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No.

342 April 29, 1999

IS READINESS OVERRATED?
Implications for a Tiered Readiness
Force Structure

by James L. George

Executive Summary
Readiness, the capability to respond quickly to unit fairly easily routed by the North Koreans at
a conflict with the appropriate force, is considered the start of the Korean War, and the Hollow Force
one of the most important elements in defense of the 1970s when, for example, ships could not
planning. From one-third to well over one-half of get under way for lack of experienced crew and
the defense budget goes toward maintaining readi- spare parts.
ness. Few people questioned the need for readi- A closer look shows that readiness was only one
ness, especially after the attack by North Korea of many factors behind the rout of Task Force
against South Korea in 1950 and during the Cold Smith and the Hollow Force. Moreover, a broader
War, when the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact was poised examination shows those examples to be as much
to quickly thrust into Western Europe without cases “for” as “against” tiered readiness. With no
much warning. major threats on the horizon until at least 2015,
However, with the Cold War over, the notion of only those forces needed for crisis response or an
“tiered readiness”—with some units less ready than initial response to a Major Theater War are needed.
others and the increased use of reserve forces—has Other forces could be placed in the reserves, elimi-
been suggested. Opponents cite two major exam- nated, or placed in an inactive “mothball” status.
ples in arguing against any decreases in readiness: This means that more emphasis should be placed
Task Force Smith, which was a green U.S. Army on maintaining the readiness of the reserve force.

________________________________________________________________________________

James L. George, currently a freelance writer, is a former congressional professional staff member for nation-
al security affairs.
Readiness is Is total active-duty force readiness needed,
defined by the Introduction and can more functions be placed in the
reserves? (Note: Throughout the paper,
Joint Chiefs of Readiness is defined by the Joint Chiefs of unless otherwise specified, the term “re-
Staff as the ability Staff (JCS) as the ability of forces to deploy serves” is used for both the National Guard
quickly and perform initially in wartime as and the reserve forces of the individual ser-
of forces to they were designed to do.1 Readiness is con- vices.) Even the two Major Theater Wars
deploy quickly sidered one of the most important elements (MTWs) against Iraq and North Korea—
and perform ini- of military capability. Even though readiness which are the cornerstone of U.S. military
is actually only one of four elements of over- planning—look more remote. Saddam
tially in wartime all military capability, its importance renders Hussein’s military is in shambles, and North
as they were it the subject of most of the current debates Korea is unable even to feed itself.
designed to do. on defense. Depending on how it is counted, One of the few new ideas for a post–Cold
at least one-third of the current defense bud- War force structure is the proposal by Sen.
get is spent on the readiness—or the opera- John McCain (R-Ariz.) for tiered readiness.
tions and maintenance—portion of the bud- The senator advocated making some forces
get. That percentage reaches well over 50 per- more ready than others or placing more
cent if other related items such as personnel forces in the reserves, or both.2 Former sena-
costs are included. Besides generally better tor Gary Hart of Colorado has gone even fur-
equipment, perhaps nothing separates the ther in his recent book, The Minuteman. He
U.S. armed forces from other military forces suggests “restoring an army of the people” by
more than their high state of readiness. Many relying heavily on the reserves.3
military experts would consider the latter Opponents of any decrease in readiness
more important than the former. cite two major examples of unreadiness. The
Few people have really questioned the first is Task Force Smith—which was a hasti-
concept of readiness since World War II and ly dispatched, unprepared U.S. Army unit
the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. During sent from Japan to South Korea in the early
the Cold War, with the Soviet-led Warsaw days of the Korean War. Task Force Smith
Pact quite literally poised next door to strike was routed by the North Korean Army.
into Western Europe with little or no warn- Second is the so-called Hollow Force of the
ing, readiness was an important issue—espe- 1970s when, for example, ships were unable
cially after the sneak attack by the North to get under way for lack of spare parts and
Koreans on South Korea in 1950. The impor- adequately trained and experienced crews.
tance of readiness has been illustrated time However, a closer look at both of those
and time again: smaller, well-trained Israeli cases reveals a different picture. Readiness
forces easily defeated larger, ill-trained Arab per se was only one of many factors that
armies; a small, elite British force far from caused the problems and may not have even
home defeated Argentinean conscripts in the been the most important. In fact, those
Falklands; and well-trained, U.S.-led forces examples may well support the case “for”
easily vanquished Iraq, which, at least on tiered readiness. However, before we turn to
paper, looked like a formidable force. those implications, a closer look at readiness
Readiness is certainly important. In fact, if definitions and measures, as well as Task
military leaders had a choice between first- Force Smith and the Hollow Force, is needed.
rate equipment and first-rate readiness, most
would probably choose the latter.
However, with the end of the Cold War What Is Readiness?
and no major threat on the horizon until at
least 2015—according to the Pentagon’s own As Richard Betts explains in his book
assessment—two questions have been raised: Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Conse-

2
quences4—which is by far the most exhaustive force structure to perform its assigned
study of readiness concepts—readiness is missions promptly. Readiness is con-
often used in two senses. One sense is proba- cerned with such issues as the ability of a
bly too broad and one is perhaps too narrow. tactical air squadron to deliver bombs to
In the broad sense, it is used as a synonym for a target or to engage in anti-aircraft war-
military capabilities as a whole. However, the fare, or the ability of a destroyer to con-
Pentagon considers readiness only one of duct anti-submarine warfare.8
four elements or pillars on which military
capability rests: There is really nothing new about readi-
ness. Sun Tzu (400–320 B.C.), in his classic
• Force Structure: The number, size, and The Art of War, wrote, “It is a doctrine of war
composition of military units. not to assume the enemy will not come, but
• Modernization: The technical sophisti- rather to rely on one’s readiness to meet him;
cation of the forces, weapon systems, not to presume that he will not attack, but
and equipment. rather to make one’s self invincible.” That is a
• Sustainability: The “staying power” of broad definition of readiness. Napoleon in
the forces measured in days. his Maxims of War expressed a narrower con-
• Readiness: The immediate ability to exe- cept: “An army should be ready, every day,
The proposal by
cute a designated combat mission.5 every night, and at all times of the day and Sen. John McCain
night, to give all resistance of which it is capa- (R -Ariz.) for tiered
While there is an obvious relationship among ble.” Perhaps the most famous narrow defin-
those elements, they are nevertheless sepa- ition is the homey (but usually misquoted) readiness advocat-
rate. For example, a single ship might be able wisdom of Confederate general Nathan ed making some
to respond to a crisis but have limited capa- Forrest to “git thar fustest with the mostest.”9
bilities to achieve sustained success. Readiness also plays a large part in the par-
forces more ready
Readiness has been defined in several lance of two U.S. military organizations. The than others or
ways. Some definitions, as Betts pointed out, Marines use the slogan “First to Fight,” placing more
are fairly broad and synonymous with overall which was first popularized in World War I.
military capabilities—for example, the “bal- The official motto of the U.S. Coast Guard is forces in the
ancing of manpower, investment, and opera- Semper Paratus (always ready). reserves.
tions and maintenance expenditures that Although most definitions are fairly sim-
produce the force structure capability of ple and narrow, Betts raises three other ques-
rapid, sustained and ultimate full response.”6 tions that are important when considering
However, most definitions are more narrow, readiness: Readiness for when? Readiness for
focusing on the ability to respond quickly. what?10 Readiness of what? During the Cold
Some examples follow. War, with the superpower Soviet Union next
door in Europe, the answers to those ques-
• The ability of forces, units, weapon sys- tions were not that important. But in the
tems, or equipment to deliver the out- more confused world of the early 21st centu-
puts for which they are designed . . . ry, the answers deserve more study because of
[and] to deploy and employ without their implications for tiered readiness.
unacceptable delays. In sum, although there are broad defini-
• The capacity to perform missions when tions that almost equate readiness with total
directed to do so. 7 military capabilities, use of the term “readi-
• A force’s ability to fight with little or no ness” is best restricted to the capability to
warning. respond quickly with the appropriate force
• The fraction of a force that can be com- with little or no warning.
mitted to a fight without unacceptable
delays and acquit itself well. Measurements
• The ability of the currently configured Although the definitions of readiness are

3
fairly simple, actual measurements of readi- not combat ready because it is undergo-
ness are more complex and have many sub- ing substantial maintenance.11
jective and intangible elements. There appear
to be some fairly solid, objective indicators of Overall readiness is reported at a level consis-
readiness—such as the number of qualified tent with the lowest rated resource level. That
personnel in a unit or a plane or ship being is, a division with only one battalion below
“down.” But even those indicators often get par can get a lower rating. On the other hand,
complex or subjective. For example, a unit commanders are allowed to subjectively
might show the requisite number of quali- upgrade or downgrade the overall ratings.
fied personnel, but their effectiveness might Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary
be undermined if they were on drugs or of defense for manpower, breaks readiness
morale was poor (as was the case for the down into two major parts, each with two ele-
Hollow Force). Another example of ambigui- ments:
ty is whether a ship with only one of several
radar systems down is ready or not. • material readiness consisting of (1)
The Pentagon uses a procedure called the material inventories and (2) material
Status of Resources and Training System to conditions and
measure readiness. Units report their overall • personnel readiness consisting of (1)
readiness status, as well as the status of four personnel inventories and (2) training.12
resource areas: personnel, equipment and
supplies on hand, equipment condition, and However, there are also some more intan-
training. The readiness status of a unit is gible, yet important, measures that are even
then reported by assigning “C” levels: harder to evaluate and quantify—for exam-
ple, some of the terrible morale problems of
• C-1: The unit can undertake the full the Hollow Force, such as rampant drug use.
wartime mission for which it is orga- The Marines have tried to capture that com-
nized or designed; that is, it is fully com- plexity by illustrating readiness as a series of
bat ready. overlapping circles that represent training,
• C-2: The unit can undertake the bulk of people, individual units, morale, confidence,
its wartime mission; that is, it is sub- public support, operations tempo, equip-
stantially combat ready with only ment, age of equipment, and unit sustain-
minor deficiencies. ment (for example, ammunition).13
• C-3: The unit can undertake major por- In short, although some objective mea-
Measurements of tions of its wartime mission; that is, it is sures exist, important subjective qualifiers
marginally combat ready (it has major are needed. As former secretary of defense Les
readiness are deficiencies) but can still perform its Aspin has commented, “The first problem in
complex and have assigned missions. addressing the issue of readiness is that there
many subjective • C-4: The unit requires additional is no simple way to define what readiness
resources or training to undertake its is.”14 The General Accounting Office has con-
and intangible wartime mission. But if the situation cluded, “[Status of Resources and Training
elements. dictates, it may be required to under- System] does not capture all the factors that
take portions of the mission with exist- DOD considers critical to a comprehensive
ing resources. In short, the unit is not readiness analysis, such as operating tempo
combat ready because it has so many and personnel morale.”15
deficiencies; it cannot perform its func- Thus, given all the problems of measuring
tions. readiness—including a certain element of
• C-5: The unit, for example, a ship in subjectivity—it is important to analyze more
overhaul, is not prepared to undertake concrete examples and case studies. The two
its wartime mission; that is, the unit is cases most often cited are Task Force Smith

4
and the Hollow Force of the mid to late under his command—to respond. Among the Opponents of any
1970s. first groups to arrive in Korea on July 1st were decrease in readi-
two companies (totaling 406 men) com-
manded by Lt. Col. Charles “Brad” Smith. ness cite two
Task Force Smith
Reconsidered Those companies were only lightly armed major
with—besides their rifles and machine guns— examples—Task
The Task Force Smith incident is impor- four 75-mm recoilless rifles, four 4.2-inch
tant for two reasons. First, it is cited—usually mortars, four 60-mm mortars, and ten 2.36 Force Smith in
by the Army—as one of the two major exam- bazooka rocket launchers (which were con- the Korean War
ples of the consequences of not being ready. sidered obsolete and ineffective against
Retired Army Colonel and syndicated mili- tanks). In addition, a small battery of six 105- and the Hollow
tary columnist Harry Summers has written mm artillery (with 124 men) was assigned, Force of the
over a dozen commentaries on Task Force but it had only six rounds of anti-tank 1970s.
Smith since the end of the Cold war.16 “No ammunition. That small force of 540
More Task Force Smiths” has become a Americans was gloriously labeled “Task Force
mantra for the Army. But Task Force Smith is Smith.” The local commander, Maj. Gen.
actually more important for another reason. William F. Dean, sent them forward with
The Task Force Smith response to the North orders to simply show themselves. There was
Korean attack on South Korea is, in fact, the a feeling that the mere appearance of
only strategic example in the history of the American troops would stop the North
United States where readiness—the ability of Korean Peoples Army (NKPA).
forces to deploy quickly and perform initially Smith deployed his forces forward on July
in wartime—was truly needed. There are 4th. But the 406 troops, backed up by a small
other examples of strategic sneak attacks— artillery battery, could only cover a limited
such as the one on Pearl Harbor—but no front. The next day, Task Force Smith was
immediate counterstrike was needed. confronted by an NKPA armored regiment
Because of the strategic invulnerability of the led by 33 T-34 tanks. Despite the lack of ade-
United States (resulting from the vast buffer quate anti-tank weapons, Task Force Smith
of the Pacific Ocean), the nation had the lux- withstood the initial tank assault and
ury of taking time to build up forces while destroyed four tanks. During that armored
conducting a slow island-hopping war assault, most of Smith’s troops performed
against the Japanese. During wartime, there well. Although many of the inexperienced
are many tactical examples of surprise artillerymen ran, the artillery officers and
attack—the most famous being the Battle of noncommissioned officers stood their
the Bulge in World War II. But Korea is the ground. Task Force Smith was then attacked
only really bolt-out-of-the-blue strategic by the NKPA infantry and fought well for
attack that required an immediate tactical almost seven hours. Finally outflanked and
response. Therefore, a full analysis of all the afraid of being overrun, Smith ordered a
factors behind the rout of Task Force Smith withdrawal. Here is where the trouble really
is important. However, before the analysis, a began. The troops were ordered to pull out
brief description of what happened to Task with one company covering another, but one
Force Smith is helpful. of the platoons failed to get the word. That
platoon found itself isolated and the men
Background simply “bugged out” with many leaving their
North Korea invaded South Korea on weapons behind.
June 25, 1950. Almost immediately, on June
27th, President Truman decided to intervene A Closer Look
and ordered Gen. Douglas MacArthur—then While there is no question that the Task
stationed in Japan with four Army divisions Force Smith episode was not the U.S. Army’s

5
finest hour, there were many factors leading budgets could afford to maintain. It was not
to its so-called rout. Readiness per se was real- just a hollow force but, in the opinion of
ly only one—and not even the most impor- many, a mere shadow of a force.
tant. There were ten factors, seven major and American forces in the theater were not
three minor, that explain the defeat of Task much better. The Eighth Army in Japan had
Force Smith and other U.S. battalions at the four divisions at less than full strength.
beginning of the Korean War. Readiness Furthermore, from 1945 to early 1949, that
would rank as about the fifth of the major force was strictly an occupation force that
factors. conducted virtually no training. By mid-1949
A Superior NKPA. The NKPA had a larger, both the American forces in Japan and the
well-trained, and well-equipped army. Critics ROK Army were starting to undergo training
of Task Force Smith usually fail to mention to increase their readiness, but in June 1950
that the NKPA was a very capable, well- the training was barely under way.
equipped force of some 135,000 men. It con- Underestimation of the Enemy. The United
sisted of over ten divisions: seven were con- States underestimated the enemy, one of the
sidered combat ready and three were newly most basic of all military mistakes. Even
activated. Also, about one-third of the force those who should have known better made
Poor readiness was veterans of the Chinese civil war. In addi- that mistake. Clay Blair, the author of The
was only one of tion, there was an armored brigade equipped Forgotten War: America in Korea, states that
with Russian T-34 tanks. All told, the NKPA MacArthur “was guilty of grossly underesti-
the many factors had 150 tanks, which would prove crucial in mating the capabilities of the enemy.”17 Maj.
leading to the the early days. The North Korean Air Force Gen. William F. Dean, commander of the
rout of Task had 200 Yak-9 fighters and Il-10 ground- 24th Army Division that first deployed to
attack bombers. When the Russians departed Korea, thought the engagement would be
Force Smith. North Korea in 1948, they left behind a well- “short and easy.”18 As Task Force Smith
trained army, which they continued to sup- moved to the front, its members had an
port. “overconfidence that bordered on arro-
By contrast, when the Americans departed gance,” according to one observer.19
the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, they Two days after the rout of Task Force
left behind a 50,000-man paramilitary con- Smith, Dean wrote to MacArthur, “I am con-
stabulary armed with only light weapons. By vinced that the North Korean Army, the
1950 South Korean president Syngman Rhee North Korean soldier and his status of train-
had built a 95,000-man army, but it had no ing and the quality of his equipment have
armor and only a few smaller artillery pieces. been underestimated.”20 Unfortunately, the
Despite repeated requests by Rhee, the generals would make the same mistakes for
United States refused to supply South Korea several more weeks. Perhaps the worst state-
with tanks, heavy artillery, or planes. There ment of underestimation was President
were fears that Rhee might attack North Truman’s off-hand remark to a reporter
Korea—which he had threatened to do—and (which he would come to regret) that this was
Washington did not want to give him the a “police action.”
means of doing so. First Engagement Syndrome. There is an old
In general, American forces were not military saying that “every unit breaks on ini-
much better off. The U.S. Army had ten divi- tial contact.” Unfortunately, that seems to be
sions manned at less than full strength; the an old American trait. In both the Revol-
Air Force had 48 air groups that were under- utionary War and the War of 1812, the
strength; and the Navy had about 250 ships— United States lost most of the early engage-
only about half of which were at full strength ments. It took the Union Army over a year to
and ready. The force was larger than win a major battle. In World War I, it took
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson’s defense over a year to get the Army ready. In World

6
War II, the Army lost its first major engage- today—and then panicked.
ment at the Kasserine Pass. But it is not real- Initially Bad Command. Although Task
ly surprising that the aggressor nation invari- Force Smith is usually singled out as the
ably wins the early battles. Besides having the major disaster, other battalions also per-
element of surprise, the attacker has the formed poorly in the first weeks of the
option of choice and is usually better pre- Korean War. The next unit to face the NKPA
pared. In short, the defeat of Task Force was the 34th Infantry Battalion, the perfor-
Smith followed a long military (and mance of which was “considerably more
American) tradition of losing the early battles inglorious than that of Task Force Smith.”22
of wars.21 It was not until the Pusan defense perimeter
Bad Position. Task Force Smith was first was established in early August 1950 that
outgunned by NKPA armor and outnum- American battalions stopped being routed.
bered by NKPA infantry. Even worse, the task Blair criticizes the American leadership for
force was in a bad position alone out in front sacrificing battalions piecemeal instead of
of other friendly forces. In the same situation, establishing a good defense perimeter.23
the eventual results would have been the U.S. Forces Not Prepared for Tank Battles.
same, whether the group was a green Task During the early weeks of the war, the NKPA
Force Smith or an elite group like the 82nd had tanks and the allies did not. The reason
Airborne or the Rangers. In fact, in 1990 the was that Korea was not considered “tank
82nd Airborne was in a similar situation country.” That was one reason why the South
when it was initially deployed in Desert Korean Army was not given tanks and why
Shield. Fortunately, the Iraqi armored units U.S. tanks were not sent earlier. The U.N.
did not attack. If they had, the military had forces had no armor until the Marines
contingency plans to evacuate the 82nd arrived with their Patton tanks. Not provid-
Airborne by sea, just as British troops were ing some of the thousands of Sherman tanks
from Dunkirk, France. And, 43 years later, a left over from World War II to the ROK Army
group of Rangers found themselves in a sim- was questionable. Modernized medium
ilar situation in Somalia; unfortunately 18 Sherman tanks were finally sent to Korea and
died. Yet no one is writing about “No More performed well.
82nd Airborne” or “No More Rangers.” The above are the seven major reasons for
Readiness. There is no question that a bet- the failure of Task Force Smith and other
ter trained unit with better weapons—such as battalions in the initial weeks of the Korean
3.5-inch rocket launchers instead of obsolete War. There are also three other minor rea-
2.36-inch bazookas—would have performed sons: In Korea, under
better. But performance probably would have Commanders’ Lack of Combat Experience.
improved only on the margins. By today’s The commanders had little—or limited— the worst condi-
standards, Task Force Smith probably would combat experience even though it was only tions, it took the
have been rated C-3 at best and maybe even five years since World War II. Many had spent
C-4—that is, not combat ready due to lack of their time in staff jobs in that war. Even those
supposedly
proper training and equipment. Considering with experience had fought in the more open unready U.S.
that rating, Task Force Smith performed terrain of Europe. That lack of experience military only four
remarkably well. Much is sometimes made of showed; several battalion and regimental
the obsolete 2.36-inch anti-tank bazookas, leaders were fired in the first months of the months to defeat
but Task Force Smith actually withstood the war. the well-trained
initial armor assault. The real problem, as Commanders Too Old. Many U.S. comman- North Korean
noted, occurred during the withdrawal. Even ders in the Korean War were simply too old.
here the problem was that one platoon was Blair places great emphasis on the fact that army.
not fully informed of the retreat—a classic many of the Army commanders were too old
communications problem that is still found for field commands.24 While battalion com-

7
Compared with manders are usually lieutenant colonels in Inchon amphibious landing that outflanked
its performance their mid-30s and regimental commanders the NKPA. By all measures, amphibious land-
colonels in their early 40s, in Korea many ings are considered one of the most complex
in most other were well into their 40s and even 50s. (This military operations and can only be conduct-
American wars, was not, incidentally, the problem with Task ed by ready, well-trained troops.
Force Smith because Smith was only 34.) NKPA Routed. Then, after Inchon, it took
the U.S. military Unfortunately, this also seems to be an another month to push the NKPA back to
did remarkably American tradition. In the early years of the 38th parallel. By early November some
well even though World War II, Gen. George Marshall had to American forces had reached the Yalu River.
cull the Army officer corps—often firing old Thus, in a little over four months, the war
it was a shadow friends who were simply too old. The Navy was—or should have been—over. It was the
force in 1950. had to relieve some older, less aggressive ship intervention of the Chinese that changed the
commanders early in that War. situation.
Inadequate Air Cover. Finally, Blair cites the Chinese Intervention Checked. Even with the
lack of air support in the early days of the massive Chinese intervention, the U.S.-led
Korean conflict. He criticizes the Air Force forces generally responded well. Unlike the
for its penchant for first clearing the skies earlier routs during the initial NKPA attacks,
and bombing enemy air fields instead of con- these withdrawals were usually orderly. In
ducting close air support of ground forces short, the U.S. military had learned well.
and attacking the NKPA tanks.25 This prob- There were still some mistakes. For example,
lem was later rectified. Interestingly, once even when it was obvious that the Chinese
again, it was the Marines who showed the had intervened, Maj. Gen. Edward M.
way. When the first Marine unit arrived, it Almond, commander of the X Corps, sent yet
had tanks and close air support. another task force—Task Force MacLean—
forward to attack. The task force was deci-
A Broader Look mated when withdrawing, but it was not
In addition to failing to look at all the fac- routed. A British force was similarly decimat-
tors that went into the demise of Task Force ed, but much of the blame lies with the “stiff
Smith, critics of the task force make an even upper lip” attitude of the commander—who
worse mistake. They fail to take a step back failed to notify his superiors of his true
and take a broader look. Such an examina- plight.
tion provides evidence that the experience of Korea Was Always a Sideshow. The Korean
Task Force Smith supports rather than War was always considered peripheral—with
undermines the case for tiered readiness. the real communist offensive expected to
The Situation Stabilized in Only a Month. Task come in Europe. There were also fears that
Force Smith was routed on July 5th, but only the Soviet Union might attack Japan. If that
a month later—on August 4th—the Pusan happened, there were contingency plans to
perimeter was established. Although a few abandon Korea and return the Eighth Army
more weeks of intense fighting ensued, by to defend Japan. Even during the war, the
about the middle of August the outcome was best equipment often went to Europe or
really no longer in doubt. The NKPA was remained in the United States. For example,
spent. Stabilizing the military situation in although the F-86 Sabre jets were the only
only a month after a sneak attack by a ready, planes that could take on the MiGs, major
well-equipped enemy is remarkable. But that debates erupted about sending them to
was only the beginning. Korea.
Inchon. What critics forget to mention is Stalemate a Political Decision. Finally, most
that on September 15th—only two and a half people remember the Korean War as a three-
months after the rout of Task Force Smith— year “stalemate,” but that was a political, not
U.S. forces were able to conduct the famous a military, decision and had nothing to do

8
with the readiness of American forces to perienced personnel and lack of spare parts
respond. and munitions (“empty bins”). In fact, there
In sum, any military that can stabilize the are at least ten different factors that con-
situation within a month after a sneak tributed to the Hollow Force of the 1970s.
attack, conduct a complex amphibious land- Before we get to them, a brief explanation is
ing in two and a half months, conquer the needed of what might be called the semioffi-
enemy’s homeland in four months, and then cial definition of the Hollow Force.
respond to massive attack from the largest
army in the world is not a totally unready The Hollow Force
military. In Desert Storm, it took the U.S. In 1980 the term “Hollow Force” was
military—still at high states of readiness from coined by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward
the Cold War—six months to build up in “Shy” Meyer when testifying before Congress
almost ideal conditions before it dared to on the condition of the Army. In that testi-
respond to the Iraqi military. In Korea, under mony he actually talked about the lack of
the worst conditions, it took the supposedly qualified personnel and the imbalance that
unready U.S. military only four months to existed between the number of Army divi-
defeat the well-trained NKPA. Had the sions and the number of personnel available
Chinese not intervened, the Korean War to fill those divisions.26 In 1979 he told
Much of the
would be remembered not as the “forgotten President Carter that only four of ten active evidence of a
war” but as another Spanish-American “nice divisions in the United States were capable of Hollow Force is
little war.” Compared with its performance in deploying overseas in an emergency.27
most other American wars—from the However, the term was soon widely used anecdotal.
Revolutionary War to World War II—the U.S. to characterize not just a lack of experienced
military did remarkably well even though it personnel but a shortage of training and wea-
was a shallow force in 1950. Thus, readiness pons—especially equipment, spare parts, and
of forces—measured by traditional indica- munitions. The most vivid example came
tors—may be overrated as a predictor of suc- from the Navy: the captain of the oiler USS
cess in combat. Canisteo refused to get under way because his
ship was short of experienced crew. It was the
first active-duty ship in recent times that
The Hollow Force refused to get under way because the captain
Reconsidered thought it unsafe. More remarkable, instead
The so-called Hollow Force of the 1970s is of being punished, the captain found himself
interesting for three reasons. First, it is the praised. There were also stories of ships hav-
example most often cited in today’s military ing to “cross-deck” equipment—that is, trans-
debates. While “No More Task Force Smiths” fer munitions and spare parts from returning
is cited by the Army, almost everyone else ships to those deploying.
talks about the Hollow Force. Barely a week
goes by without some politician or military A Closer Look
analyst warning about returning to a hollow A closer look at the Hollow Force shows
force. Second, the causal factors behind the that it involved much more than just poor
peacetime Hollow Force are more germane to readiness. As the Congressional Budget
today’s peaceful conditions than are the com- Office concluded, “Much of the evidence is
bat conditions faced by Task Force Smith. anecdotal.”28 A few books exist on the Hollow
Third, and perhaps more important, “hollow Force, such as James Kitfield’s Prodigal Soldier,
force” means different things to different but the definitive story has yet to be written.
people—which is understandable considering “Hollow Force” is one of those terms that
the admittedly subjective nature of readiness everyone uses but few have really defined.
itself. Semiofficially, the term refers to inex- Nevertheless, from the scant literature avail-

9
able, interviews,29 and personal experience,30 it same time, in 1973, came the introduction of
would seem that most observers agree that the all-volunteer force, which most profes-
the factors behind the Hollow Force involved sional military officers initially opposed.
much more than just inexperienced people Although the all-volunteer force has general-
and a lack of spare parts and munitions. And, ly worked well, at the time it was a major cul-
while once again readiness was a factor, it was tural change for the professional military and
only one of many. yet another factor with which to cope. That
A Demoralized Military. Underlining all the temporary dislocation occurred at about the
other factors that contributed to the Hollow same time as discipline and morale were
Force of the 1970s was a generally demoral- eroding because of drug and racial problems.
ized military after the debacle of Vietnam. Introduction of Total Force Concept. The Total
This is sometimes forgotten in the late Force (also introduced in 1973) integrated
1990s—when the military is one of the few the reserves into the active-duty force. The
institutions still held in high esteem. Much active force could no longer deploy without
of that esteem is a result of the spectacular calling up reserve units. That decision was
victory in Desert Storm. The United States made deliberately by the Army to force the
certainly did not win in Vietnam. There was a politicians to call up reserves—which was
general feeling in the military that the press generally avoided during Vietnam. In the
and politicians had lost the war. Vietnam was past, reserves had simply reinforced the active
the only war from which veterans returned to forces. Now, however, whole units, such as
scorn instead of parades. As Kitfield explains, logistics support and even certain crucial
well over a generation was required for the combat units, were put in the reserves. Active-
military to work this out. duty divisions could not deploy without their
Major Drug Problems. One of the major reserve brigade “round-out” units. In 1979
problems facing the military was a very seri- Shy Meyer’s complaint to President Carter
ous drug problem, which was not cleared up was that he was too reliant on the reserves to
until around 1980. The problem started in rush ready forces to Europe. Like the intro-
the later stages of the Vietnam War—when duction of the all-volunteer armed force, the
drugs were easily obtained—but it continued Total Force concept was not necessarily bad,
in too many quarters throughout the 1970s. but it was another challenge with which to
In some units, up to 50 percent of the per- cope.
sonnel were on drugs. Even the best units had Induction of Women. Soon after the intro-
some drug problems. duction of the all-volunteer force and the
A closer look at Major Racial Problems. Another serious Total Force concept came the induction of
social problem was racial relations. Ironically, more women into the military. This step was
the Hollow Force racial relations generally went well during epitomized by the opening of the service
shows that it most of the Vietnam War—even when blacks academies to women in 1976. The Carter
often made up a strikingly disproportionate administration also proposed lifting bans on
involved much portion of the combat troops. But by the late women in combat. This development was yet
more than just 1960s and early 1970s, those relations started another factor that, although not necessarily
poor readiness. to break down. After Martin Luther King’s negative, was temporarily disruptive of a mil-
assassination, the rise of the black power itary trying to cope with everything else.
movement, and riots in cities, the military Miscategorization of Mental Groups. There
found it was not immune to racial problems. was a major miscategorization of mental
Those problems were particularly pro- groups in the mid-1970s. The military uses
nounced on larger ships, such as aircraft car- an Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
riers. The Army also had serious problems, Battery test (ASVAB), which breaks down
especially in units based overseas. potential recruits into five categories. The
Introduction of the All-Volunteer Force. At the military tries to recruit from the first two cat-

10
egories (CAT I and II) and the upper half of ception that the United States was losing the What is truly sur-
CAT III. The armed forces will accept a few Cold War and even becoming impotent prising about the
CAT IVs but try to limit them to, at most, because its armed forces were unable to con-
10–15 percent—and usually then only if they duct successful military operations. The Hollow Force is
are high school graduates. A new ASVAB in changes in the international environment not how bad it
the mid-1970s miscategorized people. The were an increased Soviet presence around the
miscategorization was not noticed until world, the emergence of “Eurocommunism”
was but how
1979. Instead of only 10–15 percent CAT IVs, in many West European countries, the Soviet quickly the
the military found that it had more than 40 invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iranian situation was
percent in some units.31 Combined with hostage situation that paralyzed the Carter
other problems in the 1970s, this caused administration and was capped off by the corrected.
major difficulties and contributed to the botched Desert One rescue attempt. Desert
Hollow Force. One seemed to epitomize the Hollow Force.
Decreasing Defense Budgets. In the 1970s By 1980 the common perception in many
decreasing real defense spending without press accounts was that the U.S. military was
concomitant reductions in forces com- becoming “the gang that could not shoot
pounded the other problems. Although the straight.”
Carter administration is often blamed for the
cuts, they began with Nixon after the with- A Broader Look
drawal from Vietnam and continued during While the 1970s were certainly not the
the Ford administration. best of times, they were not the worst of times
Erosion of Pay. The late 1970s was a time of either. During that period substantial num-
high, double-digit inflation that not only cut bers of weapons were procured. New systems
into defense procurement but came at a time were introduced, such as the Air Force’s F-15
when the all-volunteer force was just getting and F-16 aircraft and the Navy’s F-14 aircraft,
under way. With the draft gone, one of the which are still considered the premier aircraft
major incentives needed for an all-volunteer in the world. More important for readiness, a
force was increased pay. Yet pay raises were slow revolution had been under way during
only single digit. In some cases, soldiers and the 1970s that ironically came to fruition
their families had to go on food stamps to around 1980—the time of the Desert One res-
make ends meet. cue attempt and General Meyer’s remarks
Readiness. Looking more closely at the fac- about the Hollow Force. That is why it is nec-
tors that actually created the Hollow Force essary to take a broader look at the Hollow
illustrates the problems with measuring Force. What is truly surprising about the
readiness. Although the readiness of the force Hollow Force is not how bad it was but how
had deteriorated, the Hollow Force was really quickly the situation was corrected. And the
due to a combination of factors. Drugs, racial main factors behind the corrections had little
tensions, the miscategorization of mental to do with more funding.
groups, the inflation of the late 1970s, and Increased Leadership. Probably the most
other factors led to the major problems of important factor that ended the Hollow
inexperienced and unqualified people of Force and increased readiness was simple,
which General Meyer had originally com- old-fashioned good leadership. The military
plained. And declining real defense budgets had learned lessons from Vietnam. While on
without concomitant reductions in forces led the surface the problems that contributed to
to the empty bins. the Hollow Force persisted, beneath there
In addition to the military factors that led was a revolution in attitude and training that
to the Hollow Force, several developments in came to fruition around the same time
the international environment formed its General Meyer made his famous statement.
context. Those developments led to the per- That view is shared by most experts who have

11
studied the problem, such as James Kitfield. Lehman was able to report that the bins were
In his book, he follows the careers of Gen. full.32 In the future, in the unlikely event of a
Colin Powell of the Army, Adm. Stan Arthur rising and aggressive great power, the United
of the Navy, Gen. Chuck Horner of the Air States—by infusing money into a military
Force, and many others who were the “gener- with lower readiness—could rapidly increase
ation of officers born of Vietnam [who] revo- the readiness of U.S. forces by buying added
lutionized the American style of War.” That equipment and spare parts.
new style of war led to the victory in Desert Although no Korean War arose to necessi-
Storm. tate an increase in readiness in a matter of
One of the best examples of the new lead- weeks and months, the Hollow Force
ership style was Chief of Naval Operations required only a couple of years to be fleshed
Adm. Thomas P. Hayward’s simple set of out. All the problems faced by the military in
standards—promulgated in 1980—known the 1970s were not rectified overnight, but
collectively as “Not in my Navy.” For exam- solving them in two to three years was still
ple, as part that program, Hayward instituted quick. Few militaries have recovered so fast. It
random drug testing. As a result, drug use— took the French army years to recover from
by up to 50 percent of personnel on some the Franco-Prussian War and the social prob-
Readiness “for ships—disappeared immediately. The truly lems of the 19th century. The once-formida-
what?” There are important point about all those actions was ble Soviet military has been in disarray for
simply no major that they required leadership and not more years with no end in sight.
funds.
threats. Personnel Problems Solved Quickly. Implications
According to both Price and Korb, as soon as
the miscategorization of mental groups was Readiness: For What? Of What?
corrected, the quality of recruits improved During the Cold War the readiness ques-
quickly. Major increases in pay for the troops tions raised by Richard Betts—“for what?”
also helped. The Carter administration and “of what?”—were easily answered. The
increased pay by 9.7 percent for 1981. It then “for what” was the Soviet Union and, to a
recommended an 11.3 percent increase for lesser extent, China (especially after the
1982, which the Reagan administration Korean War experience). The “of what” was
increased to 14.3 percent. Thus, in two years simple—everything. According to the specu-
pay went up more than 20 percent. Sharply lation of most military strategists, if World
declining inflation after 1980 allowed sol- War III had broken out, it would have been a
diers to keep more of those pay increases. The very short, intense conflict. The readiness of
combination of intolerance for drug use, bet- current forces would have been crucial. There
ter recruits (the vast majority now high- would not have been another Sitzkrieg in
school graduates), and major increases in pay Europe, or a slow island-hopping operation
solved most of the personnel problems in in the Pacific, or a two- to three-year buildup.
two to three years. Rather, World War III would probably have
Bins Filled. During the Reagan administra- been over in a matter of weeks. But, with the
tion, the problem of empty bins was solved in end of the Cold War, the international envi-
approximately two years. Because it took sev- ronment has changed and so should current
eral years for major weapons procurement to readiness requirements. The change of envi-
get under way, the emphasis during the first ronment makes Betts’s questions very rele-
two years of the Reagan defense buildup was vant.
placed on buying spare parts and restocking Readiness “for What?” There are simply no
weapons. Thus, in 1985, instead of cross- major threats. Even the normally pessimistic
decking equipment between incoming and Pentagon acknowledges that no serious
outgoing ships, Secretary of the Navy John potential threat exists until at least 2015. And

12
even then, the Department of Defense does probably could not all be deployed at once
not use the term “enemy,” or even “potential because some would be engaged in mainte-
enemy,” but potential “peer competitor.” Do nance or training. Because limited resources
we really need large standing armies for would probably constrain the number of car-
potential peer competitors? An affirmative riers under construction at any one time and
response becomes less likely when you look because it takes five years to build a carrier,
at the potential peer competitors. There are the West would have at least a 15- to 20-year
really only four: Japan, Russia, Germany, and warning.
China. Japan and Germany are allies, but In sum, the main rationale for maintain-
there are other reasons to quickly eliminate ing the readiness to fight major peer com-
them as potential threats. First, neither is petitors no longer exists and will not exist
quite the economic power it was just a few again for at least 15 years. There simply is no
years ago; second, both have aging popula- major threat on the horizon requiring a large
tions; third and more important, neither has standing army.
the slightest inclination to rearm. Both Less sinister than threats from potential
nations recently experienced domestic con- peer competitors are MTW threats—what use
troversy when deploying only a few troops for to be called “half” wars during the Cold War.
multinational operations. With the demise of the Soviet Union, it is
There are some legitimate fears of a resur- amazing how those old “half ” wars have now
gent Russia. Right-wing nationalists and for- become MTWs. George Orwell would be
mer communists are waiting in the wings to proud. There are—or at least were—two legiti-
take over after the tenure of Boris Yeltsin. But mate MTW threats, but again they have
given the sorry condition of both the Russian greatly diminished over the past few years.
economy and the Russian military—even Those threats are from North Korea and Iraq
though Russia still has a formidable military- or Iran in the Middle East. The worst scenario
industrial base left over from the Cold War— for which the Pentagon currently plans is two
many years would be required to rearm and nearly simultaneous MTWs. But Saddam’s
then retrain Russian forces. Any professional army is still in shambles from Desert Storm,
military that cannot defeat Chechen guerril- Iran’s military has still not recovered from its
las is not worth worrying about. While it’s conflict with Iraq, and North Korea cannot
true that Russia still has some 20,00 nuclear even feed itself. In both the Persian Gulf and
weapons, that is a different type of military Korea, the economies of threatened states
problem that does not require large U.S. exceed those of the potential aggressors sev-
standing forces eral times over, which gives the defending There is simply
This leaves China, which is on everyone’s states an advantage in dealing with those
list as the next major superpower. But, modest threats. Although these are still dan-
no major threat
despite dire warnings, China’s rise to that sta- gerous regional situations, none of them on the horizon
tus is many years away. The press focuses on poses a serious threat requiring a large stand- requiring a large
the pockets of the antiquated Chinese mili- ing U.S. army. Rogue countries, using terror-
tary that are gradually being modernized. ism and longer range missiles armed with standing military.
About once a month, for example, someone chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons,
warns that China is building an aircraft carri- could still pose threats to the United States.
er. Even if this warning were true—which it is Again, the answer is not a large standing
not—such a development would be almost army. Finally, it should be noted that the sce-
militarily insignificant.33 At least three or nario of two nearly simultaneous MTWs has
four—and probably five or six—small carriers never actually happened.
would be required to give China a formidable There have been frequent responses to
power projection capability in the region. crises, such as the Somali intervention and
Small carriers have limited firepower and rescue missions in Liberia. Leaving aside the

13
The kind of forces question of whether the United States should ing armies. In short, the kind of forces truly
truly needed in really intervene in such crises—which is needed in today’s environment lend them-
beyond the scope of this paper34—none of selves to what Senator McCain has called a
today’s environ- those past responses has required a large “tiered readiness” force.
ment lend them- standing army. Any crisis that needs a
response could be dealt with by the Navy and Tiered Readiness: Radical Innovation or
selves to what the Air Force. The forces of the Navy and the Reality?
Senator McCain Marine Corps have been more than adequate Senator McCain has introduced the notion
has called a to respond to most crises since World War II. of tiered readiness with three different levels of
There are examples of failures—such as the military forces:35
“tiered readiness” capture of the Pueblo, the Israeli attack on the
force. Liberty, and the bombing of the Marine bar- • Tier I—Forward-deployed and crisis
racks in Beirut—but none of them had any- response forces: Forward-deployed
thing to do with readiness. In all those cases, forces, such as the Navy and Marines, and
American forces were in places where they quick response forces, such the 82nd
probably should not have been. Those opera- Airborne division flown in by round-trip-
tions again raise questions about bad leader- capable aircraft, would be deployed in a
ship and bad foreign policy decisions but do matter of days.
not raise the question of readiness. • Tier II—Force buildup: This buildup
Readiness “of What?” Determining the types would include initial divisions of the
of forces that need to be ready is also impor- Army’s contingency corps—up to two
tant. With the old Soviet threat long gone divisions—and follow-on naval and air
and no other major power expected until at forces and reserve components. Tier II
least 2015, General Meyer’s Hollow Force forces would be deployed in a matter of
concerns about rushing five divisions quickly weeks.
to Europe are also gone. Rare crises may arise • Tier III—Conflict resolution: These forces,
in which the United States should intervene. including the remainder of Army units
However, from a readiness viewpoint, if and more reserves, are needed infrequent-
ground forces are needed to respond, the sit- ly. They would be deployed after several
uation could be handled by quickly deploy- months and would thus have time to
ing light Army units, such as the 82nd fully prepare.
Airborne, backed up by Marines aboard Navy
ships off the coast. It was exactly this force At first glance, the senator’s plan might
that was deployed to dissuade Saddam from look radical, but there is really nothing new
going into Saudi Arabia; that deployment about the concept of tiered readiness. Since
made possible a six-month buildup of coali- ancient times there have always been at least
tion forces. The increased use of preposi- two tiers of military readiness. Those tiers have
tioned equipment afloat could add to those consisted of a small standing force and
capabilities. Personnel from heavier mecha- reserves—usually just citizens—who join the
nized and armor units could be quickly active military during times of crisis. The rea-
flown in by Air Force C-17s and matched up sons for the two-tiered system were the same in
with their equipment, which can be disem- ancient Athens and Rome as they are today.
barked from sealift ships. In about the same Standing forces are expensive to maintain and
time that it took to deploy Task Force Smith are really needed only during emergencies. The
to Korea, the United States—with today’s two-tiered system lasted for centuries, ending
capabilities—could deploy a fully capable at the turn of the 19th century when Napoleon
division. started raising large standing armies.
Most responses to crises have been by In more modern times, most military
Navy and Marine Corp units, not large stand- forces have effectively had five tiers (three in

14
the active forces and two in the reserves): (1) a Mechanized Division. Even after intensive
small number of truly ready active forces, training at the Army’s Training Center, the
often elite units such as Marines or para- unit was deemed unready. The National
troopers; (2) the “other” active forces in vari- Guard brigadier general was fired and an
ous stages of readiness; and (3) those active active-duty unit was substituted for the 48th
forces in overhaul, such as ships in shipyards. Division. There is some belief (especially on
Most countries have both (4) ready reserve the part of National Guard observers) that
units and (5) inactive reserve units. The ready with just a little more time the 48th might
reserve units are usually those assigned to have been brought up to standard.37
specific units, such as reserve battalions and Whatever the true answer, the episode has
air squadrons. Very few countries have main- actually served a useful purpose. The
tained large standing forces; most have Pentagon is now responding with some new
instead relied on the reserves for real emer- programs and initiatives to make the Total
gencies. With few exceptions, reserve forces Force a ready one.
are simply mirror images of active forces and
are designed to supplement the active force.
In the United States that mirror imaging
Increasing Readiness of
changed in 1973 with the introduction of the
Reserves: Toward a “Seamless The real problem
Total Force. That change was originally made
Total Force” in the post–Cold
for political, not military, reasons. One of the The real problem in the post–Cold War War world is not
many lessons the military learned in Vietnam world is not maintaining the readiness of the
was, “Don’t go to war unless the people are active forces but maintaining the readiness of maintaining the
behind you.” That lesson led to the Total the reserve forces.38 And, while the 48th readiness of the
Force concept of fully integrating regular and Division incident during Desert Storm
reserve forces. Thus reserve forces had to be caused some bad feelings between the
active forces but
called up for any major war. The integration National Guard and the regular Army, that maintaining the
of active and reserve forces was done in two animosity has not stopped further integra- readiness of the
ways. First, most Army divisions now have tion of the regulars and reserves. A major step
reserve “round-out” brigades. Second, com- was taken by Secretary of Defense William S. reserve forces.
plete functions are in the reserves. All three Cohen in a September 4, 1997, memoran-
Army chemical brigades, for example, are dum calling for a “Seamless Total Force.” In
now in the Army Reserve. The Navy has all of that memorandum, sent to the civilian and
its air cargo logistics support squadrons and military leadership of the Department of
over half of its mine countermeasures force Defense, the secretary called for the leader-
in the reserves. All of the Air Force’s A-10 ship “to eliminate all residual barriers—struc-
Thunderbolt tank-killers for close air sup- tural and cultural—to effective integration of
port are in the reserves, as are all of its strate- the Reserve and Active components into a
gic interceptor aircraft. All told, from 25 to ‘seamless Total Force.’” Readiness was a big
100 percent of each of 45 important Army part of that proposal. In that memo,
functions—from armored divisions to public Secretary Cohen defined “integration” as the
engineering units—are manned by either
Army Reserve or National Guard units.36 conditions of readiness and trust
In general, since the Total Force went into needed for the leadership of all levels
effect in 1973, reserve units that have been to have well-justified confidence that
called up have performed well. The most Reserve component units are trained
infamous exception was the Georgia and equipped to serve as an effective
National Guard’s 48th Infantry Division part of the joint and combined forces
(mechanized), which was called up for Desert within whatever time-lines are set for
Storm to “round out” the Army’s 24th the unit—in peace and war.39

15
As a follow-up initiative, in July 1998 the time. Someone who trains one weekend a
Army issued a new White Paper, “Citizen- month and two weeks a year is obviously not
Soldiers and America’s Army: Learning from going to be as well trained as a regular. Most
the Past—Preparing for the Future,” which experts feel that at least three or four weeks of
calls for “the continuing integration of the training are needed. Although that is impos-
Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and sible every year, perhaps major units should
the Active Army.”40 be called up every three or four years for a
Some of the proposals for a Seamless longer training period.
Total Force are surprisingly simple, even cost- Another proposal is for more interaction
free. For example, changing the color of the between active and reserve personnel. The
reserve ID cards from the hated pink to Louisiana National Guard has one of its
green, which was done in 1998. The reserves reserve battalions commanded by a lieu-
always hated their pink ID cards mostly tenant colonel on active duty. That not only
because they differentiated the reserves from gives that active-duty commander the neces-
the regular forces. Although possessing a sary command for promotion (which is
green card does not add benefits, the color is becoming harder to get), but he learns to
“important in a military that values symbol- work with the reserves. As an incentive, per-
ism.”41 Another example is giving reserve sonnel swaps between active and reserve
forces better access to Pentagon computers forces might be considered as satisfying the
and to the Internet. For example, an active- new Goldwater-Nichols joint (interservice)
duty private can access the Pentagon’s “Early requirements for advancement. It is probably
Bird”—which is a summary of daily news clip- more important that an active Army general
pings of interest to the military—but a be familiar with the Army National Guard
National Guard major general cannot. and Reserves than with Navy or Air Force
There is also a host of small initiatives that capabilities. As a result of personnel swaps,
could make a big difference. For example, the the active forces are also more likely to be
Navy has three new initiatives, including comfortable with the reserve elements when
“hourly drills” that allow reservists to stop by they are called up for active duty. The mili-
an active command for an hour to fix a prob- tary also sends many officers at the 0–3 and
lem. The service is also looking at moving 0–4 (Navy lieutenant/lieutenant commander,
reserve units closer to active commands and Army and Air Force captain/major) levels to
increasing travel budgets.42 Also important is civilian graduate schools for a year or two.
giving reservists better access to commis- During that time they might be assigned to
The Army might saries and exchanges. Reservists have access drill with reserve units.
while on their two weeks of active duty and Some of these proposals are either already
be cut from its 12 times a year, but many would like unlimit- being implemented or are on the drawing
current ten divi- ed access, or at least doubled access. Another board. For example, in November 1997, as
sions to six. sore spot for reservists has been access to part of his Seamless Total Force, Secretary
health care. Currently, if an Army helicopter Cohen held a summit on reserve health care
containing regular Army, Army Reserve, and to “address the full spectrum of health care
Army National Guard personnel crashes, the issues, entitlements and legislative policies
injured will get three different levels of treat- affecting the readiness of U.S. military
ment. Reserve components in the post–Cold War
Although those smaller initiatives should world.”43 The Army’s “One Team” White
not be underestimated as a means of increas- Paper proposed more interaction between
ing the integration of the reserves and active active and reserve forces. That proposal
forces, larger initiatives such as maintaining included the formation of two integrated
the readiness of the reserves are more impor- divisions, each containing an Army National
tant. The major problem has always been Guard Enhanced Separate Brigade under a

16
headquarters commanded by an active-duty Washington you need at least three stars to Programs to
major general. have any clout. Recently, the chairman of the enhance readi-
Even more radical innovations might be JCS did create two new two-star advisory bil-
possible. For example, the main problem fac- lets, one for the National Guard and one for ness of the
ing the Air Force and Navy is pilots leaving in the reserves (currently one for the Army reserves in the
droves to take advantage of the better work- Guard and the other for the Air Force Re-
ing conditions and better pay of commercial serve). This change is a slight improvement
“One Army”
airlines. Considering the hundreds of thou- but really little more than a sop that does not White Paper
sands of dollars spent on training pilots, that truly reflect the increasing importance of the would eliminate
outflow is expensive. Because a tiered readi- reserves.
ness system would place more emphasis on Third, a blue-ribbon panel needs to be cre- the problems
the reserves, the real goal should be to keep ated to look at a host of small and large ini- experienced in
those new commercial pilots in the reserves. tiatives needed to implement programs to Desert Storm.
Programs might even be established between increase the readiness of the reserves. Blue-
the commercial airlines and the military to ribbon panels are often seen as vehicles for
split the cost of the military pilot’s training as postponing decisions, but they can also serve
a commercial pilot as long as the pilot important functions. The panel should con-
remained in the reserves. Airlines would then sist of prestigious retired military comman-
have an incentive to obtain from military ders.
pilots, before they were hired, a commitment Finally, this whole problem deserves more
to remain in the reserves. In addition, mili- attention from and study by both civilian
tary academy graduates might be given the and military think tanks and the various war
option—after two to three years of active-duty colleges, which spend virtually all their time
experience—of going into the reserves to on the problems of the active forces.
complete their five-year obligation.
Although those initiatives are important, Implications for the Active Forces
there are four more that should be consid- A realistic evaluation of readiness based
ered to raise the whole profile of the Seamless on the closer and broader looks at Task Force
Total Force. First, increasing the level of rep- Smith and the Hollow Force—in conjunction
resentation for the reserves in the Office of with the increased use and upgraded readi-
the Secretary of Defense from the assistant ness of the reserves—would have major impli-
secretary to the undersecretary rank should cations for the active forces. One new force
be evaluated. This undersecretary of defense structure that incorporates tiered readiness
would also hold the title of secretary of might consist of the following units:44
reserves, which would make him equal to the Army. The Army might be cut from its cur-
secretaries of the army, the navy, and the air rent ten divisions to six: two light, two mech-
force. In absolute numbers, the reserves are anized, and two heavy armor. (Six fully capa-
twice the size of any of the active services and ble divisions would actually be an increase
deserve better representation, especially dur- over the ten shadow divisions of 1950.) This
ing these times of relative peace. This change structure is essentially what Senator McCain
would not be a new layer of bureaucracy but calls for. The 82nd Airborne (light) Division
simply an increase in profile. would be able to deploy within days, and two
Second should be the creation of a new other divisions could deploy within weeks;
Reserve Joint Chiefs of Staff (RJCS) at the three divisions would be available for contin-
three-star level. The chairman of the RJCS, gencies. Those six divisions would in turn be
however, would assume a four-star billet and backed up by the current ten-plus division
be given a seat on the existing four-star JCS. equivalents in the reserves. In sum, the Total
Currently, heads of reserves are at the two- Force would be about 16 divisions. And the
star (major general/rear admiral) level, but in programs to enhance readiness of the

17
reserves announced by General Reimer in his the bomber force could be mothballed; the
“One Army” White Paper would eliminate other half could be split between the reserve
the problems experienced by the 48th and active forces.
Mechanized Brigade during Desert Shield Navy and Marine Corps. Although the Navy
and Desert Storm. and Marine Corps would be the least affected
Air Force. In the more benign threat envi- because they are needed for both crisis
ronment of the post–Cold War world, the response and an initial response to an MTW,
whole Air Force could be put in the reserves. more integration of the active and reserve
If this seems drastic, consider that the forces is still needed. The Navy has probably
defense of the homeland even during the done the worst job of creating a Seamless
Cold War was assigned to the Air National Total Force. Some of the reasons are under-
Guard. Even DOD analyst Frank Spinney standable. For ships deploying for six to
proposes moving 80 percent of the Air Force seven months in faraway places, trying to
into the reserves.45 Although putting the integrate reservists on duty for only two
whole Air Force or even 80 percent into the weeks is both difficult and expensive. If over-
reserves might be excessive, many analysts seas deployments were scaled back, this prob-
feel that about 50 percent of the Air Force lem might be less consequential.
Many analysts could be converted. Perhaps nothing would better symbolize
feel that about 50 First, Air Force units have a limited role in the integration of the active and reserve
deterring crises. When the Cold War ended, forces than to recommission two battleships
percent of the Air the Air Force put forth the notion of “Global as reserve ships. They were retired because
Force could be Reach, Global Power,” which implied that it their large crews were expensive. But that
converted to could respond to crises. But the evidence that problem would be solved easily and cheaply
the Air Force could perform such missions is by allowing reservists to be part of the crew.
reserve forces. scant. Worse, even when Air Force units are The Navy currently has a shortage of sea-
stationed in the area of a crisis, host countries based gunfire support for forces ashore—the
are often extremely reluctant to give the battleship’s primary mission. The ships
United States unlimited use of their air bases. could also be used for training midshipmen
For example, in 1997 the states in the Persian from the Naval Academy. The U.S. Navy is
Gulf region refused to allow their bases to be one of the few major navies of the world with-
used against Saddam. As a result, although out dedicated training ships.
there were some 200 Air Force planes in the The Navy should also examine putting
area, Navy aircraft carriers were needed. more ships in mothballs. The largest prob-
Second, virtually everyone agrees that the lem facing the military is getting troops
Air Force has done a wonderful job of inte- (Army and Air Forces) overseas. For example,
grating the air units in the active forces, the old ships such as the large LPH amphibious
Air Force Reserve, and the Air National assault ships could be kept in mothballs. In
Guard. (Even Army and Navy reservists point any conflict, those ships could transport
to Air Force integration as the most success- Army and Air Force personnel to forward
ful model.) One of the reasons is that many bases. In case a contingency arose, the Navy
Air Force Reserve and National Guard pilots used to keep LST amphibious landing ships
are commercial pilots and thus are constant- manned at about 25 percent. The Navy might
ly maintaining their skills. Because the Air also use reserves to test the new “Horizon”
Force works well with its reserve units, more concept of keeping ships manned by rotating
of the forces could be moved into the the crews. Some of those rotated crews could
reserves. be reservists. Alternatively, some ships could
The Air Force could also put some of its become part of a “surge” Navy, which would
aircraft into mothballs. Those aircraft could be manned by both active-duty and reserve
be reactivated in 30 to 60 days. At least half of crews and respond to crises from U.S. ports.

18
Although with current commitments, the The question arose again after the end of the
Navy is not as adaptable to a Seamless Total Cold War. Many analysts considered the
Force as either the Army or the Air Force, it whole NATO expansion debate to be simply
still has programs that could be implement- a “smoke screen” behind which to retain the
ed and tested. outdated U.S. presence in Europe.46 There are
also legitimate questions about whether
The Real Goal: Increasing Overall South Korea is getting a free ride.47 The situa-
Military Capabilities tion in Korea is admittedly dangerous, but
Finally, readiness is only one of the four the South Korean forces of today are not the
elements of overall military capability. Cur- ill-equipped, ill-trained forces of 1950.
rently, it may not even be the most impor- Besides, today the U.S. military could, if dire
tant. The major problem facing all the ser- circumstances were to require it, respond
vices is weapons procurement. Replacement with an entire division of well-trained and
rates for weapons are running at about one- well-equipped troops from the United States
third of requirements. Some of the savings in about the time it took to send the 500-
garnered from relying more on the reserves man ill-prepared Task Force Smith.
could be used to fund increased procure- Worse, overseas deployments can actually
ment. The cost of reserve forces is only about undermine the military’s ability to prepare to
20 percent of that of active-duty forces. Some fight. The United States now has 20,000
of the savings generated by relying more on ground and air personnel in the Middle East.
the reserves could also be used to increase That deployment has caused the most severe
military pay. With full employment, jobs in morale problems the Air Force has experi-
the civilian sector—especially in areas requir- enced since the Hollow Force days of the
ing high skills, such as aircraft maintenance— 1970s. As a result, Air Force personnel are
are more attractive to military personnel. The leaving in droves. This exodus is a harsh les-
robust civilian economy has also required the son for those who argue that readiness is nec-
military to induct more people who did not essarily increased by overseas deployments.
finish high school. As noted before, one of Somewhat ironically, many analysts are
the major factors behind the Hollow Force now questioning all of the various peace-
was the combination of low pay and keeping requirements of the active Army.
increased use of recruits who had failed to They are proposing that more of those
finish high school. An increase in pay would responsibilities be given to the reserves. In
probably improve the quality of recruits. fact, most of the civil control and military
The need for specific military capabilities police functions needed for peacekeeping Some ships could
and readiness standards depends on foreign currently reside in the reserve forces. More
policy decisions, not military decisions. This important, however, one should ask whether become part of a
paper has essentially assumed current it is advisable to intervene in places like “surge” Navy,
requirements. But there are legitimate ques- Bosnia and Somalia.
tions about why the United States still has
which would
troops in Europe, Korea, and the Middle East respond to crises
and whether it really is wise to intervene in all Conclusion from U.S. ports.
the Somalias and Bosnias of the world. In the
late 1960s, after the full recovery of Western The degree of military readiness needed
Europe from World War II, legitimate ques- depends on the threat. During the debate
tions were raised about why American troops over NATO expansion, proponents argued in
were still stationed in Europe. Combined, the favor of enlargement because “we have
countries of Western Europe had a greater already had to fight twice in Europe in this
gross national product and population than century.” When asked about threats and why
either the United States or the Soviet Union. we need a large standing army, high govern-

19
The real lesson of ment officials usually talk about the uncer- ing active forces would need to be held at the
both Task Force tain threat of the future. There is an obvious, high states of readiness that were required
rather simple answer to those responses: during the Cold War. This new force struc-
Smith and the “Read a newspaper.” This is not 1914 or ture would be more than adequate to satisfy
Hollow Force is 1939, and there is no “Kaiser Bill” or Hitler the readiness requirements for regional war
out there. When Winston Churchill was issu- or crisis response in the current relatively
that a tiered ing warnings in the 1930s, he was not talking benign international environment. Even
readiness system about “uncertainties.” Rather he was point- assuming the worst possible case of a resur-
can work for the ing to Japan in Manchuria and China; Italy in gent, militant Russia and a fully armed China
Ethiopia and Libya; and, worst of all, Hitler by 2015, the lesson of the Hollow Force
U.S. military. marching into the Saar region, Austria, and shows that it only took two to three years for
Czechoslovakia. the U.S. military to become fully ready again.
It is also necessary to knock down some of Thus, if by 2010 it looks like China is becom-
the myths of readiness. Those who cite Task ing a potential enemy (not just a peer com-
Force Smith and the Hollow Force have a petitor), sufficient warning time would be
“glass half empty, half full” problem. Most available to rebuild the active Army back to
who have written about Task Force Smith get 10 active divisions, or perhaps even the 18
bogged down in the details and see a readi- divisions of the Cold War. The real lesson of
ness glass half empty. What is really amazing both Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force
is to look more broadly and see how fast the is that a tiered readiness system can work for
U.S. military recovered (a glass half full). the U.S. military in a more benign post–Cold
Again, the real lesson of the Hollow Force is War environment.
not found in all the problems that led to that
condition—and there were certainly many—
but in how fast they were solved. Further- Notes
more, many of the problems were solved
without spending a lot of money. Moreover, 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, JCS Publication 1, January
to compare today’s active-duty force with the 1986, p. 221.
shadow force of 1950 or the Hollow Force of
the late 1970s is simply nonsense. Another 2. John McCain, “Ready Tomorrow: Defending
mistake is to overlook today’s reserve force. American Interests in the 21st Century,” March
1996.
Reserve forces today are much more capable
than they were in the past. 3. Gary Hart, The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of
There is a final irony to the current readi- the People (New York: Free Press, 1998).
ness debate. Critics cite the Korean War (and 4. Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts,
Task Force Smith’s role in it) and worry Choices, Consequences (Washington: Brookings
about being capable of fighting another Institution, 1995).
Desert Storm—the two regional wars that the 5. S. Craig Moore et al., Measuring Military
United States won. Yet they never mention Readiness and Sustainability (Santa Monica: RAND,
Vietnam—the one war the United States did 1991), p. 1.
not win. The reason, of course, is that readi- 6. Review of Readiness Considerations in the
ness had absolutely nothing to do with the Development of the Defense Budget: Hearings before the
debacle in Vietnam. House Armed Services Committee, Readiness Panel of
Thus, examining the current threats and the Procurement and Military Nuclear System
Subcommittee, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington:
the myths of readiness demonstrates that Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 36.
both the active Army and Air Force units, and
perhaps even some Navy forces, could be cut 7. Walter Kross, Military Reform: The High Tech
and more responsibilities placed in the Debate in Tactical Air Forces (Washington: National
Defense University Press, 1985), p. 57.
reserves. Furthermore, not all of the remain-

20
8. Melvin Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, The the House Committee on Armed Services, May
Problem of Military Readiness (Washington: 29, 1980, p. 18.
American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 2.
27. James L. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldier: How the
9. Forrest said, “I always make it a rule to get Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized
there first with the most men,” but the misquot- the American Style of War (New York: Simon and
ed more colorful version is often seen. Schuster, 1995), p. 199.
10. Betts, p. 33. 28. Congressional Budget Office, “Trends in
Selected Indicators of Military Readiness, 1980
11. General Accounting Office, “Military through 1993,” March 1994, p. 2.
Readiness: Data and Trends for January 1990 to
March 1996,” March 4, 1996, p. 1; and Laird and 29. For example, with Robin Pirie, assistant sec-
Korb, p. 17. The official C rating definitions are retary of defense for manpower and reserve
classified. affairs in the Carter administration and
Lawrence Korb, who held the same job in the
12. Lawrence C. Korb, “Did Readiness Get Its first term of the Reagan administration.
Fair Share of the Defense Buildup in the First
Reagan Administration?” in Defense Policy in the 30. The author was a professional staff member
Reagan Administration, ed. William P. Snyder and for national security affairs in Congress during
James Brown (Washington: National Defense the Hollow Force years.
University Press, 1988), p. 403.
31. Melvin Laird, People, Not Hardware: The Highest
13. Gen. Carl E. Mundy Jr., “Going Hollow: The Defense Priority (Washington: American
Risk to the Marine Corps,” in “Going Hollow: Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 4.
The Warning of the Chiefs of Staff, An Update,”
a report by Sen. John McCain, September 1994. 32. John F. Lehman Jr., “A Report on the Fiscal
Year 1986 Military Posture of the United States
14. Quoted in Betts, p. 260. Navy and Marine Corps,” Department of the
Navy, February 6, 1985, p. 6.
15. General Accounting Office, “Military
Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed to Guide 33. There are reports that China might be pur-
Management of Frequently Deployed Units,” chasing a Russian carrier that would take several
April 1996, p. 2. more years to complete. It would then take even
more years for the Chinese navy—which has
16. One of his latest was Harry Summers, “No never operated a carrier—to make it fully opera-
More Task Force Smiths,” Washington Times, June tional.
11, 1998, p. A21.
34. For a discussion of this question, see Ivan
17. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea Eland, “Protecting the Homeland: The Best
1950–1953 (New York: New York Times Books, Defense Is to Give No Offense,” Cato Institute
1987), p. 78 Policy Analysis no. 306, May 19, 1998.
18. Quoted in ibid., p. 93. 35. McCain, pp. 19–22.
19. Quoted in ibid., p. 98.
36. William S. Cohen, Reserve Component
20. Quoted in ibid., p. 111. Programs: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board
(Washington: U.S. Department of Defense,
21. Charles E. Keller and William A. Stofft, eds. March 1998), pp. 8–12.
Americas First Battles, 1776–1885 (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1986). 37. Kitfield, pp. 349–52.
22. Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: 38. The current reserve force consists of two
Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 77. Army and two Air Force organizations (the Army
and Air Force Reserves and the Army and Air
23. Blair, p. 97. Force National Guard), the Navy Reserve, and
the Marine Corps Reserve.
24. Ibid., p. xi.
39. William S. Cohen, Memorandum to the lead-
25. Ibid., p. 99.
ership of the Pentagon calling for a “seamless
26. Gen. Edward C. Meyer, USA, Testimony total force,” September 4, 1997.
before the Subcommittee on Investigations of
40. Gen. Dennis J. Reimer, Maj. Gen. Thomas J.

21
Plewes, and Maj. Gen. Roger C. Schultz, “Citizen-
Soldiers and America’s Army: Learning from the
Past—Preparing for the Future,” Army Times, July
6, 1998, p. 36.

41. Yana Ginburg, “Green Cards Don’t Add


Benefits: Change in Color Viewed as Symbolic,”
Navy Times, July 6, 1998, p. 24.

42. B. J. Ramos, “Making Better Use of Reserves,”


Navy Times, June 15, 1998, p. 20.

43. “Secretary Cohen Announces Summit on


Reserve Health Care,” U.S. Department of
Defense, Press release, November 18, 1997.

44. Analysts advocating a tiered readiness pos-


ture may differ on the ideal force structure for
the U.S. military.

45. Cited in Hart, p. 164.

46. See, for example, Ivan Eland, “The High Cost


of NATO Expansion: Clearing the
Administration’s Smoke Screen,” Cato Institute
Policy Analysis no. 286, October 29, 1997.

47. Doug Bandow, “Free Rider: South Korea’s


Dual Dependence on America,” Cato Institute
Policy Analysis no. 308, May 19, 1998.

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ing proposals for reform. Nothing in Policy Analysis should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views
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