Boxer1948 Salvador de Sá

Salvador Correia de s e Benevides and the Reconquest of Angola in 1648 Author(s): C. R.
Boxer Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov., 1948), pp. 483-513 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2507790 Accessed: 15/10/2008 00:33
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T1'HE
HISPANIC
AMERICAN
No. 4
REVIEW HISTORICAL
Vol. XXVIII November, 1948 SALVADORCORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES AND THE RECONQUESTOF ANGOLAIN 1648
C. R. BOXER*
Eu sou o pirata da perna de pau, de olho de vidro, da cara de mau! The refrainof this present-daypopularcariocacarnival song Brazilian is, if I am not mistaken,a vestige of seventeenth-century folklore. It recalls a time when the mothers of Rio de Janeiro and Bahia used to frightennaughty childreninto obediencewith threats of what would otherwisehappen to them at the hands of the dreadedDutch corsair,CornelisJol, better knownby his nickname of Houtbeen, Pe de Pau, or "Timber-Toe." This valorous seaman is thus perhapsbetter, if somewhatvicariously, rememberedin Brazilthan in his own countrynowadays. Nevertheless he was deservedlycelebratedin his own day and generation,his nicknamebeing due to the fact that he had lost a leg in a naval battle but walked more nimbly with his wooden one than most people on their own two feet, as the contemporaryDutch chronicler, De Laet, informsus. Jol was one of the leadingsea-captains of the Dutch West India Company, which was founded in 1621 with the avowed object of creatinga colonialempireon the South Atlantic seaboard at the expense of the Iberian settlements in South America.'
*The author is Cam6es Professor of Portuguese in the University of London, King's College. 1 For the words of the carioca carnival song I am indebted to my friend, Sr. Joao d'Antas de Campos, of the Casa de Portugal in London, who kindly obtained the full version from Rio. For the career of Cornelis Jol, alias Houtbeen, see pages lxxv-lxxxvi of L. C. M. Warnsinck's introduction to the fourth volume of the Linschoten Vereeniging edition of De Laet's Jaerlijck Verhael (Vol. XL, The Hague, 1937), and J. B. Van Overeem, "De Reizen naar de West van Cornelis Cornelisz. Jol alias Kapitein Houtbeen, 1626-1640" (reprint from De West-Indi.che Gids, XXIV [19421) and the sources there quoted.
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THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
This is neither the time nor the place to describe the vicissitudes of this curious chartered company, which like others of its kind received powerful financial and political support from its home government, and formed virtually a state within a state, with fleets, armies, and an administrative set-up of its own. Suffice it to say that earlier in the eighty-years war of Holland's independence from Spain (1568-1648), efforts had been made to organize the navigation, trade, and war of the Dutch in American waters on the lines of what is nowadays termed a trust, pool, or cartel. These efforts were rendered abortive by the HispanoDutch truce of 1609-21; but when the war was renewed in this latter year, the promoters of the scheme had more success, the Dutch West India Company being formally incorporated on the 3rd of June, 1621. Portuguese and Brazilian writers are usually inclined to characterize this formidable corporation, which wrought such notable damage to the Iberian Atlantic possessions, as the work of Jewish capitalists, and primarily of Sephardic Jews who had been expelled from Spain and Portugal and were anxious for revenge on their erstwhile fellow-subjects of the Most Catholic Kings. In point of fact, however, the organizer and moving spirit in the formation of the W.I.C., as embodied in 1621, was Willem Usselinex, a Belgian refugee from Antwerp, and it was chiefly Flemish capitalists from Spanish Flanders who formed the backbone of the company, whilst Jewish participation was on a relatively modest scale. It is true that the heretic invaders of Brazil found a certain number of willing collaborators amongst the resident cristdos-novos,or crypto-Jews, alias marranos or swine as they were often less elegantly termed. This is hardly surprising in view of the barbarous treatment to which this unfortunate class was periodically subjected by the Inquisition in Portugal, and the universal loathing with which they were regarded by those of their fellow-subjects who prided themselves, however mistakenly, on being cristdos-velhosor Old Christians, "without taint of Jewish, Moorish, or heretic blood." The extent of this collaboration has been grossly exaggerated by certain hysterical writers, such as the Brazilian academician, Gustavo Barroso, whose anti-Semitic tirades recall the obsession of Pombal with the Jesuits in the dreary pages of the Deducgdo chronologica.2
2 Gustavo Barroso, "O Brasil e a restauragdo de Angola," Anais da Academia Portuguesa de Hist6ria, VII (1942), 43-69. Even odder is the same author's Hist6ria secreta do Brasil (3 vols., Sdo Paulo, 1938), which trots out the "Secret Protocols of Zion" and all the rest of the rag-bag of conventional anti-Semitism. For the origin and progress of the Dutch West India Company, the standard works of P. M. Netscher, Les hollandais
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The West India Company's first objective was nothing less than the capture of Brazil, and this was to be begun by a surprise attack on Bahia, the capital of the colony and a flourishing settlement which had been founded in 1549. Subsequent developments proved that even this ambitious project was not the limit of the company's dreams, nor indeed could it have been, in the nature of things. The Portuguese colonies in Brazil were agricultural settlements, based primarily on the production of sugar, a rapidly expanding industry because of the increasing demand for it in Europe. Tobacco, brazilwood, and hides were the other principal products of the colony, whaling being a small but flourishing maritime industry. Experience had shown that white labor could not be used extensively along the tropical seaboard, and to slavery as field-hands had efforts to reduce the Anmerindians either failed completely or proved viciously wasteful owing to these children of nature's pining and dying in captivity. As in the Spanish Caribbean colonies, therefore, recourse was had to importing Negro labor from West Africa on an ever-increasing scale, a constant supply of slaves being assured by the tribal wars which continuously ravished the Guinea and Congo hinterland. Since Brazil could not be developed without African slave labor to work in the sugar fields and tobacco plantations, it followed that the W.I.C. must needs secure command af the Portuguese slave-depots in West Africa as well as their Brazilian settlements. The first blow against Bahia was surprisingly successful. A fleet of twenty-five ships manned by some three thousand men. took the city with little trouble on the 8th May, 1624. Its capture was facilitated, not by Jewish treachery as alleged by modern chauvinistic writers, but through the cowardice of its defenders, as is evident from the graphic account of the Jesuit padre, Ant6nio Vieira, and from those of other eyewitnesses. The fugitive inhabitants and garrison, however, speedily redeemed their momentary weakness. Under the leadership of the local bishop, D. Marcos Teixeira, they rallied their forces in the bush to organize
au Bresil (The Hague, 1853) and H. Witjen, Das Hollandische Kolonialreich in Bresilien (Berlin, 1921), may be supplemented by reference to G. Edmundson's articles on "The Dutch Power in Brasil" in the English Historical Review (XI, XIV, XV, and XVIII [London, 1896-1900]). Edmundson has made full use of Spanish and Portuguese sources unknown to his predecessors. Further see S. P. L'Honor6 Naber and Warnsinck's scholarly edition of the Jaerlijck Verhael of Johannes de Laet (4 vols., The Hague, 19291937). Far and away the best concise review of this subject is Naber's essay, De West Indische Compagniein Brazilie en Guinee (The Hague, 1930), to which stimulating lecture the present writer acknowledges his indebtedness.
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an effective guerrilla campaign which prevented the Dutch from extending their occupation a yard beyond the range of their cannon. One of the reasons for the W.I.C.'s selection of Brazil rather than the Caribbean colonies as the first point of attack was (in all probability) the idea that the Spanish government would react less strongly to the loss of a Portuguese possession than to one of their own. This natural surmise proved to be mistaken. The shock of the loss of Bahia, with its potential threat to the Spanish settlements in the Rio de la Plata and elsewhere, galvanized even the sluggish Philip IV into action. A large combined HispanoPortuguese fleet under the command of Don Fadrique de Toledo was fitted out with remarkable promptitude, and Bahia was recaptured on 1st May, 1625, a year (less a week) after the date of its fall. Meanwhile the Dutch had not forgotten the corollary to their scheme for the occupation of Brazil, that of securing the Portuguese slave depots in Africa. Three months after the fall of Bahia in May, 1624, the famous Admiral Piet Heyn left the Bay of All Saints for Angola. He found the Portuguese at Luanda on their guard, however, and was forced to return empty-handed. On his way back, he put into the Brazilian captaincy of Espiritu Santo with a view to obtaining supplies, but his landing force was worsted in a river fight with a detachment commanded by Salvador Correia de Sa e Benevides, son of the governor of Rio de Janeiro, who was on his way up the coast with reinforcements for the besiegers of Bahia. Piet Heyn likewise sailed on to Bahia, where finding the superior Hispano-Portuguese armada blockading the port, he left for Holland without attempting anything more. Meanwhile another powerful Dutch fleet of nineteen sail had appeared off the Portuguese Castle of Sio Jorge da Mina (St. George of the Mine) in October, 1625, with the object of capturing this oldest European settlement in West Africa, which was likewise an important slave-depot. A force of 1200 men was landed near the castle, but was surprised and routed whilst resting in the afternoon heat, over four hundred headless Dutch corpses being left lying on the sand. The contemporary Dutch chronicler, Caspar Barlaeus, ascribes this disaster to the negligence of the commanders, adding with justifiable irony, "and in true military fashion each one threw the blame on the other."3
3 Caspar Barlaeus apud Naber's Dutch translation published in 1923, under the title of Nederlandsch Brasilig onder het Bewind van Johan Maurits van Nassau, 1637-1644. This account is confirmed by the contemporary Portuguese version published in pamphlet form at Lisbon in 1627.
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A good beginning in May, 1624, had thus ended disastrously for the Dutch fifteen months later, and all their grandiose scheme of conquest had gone up in smoke. But the stubborn Calvinists by the North Sea were not easily deterred once they had set their hand to the plow. They now turned their efforts in another direction, namely towards intercepting the treasure fleet from the Spanish Main in the Caribbean. A preliminary effort by Piet Heyn failed in 1626, for the Spanish armada encountered proved too strong to be brought to action; but good luck and good judgment brought the same admiral a glittering reward in 1628, when the silver fleet from Mexico was captured intact, and virtually without a shot being fired, in the Cuban harbor of Matanzas. All Holland went wild with joy at this bloodless but profitable exploit, which is still remembered whenever Hollanders gather together on carnival occasions, in the tuneful strains of Joost Van Vondel's Triomf-lied. Of more immediate importance was the fact that the twelve million guilders worth of booty put the financially tottering West India Company squarely on its feet, and enabled it to tackle with renewed vigor its design for the conquest of Brazil. This time, however, the company resolved to take more than one bite at the cherry. Bahia was on its guard, and it was thought that the more northerly dependency of Pernambuco would prove an easier prey. A fleet of over thirty ships and eight thousand men captured the settlement together with the neighboring town of Olinda after a hard struggle in May, 1630, when Recife de Pernambuco became the headquarters of Netherlands Brazil. The Iberian government could not react as strongly to this loss as it had done to that of Bahia six years before, since the central treasury was empty, the Portuguese home fleet had been destroyed in a disastrous shipwreck in the Bay of Biscay in 1627, and the Iberian colonial empire was on the defensive from Manila to Mazagao. Nevertheless both Lisbon and Madrid did what they could, and a substantial if intermittent stream of reinforcements was dispatched to Brazil. But the stars in their courses seemed to be fighting against them; and all their efforts not only failed to dislodge the Dutch from their foothold in Pernambuco, but could not prevent the tenacious Hollanders from extending it. The apogee of Netherlands Brazil was reached in the golden days of Prince Johan Maurits of Nassau, a great-nephew of William the Silent, who governed the colony with distinction for
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seven years (1637 to 1644). The prince had early realized that without the occupation of Bahia, there could be no permanent security for Pernambuco against potential Portuguese attacks, and he therefore endeavored to carry the Portuguese headquarters by storm in 1638. In this he narrowly failed, but he atoned in great measure for this setback by extending the bounds of Netherlands Brazil over most of the northeast seaboard from the Maranhao to Sergipe; whilst he took the first step to secure the necessary slave-depots in West Africa by his successful conquest of Elmina in 1637, where his predecessors had failed so miserably twelve years before. In January, 1640, his sea-captains decisively defeated a large combined Luso-Spanish fleet which was making a final effort to retake Pernambuco. December of that year saw the successful revolt of Portugal from Spain at the end of sixty years "Babylonian" captivity, and the accession of the Duke of Braganza as King Dom JoAo IV.4 The tidings of Portugal's independence were received by the Dutch in 1641 with very mixed feelings. On the one hand they welcomed the dismemberment of the Iberian colonial empire as weakening their hereditary enemy, Spain, with whom they were still at war, albeit the fighting was being conducted in an increasingly fitful and halfhearted fashion; it had long been clear that Spain had no earthly chance of reconquering the United Provinces and merely persisted in fighting a losing battle out of false pride. On the other hand, formal recognition of Portugal's new-won independence would deprive the Dutch of the very profitable predatory attacks which they were making on the Lusitanian colonies from the Moluccas to the Maranhao, and which, if continued or intensified, threatened to bring about the complete collapse of the Lusitanian overseas empire in the near future, in view of the undisputed Dutch mastery of the seas. Broadly speaking, the States-General took the standpoint that it was
4 Cf. Naber's editions of De Laet and Barlaeus quoted in the previous two notes; also Warnsinck, "Een mislukte Aanslag op Nederlandsch Brazili6, 1639-1640," De Gids (February, 1940). Durval Pires de Lima ("Temas do Brasil colonial," Anais da Academia Portuguesa de Hist6ria, VII [19421) proves by copious quotation from unpublished papers in the Arquivo Hist6rico Colonial at Lisbon that Philip IV and Olivares made far greater efforts to help Brazil than most Portuguese writers are willing to give them credit for. Portuguese accounts of the (for them) disastrous naval actions of January, 1640, in the standard works of the Conde de Ericeira, Portugal restaurado, I; Costa Quintella, Anais da marinha portuguesa, II (Lisbon, 1840); Adolfo Varnhagen, Historia das lutas com os holandeses no Brasql (Lisbon, 1872); and Admiral A. Botelho de Sousa, Subsidios para a hist6ria das guerras da restauragaono mar e no alem mar (Lisbon 1940).
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better to weaken Spain by acknowledging and respecting Portuguese independence forthwith, whereas the East and West India Companies, and the powerful interests they represented, naturally preferred to continue their profitable career of aggression against the tottering Portuguese colonies. As usual a compromise was reached, whereby it was agreed to make a truce (not a peace) with Portugal for ten years; but pending the ratification of the terms, the directors of the East and West India Companies wrote to their subordinates overseas to seize all the Portuguese colonial territory which they could before the truce became effective. This strictly legal but morally disloyal attitude of a stronger nation to a weaker is not defended by any Dutch historian today; but it may be pleaded in extenuation that the Hollanders were not the only people who indulged in such manifestations of Realpolitik-either then or later. In any event, Prince Johan Maurits had his orders-which doubtless squared well enough with his own inclination-and he lost no time in acting on them. His experience of 1638 had shown him that Bahia was "not the kind of cat to be taken without gloves," and he decided to utilize his available forces in an attack on the Portuguese slave-depot of Sdo Paulo de Luanda in Angola. Capture of this place would achieve the double object of securing an adequate slave-market for Netherlands Brazil, whilst simultaneously depriving the Portuguese (and Spaniards) of their main source of supply. Moreover, slaves from this part of West Africa were generally regarded as more tractable and hard-working than those from the Guinea hinterland who were exported through Elmina. The expedition was to be rounded off by the capture of the island of Sdo Tom6, which despite its perennial unhealthiness was a source of supply for both slaves and sugar.5 The expedition which left Recife bound for Angola on the 30th May, 1641, consisted of twenty-one ships manned by three thousand men under the command of the indefatigable Cornelis
5 It is amusing to note that Prince Johan Maurits' observation that Bahia was "een kat, die niet sonder hantschoenen mach aengetast werden," is an exact echo of Admiral Cornelis Maatelief's rueful remark after his failure to take Malacca in 1606, that it "gheen katte en is om wonder hantschoene te vangen." The expedition of Jol to Angola and Sao Tomd has recently been described in detail in an excellent article by K. Ratelband, "De Expeditie van Jol naar Angola en Sao Thomd, 30 Mei 1641-31 October 1641," reprinted from De West-Indische Gids, XXIV (1943), which supersedes all previous versions. The author spent several years in Angola and is thus not only personally acquainted with the terrain but has made full -use of Cadornega, Historia das guerras angolanas, and other contemporary Portuguese accounts. Needless to say, I have followed him closely in my own account, which will serve for those who cannot read Dutch.
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Jol-Houtbeen, or P6 de Pau. The troops were under the command of an English mercenary soldier named Henderson; and a certain Pieter Moorthamer (or Mortamer) was earmarked as the director of the potential possession. The voyage proved an unexpectedly difficult one, probably because the Brazil current proved much stronger than usual. Ten weeks were taken on the crossing, since the African shore (at Mossamedes) was not sighted until the 9th of August, by which time there was only a week's supply of the much-reduced water-ration on hand. The fleet first watered in the Bero River, which by a fortunate chance happened to be fairly full that year, instead of bone-dry as is usual in August. It then resumed the voyage to Luanda, off which it appeared the morning of the 23rd August, to the great consternation of the inhabitants, albeit not to the surprise of the governor, Pedro C6sar de Meneses, who was on his guard. Houtbeen now found out that nobody on board the fleet knew the entrance to the harbor, not even the skipper of the Charitas who had been there the year before, and had drawn a sketchmap of the harbor as he recollected it. The admiral and his colleagues were thus undecided where or how to land, when their doubts were resolved by the opportune appearance of two of their ships with a prize, the Jesu'sMalriaJose',bound from the Canaries with 160 pipes of wine. The Spanish master of this ship-probably to be revenged on his erstwhile Portuguese fellow-subjects for breaking free from Spain-made no bones whatever about showing the Hollanders the narrow passage through the northern entrance to the harbor. He also indicated to them where they could land in the roadstead on a beach midway between two Portuguese forts. Incredible as it may seem, this beach was beyond the range of the cannon of either of them. This opportune intelligence enabled Houtbeen and Henderson to disembark their men here on the morning of the 25th. The Portuguese, who never dreamed that their weak spot would be revealed, beat a hasty retreat after offering only a token resistance. The defenders of the city were now seized with panic, like those of Bahia had been in 1624. Thinking that the Dutch had merely come on a plundering privateer voyage and not to stay, they evacuated the place during the night of August 25-26, taking with them what goods and chattels they could carry a few miles up country to await the expected departure of the enemy. When the Hollanders entered the empty town on the morning of August 26th, they were surprised to find it "a great and fair
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city, containing about five thousand great and fair stone houses less or more, in the bigness of the city of Olinda," to say nothing of its "five castles and seven batteries whereon stood planted about 130 guns including sixty brass pieces." Twenty sail of ships great and small were taken in the harbor, together with large stores of various kinds in the magazines. This virtually bloodless occupation cost the Dutch only three men, and the Hollanders were astonished to find so extensive and well-built a city, with spacious convents, churches, and a Jesuit college, where they had evidently expected a sordid and squalid slave-mart of mud huts and thatched roofs. Well might one of the Dutch participants in this expedition write to a friend in Holland that "It is to be admired that they have so slightly delivered up and forsaken so brave a city with invincible forts, which hath been of great importance to their King, because he brought from thence all the Negroes and Blackmoors which they had need of and employed in all quarters; and being we have now the said place in our own hands, Spain and Portugal itself will have great want of negroes. It is a place of great traffic and negotiation, which hath been of the highest importance to the King of Spain."6 The same jubilant note over this potential haul of "black ivory" is struck in another of the contemporary letters printed in 1642, which further explains how the profit was made: "This is a great victory, because the King of Castile can get no Negroes or Blackmoors to labor in the mines in the West Indies, whetherwards they have yearly sent from that place about 15,000, which they buy there for a small price and are sold here in Brazil, for 400 or 500 guilders one negro; and in the West Indies they are sold for a yet higher price: out of which trade the King of Castile hath yearly had a great treasure, which he must miss now, be6 A Little True Forraine Newes Better Than a Great Deale of Domestic Spurious False NewestPublished Daily Without Feare or Wit, to the Shame of the Nation and Beyond the Liberty of Paris Pasquils (London, 1641). This is one of the few contemporary sources on the capture of Luanda which has apparently escaped Mr. Ratelband's eagle eye. Although the title page bears the imprint 1641, this is an obvious slip for 1642, since the first page begins, An Extract out of divers letters written in Brazil, concerning the glorious Victory of the taking of the great and populous Citie of Loanda de S. Paulo in Angola: By the fleet of the Generall West India Company, under the command of the Admiral Houtebeene or Wooden-legge,which was done the 26th of August 1641. Imprinted at Middelburgh, by the Widow and Heirs of Simon Mowlers ... 1642. It should be added that Jol took Sio Tom6 in October, 1641, although only after he had sustained heavy losses in besieging the fort of Sao Sebastiao, whose heroic defense against great odds affords a striking contrast to the cowardice of the defenders of Luanda. Jol died of malaria soon afterwards and was buried in the local church, through which the equator ran, according to tradition.
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cause he had for every negro, ten cruzados customs, besides other great Revenues." The general accuracy of this is confirmed by other contemporary Portuguese and Dutch sources, albeit the Negroes were not usually sold singly but in lots of two, three, or (litermore, known in Portuguese as pega, whence the Dutch stuck ally "piece"); and the prices quoted are applicable to these peas or "lots" rather than to individual Negroes. Friar Manoel Calado, writing in 1648, alleges that the Dutch, after their dominance of the Angola slave-export market, deliberately gave the wretched Negroes sea-water to drink on board the slave-ships, so that they would die soon after being sold to the Portuguese fazendeiros of occupied Brazil. These were thus forced to buy more at equally high prices (three hundred patacas or silver dollars is the average he gives) from the monopolists of the W.I.C. This allegation is self-evidently ridiculous, since the Negroes would not have survived to reach land if given sea-water to drink en route; but that conditions on board the Dutch slavers were even worse than those in Portuguese or Brazilian vessels can be gathered from the report of Pieter Moorthamer, the first Netherlands director of the colony, drawn up after a year of Dutch occupation in September, 1642. After describing the different gradings and categories of peas, into which the slaves were classified, he continues: "The Portuguese succeed better in bringing over 500 slaves in a caravel, than we do with 300 in a large ship. This is because the Portuguese look after and feed them better, which brings them a two-fold return at the time of sale. They wash down the deck every other day with bad vinegar; they cook warm hot-pot for their slaves twice daily, once with African beans, the next time with maize, and all well cooked with a good big spoonful of palm-oil mixed therein, together with a little salt, and sometimes a large hunk of dried fish in each dish. During the day, they have always a little farinha and some water, whilst they have a little nigger-wine especially on hand for the sick, and give every slave two or three pieces of old cloth to cover himself with." Moorthamer also advocated the construction of barracoons at Luanda for the housing of slaves awaiting shipment, "like each Portuguese has attached to his private dwelling, and thus the slaves will come fit on board, remain fit on the voyage, and if the crossings are quicker, they will fetch half as much again in the market; nor will one then hear so much of their dying, or jumping over-board, or killing themselves as they do now." Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, and English are all equally to
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blame for their share in this degrading traffic but (if only because they were the more experienced), the Portuguese were evidently the most efficient, and thus relatively the most humane of them
all.7
Enough has been said to show that possession of Angola as the coveted source of "black ivory" was essential to the nation which desired to exploit the sugar and tobacco cultivation in Brazil. The loss of Luanda was therefore a severe blow to the tottering Portuguese colonial empire, of which Brazil was by now the only profitable portion, if we except sporadic benefits derived from Macau and Mozambique. It is true that all was not yet entirely lost, since the Portuguese still retained a tenuous hold on some districts in the interior from their bases at Muxima and Massangano. But the Dutch speedily consolidated their hold on the colony's littoral by occupying Benguela and the mouth of the River Kwanza (Quanza), thus effectively controlling the seaboard, and preventing the exportation of slaves save through their hands. The ten-years' uneasy truce concluded between Holland and Portugal was now belatedly-and incompletelyenforced in Angola, where the Portuguese in the interior were compelled to trade with the Hollanders at Luanda to secure the necessities of life. The Dutch in their turn had to make a deal with the Portuguese, to ensure getting a sufficient number of slaves. The Lusitanian position daily worsened, however, since the Dutch encouraged the Negroes to revolt against their former masters, and the majority of the tribes gradually came over to the side of the intruders. Nevertheless, the treacherous siezure of Luanda in August,
7 Naber, "Nota van Pieter Mortamer over het gewest Angola (1642)," Moorthamer (as his name is usually written elsewhere) was the first director of the colony and his exceedingly valuable report was printed by Naber under the above title in the Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht, Deel LIV (1933) (hereinafter cited as Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht). See also Frei Manuel Calado, 0 valerosoLucideno (ed. Sao Paulo, 2 vols., 1945), I, 249-250. Dirck Ruyters in his Toorste der Zee-Vaert of 1623, relates how a Portuguese slave-dealing friend of his in Brazil showed him that he had made a clear profit of the equivalent of 31,000 Rijks-dollars on a cargo of five-hundred Angola slaves landed at Bahia. He was assured that the profits of the slave trade in the Spanish West Indies were even higher. Another Dutch narrative of circa 1640 estimates that the slave trade at Luanda was worth 6,600,000 florins yearly, whilst 15,430 Angola Negroes were landed at Pernambuco alone in the years 1620-1623. For further facts and figures on the slave trade between West Africa and Ibero-America, see Witjen, op. cit.; Albuquerque Felner, Angola (Coimbra, 1933), pp. 79, 135-139, 166-169, 255ff; J. L. d'Azevedo, Ppocas de Portugal econ6mico (Lisbon, 1929), pp. 72-79, 236-237, 256, 266ff; Durval Pires de Lima. op. cit., pp. 257, 282, 315; Cadornega, op. cit., III, 221.
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1641, proved a Pyrrhic victory for the Dutch in the long run; for although the immediate and material benefits were great, they were eventually more than offset by the natural reaction of the Portuguese. They were understandably bitter over the whole business, and all the more since their colonial economy as well as their national prestige were adversely affected. They regarded themselves henceforth as free to pay the Dutch in the same coin, and this intensified, if it did not originate, the support given by the home government, at first secretly and later openly, to the rebellions against Dutch rule which broke out successively in the Maranhdo (1642) and Pernambuco (1645). These revolts in their turn further exasperated the Hollanders, and thus a vicious circle of reprisals and counter-reprisals was started. The Maranhao rebellion provided the Angola Dutch with a pretext for treacherously attacking the local Portuguese at Gango, where most of the refugees from Luanda had settled, in May, 1643. Amongst the prisoners was the ex-governor, Pedro Cesar de Meneses, and although he subsequently escaped from jail at Luanda, and even renewed the local truce with the Hollanders, neither side had any longer the slightest confidence in the plighted word of the other.8 Chief amongst the Hollanders' native allies was the famous Queen N'Zinga (also written Ginga, Singa, etc.), a sort of dusky Zenobia, who although a Christian convert early and late in her long and eventful life, for most of it relapsed into a hedonistic heathendom. She was a thorn in the side of the Portuguese for many years, and proved doubly formidable with the arms and munitions supplied by the Dutch. Like Houtbeen or P6 de Pau, her fame survives in modern Brazilian folklore in several verses of the celebrated Auto dos congos, so popular in Ceara and the Northeast:
8 The best Dutch account of the tragic events in Angola in 1641-1645 is contained in Naber's introduction to the "Nota" of Pieter Moorthamer in the Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht for 1933. Portuguese accounts are legion, but the traditional versions of the Conde de Ericeira, Cadornega, and other contemporary writers should be supplemented by the documents published in the Arquivos de Angola, 2a serie, which are resumed on pp. 13-26 of the off-print, "Angola: Principais datas da cronologia luso-holandesa (1621-1648)" (Luanda, 1945). Cf. also the articles in the Publicagues do Congresso do Mundo Portugues, IX (Lisbon, 1940). The reaction of the troubles in Angola and Brazil on the diplomatic negotiations between Portugal and Holland in 1641-1648 can be traced in the Correspondenciade Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, the Portuguese envoy at the Hague, edited in two volumes by Edgar Prestage and P. Azevedo (Coimbra, 19201926).
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Sou irmaioda Rainha Ginga Afilhado da Virgem Maria Almirante de Holanda Embaixador da Turquia! Meanwhile the government at Lisbon, preoccupied as it was with the perennial Spanish threat across the border, and by urgent demands for men, money, and ships from every quarter of its vast overseas empire from the Maranhdo to Macau, endeavored to do something to help the staunch remnant of Portuguese fighting a losing battle in the interior of Angola. Unfortunately that something was inevitably too little if not too late, whilst the difficulties were further enhanced by the imperious necessity of avoiding an open break with Holland. The first expedition of 215 men, mostly veterans of former campaigns in Angola, was organized in Bahia, and disembarked in the roadstead of Quicombo (roughly half-way between Luanda and Benguela and which had not been occupied by the Dutch) in April, 1645. On the overland trek to Massangano they were intercepted by a horde of the cannibalistic Jagas, and the majority were "made food for these savages and buried in their bellies" as a contemporary narrative sorrowfully expressed it. The second expedition was likewise organized in Brazil, this time at Rio, consisting of about three hundred men who reached Benguela in June of the same year, whence they proceeded to Quicombo. After being joined there by the survivors of the Bahia expedition and a number of refugees from Benguela, they went by sea and land respectively to the Suto and Kwanza rivers, whence the majority eventually reached Massangano at the end of 1645.9 With their welcome if scanty and belated reinforcements, the local Portuguese took the offensive against Queen N'Zinga's rebellious tribes in 1646. A preliminary campaign was eminently successful, the queen's sister, Dona Barbara, being taken prisoner, although the redoubtable Amazon herself escaped to fight again another day-and most effectively too. A Dutch attack on the Portuguese post of Muxima this year likewise miscarried, but these two successes were more than off-set by two crushing disI Cf. the article on the expeditions of 1645 by GastAo Sousa Dias (Publicagues do Congresso do Mundo Portugus, VII [1940], 337ff; and "Angola: Principais datas da cronologia luso-holandesa (1621-1648)," loc. cit., pp. 29-37. For the Dutch version, cf. Naber's edition of Pieter Moorthamer's "Nota." A version of the "Auto dos congos" with other references to Queen N'Zinga will be found on pp. 50-62 of Barroso's article, "O Brasil e a restauragao de Angola, " loc. cit., but he ignores Borges de Madureira's defeat and death in 1647.
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asters in 1647-48. In the first of these (October, 1647), the Dutch director, Cornelis Ouman, with the help of Queen N'Zinga, annihilated a Portuguese column under one of their best bush-warfare veterans, Gaspar Borges Madureira. In the second (August, 1648), a flying column of 220 Hollanders under Major Symon Pieterszoon, with the aid of native auxiliaries supplied by Queen N'Zinga and the king of the Congo, annihilated another column of 120 Portuguese and loyal natives under Manoel de N6brega. This final blow was seemingly the death-knell of the Portuguese in Angola, but at the last minute of the eleventh hour deliverance was at hand.'0 The manifold preoccupations of King John IV with the Spaniards and Dutch in four continents did not prevent him and his Overseas Council (Conselho Ultramarino) from periodically considering ways and means to deal with the situation in Angola, although in Portugal's plight it was easier to discuss ways than to find means. Amongst the leading fidalgos whose opinions were asked was Salvador Correia de SA e Benevides, a carioca conquistador (if I may so express it) born at Rio de Janeiro in 1594, of a Portuguese father, Martim de Sa, scion of the founding fathers of the City of Sdo Sebastiao, and a Spanish mother, Maria de Mendoza y Benevides, daughter of Manuel de Mendoza y Benevides, governor of Cadiz, and his wife, who descended from an English lady related to Jane Dormer, the Duchess of Feira. Salvador Correia de Sa e Benevides had an eventful career from his youth, since he had soldiered in Paraguay, convoyed the sugar ships from Rio, Bahia, and Pernambuco to Lisbon on various occasions, and (as we have seen) defeated the redoubtable Piet Heyn at Sdo Vicente, on his way to the siege of Bahia in March, 1625. He had further made the overland trek to Peru to find a wife in the shape of a comely (and wealthy) Spanish lady named Catalina de Velasco. Despite the fact that he had a Spanish wife and mother, in March, 1641, he had loyally acclaimed Dom Joao IV as king at Rio de Janeiro, of which city he was hereditary constable and governor, besides holding the post of "general" of the Brazil fleets. He was thus qualified to suggest that the leader of the proposed expedition to Angola should be a "pessoa que tenha cursado conquistas e navegaqoes porquanto a terra he doentia e
10 Naber's article in Bijdragen Historisch GenootschapUtrecht(1933) and the documents printed in the Arquivos de Angola (2a serie, II, No. 8 [October, 1944], 149-164), which contain the sworn testimony of the twelve Portuguese survivors of the last disaster (when N6brega's flying column was destroyed by the Dutch and Queen N'Zinga's forces) as taken on oath at Luanda on 30 August-2 September, 1648.
SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA! E BENEVIDES
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a jornada ndo pede descanso." It is probable that he had himself in mind, since he later wrote (12 September 1647), "Senhor, eu desejo servir e ha 32 anos que o fago, passando a linha 18 vezes, e a andar no mar e ser bem afortunado nele, ndo dou ventagem a ninguemnem Portugal; sempre dei boa conta de min.""1 However this may be, it is interesting to note that one of his recommendations in 1643 was to the effect that the commander of the expedition should be supplied with two sets of orders; one official document authorizing him to land at the mouth of the River Bengo or elsewhere, but ordering him to avoid all hostilities with the Dutch; and secret instruction in which "Your Majesty can order what you think best for your service, since war is a matter of stratagems and they [the Dutch] have used many." He further pointed out that a lot could be done by working through Indian or Negro auxiliaries, "when we will have our excuses readily obvious." When the tone of Salvador's suggestion of 1643 is compared with what actually transpired five years later, it seems more than likely that he was then in fact provided with an open and a secret set of instructions of diametrically opposite tenor, as he himself had suggested. The critical situation of the Portuguese in the Angola hinterland finally resulted in the nomination of Salvador Correia de Sa e Benevides as governor and captain-general of the colony in April, 1647, although his formal letters-patent to this post were not dispatched by the Royal Chancery until five months later. Preparations to scrape together a sufficient force of men and ships for him had begun early in that year; but he had the greatest difficulty in getting even part of his allocations fulfilled, owing to the chronic penury of the Royal Treasury and the diversion to other quarters of ships and supplies originally allotted to him. As late as 12 September, we find Salvador complaining that not a single one of his promised eight hundred troops had been enlisted. In the end, it seems that only about 250 actually sailed
11 The literature on Salvador Correia de S6 e Benevides is legion, arid I shall content myself with referring to three recent works wherein the reader will find adequate references to all previous books and articles on the subject: Juilio Caiola, "A reconquista de Angola por Salvador Correia de S6," Publicadoes do Congresso do Mundo Portugues, IX (1940), 423ff; Rodrigues Cavalheiro, "A colaboragAo da metr6pole na reconquista do Brasil," ibid., pp. 289-335, which despite its title, deals in point of fact primarily with the organization of Correia's Angola squadron in 1647; Clado Ribeiro de Lessa, Salvador Correia de Sa e Benevides (Lisbon, 1940); and more recently, Luis Norton, A dinastia dos Sds no Brasil (Lisbon, 1943). None of these authors nor their predecessors, Afr~nio Peixoto, Forjaz de Sampaio, Gastdo de Sousa Dias, etc., have made more than a superficial use of Dutch sources. Thus their works inevitably suffer from a certain lack of balance as regards the background of the Angola episode, which it is hoped is corrected in the present essay.
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with the squadron, most of them Brazilian-born and veterans of the Pernambuco, Angola, and Alemtejo campaigns, albeit the general complained later that they were the sweepings of the Lisbon jail and soldiery. The money for the fitting-out of this squadron was furnished by a syndicate of local Jews (including Duarte de Silva) who were given as security for repayment of the sums they advanced a lien on several royal taxes and imposts at Rio de Janeiro. The preparation of this armament for Angola was further complicated by the necessity of providing a strong armada for Brazil, in consequence of alarming intelligence received
from Bahia in the spring of 1647.12
The strategic position of Netherlands Brazil had deteriorated sharply after the departure of Prince Johan Maurits in May, 1644. The successful revolt of the Maranhdo had been followed by the widespread Pernambuco uprising, organized by Jodo Fernandes Vieira and supported by Andr6 Vidal de Negreiros, who had ostensibly been sent from Bahia to stop it. Vieira's victories at the Monte das Tabocas and Casa Forte in August, 1645, had been to some extent offset by Admiral Lichthart's destruction of Jer6nimo Serrdo de Paiva's squadron in Tamandar6 Bay in September, but the whole hinterland remained in the hands of the rebels. Strong reinforcements were sent out from Holland on receipt of the news of Vieira's rising. On their arrival in 1646, the Hollanders occupied the mouth of the river Sdo Francisco, with the idea of cutting off Vieira's line of communication with Bahia. This had only a momentary success, since the LusoBrazilians soon cut other paths through the bush farther inland, beyond reach of the Dutch fleet or fort, so the expedition was withdrawn early in 1647, after Lichthart had died from fever. The Dutch now returned to Prince Johan Maurits' idea of attacking the enemy at his strongest but likewise most vital spot, Bahia. The fleet and reinforcements which came out with Councilor Hendrik Haecxs, Admiral Haultain, and Colonel Von Schoppe in 1646, brought with them instructions to land on the island of Itaparica, "lying right opposite Bahia, richly supplied with sugarmills and cattle, and to occupy it with the object of founding there the equivalent of a new Dunkirk."'13
12 Salvador's patent as governor of Angolais printedin the Arquivos de Angola,2a serie, II, No. 8 (1944), 111-112. It is perhapsworth nothingthat is specificallyaddressedto the municipalauthoritiesof the City of Luandainteralia. The date of his nomination was 8 April;that of his patent, 20 September, 1647. 13 Cf. Naber, "Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Road van
Brazilie (1645-1654)," Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht, Deel XLVI (1925), a
pricelesssourcefor the last decadeof Dutch Brazilwhichhas apparently been overlooked by all Portugueseand Brazilianwriterswhose worksI have consulted.
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It was realized that Schoppe's two thousand men would be insufficient to carry Bahia by a coup-de-main, as the failure of Maurits' attempt in 1638 had shown. But it was thought that since the Dutch had uncontested command of the sea, their occupation of Itaparica would ensure so effective a blockade of Bahia that the city, cut off from the outer world, would eventually fall of itself like a rotten apple. Moreover, Vidal's forces would perforce have to return from Pernambuco to defend the capital, thus easing the pressure on Recife. This strategy had long been advocated by Sigismund von Schoppe, the German commander in chief of the Dutch forces, and it was no secret to the Portuguese, for Padre Ant6nio Vieira had expressed his fears of it to King John IV, some six months before the event. When the king received the news of Schoppe's landing, he sent forthwith for the Jesuit early in the morning and said to him, "You are a prophet; last night a carvel came from Bahia ... with the news that Sigismund has fortified himself in Itaparica. What do you think we should do now?" The sequel is well known, and suffice it to say that the indefatigable Vieira negotiated a loan from some Jewish friends of his, thanks to which a royal armada of twenty sail was organized under the command of the veteran Antonio Teles de Meneses, formerly governor of India, and now nominated Count of Vila Pouca de Aguiar and governor of Brazil. Five galleons of this armada were earmarked to join Correia's squadron at Rio.14 Simultaneously with the preparation of Ant6nio Teles' armada and Salvador Correia's squadron for Angola in the Tagus, similar preparations were being made in Holland to dispatch a powerful fleet to reinforce Pernambuco and Itaparica. In August, 1647, the dispatch of thirty-four ships and six thousand men had been resolved on, but the cumbersome administrative set-up of the United Provinces, the jealousy of the different provincial boards (Kamers) of the W.I.C., and the skilfull diplomatic intrigues and maneuvers of the Portuguese ambassador, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, all combined to retard the equipment of the Dutch armament until winter set in, when ice, frost, and small-pox brought further delays, apart from contrary winds. Meanwhile the council at Pernambuco, unaware of the decision taken to help them, had dispatched one of their number, Hendrik Haecxs, to Holland to solicit urgent assistance. In the Chops of the Channel,
14 J. L. d'Azevedo, Cartas do padre Ant6nio Vieira S. I. (3 vols., Coimbra, 1925-1928), I, 562; cf. Naber, ed., "Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs . . .," loc. cit., p. 159.
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Haecxs spoke a Hamburg vessel from Oporto, who gave him news of the preparation of Ant6nio Teles' armada, adding that great difficulty was being experienced in finding sufficient men to man it, pressgangs being busy all over the countryside recruiting peasants and plowboys by force. The German skipper estimated that the armada would be ready to sail by the last week in October. In this he proved a true prophet, for Ant6nio Teles left the Tagus on the 18th of October, Salvador Correia de Sa and his squadron making the voyage to Rio de Janeiro separately.15 News of the preparation of the Portuguese armada had the effect of stepping up the tempo of the Dutch armament, which was placed under the command of Witte Corneliszoon de With, one of the finest of the pleiad of Dutch fighting admirals, who had seen much service against English, Spaniards, Dunkirkers, and Javanese in four quarters of the globe. The exceptionally severe winter of 1647-48 proved the salvation of Portugal and Brazil. At a time when, as Padre Ant6nio Vieira jubilantly wrote from the Hague, the armada of Ant6nio Teles was already "dando bons principios do ano 'aBahia," Witte de With's twelve ships were still wind-bound in the frozen Dutch ports. Only on the 26th of December could his fleet put to sea, and then it was scattered by a fearful storm, with loss and damage to several of its components, "and particularly a very important one which was bound for Angola, which was sunk without trace off Vlissingen," as Padre Vieira reported on 27 January, 1648. Not until February did De With's storm-battered fleet finally weather Cape Finisterre, whence it made a relatively quick passage to Pernambuco, where it arrived at the end of March.16 The unfortunate experiences of "Double-With's" fleet contrasted strongly with the prosperous voyages made by Ant6nio Teles and Salvador Correia respectively. The former's armada reached Bahia at Christmas, after an uneventful passage which
15 Cf. Norton, op. cit., pp. 84-85; Naber, ed., "Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs. .. " loc. cit., pp. 208, 220. Ant6nio Teles with the Armada Real do Mar Oceano left the Tagus for Bahia on the 18th of October, 1648; Salvador Correia with his Angola squadron leaving for Rio de Janeiro a few weeks later in the first half of November, and not in December as erroneously stated by some modern Portuguese writers. (Cf. Naber, "T'Leven en Bedrijf van Vice-Admirael Witte de With, Zaliger," Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht, Deel XLVII (1926), 130; Cartas del Rei D. Joao IV para diversas autoridades do Reino (Lisbon, 1940), pp. 184-220. ," loc. cit., pp. 221-227; idem, 16 Cf. Naber, ed., "Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs ... "T'Leven en Bedrijf van Vice-Admirael Witte de With, Zaliger," loc. cit., pp. 124-139: Jornal da viagem da frota dos Paizes Baixos Unidos para o Brasit, principiando no dia 17 de janeiro do ano de 1648 ate o dia 17 de Maio (Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, 1931).
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(to quote Padre Vieira again) "would have been a quick voyage for even a single caravel." Von Schoppe had evacuated Itaparica on the news of the armada's approach, and had set sail for Recife eight or nine days before it arrived. Much to Vieira's disappointment, the Dutch and Portuguese fleets did not meet each other on the way. Salvador Correia (who left Lisbon in November) made a similarly speedy passage, of which we have an interesting account from the pen of the English crypto-Catholic poet and man of letters, Richard Flecknoe, savagely satirized by Dryden in later years under the guise of "Mack Flecknoe," who In prose and verse was owned without dispute Through all the realm of nonsense absolute.... The prickly poet-laureate was perhaps unduly harsh on poor Richard, who whatever his shortcomings as a poet, has certainly left us an interesting and entertaining account of his voyage "rolling down to Rio," marred only by a certain rather forced whimsicality at times. After relating how the ships touched at Funchal, where he sampled Madeira wine in situ, extolling it as "surpassing for generousall that ever I tasted yet," he tells how after passing the Canary and Cape Verde Islands, "we had the pleasantest voyage as could be imagined, no storms, the winds hardly having breath enough to fill our sails, and the air so pure, as in comparison with the pleasure of it there, that it seems a pain to breath on land, where the air is stuffing, suffocating, and noisome, tainted as it passes with odors and filth (there being few countries like Arabia, affording more sweets than stenches) whereas that of the sea comes purely (as it were) drained and purified by the sunbeams, as it passes to the sense." He claims that the passengers could enjoy afloat the equivalent of all terrestrial pleasures. Thus hawking and hunting had their counterpart in the sea-fowl (boobies) preying on the flying-fish, who were likewise the prey of the glittering douradosor "shinning fishes somewhat like dolphins." He describes how the Portuguese sailors replenished the passengers' table by harpooning the dourados, "never failing of their cast, and thus furnished us with fresh fish all the time, it being excellent meat, short and crisp like our salmons." The Sargasso Sea, "covered all over with a certain green [seaweed], so thick as the ship could hardly make way through it, with many gridiline flowers besides like our own crocuses, rendering it a most delightful spectacle," afforded the equivalent of a verdant garden. Sunrise and sunset were more color-
502
ful in these latitudes than in the northern climes; whilst "for other commodities and delicacies you have on land we wanted none. Our great cabins being large as your chambers, our beds as commodious, our decks spacious as your galleries to walk in, our kitchen our cellars as well furnished, herds of swine, flocks of sheep, and pullen of all sorts aboard, perpetually feasting, nor wanted we music to our feasts, besides an excellent set of trumpets, the mariners having some fiddles amongst them to which they often danced to delight the passengers. And thus sleeping, eating, drinking and recreating ourselves, we made our voyage secure from storms, secure from pirates and enemies," until the squadron cast anchor in Rio de Janeiro in January, 1648. This idyllic voyage is more reminiscent of a pleasure cruise in a modern luxury liner than of a seventeenth-century deep-sea voyage, which is usually associated with scurvy and short-commons. Obviously the Carreira do Brazil was a very different affair from the Carreira da India, where the sufferings and high mortality in the grossly overcrowded carracks are vividly described in the Lusiadas of Luis de Camoes, and other contemporary relations.'7 With the safe arrival of Ant6nio Teles' armada at Bahia and of Salvador Correia's squadron' at Rio, whilst Witte de With's ships lay weather-bound in Holland, the Portuguese had won the first round in the race against time. Ant6nio Vieira duly noted this from his observation-post at the Hague. After receiving the additional news of the Luso-Brazilian victory at the first battle of Guararapes (19 April, 1648), the perspicacious Jesuit wrote to his friend the Marqu6s de Niza at Paris in June, 1648, "De maneira, Senhor, que temos Pernambuco victorioso, o Rio de Janeiro socorrido, a Bahia com armada, Angola corn a esquadra de Salvador Correia, que hoje pode ter obrado muito." A week before, he had written the same correspondent, "Da esquadra de Angola se ndo tem ainda por ca noticia alguma"; whilst in his next letter he noted that it was uncertain whether or not Salvador Correia had actually left for Angola, or what his orders werethat is, whether to retake Luanda or merely to seek for a foothold on the coast elsewhere. The same uncertainty prevails to this day, although the official Portuguese version then and subsequent17 Richard Flecknoe, A Relation of Ten Yeares Travels (London, 1656), pp. 60-63. I have modernized the spelling of this rare little tract but left the punctuation more or less intact. Flecknoe's dates are vague and contradictory. It is possible that be made the Brazil voyage in 1648-1649, and not in 1647-1648 as is generally assumed; but in either event his inimitable account of "rolling down to Rio" in the mid-seventeenth century is applicable in a general way to Correia de SA's voyage.
503
ly was that Salvador's orders were to avoid a direct clash with the Dutch, by founding a fort at Quicombo, whence he was to try to open up communication overland with the hard-pressed defenders of Massangano and Muxima. The official version further explains that Salvador was compelled to depart from the letter and spirit of his instructions, and to attack Luanda, because of the Dutch offensive alliance with Queen N'Zinga and the king of the Congo. But from the wording of several of the consultas of the Conselho Ultramarino and of Salvador Correia's own representations to the king between May and September, 1647, it is quite obvious that the capture of Luanda itself was intended if found to be practical. The establishment of a port at Quicombo or elsewhere was suggested only as an admittedly unsatisfactory alternative, in the event of the Hollanders at Luanda being found too strong to make the risk of an attack worth while.18 Be this as it may, the whole expedition nearly proved abortive at the start, for although Correia's force was strengthened by five royal galleons which Ant6nio Teles, in accordance with previous orders, had detached to strengthen his squadron and which entered Rio roads (pace Vieira again) on the same day as himself, the news of De With's fleet reached Brazil about the same time. This naturally caused great opposition to the proposed Angola expedition, for it was argued with considerable cogency that it would be wiser to keep the Portuguese armada together in order to cope with De With's fleet, instead of sending part of it off on a problematical wild-goose chase to Angola, leaving Rio and its environs exposed to the tender mercies of "Double-With." Salvador himself, although he evidently considered attack to be the best form of defense, was not uninfluenced by the prevailing criticism of the rashness of the projected expedition, "since many people opined that it was wiser to defend the stronghold of Rio, which was ours, than leave it in order to recapture that of Angola, which was then subject to the Hollander." Whilst he was thus undecided what to do, he received a letter from the Jesuit padre, Jodo d'Almeida, "Inglez de nagao, mas criado no Brazil de meni18 J. L. Azevedo, ed., Cartas de Ant6nio Vieira S. I., I, 142, 165, 169, 172, 179, 215, 222. Official version of Salvador's orders is in Prestage, ed., Manifesto das ostilidades of Luis Felis Cruz (1651) (Lisbon, 1920). Cf. Arquivos de Angola, 2a serie, II, No. 8 (1944), 109. For the relevant consultas of the Conselho Ultramarino and the parecer of Salvador Correia, clearly revealing the intention to attack Luanda if possible, cf. the documents printed on pp. 300-301, 305. "Tudo se remediara com dezalojar o inimigo por uma vez," as Salvador wrote on the 15th June, 1647 (Publicagues do Congressodo Mundo Portugu8s, IX [19403,319-324).
504
no," who was locally regarded as a saint, and as such exercised great influence over the devoutly Catholic Portuguese. The father urged him to make the voyage at all costs, and prophesied a successful outcome if he started on the feast day of Saint Michael Archangel and took the latter for patron saint of the expedition. This sufficed to make up the general's mind. He embarked in his flagship forthwith to show the earnestness of his intentions, and speeded up the mustering of recruits, furnishing of supplies, and raising of money to finance the campaign, to which last he and his family contributed lavishly from their ample property and other resources at Rio. The moradoresraised a loan of sixty thousand cruzados to finance the expedition. Such was the prevalent patriotic fervor, that one citizen brought his contribution of money-bags to the accompaniment of a band playing a lively tune. Salvador himself, writing to the king on the eve of his departure, frankly admitted that the expedition could never have sailed without the men and money advanced by the moradores of the City of SAo SebastiAo.19 As enjoined by Padre Almeida, the expedition set sail on 12 May, 1648, feast day of the Archangel Michael, the armada consisting of five royal galleons, six hired but armed merchant ships, and four smaller vessels or fifteen sail in all, manned with some 1,500 men, over half of whom had been recruited and officered in Rio de Janeiro. Many of the soldiers who were not actually Brazilian born, were veterans of the Pernambuco campaigns as well as those of Alemtejo, and thus the expedition can be truly described as a Luso-Brazilian one in the full sense of the term. The ships came from various quarters (two of them were English) but half of the men and most of the money were supplied by Brazil. Salvador specifically stated that he had enlisted local lads on a large scale since they were "mais praticos, e sofredores de trabalhos, e escuzar tirar da Guarnigao desta praga." The Lisbon-bound sugar-fleet of twenty-five sail was convoyed by the
19Carta que o padre Antonio do Coutto da Companhia de Jesus escreveo ao padre Jeronimo Vogado provincial da mesma companhia dandolhe conta de toda a jornada que o general Salvador Correia de S. e Benevides fez desdodia que sahio do Ryo de Janeiro athe que chegou a Angola, e de todos os sucessos athe tomar a ditta praga, Luanda, 5 September 1648, MS in the Ajuda Library, Lisbon, Codex 51-VII8, folios 241v-253. Padre Simdo de Vasconcelos, S. J. (Vida do padre Joao d'Almeida [Lisbon, 1658], pp. 217-240) describes the reconquest of Angola in detail. Both these Jesuit sources contain information not to be found in the accounts of Luis Felis Crus' (Manifesto das ostilidades) and Cadornega (op. cit.), which form the basis of what most modern writers have to say on the matter. For the Dutch version, cf. Naber's introduction to the "Nota" of Pieter Moorthamer.
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squadron as far as Latitude 20'S Longitude 14021, W; where it was detached to follow its voyage to Portugal. The crossing proved a difficult one, mountainous seas "running as high as the clouds," according to the hyperbolic description of the Jesuit padre, Ant6nio do Couto, who has left us an account of the voyage in which he took part. Two of the smallest vessels could not cope with the high seas and put back to Rio, when only three or four days out. Two other pinnaces and the almiranta (vice-admiral's ship) likewise parted company at various times. The almiranta rejoined the squadron on the 9th July whilst one of the pinnaces came up with the fleet off Luanda, the other arriving when everything was over. It was thus with only eleven sail that Salvador Correia sighted the African coast on the 12th July in Latitude 18? S.20 The crossing had taken exactly two months, long enough perhaps, but two weeks less than Houtbeen's difficult voyage seven years before, when the whole Dutch fleet narrowly escaped miscarrying for want of water. The Portuguese were evidently better supplied, for we meet with no complaints of material shortages on the voyage. On the contrary, Padre Couto tells us that the time was taken up by military preparations of all kinds, the ships being cleared and ready for action, whilst the foreign gunners and engineers, "of whom there were several," busied themselves with preparing hand grenades and so forth. No enemy was encountered, but the squadron overshot Benguela (which the general had intended to attack) in the dark one night, and it anchored off Quicombo roadstead on the 27th of July. During this time the redoubtable Dutch Admiral de Witte was cruising off Bahia after having careened his ships off "The Red Land" of Paraiba early in May. From the crew of a prize taken on the 5th June, he learned that the Rio sugar-fleet had sailed direct for Lisbon, after leaving Salvador Correia to continue his voyage "with 6 or 7 galleons, some smaller ships and about 2,000 of the militia from Rio de Janeiro, bound for Angola with the resolve to beat up our people there." Witte at once sent post-haste to Recife to notify the council of this alarming intelligence, but he states they took no notice of this warning, although it was twice repeated later. The chance of sending his fleet in pursuit of Salvador's squadron was thus lost.
20 Carta que o padre Antonio do Coutto ... escreveo .. ., loc. cit.; and Vasconcelos, op. cit., passim; Publicagaes do Congresso do Mundo Portugues, IX (1940); Norton, op. cit., 240-241, 250-255.
506
According to the official version, Quicombo was Salvador's destination, since he was supposed to found a fortress here and get in touch with the defenders of Massangano overland. Padre Couto, however, who accompanied the expedition and wrote his account of it on the 5th September, 1648, explicitly stated that the squadron only stopped here for wood and water on its way to Luanda. This alone goes far to confirm the supposition that Salvador had secret orders enjoining him to attack the capital of the colony if practicable. In any event, disaster overtook the fleet here. As the squadron lay at anchor in the roads on the evening of the 1st August, a violent submarine quake occurred, which though intense was evidently extremely local, since the water in the offing "remained a sea of roses." The flagship came within an ace of being lost, whilst the almiranta foundered and broke her back soon after midnight-with the loss of over two hundred of the best troops in the expedition. The few survivors (most of whom saved themselves by swimming) included a soldier who was found next day in the stranded forepart of the hull. Like the classic Roman sentinel of Pompeii, he had remained faithfully (and eventually safely) at his post on guard over the regimental flags where he had been placed. Another disaster overtook a reconnaissance party sent ashore to try to capture some prisoners and gain intelligence. This party was likewise involved in the earthquake, and the survivors were killed and eaten by the local cannibals. The loss of the almiranta and so many men might well have daunted most people, but Salvador Correia was made of sterner stuff. Luanda was now openly proclaimed as the objective and thither the fleet set sail, after first recovering the ill-fated reconnaissance party's sloop. A stop was made at the mouth of the Suto River where another party was set on shore with letters for the defenders of Massangano, telling them to advance from up-country and assist the squadron to attack Luanda. This party was nearly as unlucky as the other. They were captured by hostile natives who turned them over to a Dutch post on the Kwanza. The Hollanders thus learnt of Correia's arrival and intentions. Although it was too late for them to warn their compatriots in the capital, they prevented -thePortuguese at Massangano from knowing what was toward.2' Salvador's squadron appeared off Luanda on the 12th August. There were two Dutch ships in the harbor, which at once put out
2Ibid.; Naber, "T'Leven en Bedrijf van Vice-Admirael Witte de With, Zaliger," loc. cit., p. 133.
507
to sea to reconnoiter the newcomers. On discovering their nationality, they forthwith disappeared over the horizon, leaving the garrison of Luanda the less by fifty soldiers whom they had on board. This was not the only piece of luck Salvador had, for like Houtbeen seven years before him, he was still ignorant of the true state of affairs ashore. Just as the Dutch Admiral's doubts had been resolved by the opportune capture of the helpful Spanish skipper of the Jesus Maria Jose, so the Portuguese commander's perplexities were now solved by the capture of two Negro fishermen. These told Salvador that 220 picked Dutch troops were away up-country on an expedition with Queen N'Zinga against the Portuguese, and that the remainder of the garrison (about six hundred men apparently) had retired to the hill fort (Morro) on the appearance of the Portuguese squadron, taking with them from the city what stores and chattels they could secure. Encouraged by this news, Salvador entered the roadstead with his ships and sent a Dutch-speaking emissary ashore to demand the peaceful surrender of the place. The defenders asked to be allowed three days to make up their minds, which the general readily conceded them. This is rather astonishing, for, as might have been expected, they used these days to strengthen their defenses and fetch in a supply of water, returning a defiant answer at the end of this period. The Portuguese landed at daybreak on the feast day of Our Lady of the Assumption (15 August) apparently in the same place where Jol had landed seven years before. Numerous dummies of soldiers and flags were left in the galleons and rowed ashore in the ship's boats, to give the defenders the impression that the attackers were far more numerous than they really were. Judging by later results, this stratagem was evidently successful. As soon as the landing party of a thousand men (eight hundred soldiers and two hundred sailors) had formed up on the cliff above the shore, the march on the city began, Salvador riding part of the way on horseback since he had a bad leg. He was thus a conspicuous target for the Dutch cannon which fired repeatedly on the advancing column but miraculously without effect, though many shots fell close. A halt was made for the celebration of a field-mass half-way, after which the attack on the city was begun by the vanguard. The Hollanders only intended to fight a delaying action, so they put up merely a token resistance in the town and speedily withdrew to the shelter of the Morro fort whens the Portuguese pressed their advance.
508
Next day the Portuguese commander opened approaches against the Morro, and began an artillery bombardment, but the results were virtually nil, since only field-pieces of small caliber were available. He was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the forces from Massangano, unaware that his messengers had all miscarried and that the Dutch in the interior had inflicted (with the aid of Queen N'Zinga) a crushing defeat on his compatriots, who were therefore in no condition to come to his help and could hardly defend themselves for more than a few days longer. The infantry captains of the Rio expeditionary force, encouraged by the feeble Dutch resistance in the town, and impatient at the failure of the artillery bombardment, warmly pressed their commander to order a general assault, and rather reluctantly he consented. The attack was fixed for just before dawn on the night of the 17-18th, with three columns converging on the Morro from three directions. Unfortunately, as is usual with night-attacks, the timing miscarried in the darkness and resultant confusion. The central column having the easiest and most direct way to go, reached its objective first, and being descried by an outpost, delivered its attack without waiting for the other two. These consequently found the garrison fully prepared to receive them when they delivered their belated assaults successively. Nevertheless the Portuguese columns continued their efforts till daylight with admirable pertinacity, when Salvador seeing that their attacks were fruitless sounded the general recall. The attackers then withdrew with a loss of nearly two hundred killed and wounded out of total force of little over four hundred. The Dutch casualties were negligible, since they had the security of their walls and the darkness of the night to aid
them.22
The position of Salvador and his men was now anything but enviable. Even though they did not know it, effective help from Massangano was out of the question, after the annihilation of
22Cadornega has a good description of the assault, as does Padre Simao de Vasconcelos in his Vida do padre Jodo d'Almeida, which is dedicated to Salvador Correia de Sd as reconqueror of Angola and patron of the Jesuit missions in Brazil. Estimates of the casualties vary considerably. Couto, who wrote his Carta about three weeks later, writes "neste conflito nos ferirao alguns 80 homens, e morrerAomais de 20, huns logo, outros depois no Hospital," but other estimates are higher. King John IV, reporting the reconquest to the Marqu6s de Niza at Paris in a letter dated 29 November, 1648, gives the casualties in the assault as 140 killed and wounded. The authorities likewise differ on the date of the actual attack, some placing it on the 17-18th and others on the 18-19th. On this last point I have followed Luis Crus in preference to Padre Couto who implies it was the 19th Crus positively states that it was in the early hours of the 18th, before dawn.
509
Manuel de N6brega's flying column by the Dutch and Queen N'Zinga on the 1st August. On the contrary, the victors, flushed with their success, were rapidly approaching Luanda by forced marches, since they had been recalled to the city by Director Ouman when the Portuguese fleet had been sighted on the 12th. Apart from this, over four hundred men had been lost or rendered in the sunken galleon Sdo Luis and in the unhors-de-combat successful assault on the Morro, whilst others were daily sickening in the unhealthy climate. Such a casualty rate had naturally made great inroads on a force which barely totalled 1,500 when it left Rio, nor would it be easy for the survivors to defend the rambling extent of the city against Queen N'Zinga's hordes and the Dutch from one side, and against the garrison of the Morro from the other. The astonishment of the Portuguese may be imagined, when a few hours after the abortive attack on the Morro, the defenders hoisted the white flag and sent pourparlers announcing their willingness to surrender, not merely the fort, but all their outlying settlements at Kwanza, Benguela, etc., as well, if granted favorable terms! It need hardly be added that Salvador did not need asking twice, but told the Flemings that they could draw up their own terms. This they did, and they were duly signed by both parties on the 21st August. It was stipulated that the Dutch were to evacuate the entire colony, taking their property with them, whilst the Portuguese were to provide adequate shipping for the voyage. The garrison was to march out with the honors of war, drums beating and colors flying, five days being allowed to complete their evacuation, and to await the arrival of Major Pieterszoon's column from up-country. A certain number of French and other Catholic soldiers in Dutch service were allowed to stay and sign on with the Portuguese. The terms were punctiliously fulfilled, and thus the Hollanders marched out of the fortress on the 26th August, 1648, seven years to the day after Admiral Jol (alias P6 de Pau) had entered it. The wheel had come full circle.23
23 This point was duly noted by Padre Couto. The terms of the surrender were signed on the 21st of August, as can be seen from the copy printed in the Manifesto das ostilidades and reprinted in the Arquivos de Angola, loc. cit., 145-147. Oddly enough, they had been printed in Holland as early as 1649, in a (nowadays exceedingly rare) broadside issued at Amsterdam, together with King John IV's covering letter to the Marques de Niza, mentioned in the previous note and reprinted in the Arquivos de Angola. Although signed on the 21st, the terms allowed the Dutch five days to evacuate the fort, and hence their rear-party did not leave until the 26th, the anniversary of Jol's entry. The Morro fort
510
It is needless to describe the joy of the "forlorn hope" at Muxima and Massangano, since the Portuguese in the interior saw themselves delivered at the eleventh hour from certain destruction. Nor need we describe the rejoicings which took place in Luanda itself; the formal consecration of the desecrated churches and convents; the renaming of the city in honor of Our Lady of the Assumption "on whose Day, Feast and Octave, the enterprise was begun, won, and ended"; and t4ie measures taken by Salvador Correia de Sa e Benevides as governor and captain-general to consolidate his hold on the colony. Sdo Tome was likewise evacuated by its Dutch garrison on the news of the capitulation of Luanda, whilst Benguela and the other places were taken over without any trouble. The Portuguese position in West Africa was thus back to where it had been in 1641, and a supply of the vital slave-labor for Brazil was assured. The international reactions, though important, can only be briefly touched on here. The Dutch naturally accused King John IV of a breach of faith, but in view of the way they had acquired the colony seven years earlier, their complaints carried conviction to nobody, probably not even to themselves, The economic repercussions were more important. In July, 1648, when the whereabouts and intentions of Salvador Correia's squadron were still unknown in Europe, Padre Ant6nio Vieira reported from the Hague that Luso-Dutch diplomatic discussions had reached a deadlock over the question of Angola-"f or the company insists on remaining absolute masters of the whole coast and states that the trade with our fortresses in the interior must all pass through their ports, and that we must pay them the dues which we formerly paid there to the king." Apropos of the same matter, he wrote again on 12 August (what time Salvador was anchoring in Luanda roads), "All the argument is now over Angola, and this is a point on which they cannot yield, for without Negroes there is no Pernambuco, and without Angola there are no Negroes."24 Subsequent events were to justify the Jesuit's aphorism to the full, for one of the reasons why the Dutch reacted relatively
was renamed after the Archangel Michael, whom Salvador had selected as patron saint of the enterprise, and on whose feast day (12 May) he had left Rio de Janeiro at the suggestion of the Anglo-Brazilian Jesuit, Padre JoAo d'Almeida. Naber has pointed out that Portuguese versions of the surrender terms transcribe the word Aerdemburgh as a proper name, whereas it was merely the Dutch equivalent of Morro. The Dutch forces in Angola at the time of their surrender totalled a little over one thousand men, distributed approximately as follows: Luanda, 600; Major S. Pieterszoon's flying column, 220; Benguela and Kwanza River posts, 200 men. 24 J. L. Azevedo, ed., Cartas de Antonio Vieira S. I., I, 243.
511
calmly to the final loss of Pernambuco in 1654, was that there was no economic future for their colony without an assured supply of Negroes from Angola, and that had gone with the wind that wafted their departing garrison from the African shore in September, 1648. The same point occurs in one of the typical pasquils of the period which reflect the state of Dutch public opinion on various matters. In this particular pamphlet (Amsterdams Dam-Praetje, 1649) one of the dramatic personae inquires whether it is not possible to arrange some compromise with Portugal on the lines of a joint condominion in Angola. To this the Portuguese spokesman retorts that the complete and undisputed possession of the Angola slave-market is just as essential to Portugal as is the North Sea herring fishery to the Dutch. However much of an exaggeration this claim may have been when applied to Portugal per se, it was certainly nothing less than the truth as regards the supply of labor for colonial Brazil.25 From the foregoing it is perhaps sufficiently clear that the struggle for Angola three hundred years ago was primarily a struggle for the most lucrative slave-market in West Africa. Whosoever possessed the slave depots and harbors on the West African coast held the key to the economic development of much of the New World. The mining industries in parts of Spanish America, the sugar plantations of Portuguese Brazil, as later the European colonies in the Caribbean and the tobacco fields of Virginia, all depended for their progress on an adequate supply of African slave labor. Just as nowadays the great powers fight for oil, so three centuries ago they fought for black ivory. Regarded in this light, Salvador Correia's reconquest of Angola in 1648 saved the Portuguese colonial empire from ruin. More than that, it saved the existence of the mother-country itself. For Portugal stood no earthly chance in her twenty-eight-years war of independence against Spain (1640-1668), at a time when she was likewise fighting the strongest naval power in the world (Holland), without the resources she derived from her possession of Brazil. Well might King John IV term Brazil his vaca de leite,
25AmsterdamsDam-Praetje, van wat outs en wat nieuws en wat vreemts(Amsterdam, 1649). Angola figures prominently in this pasquil, which is undoubtedly one of those subsidized by the Portuguese ambassador, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho. It is worth noting that three out of the five interlocutors who figure as the dramatis personae (Edward Man, Isaac van Beeck, and a Mr. Raij) were real personages and actual directors (bewindhebbers) of the W. I. C. The two latter are mentioned in this capacity on pp. 158 and 241 of the Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs (1645-1654), as well as in various pamphlets (Breeden-Raedt, etc.) of the time. Edward Man was an elder of the English Church in Holland, and a staunch Commonwealth supporter.
512
THE HISPANIC
AMERICAN
HISTORICAL
REVIEW
for she was indeed Portugal's milch-cow then and for long afterwards. It was the money obtained from the sale of Brazilian sugar and tobacco which paid for the upkeep of the armies who held the Spaniard at bay along the frontier. It was Brazil which furnished the bulk of the fantastic dowery of Catherine of Braganza for her marriage to Charles II, thus securing the vital diplomatic support of the merry but impecunious monarch against Holland and Spain. It was the sale of the Brazilian products which atoned for the shortcomings of Portugal's own ill-balanced economy, and gave her the wherewithal to pay for the imports of corn and grain from the Baltic countries without which she would have starved. In fact, the national survival of Portugal in the seventeenth century, and hence her importance as a great colonial power in the world today, derives directly from her economic exploitation of Brazil. That in turn depended on the reconquest
of Angola-a mae preta.
APPENDIX I
DUTCH FLEET FOR THE CAPTURE OF LUANDA, 30 MAY-26 AUGUST,
1641
(ADMIRAL CORNELIS JOL, NICKNAMED
HOUTBEEN
OR PE DE PAU)*
Ship Amsterdam (flagship)........ Mooriaen (Vice-Admiral) ..... Eendracht (Rear-Admiral).... Swol ..................... Enchuysen................. Overijsel................... Leyden.................... Soutelande................. Leeuwinne................. Charitas................... St. Jacob................... Orpheus................... Groene Wijif ............... Coninck David.............. GrooteGerrit ................
Sailors 89 42 48 67 62 58 55 48 46 45 41 40 40 32 30
Soldiers 216 Cornelis Jol 122 Jacob Huygenszoon 84 Matheus Jansen 134 133 112 101 128 104 66 155 218 82 91 40
*Based on the list given by K. Ratelband on p. 3 of his article in De West-Indische Gids, XXIV (The Hague, 1943). The troops were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, an English mercenary soldier in the service of the W.I.C., and were formed into fourteen companies. Pieter Moorthamer (or Mortamer) sailed on board this fleet with the nomination of director of the captured colony, which post he held until September, 1642.
SALVADOR CORREIA DE
SX E
BENEVIDES
513
Liefde..................... Steenhuys.................. Schelvis (Yacht) ............ Koin (Yacht) ............... Hasenwint (Yacht) .......... Hennitgen (Yacht) ..........
TOTAL
22 14 22 20 15 15
120 120 30 20 15 15 2 106
(Brazilian Indians) (Brazilian Indians)
.851..
X81
APPENDIX II
PORTUGUESE FLEET FOR THE RECAPTURE (SALVADOR OF LUANDA,
12 MAY-26
GENERAL
AUGUST,
1648
CORREIA DA SX E BENEVIDES,
DA ARMADA DE SUA MAGESTADE.)
Nossa Senhora da Concei~do(capitana or flagship) Sdo Luis (almiranta) Santo Tomds Santa Margarida e Santa Marta Santo Antonio (urca) Caridade Nossa Senhora dos Remedios e Almas Santo Antonio (charrua) Pedra or Sao Pedro (English) Alexander (English) Santo Milagre Sao Gabriel Tres Reis Magos Nossa Senhora da Concei~doe Santo Antonio Nossa Senhora do Rosario e Sao Jodo de Deus
Clemente Martins M. Pacheco de Melo Luis Barbosa de Franga Manoel Pinheiro Alvaro de Novaes Jodo Soromenho Francisco Fernandes uncertain George Dobens (?) Joseph(?) Manoel Almeida Falcao Francisco Gomes da Vinha Gaspar Rubim Manoel Lopes Angino Antonio Vaz de Oliveira
The first five vessels were royal galleons and ships detached by Ant6nio Teles from the Armada Real at Bahia in January, 1648; the next six were freighted at Lisbon with the aid of Jewish capitalists, whilst the last four were freighted by Salvador Correia at Rio. The two last named seem to have been identical with the pinnaces nicknamed Gamela (trough) and Canoa (canoe) in Padre Couto's account. Estimates of the force on board this armada vary from 1,200 to 1,500, apart from volunteers. The grand total was probably nearer the latter figure, of whom about 1,100 reached Luanda.

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Salvador Correia de s e Benevides and the Reconquest of Angola in 1648 Author(s): C. R.

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE Sk E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA! E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

Brazilie (1645-1654)," Bijdragen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht, Deel XLVI (1925), a

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SX E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

SALVADOR CORREIA DE SA E BENEVIDES

(ADMIRAL CORNELIS JOL, NICKNAMED

120 120 30 20 15 15 2 106

(Brazilian Indians) (Brazilian Indians)

DA ARMADA DE SUA MAGESTADE.)

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