Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 30, No.

4, December 2010

Connecting the Actual with the Virtual: The Internet and Social Movement Theory in the Muslim WorldThe Cases of Iran and Egypt

MELISSA Y. LERNER
Abstract The rapid expansion of Internet use in the Muslim world has called into question what roleif anythis medium can play in political action in these countries. This paper seeks to analyze the extent to which the Internet offers space for an expansion of social movement theory in the Muslim world. It relies on a number of case studies from two Muslim countries, the One Million Signatures Campaign and Weblogistan in Iran, and the Kefaya Movement and Muslim Brotherhood blogging in Egypt. When placing Internet use in the context of political scientist and historian Charles Tillys repertoire of social movement characteristics (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment) and political scientist Robert Putnams theory that the Internet can isolate individual users, it appears that the key to the successful collaboration of the web and social movements is an adaptive dynamic, through which groups function in both the cyber-world and the real world. This paper presents a potential vision for the future of the Internet and Islamic activism based on the assumption that an online element will help generate some of the elements of Tillys social movement repertoire, particularly if the Internet is used to inspire sympathetic individuals to real world political action. Introduction The advent and increasing popularity of the Internet, particularly in the Western world, has inspired a rich literature forecasting the impact of the World Wide Web on communication, politics, participation, and public opinion. In democratic countries, including the United States and in the European Union, the Internet has become an integral xture of popular culture, andby extensionpolitical culture. Long-established newspapers, political parties, and organizations all maintain websites that serve as another medium through which to attract readers, members, and volunteers. Chatrooms, message boards, and instant messaging programs offer immediate and sometimes anonymous methods of communication with people all over the world. More recently, blogs or weblogs have become a pervasive feature of the cyber-world. The number of blogs increased exponentially after easy-to-use blog software became available free of charge in 1999.1 Blogs are online postings commonly displayed in reverse chronological order, and can resemble informal diaries or more journalistic commentaries on political and social events.2 They are usually accompanied by a comment board that viewers can use to post opinions related to the entries that they read. Blogs have reinforced the communication methodology of the Internet: the decentralized interactive exchange of opinions and information that blogs exemplify is becoming a basic element of social interaction with rapidity.3 The blogging
ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/10/040555-20 # 2010 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs DOI: 10.1080/13602004.2010.533453

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phenomenon, while still relatively new, has shown potential for great impact. In fact, political scientists studying the recent tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan have found that, in an environment where opposition websites online were continually shut down or hacked into, an advocacy blog played a signicant role in inuencing Askar Akayev, the Soviet-afliated ruler, to step down from power.4 This situation suggests that blogs, as an element of the Internet at large, can effectively inform and shape public opinion, with major political consequences. The Muslim world has also entered the Internet age, and has become familiar with the phenomenon of blogging. The inux of web use in the Middle East has elicited various responses from scholars of the region. Often, these reactions to the role of the Internet in Muslim countries have focused on the potential for the web to contribute to social movements in various countries, particularly those aimed at democratization. There are two conicting schools of thought. One views the Internet as an expansive alternative to the dangers associated with traditional social movement actions. The other is concerned that the Internet will hasten isolation and encourage anonymity. Many scholars have embraced the web as the answer to limited political opportunity, and a facilitator for democratic change. There are few who fail to acknowledge that the Internet and social movement theory have interactedand will continue to do soin Muslim-majority countries. The other school predicts that the spread of the Internet will indulge risk-aversion among those displeased with the status quo by allowing them to express dissent anonymously. Scholars have found a name and place in social movement theory for the processes of political action in the Muslim world. The term Islamic activism describes the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes.5 Islamic activism is meant to encompass a plurality of movements in Muslim countries, including propagation movements, terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts.6 Social movement theorists establish that Islamic exceptionalism is false by asserting that activism in Islamic countries shares many of the same drivers and manifestations as activism in nonMuslim societies. The dynamics, process and organization of Islamic activism highlight its commonality with other protest movements and reafrm that Islamic activism is not sui generis.7 Social movement theorists believe that Islamic social movements are driven by political opportunity and restraint structures, resource mobilization, and framing. Theorists seek to identify a set of shared characteristics amongst various types of social movements. Political scientist and historian Charles Tilly calls this a shared repertoire.8 In this repertoire, he identies four characteristics: worthiness, including sober demeanor and neat clothing; unity including matching . . . costumes, singing and chanting; numbers; and commitment including resistance to repression among other things.9 This vision of social repertoire, therefore, is replete with public and physical demonstrations of solidarity and devotion to a cause. However, even writing as late as 2004, Tilly does not include a virtual or online element to this unied, politicohistorical theory of social movements. While Tilly does not nd the Internet to be a central element in the social movement repertoire, there is a possibility that the web and blogs can be manipulated so as to demonstrate worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment to a cause. Some political scientists fear that the Internet will not enhance the virility of the social organizations requisite for democratic development or maintenance, but rather will chip away at the foundations of civil society. Robert Putnam acknowledges that the Internet is

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an unparalleled transmitter of free and easily accessed information; yet, there is no proof that information alone can produce the type of social capital and community ties required for the development and sustenance of democracy.10 Low barriers to access and publication can actually have an adverse effect by providing a confusing, distracting surfeit of information.11 Also, while the anonymity of the Internet does have its benets, online communication lacks the important social cues implicit and taken for granted in face-to-face communication.12 Putnams most important nding for the impact of the Internet on social movements is that participants in computer-based groups nd it harder to reach consensus and feel less solidarity with one another as they develop a sense of depersonalization and are less satised with the groups accomplishments.13 The anonymity and isolation of Internet membership in various groups may replace realworld interactions to the detriment of the solidarity and singular purpose associated with social movements. This article seeks to analyze the extent to which the Internet offers space for an expansion of social movement theory in the Muslim world. Scholars certainly have a vision of how the web should be used by Islamic activists, specically to promote human rights, civil liberties like free speech, andultimatelydemocratization. Until now, however, the Internet has not been able to establish itself as a substitution for some of the more familiar expressions and strategies of social movements. Websites and blogs are not a free platform for expression, and cannot avoid many of the restraints that authoritarian governments have successfully placed on social movements in the past. Yet, harsh government retaliation indicates the recognition of authoritarian rulers that the Internet has an important role to play in the political trajectory of the Muslim world that may threaten their interests. The key to the successful collaboration of the web and a social movement seems to be a sort of amphibious group dynamic, with which its membership functions effectively in both the cyberworld and the real world. A likely prediction for the future of the Internet and Islamic activism is that an online element will help generate some of the elements of Tillys social movement repertoire, specically when utilized to inspire sympathetic individuals to palpable political action. Without demonstrable political activities, social movements risk losing their followers to the disconnected anonymity predicted by Robert Putnam. While exploring the role of the Internet in Islamic activism, this paper will examine two countries to illustrate varying levels of engagement with virtual resources in the face of undemocratic governments. First, the case of Irans blogging culture demonstrates the potential for the Internet to appeal to very different groups, sometimes espousing undemocratic views. This case study shows that the Internet is not a zone free of interferenceas many democratic activists intent on the democratization of Iran had hopedbut rather has been subjected to government incursion and cooptation. The One Million Signatures Campaign provides an instance in which the Internet has helped garner support for an organization that still relies primarily on face-to-face communication. Next, Egyptian state responses to various anti-government Internet resources have raised the stakes of virtual and physical protest. The Kefaya Movement illustrates the successes and limitations of social movements reliance on the Internet as a forum for disseminating reformist messages and challenging traditional authoritarian control. Muslim Brotherhood bloggers exemplify the range of social movements that have found a voice on the web. Considered together, these case studies illustrate the range of Internet-based strategies developed by social movements and the attendant limitations placed by the authorities on this form of activism.

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Spreading the Web Internet use in the Muslim world has been rapidly expanding, despite variations in access across nations. Overall, the Arab world has been marked by slower growth in Internet use than elsewhere in the world, reaching only 2.45% of the total population of Arab nations and Iran by the end of 2001.14 For the most part, Internet users consist of the elite of these nations because of the high costs of computers and web access subscriptions in many of these countries, and also because of the English language knowledge required to use many Internet programs and navigate the web.15 To some extent, the Internet phenomenon has helped men and women overcome these barriers, providing cafe them with more affordable access and, in some cases, training in Internet use.16 Scholar Deborah Wheeler suggests that [a]ccess to the Internet in cafes could parallel access to newspapers in coffee houses during the late nineteenth century.17 In short, the Internet has become the newest alternative source of news, information, and opinion for citizens of non-democratic societies of the Muslim world. Websites and blogs are two manifestations of how the Internet is used by protest movements. A website can, in essence, provide a mobile and widely accessible headquarters for an organization. Websites can serve multiple purposes, the two most common of which are spreading their [the organizations] message to the outside world and communication . . . primarily to their own people [members of organizations].18 The open, ad hoc information-sharing system promoted by the expanding Internet universe coincides with the choice of organizations operating under authoritarian regimes to adopt decentralized structures that are more difcult to repress.19 This has proven especially useful because organizations have tapped into the willingness of sympathetic voices abroad to host websites for their causes. This strategy bypasses some authoritarian governments strict Internet surveillance or limited infrastructure in a particular country. For example, the Islamic Liberation Party website is hosted by Imperial College London; the Palestine Times website lists an address in Leeds in the United Kingdom.20 At the same time, website addresses can be moved quite effortlessly, allowing groups to quickly rebound after government authorities shut down their current site.21 The Internet offers an unparalleled level of exibility to organizations that want to reach their membership and like-minded individuals, both within and outside of the connes of their country, through websites that function as portable headquarters. Scholars seem to agree that blogs, while not necessarily a primary causal factor in politics and policy outcomes, have started to play a role in this sphere. Blogs are seen as an alternative to traditional print media and their attendant shortcomings. Blogs are considered more democratic in their bottom-up approach to gathering and sharing information.22 In the United States alone, blogs have helped air politicians dirty laundry, inuence legal decisions, set party agendas in Congress, and determine foreign policy strategies.23 In these arenas, blogs have captivated decision-making elites, as well as ordinary citizens; the former utilize blogs in major political decisions.24 In many instances, blogs are only a tangential element in politics. Their greatest effect has been a change in the way people communicate and spend time learning about their interests. In the Information Age, the Internet has certainly become a part of social movements, both in the free world and under less open conditions. When political space for protest is lacking, cyberspace creates different opportunities for expression. When a countrys regime controls resource mobilization, the World Wide Web can connect likeminded individuals and help them pool together funds for action. Grassroots campaigns have been redened in the modern world through the use of the Internet. United States

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Presidential candidate, Howard Dean, gained prominence during the 2004 presidential campaign as he used his blog to inspire followers.25 The 2008 presidential campaign in the United States is the most recent manifestation of an Internet-based social movement that inspired real political action that resulted in the election of President Barack Obama. He used his website for resource mobilization which helped him raise more money for his election campaign than any American political campaign before.26 In the end, Mr. Obama was able to use the Internet to extend visibility and actually inspire his followers to vote for him on Election Day, resulting in his election to the presidency. Mr Obamas success was not predicated upon his savvy web design (although it might have helped engage Internet users), but rather upon his ability to translate peoples interest in the web-based elements of his campaign into tangible political action and an actual vote. It is this combination of online activity and learning and ofine participation in activism that makes the Internet an intriguing element in the development of social movement theory. Iran: the Land of Weblogistan The Internet has been a part of Iranian culture for well over a decade. The rst email was sent from Iran in 1993.27 By 2001, 420,000 Iranians were using the Internet;28 this number had more than doubled to 1.2 million in 2003.29 In June 2007, the Islamic Republic of Iran was ranked as the country with the highest percentage of Internet users in the Middle East with 38.6% of its population online, and estimates have predicted 25 million users by 2009.30 The Internet gained popular traction in Iran with the 1997 presidential election in the country, and has since become a regular element of Iranian politics. In 1997, Mohammad Khatami and his opponent Ali Akbar Nategh Nuri both established ofcial campaign websites.31 Later, in the 2005 election, many candidates used websites and blogs as an element in their bid for ofce.32 The phenomenon of Iranian blogging has emerged at the forefront of Internet scholarship in the Middle East. In 2001, when Iranian blogging took off, its participants dubbed this online community of publishers and posters Weblogistan (literally the land of the Web).33 One of the rst blogs in Persian was established in September 2001 by Hossein Derakhshan, an Iranian journalist who had recently moved to Canada.34 With the help of Derakhshans online guide to creating blogs in Persian (Farsi) script, the number of Farsi blogs exceeded 100 within two months.35 Recent estimates establish the number of Persian language blogs at about 60,000, verifying the rapid expansion of Weblogistan into a serious source of information for Persian-language speakers.36 Political scientists often link the popularity of the Internet and blogging to the Islamic Republics history of dependence on new technology to disseminate its revolutionary message. Numerous sources explain that [t]he Islamic revolution of 1979 was meant to put into practice the supposed afnity between scientic revolution and faith.37 In the 1970s, this merging of the scientic and the religious was encapsulated in Imam Khomeinis use of the advanced audiocassette players and short-wave radio to spread his revolutionary rhetoric in Iran.38 When the Internet rst emerged, the Iranian government was actually eager to tap into this new medium as the next iteration of its commitment to a technologically advanced religious society. Consequently, the government pursued a non-censorship policy at rst, to afrm the original ideology of the Islamic Republic as a supporter of modern technology as a means to promote and secure its authority.39 To reinforce this ideology, many high-level government gures have used the Internet to establish their own blogs. The phenomenon has caught on in extremely

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conservative circles, where individuals are committed to preserving the status quo. Current bloggers include such high-prole individuals as members of the Iranian parliament or Majlis,40 President Ahmadinejad, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.41 Irans most important clerics have used websites to disseminate their religious scholarship and speeches as Webatollahs.42 These instances emphasize the importance of the Internet to the government as well as to its detractors. Many initial reports about Weblogistan have focused on the promise of the Internet to provide a free and unregulated space for critics of the Islamic Republic of Iran to express their dissenting views. Scholars who espoused these claims saw the Internet as the next frontier for successful activism in Iran. Yet the prole of bloggers and Internet users does not fully support this Wild West vision of the Persian blogosphere. Drawing upon a history of technological innovation, scholars continue to emphasize the potential of the Internet, especially blogs, as a source of uninhibited informationsharing and information-gathering. In particular, these narratives frame Weblogistan as the domain primarily of reformist voices. One scholar describes how the Internet has opened a new domestic arena of contestation, accommodating numerous dissident groups online, even as politics has become more of a limited pursuit in the real spaces of everyday life.43 This analysis boldly asserts that the Internets role is as a replacement for increasingly difcult and risky public activism, suggesting that virtual activism can serve as a viable wholesale alternative to traditional real-world activism. One especially hopeful voice is that of Nasrin Alavi, whose book We Are Iran focuses on the reformist tone of a number of weblogs translated from Farsi.44 Alavi echoes the opinion of other researchers in stating that websites and blogs have made it possible for young Iranians to express themselves freely and anonymously.45 Alavi even suggests that recent attempts by the Iranian government to establish a national intranet that would separate Iranian users from the rest of the Internet could not stie this revolutionary spirit. For Alavi, it seems that [t]he rate of change of technology might well be working in favour of free speech, even as the Chinese authorities have not been fully able to contain the free ow of information.46 However, even with its imperfections, the Great Firewall has proven harmful and, at times, fatal to the ideal of unbridled online discourse, demonstrating that technological innovations on both sidesthat of free speech and that of online content controlare in close competition. Researcher Babak Rahimi identies a number of instances in which dissident groups have successfully used the Internet to criticize the government. Websites have served as government watchdogs, in many cases serving as the rst platform for investigative journalism. For example, in 2002, the reformist website Emrooz.org publicized the plans of Khamenei supporters who wanted to open a chain of brothels called houses of chastity.47 That same year, another reformist website broke the news about a meeting between one of Saddam Husseins sons and a senior leader in Irans army.48 When veried by the proper authorities, these stories became national news and a source of embarrassment and consternation for those in power. Finally, in 2001 reformist Mohsen Sazgara posted a letter critical of Khamenei on Gooya.com; this letter was eventually sent to the Associated Press and helped bring worldwide attention to the abuses of the Iranian government.49 Still, none of these examples support the claim that the Internet is a workable alternative platform for social movements, even as they do provide otherwise unavailable information. This can be an important step in inspiring opposition to the government. Access to otherwise restricted facts may help inspire dissident sentiments, or even anti-government action. But, as Putnam argues, while providing otherwise restricted

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information is a central function of the Internet, this alone does not a social movement make. The real question is whether the Internet can mobilize followers to engage in the cause actively. In 1999, the Internet played only a limited role in widespread student protests in Iran.50 Primarily, the web was important because it helped students keep in contact with each other even after government crackdowns made it impossible to meet publicly. Again, in 2003, the Internet became part of student protests, insofar as some students avoided encounters with the plainclothes militia and agents of the conservatives posted in public places by organizing street demonstrations in chat rooms and on weblogs, using the internet as a mode of communication between activists.51 This more closely conforms to the idea of the Internet as a setting for the planning phases of Islamic activism actions. The case of the 2003 protests is an instance in which the Internet was used more effectively by anti-government forces to mobilize followers and organize them for public demonstrations. These examples do not validate the concern that the Internet will encourage people to rely on anonymity as a guarantee of safety from repressive government authorities, potentially dissuading them from any public protest. Putnam would warn that if the Internet supplants face-to-face communication, increased isolation is likely.52 However, in the hands of Iranian student groups, the Internet has contributed to solidarity instead of undermining it. The Iranian Government Responds Online participation in Islamic activism is not without its consequences. Initial reports of the Internet as a free, safe, and anonymous zone for dissent in Iran have rapidly proven incomplete and untrue. There are four ways in which this view of the Iranian blogosphereand Iranian web use, in generalare challenged. First, many Iranian blogs are not reformist publications that scholars have xated on as a potential path to democratization. In addition, the Internet is now dramatically censored. Moreover, blogs have become sources of evidence for the government when it wishes to punish the opposition. Finally, because of increased censorship and hostility from the government, those in Weblogistan have developed a manner of criticizing the incumbents that is far less overt; in short, Weblogistan has created a form of self-censorship. A Virtual Milieu Much has been made of the reformist nature of Weblogistan. However, a recent study published by Harvard Law scholars John Kelly and Bruce Etling that maps the themes of Weblogistan content, undermines this optimistic depiction of the online community.53 Their analysis establishes four broad categories for Iranian blogs: secular/reformist, conservative/religious, Persian poetry and literature, and mixed networks.54 Kelly and Etling challenge the view of the Iranian blogosphere, which, with the exception of Ahmadinejads blog, focuses on bloggers who are found within just one of these structures [secular/reformist] . . . a large group dominated by expatriates and reformists and featuring frequent criticism of the Iranian regime and its political values and philosophy.55 Kelly and Etling emphasize that the blogosphere in Iran is not dominated by reformist voices. It is a varied community, divided by cleavages along the lines of gender, anonymity, and philosophy. These multitudinous and specic online identities are reminiscent of the Internet-induced cyberbalkanization that Putnam warns may further divide individuals instead of contributing to a stronger sense of online

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community.56 Just as high-prole reformist blogs challenge the government conservative/religious blogs focus intensely on politics and support the philosophy and legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader, if not always particular government policies and politicians.57 Nevertheless, despite increased and varied Internet use, the web still remains inaccessible to a large segment of Iranian society, and the traditional cleavages of class and wealth apply to Internet access to this day.58 The vast array of blogs and their messages may confuse or distract Internet users, leading to a web overload, instead of cultivating their opinions and inspiring or bolstering political stances. Access to the Internet can be used to spread many types of messages, many of which are not associated with calls for democratization or even with brands of Islamic activism embraced by the West. Kelly and Etlings study examines the ways in which the Internet can serve as a portal for antidemocratic as well as liberalizing voices, contrary to some scholars portrayal of Weblogistan. The Internet is a powerful source of information, not ruled solely by dissidents opposed to the management and message of the Islamic Republic. Methods of Censorship After the 1997 election of Khatami, the environment has proven increasingly difcult for reformist or dissident voices on the Internet. The rst assault on the freedom of the Internet came on 7 November 2001, with a declaration from the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution that all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) must remove antigovernment and anti-Islamic sites from their services, and that all internet service providers should be placed under state control.59 The pace of website blocking quickened after the start of the Iraq War in 2003.60 These measures have dramatically constrained expression via the web, limiting the scope of this alternative space for activism. While many hoped that the Internet would remain an adaptable and unregulated territory, the government has treated it as an analogue of the traditional media, managing to censor content and undercut these optimistic predictions. With these policies, a history of restricting the press in Iran has spread to the Internet. Historically, editors and authors are susceptible to repression under the Iranian Penal Code.61 In February 2004, a new supplement to the law laid out specic sentences for publishing information damaging to Irans national security or revealing sensitive information about the government, and created 20 types of web-based offenses.62 The government also set up a special unit charged with investigating and punishing Internet crimes.63 It is undeniable that [t]he Iranian government is a vigorous censor of the Internet as the government forces ISPs to block access to a large number of websites, including many blogs.64 In fact, the OpenNet Initiative reports that the majority of blocked blogs fall under the secular/reformist category identied by Kelly and Etling.65 This means that, in Iran, Internet users may actually access a blogosphere in which the dominant and accessible voices are those that express strong support for the government. The government has also ruled that all Iranian Internet users must be restricted to a slower connection, so as to frustrate plans to upload or download large les from the Internet.66 Targeting Bloggers Beyond simply ltering websites available for viewership in Iran, the government has adopted more extreme methods of repression, including physical intimidation. Specically, the arrest of bloggers since 2004 has been the most high-prole way in which

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Iranian ofcials have been able to demonstrate that actions performed in the virtual world have serious consequences in the real world. Specically, the authorities have extended the public morality-based limits on speech to apply to blog content; at the same time, conservative and religious leaders have worked to connect blogging to a perceived cultural assault from the West.67 This approach to limiting online dissent has signicantly undermined the unique nature and supposed immunity of the Internet. Arrests based on banned content demonstrate that the Internet isin the eyes of the authoritarian Iranian regimeanother form of speech that can be censored with relative ease as simply another media incarnation. Arrests over the years have shattered the perception that blogs could serve as an alternative to more standard ltered Internet sites and the regulated print media of Iran.68 Each blogger arrest has changed the landscape of prohibited speech and political activity in Iran, to the detriment of freedom of expression. Especially since blogging is perceived to be one of the most innovative and raw means of communication, these developments have been seen as putting incredible constraints on dissent in Iran. One of the rst bloggers to be arrested was Sina Motallebi, in April 2003.69 The Iranian government used Motallebis arrest to send a message at a time when blogs were still a developing form of communication in Iran. A high-ranking interrogator told Motallebi, Now we make you an example for other webloggers and will show them that weblogging is not a free [means of expression] without any cost. We will show that they must pay the expensive costs of their writings in this way.70 Motallebis detainment and interrogation reshaped the connection between self-expression and legal responsibility. The incident also indicated how quickly the Iranian government was able to assess the threat posed by blogging culture and repress this emerging medium. Other cases further illuminated the Iranian governments method of online surveillance, reasoning for arresting bloggers, and strategy for prosecuting these cybercrimes. Blogger Omid Memarian, detained in October 2004 for his blog statements, was also active in Irans limited civil society; however, his online postings formed the basis for his arrest and the evidence for his prosecution.71 Another writer, Arash Sigarchi, faced many charges initially, but was eventually prosecuted solely based on the content of his blog.72 These two cases reveal the dangers inherent in the form that blogs take. Previous entries are archived and are usually available to all readers through a link on the blog homepage. This automatic archival system provides convenient documentation to those who wish to hold bloggers accountable for their words. This system has facilitated the Iranian governments extension of traditional speech limitations to blog content. In this respect, there are some pitfalls common to both online and traditional print media. These arrests have brought the online world into the real world, blurring the distinction that many observers had hoped was more pronounced. The ability of the government to easily use blog content in support of repression suggests that the Internet is not really a way to escape the constraints of limited political opportunity. Rather, the Iranian government has adeptly transferred its restrictions on expression to the Internet realm. Social movement theory proposes that external factors contribute to the shape and trajectory of various activist trends. This structuralist approach includes the degree of political system receptivity to challenger groups, the prevalence of allies and opponents, [and] the nature of state repression among the variables that determine opportunity structure.73 Since the Iranian government has been able to apply many of the same incentives and disincentives for political challengers to the virtual protest platform, the opportunity for expression has been constrained in this sphere as well. Physical attacks and imprisonment of individual bloggers are particularly potent reminders of the fact

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that campaigns undertaken on the Internet have many of the same brutal consequences as traditional forms of protest in Iran. These tactics also raise the price of joining an online activist community, deterring people from engaging in the connective aspects of the Internet and instead heightening the potential for Putnams predictions of isolation and reclusion.

Self-Censorship from Within the Online Dissident Community Knowing that the government is now closely monitoring their words and what the attendant consequences of this scrutiny can be, bloggers have decided out of an impulse for self-preservation to regulate the nature of their message. The charges brought against bloggers usually concern direct critiques of powerful Iranian ofcials.74 Scholars propose that Persian blogging has matured since its 2001 inception and has since create[d] its own customs so as not to challenge the legitimacy of the Iranian republic.75 Once the bloggers themselves consider overt criticism of the status quo too risky, the Internet loses its place as an especially appealing means for reform and democratization in Iran. Additionally, once the candor of dissident voices disappears, the attraction of the Internet for activists disappears. Without frank discussion of the issues, bloggers can no longer be considered a source of otherwise restricted information. Just as many of these online activists have started to scale back the intensity of their publications, the Iranian government has pursued an aggressive policy of cooptation. The decision by the Information Dissemination Supreme Council of Iran to enforce the morality code by guiding the content of weblogs is strengthened by internal restraint from the bloggers themselves.76 When President Ahmadinejad created his personal blog, he did so with the acknowledgment that blogs were important carriers of ideology and state propaganda, especially in exposure to youth and to international public opinion.77 The Iranian government has had some success in using the methods of its opponents to forward just the opposite philosophies: that the Islamic Republic is a strong state, tolerant and respective of minority rights, and capable of harnessing modern technology to its advantage. This strong, pro-government voice that has grown concurrently with the wavering voice of protest threatens to overpower online activism.

The Campaign for One Million Signatures In light of the controversy surrounding the limits of bloggings efcacy for the transformation in Iranian society, the case of the One Million Signatures campaign is an interesting case study of how the Web and traditional social movement characteristics interact. The One Million Signatures Campaign was launched on 27 August 2006, and is committed to collecting one million signatures for a petition to the Iranian government in protest of a body of laws that discriminate against women.78 As a result of government reaction to their actions, 43 members of the campaign had been arrested by February 2008.79 The website was blocked for the eleventh time on 28 June 2008.80 The campaign has found creative ways to use the Internet for advocacy. They have established mailing lists, through which they communicate with their supporters, specically informing them when they have changed their web address in response to government censorship.81 The Internet provides the women of the campaign with a way to reach out to international supporters, who are encouraged to sign petitions demonstrating solidarity with the plight of Iranian women, as well as Iranian citizens who cannot be

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reached in face-to-face interactions or who live outside of Iran.82 The Internet also offers a way for the campaign to garner contributions from donors.83 The One Million Signatures Campaign website offers Internet users a way to learn about the women involved with the organization. A section entitled Focus on the Campaigner includes brief interviews with members who talk about how they became involved, what tasks they perform in connection with the campaign, and what effects the campaign has had on their self-perception. One interview, in particular, reveals that the Internet does have the potential to translate interest into tangible mobilization. When asked how she became involved with the campaign, Hoda Aminian said, I found the Campaign on the Internet.84 Closest to blogging, the Face-to-Face section includes personal entries from members of the organization, who write about their own experiences gathering signatures, the effects of Iranian laws on their way of life, and the lessons they have learned from involvement in the campaign.85 Some of the proles include links to the members personal blogs; in turn, some of those arrested have been charged because of their blog writing and posts on the Campaign site.86 In societies where activist visibility is dangerous, such as Iran, [t]he use of social networks and informal resources for mobilization is especially common.87 The Campaigns personalized website layout transfers the benets of informal connections between activists in the real world to an online format. Thus, the Campaigns website relies on the feeling of intimacy with other protestors, seemingly simulating the real-life interactions that Putnam favors, even as it uses an internationally accessible medium that enables its resources to be easily moved in virtual space. Despite the usefulness of its Internet resources, the One Million Signatures Campaign continues to rely on the power of recruiting people to the cause through direct interaction with Iranian citizens. Initially, the Campaign obtained signatures primarily by traveling door-to-door and speaking with women in their homes. When this became more difcult due to government interference, the organization began to collect signatures in public spaces by provoking debates about womens rights.88 The Campaign has continued to sponsor seminars advocating greater rights for women and educating Iranians about the repressive aspects of the current law.89 Even the many women detained for their involvement in the Campaign have found ways to empower those whom they encounter in jail. These women are held in the public ward of Evin, a womens prison, where they have inspired respect in their fellow prisoners and even their guards; consequently, they are treated well while serving their sentences.90 Clearly, the strength of this organization lies in its person-to-person advocacy. The One Million Signatures Campaign demonstrates the ways in which the Internet can be used artfully as a supplement tobut not a replacement fortraditional forms of social movement mobilization and advocacy. Applied adeptly, it can be a strong tool for education and dissemination of a movements message. The One Million Signatures Campaign website includes material to engage its viewers politically. The online petitions with their many signatures help the organization demonstrate strength in numbers, a part of Tillys social movement repertoire. Updates on the condition of detained members also illustrate commitment and unity of the membership. In these ways, the Campaign website has been able to establish certain social movement criteria farther from the governments view. At the same time, the Campaign has not tried to use the Internet to entirely replace ofine political activism. Nor has the Campaign acted as if web use can help members avoid the risks of social movements for governmental change in authoritarian regimes. The Internet is an extension of the organizations advocacy, but the groups real work

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is still done in the houses and coffee shops of Tehran. In the face of a hostile political atmosphere, members of the Campaign have demonstrated great skill in nding spacehowever limitedin Iranian society to advocate an end to gender discrimination and mobilize women, despite the threat of detainment and harassment. Summing Up the Iranian Scene To date, the Internet and blogs have not served the democratizing role in Iran that many political scientists had predicted. There is a sizeable presence of dissident voices in Weblogistan, but there are also many antidemocratic voices that are not subjected to the same government scrutiny and censorship as those championing democracy. The state has also found ways to detract from the novelty of the Internet by applying familiar legal codes and developing new laws to deal with web-based sedition. Physical repression and jail sentences have made real the consequences of online activism, reducing the applicability of theories that view the Internet as a separate and insulated platform for politics. The Internet in Iran seems most useful for mobilizing resources, such as volunteers, and reecting an organizations support. The specic experience of the One Million Signatures Campaign in Iran suggests that social movements are still most successful when they operate in the real world and seek to strengthen these actions with an online resource. Just as political activists have had to adapt to government repression in the streets of Tehran, so too must they continue to develop new ways to use the Internet to their advantage while avoiding government incursion into the online world. Egypt: Introduction of and Reaction to the Internet In Egypt, the Internet has had mixed success in expanding political opportunity for dissent. The highly repressive government of President Hosni Mubarak has relied on emergency rule in an attempt to legitimize violations of human rights and civil liberties in Egypt for over 27 years. At the end of 2001, only 0.86% of the Egyptian population, or 600,000 individuals out of the population of 68 million, were using the Internet.91 In 2008, a Central Intelligence Agency report estimated that six million Egyptian citizens were online.92 As is the case elsewhere in the Arab world, unequal access in Egypt has focused Internet use in the hands of the elite and the highly educated.93 Since its introduction in Egypt, the Internet has been highly monitored by the Egyptian government. The government opened up the ISP sector to private competition in 2002, which helped a greater portion of the Egyptian public gain access to the Internet.94 Still, the largest ISP in Egypt, T-Data Company, is owned and operated by the state.95 This arrangement makes it relatively easy for the government to determine which websites are available to a majority of Egyptian Internet users. Cairo attempted to prescribe a limited role for the Internet by encouraging some businesses to tap into globalization trends through the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs).96 Still, Mubaraks commitment to blocking objectionable sites critical of the government enables him to extend his authoritarian rule to the Internet. The Egyptian government has relied primarily on two arguments for limiting Internet access. First, in line with the Mubarak governments state of emergency, the Internet has been described as a threat to Egypts national security. In September 2002, the state established a unit in the police force charged specically with monitoring the Internet.97 Later, in November 2002, President Mubaraks ofce proposed a telecommunications bill to the Egyptian parliament that included an extensive section on Telecommunications

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and National Security.98 Another strategy to curtail certain Web content has been pursued by the vice department of the Interior Ministry, which prosecutes individuals on charges of pornographic or homosexually oriented content.99 In conjunction, these two means of classifying illegal or dangerous Internet activity lend the state the ability to prosecute artists and political activists alike. This has made the Internet a very dangerous place to express minority opinions or engage in any semblance of free expression. In this hostile environment, however, various individuals and groups have still attempted to challenge the status quo. Those who have done so have met outright repression from the government. For example, many bloggers who established themselves as sleuths dedicated to uncovering government abuses experience unjust treatment at the hands of the Egyptian authorities. Wael Abbas is one of the most famous of this group of men and women in Egypt. He writes a prominent and popular blog, called Misr Digital.100 Abbas is recognized by many international human rights and news sources as an inuential activist in Egypt; his website lists accolades from Human Rights Watch, the International Center for Journalists, CNN, and the BBC.101 In 2007, Abbas described his work and that of his colleagues as establishing a new school of journalism.102 In response to their commitment to revealing government abuses, many of these individuals have suffered personal attacks. One blogger claimed he had been beaten so many times at rallies that it no longer matters.103 Another blogger, Abdel Kareem, was sentenced to four years in prison because of his harsh words about the religious institution Al-Azhar University and President Mubarak.104 In response, his supporters have established the Free Kareem campaign, complete with a blog and website.105 Such responses to harsh government policies among bloggers are important as they establish the concept of an online community, in which bloggers are connected to one another and have shared interests. The ability to cultivate these informal bonds over the Internet can help overcome bloggers inclination to create competing sources of information. To some extent, then, government retaliation may be bringing these individuals closer together. Aside from these individual watchdog journalists, two social movements in Egyptthe Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya) and the Muslim Brotherhoodhave turned to the Internet and blogging to bolster their critiques of and challenges to the Mubarak government. Kefaya: An Online Supplement to an Ofine Movement The Egyptian Movement for Change, or Kefaya, demonstrates the limitations of the Internet as a form of government protest. The movements success and decline hinged on the promise and limits of alternate forms of communication. Kefaya, the Arabic word for enough, reects the movements opposition to President Hosni Mubaraks continued emergency rule, as well as his plans to turn over the government to his son.106 The grassroots movement was particularly notable for its bold demonstrations against the Mubarak government, specically its tactic of taking to the streets without waiting for government permission and thus opening further space for public protest.107 The organization made an impact in Egypt and internationally in large part through its successful use of information technology, particularly the Internet. The Kefaya website was popular because it allowed members and sympathizers to anonymously post their complaints about the government.108 This interactive format invited users to engage with likeminded individuals and foster a sense of online community

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and networking. In response to likely censorship of traditional print media and previous successful use of alternative communication to mobilize Egyptians for demonstrations, the Kefaya movement used emails to its original members, text messages, website advertisements and outreach to bloggers to help bring people to its events.109 Specically, Kefaya members used the blog Wehda Masrya, meaning Egyptian Unity, to solicit support for a 2007 rally in favor of freedom of the press.110 Kefayas ability to translate online interest into attendance at a street protest is an important feature that contributed to the movements inuence on the government. The organization was able to motivate individuals to move beyond passive or anonymous online participation. This suggests that some aspect of the websites design and structure convinced Egyptian citizens of the worthiness of this cause. The success of Kefaya, however, is still measured in terms of traditional social movement repertoire, specically the number of people who attended a public protest in the streets of Cairo and their commitment to the cause despite predicted violence. While the Kefaya movement maintained its own website, its rst method of publicity and outreach was through relationships with nonconformist bloggers. Some bloggers personal philosophy coincided quite nicely with Kefayas message of dissent, making their collaboration a natural choice.111 Bloggers were able to command the attention of the international media, while reaching out to politically conscious Egyptian citizens and encouraging their attendance at Kefaya events.112 This method demonstrated the technological and political savvy of Kefayas leaders. At least temporarily, the grassroots movement was able to cleverly use already popular forms of online communication as a way to propagate its message of reform and demands for peaceful democratization. Response from the Egyptian State However, the Egyptian state was quick in its response to thwart Kefayas success. On May 4, 2008, Mubaraks government blocked the Kefaya movements website, www. harakmasria.org, through the state-owned T-Data Company.113 The government knew that this would only partially resolve the problem of Kefayas success. Next, the state pursued means of physical repression to thwart the social movement. Protestors were beaten and tortured and detained without charges.114 The state began to target journalists, including those who used non-traditional media for their reports. These retaliations, similar to those pursued by the Iranian government, complicated the distinction between virtual and actual dissent and punishment. As in Iran, the Internet in Egypt is not recognized as a separate sphere for political action governed by entirely separate cultural and legal codes. Government reactions have overturned any belief that the Internet could signicantly expand limited political opportunity structures already in place. Kefayas Fate These attacks had several consequences for Kefaya. They clearly delineated the risks associated with support for the grassroots movement, whether in public demonstrations or via online activity. While these may have served as insufcient deterrents for committed activists, they raised the costs for other members of the movement. At the same time, the arrest and detainment of important leaders of the Kefaya movement necessarily changed the focus of the organization. As more and more protestors were abused and treated unfairly, the Kefaya movement was forced to direct attention and resources to protests for these individuals release. Finally, the state was able to

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combine its policy of targeting the Kefaya leadership with a government-owned media barrage undermining the movement.115 Mubarak and his cohorts fell back on circulating the traditional damaging rumor that Kefaya was somehow a proxy for the United States government.116 Despite its eventual demise, Kefaya changed the political environment in Egypt in its moments of popularity and success. Kefaya was able to use the Internet as a tool for mobilizing followers into traditional forms of protest. Because of this, the Kefaya case study challenges the presumption that the Internet causes isolation and dissuades those dissatised with the status quo from direct challenges to the government. A RAND report states that Kefayas successful use of the Internet and bloggers to widely publicize human rights abuses perpetuated by the government forced the state to make some concessions. The government prosecuted some of the perpetrators of violence against protestors.117 This compromise eroded the states authority to a certain extent. Few contest that the governments crackdown on Kefayas various means of communication was only one of many forcesboth internal and situationalthat contributed to the demise of Kefaya. This assessment reinforces the view that an effective Internet presence was also only one of many factors that contributed to the movements success. However, it was an important and adaptive one. The Muslim Brotherhoods Modern Medium The Kefaya experience has provided additional lessons for activists and the state. The blogging model has since spread to conservatives in Egypt. Specically, the Muslim Brotherhood has turned to the blog as a medium for challenging the governments detainment of a number of its members. The Muslim Brotherhood blogging phenomenon took root after the mass arrest of Al-Azhar students and Muslim Brothers, which resulted in the formation of a website and a number of blogs in February 2007.118 The style of these blogs, which rely on video clips, interviews, and photographs to uncover government abuses of the Brotherhood, resemble that of more liberally minded bloggers, specically Wael Abbas.119 This similarity suggests that a learning process is taking place among Egyptian activists of all stripes regarding best practices for online dissent. One of the strongest voices behind the Brotherhood blogging movement is Abdel Monem Mahmoud. Mahmouds blog, I am Ikhwan is published online in both English and Arabic and received over 2000 hits in the rst 6 months after its October 2006 launch.120 However, in clear support of the claim that [t]he Egyptian regimes repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and its repression of liberal bloggers are part and parcel of the same despotic impulse,121 Mahmoud was detained for 45 days in 2007.122 However, violence against the Muslim Brotherhood did not dampen the groups demand for recognition as a political party.123 Thus, whether liberal or conservative, online voices that challenge the government are taken seriously in Egypt and are treated in the same repressive manner by the authorities. The Promise of Egyptian Blogs The trajectories of these two blogging movements in Egypt, Kefaya and the Muslim Brothers, illustrate the Internets very limited potential for success as a tool for expanding political opportunity and facilitating resource mobilization and support in the country. Clearly, the Mubarak government has refused to offer free reign to

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those using the Web. Internet lters and website blocks, combined with physical intimidation and arrests, prove that the Egyptian state perceives the blogging phenomenon as a real threat to its authoritarian rule and one that it will not stand for. While utilizing repressive tactics to halt the online aspects of these social movements, the state has also been forced to make some concessions in light of the information that blogs have made widely available on an international scale. These results offer hope for the Internet as a weapon in the arsenal of brave activists against authoritarianism. Role of the Internet in Civil Society Social movement theorists have identied the importance of opportunity structures and resource mobilization for the success of Islamic activism, and how these factors are constrained under authoritarian regimes. Scholars such as Charles Tilly have classied the various elements of social movement repertoire.124 Political scientists like Robert Putnam have identied informal networks as a help to democratization and have wondered whether the Internet may be a hindrance to this process.125 Many scholars, pundits, and activists held high hopes for the potential of the Internet to aid in the development of civil society and active protests.126 In spite of these predictions, the evidence from the Muslim worldspecically Iran and Egyptis mixed. There is a role for the Internet in promoting and strengthening social movements; but the Internet is not a panacea for the threats these movements face. The cases of the One Million Signatures Campaign in Iran and the Kefaya movement in Egypt prove that Internet use can be an important activist tactic. Both of these social movements successfully relied on virtual resources to inspire people to take tangible political action. In both countries, cultural attitudes have not signicantly slowed the acceptance of the Internet as a means of activism, which could hinder a social movements opportunity for action.127 Active members of the One Million Signatures campaign found the cause online, became linked into the community, and translated their virtual empowerment into concrete action on the streets of Tehran. Their personal website mimics the one-on-one interactions that still form the foundation of the Campaign. The Kefaya movement successfully tapped into the online blogger community to nd mouthpieces for their cause and inspire people to attend mass street demonstrations in the face of cruel government retaliation. The interactive nature of the website engaged users politically, and left them hoping for a more direct outlet for their frustration. At the same time, the experiences of these organizations reveal the limitations of the Internet. Censorship, cooptation, and government retaliation against prominent Internet-based gures constrain the online possibilities for these movements. The Internet is heavily regulated through the application of both older, tested legislation and new, adaptive codes. Savvy antidemocratic Internet users threaten to create the online din that Putnam warns can overshadow liberal messages.128 Furthermore, governments choice to rely on physical violence, human rights abuses, and civil liberties violations to silence virtual dissent makes real the punishment associated with any type of challenge to the government. The rising costs of repression may lead to government concessions, such as in the case of Egypt. On the other hand, the tendency of bloggers to moderate their messages in response to authoritarian crackdowns may help the government stie voices of democratization so that they do not need to make any sweeping changes to their style of rule.

Connecting the Actual with the Virtual Conclusion

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These case studies demonstrate that the Internet is not the arena of free speech and democratization that many scholars had believed it to be. But the future hardly looks bleak. The promising evidence from Iran and Egypt is threefold. First, Putnams greatest fears that the Internet would encourage a retreat into anonymity and away from political participation remain unfullled. The manner in which these social movements have complemented face-to-face interaction with Internet communication proves that the two can exist in harmony. The Internet need not supplant traditional forms of protest. This leads to the second point. Online activism has merely proven to be another social movement innovation, rather than a replacement for effective signs of commitment and challenges to the government. Finally, despite government crackdowns, Islamic activists have refused to abandon their struggle. Whether through a blog or a meeting in a shop in Tehran, these groups continue to challenge the status quo and rufe the feathers of the authoritarian regimes under which they live. With the support of international media and the help of private, unltered ISPs, the Muslim blogging community can continue to uncover regimes human rights abuses and challenge undemocratic practices. By politicizing citizens and providing uncensored information when possible, the Internet continues to serve as a developing forum for debates about the role of government and its treatment of its citizens. An integral aspect of a social movement is its ability to inspire and reach out to a broad coalition of society in a straightforward way. Increasing affordability of Internet access may make this phenomenon even more far-reaching in the near future. At this point, the Iranian and Egyptian cases cannot do much more than show ways in which the Internet can be successfully incorporated into social movements as another supplementary means of mobilization, communication, and education. But it is impossible to forget that the street demonstration, taken for granted today as a form of activism, was a tactic adopted slowly over time.129 The Internet and, specically, blogs are still relatively new resources upon which activists may draw. They may be the street protest of tomorrow, an expression of the social movement repertoire that continues to evolve in the coming years.

Acknowledgements The author extends thanks to Dr Mirjam Ku nkler for her guidance with picking a topic, nding additional sources, and restructuring and improving this article.

NOTES
1. Daniel W. Drezner and Henry Farrell, Introduction: Blogs, politics, and power: a special issue of Public Choice, Public Choice, Vol. 134, 2008, p. 2. There were an estimated 70 million blogs on the Internet in 2007. 2. Elizabeth M. Bucar and Roja Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan? The Ofine Consequences of Online Communication, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 40, 2008, pp. 403 404. 3. D. Drezner and H. Farrell, Introduction: Blogs, politics, and power, op. cit., p. 2. 4. Svetlana V. Kulikova and David D. Perlmutter, Blogging Down the Dictator? The Kyrgyz Revolution and Samizdat Websites, International Communication Gazette, Vol. 69, No. 29, 2007, pp. 29 31. 5. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Introduction, in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 2. 6. Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 3. Emphasis from text. Charles Tilly, Social Movements 1768 2004, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2004, p. 4. Ibid. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, New York: Touchstone, 2000, p. 172. Ibid., 173. Ibid., 175 176. Ibid., 176. Deborah L. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses: Women and the Internet Revolution in the Arab World, in Women and Media in the Middle East: Power through Self Expression, ed. Naomi Sakr, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004, 139 140. Edmund Ghareeb, New media and in the information revolution in the Arab world: An assessment, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3, Summer 2006, p. 416. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., 141. Ibid. Michael Whine, Islamist organizations on the Internet, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1999, p. 125. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 127, 129. As explained later, the One Million Signatures Campaign regularly moves its websites to avoid Iranian government censorship. Deva Woodley, New competencies in democratic communication? Blogs, agenda setting and political participation, Public Choice, Vol. 134, 2008, p. 114. D. Drezner and H. Farrell, Introduction: Blogs, politics, and power, op. cit., pp. 35. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 3. United States: Flickring here, twittering there, The Economist, Vol. 388, No. 8593, August 2008. Babak Rahimi, Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2003, pp. 101102. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., p. 141. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, op. cit., p. 102. Liora Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan: Online Personal Journals and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2007, p. 80. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid. E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit., p. 403. Nasrin Alavi, We Are Iran: The Persian Blogs, Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 2005, p. 1. Derkhshan goes by the online name Hoder (E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit., p. 404). E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, p. 404. John Kelly and Bruce Etling, Mapping Irans Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2008, p. 2. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, op. cit., p. 102. Ibid., p. 106. Ibid. J. Kelly and B. Etling, Mapping Irans Online Public, op. cit., p. 9. E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, p. 404. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, p. 87. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, pp. 107-8. N. Alavi, We Are Iran, op. cit. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 346. Unfortunately, increasing cooperation from Western technology providers (such as Google in China) has helped repressive governments control the information that their citizens can access. See Clive Thompson, Googles China Problem (and Chinas Google Problem), New York Times, 23 April 2006. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, p. 108. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50.

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51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

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75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94.

Ibid. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit., p. 179. J. Kelly and B. Etling, Mapping Irans Online Public, op. cit., p. 2. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 12. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit., p. 177. J. Kelly and B. Etling, Mapping Irans Online Public, op. cit., p. 21. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, op. cit., p. 110. Ibid., p. 109. Ibid. E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, p. 404. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, op. cit., p. 84. Ibid., p. 85. J. Kelly and B. Etling, Mapping Irans Online Public, op. cit., p. 9. Ibid., p. 37. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, op. cit., p. 86. E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit., p. 405. Ibid., p. 407. Ibid., p. 406. Ibid., p. 407. Ibid., pp. 409-10. Ibid., pp. 411-412. Q. Wiktorowicz, Introduction, op. cit., 14. Case in point, Arash Sigarchi was eventually held responsible for three of the original ve charges brought against him. In the end, the content of his blog was able to support only three crimes: insulting Khomeini, insulting Khamenei, and criticizing the Islamic republic (E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit., p. 412). Ibid., p. 413. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, p. 88. Ibid. Sussan Tahmasebi, Answers to Your Most Frequently asked questions about the campaign, http:// www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?article226. Ibid. Change for Equality Blocked for Eleventh Time, 28 June 2008, http://www.change4equality.com/ english/spip.php?article304. Email, Dr Mirjam Ku nkler to Melissa Lerner, Fwd: News: Change for Equality One Million Signatures Campaign, Iran, 11 December 2008. About One Million Signatures Demanding Changes to Discriminatory Laws, 28 August 2006, http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article18. Ibid. Interview by Sussan Tahmasebi, Focus on the Campaigner: Hoda Aminian, 4 December 2008, http://www.change4equality.org/english/spip.php?article411. Face to Face, 27 December 2008, http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?rubrique3. Maryam Hosseinkhah was detained on 18 November 2007 for her contributions to the One Million Signatures campaign website and the Zanestan website, associated with the Womens Cultural Center (Maryam Hosseinkhah, Detentions and Summons against Campaigners for Gender Equality, 24 February 2008, http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article225). Q. Wiktorowicz, Introduction, op. cit., p. 12. Discussion with Mirjam Ku nkler, Princeton University, 11 December 2008. See About One Million Signatures Demanding Changes to Discriminatory Laws on the One Million Signatures Campaign website. S. Tahmasebi, Answers, op. cit. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., p. 140. Nadia Oweidat et al., The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 22. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., p. 145. Hossam Bahgat, Egypts Virtual Protection of Morality, Middle East Report, No. 230, Spring 2004, p. 23.

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95. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Egypt: Coincide Hosting the Largest Communication Conference in Africa, an oppositions Web Site is being Blocked Egyptian Government should Unblock Kefaya Homepage, 12 May 2008, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtml. 96. For more information on this trend, see Heba El Sayed and Chris Westrup, Egypt and ICTs: How ICTs bring national initiatives, global organizations and local companies together, Information Technology & People, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003, pp. 7692. 97. H. Bahgat, Egypts Virtual Protection of Morality, p. 23. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Abbass blog, Misr Digital: An Independent Egyptian Blog, is updated almost daily and can be found at http://misrdigital.blogspirit.com. 101. Ibid. 102. Stephen Franklin, Arab bloggers pay toll for truth; Journalists challenge authority in unfriendly environs, Chicago Tribune, 22 July 2007, p. 3. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. More information about Free Kareem! Campaign to Free the Brave Egyptian Blogger Abdelkareem Nabil Soliman is available at http://www.freekareem.org. 106. Manar Shorbagy, The Egyptian Movement for Change Kefaya: Redening Politics in Egypt, Public Culture, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, p. 177. 107. Ibid., p. 190. 108. N. Oweidat et al., The Kefaya Movement, op. cit., p. 20. 109. Ibid., p. 21. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid., p. 23. 112. Ibid., pp. 23 24. 113. Egypt: Coincide Hosting the Largest Communication Conference in Africa, an oppositions Web Site is being Blocked; Egyptian Government should Unblock Kefaya Homepage, The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtml. 114. N. Oweidat et al., The Kefaya Movement, op. cit., p. 28. 115. Ibid., p. 31. 116. Ibid., p. 32. 117. Ibid., p. 50. 118. Marc Lynch, Brotherhood of the Blog, Guardian.co.uk, 5 March 2007. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 122. S. Franklin, Arab bloggers pay toll, op. cit., 3. 123. Michaelle Bowers, The Egyptian movement for change: Intellectual antecedents and generational conicts, Contemporary Islam, Vol. 1, 2007, p. 81. 124. C. Tilly, Social Movements, op. cit. 125. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit. 126. See, Quintan Wictorowicz, Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research, London: Routledge, 2002; Aghil Ameripour, et al., Conviviality of Internet social networks: An explanatory study of Internet campaigns in Iran, Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 25, 2010, pp. 244 257; Marlyn Tadros, Knowing the Promises, Facing the Challenges: The Role of the Internet in Development and Human Rights Campaigns and Movements in the Arab Middle East, in Charting Transnational Democracy: Beyond Global Arrogance, ed. Janie Leatherman & Julie A. Webber, New York: MacMillan Palgrave, 2005, pp. 175 194. See also Yanuar Nugroho, Adopting Technology, Transforming Society: The Internet and the Reshaping of Civil Society Activism in Indonesia, International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2008, pp. 77 105. These provide only a small cross-section of the scholarship that has arisen over the past decade related to social movements, civil society, and the Internet in the Araband, more broadly, the Muslimworld. 127. Q. Wiktorowicz, Introduction, op. cit., p. 14. Wiktorowicz explains that political opportunity structures is too narrow a term, since a movements opportunity is also ruled by cultural, social, and economic factors (pp. 13 14). 128. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit., p. 173. 129. C. Tilly, Social Movements, op. cit., p. 11.

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