011. Improving intelligence analysis requires bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Compared to the more established academic disciplines of political science and international relations, intelligence studies scholarship is generally quite relevant to practice. Yet a substantial gap exists nonetheless. This book is intended to help bridge the gap by providing a guided roadmap through the scholarship on mechanisms and methods for improving intelligence analysis processes and products. A wide variety of potentially useful ideas are addressed in this volume including the nature of intelligence analysis as an art and science and mechanisms to improve both, the creation and operation of analytic teams, the development of training and education programs, the exploitation of best practices from other fields such as medicine, and the creation and promulgation of formal professional practices. It is from ideas for improvement such as these that scholarship can have its greatest impact on the practice of intelligence analysis. Stephen Marrin. The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence and National Security. V. 26, Nos. 2-3 April-June 2011. 1-21. The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been intensively examined as both tactical and strategic intelligence failures but less attention has been paid to the policy failures which preceded them. Perhaps this is due to the presumption that intelligence analysis influences decision-making as a precursor to and foundation for policy. This assumption about the influence of analysis on decision deserves a much closer examination. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provide a good case to study for greater understanding of the influence, or lack of influence, that intelligence analysis has on decision-making. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission Report identifies as a significant failure the lack of a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001, and implies that if one had been produced it might have helped enable decision-makers to prevent the 9/11 attacks. In other words, a failure of strategic intelligence analysis lay at the foundation of the failure to prevent 9/11. But was this really the case? This article takes a closer look at the case of the missing National Intelligence Estimate by first evaluating what decision-makers knew about the threat prior to the 9/11 attacks, the policies they were implementing at the time, and the extent to which the hypothetical National Intelligence Estimate described by the 9/11 Commission would have mattered in terms of influencing their judgement and policy for the better. It concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were more a failure of policy than strategic intelligence analysis.

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013 Stephen Marrin. National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968 80: An American Experiment in a British Style of Analysis? Intelligence and National Security Vol. 24, No. 5, 644673, October 2009. (With Philip H.J. Davies) http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a915530081~db=all~jumptyp e=rss At a time of intense debate over the specific organizational arrangements of American national security agencies with new or refocused intelligence responsibilities, the relative proximity between intelligence producers and consumers is a key issue. Intelligence capabilities may have to be kept separate from decision-making because of organizational economies of scale and scope, but separation alone does not mean intelligence must be distant from decision-making. For example, the British style of analysis involves a much closer relationship between intelligence producers and consumers than exists in the American context. Efforts to improve the integration of intelligence into decision-making by closing the distance between them would do well to study the history and efficacy of this process as they look to create new ways of structuring the relationship between intelligence analysis and decision-making. Specifically, history demonstrates that the US National Security Council staff implemented a process in 1968 through 1980 that approximated the British style of analysis, and this may provide US policymakers with a model for bridging the gap between intelligence analysis and decision-making. Stephen Marrin. Training and Educating US Intelligence Analysts. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 22. Issue 1. (Winter 20082009). 131-146. http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/382975__906605154.pdf In the United States, the training and education of national security intelligence analysts in both government and academia is undergoing significant changes. The traditional distinction between training in government and education in academia is disappearing as the government fosters education in intelligence analysis at the same time that academia is embedding analytic training into its degree-granting programs. Additional changes are likely as analytic training is subsumed into a broader national effort to professionalize the countrys analytic corps. In the end, the professionalization of intelligence analysis will change what intelligence educators do in two different ways: they will be required to do a better job proving that the programs produce better analysts, especially if their efforts are to become a required part of the professionalization process. And they will be required to work harder at creating a cumulative literature that provides the conceptual and theoretical foundation for the emergence of a more formal and improved intelligence profession.

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013 Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Analysis and Decisionmaking: Methodological Challenges. Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates. (Eds. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian). Routledge. 2008. 131-150. http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415429474/ This chapter examines how the intelligence literature has historically represented the processes involved in turning data into usable knowledge, as well as how that knowledge is subsequently used by decisionmakers. It then evaluates and critiques the standard approach taken to portray the incorporation of intelligence analysis into decisionmaking, and recommends that a new kind of theory be developed to explain how intelligence analysis is actually used by decisionmakers. Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities. Intelligence and National Security. 22:6 (December 2 007). 821846. (abstract only available here: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a788236837~db=all~order=p age This article presents a theoretical framework to explain why there was such a wide variety of perspectives regarding the future need for intelligence, embeds these ideas within the existing intelligence theory literature, applies this framework more generally in a way that can be used to explain variations in the substantive coverage of intelligence analysis in the past and predict possible variations in the future, and then tests the theorys ability to explain the analytical focus of domestic intelligence organizations. In sum, this is a theory explaining the purpose and scope of foreign intelligence analysis. Stephen Marrin. At Arms Length or At the Elbow?: Explaining the Distance between Analysts and Decisionmakers. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. Vol. 20, No. 3. (Fall 2007). 401 414. http://pds4.egloos.com/pds/200705/16/77/at_arms_length_or_at_the_elbow.pdf This article argues that the hierarchical and adversarial national security decision making process explains the relative distance between intelligence analysts and decisionmakers in the US, and that this distance is legitimated by a myth that analysts possess based on an idealizedand unrealisticconception of the decisionmaking process. It concludes by arguing that closing the distance between intelligence analysis and decisionmaking in the United Statesand thereby improving the integration of intelligence analysis into policymakingwill require that intelligence analysts possess a more realistic understanding of their (limited) role in decisionmaking than is currently prevalent in intelligence culture, and work within the broader hierarchical decisionmaking culture to improve the analytic support that decisionmakers get from intelligence analysts.

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013 Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Analysis: Structured Methods or Intuition? American Intelligence Journal. Vol. 25. No. 1. (Summer 2007). 7-16. Recentlyafter the release of the 9/11 Commission and WMD Commission Reports--a substantial amount of money and attention has been devoted to the identification and development of structured analytic techniques for capturing, presenting, and evaluating data more effectively; deriving patterns from the data; understanding what those patterns mean; and communicating them to others. But less attention has been focused on the utility of structured methods, their fit with the reigning analytic culture, and when they should be used, or not used, by analysts. This article addresses these issues using medical practices to illustrate how the same kinds of dynamics can play out in the field of intelligence analysis. Stephen Marrin. Adding Value to the Intelligence Product. Handbook of Intelligence Studies. (Ed. Loch Johnson) Routledge. 2006. 199-210. http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415777834/ This chapter argues that intelligence consumers would be better served by improvements to both the science and art of intelligence analysis. The science of intelligence analysis can be improved through greater rigor in the application of the scientific method in the analytic process, as well as modeling intelligence analysis production processes more closely on those that exist at the Government Accountability Office. In addition, the art of intelligence analysis can be improved through intelligence analysts increased use of empathy (in terms of seeing the world from the others perspective) and imagination (based primarily on that which exists in historical interpretation).

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013 Stephen Marrin. Modeling an Intelligence Analysis Profession on Medicine. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 19. No. 4. (Winter 2006-2007). 642-665. (co-authored with Dr. Jonathan Clemente) http://www.stuart-hall.com/ftp/IJIC--Vol19No4--Marrin%20and%20Clemente-Modeling%20an%20IntellAnalysis%20Profession%20on%20Medicine.pdf This article provides a vision for the future of intelligence analysis spanning the national security, law enforcement, and business intelligence disciplines and provides a recommendation for how to achieve that vision. It argues that intelligence analysis across all of the intelligence disciplines is spontaneously professionalizing, but the process is inefficient and ineffective without a centralizing entity to provide structure and direction for the professionalization process. It suggests that modeling this process on the way medicine professionalized from about 1850 through the 1900s via the efforts of a centralizing association (the American Medical Association) would be a more effective way to professionalize. The AMA provides a mechanism for the medical profession to find common ground and bridge differences between many different medical specialties that have very different substantive knowledge bases. For example, doctors that do brain surgery and doctors that examine foot problems are still doctors even though their specialties are very, very different. Medicine links the different specialties together by binding them under the overall mission of improving the health of the patient. The field of intelligence analysis could do something similar. Law enforcement intelligence analysts are different from national security intelligence analysts who are different from business intelligence analysts; they all need to know different things and the kinds of analysis they do are different as well. But since all intelligence analysts use similar techniques to achieve the same goal--providing information to improve decisionmakingbinding them together into a single profession should be achievable by using their common characteristics to build a core set of best practices--and a single code of ethics--that can be standardized across the entire range of analytic disciplines. Yet at the same time greater professionalism does not have to require uniformity. The medical profession also provides flexibility in the standards that apply to different medical specialties. It does this by establishing specialty boards that define the knowledge, skills and abilities required for that specialty. Where differences between intelligence analysis specialties are too great to be combined under a single common standard, intelligence analysis can follow the medical model by establishing similar boards or committees. Accordingly, the creation of an American Intelligence Analysis Association as an overarching organization could provide a more solid foundation for the continued improvement of intelligence analysis, and argue thatshould this association be created-over time it would establish intelligence analysis as a true profession in its own right. 7

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013
Stephen Marrin. Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 18. No. 4. (2005). 707-729. (co-authored with Dr. Jonathan D. Clemente). http://dungarvanconference.mcintel.net/images/d/d1/Marrin-Improving_Intell_Analysis_by_Looking_to_Medicine.pdf This article identifies some of the many ideas for intelligence reform that can be found in medical practices. Co-authored by Dr. Jonathan Clemente--a practicing physician and expert in the history of medical intelligence--this article addresses both the similarities and differences between intelligence analysis and medical diagnosis, including epistemological differences resulting from their different theoretical bases. The article goes on to outline a number of procedural reforms modeled from medicine that could improve many aspects of intelligence practice including: the prioritization of collection resources; the detection of denial and deception; the accuracy of analysis; and the quality of information flowing from intelligence agencies to national security decisionmakers. Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Analysis: Turning a Craft Into a Profession. Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Intelligence Analysis. McLean, VA. May 2005. https://analysis.mitre.org/proceedings/Final_Papers_Files/97_Camera_Ready_Paper.pdf Even though intelligence analysiswhich possesses characteristics of both crafts and professions--is frequently referred to as a profession, in actuality it has been practiced more like a craft. As a result, it lacks many of the benefits of formal professions, such as structured personnel practices, and possesses no quality control mechanism to ensure the reliability of the individual analysts output. Turning intelligence analysis from a craft into a profession would provide the opportunity for improvement in both individual and organizational performance due to the adoption of formal personnel practices and standardization of best practices across all intelligence agencies. Stephen Marrin. Preventing Intelligence Failures By Learning From the Past. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. V. 17. No. 4.(2004). 655672. http://www.gustavholmberg.com/bkurs04/archives/IJIC%20Vol17No4--Marrin.pdf This article profiles the strategic surprise and intelligence failure literatures to derive ideas for reformsincluding various means to improve the accuracy of intelligence such as alternative analysis or competitive analysis--that could improve the quality of intelligence analysis and possibly prevent future intelligence failures. As I conclude: "The identification of causes of past failure leads to kernels of wisdom in the form of process modifications that could make the intelligence product more useful. A more effective, more accurate intelligence capability may still be vulnerable to the cognitive and institutional pathologies that cause failure, but a self-conscious and rigorous program based on the lessons derived from the existing literature would strengthen the intelligence product. This might lead to greater policymaker ability to respond to challenges, and thereby contribute to the national security of the United States."

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013 Stephen Marrin. Book Review: General William Odoms Fixing Intelligence. Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 119. No. 2. (Summer 2004). 352-353. http://www.psqonline.org/?redir=%2F99_article.php3%3Fbyear%3D2004%26bmonth%3 Dsummer%26a%3Dbr14free This short review critiques Gen. Odoms book for focusing exclusively on organizational structure without addressing the standard operating procedures, informal processes, task forces, and working groups (that act) as malleable mechanisms to bridge the inadequacies of organizational structure. I conclude that it is impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of the structural reforms he advocates because he does not address organizational process. A similar critique could be applied to the emphasis on structural reform arising from the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Stephen Marrin. Improving the CIAs Analysis. Washington Times OpEd/Letters to the Editor. February 22, 2004. B2. This essay evaluates CIAs production processes in light of the pre-war Iraq WMD intelligence issue, focusing on the importance of caveats in finished intelligence. It advocates improved validation of raw intelligence and the use of alternative or competitive analysis in finished intelligence reports. Stephen Marrin. Homeland Security Intelligence: Just the Beginning. Journal of Homeland Security. November 2003. Also reprinted under the same title in: The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies. Vol. 14. No. 1. (Winter/Spring 2004). 43-51. http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/marrin.html This article provides an overview of the development and growth in the roles and missions of the US foreign intelligence community and uses it as a model to argue that a similar growth will likely happen in the domestic arena due to the inevitable expansion of technological capabilities. If this in fact does occur, the expanding roles and missions of domestic intelligence agencies will likely pose a threat to civil liberties. The article concludes by suggesting that the threat to civil liberties could be countered through the incorporation of overlapping procedural guidelines and oversight mechanisms at the creation of each new domestic intelligence program.

Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013
Stephen Marrin. CIAs Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 16. No. 4 (Winter 2003/2004). 609-637. http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/031223/a478766610e2c6a4f12bdead70d545ab/2003_ IJIC_Article__CIAs_Kent_School__Improving_Training_for_New_Analysts%5B1%5D.pdf This article provides the history behind the creation of CIA's Sherman Kent School in 2000, describes the CIA's career analyst program for new analysts circa mid-2002 (based on interviews with the Kent School's director and three program managers), assesses the hypothetical benefits that improved training could have on institutional output, and places the training program back within institutional context by arguing that improved training won't be able to achieve its potential if organizational structures and bureaucratic processes are not aligned in ways that are consistent with an analyst's acquisition and application of analytic expertise. The Kent Schools training program was highlighted on pages 4-6 of the July 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligences Report on the U.S. Intelligence Communitys Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq; this article provides a much more detailed description of it. Stephen Marrin. Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institutional Obstacles. Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices. Russell G. Swenson, Editor. Joint Military Intelligence College: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. May 2003. 40-59. http://www.ndic.edu/press/5138.htm This article looks at how CIAs institutional practices can prevent full utilization of lessons learned in training, education, or other knowledge-building endeavors. Specifically, it assesses both the dissolution of CIA's Office of Leadership Analysis and the changing emphasis on current versus long-term intelligence, and in the end argues that organizational and procedural modifications may be necessary to improve the CIA's analytic output. Specifically, that CIA should re-constitute its Office of Current Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports to take advantage of individual analysts' cognitive strengths. Stephen Marrin. Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign Intelligence. Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age Background Paper. October 2002. Also reprinted under the same title in: The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies. Vol. 13. No. 2. (Winter/Spring 2003). 25-36 This background paper describes how foreign intelligence analysis contributes to homeland security. It begins with a description of the structure and operations of the intelligence community, and then focuses more tightly on CIAs analytic practices before addressing the role of the DCIs Counterterrorist Center in providing intelligence analysis to national level decisionmakers. This paper provides similar content but at a much greater level of granularity to the subsection titled An Analysts Daily Taskings and The Finished Product on pages 6-8 of the July 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligences Report on the U.S. Intelligence Communitys Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.

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Abstracts and Links to Intelligence Studies Publications Stephen Marrin spm8p@yahoo.com 12 April 2013
Stephen Marrin. Foreign Policy and Intelligence. H-Net List for Diplomatic History. March 3 2002. Reposted to the Intelforum Bulletin Board sponsored by Intelligence and National Security. This piece--linking foreign policy informational requirements to intelligence roles and missions-provides a theoretical framework that could be used either as an academic exercise in creating a theory of intelligence or as a tool for intelligence community strategic planning. Stephen Marrin. New Special Operations Component Necessary? Email posted to Intelforum Bulletin Board sponsored by Intelligence and National Security. Sept 15, 2001. This think piece written a couple of days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks advocated for the creation of a new kind of covert special operations component in order to provide more robust tactical intelligence support to special operations units to facilitate their anti-terror mission. It provides context regarding the need for this kind of tactical humint in light of the recent revelations regarding the creation of the Defense Departments Strategic Support Branch. Stephen Marrin. The CIA's Kent School: A Step in the Right Direction. The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies. V.11. No. 2. (Winter 2000). 55-57. This short 3 page article contributed to the creation of CIA University in 2002. In 1999 I floated a proposal to an internal CIA discussion group saying in part that "a good argument could be made for centralizing (a number of disparate CIA units around the Kent School) and creating a mini-university within CIA." This article further developed the thought by suggesting that CIA create a CIA University to both create and disseminate knowledge regarding best practices throughout the agency. As quoted from page 56 of this article: The (CIAs Sherman) Kent School could form the core of a center of learning and innovation--a CIA University--where knowledgeable insiders could collaborate with insightful outsiders to develop both the theory and practice of intelligence analysis tradecraft and teach it to interested practitioners. Synergies resulting from the formal integration of analytical occupational standards; methodological training, and alternative and innovative approaches to intelligence analysis would result in greater conceptual variety, a pre-requisite for effective institutional change. The creation of the equivalent of a graduate program would provide the appropriate environment and resources for promising young intelligence officers to work with more experienced senior intelligence officers on projects developing new intelligence products, processes, and dissemination methods. From these projects could come the kernels of insight to foster improvements in intelligence analysis. In addition, such a structure would provide bureaucratic protection for the innovators and experimenters willing to use their insight and a trial-and-error approach to test concepts while allowing for failure but pursuing success.

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