UMIL VS. RAMOS (GR 81567, SEPT.

8, 1990) FACTS: -The are separate motions filed by 8 different petitions seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part: "WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs." - These petitions were consolidated because of the similarity of the issues being raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and explain why they should not be set off to liberty without delay. - Respondents assert that the privilege of habeas corpus is not available to petitioners as they have been legally arrested and detained by virtue of valid information file in court against them. - Petitioners are members of NPA ISSUE: WON the petitioners are illegally arrested and detained.HELD:Arrest and detention is valid. RATIO: There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted. In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; The record of the cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed has freshly committed, or were actually committing an offense when apprehended so that their arrest without warrant is clearly justified , and that they are detained by virtue of valid information filed against them.

United States v. Wade Facts. Two men robbed a bank in Eustace, Texas. One man, with two pieces of tape on his face, went into the bank, pointed a gun at the cashier and demanded the money. His accomplice waited outside in a stolen getaway car. Wade and his accomplice were indicted for the robbery and counsel was appointed. About two weeks later, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent caused the two men to be part of a lineup consisting of five or six other men at which the bank employees were asked to make an identification, and at which the two men were in fact identified. At trial, Wades defense counsel objected to the identification procedures, but his efforts to have them stricken were in vain. Wade was convicted of the robbery. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup had violated Wades Sixth Amendment constitutional right to counsel. Issue. Whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before trial at a post indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes, without notice to, and in the absence of, the accuseds appointed counsel? Held. Yes. The court must analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendants rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. The in court identification must be found to have independent origin, free of the primary taint of the improperly conducted lineup, in order to be admitted. Ratio. The opinion emphasizes the fact that the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination is not implicated because nothing about the lineup itself violated the long line of cases holding that only testimonial or communicative evidence must be suppressed if coerced. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, did attach to pretrial proceedings because of the importance that they have carrying on an adequate defense. The right has been interpreted to apply to critical stages of the proceedings. Identification procedures are critical because of the many dangers that inhere in identification procedures in general, and in eyewitness identifications in particular. Any prejudice occurring in an identification procedure without counsel present would denigrate the right of the defendant to effectively cross examine the witness in question.

Miranda v. Arizona Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations. The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights. The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was arrested, along with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes. Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants? Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court. Ratio. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney, any interrogation should cease. Further, the individual has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the government will not be allowed to argue for an exception to the notification rule. Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a new rule as the majority finds here. The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) also argues that the Due Process Clauses should apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment rule against selfincrimination was never intended to forbid any and all pressures against self-incrimination. Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to include the rights that the majority extends in their decision. The majority is making new law with their holding.

TEEHANKEE JR.vs. MADAYAG March 6, 1992 FACTS: Here, Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of frustrated murder for shooting Hultman who was comatosed some time. In the course of the trial, Hultman died. The prosecution sought to change the information from frustrated murder to consummated murder. Teehankee Jr. questioned the new charge for lack of preliminary investigation thereon . There are three (3) questions to be answered here: ISSUE #1: Was there an amend ment of the information or substitut ion when the information was changed from frustrated murder to consummated murder? HELD: There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information [murder pa rin!]. What is involved here is not a variance of the nature of different offenses charge, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper. ISSUE #2: What kind of amendment? Formal or substantial? HELD: Formal. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. So halimbawa sabihin ng prosecutor: You shot Hultman who almost died. Teehankee Jr.:W ala man ako dun ba! I was at home asleep! Alibi ang defense niya ba. Now, namatay si Hultman. Ano man ang depensa mo? Mao man gihapon: Wala man ako dun! The accused is not prejudiced since the same defense is still available to him. SSUE #3: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new charge? HELD: No need because you have not changed the crime. If you change the crime or when there is substitution, kailangan ng preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal amendment, preliminary investigation is not necessary. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary. Nota Bene: A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event

of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

LEVISTE vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 189122- March 17, 2010

THE FACTS Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day [11] of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
[15] [13] [12]

Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

THE ISSUE Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules. petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. RULING We disagree. 1. pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the [27] third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is more than one possible outcome, [29] with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a [30] clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
[28]

BROCKA v ENRILE 1990

FACTS: 63 jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers Jan 28 85 64 petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC 65 all petitioners released on bail P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended 66 urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 85 On Feb. 7 or 9 85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et als provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds BUT 67 Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 85 o Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al. 68 Feb 11 85 Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows: o 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons another phone call subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal complainants affidavits had not yet been received o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition o 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka, et al had been officially received informed that said charges were never coursed through the Records Office o ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are, almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a matter of Constitutional right appears that respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsels request that they be give n 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their clients no such requirement required under the rules 69 Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 85 on orders of then Pres.Marcos release narrated in Courts resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al: o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released four on Feb15 85 and one on Feb.8 85 o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition. 70 Hence, this petition. o Brocka, et al contend: 1. bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution 2. second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal premised on one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is ISSUE: WON criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined YES RATIO: GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final EXCEPTIONS: 1. To afford adequate protection to the consti rights of the accused 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions

When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation When double jeopardy is clearly apparent When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground had been denied 11. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners HERE, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state officials in bad faith: 1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et als release from detention BUT This PDA was issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9 85 upon receipt of TCs order of release violates guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in MM or 48 hours outside MM (Ilagan v Enrile) Despite subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely presented a purported xeerox copy of it violates Court pronouncement that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile) 2. SolGens manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information [instead of a petition for HC] Court Held: such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing: 1. spurious and inoperational PDA 2. sham and hasty PI clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew IF-THEN RULE: If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined. xx Petition granted. TC permanently enjoined from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.