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J. R. LUCAS

Theoremseemsto me to provethat Mechanism is false, thatis, thatmindscannotbe explained as machines. So also has it seemedto manyotherpeople: almosteverymathematical logician to has confessed I have put the matter to similar but has thoughts, to commit himself feltreluctant untilhe could see the definitely setout,withall objections wholeargument statedand properly fully This I attempt to do. met.2 states that in any consistent Godel's theorem systemwhichis strongenoughto produce simple arithmetic thereare formulae which cannotbe proved-in-the-system, but whichwe can see to be true. Essentially, we considerthe formula which says, in effect, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system". If this formula were we should have a contradiction: provable-in-the-system, for if it thenit would not be unprovable-inwere provable-in-the-system, so that "This formulais unprovable-in-the-system" the-system, would be false: equally,if it wereprovable-in-the-system, then it but wouldbe true, wouldnotbe false, sinceinanyconsistent system falsecan be proved-in-the-system, nothing but onlytruths. So the "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" formula is notprovablebutunprovable-in-the-system. iftheformula in-the-system, Further, is unprovable-in-the-system" "This formula is unprovable-in-thethenit is truethatthatformula is unprovable-in-the-system, system, is unprovable-in-the-system" that is, "This formula is true. The foregoing argument is very fiddling, and difficult to grasp to puttheargument it is helpful theother consider fully: wayround, the possibility that "This formulais unprovable-in-the-system" and thus that the mightbe false,show that that is impossible, is true; whenceit follows formula that it is unprovable. Even so, remains the argument we feelthat there persistently unconvincing: mustbe a catchin itsomewhere. Thewhole labourofGadel'stheorem is to showthatthereis no catchanywhere, and thatthe resultcan
G6DEL'S A paper read to the OxfordPhilosophicalSociety on October 30, I959. and Intelligence":Mind, I950, See A. M. Turing: "ComputingMachinery pp. 433-60, reprintedin The World of Mathematics,edited by James R. and K. R. Popper: "Indeterminismin Quantum Newman, pp. 2099-123; Physics and Classical Physics"; British Journalfor Philosophyof Science, Vol. I (I95I), pp. 179-88. The questionis touchedupon by Paul Rosenbloom; Elements of MathematicalLogic; pp. 207-8; Ernest Nagel and James R. and by Hartley Rogers; Theory of Newman; G6del's proof, pp. 100-2; (mimeographed), Computability Recursive Functionsand Effective 1957, Vol. I, pp. 152 ff.
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all formal it holdsfor deduction; by themostrigorous be established (ii) adequate forsimplearithmetic whichare (i) consistent, systems of addition and the operations -i.e. containthe naturalnumbers it shows that they are incomplete-i.e. and multiplication-and some formulae, meaningful, thoughperfectly containunprovable, be to can see system, the outside we, standing moreover, of which, true. because machines, must apply to cybernetical G6del's theorem be concrete a it that should it is of the essenceof beinga machine, thatgivenany machine It follows system. ofa formal instantiation thereis arithmetic, simple and capable ofdoing whichis consistent the true-i.e. as being whichit is incapableofproducing a formula be to whichwe can see is unprovable-in-the-system-but formula that no machinecan be a completeor adequate true. It follows machines. different from areessentially thatminds ofthemind, model machinean apparatuswhich by a cybernetical We understand set of rules. to a definite according a set of operations performs a machine:that is, we give it a set of we "programme" Normally and we feed about whatit is to do in each eventuality; instructions is to perform its on whichthe machine in the initial"information" thatthemindmight the possibility Whenwe consider calculations. we have such a model in view; we mechanism be a cybernetical neuralcircuits, of complicated supposethat the brainis composed fed in by the sensesis "processed"and and that the information then use. If it is sucha mechanism, acted uponor storedforfuture way in whichit is giventhe way in whichit is programmed-the whichhas been fed into it, the "wiredup"-and the information sufficient and could, granted response-the"output"-is determined, time,be calculated.Our idea of a machineis just this, that its is completely determined by the way it is made and the behaviour of its actingon its own: "stimuli":thereis no possibility incoming and a certain ofconstruction inputofinformaform givena certain shall a in certain act We, it way. must however, specific then tion, not withwhat a machinemustdo, but withwhat it be concerned the wholeset of ruleswhich can do. That is, insteadof considering willdo in givencircumwhata machine determine exactly together whichwill we shall consider onlyan outlineof thoserules, stances, but not completely. of the machine, the possibleresponses delimit at every theoperations rules willdetermine completely The complete a be definite will there e.g. "If instruction, at stage; everystage divide and add one two than by and is greater the number prime however, we, factor": its smallest divideby two: if it is not prime, of therebeingalternative instructions, the possibility will consider and bottom by any number you may dividetop e.g. "In a fraction In thus and denominator". of both numerator factor whichis a
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PHILOSOPHY of our model, so that it is no longer relaxingthe specification completely we shall determinist, thoughstill entirely mechanistic, be able to takeintoaccounta feature often formechanical proposed modelsofthemind, thattheyshouldcontain namely a randomizing device. One could build a machinewherethe choice betweena was settledby, say, the number number of alternatives of radium atomsto have disintegrated in a givencontainer in the past halfminute.It is prima facie plausiblethat our brainsshouldbe liable a cosmicraymight to random effects: wellbe enough to trigger off a neuralimpulse.But clearlyin a machinea randomizing device to choose any alternative could not be introduced it whatsoever: can only be permitted to choose betweena numberof allowable alternatives. It is all rightto add any number chosenat random to bothsidesofan equation, but notto add one number to one side and anotherto the other.It is all rightto choose to prove one ofEuclid rather theorem thananother, or to use one method rather than another, but not to "prove" something whichis not true,or to use a "methodof proof"whichis not valid. Any randomizing devices must allow choicesonly betweenthose operations which will not lead to inconsistency: whichis exactlywhat the relaxed of our modelspecifies. specification Indeed,one mightput it this whata completely way: insteadof considering determined machine whata machine must do, we shallconsider be able to do ifit might had a randomizing device that acted whenever thereweretwo or none of moreoperations which could lead to inconsistency. possible, If such a machinewerebuilt to producetheorems about arithmetic(in manyways the simplest part of mathematics), it would number of components, have only a finite and so therewould be number of typesof operation it could do, and onlya onlya finite initial number of it could operateon. Indeed, finite assumptions and saythatthere we can go further, wouldonlybe a definite number and of initialassumptions, of types of operation, that could be built intoit. Machinesare definite: whichwas indefinite anything or infinite we shouldnot count as a machine.Note that we say not numberof operations. numberof typesof operation, Given that it did not wear out, a machine sufficient time,and provided an operation couldgo onrepeating it is merely indefinitely: thatthere number of different can be onlya definite sorts of operation it can perform. If thereare only a definite numberof types of operation and built into the system, initialassumptions we can represent them written downon paper.We can parallelthe all by suitablesymbols operationby rules ("rules of inference" or "axiom schemata") allowingus to go fromone or more formulae (or even fromno at all) to another formula and we can parallelthe initial formula,
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proposi("primitive formulae (ifany) by a set ofinitial assumptions these tions","postulates"or "axioms"). Oncewe have represented all we need do everysingleoperation: on paper,we can represent before and afterthe the situation representing is to give formulae operation,and note which rule is being invoked.We can thus themachine on paperany possiblesequenceofoperations represent we Howeverlong the machinewenton operating, mightperform. could, given enough time, paper and patience,write down an This analoguewouldin fact operations. analogueof the machine's ofthemachine is represented by be a formal everyoperation proof: of one of the rules:and the conditions whichdeterthe application an operation can be performed in a whether mineforthe machine which conditions become,in our representation, certainsituation, a rulecan be appliedto a certain i.e. formal formula, settlewhether our rules as rules of of applicability. Thus, construing conditions of formulae, each one we shall have a proof-sequence inference, ofsomeformal ruleofinference having downin virtue beingwritten or formula of to some formulae (except, previous been applied which are given because they course, for the initial formulae, builtintothesystem). The conclusions initial assumptions represent as beingtruewilltherefore to produce forthemachine it is possible thatcan be provedin thecorresponding to thetheorems correspond a G6delian formula in thisformal We nowconstruct system. formal cannotbe proved-in-the-system. the Therefore This formula system. formula as beingtrue. machinecannotproducethe corresponding is true: any rational But we can see that the Gbdelianformula and convincehimself that being could followGodel's argument, was theGddelian although unprovable-in-the-given-system, formula, forthatveryreason-true.Now any mechaninonetheless-in fact, a mechanism which mustinclude can enunciate cal modelofthemind which minds can do: becausethisis something ofarithmetic, truths which willin many models in fact,it is easy to producemechanical thanhumanbeings farbetter of arithmetic truths produce respects can. But in thisone respect theycannotdo so well:in thatforevery as beingtrue,but whichit cannotproduce is a truth there machine cannotbe a complete whicha mindcan. This showsthata machine that a and adequate model of the mind. It cannotdo everything muchit can do, thereis alwayssomemindcan do, sincehowever it cannotdo, and a mindcan. Thisis notto say thatwe which thing to simulateany desired piece of mind-like cannotbuild a machine behaviour:it is onlythat we cannotbuild a machineto simulate We can (or shall be able to one behaviour. piece of mind-like every bits of mind-like day) build machines capable of reproducing of human behaviour,and indeed of outdoingthe performances muchbetter but however minds: is, and however goodthe machine
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PHILOSOPHY than a humanmindcan, it always it can do in nearlyall respects thisone thingwhichit cannotdo, whereas has thisone weakness, formula is theAchilles' heelofthecybera mindcan. The Godelian we cannothope ever to producea neticalmachine.And therefore machine thatwillbe able to do all thata mindcan do: we can never, have a mechanical modelofthemind. not evenin principle, This conclusion will be highly suspectto somepeople.They will thatwe cannothave it boththata machine can simulate objectfirst and thatit cannot any piece of mind-like behaviour, simulate every to themit is enoughto point piece. To someit is a contradiction: betweenthe fact that forany out that thereis no contradiction therecan be produced a greater naturalnumber and the number, cannotbe produced thanevery factthata number number. greater We can use the same analogy also against those who, finding a machinecannotproduceas beingtrue,concede formula theirfirst that that machineis indeed inadequate,but thereupon seek to a second,moreadequate,machine, in whichthe formula construct as beingtrue.This theycan indeeddo: but then can be produced all of its own, the secondmachinewill have a Gddelianformula to the formalsystem constructed by applyingGddel's procedure its (the secondmachine's)own,enlarged, whichrepresents scheme And this formula the second machinewill not be of operations. as beingtrue,whilea mindwillbe able to see that able to produce machine is constructed, able to do what it is true.Andifnowa third was unableto do, exactly thesecondmachine thesamewillhappen: the Godelianformula therewill be yet a thirdformula, for the to the third machine'sscheme of formalsystemcorresponding is unableto produceas being whichthe thirdmachine operations, true,whilea mindwill stillbe able to see thatit is true.And so it a machinewe construct, will go on. Howevercomplicated it will, to a formal ifit is a machine, correspond which in turnwill system, for a formula be liableto theGodelprocedure finding unprovable-inthemachine This formula willbe unableto produce that-system. as being true,althougha mind can see that it is true. And so the machinewill still not be an adequate modelof the mind.We are a modelofthemindwhich to produce is mechanical- which trying "dead"-but the mind,being in fact "alive", can is essentially alwaysgo one betterthan any formal, ossified, dead, system can. themindalwayshas thelast word. Thanksto G6del'stheorem, A second objectionwill now be made. The procedure whereby is constructed formula is a standard the Gddelian procedure-only formula can be constructed so couldwe be surethata G6delian for But ifitis a standard formal every system. procedure, thena machine to carryit out too. We could shouldbe able to be programmed a machine withthe usual operations, construct and in additionan ii6

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operation ofgoingthrough theGbdelprocedure, and thenproducing the conclusion of that procedure as beingtrue;and thenrepeating theprocedure, and so on,as often as required. Thiswouldcorrespond a system to having with an additional ruleofinference which allowed one to add, as a theorem, the G6delianformula of the rest of the formalsystem,and then the Gbdelianformula of this new, strengthened formal system, and so on. It would be tantamount to adding to the originalformalsysteman infinite sequence of axioms,each the Godelianformula ofthe system hitherto obtained. Yet even so, the matteris not settled:for the machinewith a as we might call it, is a different machine from Gddelizing operator, without suchan operator; the machines and, although the machine would be able to do those thingsin whichthe withthe operator machines without the operator wereoutclassed by a mind,yet we might expect a mind, faced with a machinethat possessed a to take this into account,and out-Gbdel the Godelizing operator, new machine, and all. This has, in fact, Godelizing operator proved to be the case. Even if we adjoin to a formal systemthe infinite of the successiveGodelianformulae, set of axioms consisting the is still incomplete, and containsa formula resulting system which cannot be proved-in-the-system, althougha rational being can, outsidethe system, see that it is true.' We had expected standing setofaxiomswereadded,they for evenifan infinite wouldhave this, ruleor specification, and thisfurther to be specified by somefinite could thenbe taken into accountby a mind rule or specification formal In a sense,just becausethe the enlarged considering system. mind has the last word,it can always pick a hole in any formal to itas a modelofitsownworkings. The mechanical system presented and definite: and thenthemind modelmustbe, in somesense,finite can alwaysgo one better. This is the answerto one objectionput forward He by Turing.2 to thepowers ofa machine do notamount arguesthatthelimitation much.Although each individual machineis incapable to anything answerto somequestions, the right all each indiviafter of getting also: and in any case "our superiority dual humanbeingis fallible to the one machine can onlybe felton suchan occasionin relation Therewould be no overwhichwe have scoredour pettytriumph. over all of machines". But this question triumphing simultaneously are not We whether the machines or is not minds point. discussing arethesame.In somerespect butwhether machines aresuperior, they are undoubtedly superiorto human minds; and the questionon a ratherniggling, are which they even stumpedis admittedly,
I G6del's originalproofapplies; v. ? i init. ? 6 init. of his Lectures at the Instituteof Advanced Study, Princeton,N.J., U.S.A., 1934. 2 Mind, I950, pp. 444-5; Newman, p. 21IO.

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P H I LO SO P H Y to showthatthemachine But it is enough, trivial, question. enough is notthesameas a mind.True,the machinecan do manythings is ofnecessity thata humanmindcannotdo: but ifthere something that the machinecannotdo, thoughthe mindcan, then,however trivialthe matteris, we cannotequate the two, and cannothope the modelthatwilladequatelyrepresent everto have a mechanical that it is onlyan individual machine we mind.Nor does it signify over:forthetriumph is notoveronlyan individual have triumphed that anybodycares to specifybut over any individual machine, machine. it is truethat of a mindmustbe an individual Although any particular"triumph"of a mind over a machinecould be "trumped"by anothermachineable to producethe answerthe so that "thereis no questionof first machinecould not produce, overall machines", triumphing simultaneously yetthisis irrelevant. between one mindand What is at issue is not the unequalcontest but whether therecouldbe any,single, all machines, machine that thesisto holdwater, coulddo all a mindcan do. For themechanist in principle, to produce a model, a single it mustbe possible, model, the mindcan do. It is like a game.I The whichcan do everything He produces has first turn. mechanist one a-any, but onlya definite -mechanical model of the mind. I point to something that it is freeto modify cannotdo, but the mindcan. The mechanist his but each timehe does so, I am entitled to lookfordefects example, can devise a modelthat I in the revisedmodel.If the mechanist if he cannot,then cannotfindfaultwith,his thesisis established: out-he necessarily it is not proven:and since-as it turns cannot, To succeed,he mustbe able to producesomedefinite it is refuted. modelof the mind-any one he likes,but one he can mechanical and willstickto. But sincehe cannot,in principle cannot, specify, modelthat is adequate, even thoughthe produceany mechanical is a minor pointof failure one,he is boundto fail,and mechanism mustbe false. can stillbe made. Gddel'stheorem Deeper objections appliesto and humanbeingsare not confined deductivesystems, to making Gddel's theoremapplies only to cononly deductiveinferences. and one may have doubts about how far it is sistentsystems, to assume that humanbeingsare consistent. permissible Gddel's and there is no a priori theorem bound appliesonlyto formal systems, which rulesout thepossibility to humaningenuity ofourcontriving whichwas not representable somereplicaofhumanity by a formal system.
I

in Latin quivis or quilibet. not quidam-and a mechanical model

Philosophical Quarterly, April i958, p. I44.

PHILOSOPHY,

For a similartype of argument,see J. R. Lucas: "The Lesbian Rule"; July I955, PP. 202-6; and "On not worshippingFacts"; The

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inferences, to makingdeductive Human beingsare not confined and it has been urgedby C. G. Hempel,and HartleyRogers;that of a fairmodelof the mindwouldhave to allow forthe possibility and thesemightprovidea way inferences, makingnon-deductive of escapingthe Gddel result.Hartley Rogersmakes the specific to entertain that the machineshould be programmed suggestion and or disproved, proved been had not which propositions various last theorem of Fermat's axioms. list to its on occasionto add them or Goldbach's conjecturemightthus be added. If subsequently theywouldbe was foundto lead to a contradiction, theirinclusion negations their droppedagain, and indeedin those circumstances In thissortofwaya machine wouldbe addedto thelistoftheorems. as truecertain was able to produce which wellbe constructed might to its axiomsaccording formulae whichcould not be provedfrom And therefore the methodof demonstrating its rulesof inference. work. no longer might overthemachine themind'ssuperiority difficulties. presents however, ofsucha machine, The construction and add them to its It cannot accept all unprovableformulae, formula and boththeGbdelian itself accepting or it willfind axioms, Nor wouldit do if it accepted and so be inconsistent. its negation, and, havingadded formulae, of each pair of undecidable the first as undecidable, itsnegation wouldnolonger regard thatto itsaxioms, happenon thewrong and so wouldneveracceptit too: forit might of the G6delian of the pair: it mightaccept the negation member itself.And the system ratherthan the Godelianformula formula constituted by a normalset of axioms with the negationof the is an unsound notinconsistent, formula Gb5delian although adjoined, It is something ofthenaturalinterpretation. not admitting system, not actually in two dimensions: geometries like non-Desarguian muchso to disqualify it sufficiently but rather wrong, inconsistent, was liableto infelicities which A machine consideration. serious from ofthatkindwouldbe no modelforthehumanmind. ofselection ofunprovcriteria careful clearthatrather It becomes somepossible willbe needed.HartleyRogerssuggests able formulae new axioms,even if the ones. But once we have rulesgenerating are onlyprovisionally accepted,and are liable to axiomsgenerated thenwe to lead to inconsistency, againiftheyare found be dropped as on any other.We can set about doinga Gbdelon this system, the infinite are in the same case as whenwe had a rulegenerating is a machine however as axioms. In short, formulae set ofGodelian definite to or at random either according must it proceed designed, it: we cannotoutsmart is random, rules.In so faras its procedure
I X

In private conversation. I957, Vol. I, Computability, Theoryof RecursiveFunctionsand Effective

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pp. 152 ff.

PHILOSOPHY
is notgoing to be a convincing but itsperformance parodyofintelligent behaviour:in so far as its procedure is in accordancewith can be used to producea formula definite rules,the Godel method which the machine,accordingto those rules, cannot assert as can see it to be true,althoughwe, standingoutsidethe system, true., All thatwe Godel's theorem applies onlyto consistent systems. is that if the systemis complete,then the can proveformally is unprovable-in-the-system. To be able to say G6delianformula thattheGddelian formula is unprovable-in-the-system, categorically we must not onlybe dealing witha consistent and therefore true, but be able to saythatit is consistent. system, And,as Gbdelshowed of his first-itis impossible in his secondtheorem-a corollary to thatthatsystem is consistent. provein a consistent system Thusin a formula the machine orderto fault ofwhich by producing we can say boththatit is trueand that the machinecannotproduce it as we haveto be able to saythatthemachine true, its rather, corre(or, and there is consistent; formal is no absolute sponding system) of proof this.All we can do is to examinethe machine and see if it appears There always remainsthe possibility of some inconconsistent. At detected. best we can not that sistency yet the machine say is providedwe are. But by what rightcan we do this? consistent, seems to show that a man cannotassert Godel's second theorem and his ownconsistency, so HartleyRogersz arguesthatwe cannot to counterthe mechanist really use Godel's firsttheorem thesis are distinctive attributes unlesswe can say that"there which enable thislast limitation and asserthis own a humanbeingto transcend consistent". whilestillremaining consistency reaction if his consistency is questioned A man's untutored is to but this,in view of Godel's secondtheorem, it vehemently: affirm ofhisactualinconsistency. as evidence is takenby somephilosophers has suggested thathumanbeingsare machines, Putnam3 Professor If a machine machines. werewiredto correspond but inconsistent to thenthere wouldbe no well-formed an inconsistent system, formula whichit could not produceas true; and so in no way could it be to a humanbeing. Nor could we make its provedto be inferior a reproachto it-are not men inconsistent inconsistency too? and evenmalenon-politicians women Certainly are,and politicians;
I G6del's original proofapplies if the rule is such as to generatea primitive recursiveclass of additional formulae;v. ? I init.and ? 6 init.of his Lectures at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton,N.J., U.S.A., I934. It is in that the class be recursively enumerable.v. Barkley Rosser: fact sufficient "Extensions of some theoremsof G6del and Church",Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. I, I936, pp. 87-91.

of Princeton,N.J., U.S.A. in privateconversation. 3 University

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Op. Cit., p. I54.

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and a single inconsistency is sometimes, contradictthemselves make inconsistent. a system enoughto inconsistent The factthatwe are all sometimes cannot be gainsaid, that we are tantamount to inconbut from this it does not follow are mistakesratherthan set sistentsystems.Our inconsistencies to the occasional malfunctioning of a policies.They correspond Witness to thisthat schemeof operations. machine, not its normal whenwe recognize themforwhat they we eschewinconsistencies machines,we should remain are. If we really were inconsistent and would happilyaffirm both contentwith our inconsistencies, we would be prepared to say Moreover, halves of a contradiction. we are not. It is easilyshown'that in anything-which absolutely is provable,and the formalsystemeverything an inconsistent turns out to be just thatnot everything ofconsistency requirement goes". This can be provedin it-it is not the case that "anything of the mentaloperations of humanbeings: is a characteristic surely between favoured-truetheyare selective:theydo discriminate whena personis prepared to and unfavoured-false-statements: and is preparedto contradict himself withoutany say anything, thenhe is adjudgedto have "lost his mind". qualm or repugnance, are not so much not perfectly Human beings, consistent, although as fallible. inconsistent machinewould still be subject to A falliblebut self-correcting inconsistent machinewould results.Only a fundamentally Go-del's but at the inconsistent, escape. Could we have a fundamentally same time self-correcting machine,which both would be freeof unlikea Godel's resultsand yet would not be trivialand entirely inconsistency human being? A machinewith a ratherrecherche' it was consistent, but wiredintoit, so thatforall normal purposes was able to proveit? withthe G6deliansentence whenpresented be might proofs Thereare all sortsof ways in whichundesirable have a rule that whenever we have provedp obviated.We might and not-p,we examinetheirproofsand reject the longer.Or we in a certain the axiomsand rulesof inference order, arrange might is see to an what and whena proof inconsistency proffered, leading axiom that or rule for and are and rules axioms reject required it, as this In some such in the last we could comes which way ordering. so that the inconsiswitha stop-rule, have an inconsistent system, of an inconsistent the form out in to come allowed tencywas never formula. at first The suggestion yet thereis somesightseemsattractive: the facadeof we mightpreserve Even though thingdeeplywrong. twoinconsistent formulae byhavinga rulethatwhenever consistency
I See, e.g., Alonzo Church: Introduction to MathematicalLogic, Princeton, Vol. I, ? I7, p. io8.

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PHILOSOPHY appear we wereto rejectthe one withthe longer proof, yet such a in ourlogicalsense.Even thelessarbitrary rulewouldbe repugnant No longerdoes the systemoperate are too arbitrary. suggestions on certaindefinite formulae. rulesofinference definite with certain we do are the axioms the rules ... Instead, true,provided apply, We no longerknowwherewe not happento findit inconvenient. of the rule of Modus Ponensmaybe accepted stand.One application is rejected:on one occasionan axiom may be true, whileanother will have ceased to be a false.The system on anotherapparently and the machinewill barelyqualifyforthe formal logicalsystem, the titleofa modelforthemind.For it willbe farfrom resembling theminddoesindeedtryout dubiousaxioms mindin its operations: to lead to contradiction, but iftheyare found and rulesofinference; We try outaxiomsand rules ofinference arerejected they altogether. but we do not keep them, once theyare found provisionally-true: We mayseekto replacethemwithothers, to lead to contradictions. and thatthough is at fault, some we mayfeelthatourformalization ofthissortis required, we have notbeen axiomor ruleofinference it quitecorrectly: but we do not retain the faulty able to formulate withoutmodification, formulations merelywith the provisothat leads to a contradiction we refuse whenthe argument to follow it. irrational. We shouldbe in theposition To do thiswouldbe utterly whensuppliedwiththepremisses ofa Modus thaton someoccasions and Ponens,say, we applied the rule and allowedthe conclusion, to apply the rule,and disallowed we refused on otheroccasions the A person,or a machine, whichdid this without conclusion. being for so doing, wouldbe accounted able to givea goodreason arbitrary It is partoftheconcept of "arguments" and irrational. or "reasons" that theyare in some sense generaland universal:that if Modus ofarguing whenI am establishing Ponensis a validmethod a desired it is a valid methodalso whenyou,my opponent, are conclusion, I do not wantto accept.We cannotpick a conclusion establishing of argument is to be valid; not and choosethe timeswhena form It is ofcourse true, ifwe are to be reasonable. thatwithourinformal arenotfully which we do distinguish arguments, formalized, between whichare at first sightsimilar, addingfurther reasons arguments not reallysimilar: and it might be mainwhytheyare nonetheless tained that a machinemightlikewisebe entitledto distinguish at first if it had good reasonfor betweenarguments sightsimilar, further be maintained thatthemachine had doingso. And it might those patterns of argument it did reject, good reasonforrejecting indeedthe best of reasons, namelythe avoidanceof contradiction. at all, is too gooda reason. But that,ifit is a reason We do notlay it to a man's creditthat he avoids contradiction merely by refusing which to acceptthosearguments wouldlead himto it, forno other
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reasonthan that otherwise he wouldbe led to it. Special pleading rather thansoundargument is the nameforthattypeofreasoning. No creditaccruesto a man who,cleverenoughto see a fewmoves of argument ahead, avoids beingbrought to acknowledge his own as soonas he seeswhere inconsistency, bystonewalling theargument will end. Rather, we accounthiminconsistent too, not,in his case, because he affirmed and deniedthe same proposition, but because he used and refused to use the same rule of inference. A stop-rule an inconsistency is not enoughto save an on actuallyenunciating from inconsistent machine beingcalled inconsistent. thatwe are inconsistent, and thereis The possibility yetremains is so recherche' thatit has never but the inconsistency no stop-rule, whichwas deeplyembedded turned up. After all, naiveset-theory, didnotturn outto be inconsistent. incommon-sense waysofthinking for fateis notinstore Can we be surethata similar simple arithmetic of our in of certitude too? In a sensewe cannot, spite greatfeeling can be addedand multiplied which ofwhole numbers thatoursystem It is just conceivable is nevergoingto proveinconsistent. together If we had,we should it incorrectly. find we might we had formalized ofnumber, as we have anewourintuitive tryand formulate concept our intuitive conceptof a set. If we did this,we shouldof course axiomsand rulesof inference our present would recastour system: be utterly rejected:therewould be no questionof our usingand fashion. We should,once we not usingthemin an "inconsistent" be in the same positionas we are now, had recast the system, but not provably believedto be consistent, possessedof a system It is so. But then could therenot be some otherinconsistency? once detected But again no inconsistency will indeeda possibility. not to be inconsistent, We are determined and are be tolerated. should any appear. Thus, resolved to root out inconsistency, certainor completely freeof we can neverbe completely although out ourmathematics theriskofhavingto think again,theultimate positionmust be one of two: eitherwe have a systemof simple and beliefis consiswhichto the best of our knowledge arithmetic case we are tent:or thereis no such system possible.In theformer in the latter, if we findthatno as at present: in the same position can be freeof contradictions, system containing simplearithmetic we shall have to abandon not merelythe whole of mathematics but the wholeofthought. sciences, and the mathematical a manmustin thissense thatalthough It maystillbe maintained his own consistency without assume,he cannot properly affirm, indeedwe have his words.We may be consistent; thereby belying forbids everyreasonto hope thatwe are: but a necessary modesty so. Yet thisis notquitewhatGbdel'ssecondtheorem us from saying states. Gddel has shown that in a consistent systema formula
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cannot be proved in that ofthesystem theconsistency stating system. if consistent, cannotproduceas truean that a machine, It follows hencealso that a mind,if it were assertion of its own consistency: that it was a concould not reachthe conclusion really a machine, no suchconclusion one. For a mindwhichis not a machine sistent All thatGddelhas provedis thata mindcannotproducea follows. ofa formal insidethesystem formal oftheconsistency proof system is outside the itself: to going and no but there no objection system for the consistency objection to producinginformal arguments less formaland less eitherof a formalsystemor of something will not be able to be Such informal systematized. arguments formalized: but thenthe wholetenorof Gbdel'sresults completely is thatwe oughtnotto ask, and cannotobtain,complete formalizait wouldhavebeenniceifwe couldhaveobtained tion.Andalthough formalized are more coercive them, since completely arguments thaninformal cast ones,yetsincewe cannothave all ourarguments into that form, we must not hold it againstinformal arguments or regardthemall as utterly that theyare informal worthless. It therefore seemsto me both properand reasonablefora mind to because although assertits own consistency: proper, as machines, are unable to reflect we mighthave expected, fullyon theirown and powers, performance in this yet to be able to be self-conscious and reasonable, for way is just whatwe expectofminds: thereasons given. Not only can we fairlysay simplythat we knowwe are ourmistakes, butwe mustin anycase assume consistent, apartfrom is to be possible at all; moreover thatwe are,ifthought we are selecmachines tive,we will not,as inconsistent would,say anything and and finally we can, in a sense,decide whatsoever: everything to be in the sensethat we can resolvenot to tolerateinconconsistent, in our thinking and speaking, and to eliminate sistencies them,if ever they shouldappear,by withdrawing and cancelling one limb ofthe contradiction. almosthave expected We can see howwe might G6del'stheorem to distinguish self-conscious beings frominanimateobjects. The is that it is self-referring. essenceof the Godelianformula It says that "This formulais unprovable-in-this-system". When carried is specified the formula in terms over to a machine, whichdepend in question.The machine on the particular machine is beingasked a questionabout its own processes.We are askingit to be selfit can and cannotdo. Such questions and say whatthings conscious, lead to paradox. At one's first and simplest notoriously attempts to philosophize, one becomes entangledin questionsof whether one knows whenone knowssomething thatone knows it, and what, of oneself, whenone is thinking is beingthought about,and what is doingthethinking. After onehas beenpuzzledand bruised by this
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problemfora long time,one learnsnot to pressthese questions: realized to be different ofa conscious theconcept being is,implicitly, fromthat of an unconscious object. In sayingthat a conscious we are sayingnot onlythat he knowsit, beingknowssomething, but that he knowsthat he knowsit, and that he knowsthat he knowsthathe knowsit, and so on, as longas we care to pose the an infinity question:thereis, we recognize, here,but it is not an in the bad sense,forit is the questions infinite regress that peter than the answers. rather The questions out, as beingpointless, are because the conceptcontainswithinitselfthe feltto be pointless such questionsindefinitely. idea of beingable to go on answering have the Although conscious beings powerof goingon, we do not as a of tasks theyare able succession wishto exhibitthis simply nordo we see themindas an infinite to perform, sequenceofselves and super-super-selves. and super-selves Rather,we insistthat a we talk about partsof the conscious beingis a unity,and though and willnotallowit to be taken we do so onlyas a metaphor, mind, literally. arise because a conscious The paradoxesof consciousness being as well as of otherthings, and yet cannot can be aware of itself, as beingdivisibleinto parts. It meansthat a reallybe construed in a way in which conscious beingcan deal withGodelian questions a machinecannot,because a consciousbeing can both consider and yet not be otherthan that which itselfand its performance A machine can be madein a manner ofspeaking didtheperformance. but it cannottake this "into to "consider"its own performance, a different account" withoutthereby becoming machine,namely the old machinewith a "new part" added. But it is inherent in our idea of a consciousmind that it can reflect upon itselfand and no extrapart is required its own performances, to do criticize and has no Achilles' heel. this:it is alreadycomplete, The thesisthus beginsto becomemorea matterof conceptual This is borne out by conanalysisthan mathematical discovery. another sidering argument put forward by Turing.iSo far,we have constructed artefacts. Whenwe onlyfairly simpleand predictable of our machinestheremay, perhaps,be increasethe complexity in storeforus. He draws a parallelwith a fission surprises pile. muchhappens:but above Below a certain"critical"size, nothing So too,perhaps, thecritical withbrains size,thesparks beginto fly. Mostbrainsand all machines and machines. "subare, at present, in a stodgy stimuli reactto incoming and uninterestcritical"-they ingway,haveno ideasoftheir own,can produce onlystockresponses and possibily somemachines in the -but a fewbrainsat present, and scintillate on their own are super-critical, account. future,
x Mind,
1950,

p. 454; Newman, p. 2II7-i8.

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PHILOSOPHY thatit is onlya matter is suggesting ofcomplexity, Turing and that levelofcomplexity a qualitative above a certain difference appears, machineswill be quite unlikethe simple so that "super-critical" oneshitherto envisaged. oftendoes introduce This may be so. Complexity qualitative it soundsimplausible, it might differences. turnout that Although levelofcomplexity, a machine ceasedto be predictabove a certain and started on its ownaccount, able, evenin principle, doingthings it might or,to use a veryrevealing phrase, beginto have a mindof its own. It might beginto have a mindof its own. It wouldbegin to have a mindof its own whenit was no longer entirely predictable and entirely whichwe docile,but was capable of doingthings and not just mistakesor randomshots, as intelligent, recognized intoit. But thenit wouldcease but whichwe had notprogrammed of the act. What is at stake the meaning within to be a machine, debateis nothowmindsare,or might in the mechanist be, brought forthe mechanist into being,but how theyoperate.It is essential modelofthemindshalloperate thatthemechanical thesis according that is, that we can understand to "mechanicalprinciples", the of the operations of the wholein terms of its parts,and operation shall be determined of each part either the operation by its initial of the machine, or shall be a random state and the construction of determinate a determinate number choicebetween If operations. a machine which mechanist is so complicated the produces that a machine thisceasesto hold good ofit, thenit is no longer forthe how it was constructed. no matter purposesof our discussion, We in the same sortof thathe had createda mind, shouldsay, rather, Therewouldthenbe two senseas we procreate people at present. new mindsinto the world,the traditional ways of bringing way, and a newwaybyconstructing bornofwomen, children by begetting very,verycomplicated systems of, say, valves and relays.When takecareto stress ofthesecond thatalthough talking way,we should what was createdlooked like a machine,it was not one really, because it was not just the total of its parts. One could not tell thewayin which whatit was goingto do merely it was by knowing built up and the initialstate of its parts: one could not even tell the limitsof what it could do, for even when presented with a Godel-type question,it got the answerright.In fact we should that any systemwhichwas not floored say briefly by the Gddel questionwas eo ipso not a Turingmachine,i.e. not a machine oftheact. themeaning within ofmechanism ofthefalsity is valid,it is ofthegreatest If theproof forthewholeofphilosophy. SincethetimeofNewton, consequence has obsessed determinism ofmechanist thebogey philosophers. If we it seemed thatwemustlookonhumanbeings wereto be scientific, as
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moralagents;if we automata,and not as autonomous determined wereto be moral,it seemedthatwe mustdenyscienceits due, set humanneuroin understanding limitto its progress an arbitrary Not even mysticism. in obscurantist and take refuge physiology, But betweenthe two standpoints. Kant could resolvethe tension stillremain, againsthumanfreedom manyarguments now,though argumechanism, perhapsthe mostcompelling from the argument on thiscountwillit mentof themall, has lost its power.No longer in the to deny freedom on the naturalphilosopher be incumbent feelthe urgeto abolish willthe moralist name of science:no longer to make room for faith. We can even begin to see knowledge its beingnecessary without how therecould be roomformorality, the provinceof science.Our to abolish or even to circumscribe enquiry:it will still be has set no limits to scientific argument of the brain. It will still be the working possibleto investigate of the mind.Only,now we models mechanical possibleto produce be will adequate,nor model completely can see thatno mechanical models can terms. We produce mechanist in purely anyexplanations far but, however and theywill be illuminating: and explanations, they go, therewill always remainmore to be said. There is no but no scientific enquirycan enquiry: boundto scientific arbitrary of the humanmind. variety ever exhaustthe infinite Merton Oxford. College,

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