DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

84TH RADAR EVALUATION SQUADRON (ACC)

HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH

18M03

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON

THE UNITED STATES

ATTN: AF/XOH
.-19/11 Closed by Statute
9/11 Agency Internal Matters
FROM: 84RADES/CC
7976 Aspen Ave
Hill AFB UT 84056-5846

SUBJECT: DoD Document Request No. 5

1. Introduction. At the request of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, the 84th Radar Evaluation'Squadroh (84 RADBS) iarialyzed data from 13 Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA))United States Air Force (USAF) (adars and one Canadian Joint
Surveillance System radar providing coverage of the eastern portion of the United States on M
Sep 01 from 0930Z through 1630Z. Radars located at|

I provided primary^ (search) and secondary

(beacon)radar coverage. / \. Radar Constraints. The 14 radars provided covera

request from the Commission, data froni all of the fadars Was included in the creation of the
products. The primary range accuracy limitation for both s^archiand beacorj radar systems is ±
| [nmi due to the target-reporting format employed by the radar: system in the area of interest.
Azimuth accuracy is primarily a function of radar beamwidth that is limited to approximately
ij [degrees for both primary and secondary radar systems providing coverage in the area. Mode
C height accuracy is limited to dj [feet (for standard barometric pressure), which is the value of
the least significant bit in the Mode C altitude report. From the ARSR-4 radar specifications, the

a -mean-square (RMS) height error for primary radar returns is to be less than]
nmi. / ;
jft within
\n addition to these range, azimuth, and height accura

require! Tto complete each 360-dcgree azimuth , and the Jadar sites/
J and I Irequire [_ Jto complete each
360-degree azimuth scan. This relatively slow scan rate precludes precludes moment-by-moment,
contiguous aircraft positional information (i.e., precludes precise track statistics such as heading
and speed), particularly when aircraft are making rapid maneuvers. Because of these intrinsic
limitations, all radar plots illustrated in this report, on a scan-to-scan basis, should be considered
close approximations.

3. Challenges, compromises, and assumptions. To fulfill the requirements outlined in DoD

Document Request No. 5 (attachment 2), The 84 extracted data from over 11 million radar
messages. The data extracted consists of over 130,000 radar messages. One challenge of the
request was the need to separate military air traffic from civilian air traffic. However, due to the
lack of specific mode/code information for military aircraft, making a precise determination of
which aircraft are military and which are civilian had to be made by filtering the data to show
only aircraft squawking valid mode 2 codes (which only military aircraft are equipped to
squawk). Since military aircraft may or may not be squawking valid mode 2 codes it is probable
that there are military aircraft which are not depicted in the included products.

The request asks for inclusion of specific military aircraft including ANG flights, scrambles from
Otis ANG base, Langley AFB base, Andrews AFB, the flight of a C-130 with the call sign
Gopher 6, and the hijacked aircraft. Unfortunately, 84 RADES does not have access to the
modes/codes necessary to make positive identification of these aircraft. The codes that are
generally accepted to be associated with the hijacked aircraft and Gopher 6 have been used in the
included products. 84 RADES assumes these codes to be accurate, but cannot confirm their
veracity without written confirmation. Although certain military aircraft depicted in the included
products seem to be consistent with the request, 84 RADES cannot determine which aircraft may
be the scrambles from Otis, Langley, or Andrews, or which may be ANG flights. Thus all aircraft
that 84 RADES can confirm to be military are included.

4. Timing problem. While initially analyzing radar data from the NEADS and SEADS (in
2001), 84 RADES identified a timing problem with the Radar Data Interface System (RDIS) that
caused the NEADS data to be 25 seconds late. For any given radar message, add 25.3 seconds to
find the actual time of the radar message.

5. Description of products. The 84 RADES is providing six playbacks. Five of the playbacks
approximate, to the best of 84 RADES ability, the requested items. The sixth playback is an
unfiltered playback. Note: During replays map background boarders and symbol text are
partially erased as the radar plots pass over them. Activating or pressing the refresh button (F5)
will restore these features.

RS3 Playbacks. The red plots depict what is assumed to be American Airlines flight 11. The
orange plots depict what is assumed to be United Airlines flight 175. The purple plots depict
what is assumed to be United Airlines flight 93. The pink plots depict what is assumed to be
American Airlines flight 77. The blue plots depict what is assumed to be Gopher 6. The dark
green plots (military aircraft which are not within the primary areas of concern) and the gold
(olive green) plots depict military aircraft squawking valid mode 2 codes.
 File Name
AA Flight 77.RS3
Langley Activity. RS3
Otis Activity. RS3
New York Holding Pattern. RS3
Overall Scenario. RS3
Unfiltered Scenario. RS3
Description
RS3 playback of what appears to be AA Flight 77 from the time
it reappears as a primary radar return, Gopher 6, and military
aircraft in the Andrews and Langley areas.
RS3 playback of what appear to be military flights departing
and/or flying in the Langley area.
RS3 playback of what appears to be military flights departing
and/or flying in the Otis area, and what appears to be American
Airlines 11 and United Airlines 175.
An RS3 playback of what appears to be military flights
departing from and/or flying in the New York area.
RS3 playback depicting what appears to be the flights of all
hijacked aircraft and military flights.
RS3 playback showing the entire air picture (completely
unfiltered)

6. Using the Autoplay. The CD-ROM included with this letter features an "auto-play function;
that is, the CD-ROM will start playing automatically when inserted into a computer. The
recommended screen resolution for viewing the products is 1024 x 768. A tutorial on RS3 is
included and can be accessed by pressing the "View Advanced Options" button in the lower right
corner of the dialogue box. Follow the on-screen instructions.

7. Contacting 84 RADES. If you have other questions or need more information, please contact
TSgt Kevin Powell at DSN | | Commercial | | e-mail:
JorMr. Lanny Clclland | Commercial [_

9/11 Closed by Statute

9/11 Agency Internal Matters

RICHARD B. REHS, LT COL., USAF

Commander