1 Philippine Today Inc. vs. NLRC and Felix Alegre, G.R no. 112965 Petetioner: Philippines Today, Inc.

(PTI) owner of the Philippine Star and officers and members of the board of directors of PTI, namely, Betty Go-Belmonte, chairman of the board; Arturo A. Borjal, president; Maximo V. Soliven, publisher and chairman, editorial board; and Isaac G. Belmonte, treasurer Respondent: NLRC and Felix Alegre , employed by PTI in July 1986 as a senior investigative reporter of the Philippine Star with a monthly salary of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) later became chief investigative writer and then assistant to the publisher with monthly compensation was correspondingly increased to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) Facts Mr. Alegre requested for a 30day leave of absence for medical reasons to be conducted abroad, said request was granted by the PTI. He wrote a MEMORANDUM FOR FILE addressed to Ms. Betty Go-Belmonte Belmonte with copies furnished to members of the board of directors of PTI expressing his sentiments about the working conditions in the company. He used harsh words, if not, confrontational, straightforward and sarcastic remarks about his disappointments and frustrations in his job and his relation to his immediate supervisor. The memorandum was construed by the board of members as resignation of Mr. Alegre from his job. So, they sent a reply to the latter purporting the collective decision of the board in accepting Mr. Alegres resignation. On his reply, Mr. Alegre explained that he is not resigning from his job and that the memorandum he wrote was just supposed to be an eye-opener to the board about his working conditions. He likewise argued that he was constructively dismissed without just cause. LA decided in favour of PTI and dismissed Alegres complaint for lack of merit. On the its decision, it correctly deduced from the latters memorandum and attendant actuations that he resigned. The NLRC reversed the said decision maintaining that Alegre did not resign as there was no actual act of relinquishment to constitute complete and operative resignation. (resignation as a "formal renouncement or relinquishment of an office).

Issue: WON whether the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre addressed to Petitioner Belmonte constitutes a letter of resignation. SCs Decision: Yes Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment. PECA: Labor Relations

2 The Court finds that the sarcastic remarks of Mr. Alegre negate the alleged desire to improve his relations with his immediate supervisor or in the workplace. Apprising his employer (or top-level management) of his frustrations in his job and differences with his immediate superior is certainly not done in an abrasive, offensive and disrespectful manner. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without causing ferocious conflicts. Here, respondent Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. His memorandum is too affrontive, combative and confrontational. It certainly causes resentment, even when read by an objective reader. His incendiary words and sarcastic remarks. The Court also finds that Mr. Alegre was a well-educated journalist. Trust and confidence has been breached by Mr. Alegres memorandum. Alegre is a highly confidential employee who holds his job at the pleasure of his employer or, stated otherwise, for as long as he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer. The use of offensive language can only mean expression of disloyalty and disrespect. It renders the writer unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It is beyond human nature to expect two persons with underlying mistrust in each other to continue to work together effectively, not to say, harmoniously. Antecedent, Contemporaneous and Subsequent Actions Affirming Resignation: Medical reasons for leave of absence not proved, Cleared desk of personal belongings even before he knew the acceptance of his resignation, Did not report back to work, Not deprived of chance to return to work, he expressly manifested his desire to resign, assumed job from another office. Note: It held that resignations, once accepted, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. If the employer accepts the withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them . An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "findshimself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment. Laws are interpreted always in the context of the peculiar factual situation of each case.

Servidad vs. NLRC, Innodata Phils. Inc and Todd Solomon, GR no. 128682 Petitioner: Joaquin Servidad, employed by Innodata as DATA CONTROL CLERK Respondent: Innodata PECA: Labor Relations

3 Special civil action by way of certiorari seeking to annul the decision of NLRC in dismissing the earlier decision by the LA in its disposition the Servidad was illegally dismissed. Facts Servidad was employed on May 9, 94 as Data Control Clerk. After working for 6 months he was made to sign a 3-month probationary employment which later extended to another 3 months good until May 9, 95. He was given a rating of 98.5% by Solomon for his work evaluations. But on May 9, 95, Servidad was dismissed from service on the ground of alleged termination of contract of employment. Innodata contended that the contract between petitioner was for a FIXED TERM, therefore the latters dismissal was valid. LA decided in favor of Servidad, awarded full backwages and reinstatement NLRC- reversed the LA decision, it favoured Innodatas contention.

Issue: WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the LA decision finding that the Servidad was illegally dismissed and adjudging subject contract of employment of petitioner to be for a definite or fixed period. SCs Decision: Petition is impressed with merit. The Contract of employment contains two periods, namely : for six months terminable at the option of private respondent, while the second period was also for six months but probationary in character . In both cases, the private respondent did not specify the criteria for the termination or retention of the services of petitioner. Such a wide leeway for the determination of the tenure of an employee during a one year period of employment is violative of the right of the employee against unwarranted dismissal. Art 1377 of the NCC, reads: The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. Certainly, favorable interpretation of the contract in the case under scrutiny should be for petitioner and not for the private respondent which caused the preparation of said contract. If the contract was really for a fixed term, the private respondent should not have been given the discretion to dismiss the petitioner during the one year period of employment for reasons other than the just and authorized causes under the Labor Code. Settled is the rule that an employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence The language of the contract in dispute is truly a double-bladed scheme to block the acquisition of the employee of tenurial security. Thereunder, private respondent PECA: Labor Relations

4 has two options. It can terminate the employee by reason of expiration of contract, or it may use "failure to meet work standards" as the ground for the employee's dismissal. In either case, the tenor of the contract jeopardizes the right of the worker to security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution. On the averment that NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioner failed to meet the standards of the company, we find for petitioner. The decision at NLRC on the matter simply stated that the petitioner fell short of the expectations of the company without specifying factual basis therefore. ndeed, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in construing the contract sued upon as one with a fixed term. To uphold such a finding would be to concede to the private respondent an advantage arising from its own mistake.

Pakistan International Airlines Corp. vs. Ople, GR no. 61594 Petitioner: PIA, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. Respondents: Ople, as Minister of Labor, Leogardo, as Deputy Minister, Ethelynne Farrales and Maria Mamasig, both EEs of PIA Special civil action by way of certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of MOLE in deciding in favor of private respondents being illegally dismissed by PIA. Facts: Farrales and Mamasig were employed by PIA as flight stewardess based on Manila and flying assignments to different parts of Middle East and EU. They were made to sign a contract of employment in which it was stipulated that the duration of the employment is for 3 years commencing on Jan. 9, 1979 but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties (sec5). Sec6 thereof also says that PIA reserves the right to terminate the said agreement AT ANY TIME by giving the EE a notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EE wages equivalent to one months salary. It was also stipulated that the said agreement shall be construed and governed under the laws of Pakistan and only Courts of Karachi that has jurisdiction to consider if any disagreements that will arise out of the contract (sec10). 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the employment, PIA sent a letter to private respondents advising that their services will be terminated at the end of the period as provided in the employment contract. Farrales and Mamasig sought relief against PIA from MOLE. MOLE ordered that the parties submit position paper, PIA submitted their position paper but no evidence to support their claim. RD Estrella ordered reinstatement of private respondent plus backwages. It was affirmed by Deputy Minister Leogardo. PECA: Labor Relations

5 Now, PIA anchored its claimed that private respondents were habitual absentees that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of personal effects. It also contended RD, MOLE has no jurisdiction, that public respondents violated their right to procedural due process and that it invokes Sec5 and 6 of the contract of employment arguing that the relationship with them was governed by the provisions of the contract and not by the general provision of the LC.

Issue: WON public respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion in deciding in favour of the private respondent. SCs Ruling: No. Art. 278 of the Labor Code , as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of employees with at least one (1) year of service without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and Employment ( Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions . . .(b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of employees with at least one year of service during the last two (2) years, whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior written authority issued in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may promulgate) Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, made clear that in case of a termination without the necessary clearance, the Regional Director was authorized to order the reinstatement of the employee concerned and the payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over such termination cases . Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement. PIA was not denied of its right to procedural due process. In other words, under the then applicable rule, the Regional Director did not even have to require submission of position papers by the parties in view of the conclusive (juris et de jure) character of the presumption created by such applicable law and regulation. Sec5 and 6 should be read together. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to PECA: Labor Relations

6 labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. Employment for a fixed term i.e with a period is not necessarily unlawful. It becomes unlawful only if it is intended to circumvent the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee. If the period is fixed it must be agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Here, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA , the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years.

Philippine labor law is controlling in this case. Contract was executed here, private respondents were Philippine citizens, PIA is actually doing business here notwithstanding that it is a foreign corporation.

PT&T vs NLRC, GR no. 118978 Petitioner: PT&T Respondent: NLRC and Grace de Guzman Petition for certiorari seeking for the decision of the NLRC be set aside. Facts: De Guzman filed a complaint for illegal dismissal againt PT&T. She was initially hired as a RELIEVER as "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with Petitioner Company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Sometime on September 1991, she was asked to join PT&T as PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE for a period of 150days. In her job application she indicated that she was SINGLE on her civil status although she contracted marriage a few months earlier on May 26, 1991. PT&T sent memorandum where she was made to explain the discrepancy in her job application likewise reminded about the companys policy of not accepting married woman for employment. PECA: Labor Relations

7 De Guzman replied that she was not aware of such policy and that she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Unsatisfied with her explanation, she was dismissed from her job. PT&T claimed that De Guzmans dishonestly and failure to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collection became the basis of her dismissal. LA- decided in favour of De Guzman, it found that she was gained the status as regular employee and that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. NLRC- affirmed the decision of the LA.

Issue: WON de Guzman was illegally dismissed on account of her marriage contrary to the companys policy. SCs Decision- YES In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention. That is why in the Constitution is, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Example: , Section 14, Article II, Section 3 of Article XIII, , Section 14 of Article XIII. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. PECA: Labor Relations

8 Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.

Asian Transmission Corp. vs. CA et. al, GR no 144664 Petitioner: ATC Respondent: CA, Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of the CA. Facts DOLE issued an EXPLANATORY Bulletin dated March 11, 93 clarifying that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9, 1993, whether unworked for it is a day falling to two regular holidays, namely: Good Friday and Araw ng Kagitingan. Said bulletin was reproduced when April 9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan. Despite such bulleting, ATC opted to pay its DAILY wage employees only 100% on April 9, 1998. Thus, BATLU protested. In accordance to its CBA, the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration where the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered decision directing ATC to pay its daily wage employees 200% and not just 100%. According to the VA, Article 94 of the Labor Code as amended by EO 203 series of 1997 should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, like 1993 and 1998, is also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday." The VA decision was affirmed by the CA. According to the CA, the CBA of the parties clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA. Further, it held that under the labor code, it is the basic rule that any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved in favor of labor.

Issue: WON the ATCs daily wage employees are entitle to 200% of their basic wage for April 9, 1998 which falls on double regular holiday. PECA: Labor Relations

9 SCs Decision: YES Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his holiday pay." It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the days identified as with great historical and cultural significance. Independence Day, Araw ng Kagitingan, National Heroes Day, Bonifacio Day and Rizal Day intended as holiday to afford Filipinos with recurring opportunity to commemorate the heroism, of the Filipino people, promote national identity and deepen the spirit of patriotism. Labor Day reserved to celebrate the contributions of the working class to the development of the nation. Religious Holidays allow the worker to celebrate faith with his family. Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis.Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive. In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co. vs. Ibanez et al., GR no. 170181 Petitioner: Hanjin foreign company duly registered with the SEC to engage in the construction business in the Philippines. Respondents Ibanez, Carolino, Gacula, Dagotdot and Calda allegedly hired by Hanjin as project workers Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the rules of court. Facts Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC with a prayer for reinstatement and full back wages. They were hired on different dates into different positions, Ibanez (tireman, 2000), gacula (crane operator, 1992), dagotdot (welder, 1995), Carolino (welder, 1994) and Calda (warehouseman, 1996). Respondents PECA: Labor Relations

10 stated that their tasks were usual and necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of Hanjin. Hanjin, on the other hand, opposed claiming that respondents were hired as PROJECT EMPLOYEES for the construction of LRT/MRT Line 2 Package 2 and 3 projects. That they executed contracts of employment in which it was clearly stipulated that respondents were to be hired as project employees for a period of 3months but the contract may be renewed automatically in the absence of any NOTICE OF TERMINATION from them. It was also stipulated that at the completion of the project or any particular phase, the contract automatically terminates. Hanjin also claimed that respondents were duly informed of the abovecited policies and that respondents were among the project employees who were laid off because of the companys intention to reduce its manpower. That they paid respondents COMPLETION BUNOS in accordance with the usual practice of the construction industry. A QUITCLAIM was also made into effect which formally states that respondents received all wages and benefits due to them. LA- in favour of the respondents, and declared that they were regular employees. It ruled that respondents were regular employees who had been illegally dismissed without just causes and without due process. It ruled that HANJIN's allegation that respondents were project employees was negated by its failure to present proof thereof. NLRC- reversed the decision of the LA. It gave probative value to the Termination Report submitted by Hanjin to DOLE, the completion bunis and the executed Quitclaims. CA reversed the NLRCs decision and uphold the decision of the LA except the award of damages and attorneys fee. It emphasized that it is the employer who has the burden of proving the legality of the dismissal where in this case Hanjin failed to prove.

Issue: WON respondents were regular employees or project employees.

SCs decision. They are regular employees. The applicable law is Article 280 of the LC. In a number of cases, the Court held that the length of service or the re-hiring of construction workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer upon them regular employment status, since their re-hiring is only a natural consequence of the fact that experienced construction workers are preferred. PECA: Labor Relations

11 Employees who are hired for carrying out a separate job, distinct from the other undertakings of the company, the scope and duration of which has been determined and

made known to the employees at the time of the employment ,

are properly treated as project employees and their services may be lawfully terminated upon the completion of a project. Should the terms of their employment fail to comply with this standard, they cannot be considered project employees. The principal test for determining whether employees are "project employees" or "regular employees" is whether they are assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which are specified at the time they are engaged for that project. Such duration, as well as the particular work/service to be performed, is defined in an employment agreement and is made clear to the employees at the time of hiring. In this case, petitioners did not have that kind of agreement with respondents. Neither did they inform respondents of the nature of the latters' work at the time of hiring. Hence, for failure of petitioners to substantiate their claim that respondents were project employees, we are constrained to declare them as regular employees. the Court markedly stressed the importance of the employees' knowing consent to being engaged as project employees when it clarified that "there is no question that stipulation on employment contract providing for a fixed period of employment such as ` project-toproject' contract is valid provided the period was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent. Absence of a written contract does not grant regular status, but such contract is the best evidence that respondents were informed of the duration and scope of their work and their status as project employees. But in this case, Hanjin was not able to present the said contract. It then follows that they were not properly informed of their status as project employees, hence they are treated as regular employees in accordance with Clause 3.3 (a) of DO no. 19, series of 1993. a) Project employees whose
aggregate period of continuous employment in a construction company is at least one year shall be considered regular employees, in the absence of a "day certain" agreed upon by the parties for the termination of their relationship. Project employees who have become regular shall be entitled to separation pay.

Further, the failure of Hanjin to file a Termination Report with the DOLE every time a project of phase is completed indicates those respondents were not project employees. Such practice marks that employees are unjustly precluded from acquiring security of tenure, contrary to public policy, morals and good customs. On the quitclaim to be valid it must be taken into account that the CONSIDERATION ACCEPTED BY THE RESPONDENTS constitutes a reasonable settlement equivalent to the full measure of their legal right. PECA: Labor Relations

12 In this case, the Quitclaims signed by the respondents do not appear to have been made for valuable consideration. Respondents, who are regular employees, are entitled to backwages and separation pay and, therefore, the Quitclaims which they signed cannot prevent them from seeking claims to which they are entitled.

Valiao vs. CA, GR no. 146621 Petitioner Rene Valiao appointed by WNC as SAO Director, transferred to a Staff Position and designated as Records Chief at the Registrars Office and later re-assigned as typist, later appointed as Information Assiatant and then transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as Record Evaluator. Respondents: CA, West Negros College Facts Valiao filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal. He alleged that the true intention of the WNC in terminating his services was because he was among those apprehended in a raid. That he was not accorded due process. MNC, on the other hand, claimed that Valiaos dismissal was based on his tardiness and habitual absenteeism which was fully supported by documentary evidence. That the petitioner was accorded due process as several memorandums was sent to him with the intention that he explains his side of the story. In fact prior to the time that he was put into a preventive suspension there was an Investigation Committee that was organized and a notice thereof was duly sent to the petitioner. It was only after the investigation proceeding that a notice of termination was sent to him. LA - found no justifiable reason to place the petitioner under preventive suspension as there was no serious or imminent threat to the life or property of his employer or co-workers. However, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of the petitioner from WNC to be valid due to absenteeism and tardiness and after he was accorded the procedural due process aspect of the law as reflected in the records showing that the petitioner was formally investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings by the management of WNC. NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA CA held that the petitioner was validly dismissed for serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties.

Issue: WON petitioner was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, including habitual tardiness and absenteeism. SCs Decision YES, petitioners dismissal from employment is valid and justified. Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes for terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross negligence PECA: Labor Relations

13 connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. Petitioners repeated acts of absences without leave and his frequent tardiness reflect his indifferent attitude to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly, his repeated and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute gross misconduct unexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This Court has held that habitual absenteeism without leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify termination of an employee. petitioner claims that he was dismissed not for his tardiness or absences but for his arrest as a suspected drug user. His claim, however, is merely speculative. We find such contention devoid of basis. Indeed, even without the arrest incident, WNC had more than enough basis for terminating petitioner from employment. It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative of WNC to terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld. However, on the issue on putting the petitioner in a preventive suspension, the Court finds to sufficient ground to justify this act as his continued employment poses a NO serious and imminent threat to life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.

MANILA HOTEL CORP. and MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD., vs. NLRC, G.R No. 120077, October 13, 2000 Facts Petition for certiorari seeking to annul the orders of NLRC for having been issued without or with excess jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Private respondent Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as a printer at the Mazoon Printing Press in Oman. Sometime in June 1988 he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel in Beijing, China who later terminated his employment because of retrenchment. Santos was directly hired by Palace Hotel through the recommendation of his friend in the name of NESTOR BUENIO. PECA: Labor Relations

14 Petitioners of the other hand, MHC was a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines while MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. By virtue of a MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT with the Palace Hotel petitioner trained the personnel and staff of the former at Beijing, China. Sometime on August 1989, Santos was informed by Palace Hotel about the termination of his employment. In the letter, Palace Hotel noted that the reason why they are terminating Santos was because of the political upheaval of in China (referring to Tiannamen Square incidents) which affects their business very much. Hence, to reduce expenses, they will not open/operate printshop for the time being. Santos went back to the Philippines and filed a case for illegal dismissal with the prayer of full compensation pursuant to the employment agreement he signed. The case was file before the Arbitration Branch, NCR, NLRC. Judgment was rendered ordering the petitioners to pay Santos jointly and severally. Petitioners questioned the said decision claiming that it is the POEA and not the NLRC who has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: WON NLRC over jurisdiction over the case. SCs RULING: No, POEA has jurisdiction. Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government.

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. 37 The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.

Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither .are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines. No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the PECA: Labor Relations

15 Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment. No power to determine applicable law . Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). There was no existing employer-employee relationship between Santos and MHICL. MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the aforementioned powers. It did not select respondent Santos as an employee for the Palace Hotel. He was referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend, Nestor Buenio. MHICL did not engage respondent Santos to work. The terms of employment were negotiated and finalized through correspondence between respondent Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Henk, who were officers and representatives of the Palace Hotel and not MHICL. No Jurisdiction, hence, there is grave abuse of discretion - The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, or other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreements

JO vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121605, February 2, 2000 Facts Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the NLRC in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Private respondent Peter Mejila worked as baber on a piece rate basis at Dianas Barber Shop. Said baber shop was sold to Petitioners Paz and Martin Jo sometime on 1970. All employees, including Mejila, were absorbed by the new owners. The scheme was sharing of in the earnings of the barber shop, 2/3 for the barbers while 1/3 to the owners. Sometime on 1977, petitioners designated Mejila as the caretaker of the shop. In addition to his being a barber, he was tasked (as a caretaker) for the maintenance of the shop. For his additional job, he was given an honorarium equivalent to 1/3 of the net income on the shop. Sometime in 1992, Mejila had an altercation with his co-barber, Jorge Tinoy. The bickerings, characterized by constant exchange of personal insults during working hours, became serious so that private respondent reported the matter to Atty. Allan Macaraya of the labor department. When the mediation was still ongoing, Mejila continued reporting for work at the barbaershop. But sometime in January 1993, he turned over the duplicate keys of the shop PECA: Labor Relations

16 to the cashier and took away all his belongings therefrom. . On January 8, 1993, he began working as a regular barber at the newly opened Goldilocks Barbershop also in Iligan City. Later on, Mejila filed a case for illegal dismissal against the petitioners with prayer for payment of separation pay and other monetary benefits, attys fee and damages. LA found the Mejila was an employee of the petitioners but he was illegally dismissed instead he voluntarily left his job because of his misunderstanding with his co-worker; ordered petitioners to pay private respondent his 13th month pay and attorneys fees. NLRC sustained the findings of the LA as to the existence of employer-employee relationship but ruled that Mejila was illegally dismissed, hence, it ordered to reinstate Mejila plus payment of backwages.

ISSUE: WON Mejila is an employee of the petitioners; WON he was illegally dismissed. SCs Ruling; First issue: Yes, there Mejila is an employee of the petitioners. The doctrine that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of fact and that the findings thereon by the labor arbiter and the NLRC shall be accorded not only respect but even finality when supported by ample evidence. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers ; (2) power of dismissal; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to control the workers conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The power of control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof. It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee; it is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power. Here, undoubtedly, the services performed by private respondent as barber is related to, and in the pursuit of the principal business activity of petitioners. Later on, petitioners tapped private respondent to serve concurrently as caretaker of the shop. Certainly, petitioners had the power to dismiss private respondent being the ones who engaged the services of the latter. In fact, private respondent sued petitioners for illegal dismissal, albeit contested by the latter.

Second Issue: NO, Mejila was not illegally dismissed, he voluntarily abandoned his job. To constitute abandonment, there must be concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt acts from which it may be inferred that the employee concerned has no more interest in working. In other words, there must be a clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship on the part of the employee. PECA: Labor Relations

17

In this case, the following circumstances clearly manifest private respondents intention to sever his ties with petitioners. First, private respondent even bragged to his co-workers his plan to quit his job at Cesars Palace Barbershop and Massage Clinic as borne out by the affidavit executed by his former co-workers. Second, he surrendered the shops keys and took away all his things from the shop. Third, he did not report anymore to the shop without giving any valid and justifiable reason for his absence. Fourth, he immediately sought a regular employment in another barbershop, despite previous assurance that he could remain in petitioners employ. Fifth, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal without praying for reinstatement.

The rule that abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is not applicable in this case. Such rule applies where the complainant seeks reinstatement as a relief. Corollarily, it has no application where the complainant does not pray for reinstatement and just asks for separation pay instead [13] as in the present case. It goes without saying that the prayer for separation pay, being the alternative remedy to reinstatement,[14] contradicts private respondents stance. That he was illegally dismissed is belied by his own pleadings as well as contemporaneous conduct.

JARDIN et. al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000 Facts Petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the NLRC which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners were taxi drivers of the private respondent PHILJAMA INTERNATIONAL INC., (a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of Goodman Taxi). They used to drive private respondents taxi every other day on a 24-hour work schedule under the boundary system. Under the system, drivers were made to pay the so-called boundary and the excess will be their net earnings for that day. Nevertheless, private respondent admittedly regularly deducts from petitioners, daily earnings the amount of P30.00 supposedly for the washing of the taxi units. Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect their rights and interests. Upon learning about the plan of the petitioners, private respondent refused to let the former drive their taxicabs for unknown reason. This prompted petitioners to file a case for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. LA- dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC - tribunal declared that petitioners are employees of private respondent, and, as such, their dismissal must be for just cause and after due process. PECA: Labor Relations

18 Private respondent first motion for reconsideration denied; 2 nd Motion for reconsideration NLRC granted it, it reversed itself and ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over the case as petitioners and private respondent have no employer-employee relationship. It held that the relationship of the parties is leasehold which is covered by the Civil Code rather than the Labor Code.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are employees of the private respondents; WON the second motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent was allowed under the rules. SCs Decision: 1st Yes, petitioners (being a taxi driver) are employees of private respondents. The four- fold test is present. The Supreme Court stresses that "control is deemed the most important that the other requisites may even be disregarded". Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship exists if the "employer" has reserved the right to control the "employee" not only as to the result of the work done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. Otherwise, no such relationship exists. In a number of cases decided by this Court,19 we ruled that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. The management of the business is in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the abovestated doctrine to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor,20 auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, termination of employment must be effected in accordance with law.The just and authorized causes for termination of employment are enumerated under Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. The requirement of notice and hearing is set-out in Article 277 (b) of the said Code. Hence, petitioners, being employees of private respondent, can be dismissed only for just and authorized cause, and after affording them notice and hearing prior to termination. In the instant case, private respondent had no valid cause to terminate the employment of petitioners. Neither were there two (2) written notices sent by private respondent informing each of the petitioners that they had been dismissed from work.

2nd Issue: the second motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent is indubitably a prohibited pleading PECA: Labor Relations

19 In this case before us, private respondent exhausted administrative remedy available to it by seeking reconsideration of public respondent's decision dated April 28, 1994, which public respondent denied. With this motion for reconsideration, the labor tribunal had ample opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Thus, when private respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, public respondent should have forthwith denied it in accordance with Rule 7, Section 14 of its New Rules of Procedure which allows only one motion for reconsideration from the same party, thus: Sec. 14. Motions for Reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished within the reglementary period the adverse party and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained. The rationale for allowing only one motion for reconsideration from the same party is to assist the parties in obtaining an expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor cases. For obvious reasons, delays cannot be countenanced in the resolution of labor disputes. The dispute may involve no less than the livelihood of an employee and that of his loved ones who are dependent upon him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine, and education. It may as well involve the survival of a business or an industry. With regard to the amount deducted daily by private respondent from petitioners for washing of the taxi units, we view the same as not illegal in the context of the law. Car washing after a tour of duty is indeed a practice in the taxi industry and is in fact dictated by fair play.

SY vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT, G.R No. 142293, February 27, 2003 Facts Petitioner for review praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA. Private respondent Jaime Sahot started working a truck helper for petitioners familyowned trucking business sometime on 1958. On 196, he became a truck driver of the same family business until 1994. Sometime in April 1994, Sahot was already 59 years old. He had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various ailments. He inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) on April 25, 1994, but discovered that his premium payments had not been remitted by his employer. This prompted him to file a week-long leave. At the end of his week-long absence, he applied for extension. At this time, petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should the he refuse to go back to work. Since his was not able to work, he was dismissed by the petitioners. Hence, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. He ended up sick, jobless and penniless. PECA: Labor Relations

20 Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that Sahot was not illegally dismissed; that he was not a driver, rather, he was an INDUSTRIAL PARTNER and that his refusal to go back to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily RESIGNED from his work. LA - ruled that there was no illegal dismissal in Sahots case and that he had failed to report to work; it also ruled that Sahot was an industrial partner of the petitioner and not an employee. NLRC ruled that Sahot was an employee and he did not abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness. CA- affirmed the NLRCs decision

ISSUE : WON Sahot was an employee of the petitioner; WON there was illegal dismissal; SCs Ruling 1st YES. There exist an employer-employee relationship between Sahot and the petitioner. The LA committed an error when he concluded that Sahot was an industrial partner with the petitioner. According to the Court, the four elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are present in this case. Records of the case show that private respondent actually engaged in work as an employee. During the entire course of his employment he did not have the freedom to determine where he would go, what he would do, and how he would do it. He merely followed instructions of petitioners and was content to do so, as long as he was paid his wages. Indeed, said the CA, private respondent had worked as a truck helper and driver of petitioners not for his own pleasure but under the latters control. The claimed as Industrial Partner is unmeritorious. Article 1767 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Not one of these circumstances is present in this case. No written agreement exists to prove the partnership between the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money, property or industry for the purpose of engaging in the supposed business. There is no proof that he was receiving a share in the profits as a matter of course, during the period when the trucking business was under operation. Neither is there any proof that he had actively participated in the management, administration and adoption of policies of the business. Thus, the NLRC and the CA did not err in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that private respondent was an industrial partner from 1958 to 1994. Time and again this Court has said that "if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter."

2nd Yes. Sahot was illegally dismissed. PECA: Labor Relations

21 In termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination was for lawful cause and validly made.28 Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer, without distinction whether the employer admits or does not admit the dismissal. For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process. Termination under Article 284 of the Labor Code,in order to be valid must comply with the following requisite: (see Book VI, Rule 1, Section of the IRR) The employee is suffering from a disease His continued employment is either: PROHIBITED BY LAW, PREJUDICIAL TO HIS HEALTH and TO HIS CO-EEs There is a certification by a COMPETENT PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITY that the disease is of such nature or such stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment NOTICE OF TERMINATION should be served both to the employee and the DOLE at least 1mo prior to the effectivity of the termination Separation pay equivalent to at least 1mo salary or to month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater , a fraction of at least 6mo being considered as one whole year

Further, the medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor. In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected. Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employees dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work.

TAN vs. LAGRAMA, G.R. No. 151228, AUGUST 15, 2002 FACTS Petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the CA. PECA: Labor Relations

22 Private respondent Leovigildo Lagrama is a painter by the Supreme Theatre Corporation. He is engaged in making billboards and murals for the motion pictures shown in the Empress, Supreme, and Crown Theaters for more than 10 years. Petitioner Rolando Tan is the president and the general manager of the STC. Sometime in September 1998, Tan summoned Lagrama where he scolded the latter for urinating inside the work area. Lagrama denied the allegations and claimed that he is not the only one who goes inside the work area. He tried to explain his side but petitioner did not listen. He claimed that he was not afforded with due process and was illegally dismissed from his job. Hence, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that Lagrama was not an employee, instead, he was an INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR who did his work according to his own method since the petitioner is only interested as to the outcome thereof. . He cited the admission of Lagrama during the conferences before the Labor Arbiter that he was paid on a fixed piece-work basis, i.e., that he was paid for every painting turned out as ad billboard or mural for the pictures shown in the three theaters, on the basis of a "no mural/billboard drawn, no pay" policy. LA- ruled that Lagrama was an employee of the petitioner and that he was illegally dismissed. NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that Lagrama was an independent contractor of the petitioner. CA - found that petitioner exercised control over Lagrama's work by dictating the time when Lagrama should submit his billboards and murals and setting rules on the use of the work area and rest room, it reinstated the decision of the LA

ISSUE: WON Lagrama was an employee of the petitioner. SCs Ruling : Yes. In determining whether there is an employer-employee relationship, we have applied a "four-fold test," to wit: (1) whether the alleged employer has the power of selection and engagement of employees; (2) whether he has control of the employee with respect to the means and methods by which work is to be accomplished; (3) whether he has the power to dismiss; and (4) whether the employee was paid wages. These elements of the employer-employee relationship are present in this case. First. The existence in this case of the first element is undisputed. It was petitioner who engaged the services of Lagrama without the intervention of a third party. Second, the control test. Compared to an employee, an independent contractor is one who carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work, or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method, free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters PECA: Labor Relations

23 connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. Otherwise stated, an independent contractor enjoys independence and freedom from the control and supervision of his principal, an employee is subject to the employer's power to control the means and methods by which the employee's work is to be performed and accomplished. Here, the pieces of evidence presented before the Court shows that Lagrama performed his work as painter under the supervision and control of petitioner. Lagrama worked in a designated work area inside the Crown Theater of petitioner, for the use of which petitioner prescribed rules. The rules included the observance of cleanliness and hygiene and a prohibition against urinating in the work area and any place other than the toilet or the rest rooms.9 Petitioner's control over Lagrama's work extended not only to the use of the work area, but also to the result of Lagrama's work, and the manner and means by which the work was to be accomplished. Moreover, it would appear that petitioner not only provided the workplace, but supplied as well the materials used for the paintings, because he admitted that he paid Lagrama only for the latter's services. Third, payment of wages. Lagrama worked for Tan on a fixed piece-work basis is of no moment. Payment by result is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. It is a method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of employer-employee relationship. One may be paid on the basis of results or time expended on the work, and may or may not acquire an employment status, depending on whether the elements of an employer-employee relationship are present or not. Further, The primary standard for determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. In this case, there is such a connection between the job of Lagrama painting billboards and murals and the business of petitioner. To let the people know what movie was to be shown in a movie theater requires billboards. Petitioner in fact admits that the billboards are important to his business. It is claimed that Lagrama abandoned his work. There is no evidence to show this. Abandonment requires two elements: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.25 Mere absence is not sufficient. What is more, the burden is on the employer to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. There is no evidence that Lagrama did urinate in a place other than a rest room in the premises of his work.

Bautista vs. Hon. CA and Officials and Board of Directors of the Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa MWSS Union, G.R. No. 123375, Feb. 28, 2005 Facts KKMK-MWSS is a labor organization in the MWSS created pursuant to EO 180. A petition for election of KKMK-MWSS was filed by Bonifacio de Guzman before the Bureau of Labor Relations. The same

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was granted and directed the Labor Organization Division of the said Bureau to conduct the election. Petitioner, an incumbent President of the KKMK-MWSS, questioned the jurisdiction of the BLR to approve the said petition for election as well as its authority to conduct the same. A temporary restraining order was issued ordering BLR not to pursue the election, howeber, the same failed as the election went through on 2Dec1993.

ISSUE: WON BLR have jurisdiction to call for and conduct the election of officers of an employees association in the public sector. SCs RULING: YES. In the case of Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) v. Ferrer-Calleja , the court ruled that the BLR has jurisdiction to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections in the public sector, viz, x x x In the same way that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant requisite eligibilities to court employees, we see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the certification process in the Court of Appeals, considering its expertise, machinery, and experience in this particular activity. Executive Order No. 180 requires organizations of government employees to register with both CSC and DOLE.l^vvphi1.net This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do the job. x x x Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in determining whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different conclusions. At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner. The authority of the BLR in assuming jurisdiction over a certification election, or any inter-union or intra-union conflicts, is found in Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, Art. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. It is quite clear from this provision that BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all interunion and intra-union conflicts. An intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, and an inter-union controversy or dispute, one occurring or carried on between or among unions. The subject of the case at bar, which is the election of the officers and

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members of the board of KMKK-MWSS, is, clearly, an intra-union conflict, being within or inside a labor union. It is well within the powers of the BLR to act upon. Petitioner is likewise esptopped since he actively participated in the election where he garnered 288 votes.

Philips Industrial Development Inc. vs. NLRC and Philips Employees Organization (FFW), G.R. No. 88957, June 25, 1992 Facts Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and marketing of electronic products. Since 1971, it had a total of 6 collective bargaining agreements with FFW, a registered labor union and certified bargaining agent of all the rank and file EEs of the former. In the first CBA it expressly excluded confidential EEs, security guards, temporary EEs and sales reps in the bargaining unit. In the second to fifth, sales force, confidential EEs, managerial EEs, temporary EEs and security guards were excluded also. In the sixth CBA, it was agreed upon that the subject of inclusion and exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and confidential EEs in the coverage of the CBA will be submitted for arbitration. The same failed, hence it was submitted for compulsory arbitration pursuant to ART 228 of the LC. LA rendered decision ordering petitioner to conduct a referendum to determine the will of the service engrs., sales reps. as to their inclusion and exclusion in the CBA. FFW appealed this decision to the NLRC. NLRC set aside the decision of the LA; it ordered that company's Service Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included within the rank and file bargaining unit.

ISSUE: WON NLRC committed grave absuse of discretion in holding that service engrs., sales reps., and confidential EEs are QUALIFIED to be part of the existing bargaining unit. SCs Ruling: Yes, there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Petitioner is correct in saying that the inclusion of the group in the existing bargaining unit would run counter to the history of this parties CBA considering that in the last five CBA it consistently excluded this group of EEs from the scope of the bargaining unit. The rationale for such exclusion is that these employees hold positions which are highly sensitive, confidential and of a highly fiduciary nature; to include them in the bargaining unit may subject the company to breaches in security and the possible revelation of highly sensitive and confidential matters. Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Hon Augusto Sanchez : x x x The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty, to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. x x x

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As regards the sales representatives and service engineers, however, there is no doubt that they are entitled to join or form a union, as they are not disqualified by law from doing so. The NLRC practically forced them to become members of PEO-FFW or to be subject to its sphere of influence, it being the certified bargaining agent for the subject bargaining unit. This violates, obstructs, impairs and impedes the service engineers' and the sales representatives' constitutional right to form unions or associations and to selforganization. Finally, the decision then of the Executive Labor Arbiter in merely directing the holding of a referendum "to determine the will of the service engineers, sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in (sic) the bargaining unit" is the most appropriate procedure that conforms with their right to form, assist or join in labor union or organization.

Metrolab Industries vs. Hon. Nieves Confesor, as Secretary of the DOLE and Metro Drug Corp Employees Association- Federation of Free Workers, G.R. no. 108855, Feb. 28, 1996 Facts Private respondent is a labor organization representing the rank and file EEs of the petitioner. On 31Dec1990, the CBA between Metrolab and the Union expired. The negotiations for a new CBA, ended in a deadlock. The Union filed a NOTICE TO STRIKE against the petitioner. The parties failed to settled their dispute despite the conciliation a efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. So, the Secretary of Labor, Ruben Torres, issued an assumption order to avoid escalating the dispute. An Order was issued directing the Union to cease and desist from committing any and all act that might exacerbate the situation. It also ordered that the parties will resolve the dispute and to execute a new CBA. But the Union filed and MR. At the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner laid off 94 of its rank and file EEs. So, Union filed a Motion for a cease and desist order to enjoin the petitioner from implementing the mass lay-off. According to the petitioner the mass lay-off was effected on the premise that they are exercising their right i.e management prerogative considering that the company is losing millions of pesos. Thereafter, it recalled some of its laid-off EEs. On April14, 1992, ACTING SECRETARY NIEVES CONFESOR issued a resolution declaring that the mass lay-off effected by the petitioner is illegal, hence, it declared that the same will be reinstated plus full backwages. The parties are likewise enjoined to cease and desist from committing any act which may tend to circumvent this resolution. Thereafter, the parties finally entered into a new CBA. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the layoff did not aggravate the dispute since no untoward incident occurred as a result thereof. It, likewise, filed a motion for clarification regarding the constitution of the bargaining unit covered by the CBA. Pending resolution of the aforcited motion, petitioner laid off 73 of its EEs on ground of redundancy.

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Sec. Confesor issued a cease and desist order against the petitioner. Labor Secretary Confesor also ruled that executive secretaries are excluded from the closed-shop provision of the CBA, not from the bargaining unit.

Issue: WON the Secretary Confesor committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the temporary lay-off is illegal. WON executive secretaries are part of the bargaining unit of the rank and file EEs. SCs Ruling: First Issue: No grave abuse of discretion. This Court recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. However, this privilege is not absolute but subject to limitations imposed by law which must likewise be exercise without abuse of discretion. The Secretary of Labor is expressly given the power under the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction and resolve labor disputes involving industries indispensable to national interest. The disputed injunction is subsumed under this special grant of authority. Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code. Petitioners business is of national interest is not disputed considering that they are one of the leading manufacturer and supplier of medical and pharmaceutical products to the country. Metrolab's management prerogatives, therefore, are not being unjustly curtailed but duly balanced with and tempered by the limitations set by law, taking into account its special character and the particular circumstances in the case at bench. Noteworthy that during the layoff, the parties were still in the process of resolving their CBA deadlock. As a result, the motions and oppositions were filed diverting the parties attention, delaying resolution of the bargaining deadlock and postponing the signing of their new CBA, thereby aggravating the whole conflict.

Second Issue: Executive Secretaries are not part of the bargaining unit, contrary to the view of Secretary Confesor. Although Art 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial EEs, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to CONFIDENTIAL EEs or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial EEs and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Unions assurances fail to convince the Court. The danger sought to be prevented, particularly the threat of conflict of, interest and espionage are not limited by non- membership of Metrolab's executive secretaries or confidential employees in the Union. Forming part of the bargaining unit, the executive secretaries stand to benefit from any agreement executed between the Union and Metrolab. Such a scenario, thus, gives rise to a potential conflict between personal interests and their duty as confidential employees to act for and in behalf of Metrolab. They do not have to be union members to affect or influence either side. Finally, confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file. The nature of employment of confidential employees is quite distinct from the rank and file, thus, warranting a separate

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category. Excluding confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination. San Miguel Corp Supervisors and Exempt Union vs. Hon. Laguesma, as Undersecretary of the DOLE, Hon. Reynante as Med-Arbiter and SAN MIGUEL CORP. G.R. No. 110399, August 15, 1997 Facts Petitioner filed before the DOLE a Direct Certification or Certification Election among supervisors and exempt EEs of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products of CABUYAO, SAN FERNANDO and OTIS, Med-Arbiter Reynante issued an Order for the conduct of certification election among supervisors and exempt EEs of the SMC of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit. This has been protested by SMC. Hence, they filed an APPEAL on the ground that the supervisors level 3 above whose position is confidential in nature. The appeal was granted by the Undersecretary ad remanded the same to the Med-Arbiter for the determination of the true classification of each of the EEs sought to be included in the bargaining unit. Upon the petitioners motion, Undersecretary Laguesma ordered that a separate certification elections among supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1-4 and the exempt EEs in each of the three plants. SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Suspend Proceeding. This were granted following the doctrine in the case of Philips Industrial Development, Inc . v. NLRC ; Confidential employees, like managerial employees, are not allowed to form, join or assist a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining.

ISSUE: WON supervisory EEs 3and 4 are exempt EEs of the company considered as confidential EEs. WON the EEs of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit. SCs Ruling First Issue: No, they are not confidential EEs Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity , (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ''confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. Granting arguendo that an employee has access to confidential labor relations information but such is merely incidental to his duties and knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties, said access does not render the employee a confidential employee. It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to "all" workers the right to self-organization. Hence, confidential employees who may

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be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to needlessly deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing. In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered confidential employees merely because they handle "confidential data" as such must first be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to fall under said restrictions. The information they handle are properly classifiable as technical and internal business operations data which, to our mind, has no relevance to negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein the interests of a union and the management are invariably adversarial. Since the employees are not classifiable under the confidential type, this Court rules that they may appropriately form a bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Furthermore, even assuming that they are confidential employees, jurisprudence has established that there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union.

Second Issue: Yes, it is appropriate to include them into a single bargaining unit. An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining. It is undisputed that they all belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This means that, although they belong to three different plants, they perform work of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed. The distance among the three plants is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in the administration of union affairs. Neither are there regional differences that are likely to impede the operations of a single bargaining representative.

KIOK LOY, doing business in the name and style of SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT vs. NLRC AND PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAW (KILUSAN), G.R. No. L-54334, January 22, 1986 Facts Private respondent KILUSAN won in a certification election, subsequently it was certified as legitimate labor federation by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the ran-and-file EEs of the petitioner-company. The Company opposed. Kilusan furnished to the Company copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement, at the same time, it requested the latter for its counter-proposal. Several efforts were made by the Kilusan but the Company did not response. Hence, Kilusan filed a NOTICE TO STRIKE with the BLR on the ground of unresolved economic issues in the collective bargaining.

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Attempts towards amicable settlement failed, prompting the BLR to certify the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to PD 823. A hearing was scheduled by the LA but was cancelled for failure of the parties to submit their position papers. The case was further reset due to the withdrawal of the Companys cousel of record. A motion for postponement was made by the Company through its new counsel allegedly for the purpose of acquainting himself with the case. Finally on June 4, 1979 the case was called for a hearing but the representative of the Company failed to appear. So another request for postponement was made by the Company. This time, it was denied. Hence, the LA ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence, and considered the case for resolution. LA- declared that the Company guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain in violation of Section (g) Art 248 (now Art249) of the labor code. NLRC admitted the report of the LA.

ISSUE: WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared that the Company is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain which is not supported by law and evidence; WON the Companys right to procedural due process is violated. SCs Ruling: The decision of the NLRC is proper and justified. No violation of the right to due process. Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. A mutual responsibility of the ER and the Union as characterized a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party. The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely: (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; 2) proof of majority representation (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case. From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain in good faith. A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is especially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered.

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It was further ruled that "while the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. No violation of the Compnys right to procedural due process. Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared totally bereft of any legal and factual support. Certainly, the moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting settlement of economic disputes.

DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY BUENAVENTURA MAGSALIN, G.R. No. 109002, April 12, 2000 Facts Petitioner University

EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION

and

Respondent composed of REGULAR NON-ACADEMIC RANK AND FILE EEs Parties entered into a CBA for a period of three years. During the FREEDOM PERIOD (60days before the date of expiration of the CBA) Union negotiate to the University for a new CBA, but turned to be unsuccessful. Hence, they filed a Notice To Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. After several conciliation-mediation meetings, only 5 out of 11 issues raised were resolved, hence, there is only PARTIAL CBA. Parties appointed Buenaventura Magsalin as the Voluntary Arbitrator. 1st Issue: Scope of the Bargaining Unit. Union Computer Operators and DISCIPLINE OFFICERS are not considered as Confidential EEs, hence, they can join in the bargaining unit. Univesity they are confidential EEs by the reason of the nature of their work, they are likewise EXCLUDED as expressly agreed upon in the previous CBA. VA- they are not confidential EEs as are presently doing clerical and routinary work and had nothing to do with the setting of management policies for the University. With respect to the employees of the College of St. Benilde, the voluntary arbitrator found that the College of St. Benilde has a personality separate and distinct from the University and thus, held ". . . that the employees therein are outside the bargaining unit of the University's rank-and-file employees ."

2nd Issue: Inclusion of Union Shop Clause in the CBA.

Union include the union shop clause in the CBA as no less than the Labor Code affirmed the same. (art248) University inclusion of the union shop clause is unjust and oppressive since it avers the spirit of the exercise of the constitutional right to self-organization that every individual should be able to freely choose whether to join a Union or not.

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VA inclusion is valid since it is not a restriction on the employee's right of freedom of association but rather a valid form of union security while the CBA is in force and in accordance with the Constitutional policy to promote unionism and collective bargaining and negotiations. The parties therefore should incorporate such union shop clause in their CBA. 3rd Issue Use of Last-In-First-Out Method

Union- not a legitimate exercise of mgt prerogative; this is the method that they want to be followed by the University University legitimate exercise of mgt prerogative; they have the right to control the affairs of their business VA denied the Unions proposal; right and prerogative of the management of the University to select and/or choose its employees, a right equally recognized by the Constitution and the law. 4th Issue: Salary Increase

UnionUniversity VA denied Unions claim on the ground that the proposed budget of the University for SY 1992-93 could not sufficiently cope up with the demand for increases by the Union. 5th Issue: Demand for Reduction of the Workload of the Union President, Special Leave Benefits and Indefinite Union Leave with pay. UnionUniversityVA denied the Unions claim; no valid reason for the reduction of the workload of its President," 21 and that there is ". . . no sufficient justification to grant an indefinite leave. 6th Issue- Duration of the CBA

Issue: WON the VA committed grave abuse of discretion when he rendered the said decision. SCs Ruling: partially granted, partially modified 1st Issue: Computer Operators and Discipline Officers are not considered to be confidential EEs. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the express exclusion of the computer operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the parties may not only renew the existing collective bargaining agreement but may also propose and discuss modifications or amendments thereto. The Court also affirms the findings of the voluntary arbitrator that the employees of the College of St. Benilde should be excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file

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employees of Dela Salle University, because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. 2nd Issue: We affirm the ruling of the voluntary arbitrator for the inclusion of a union shop provision in addition to the existing maintenance of membership clause in the collective bargaining agreement. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.

3rd Issue: We agree with the voluntary arbitrator that as an exercise of management prerogative, the University has the right to adopt valid and equitable grounds as basis for terminating or transferring employees. Valid exercise of management prerogative is one which, among others, covers: work assignment, working methods, time, supervision of workers, transfer of employees, work supervision, and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for, or limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment

4th Issue: We find that the voluntary arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the basis of the Universitys Proposed Budget which can no longer be required to grant a second round of wage increase. In one case, the Court ruled that, the standard proof of a company's financial standing is its financial statements duly audited by independent and credible external auditors . Financial statements audited by independent external auditors constitute the normal method of proof of profit and loss performance of a company. The financial capability of a company cannot be based on its proposed budget because a proposed budget does not reflect the true financial condition of a company.

5th Issue: We agree with the voluntary arbitrator's rejection of the said demands, there being no justifiable reason for the granting of the same.

6th Issue: The Court finds that the voluntary arbitrator did not gravely abuse his discretion when it ruled that the MULTI-SECTORAL COMMITTE in the University is the legitimate group which determines and scrutinizes the annual salary increases and fringe benefits of the EEs in the University.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 180 June 1, 1987

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PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, CREATING A PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES In accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order: I. Coverage

Sec. 1. This Executive Order applies to all employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. For this purpose, employees, covered by this Executive Order shall be referred to as "government employees". Sec. 2. All government employees can form, join or assist employees' organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. They can also form, in conjunction with appropriate government authorities, labor-management committees, works councils and other forms of workers' participation schemes to achieve the same objectives. Sec. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and-file government employees. Sec. 4. The Executive Order shall not apply to the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards. II. Protection of the Right to Organize

Sec. 5. Government employees shall not be discriminated against in respect of their employment by reason of their membership in employees' organizations or participation in the normal activities of their organization. Their employment shall not be subject to the condition that they shall not join or shall relinquish their membership in the employees' organizations. Sec. 6. Government authorities shall not interfere in the establishment, functioning or administration of government employees' organizations through acts designed to place such organizations under the control of government authority. III. Registration of Employees' Organization

Sec. 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from receipt thereof. Sec. 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration certificate be issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization with the right to represent its members and undertake activities to further and defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary of Labor and Employment.

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IV. Sole and Exclusive Employees' Representatives

Sec. 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employers unit consisting of rank-and-file employees unless circumstances otherwise require. Sec. 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit shall be designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the employees. Sec. 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees' organization is registered or is seeking registration, based on records of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that the said organizations has the majority support of the rank-and-file employees in the organizational unit. Sec. 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organization unit. D. Terms and Conditions of Employment in Government Services

Sec. 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities. VI. Peaceful Concerted Activities and Strikes

Sec. 14. The Civil Service laws and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. VII. Public Sector Labor-Management Council

Sec. 15. A Public Sector Labor Management Council, hereinafter referred to as the Council, is hereby constituted to be composed of the following: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) Chairman, Civil Service Commission Chairman Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment Vice Chairman Secretary, Department of Finance Member Secretary, Department of Justice Member Secretary, Department of Budget and Management Member

The Council shall implement and administer the provisions of this Executive Order. For this purpose, the Council shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive Order. VIII. Settlement of Disputes

Sec. 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the

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parties may jointly refer the dispute to the Council, for appropriate action. IX. Effectivity

Sec. 17. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 1st day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eightyseven.

Danny Nacpil vs. Int. Broadcasting Corp., G.R. No. 144767, 21 March 2002 Facts Danny Nacpil- Assistant General Manager for Finance/Administration and Controller of respondent from 1996 until April 1997. He alleged that when Emiliano Templo was appointed to replace IBC President Tomas Gomez III, Templo told the Board that as soon as he assumes the IBC Presidency, he will terminate the services of Nacpil. Upon his assumption as the new IBC president, Templo allegedly harassed, insulted, humiliated and pressured petitioner into resigning until the latter was forced to retire. However, Templo refused to pay him his retirement benefits, allegedly because he had not yet secured the clearances from the Presidential Commission on Good Government and the Commission on Audit. So, Nacpil filed a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal against IBP. IBP moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that the LA has no jurisdiction over the case. . IBC contended that petitioner was a corporate officer who was duly elected by the Board of Directors of IBC; hence, the case qualifies as an intra-corporate dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The motion was denied. LA rendered decision in favour of Nacpil ordering reinstatement plus moral and exemplary damages including attys fee. IBP appealed before the NLRC, the same was dismissed for failure to file the required appeal bond in accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. A MR was lifewise denied. CA under R65 reversed the decision of the LA and NLRC.

ISSUE: WON LA has jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits by the petitioner. SCs Ruling: LA has NO JURISDICTION. Presidential Decree No. 902-A (the Revised Securities Act), the law in force when the complaint for illegal dismissal was instituted by petitioner in 1997, the following cases fall under the exclusive of the SEC: c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations; PECA: Labor Relations

37 2 elements in determining whether the SEC has jurisdiction or not, to wit: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. Petitioners argument that he was a mere employee is untenable. Even assuming that he was in fact appointed by the General Manager, such appointment was subsequently approved by the Board of Directors of the IBC. That the position of Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of the IBC in the By-Laws is of no moment, because the IBC's Board of Directors is empowered under Section 25 of the Corporation Code12 and under the corporation's By-Laws to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary. An "office" has been defined as a creation of the charter of a corporation, while an "officer" as a person elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" occupies no office and is generally employed not by action of the directors and stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee. As to petitioner's argument that the nature of his functions is recommendatory thereby making him a mere managerial officer, the Court has previously held that the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or agent or employee is not determined by the nature of the services performed, but instead by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist. The IBC's failure to post an appeal bond within the period mandated under Article 223 of the Labor Code has been rendered immaterial by the fact that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since as stated earlier, the same is in the nature of an intra-corporate controversy.

Prudential Bank vs. Clarita Reyes, G.R. 141093,20 Feb 2001 Facts Respondent Clarita Reyes held a position of Assistant V-President in the foreign department of the petitioner-bank; she is tasked to collect checks drawn against overseas banks payable in foreign currency and to ensure the collection of foreign bills or checks purchased, including the signing of transmittal letters covering the same. Reyes filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal against petitioner on the ground that her dismissal was not base on just cause or authorized causes under the LC. Petitioner-Bank: alleged that her dismissal was base on the loss of trust and confidence for deliberately withholding 2 checks amounting to $224,650.00 and the same being acts of serious misconduct in her performance resulting in monetary loss to the bank. PECA: Labor Relations

38 LA finds that the dismissal of Reyes was without factual and legal basis, hence, it ordered the bank to pay to the former backwages, separation pay, fringe benefits as well as attys fee. NLRC reversed the decision of the LA, Reyes filed an MR but was denied. CA reinstated the decision of the LA.

Issue: WON it is the SEC (now RTC) who has jurisdiction over the case involving the removal from office of a CORPORATE OFFICER. WON Reyes was illegally dismissed. SCs Ruling: NB: questioned the issue on jurisdiction before the CA; it argued that the dispute involved an INTRA-CORPORATE controversy concerning as it does the non-election of private respondent to the position of Assistant Vice-President of the Bank which falls under the exclusive and original, jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (now the Regional Trial Court) under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

Court: Applied the PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL, hence, the bank can no longer Q the issue on jurisdiction. The Bank participated in the proceedings from start to finish. It filed its position paper with the Labor Arbiter. When the decision of the Labor Arbiter was adverse to it, the Bank appealed to the NLRC. When the NLRC decided in its favor, the bank said nothing about jurisdiction. Even before the Court of Appeals, it never questioned the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Banks assertion that "from the beginning, petitioner Bank has consistently asserted in all its
pleadings at all stages of the proceedings that respondent held the position of Assistant Vice President, an elective position which she held by virtue of her having been elected as such by the Board of

such an assertion was made only in the appeal to the NLRC and raised again before the Court of Appeals, not for purposes of questioning jurisdiction but to establish that private respondent's tenure was subject to the discretion of the Board of Directors and that her nonreelection was a mere expiration of her term.
Directors is untenable since as far as the records before this Court reveal however,

It has been stated that "the primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. As Assistant Vice-President of the Foreign Department of the Bank she performs tasks integral to the operations of the bank and her length of service with the bank totaling 28 years speaks volumes of her status as a regular employee of the bank. In fine, as a regular employee, she is entitled to security of tenure; that is, her
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services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. This being in truth a case of illegal dismissal, it is no wonder then that the Bank endeavored to the very end to establish loss of trust and confidence and serious misconduct on the part of private respondent but, as will be discussed later, to no avail. There was illegal dismissal since the ground was not supported and was without basis.

Rural Bank of Coron vs. Annalisa Cortes, G.R. No. 164888, 6 Dec 2006 Facts Analisa Cortes hired by petitioner as clerk, she was still single at the time, she later became Financial Assistant, Personnel Officer and Corporate Secretary of The Rural Bank of Coron, Personnel Officer of CDI, and also Personnel Officer and Disbursing Officer of The Empire Cold Storage Development Corporation (ECSDC). She simultaneously received salaries from these corporations. ANITA CORTES is the wife of Victor Garcia (son of Virgilio, the founder of the pets corporation); later, Analisa married Anitas brother (Eduardo Cortes). Sandra Garcia Escat daughter of Victor and Anita discovered that Analisa was involved in several anomalies,drawing petitioners to terminate respondents services on November 23, 1998 in petitioner corporations. Analisa conveyed respondents willingness to abide by the decision to terminate her but reminded them that she was entitled to separation pay equivalent to 11 months salary as well as to the other benefits provided by law in her favor. But petitioners denied any payment of the Analisas unpaid salaries, hence the latter filed a case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of LACK OF JURISDICTION, contending that the case was an intra-corporate controversy involving the removal of a corporate officer, respondent being the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, Inc., hence, cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Section 5 of PD 902-A. LA denied the motion, it rendered decision in favour of respondent Petitioner appealed before the decision ON THE LAST DAY OF PERIOD OF APPEAL it also filed a MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF BOND. They alleged that the corporation
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is under financial distress. Thus, they prayed that the amount of bond be substantially reduced, preferably to one half thereof or even lower. NLRC - while noting that petitioners timely filed the appeal, held that the same was not accompanied by an appeal bond, a mandatory requirement under Article 22314 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure. It also noted that the Motion for Reduction of Bond was "premised on self-serving allegations." It accordingly dismissed the appeal.

ISSUE:WON the appeal was effected considering that the appellant (petitioner) never paid the bond required. SCs Ruling: no appeal bond is equivalent to no appeal at all TABERRAH vs. NLRC - The appellant in Taberrah filed a motion to fix appeal bond instead of posting an appeal bond ; and the Supreme Court relaxed the requirement considering that the labor arbiters decision did not contain a computation of the monetary award. COSICO Jr. vs. NLRC - In Cosico, the appeal bond posted was of insufficient amount but the Supreme Court ruled that provisions of the Labor Code on requiring a bond on appeal involving monetary awards must be given liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on their merits.

Herein, no appeal bond, whether sufficient or not, was ever filed by the petitioners.
Moreover, the motion for reduction of appeal bond , which was incorporated in the appeal memorandum, was filed only on the tenth or final day of the reglementary period. Under such circumstance, the motion for reduction of appeal bond can no longer be deemed to have stayed the appeal, and the petitioner faces the risk, as had happened in this case, of summary dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection. Article 223, which prescribes the appeal bond requirement, is a rule of jurisdiction and not of procedure. There is a little leeway for condoning a liberal interpretation thereof, and certainly none premised on the ground that its requirements are mere technicalities. It must be emphasized that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from grant of statute, namely the Labor Code.

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It bears emphasis that all that is required to perfect the appeal is the posting of a bond to ensure that the award is eventually paid should the appeal be dismissed. Petitioners should thus have posted a bond, even if it were only partial, but they did not. No relaxation of the Rule may thus be considered. In the case at bar, petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the prescribed period, thus, no appeal was perfected from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. For this reason, the decision sought to be appealed to the NLRC had become final and executory and therefore immutable. Clearly then, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceeding held for that purpose.

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