Lecture 11 Defending the Lion City A. Introduction 1. Hardware: From suicide or surrender to most advanced military in SE Asia 2.

Heartware: Deep shared beliefs about what the imagined community should be 3. Content/Learning Outcomes: o Why is Singapore relatively secure yet still vulnerable? o o How did defence-related developments affect Singaporeans psychologically? Why has defence and National Service (NS) become a controversial topic in Singapore

1. Consider: o Are Singapores defence-related achievements something to be proud of? o How close is the relationship between hardware and heartware as far as defence-related nation-building is concerned? Has NS been more of an inclusive bonding or a divisive experience for Singaporeans over time?

B.

Developing the means to secure Singapore Grim Beginnings in 1965: A. Poor relations with neighbours: A. Aftermath of expulsion from Malaysia: Tengku Abdul Rahman: All we have to do is turn off the tap Gazali Shafie: Crawl back to Malaysia on their terms Malay Ultras unhappy with Separation. Did not want to lose Singapore BG Alsagoff commanded Malaysian 4th Brigade in Singapore until 1967 Insisted on escorting LKY to opening session of parliament Independence on sufferance?

B. Aftermath of Konfrontasi with Indonesia: 1965: Reports of massacres of Chinese in Jakarta after failed communist coup General Suhartos (new Indonesian leader) attitude unclear: Ended konfrontasi officially in 1966 Chinese language and culture heavily curtailed Singapore executed 2 commandos who planted bomb at MacDonald House in 1968 despite President Suhartos personal appeal for clemency

Took time to normalize relations

B. Meager capabilities: SAF set up in 1965 Air Force: Great airfields, no airplanes or anti-aircraft defence Navy: Biggest and most advanced Naval Base, two training craft Army: 2 Regular battalions (1SIR & 2 SIR) deployed outside Singapore as part of Malaysian Armed Forces. High percentage of Malaysian personnel Little money to spare, Chinese majority traditionally shun soldiering

C. Allies: Br announced withdrawal of all military units in 1968 by 1971 instead of 1975: NS needs time to train enough soldiers Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) = Australia, NZ, UK, Malaysia and Singapore. To consult if threat to Malaysia and/or Singapore arises. Small Australian and NZ land and air units in Singapore and Penang Little contact with USA: Embroiled in Vietnam India and Egypt declined to help Singapore set up defence force. Accepted Israels offer

Unpopular measures: Universal male conscription for compulsory NS from 1967 2 years full-time NS plus reserve training until age 40 (45-50 for officers) Exemptions for hardship cases originally poorly processed Allowance very low (less than $100/month for recruits-officer cadets)

D. Government leaders not confident of loyalty of largely Malay soldiers Conveniently forgot to call up Malays for NS Quietly sidelined and retired best soldiers Singapore had (mostly Malay) Dissatisfaction:

Spent large sums on aircraft and air defence before Br withdrawal in 1971

Strategy: Poison Shrimp Promise to inflict pain on aggressor even if we cannot win Lee Hsien Loong: Surrender or suicide!

 Upgrade to hedgehog (Forward Defence) Late 1970s/Early 1980s: Bought surplus tanks from Israel/France well ahead of Malaysia Upgraded Navy (when funds allowed) and especially Air Force NS started to produce large numbers of quick-to-mobilize citizen soldiers

Forward Defence: Fight outside Singapore by occupying/defending surrounding territory when attack imminent:

Inherent Weaknesses A. Lack of strategic depth: No recovery if taken by surprise: No space to retreat and regroup intact Cannot adopt a purely defensive strategy: Opponent can easily subdue Singapore without invading: E.g. Blockade and bombard

B. Limited stamina: Not self-sufficient in most strategic items No combat experience, citizens needed for much else

C. Diversity and double minority: Little Red Chinese-majority Dot in a Green Malay Sea Internal diversity can be exploited to undermine security

D. Need to overcome inherent weaknesses by creating and maintaining countervailing strengths: High military spending: Capped at 6% of GDP, up to 1/3 of budget Superior numbers and quality of trained men and equipment Mobilizes and moves much faster than most: 6 hours of less Maximum possible power in crucial opening round of war

NOTE: Forward defence overcomes surrender or suicide scenarios but still requires timely third party help to end war

Growing Confidence Lee Hsien Loong: If you come I`ll whack you and I`ll survive!

DPM Mahathir asked LKY what Singapores tanks were for. LKY: Escort engineers to repair Singapores water supply [in Johore] if in a moment of madness the water supply was disrupted

NOTE: From 1978 (Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea/Cambodia) onwards, Singapore also began to conceive of fighting with Malaysia and Thailand against Vietnamese invasion in the same manner that British had envisioned in WW2 and the Cold War.

Standing Tall: 1975: Singapore backed down after abstaining from UN vote on Indonesian annexation of E.Timor. LKY half-apologised and hoped President Suharto understood Singapores position as a small-state

- 1986: Israeli President Herzog visit to Singapore. Malaysia and small group of Singapore protestors (Angkatam Islam) demanded cancellation of visit. Singapore stood its ground - 1991 joint Indonesian-Malaysian paratroop exercise in Johore. SAF mobilised in a show of operational readiness

The 3rd Generation SAF (Knockout blow in Round one) Mid-1990s onwards Advanced Command and Control, weapons and joint fighting capabilities (RMA) Overwhelming superiority in technology and numbers (first-line)

Aim: Swift and decisive victory over adversary WITHOUT NEED for favourable third-party intervention

The mission of MINDEF and the Singapore Armed Forces is to enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor.

Why still vulnerable? The Golden Rule and the Art of War A. Tim Huxley: Victory is by no means certain: Expect a competent opponent Know your adversary, know yourself A skilled adversary will drag out a fight for as long as possible to make Singapores strength irrelevant. Strategic depth and superior stamina can absorb swift and decisive campaigns even if forces smaller and less well-equipped

B. Limited size: SAF cannot maintain regional peace and stability or handle global power

Diplomacy and Deterrence: Not looking for a fight

No such thing as a profitable war for Singapore Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) E.g. Operation Flying Eagle: Not life-takers but life-givers

Joint training and overseas training Only global powers exercise in and with as many countries as SAF does Making as many friends as possible even as we build up military capabilities

Active diplomacy Be active in global forums: Maintain high profile and do favours Influence international law in favour of small states Maintain access to multiple sources of supply

Make it as hard as possible to pick a fight with Singapore o Overwhelming force on our side in any situation: In terms of its foreign policy, Singapores strategy has been to always cultivate a maximum of friends and ensure a minimum of enemies, as Rajaratnam once put it. From among those friends, Singapore would need to always have overwhelming power on our side, in the words of Singapores founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew -Emrys Chew

Borrowing power without losing sovereignty/freedom of action

United States: US strategic forces use Singapores military bases e.g. Changi Naval Base Privileged access to advanced technology Strategic partner in Global War on Terror Need not agree with US on Liberal values vs Asian values debate. Will vote against US in UN when Singapores interest calls for it

Peoples Republic of China (PRC): LKYs policy of constructive engagement with PRC under Deng Xiaoping: Peaceful rise of PRC in everyones interest Very close economic and diplomatic but not military co-operation Prevent Singapore from looking like Third China Maintains military training bases with Taiwan (Republic of China)

Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) Engages USA, PRC and other global players as part of a regional bloc Acts ahead of ASEAN when it needs to

The Big Powers can keep one another in check and will prevent any one of them from dominating the region, and so allow small states to survive in the interstices between them. Lee Hsien Loong

Why is diplomacy not enough? A clever opponent will attack Singapore only when its friends and allies are busy: Japan during World War Two. Are you willing to wait 3.5 years for help to arrive? Must not appear to be unreliable or unserious partner. Creates resentment in countries providing help

Singapore is relatively secure because it takes extraordinary effort to engineer and maintain relative strengths to overcome inherent weaknesses. This includes generating, borrowing and balancing power to: Make war as unlikely as possible Maximize immediate availability of power Maximize favourable balance of power should our own not be enough

Psychological Effects A secure, defended homeland with a high measure of confidence and respect o o Freedom from effective intimidation (external) Especially in older generation that experienced armed conflicts and bullying

A rite of passage for every Singaporeans son: A. Boys into men: Endurance, Toughness, Duty and Loyalty A sense of growth and achievement. We have gone through hell and emerged tougher to talk about it A badge of honour: I should be treated with dignity and respect B. The great equalizer: Ego-bruising experience for every recruit C. Unity in diversity: Putting young Singaporeans of all ethnic groups, educational backgrounds and social classes together. They sleep, eat, work in close proximity and succeed or get punished together in a controlled environment

D. Comradeship, camaraderie and army stories: The buddy system Unit loyalty and pride Common experience, fun and hardship overcome

Making the imagined community Total Defence (TD): Whole of nation strategy: The other 4 aspects of National Defence: 1. Civil defence: Bomb shelters, emergency services including war-time rationing, evacuation and rescue, hazardous material response Make sure soldiers families taken care of while they are away at war First aid training, collecting water, emergency broadcast and procedures

2. Economic defence: Civil resource requisitioning Strategic storage of food, fuel, medical supplies etc at states disposal in emergency Emergency stockpiles and food production to keep economy running in emergency Upgrade skills to stay economically relevant and productive

3. Psychological defence: Want to and believe that Singapore can be defended. Not easily intimidated by enemy propaganda 4. Social defence: Take care of less fortunate. Believe in racial tolerance and harmony Exercises and commemoration: Civil resource mobilization, water rationing, Total Defence Day 15th Feb, Racial Harmony Day (July)

Tie-in with other aspects of nation-building o o The economy: Defence an insurance policy to keep investor and citizen confidence high FDI: Give other countries a stake in our safety and success Those who serve NS given perks and special rebates Publicity and recognition for employers who support reserve-training Education and housing: NE and uniformed groups to prepare youth for NS Sense of defending own property and interests

Civic society: E.g. Blood and charity donation drives in NS

C. Controversies in defence and National Service The ever increasing cost of defending the Lion City: o Figures: Up to 1/3 of budget (all aspects), 6% GDP FY2013: S$12.3 bil. @24% of budget. Largest in SE Asia. Contrasted with reluctance to create welfare state

The crisis mentality o No clear and present danger. A propaganda/hegemony ploy? Will not oppose government Paranoia of a few key leaders?

Backsliding on integration? o Not so universal after all? Malays/Muslims quietly excluded from NS from 1967. Later posted to Police and Civil defence units @ late 1970s/early 1980s 1980s onwards: Mainly infantry and service units Still excluded from high security and sensitive units, though this is progressively being rolled back.

o -

Glass ceiling for Malays? Malays under-represented as Officers Only one Muslim general

o -

Scholar platoons: Recruits from elite secondary institutions grouped together instead of being mixed randomly: Operational requirement/administrative ease?

o -

Farmer vs Scholar: Scholars spend very little time in command positions (fast-tracked) Meritocracy: Is a more highly qualified officer a better soldier? Farmers with glass ceilings.

Training ground for high government appointments. Unprofessional elitism?

o -

White Horse privileges: Youths from privileged backgrounds SAFSA: National sportsmen pes C?

o -

Careerism: Soldiering no longer a mission but another career choice Managers rather than inspirational leaders Linked to lower esteem of NSFs for their NCOs and Officers

Tie in with other aspects of nation-building: What are our citizen soldiers defending? o Influx of new migrants, Permanent Residents (PRs) and Foreign Talent (FT) Feeling that new arrivals not sincere about becoming Singaporeans. Second-generation will serve but...

Cancel PR/Citizenship when time to serve NS Obtain medical excuse through contacts in home country

o -

Increasing feeling that citizens have obligations but not consummate rights Increasing crowding and competition for housing and jobs Employers prefer cheaper foreigners with no reservist duty

Increased media attention o Scandals: E.g. Dr Patrick Tan Dr Tony Tans son received unusually long deferment etc. Lee Hong Yi protest Email (2007): LT X and repeated AWOL going unpunished

Sprout debate over PMs sons arrogance rather than LT X behaviour Maid carry fullpack picture

o -

Accidents/Tragedies: 4 Commandos charged over death of NS Sergeant (2008) during survival training

Suggested lack of care for soldier: Suicides, deaths and lack of reporting on servicemen incidents

Suggested lack of transparency, accountability: Voice of the people, sensationalism or government-bashing?

Survey of the internet:

1) Complain threads: Have other complains about life Serving NS to protect elite/foreign talent/MNCs Serving NS to massage ego of careerist regulars No love for country, why must serve?

2) Mixed forums: Most common Its all about the attitude: Sympathetic to those who hate NS. Counters with very personal positive accounts

3) Nostalgic Threads: Touching reminiscing

D. Conclusion Singapores defence-related hardware achievements are rather remarkable and enviable, though not invincible o Comes at a high cost: Economic, political and personal o Heartware experiencing diminishing returns: Generational difference in experiences Backsliding policies Lack of knowledge of what hardware brings Is the sacrifice worthwhile? Objective answer: As with economic growth, sacrifice and discipline seem necessary for the common good. In this case, tweak the execution of policies Subjective answer: Does it not depend on what your personal experience of NS and/or life in Singapore is like? o

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