The Origins of the Second Macedonian War Author(s): A. H. McDonald and F. W.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

By A. H. McDONALD
AND

F. W. WALBANK1

There is little need now to emphasise the importance of the declaration of war against Philip V of Macedon in the history of Roman imperialism, or to formulate the problem of the causes of the Roman decision to intervene in the East. The work of M. Holleaux has defined the problem and indicated its historical implications, and subsequent research has kept the issue clear. We have rather to justify a paper upon this subject which returns to details of reconstruction already fully treated. Yet the reconstruction of events has not received its final exposition, and a better understanding of the details is essential for the historical interpretation of the political situation in 200 B.C. It was the achievement of Holleaux to establish the place of Polybius as the primary authority for the period, to give a working reconstruction of the Polybian tradition, and to show that- the Roman policy in 200 B.C. was determined, not by an Athenian appeal under the terms of the Peace of Phoenice, but by fear of Antiochus the Great in alliance with Philip of Macedon.2 Holleaux, however, left two major difficulties first, the relative insignificance of Philip as compared with Antiochus in the Roman calculations, and, secondly, the question of an Athenian appeal to Rome, even if it did not affect the case for war. The first point has been cleared up by G. T. Griffith, who has shown that the Roman decision to intervene in Greece was influenced by the appearance of Philip, with his newly created fleet, as the victor of Lade and Chios, and that the Senate took Philip's naval policy into account in considering the strategic position in Greece
in 200
B.C.3

The second point has been less convincingly treated. The annalistic- tradition in Livy included Athens in the Peace of Phoenice on the Roman side and made the casus belli in 200 B.C. the Macedonian aggression against Athens. Holleaux asserted that Philip would not have attacked Athens if Rome had been involvred through treaty relations, and showed that the Roman ultimatum contained no reference to Athens: the annalistic tradition of an Athenian appeal to Rome, he concluded, must therefore be
1 Part I, Part II, I and 3, and Part III, i.e. the historical reconstruction, are by A. H. McDonald; Part II, z, the constitutional section, by F. W. Walbank. These represent two papers, at first written independently, which it has been found possible with full agreement to combine into a comprehensive treatment of the evidence. 2 Rome [la Grece et les nionarchies bellinistiques] (Paris, I92I); C[ambridge] A[ncient] H[istory] viii, ch. 6 (with bibliography). 3 CambridgeHistorical Journal v, I (I935), I f.

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rejected. 4 Subsequent work has taken the line either of defending the Livian account or of modifying it less drastically than Holleaux. As defenders of Livy we may mention G. De Sanctis,5 whose criticisms of detail do not, however, invalidate Holle'aux' main thesis, and T. Walek-Czernecki,6 whose methods in arguing against Polybius from annalistic data have been refuted by Holleaux himself. 7 E. Bickermann argues for the assumption that the Peace of Phoenice was a xoLvveip'vw including Athens.8 To meet those objections of Holleaux which remain unanswered, he has altered certain points in the reconstruction of the Polybian tradition, and in particular has suggested that the Roman embassy in 200 B.C. was sent, not to deliver a formal ultimatum, but to intimidate Philip and fulfil Rome's obligations under the treaty of Phoenice without war. We shall consider Bickermann's arguments in the course of this paper, and examine the constitutional character of the Roman embassy in a
special sectlon.

Of those who accept the thesis of Holleaux but propose modifications, we may mention A. Passerini9 and J. A. 0. Larsen.10 Both critics rightly place the Athenian appeal after the Roman declaration of war, but they explain its circumstances differently, and neither brings it into full relation with the Polybian tradition. The problem of the relation of Athens to Rome, then, has become an issue upon which Holleaux' view of the Roman policy at this ,time may be accepted or rejected, and in dealing with it we shall raise the whole question of the origins of the Second Macedonian War. Our opening point must be the Peace of Phoenice, and here we shall take Holleaux' general criticisms of the Livian record as our basis.11 But the real answer to the problem of the treaty is to be found in the study of the events leading up to the outbreak of war between Rome and Macedon in 200 B.C. We shall attempt to reconstruct the situation in the light of the evidence, including the recently discovered decree in honour of Cephisodorus. 12 By proposing slight modifications in Holleaux' exposition of details, we hope to end by setting out more clearly his thesis that Rome did not formulate an Eastern policy until the report in 201 of a secret Syro-Macedonian pact. The paper falls into three parts: first, the Eastern situation secondly, the Athenian declaration of war, the Roman B.C.; 205-I
4 Livy (A[nnalist]) xxix, I2, I4; XXXi, 1-9, Holleaux, Rome, 265-271. 6 Storia dei Romani iv, I, 32, n. 65; /f. iii, Riv- fil- (NS) XiV (1936), I96 ff. 2, 4386 Rev. phil. xlix (I925), 28 if.; Eos xxxi (1928), 369 ff. 7 Rev. phil. 1 (I926), 194 ff8 Rev. phil. lxi (I935), 59 ff-, i6I ff. 9 Athenaeum ix (1931), 260 if., 542 ff.
1I Class. Phil. xxxii, I (I937), I5 ff., in reply to Bickermann's paper. 11 Rome, 258-7I ; CAH viii, 135-6; cf. Taubler, Against De Sanctis, Imperium Romanunc i, 214-8. op. cit., iii, 2, 436 ff. ; cl. Larsen, Class. Phil. xxx (I935), 210-12 ; xxxii, I (I 937) 5 ff. 12 Published with commentary by B. D. Meritt Mr. McDonald in Hesperia v, 3 (I936), 419-28. has had the privilege of reading the decree with Prof. Meritt, who refers to this paper for the discussion of the historical implications of the decree.

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200 B.C.;

embassy, and the Athenian appeal to Rome in

I. THE EASTERN SITUATION 205-I

thirdly,

the Roman declaration of war and the policy of the Senate.

B.C.13

After the Peace of Phoenice, Philip proceeded with a naval policy in the Aegean. The twenty ships under Dicaearchus show his progress by 204, just as the activities of Dicaearchus indicate his designs on the Cyclades and the Hellespont, and the intrigues in the ' Cretan War' (with, perhaps, the alleged attempt of Heracleides on the Rhodian fleet) betray his desire to break the influence of Rhodes and re-establish Macedonian ascendancy. 14 Developments in the Aegean would also affect Egyptian and Syrian interests. Egypt in these last years of Ptolemy Philopator's reign had declined in strength, through weak rule and native troubles, and was now threatened by Syria; for Antiochus, after the triumph of his ' Anabasis,' was in 204 planning to regain Coele-Syria. Antiochus' ambitions also to recover his hereditary possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace would in the end clash with the aims of Macedonian expansion in the Aegean. This was the position,15 with the Syrian policy of aggression clear but the Macedonian policy not yet defined, when Ptolemy Philopator died (c. Aug.-Sept. 204), leaving the infant Ptolemy Epiphanes as his heir.' 6 Sosibius and Agathocles concealed this critical change in the rule of Egypt, and at the end of 204 or early in 203 made overtures for an alliance with Philip, which should be sealed by the marriage of the young Epiphanes with one of Philip's daughters. On the announcement of Philopator's death and the accession of Ptolemy Epiphanes (c. Aug.-Sept.- 203), Agathocles immediately sent Ptolemy, ;he son of Sosibius, to conclude the negotiations for an alliance against Syria. 1 7 Antiochus saw that it would be necessary to come to an agreement with Philip, and towards the end of 203 he proposed a pact defining their spheres of expansion. Philip accepted the offer, and a secret Syro-Macedonian pact was drawn up. According to Polybius, the agreement involved the partition of the Egyptian empire, Philip taking the Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean, Caria and Samos, Antiochus those in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia ;18 and, as Zeuxis was apparently bound to help Philip according to the treaty, 1 9 there were presumably pledges of mutual assistance. Polybius also seems to have envisaged an attack on Egypt
13 On the earlier relations of Rome with the East, see Holleaux, Rome, chs. I-6. 14 Polyb. xiii, 4-5, xviii, 54, 8; Diod. xxviii, I i Polyaenus v, 17, 2. C/. Holleaux, Klio xiii (I913), I37 ff., Rev. EG xxx (19I7), 88 ff., xxxiii (I92o), 223 ff. ; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 3 and notes 7, 8, g; M. Segre, Riv. fil. (Ns) xi (1933), 365 f.-; Griffith, op. cit., 7-8. 15 Holleaux, Rome, 281-3.

16 For a full reconsideration of the demotic and Greek evidence for the problem of the date of Philopator's death and the accession of Epiphanes, see F. W. Walbank, 7[ournal on]E[gyptian] A[rchxxii (I 936), I, 20-34c0ology] 17 Polyb. xv, 25, I3. Holleaux, Rome, 77-80. 18 Polyb. iii, 2, 8; xv, 20. 9 Polyb. xvi, I, 8-9.

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itself, for he condemns the coalition as directed against the very existence of the child Ptolemy, 20 and strongly criticises Philip for Yet not not sailing against Alexandria after the battle of Lade. only did the strategic situation make this impossible, 23 but a study of the position at the time shows that Philip's policy was limited to the establishment of Macedonian power in the Aegean. Polybius, then, appears to have misrepresented the Macedonian policy in regard to Egypt itself, and he may have exaggerated the aims of the pact in the same respect.2 3 The agreement between Antiochus and Philip was not, as Polybius judged, 24 due merely to some brute instinct to devour the weaker: it was forced upon Antiochus by the danger of an alliance between Macedon and Egypt, and was accepted by Philip because it gave him a free hand in the Aegean. Its basis lay in the mutual recognition of the right to expand at the expense of Egypt in the spheres in which each power had hereditary claims, Antiochus in Coele-Syria, Philip in the Aegean. Both powers were pursuing an independent policy of aggression, and even if they had been in a position to invade Egypt, it is doubtful whether either would have been willing to support the other in the conquest of a country which could not be partitioned and which might prove an acquisition of decisive weight in the balance of the Hellenistic political system. We may believe that neither Antiochus nor Philip would have allowed the other to set foot in Alexandria. Indeed, it would be surprising if Antiochus gave Philip entire freedom in the Aegean, considering the Syrian interests there. Certainly he may have been ready to make concessions in order to avoid embarrassment in Coele-Syria and to obtain treaty limitation of Macedonian expansion in Asia Minor; but we may assume that he received a promise from Philip that Macedonian ascendancy in the Aegean would respect the interests of Syria. Otherwise he would scarcely have agreed to terms of mutual assistance by which Philip rather than himself would benefit. And he may have been strictly within his rights when he reconciled certain Cretan cities with Rhodes.25 The compact, however, must be considered a diplomatic success for Philip, and he exploited his advantage in the Aegean to the full. When the pact at last stood revealed, it had become an empty form. Antiochus had been estranged by Philip's unscrupulous policy at his expense: his reconciliation of the Cretan cities with Rhodes deprived Philip of valuable auxiliaries, and Zeuxis was no doubt acting under orders when he neglected to give Philip the full assistance stipulated in the treaty. 26 But this would hardly appear in the
20 21 22 23

Polyb. XV, 20, Polyb. XVi, IO.

2.

De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, IO-I I. Appian (Maced. 4, I), preserving the Polybian tradition through an annalist (Schwartz, P-W s.v. ' Appianus ' col. 2I9), states that, according to report, Philip was to help Antiochus against Egypt

and Cyprus, and Antiochus to help Philip against Cyrene, the Cyclades and Ionia. 24 Polyb. XV, 20, 3Holleaux, Klio xiii (I9I3), Polyb. xvi, I, 9; 24, 6. 290 n. I ; CAH viii, I55.
25 26 I48

ff-

Holleaux, Rome,

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revelationof the pact. The mere fact of a treaty between the great powers of Syria ancdMacedon would cause a serious political crisis in the East.27 For the moment, however,the pact was secret, and Philip, playing a double game, maintainedfriendlyrelationswith Egypt.28 In Rome an Egyptian embassy had announced the accession of Ptolemy Epiphanesand had doubtlessappealedfor mediationwith Antiochus; but there was little hope at this time that Rome would take action over Coele-Syria.2 9

at the end of 203. This wasthe position

In 202 the effect,though

not the fact, of the coalition became clear. Antiochus invaded Coele-Syria. Philip, his fleet now forty strong in addition to a large number of lembi, openly seized control of the Hellespont. He occupied the strategicallyimportantcities of Lysimacheia,Chalcedon and Perinthus,and as the ally of Prusiastook Cius: on his return he gained possessionof Thasos. Lysimacheia,Chalcedon and Cius had been dependent allies of the Aetolian League, and Perinthus a dependency of Byzantium: Cius was sackedin the face of Rhodian intercession,and Thasos was enslavedwithout justification.30 The campaign provoked the open hostility of Aetolia, Byzantium and Rhodes, and shocked the Greek world. It also probably irritated Antiochus, who must have resented Philip's co-operation with Prusias,a naturalopponent of the Seleucids,and above all his occupato which he himselfhad claims,31 tion of Lysimacheia, The Greek states, although ignorant of the pact, could not be blind to Philip's deliberate policy of aggression. The Macedonian control of the Hellespont threatened the Bosporantrade of Rhodes, Delos and Athens, and would endanger the economic stability of the Aegean: Cephisodorus'public service as TOIoCtX Tcv GLTCVLXCdV in Athens may well have been worthy of record.32 And the (203-2) political ascendancyto which Philip's efforts appearedto be directed might well menace the established autonomy in Greece.33 As a result of Philip's campaign, Rhodes with Byzantium and her other allies declaredwar on Macedon,34 and Aetolia attempted to renew friendly relationswith Rome (autumn 202).3 5 The Greeksstates, then, were in open hostility to Philip. Egypt, whose possessionson the Thracian coast he had respected and who still hoped for his help against Antiochus, remained acquiescent. Rome was indifferent. The Senate harshly rejected the Aetolian
2 7 For this interpretation of the Polybian account, compare the similar lines of the brief exposition of Holleaux, CAH viii, 15o. 28 Polyb. XVi, 22, 3-5. Holleaux, Rome, 2go n. I,

notes I, z; CAH viii, I5I ; De Sanctis, op. ci t., iv, I, 6-8. 31 Polyb. xviii, 5I, 4-6. Holleaux, Rome,
29i,

Rome, 8S, 82. On the earlier relations of Rome with Egypt, see Holleaux, ibid., 6o-83, 93-4. 3 ? Polyb. XV, 22-4; 4, 5-7; cf. XViii, 3, I 1-12; 5, 4; Livy (P[olybius]) xxxi, 3', 4. Holleaux, Rome,

I53, I55. CAHviii, I50-i, 3I7-8; 2 9 Polyb. xv, z5, 14. Holleaux,

n. I. 3 2 Meritt, Op. cit., 426; Heichelheim, Aegyptus XVii (1937), 6i ff. 33 We may note Philip's severe rule in his own
290,

kingdom: Holleaux, CAH viii, 144-5. 34 Polyb. xvi, 9, 3-43 a Appian, Maced. 4, 2; Livy (P) xxxi, 29, 4.

THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN

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appeal.

Livy, reproducing Polybius, gives their reply

sine quorum auctoritate pacem cum

'QQuid ad
Philippo

nos venitis, Aetoli, fecistis ? ' 36

It is the manner, not the fact, of this refusal that is significant. The Senate in 202 might well have declined to intervene in the East, but with any anticipation of military action in Greece the careful, calculating Roman diplomacy will scarcely have administered such a cruel rebuff to a powerful ally. In 200, when war against Macedon had been decided upon, and in 200-i99, after the arrival of Sulpicius Galba in Greece, Rome made most urgent attempts to repair the breach with the Aetolians.37 The Senate cannot have underestimated the strategic importance of Aetolian support in case of war.
Yet the rebuff was crushing. Its effect is seen in the collapse

of Aetolian policy. The Aetolians did not respond to the appeal of Attalus to invade Macedonia during Philip's absence in 20I, and remained inactive despite his further appeal in 200. Even after the appearance of the Roman army in Greece, Amynander was equally
unsuccessful, and at the Panaetolica in
I99

there was no reply to the

Roman envoy: the Aetolians came in only at the end of the year, when the Roman superiority became certain.38 This may be attributed to the Senate's harsh dismissal of the Aetolian embassy: it was a result easily foreseen, and the implication is that at the end of 202 Rome did not contemplate any Eastern policy that would involve military action in Greece. 9 In 20o the Eastern situation developed further. Antiochus continued his operations in Coele-Syria, taking Gaza after a long siege; but the delay had enabled Scopas to gather an army, and in thle winter of 20I-200 he reconquered Palestine up to the sources of the Jordan.40 Philip, having established an ascencdancyin the North Aegean, confirmed his control of the Cyclades and extended his
aggression to the East Aegean, with the object of securing a stategic

position in Caria. He was still sparing Egyptian possessions, and although Samos, a Ptolemaic dependency, refused him entrance and he was forced to reduce the city, this was due to the action of the Samians themselves, and he did not let it affect his relations with Egypt:
36 Livy (P) XXXi 29, 4, in a close adaptation of Polybius, cf. Polyb. xviii, 38, 8. Nissen, Krit. Unters. iiber die Quellen der 4 und 5 Dekade des Livius, 126. 37 Polyb. xvi, 27, 4 (zoo). Livy (P) xxxi, 28, 3; 29, I ; 31, 20 (2OO-199).
38 Livy (P) xxxi, 46, 4 (ZOI); 15, 9 (Zoo); 28, 3 (200-I99); 32, 2-5 (I99). 3a9 See Holleaux, Rome, 293-7, and Griffith, op. cit., 3-5. It will appear even more clearly from the present reconstruction of events that the embassy would never have been rebuffed after the Pergamene and Rhodian appeal in zoi, where Appian places it. Bickermann (op. cit., I6z n. 4)

surprisingly accepts Appian's dating on the grounds that " rien ne prouve que le Senat voulut la guerre d6ja en ilhiver zoI-o.' Yet the appeal in zoI was the cause of the war: the Senate must have grasped its implications immediately. The election of Sulpicius Galba as consul for zoo shows the antiMacedonian policy in Rome at the beginning of the

winter
(I936),

zOI-o

(cf. De Sanctis, Riv. fil.

(NS)

xiV

zoo against Bickermann, op. cit., I67 n. z). The date of Zama, it may be noted, does not affect the implications of the rebuff to the Aetolians, for we may not assume that the Punic War made the Senate blind to the situation in Greece. 4 ?Polyb. 39. Holleaux, Klio viii xvi, 22a; (i908), 267 ff

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Samos remained Egyptian, and an Egyptian squadron lying in the harbour reinforced his fleet. 41 Clearly the pact with Antiochus was still unsuspected. The Rhodians were forced by the appearance of Philip in their waters to offer direct assistance in spite of their inferior numbers. They brought the Macedonian fleet to action at Lade, but were defeated and had to retire, while Miletus, nominally an ally of Egypt, gave Philip a triumphal reception.42 The victory secured the Macedonian ascendancy in the Aegean, and the Greek states recognised this with hatred and fear.43 But the threat of Macedonian domination in Asia Minor roused Attalus of Pergamum, whose ambitious policy did not conduce to friendly relations with Rhodes and who had so far held back from the support of Rhodes, to join in combined action against the common danger. After a declaration of war, he appealed to his allies the Aetolians for a diversion in Greece, and proceeded without delay to military measures.44 Philip turned on Pergamum. He subdued Teos, a Pergamene dependency,45 and after an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Pergamum, plundered the temples outside the city.46 Then he moved against Chios, a city with Rhodian connections.47 Here the combined Pergamene and Rhodian fleets brought him to battle. In the engagement the Macedonian fleet won a strategic victory; but Philip's losses were the heavier, and Attalus and the Rhodians together would in future have a superiority at sea.48 The allies meanwhile separated, and Philip was able to invade Caria and, in spite of failing at Cnidus, seize the Rhodian Peraea and establish a
41 Appian, Maced. 4, I; Polyb. xvi, 2, 4, 9 ; 7, 6 for MS. v7revavrtwv); Livy (P) (reading A1yuv7ri&nv xxxi, 31, 4. G. Klaffenbach, Ath. Mitt. li (ig26), 28-33. Holleaux, Klio ix (Io99),454-8 ; Rev. EA xxii (1920), 237 ff., xxiii (192I), i8i ff.; Rome, 290 n. I, 3i8 n.z; CAH viii, i53 ; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 8 n. zz. Samos does not appear in the negotiations of i98 (Polyb. xviii, z) or in the settlement of I96 (Polyb. xviii. 44), and is definitely among the civitates sociae Ptolomaei in 197 (Livy (P) xxxiii, 20, Ii-iz) : the explanation must be that Samos On had remained juridically Egyptian in zoi. occupying the city Philip will have made clear his friendship with Ptolemy, the strategic necessity for his action, and the fact that it was not intended to injure Egyptian sovereignty. The priority of the battle 42 Polyb. xvi, 14-15. of Lade is established by the comment of Polybius 7ijv 7repl (xvi, IO) I): Ae&a 7O6ovreXe-Ovat 'Po&ovs Tj71v Ad&0XP Aev VUa%CLX'CLV Ka' TOVS eK7roUbv
o7vtuke 41?tX17r 7r yev&tOac,

J'Evat, 6Xov
'ov e ts

pA 7rw rOv o' `A-rraXov WS e?Jv Te reXetv -rC

-rv 'AXe4dv6ptctav 7rwXov.

Polybius will have recognised the move against Alexandria as a major campaign to be undertaken only with unchallenged mastery in the Aegean. It could not be carried out after the alliance between Attalus and the Rhodians, in any interval in the summer in which the allies might happen to be

temporarily separated: in the reference to Attalus Polybius must have meant that the king had not yet joined in the war. Thus Lade will come before the combined action at Chios. In any event, after the Macedonian losses at Chios, with Attalus operating in the Aegean, no victory over the Rhodians would have made Polybius criticise Philip for not sailing to Alexandria: we may conclude that he recorded the battle of Lade as the first engagement, with Philip at the height of his power and before Attalus entered the war (cf. De Sanctis, op. cit., iv. i, io n. 27; Griffith, op. cit., 8; against Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (I920), 244 ff.; CAH viii, 153-4). 43 Cl. Polybius (Polyb. xvi, io and supra, n. 42), and Alcaeus of Messene (Anth. Pal. ix, 5I8). De Sanctis,op. cit., iv, I, 9 n. z6. 4 4 Polyb. xvi, 9, 4; Livy (P) xxxi, 46, 4. 45 Holleaux, Klio xiii (I913), CAH viii, 144; 153 n. 2. 46 Polyb. xvi, i; xviii, 2z 2; 6, 4; Diod. xxviii, 5; Appian, Maced. 4, I. Holleaux, Rev. EA xxiii (I9zI), i96 if. 4I Holleaux, Rome, 35, 87 n. 2, 9i, against Beloch, Gr. Gesch. iv, 2, 345, followed by De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I) I2 n. 32, who hold it to be nominally Ptolemaic.
48 450

f.;

Polyb. xvi, 2-9. Holleaux, Klio ix De Sanctis,op. cit., iv, Ix I2-14.

(I909),

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Macedonian province.49 Yet his mastery of the Aegean had disappeared. He could still carryout effectivemaritime operations,but it must have been clearthat wheneverAttalus and the Rhodianschose to unite their fleetsthey could force him to act on the defensive.50 This was the position in the summer of 20i. Yet it was at this moment that Attalus and the Rhodians sent an embassyto beg the intervention of Rome.51 Why ? Surely, in spite of his cordial relations with Rome, Attalus must have preferred to pursue his ambitions without the embarrassmentof a dominant ally. And the Rhodianshad been consistentlyopposedto Roman intervention in the East. Why should Attalus weaken and the Rhodiansreverse their policy at the moment when they appearedto have the Aegean situationin hand ? The reasonmust have been great and compelling. There must have arisen in the political situation a factor of such overwhelming importance that the small Aegean powers could balanceit only by callingin Rome. The implicationof the appeal to Rome is clear Syria stood revealed to the Greek world behind Macedon. The Syro-Macedonian pact had been discovered. This will be independentlyestablishedfrom the history of Athens in this year, on the basisof the following reconstructionof the course
of events in Greece in
II.
20I-200 B.C.

THE ATHENIAN DECLARATION OF WAR, THE ROMAN EMBASSY, AND THE ATHENIAN APPEAL TO ROME IN 200 B.C. I

In the autumn of 20I Philip lay blockadedin Bargyliaby the combined Pergamene and Rhodian fleets. As the winter came on, the allies tightened up the blockadeuntil escape became impracticable, and, in spite of his anxiety for affairsat home, Philip was forced to remain. Suppliesgave out, and he had to rely on what he could get from Zeuxis or the neighbouring towns of Mylasa, Alabanda and Magnesia: it wasthe life of a wolf, saysPolybius. Finallyhe attempted to seize Mylasa,and ravaged the territory of Alabanda.52 This is the picture of a full winter under famine conditions, and we may conclude that Philip didcnot effect his escape, by the stratagem recordedin Polyaenus(iv, I8, 2), until the springof 200. Only then did he return to Greece, closely pursued by Attalus and the
Rhodians.5 3

In Greece there had been strainedrelationsbetween the Athenians and the Acarnanians since August zoi, when the Athenianshad put
4 9 Polyb. xvi, I I-I2; XViii, 2, 3; 6, 3; 8, 9. Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (1920), 237 ff., xxiii CAH viii 330 if.; (1921), I9I ff., xxv (I923), De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, II 15. I54-5. 6 0Polyb. xvi, 8; ct. xvi, 28; Livy (P) xxxi,
15, I0. 51 Appian, Maced. 4, 2; Polyb. xvi, 24, 2-3; Justinus xxx, 3, 5; cf. Livy (A) xxxi, z, i. 5 Polyb. xvi, 24. Holleaux,Rev. EA xxii (I920), 249-50,
63

Xxv (I923),

353-5.

Livy (P) xxxi, I4, II . Holleaux, Rev. EA. xxv (I923), 353-9; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, i6, n. 44. See infra p. 19 I, n. 70.

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to death two Acarnanian youths who had violated the Eleusinian mysteries. 5 4 The Athenians had refused redress, and the Acarnanians planned a punitive expedition ; but as allies of Philip they waited for his support. On his return Philip was informed, and immediately sent Macedonian auxiliaries to join the Acarnanians. The combined force devastated Attica, and the Acarnanians returned with their booty. This is the Polybian tradition in the adaptation of Livy; but it has been abbreviated. In particular, there is no reference to the co-operation of Macedonian ships, which, we shall see, accompanied the operations by land. 5 5 The account may be supplemented from the description of Attalus' visit to Athens.56 According to Polybius (xvi, 25, i), the Athenians sent envoys to Attalus in Aegina 'to thank him for what had been done (suXocplcatnaovta4 od to1 ysyovoaLv) and to invite him to Athens to confer on the present situation.' Now this expression of thanks cannot be dismissed as an empty compliment or referred to the operations in the East Aegean, which only indirectly concerned Athens. The natural sense of the words is that Attalus had rendered the Athenians some direct service, presumably after his arrival in Greek waters. This impression is strengthened by the account of his reception, when some days later he crossed to the Peiraeus in order to meet the Roman envoys despatched in reply to his and the Rhodians' appeal in 20I. The archons met him and escorted him with great ceremony up to the city. The temples were prepared for sacrifice, and in the ecclesia the people voted him honours such as they had never voted to previous benefactors without long consideration: they created the new tribe of Attalis, and added his name to the roll of eponymous heroes. But what had Attalus done to receive thanks, to be called a benefactor, and to have the welcome and the honours due to a saviour of the cityv-and all this by a sudden decision ? The nature of his service will appear from a consideration of the Rhodians' activities at this time. Their leaders did not cross from Aegina with Attalus, but they are present in the ecclesia and receive the honour of a a poe'vo &pLaG-LcLv and the vote of Zgonom-c'La. According to Polybius, this was because ' apart from the other things (zop' tCov &`Xcov)they had returned the captured ships with their crews ' ; and Livy preserves from the lost Polybian chapters the information that the ships were four in number and had recently been captured by the Macedonians and retaken from them. The fact that the crews were still on board shows that the Rhodians had appeared during the engagement and had rescued the Athenian
Bickermann, op. cit., I64 n. 3. Livy (P) xxxi, I4, 6-io; iS, S; Polyb. xvi, z6, 9. In adapting Polybius, Livy has limited himself to presenting separately, first the outbreak of hostility between Philip and the Athenians, then the formal declaration of war: the intervening account of events by sea has been omitted.
54

55

Polyb. xvi, 25-6, cf. Livy (P) xxxi, 14, 7. The Polybian fragment has not been abridged: the undefined allusions refer back to the previous chapters (cf. Holleaux, Rev. EA xxv, 19Z3), 356 n. 6).
56 11-15,

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ships before the Macedonians could reach port with them. We may connect the thanks to Attalus 'for what had been done ' with the reference to 'the other things ' of the Rhodians, and see here an allusion to some action by Attalus and the Rhodians on behalf of Athens against Macedonian naval operations. It would seem that Philip not only sent auxiliaries to reinforce the Acarnanians: he also despatched ships from Chalcis to co-operate in raiding on the Attic coast. The land force no doubt devastated Attica almost to the walls of Athens. The naval force threatened the Attic ports and may have appeared o$f the Peiraeus ; and the four Athenian ships were captured. In helpless anger the Athenians had to watch the destruction of their peaceful land and the loss of their small protection by sea. At this moment, we may suppose, Attalus and the Rhodians appeared on the scene, presumably from their base at Aegina. The raiders fled, with the Rhodians in pursuit to recover the Athenian vessels. The Acarnanians, their purpose fulfilled, retired. And the Athenians may well have felt that their safety had been secured by the opportune

arrivalof Attalus.5 7
It was for this reason, then, that, when the Rhodians arrived with the recaptured ships and they saw Attalus put back into Aegina, the Athenians sent envoys to thank the king and invite him to the city. This was the reason for the magnificent reception and the almost divine honours voted to Attalus, and the award for valour and grant of isopolity to the Rhodians. And, we should note, the swiftness of the relief will have anticipated any wide-spread appeal for help such as that recorded by Pausanias concerning Cephisodorus, which is generally, but, on the above interpretation of the Polybian evidence, falsely, dated to this time. 58 In Rome the Pergamene and Rhodian embassies had won over the Senate to a policy of intervention in Greece: the decision is reflected in the election of P. Sulpicius Galba, who had been general in the First Macedonian War, to the consulship for 200 (c. Nov. 20I). 59 In spring 200 the Roman envoys, C. Claudius Nero, P. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Aemilius Lepidus, crossed to Greece to deliver an ultimatum to Philip and to proceed to the East to offer mediation The ultimatum between Antiochus and Ptolemy Epiphanes. demanded that Philip should not make war on any Greek state and should submit Attalus' claims for reparations to arbitration.61- The envoys visited Epirus, Athamania, Aetolia and Achaea, publishing this measure for the protection of Greek autonomy and soliciting support in the event of its rejection ; and in due course, as we have
Cf. Ferguson, Hell. Athens, 268 ; De Sanctis, iV, I, 20 n. 52; and Holleaux,Rev. EA xxv (1923), 356-9. 58 Paus. I, 36, 5-6; cl. Ferguson, op. cit., 269; De Sanctis, Op. Cit., iV, I, 21 ; Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (Ig20), 84 n. 3; CAH viii, I6I.
57

Op. cit.

5 9 Supra p. I 85, n. 39, 6 0 Polyb. XVi, 27; 34, I-7; Livy (A) xxxi, 2, 3-4; Justinus xxx, 3, 3-5 ; xxxi, I, 2. Holleaux, Rev. EA xv (1913), 4, XXV (1923), 359; Rome, 50; CAH viii, i6I ; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 23 n. 57.
61

Polyb. XVi, 27, 2.

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seen, they arrived at the Peiraeus. Their reception and their subsequent conduct in Athens show that their visit here was no different from their earlier halts on the way. There is no sign of any political relations or previous commitments of Rome to Athens. If it had not been for the presence of Attalus, the envoys would no doubt once more have repeated their proclamation, and have merely asked for the promise of Athenian co-operation in the event of war with Macedon.62 But Attalus' position in Athenian regard offered a more effective course of action. For who could now better solicit Athenian support than the king himself ? And so, after reporting the decision of the Senate to Attalus, the Roman envoys remained in the background and left the handling of the situation to him. 63 The appeal of Attalus, already in a state of war with Philip, produced a result that the Roman envoys would not have attempted, one beyond the scope of their mission, since the ultimatum had not yet been presented and Rome was still at peace with Macedon. In alliance with Attalus and the Rhodians, the Athenians openly declared war on Macedon. This clearly lay outside the competence of the Roman embassy, and they took no part in the declaration of war. Further, it would seem that, although war was practically certain and Attalus might well invite the Athenians to join the Rhodians, the Romans, and himself in hostility to Macedon, 64 yet the Roman envoys at this point had not the power to enter into relations of alliance with Athens, as they did later with Rhodes. For, while Rome was already acting on behalf of Pergamene interests and the Rhodian case appears in the final demands, after the establishment of relations of alliance, the Athenians came into no relations with Rome. Their case will not appear in the Roman demands, and, as we shall see, when they were finally forced to appeal to Rome, it was only as a last resort after the failure of their allies. Apparently the competence of the Roman embassy at this point was limited. This will appear also from a study65 of the procedure followed in the presentation of the formal ultimatum and declaration of war at Abydus. We shall find that the embassy did not at first have the authority of the Roman People, and this is to be explained by the fact, recorded in the annalistic tradition, that the Centuries had refused to pass the proposal for war against Macedon at the beginning of 200.66 The course of Athenian policy leading up to the declaration of war, then, has developed continuously from the incident at the
62 Taiubler, op. cit., 2i6-7; xxii (I920), n. 2.

77;

Holleaux, Rev. EA Ronme,267-70; CAH viii, i6i

63 Livy omits all mention of the envoys in his adaptation of Polybius, not because after a critical survey he felt it inconsistent with his annalistic account of the causes of the war (as Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (ig20), 9I-2; CAH viii, i6i, n. z)

nor in order to preserve the dignity of Rome (as De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, sv 32, n. 65), but rather because he had stated that they went direct to Alexandria (Livy (A) xxxi, 2, 3): this would appear from his addition in xxxi, i8, r; cf. Polyb. xvi, 34. 64 Polyb. xvi, 26, 6. 65 See infra p. i92 ff. 66 Livy (A) xxxi, 6, 3-4 ; cf. Passerini, op. cit., z8I.

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Eleusinian mysteries in August 20I ; yet this case of sacrilege appears in itself too slight an occasion for such drastic action. We may suppose some already existing political tension, which found issue in this way. 67 In the evidence for the abolition of the ' Macedonian ' tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, we have the means to determine more precisely the position in Athens at this time. These tribes, created in 307-668 were abolished in the Attic year 20I-200, long enough before the creation of Attalis in the spring of 200 for a redistribution of demes into eleven tribes :6 9 thus, as Attalis was created immediately after the Acarnanian raid, we must search for a motive earlier.7 0 The abolition could have accompanied the incident at the Eleusinian mysteries ; but it was even less likely to have been caused by a mere act of sacrilege. We must assume in Athens at this time a state of hostility to Macedon so strong that not only are Macedonian allies unreasonably put to death, but the two tribes created in honour of Macedon a century earlier, which had survived the revolt in 289-8, the Chremonidean War in 266, the secession in 229 and the alliance with Egypt in 224, are suddenly abolished. Certainly Athens will have suffered from the economic disturbance of Philip's control of the Hellespont, and with the rest of the Greek world will have detested his brutal treatment of free cities and feared the aims of his deliberate aggression; yet for nearly thirty years the Athenians had maintained a strict neutrality. There must have been some overwhelming reason for this open break with Macedon: we may see it in the discovery of the Syro-Macedonian pact, directed against the great power which for over twenty years had stood behind the Athenian policy of neutrality. The creation of the tribe Ptolemais, 71 the Egyptian orientation of the whole foreign policy of Eurycleides and Micion,72 its continuation under Cephisodorus, the appeal to Egypt in 200-these are the signs of the close Athenian friendship with Egypt ; and it can hardly be a coincidence that the new Tribal Cycle in 20I began with Ptolemais. 73 At the same time that the Pergamene and Rhodian embassies left for Rome, in the summer of 20I, Athens proclaimed her Egyptian sympathies in the face of the coalition of Syria and Macedon. And we can now appreciate something of the feeling that found
67

Niese,

Gesch. der griech. und niaked. Staaten

ii, 589.
68 Ferguson, Hell. Athens, 96, n. 2; Athenian Tribal Cycles, 5, n. i. 69 IG2 Ferguson, Ath. Tr. Cycles, 236z. iiI

14I, n. I.
7 Ferguson (Ath. Tr. Cycles, I4I, n. i) has placed the Acarnanian raid in autumn zoi, before the return of Philip, in order to explain the abolition of Antigonis and Demetrias; but the evidence given above (p. I87 ff.) dates the raid to spring 2oo, and our explanation, we submit, provides satisfactorily for the abolition of the tribes. Bickermann (op. cit.,

i64, n. 3), without detailed treatment, places the Eleusis incident in August 2oi, the Acarnanian invasion some weeks later in autumn 2oi, and the Athenian embassy to Rome in winter 2oi-o. The present reconstruction (see also infra, p. I 97 ff.) may be held to dispose of this view.

Ferguson, Ath. Tr. Cycles, 92. Niese, op. cit., ii, 463-5; Ferguson, Hell. Athens, 24I ff.; Ath. Tr. Cycles, 143-4; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, i, i6 ff.; Holleaux, Rome, i i8. 7 3 Ferguson, Ath. Tr. Cycles, 142.
71 224-3

or 223-2.

72 Polyb. v, io6, 6-8.

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expression in the reception of Attalus and the Rhodians, and in the Athenian declaration of war.
2

From Athens Attalus returned to Aegina and the Rhodians left to bring over the Cyclades.74 The Roman envoys remained, and when Nicanor, one of Philip's generals, no doubt informed of the Athenian declaration of war, ravaged Attica up to the Academy, they sent a herald and delivered the ultimatum. Nicanor retired to transmit it to Philip, and the Romans left for Rhodes. 7 Here they waited for a report of Philip's reception of the ultimatum, which they might send back to the Senate; but when this took the form of a second attack on Attica, this time by Philocles, 76 they unexpectedly made no further move, but allowed Philip to proceed unhindered to a rapid campaign of conquest in Thrace and the Thracian Chersonese,77 culminating in the siege of Abydus. To Abydus the Roman envoys despatched M. Aemilius Lepidus, their youngest member, to deliver a second ultimatum to Philip in person.78 This has generally been taken as the indictio belli leading up to the Second Macedonian War. 7 9 Certain criticisms of this view by Bickermann, however, make it advisable, before proceeding to a consideration of the Roman policy, to discuss the character and competence of the embassy, and the real nature of the two ultimatums delivered at Athens and Abydus. By the end of the third century B.C. the forms observed in the declaration of war had diverged considerably from those laid down in the ius fetiale, as described in Livy. 8 0 The original procedure had contained three stages. First, the pater patratus was sent, with others of the fetiales, ad res repetendas.81 Next, after an interval of thirty-three days, if the demands were not satisfied, this envoy delivered the testatio or denuntiatio82 in these terms: he swore by the gods that his cause was a just one, and stated that ' de istis rebus in patria maiores natu consulemus, quo
Polyb. xvi, 26, 10, cf. 74 Livy (P) xxxi, I5, 8-Ia; xvi. z8. 75 Polyb. xvi, 27; Livy (P) xxxi, i6, I-z. Livy omits the incident of Nicanor and records only the despatch of Philocles ; but there was not merely one episode, with Livy giving Philocles in confusion for Nicanor (as Ferguson, Hell. A4thens, 273, n. i) or Polybius giving the subordinate Nicanor and Livy the commander Philocles (Niese, op. cit., ii, 592, Livy omitted the n. 7; De Sanctis, 35, n. 67). Nicanor incident because it introduced the Roman envoys he did not wish to mention (see supra p. i90, n. 63) ; and the despatch of Philocles presupposes a knowledge of the Roman ultimatum which must have come through Nicanor 'Philippus . . . ne Romano quidem quod imminebat misso,' etc. (ci. Polyb. bello territus, Philocle . xvi, 29, I)7 6 Livy (P) xxxi, i6, 2. Livy (P) xxxi, i6, 3-I7, II. See infra, p. I99. Polyb. xvi, 34, I-7 , Livy (P) xxxi, I 8, I-4 ; Diod. xxviii, 6; Appian, Maced. 4, 2. 79Cf. Holleaux, Rome, 267-8; CAH viii, I64; De Sanctis op. cit., iv, I, 35; Niese, op. cit., ii, 595. 80 Livy i, 3z, 5; cl. vii, 6, 7; 32, I; x, 45, 7 Dionys. Ant. Roen. ii, 72, 6. Lange, Romische Altertiimer i3, 322 ff. 81 Theoretically, 'of course, the Roman People has always suffered injury from its adversary; and it is reparation for this injury that is sought by the pater patratus. The rerum repetitio is also called the clarigatio, cf. Servius, ad Aen. ix, 52; Arnobius ii, 67; and Wissowa, Religion und Kultus der Rimer2, 553. 82 Testatio-Livy i, 32, 9, 'ego vos testor populum illum iniustum esse': denuntiatioLivy x, I 2; Cic. de re pub. ii, I 7.
77

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facto ius nostrum adipiscamur.' The Senate then met and solemnly decided on war, the war was authorised by the people,83 and a messenger was sent to the frontier to carry out the symbolical ceremony of casting a spear into the enemy's land. It was to this ceremony that the term indictio belli was originally applied. 84 Thus in the original res repetuntur, form of the ius fetiale the order of procedure was senatus censet, populus iubet, bellum indicitur.' The first change in this procedure came as early as the time of Pyrrhus. Servius (Danielis) relates how, in the case of an overseas enemy, difficulty was experienced in finding a suitable place for the casting of the ceremonial spear.85 Accordingly, a prisoner of war, captured from Pyrrhus, was made to purchase a piece of land near the temple of Bellona, boundary stones were set up, and into this strip of permanently ' hostile soil ' the spear of war was henceforth cast ! 8 6 Thus from the time of Pyrrhus, it cannot be assumed that the oldfashioned indictio belli necessarily took place on any particular
occasion.

With the growth of the Senate's power during the second half of the third century, a still more important modification took place, this time with reference to the clarigatio or rerum repetitio. In the interests of centralised control, the duties of the fetiales were now transferred to senatorial legati. 87 And as the Senate came into contact with non-Italian peoples, who had no ius fetiale, it was this senatorial legatio which, in practice, presented the ultimatum and declared war. The modification was scarcely avoidable. When envoys had to be sent to Carthage, Syria or Macedon, it was no longer practicable for them to deliver their message, bring the refusal back to Rome, there wait until the question had gone before the Senate and People, and then, finally, return to the enemy to deliver the formal indictio belli. The new procedure can best be seen in the preliminaries to the Second Punic War. In 2i8, after long deliberations, the Senate decided on war with Carthage ; the necessary military preparations were made; ' latum inde ad populum, vellent iuberent populo Carthaginiensi bellum indici; eiusque belli causa supplicatio per urbem habita atque adorati dei, ut bene ac feliciter eveniret quod bellum populus Romanus iussisset.'88 This sounds like an unqualified
83 Livy vii, 6, 7, the term used being iubere; this step is omitted in the account of i, 32, 5. 84 Livy x, 45, 7 where the letiales are sent ad res repetendas; ' quibus non redditis ex auctoritate patrum iussu populi bellum Faliscis indictum; ' Cic. loc. cit.; Lange, op. cit., i3, 328. In two places in Livy (i, 32, 5; vii, 32, i-z) the expression indictio belli is used to describe the denuntiatio; the reason for this curious error will be considered below (p. I94, n. 9I). 85 Serv. Dan. ad Aen. ix, 52: 'cum . . . nec invenirent locum ubi hanc sollemnitatem per fetiales indicendi belli celebrarent.' 86 Serv. Dan. ibid.; Ovid, Fasti vi, 205 ff. This fiction was preserved into imperial times; cl. Suet. Claud. 25; Amm. Marc. xix, 2, 6. 87 Wissowa, op. cit., 554; P-W., s.v. Fetiales' (Samter); Weiss in Daremberg-Saglio, Dict. des antiquites, ii, I Ioo (inaccurately paged zooo); Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, ii3, 675; cf. Varro, de 1. 1. v, 86 (fetiales) '. . . ex his mittebantur . . . qui res repeterent, et per hos etiam nunc fit foedus.' 88 Livy xxi, I7, 4; the passage derives ultimately from a contemporary annalistic tradition: ct. De Sanctis, op. cit., iii, 2, 185.

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but the account goes on to explain how, ' ut omnia iusta

ante bellum fierent,' the Senate despatched five legati to ask certain questions at Carthage about the siege of Saguntum and ' si faterentur ac defenderent publico consilio factum, ut indicerent populo Carthaginiensi bellam.' 8 9 Then there occurred the famous incident when the Roman envoy, making a fold in his toga, exclaimed 'hic vobis bellum et pacem portamus: utrum placet, sumite.' 90 In short, notwithstanding the authorisation of the Senate and People, the toga still held both peace and war; thus the order of procedure now ran: ' senatus censet, popialus iubet, res repetuntur, bellum indicitur.' Hence, the People and the Senate now decided on war conditionally; the legati were authorised to convey the decision of war, if they received a certain reply. 91 It is an indictio belli of this kind which most historians have seen in the visit of Aemilius Lepidus to Abydus. Bickermann, however, claims that the assent of the Roman people to the war was not given until after this meeting, which was therefore not the indictio belli; 92 and he has put forward two main objections to the usual view. 93 First, the annalistic account in Livy 94 states that after the people had been persuaded to vote for the war, the consul Sulpicius asked the fetiales whether the declaration must be made to Philip in person, or if an announcement at the nearest frontier station would be sufficient : this question, Bickermann claims, would be superfluous
89 Livy (A) xxi, i8, 2; Polyb. iii, 20, 6-7 gives two similar alternatives. 9 0 Livy xxi, i 8, 13 (Polybius through an annalist, cf. De Sanctis, op. cit., iii, z, 176); Polyb. iii, 33, 2. 91 The reason for the error in Livy (see supra, p. I93, n. 84) is now clear: under the later procedure, the new senatorial legati deliver the indictio belli short, at the immediately before departing-in point where formerly the fetiales had delivered the denuntiatio. The spear-throwing ceremony is a mere rite, to be carried out at Rome or on the enemy's frontier, as convenience allows: the real indictio belli is the parting word of the legati. 92 op. cit., I72 ff. Apart from the difficultyof explaining the allotment of Macedonia as a province to Sulpicius at the beginning of the year (supra, p. i85, n. 39), the chronology of Bickermann's thesis is hard to accept. Sulpicius landed in Epirus autumno fere exacto (Livy (P) xxxi, 22, 4), i.e. in mid-September (cf. Ilolleaux, BCH, lvi, I932, 531 f.), and Philip learnt of this on the way from Abydus to Macedon (Livy (P) xxxi, I8, 9). Now if Lepidus' meeting at Abydus preceded the warvote in the Comitia, time is needed for Philip's reply to reach Rome, for the two votes on the warmotion, for all the preparations and formalities, and for the army to get from Rome to Epirus before Philip left Abydus. Bickermann allows (op. cit., 174, n. 3) twenty days for the journey from Abydus to Rome, three days for the supplicatio, ten days for military preparations and other formalities and nine days for the journey from Rome to Epirusin all about six weeks. Therefore, assuming that

Philip left Abydus about the time that Sulpicius landed in Epirus (as seems likely, since the news met Philip en route for Macedon), Philip must have stayed six weeks at Abydus after it fell. But Livy's words ( .(P) xxxi, I8, 9) are simply: 'Philippus imposito Abydi praesidio in regnum rediit.' It is difficult to limit the whole of the Roman preparations to ten days and equially so to prolong Philip's stay at Abydus to six weeks (particularly after the visit of Lepidus). Yet Bickermann's figures are here a maximum and a minimum respectively: neither can be modified except at the expense of the other.
93 Op. cit., I83. Bickermann's other criticisms if the are easily disposed of. His first-that ultimatum at Abydus was the indictio belli, that to Nicanor must have been the clarigatio-rests on a misunderstanding not only of the procedure at this time, but indeed of the ius /etiale of the early republic. For the original indictio belli was, as we saw (supra, p. I93, n. 84), a mere ritual of spearthrowing; hence it can never have possessed 'la meme ampleur' as the clarigatio. Secondly, Bickermann argues, Lepidus was sent to Abydus on the instructions of the embassy, whereas any question of an ultimatum must have been managed direct from Rome. But that the envoys did have direct instructions from Rome is clear from 3sA6iuevoc 7rpobsav'srb' TO-V Pol. xvi, 34, 2: C'lX7r7rov
E'ToVds. 94 7ro?osrcW Lt TObS

\6' OVS

KacT

Ta'5

xxxi, 8, 3-4.

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if AemiliusLepiduswasto be sent. Now, on the analogyof the Second Punic War, 5the war-vote (which was only a conditional declaration
of war9 6) should have been followed by the sending of legati to Philip ad res repetendas. But on this occasion legati were already in Greece and had delivered what was in effect a rerum repetitio to Nicanor at Athens; and Philip, disdaining to reply, had merely continued his aggression in the north-east. Therefore, Sulpicius, authorised conditionally by the People to make war, asked the fetiales whether in fact the ultimatum (that is, the combined clarigatio and indictio belli) need be delivered to Philip in person, 97 or if the old spearthrowing ceremony would be sufficient. 98 And the fetiales replied that either would be in order. So long as the validity of the ultimatum presented to Nicanor, before and without the authorisation of the Centuries, was in question, Sulpicius' appeal to the fetiales, far from being superfluous, was almost the only course ; and the reply of the priests shows that they were aware of the difficulty and were determined to evade it. 'La reponse des pr6tres fut positive ' writes Bickermann: 99 positive it was, but only in informing the Senate that whichever course they adopted would be correct. This failure on the part of the fetiales to offer a reliable interpretation of the ius fetiale under the more complicated conditions of the early second century was to bear fruit eight years later, when, at the outset of the war with Antiochus in I92, the consul, confused by the precedent of 2oo, again asked the same question-only to be referred back to that precedent, i.e. that he should please himself. 1 0 0 But the fact that the reply in zoo was evasive is not evidence that the question was superfluous. Bickermann's second objection concerns the sending of M. Aemilius Lepidus to Abydus, after the Senate, according to the annalistic tradition, had instructed the consul to send ' quem videretur
ex eis qui extra senatum essent . . . ad bellum indicendum.' 1 o 1 Lepidus,

he claims, was already a senator; hence the meeting at Abydus was not the indictio belli. The answer is that there is no proof that Lepidus was a senator in 200 B.C.; it is doubtful, indeed, if he had even held the quaestorship in 204, when the last censors had been in
96 The similarity of language in which the two decisions and the subsequent religious ceremonies are described shows the two situations to be parallel: if Livy (A) xxi, 17, 4 (quoted supra, p. 193) and xxxi, 8, i-z (A): ' supplicatio inde in triduum ex senatus consulto indicta est, obsecratique circa omnia pulvinaria dei, ut quod bellum cum Philippo populus iussisset, id bene ac feliciter eveniret.' 96 See sUpra, pp. I 93-49 7 Livy (A) xxxi, 8, 3: ' bellum, quod indiceretur regi Philippo, utrum ipsi utique nuntiari iuberent . 98 ibid. an satis esset, in finibus regni, quod proximum praesidium esset, eo nuntiari.'
-99 Op-. Cit., 17z.

1 00 Livy (A) xxxvi, 3, 7 ff. A similar evasiveness may appear also in the record of the priests' reply to the consul's second question-whether a separate declaration of war must be made against the Aetolians and whether friendly relations must first be broken off; for the statement that Aetolia had already broken off her relations with Rome by her refusal to give satisfaction legatis totiens (res) repetentibus (Livy (A) xxxvi, 3, io) grossly misrepresents the negotiations of Flamininus with the Aetolians in I92 at the spring League meeting (Plut. Tit. i5; Livy (P) xxxv, 33) and at Aegium in November (Livy (P) xxxv, 47 sq.; Plut. Philop. Tit. 17; Comparison, 2). I5; 101 Livy (A) xxxi, 8, 4-

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office. 10 2 And, in any case, all that is known of the quaestorship in this respect is that by I50 B.C. anyone holding the office could reasonably expect to be enrolled in the Senate at the next census 1 03 and that in the time of Sulla this enrolment became automatic. 1 04 But in the year 200 B.C. admission to the Senate could only be obtained in one of two ways. First, the censors filled up the ranks every five years from those citizens who, in addition to certain other qualifications, were over the age of forty-six. 10 5 Secondly, upon holding certain magistracies, a Roman became qualified to sit in the Senate and enjoy the rights of a senator without actually holding the rank; these magistracies were, in the year 2i6,106 those of consul, praetor and curule aedile. The formal distinction between the two grades is seen in the phrase " senatores et quibus in senatu sententiam dicere licet."1 07 Now it is improbable that Lepidus had in 200 been admitted into the Senate by the second method; and, as his youth automatically precludes the first, we may assume that he was not at this date a member of the Senate.1 0 8 What then, if we accept the annalistic record, will have been the Senate's motive in instructing the consul to deliver the ultimatum to Philip by a non-senator ? In the first place, that it was delivered at all is proof that in spite of the reply of the fetiales the Senate considered it better to regularise the position with a full rerum repetitio-ut omnia iusta ante bellumfierent.109 But why was it to be delivered by a single legatus and a non-senator ?1 1 0 The answer is, we believe, that the Senate were compromising between religious legality-that strict pietas to which Bickermann refers"'1-and their dignity as a body. Since the ultimatum delivered to Nicanor was, whatever the fetiales might say, not fully valid according to the ius fetiale, they would deliver a further indictio; but, as Philip's only reply to the first ultimatum had been intensified aggression, lest they should appear to be giving him excessive consideration this time
1 02 Livy (A) xxix, 37, i. Bickermann follows Munzer (Romische Adelsparteien, I7I) in the view that the quaestorship at this time brought automatic entry to the Senate; but neither adduces any evidence in its support. 103 Val. Max. ii, Z, I. Q. Fabius communicated the war-decision against Carthage to Crassus 'memor eum triennio ante quaestorem factum, ignarus nondum a censoribus in ordinem senatorum adlectum, quo uno modo etiam iis qui iam honores gesserant aditus in curiam dabatur.' The last statement requires modification, at least as regards consuls, praetors and curule aediles (see infra, n. Io6). 104 Mommsen,op. cit., iii 3, 863. 105 Monimsen, op. cit., iii3, 874; DarembergSaglio, op. cit., iv, I185, ' Senatus' (Lecrivain): according to the latter the age of entrance to the Senate was probably reduced by the Lex Villia of 18o to twenty-seven. 106 Livy (A) xxiii, 23107 Aul. Gell. iii, I8, 7; cf. also Festus, p. 339, M: ' qui post lustrum conditum ex iunioribus magistratum ceperunt, et in senatu sententiam dicunt, et non vocantur senatores ante quam in senioribus sunt censi.' The seniores are presumably those of forty-six and over. 1 08 Even if it could be proved that Lepidus was a member of the Senate in zoo, there is still the possibility that the words qui extra senatum essent are merely the annalistic or Livian transcription of an original qui nondum senatores essent or the like. The distinction between senatores and quibus in senatu sententiam dicere licet was blurred as early as the S.C. ' de Bacchanalibus ' of I86; cf. Mommsen, op. cit., iji3 859, n. I. 1 0 9 Livy (A) xxi, I8, z referring to the legati of zi8. See supra, p. I 94. 110 Cl. Mommsen, op. cit., ii3, 685 'Einzelgesandte finden sich auch, aber sehr selten.' 111 Op. cit., I70, quoting Flor. ii, 6, z, ' summa foederum Romanis religio est.'

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they would send only a single envoy, and him a non-senator.Accordingly, not all three legati, but only the youngest,112 presentedhimself at Abydusto deliverthe ultimatum. This journey thus fulfilledthe same function as that of Q. Fabius and his four colleagues to Carthage in zi8. And indeed the two interviews ran a parallel course; at both the Romans began by delivering their ultimatum,113 whereupon their opponents first of all contested the demands made,114 but then, realising from the Roman answer that the Senate was determined on war in any event, 115 they accepted the ultimatum as a true declaration of
war. 116

To sum up: the Roman embassywhich deliveredthe ultimatum to Nicanor was limited in competence, and the ultimatum had not the full validity of an indictio belli: this we may attribute to the fact, recorded by the annalistic tradition, that the first attempt to get the war-motionthroughthe Centurieshad failed and the embassy thus lacked the authority of the Roman People. When the news that the war-vote had at last been passedby the People reached Rhodes, it was accompanied by instructions that a final indictio should be delivered to Philip in person; but that in order to avoid compromisingthe dignity of the Senate, only the youngest of the three envoys, the non-senator,M. Aemilius Lepidus, should be sent. It was this formal declarationof war which was to be delivered at Abydus. 3 Philip's reply to the Senate's ultimatum had been to despatch Attica.117 to devastate with z,ooo infantryand 200 cavalry Philocles There are no details of the opening of Philocles' operations, but it seemsthat he was to carryout a continuous and systematic blockade of Athens. From the fact that towardsthe end of the year he came

from Euboeawith

2,000

to ravage Thraciansand Macedonians

Attica,118 it would appearthat he had been in command there and operating against Athens for the whole summer. Some idea of his methods may be gained from the account of the condition in which the Atheniansfound themselvesbefore their relief by ClaudiusCento in the autumn. 19 They had been sufferingfrom regularincursions
112 Polyb. xvi, 34, I: 6 vecbraToe; 34, 6: ve0 wpaty/54TOV &7repos; cf. Livy (P) xxxi, i8, i.

Kac

113 Carthage: Polyb. iii, ZO, 7; Livy (A) xxi, i8, 3. Abydus: Polyb. xvi, 34, 3; cf. Livy (P) xxxi, i8, i. (On the source of Livy xxi, I8 see

supra, p. 193, n. 88.)

Livy (A) 114 Carthage: Polyb. iii, zo, io sq.; xxi, I8, 4. Abydus: Polyb. xvi, 34, 5; cf. Livy
(P) XXXi, I 8, 2. 115 Carthage:

I8, I3. Abydus: xxxi, I 8, z-3.

Polyb. iii, 33, i-z; Livy (A) xxi, Pol. xvi, 34, 5; cf. Livy (P.)

Carthage: Polyb. iii, 33, 4; Livy (A) xxi, Abydus: Polyb. xvi, 34, 7; cf. Livy (P) xxxi, I8, 4. 117 Livy (P) xxxi, I6, z. See supra, p. I92. 118 Livy (P) xxxi, z6, I. 119 Livy (P) xxxi, I4, 3; 22, 5-7. Zonaras ix, I5. the Appian, Maced. 4, I, is misdated to zoI: record represented by the phrase ETepqp/le'peto-rparoO may originally have applied to the simultaneous operations of Philip in Thrace and Philocles in Attica in the summer of zoo.
116

I8, 14.

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of Macedonian troops from Corinth, and privateers from Chalcis had not only made the sea unsafe for shipping, but were a constant menace to the coastal districts of Attica. How long this had been going on is not stated; but the regularity of the depredations and the utter despair of the Athenians point to a considerable period, and we may conclude that the desperate situation in the autumn was the result of Philocles' strategy throughout the summer. The question immediately arises: what help did the Athenians receive from their allies ? There is a reference to the presence of three Rhodian quadriremes at the time of Cento's arrival, and to the part played by a Pergamene detachment in the defence of the city against Philip. 12 0 We do not know when these reinforcements came on the scene, but in all probability they were sent in response to an Athenian appeal soon after Philocles had opened his operations, just as Abydus later received reinforcements of 300 Pergamene troops and one Rhodian quadrireme. 121 The safety of Athens was thus secured; but apparently no measures were taken to protect Attica from devastation, and it is clear that neither Attalus nor the Rhodians felt able to spare the necessary forces. In these circumstances the Athenians would certainly extend their appeals to every possible quarter. They would immediately approach their other allies; then, if aid was late in coming and the strict blockade continued, they might well, even without having official relations, send envoys to Rome and appeal to the Senate to hasten the military intervention in Greece. It is to this point that we may attribute the embassy of Cephisodorus, which Pausanias, in describing his monument, celebrated as the outstanding achievement of his career. 122 Cephisodorus, says Pausanias, led the Athenians in an anti-Macedonian policy c tc A-%qup'ouMocx8'ov PoaLe6o0vL G C s&v(o xod D t-Jccp (,uol Ipo
XLSa-o ZVocVTL&&V-T4). He

procuredas alliesof Athens the kingsAttalus

'Attocov otuovo

and Ptolemy Epiphanes, of the autonomous peoples the Aetolians, and of the islanders the Rhodians and Cretans (au61Xouq 8?
&MYeTO

XoL Kpstocq.) Then, when TPoaou AlAXoq xod'LvnaLrmtv Attalus, Ptolemy and the Cretans for the most part failed to send help, and the Rhodian ships were of little use against the Macedonian hoplites, he sailed with other envoys to Rome to beg for Mua'ocX oOC T&v Kpvti0v tok 7roXX& xoct protection ((O xoctZ Alyi'rn-ou

Kiyp=66&poq 'AO-svm'mq yev aOmL a6sZx?G ptv bov Muabv xoc l HltoXsecZov t6v A'yL&7rLov, e'Ovj 8

ua6tpL40v

oct

Mocax6vaq

TP&OL U P6 VOCVq VOCU6V LayUOVte4 PoWeLOCL, &vtoMi5oc KypLa608cpo4 e' oi) iueyokXoc ceXouv,

7ZpO4

07WrLt4

to6

'Jtow acv

a"V &\xxoL

4tivaL 'PcPtoaouq). This record may be taken to represent the laudatory decree inscribed upon Cephisodorus' 'AO-voukov -nXe6aoc 'xz&uev
120

121

Livy (P) XXXi, 22, 8; 24, 10. Polyb. xvi, 30, 7; 31, 3. Livy (P) xxxi, i6, 7.

122

Paus. i, 36, 5-6.

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monument. 123 Pausanias' inaccuracy in the context does not affect this detailed passage, 124 which clearly stands by itself and may be taken as a special reproduction. It even preserves the diplomatic phraseology in the distinction between 3ocaLXe4, Ovn ocC6ovo,uac and vnatoCL& , just as these classes appear in contemporary inscriptions. 1 2 5 The statements are in striking agreement with our reconstruction of the situation that will have arisen in Athens during Philocles' operations. The auxLpCYoct are military agreements against Macedon. 126 The Rhodian ships are the three quadriremes; the qualification & -toXXOc in regard to the lack of assistance from Attalus, Ptolemy and the Cretans appears appropriately in deference to the small Pergamene detachment; and the suggestion of inadequacy in defence points to a period of regular incursions before the appeal to Rome. Egypt no doubt maintained the old relations of alliance with Athens, but in spite of promises was not in a position to send help. In Crete there were towns hostile to Philip and friendly towards Athens, e.g. Cnossus, Polyrrhenium, Rhaucus, Cydonia, Hierapytna, The Aetolians, Gortyn, which may have promised assistance.127 who were on friendly terms with Athens,128 may have given their formal support to the Athenian side, but probably from the first declared themselves unable to promise immediate military action this will account for the absence of reference to them in the second part of the Pausanian record; and we may compare their similar inaction in connection with the appeal of Attaluasat the same time. 12 9 Taking the definite evidence of Pausanias' record with the indications of the Polybian reconstruction, therefore, we may accept the tradition of an Athenian appeal to Rome and date it to late in the summer of
200.13 0

After the despatch of Philocles, Philip had taken immediate steps to secure Thrace and the Hellespont and keep control of the Straits. 131 It was only now that he appeared in open action against Egypt. He reduced the Ptolemaic possessions on the Thracian coast, completed the conquest of the Thracian Chersonese, and began the siege of Abydus. Attalus and the Rhodians made no attempt to hinder him, and although they sent 300 men and a quadrireme to Abydus, they did not move to the relief of the city. 13 2 The Roman envoys at Rhodes will have reported to the Senate
123 Niese, op. cit., ii, 590, n. I ; Taubler, op. cit., i, zI6 ; Ferguson, Hell. Athens., 269, n. I ; De Sanctis, op. cit. iv, I, zi, n. 53. 124 As Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (I920), 84 (cf. Nissen, op. cit. Izz note). 125 Cf. for ao-tXeds, 96vq air76voga: Ditt. ii3, 557, 31 ff-; 590, I2, 3I; 6I3 A. 3-4; for the Aetolians as an t6vos: i, 532, 6; ii, 554 7; for v37odtiras: i, 390, D. 6; I3, I9, 598, 24; ii, 58z, 6 if. 126 Ferguson, Op.cit., 270, n. 5. 127 Holleaux, Klio Xiii (I9I3), I46-8 ; Seltman, Greek Coins, z6i. 128 Holleaux, Rome, z66, n. 3.

Livy (P) xxxi, I5, 9-IO. See supra, p. I85. Cf. Passerini, op. cit., z8z-6. 131 Polyb. xvi, 29, i ; Livy (P) xxxi, i5, I i. De Sanctis op. cit., iv, I, 34; Holleaux, CAH viii, I63 ; Passerini, op. cit., 287-8. 132 Polyb. xvi, 29-34; cf. Livy (P) xxxi, i6, 3-I8, 8.
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the rejectionof the ultimatum shownin Philocles'opening operations in Attica, and the beginningof Philip'scampaignin Thrace, including the threat to the Egyptianpossessions. The despatcharrivedin midsummer, and the Senate again presentedthe proposalfor war to the people, on the grounds of Philip's aggressionagainst Attalus, the friend and ally of Rome. When the measurewas voted, the Senate sent instructions to the envoys, who were still at Rhodes, to communicate the formal Roman rerum repetitio and indictio belli to Philip in person. Philip should not makewar on any Greek state or touch Egyptian possessions,and he must submit to arbitration the 33 question of reparationsnot only to Attalus but to the Rhodians.1 The referenceto Egypt at this late point will be due to the fact that Philip was only now openly threatening Egyptian possessionsin the Aegean. The addition of Rhodes would seem to accompany the establishmentof relationsof alliance. Athens as yet clearly had no formal relationswith Rome which would permither appearance in the Roman demands. But soon after the despatch of instructions for the delivery of the indictio belli, the Athenian embassy under Cephisodoruswill have arrived, and doubtless the Senate entered into relations of alliance.134 This was the climax of Cephisodorus' diplomacy; and we may here attempt a survey of it in connection with the decree of the passedin his honourin the springof I95, when the proclamation ' Freedom of Greece' by Flamininusat the Isthmian Games in I96
seemed to have set the seal of success upon his policy. 135 The

preambleis cast in studiouslyvague terms, but the referencesin their order are clearly to Cephisodorus'special servicesto the State: the allusions must have been intelligible to the Athenians, who knew the details of his career, and we have now sufficient evidence to definethem more closely. Cephisodorus began his political careersoon after 225, and carried out the usual liturgies.136 He did not become prominentuntil after the deaths of Eurycleidesand Micion, 137 when in the archonship
of Apollodorus (204-3)
the archonship of

he served as rocpJocq -r&v acp

(203-2)

-rtconxv and in
-wv av(VL&x&V.

Proxenides

as

In the latter capacity he will no doubt have had to face the economic difficulties caused by Philip's campaign in the Hellespont in the spring
1 3 3 Polyb. xvi, 34, I-4.

-roclqO

This embassy, it may be noted, should not be confused with the Athenian envoys who met Sulpicius Galba on his arrival in Greece in the autumn and requested the immediate despatch of a squadron to the relief of Athens (Livy (P) Xxxi, I4, 3): against Larsen, Class. Phil. xxxii,
134

Eurvcleides' death occurred after the archonship of Archelaus (zIz-I or 209-8: Ferguson, Ath. Tr. Cycles, 36, n. 7), and before the archonship of Dionysius, which, with the preceding archonship of Nicophon, may now (since we have Apollodorus
204-3

and Proxenides203-2)

be placed before the

I (I937), 22 f$1 3 5 Meritt, Hesperia v (I 93 6), 3, 424-5,

13 6
11

427.

ibid., 425-6. 137 According to Pausanias (ii, 9, 4) Eurycleides and Micion, like Aratus, were poisoned by Philip.
7-jZ:

archonship of Callistratus 2o6-5. It may thus be dated as early as IsI or as late as 207, and the later date is preferable in view of the effect of their policy, which would imply influence in the last decade of the century, and in the light of the tradition of Philip's hostility.

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of

202, and we may associate with this the legislation for civic unity and the recom(Vopuq au5 yepovroc I '(Po'40[0o0L 7t&VrCOV'AONvocU&w)

mendation of measures for raising money (7o6pouq Xpn,uocrv'Laour

XOct I aLctoVq

au tppouXeuxd).

effect in Athens of Philip's policy of aggression in the north Aegean in ZOZ.138 The next reference is to a proposal of Cephisodorus to consider the means of maintaining old alliances and obtaining new ones
(eLG-NY? XM0 8? axo'L

The recordthus throws light upon the

o?i Tp6'ouIoVt
EVOVTMGxao

re

p?o 6'v'aq yXou 7porx

05 L pq

?POC'LOUq ?V T'EZ 7da[L]

ETSpOUq

carL).

This was

a move due to his foresight in regard to foreign (i.e. Macedonian) 7LM3OU plots (xocl r YLVOk?LVgoc IX?'& 1J7b'? T'CiV 96)O?V 7rpO&)p0qLSV0 ), and he was appointed to consider measures of resistance (xocl He made recommendations for ocVnLas'VOC[L] tp[oa0 1oCy?voq). (xocl aU[LVoxMLMo alliances xot [aVV]eVnVO|7?LCg auV.PPU?SUX&q Xax 'cU)L a,[L6L). We have here the record of a definite proposal by Cephisodorus that Athens should formulate a policy against aggression in anticipation of an open threat to Athenian interests, of his official appointment to consider ways and means of carrying it out, and of his recommendations for alliances. These measures are to be dated to a point at which the Macedonian danger to Athens could be felt but the full aims of Philip's policy had not yet been revealed, so that Cephisodorus' proposal could be praised as foresight. The date will clearly be earlier than the discovery of the Syro-Macedonian pact in the summer of 20I, but presumably later than the economic measures of 202. We may see the occasion in Philip's appearance in the Cyclades in the spring of 20I, which may now have seemed to Cephisodorus almost as threatening as the operations in the East Aegean were to appear to Attalus. 13 9 Our reconstruction of the course of Athenian policy may thus be taken a stage further back. As early as the spring of 20I the Athenians felt obliged to take steps to meet the possibility of Macedonian aggression. The report of the Syro-Macedonian pact convinced them that the danger was not only direct and imminent, but even more serious than they had imagined. And so the break with Macedon followed immediately in the abolition of the ' Macedonian' tribes, and we see the tension in the attack on the Acarnanians. The strain of the winter 20I-O may be imagined, and the effect of the Acarnanian and Macedonian raid is shown by the reception of Attalus as a saviour hero. The formal declaration of war on Macedon followed as a natural con'sequence. Then, with the operations of Philocles, the Athenians found themselves again in desperate straits, and it would scarcely be possible to exaggerate the urgency of the appeals to Attalus, Ptolemy
138 11. I2-17. Meritt, op. cit., 426: cl. Heichelheim, loc. cit. (see supra, p. I84, n. 32).

13

11. 17-ZZ:

ibid.,426.

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Epiphanes, the Aetolians,-the Rhodians and the Cretans, and ultimately to Rome. These appeals are the subject of the next record of special commissions undertaken by Cephisodorus: he carriedout important embassiesfor the security of the Attic towns 7rsnp [-TW&V] 1y'aLCTCV and territory (xocl 7tp?ar3LMoc 7?p?r3?Ux6 a ov 'oc t6? OXoO ' L Xc)poL). The reference to the 7hXetL ?L C@ pLo and to the Zc6poc indicates that Athens itself was not threatened, but that the coastal towns and the Attic countrysidewere in danger of falling entirely into Macedonian hands, and we have seen that Philocles' strategy was to blockade Athens by the devastation of Attica and by naval operationsalongthe coast. The terrible ef3ectof gifts of money, the blockade is reflectedin the recordof Cephisodorus' corn and other-things at this time (xocl Zp+jLocvroc 'Zj xodt ev'ov xocl

Wacq acops?k

OV'X OXELzCq).14 0

The rest of the preambleconcernsthe Second MacedonianWar.

(elavNVoq

We have mention of decrees proposed by Cephisodorus

The decrees will no doubt have included xpovov [La-rcov-pP).)141 the anti-Macedonian decrees of I99 and those in honour of allied commanders such as Attalus in I99, L. Quinctius Flamininus in I98, and Erinus of Byzantium. We may see his policy in the appeals to the Aetolians in I99 and to the Achaeans in I98, and in the Athenian part in the peace negotiations at Nicaea and later in Rome at the end of I98, in the measures against Boeotia, and in the final peace settlement in I97-6.142 This was the policy, the preamble states in closing, that with the 8&o 'x goodwill of the gods had preserved Athenian autonomy (xo'L
auv' | Iod 'L

'tr V[Lco), and reference to his consistent policy 'uZaxZ,Ioau5vsv &7OCV'O 'OV | VNXcg 'rC ocurrIp?a throughout the war (xo' I

xc L~p~ 6ocv AORCV OCI a ov'Ooc 8? aocL n|<LS,UCTO xdXOC'L xodL ro NOB8C 7rO?X& zCOC xocl XOC'L & XOV'rOC 7rPOCRV ZPTCFOC L-'aqoc~ 'JMa1

V tV 0a'VocC pTO odTT V(V

?tVOOuVcoV

ysyofvg

&l'o 'r~ '(-Iv OCCVSufleveLocq rOi5 &Ovr-Pi-a=c t6v 8~110VJ ['T]~v ociovoVLocv)and had brought great benefits to much of the rest of Greece (ouix oXLyoLq 8' xocLTrv &CXXv 'EXX'v&v nepmel7[l=O-x]VOCL In this allusion to their deliverance -TrV &yACO5v ).143 'OC cgaymov

from the threat of Macedonian control of Athens and Macedonian domination of Greece, we may see not only the claim of success but the ultimate justification of Cephisodorus' pro-Roman policy. As the successor of Eurycleides and Micion, he had turned to Rome only when Egypt could not hold the balance against Macedon and Syria, and his appeal was for no more than the protection of the old Athenian autonomy. This question of autonomy was the point at issue between the Greek states and Macedon. It had conditioned the appeals to Rome, and, as we shall see, it determined the form of
14011. Z2-24: 14 111. 24-7.

ibid., 426.

14 2 See Ferguson, Hell. Athens, 276-80 (with references). Meritt, op. cit., 427. 14311. 27-3I:

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the Roman action. Rome definitely laid down the principle of Greek autonomy as her justification for intervention in Greece, and as the basis for her diplomacyin the Second MacedonianWar, and the support of the Greek states was given to her expresslyand solely in her characteras the defenderof freedom. This was the extent of Cephisodorus' pro-Romanpolicy: it rested upon the needs of Athens and upon the declaredpolicy of Rome ; and in I95, afterthe Isthmian proclamation of Flamininusin I96, a decreein honourof the Athenian statesman might justifiably claim that his aims had been achieved.
III. THE ROMAN DECLARATION OF WAR AND THE POLICY OF THE SENATE

From our study of events in Athens, then, it would appearthat Rome was not involved by treaty relations in the protection of Athenian interests. We may not accept the record of Athens' part in the Peace of Phoenice even as a xoLv' 46n. 1But,while the Athenian case did not legally affect the Roman declarationof war, the embassyof Cephisodorus,arrivingimmediately afterwardswith its reportof Macedonian violence, must have created a profound impression and it is not hard to understandhow the Athenian appeal came to occupy an unduly significant place in the Roman tradition of the outbreakof the war, and finally,in the chronologicalconfusion and tendentious compositionof the annalists,after Rome and Athens had enteredinto close relations,was acceptedas the decidingcause.144 To return to the reconstructionof events: late in the summer, besidesthe Athenian embassy,Egyptian envoys may have appearedin 145 Rome. By mid summerAntiochus had won the battle of Panion and Scopas lay besieged in Sidon; an Athenian embassy led by had appearedin Alexandriato beg for help; and news Cephisodorus will have come of the Senate's ultimatum, and of Philip's threat to the Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace. Now there had been little hope that Rome would move on behalf of Coele-Syria; but the position in Thrace was different, for Rome had shown her intention to block Philip's expansion, and she could easily afford protection to the Egyptian cities there. Thus, when the annalistic tradition recordsan Egyptian embassyto Rome after the war-vote in 200, this may well be true.146 The envoyswould have reportedthe Athenian of the situation, and have requested appealas proof of the seriousness help for their Thracian possessions. They would, of course, have
'44 Livy (A) xxxi, I, I0; 5, 5-6; xl, zz, 6. Appian, Maced., 4, 2. On other annalistic falsifications, see De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 2I, n. 55. 14-5 On the dating of the battle the evidence of Josephus (Ant. lud. Xii, I35) for its appearance in Polybius Bk.x vi (ob., I44, 3, 4 = ZOZ-ZOO) may be accepted and the year taken as 200 (cf. Niese, op. cit., ii, 578, n. 6; Holleaux, Klio Viii (i908), Z70; against the date of I98 upheld by De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, ii8, n. 8).
146 Livy (A) xxxi, 9, This notice is in I--5. typical annalistic style, with its anachronistic mode of reference to the relations between Rome and her amici at this time; but allowance must be made for this characteristic elaboration in all treatment of annalistic data: it does not necessarily mean complete invention (as Niese, op. cit., ii, 580, n. 3; HIolleaux, Rome, 64, n, 4). The basic record under the elaboration may be sound (cf. De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 2z, n. 56).

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found their reply in the Romanultimatum. If the questionof CoeleSyriawas raised,it would have been referredto the Roman embassy. The formal ultimatum and declarationof war was delivered, as we have seen, by M. Aemilius Lepidus at Abydus.147 Rome demanded that the king should not make war on any Greek state or touch Egyptian possessions,and that he shouldsubmit to arbitration the question of reparations to Attalus and the Rhodians. The Rhodians,we may note, are now added in view of the establishment of relations of alliance with Rome, for which the embassy received full authority after the war-vote.148 Philip raisedthe legal question of the right of Rome to intervene against Macedon. He claimed that the Rhodianswere technically the aggressors, and that, in joining them and Attalus, Rome would violate the Peace of Phoenice.149 It must be clear from this appeal to the treaty of Phoenice that Philip had not committed aggression against any signatory: in the case of Attalus he makes the counter-chargeof aggression. Lepidus ignored the legal argument,and maintainedthe Roman claim to be acting in defence of Greek autonomy. Philip, he stated, was convicted of aggression againstfree Greekstates by his treatment of Athens, Cius and Abydus. These instances have no connection with the Peace of Phoenice, and there is no question of treaty obligationson the part of Rome: 150 they are quoted together as the most flagrant examples of the Macedonian threat to the autonomy of Greece. The Roman and the Macedoniancases were irreconcilable. Philip held to his point that he had not violated the treaty with Rome, and rejected the demands. Rome was left to declarewar in the name of Greekautonomy. The Roman embassythen left for Syria on its further missionof mediation between Antiochus and Ptolemy Epiphanes. The victory of Panion markeda decisive step in the conquest of Coele-Syria,and the Romans found as an almost accomplishedfact what they can scarcelyhave intended to hinder: the duty of interveningfor Egypt in Coele-Syriacould be given up as impracticable. The real point at issue lay nearer home. Antiochus must have been askedhow far the Syro-Macedonian pact committed him to the support of Philip in a war with Rome. His reply seemsto have given complete satisfaction, and argumentswere made for a Syrianembassyto visit Rome to open diplomatic relationswith the Senate.151 It has been urged that on the Roman side this cordialitywas only apparent. The Romans,it is said,were uneasyat the threat of Syrian support for Macedon and wished at any cost to secure Antiochus' neutrality; so they feigned goodwill in the hope that he might be
See supra, p. i92 ff. Cf. Holleaux, Rome, 3o-46; Carcopino, L'imperialisme romain, 48, n. 2; against De Sanctis,Riv. fil. (NS) Xiii 76-3 (I935), 14 9 Cf. Polyb. xviii, 6, z.
147
148

150 As De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 32, n. 65 and Bickermann, op. cit., 75: see Holleaux, Rome, z68, and Passerini, op. cit., 289. 151 Cf. Livy (P) xxxiii, zo, 8. Holleaux, Rev. EA
Xv

(I9I3),

I-4.

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ORIGINS

OF THE

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sufficiently occupied with Egypt to withhold help from Philip.152 Yet a study of the situation appears to indicate that the Roman cordiality was due not so much to anxiety for Syrian neutrality as to the welcome discovery that this was certain. The Syro-Macedonian pact had broken down. The unrestrained aggression of the Macedonian policy, as we have seen, had roused uneasiness in Syria, and Antiochus had practically withdrawn his support from Philip in the Aegean. He would scarcely undertake a great war with Rome merely to save Philip. The only thing that might have moved him was fear of Roman imperialism in the East. But here the Roman envoys could assure him that their policy in Greece was based upon the principle of autonomy, and that it would secure full respect for Syrian interests in the Aegean. The tacit acceptance of the conquest of Coele-Syria and the fact that Antiochus had no immediate designs upon Egypt itself, resolved any difficulties arising from the relations of Rome with Egypt. Thus Antiochus could promise Syrian neutrality in the war with Macedon, and the embassy could cordially invite him to enter into diplomatic relations with Rome. The Roman envoys then proceeded to Egypt. Here, where in any case there was little hope of effective Roman action over Coele-Syria, they probably pleaded the necessity of accepting the situation, and pointed to the measures in defence of the Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean as the true indication of Rome's practical support. The Egyptian government will have entertained the embassy in royal fashion, and it was then that M. Aemilius Lepidus began his connections of friendship with the Ptolemaic dynasty.153 On returning to Rome the envoys could report that the situation in the East had resolved itself. The Syro-Macedonian pact had broken down: Syria would acquiesce in the Roman intervention against Macedon. The problem of Coele-Syria no longer existed: Egypt would not demand Roman action against the Syrian conquest. Thus with the friendly neutrality of Syria and in alliance with Egypt, Rome could make war on Macedon in the name of Greek autonomy. The diplomatic preparations were complete. We thus reach the conclusion of our study of the events leading up to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War. But we may not stop at this point, for it is not unduly cynical to believe that there was more in the Roman policy than philhellenism. The real motive has been seen in the rising Roman imperialism, hitherto engaged in the West, which now turned to the East as soon as the Carthaginian danger disappeared and the Aegean situation gave a favourable opportunity for intervention. The Senate was militaristic in spirit, and Scipio Africanus inspired a programme of
Xv (I9I3),

lg2 Niese, op. cit., ii, 637-8 ; Holleaux,Rev. EA 4; Rome, 58-9; CAH viii, I65-6.

153 For a full treatment of this matter, see Otto, Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6. Ptolemders, 27-9; Mattingly, Roman Coins, 76.

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imperialistic aggression. 154 Yet our survey of the evidence raises difficulties in this conception of Roman policy. In 205, with the Peace of Phoenice, Rome withdrew from Greece. In' 202, with the rebuff to the Aetolians, the Senate did not contemplate even the possibility of military action there. It was only late in 20I, with the appeal of Attalus and the Rhodians, that the Senate determined upon intervention in Greece. The decision would thus appear to involve a reversal in Roman policy, and it is hard to believe that this came from imperialistic tendencies which had previously been so conspicuously absent. We must not forget, too, the general position of Rome at this time: the economic exhaustion and war weariness, the tremendous task of repairing conditions in Italy, the need for military action in Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria, and the problem of the re-organisation of Spain. The Senate had scope for all its energies in the West. Here lay the field for that national drive towards expansion and rule which we loosely call imperialism. The intervention in the East was imposed by external circumstances it took the simple form of preventive action followed by withdrawal, and the determining cause, we submit in support of Holleaux, was the discovery of the Syro-Macedonian pact in 20I.155 The Senate will have based its calculations upon the assumption that, after the partition of the Egyptian empire, Macedon and Syria would act in concert to dominate the East, Philip supreme in Greece and the Aegean, Antiochus in Asia. Now Rome had felt the threat of Philip's ambitions in his alliance with Hannibal in the Punic War. The First Macedonian War, however, had shown that the Macedonian land power, without a navy and without effective reinforcement from a powerful ally, could never seriously endanger Roman interests; so the Senate had remained indifferent to the Aetolian report of Philip's resurgent ambitions in Thrace and the Hellespont. But the appeal of Pergamum and Rhodes in 20I put the situation in another light. Philip was carrying out a naval policy which with Syrian help might in the end give the Aegean entirely into his hands, and his army could sweep Greece at any time. Then, having behind him the wealth and power of Antiochus, an ally as formidable as Hannibal and Carthage, he might again and with better prospects of success make his ambitions dangerous to Rome.156 It was a situation that in its
154 See above all De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 2I-8 (cf. Riv. fil. (NS)XiV (I936), I96-200), and Carcopinc, op. cit., 58-69. 15 5 Holleaux, Rome, 306 ff.; CAH viii, I 57-9. Passerini (op. cit., 547-5I) argues that Philip's reported designs on Cyrene (Appian, Maced., 4, 2) made Rome fear a possible understanding with Carthage, and he connects this with the embassy to Africa in 200 (Livy (A) xxxi, ii, 4-I8 ; i9, i-6). But the Macedonian policy was concerned with Greece and the Aegean, and there is no evidence that the Senate feared any Macedonian relations

with Carthage. M. A. Levi (La politica imperiale di Roma, io6-i I7) holds that the Roman policy was to stop a Syro-Macedonian hegemony closing the Eastern markets to Romano-Italian commercial penetration, and to secure for Rome the central place in Mediterranean economic life. The assumption of commercial motives in Roman policy in the- East at this time has been refuted by Holleaux (Rome, 83-93). 156 See above all, Griffith, op. cit., 7-9, with CAH viii, I 57-8. Holleaux, Rome, 320-2;

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strategic aspect called for immediate preventive action, and so, in addition to the tremendous tasks in the West, the Senate undertook the burden of a new war in the East. It has been said that these fears and calculations rested upon ignorance of political conditions in the East :I57 it is enough to recall that Attalus, the Rhodians and the Athenians, subtle and experienced Greek diplomats, took an equally serious view of the Syro-Macedonian pact. The Senate, then, felt obliged to embark upon a policy which would maintain the status quo in Greece and the Aegean: a policy that would as a broad basis involve the restriction of Macedonian power to Macedonia and the exclusion of Syrian power from the Aegean. The diplomatic form for such a policy had been established by common usage during the struggles of the Hellenistic powers since the time of Polyperchon and Antigonus: Rome could follow high precedent in declaring that she wo-ild defend the autonomy of Greece. This gave formal justification for war against Macedon in violation of the Peace of Phoenice, and asserted a principle upon which Rome might expect to gain Greek support against Philip, and which she might apply in a similar way against Antiochus. This policy explains the character of the Roman ultimatum and the case presented by M. Aemilius Lepidus. It no doubt later largely determined the appointment of Flamininus and the prorogation of his command, and it is seen in the measures of his diplomacy. It forms the basis for the terms of peace imposed on Macedon, the proclamation of Corinth, and the settlement of Greece, and then, when the power of Syria finally appeared in the Aegean, it would be enforced against Antiochus. 158 The policy was one which could parade itself as philhellenic and call upon idealism and sentimentalism ;159 but in conception and execution it was realistic. 1( 0 Greece must not be allowed to serve as a base of operations against Italy. Greece must be maintained independent as a neutral zone guaranteed against Macedonian or Syrian occupation. In Holleaux's words, Greece was to become the outwork of Italy's defences to the East. Yet, in point of fact, the danger which the Senate feared from the East was unreal. The coalition of Syria and Macedon was unnatural and impermanent : it had, indeed, already broken down, and, given time, the truth must have becom eevident. With less drastic action in 200, the Roman intervention in the East might have been indefinitely postponed, and Roman relations with the Hellenistic world might have developed upon the basis of sound and stimulating imperial achievement in the West. 161
Holleaux, Rome, 328 if.; CAH Viii, 237-9. See Holleaux, CAH viii, chs. 6, 7. 15 9 C/. Tennev Frank, Roman Imperialism, I 50-I; Haywood, Scipio Africanus, s9ff.
157 `58 10 161

Holleaux, Rone, 307. Holleaux, ibid., 332-4;

CAH Viii, 239-