Chronophotograph of a st an d i ng ju mp , c . 18 8 2 .

Eti enne-Ju l es Marey

The Genesis of the Individual
Gilbert Simondon
When th e living bei ng is con sidered as an individual, there are two ways in whi ch it
can be conceived . There is t he substantialist viewpoi nt, whi ch conceives t he unit y of
living be ing as its essence, a un ity th at it has provided for itself, is based on it sel f and
is cr eated by it self; a un ity that will vigorously resist anyth ing that is not it self. Ther e is
also the hylomorphic viewpoi nt, whi ch regard s t he ind ividu al as having been cr eat ed
from t he conj uncti on of a form and some matter. If we compare these two app roaches,
we can see there is a clear opposit ion between the self-centered moni sm of substantial-
ist metaphysics and t he bi po larity depicted by hylornorphism. But despit e th is oppo-
sit ion , these two ways of ana lyzing the real nat ure of the ind ividual
have somet hing in commo n: in bot h cases, there is the assumption
t hat we can di scover a pri nciple of individu ati on, exercising its
in fluen ce befo re th e act ual individuat ion itself has occurred, one
that is able to explain, produce and deter mine th e subsequent
course of individuation . Taking the cons t it uted indi vid ual as a
given , we are t hen led to try to recreate t he conditions th at have
made its existence possible.
However, when the problem of indi vidu ati on is formulated in
ter ms of t he exi stence of individuals, we find th at a presupposi-
tion has emerged warranting fur t he r ex planat ion. Th is presuppo-
sit ion point s t o an import ant aspect of t he solut ion s that have
been given to thi s problem, and it has surrept it iously de te rmined
the course of researc h dealing with the principl e of individuatio n:
that it is the indi vidu al qua t he already con st it ute d ind ividual th at
is t he most noteworthy reality, t he one to be explained. Whe re t his
2 0 n e
Th e Ge nes is of the Individual
at t it ude prevails, th e principle of individu at ion is so ught only insofar as it is abl e to
acco unt for th e cha racte r ist ics of the ind ividual exclusively, without allowing for thi s
pr inciple's necessary relation to other infl ue nce s on th e being as a whole, whi ch could
be equally important to the emergence of t his ind ividu ated be ing. Research carried out
under these assumptions accords an ontological privileoe to the already const ituted indi vid-
ual. Suc h research may well prevent us from adequately representing th e process of
ontogenes is, and fro m acc ur ately according the individual it s proper place in th e
act ual syste m that res ults in ind ividuati on. The idea that indi viduation might have a prin-
ciple at all is a crucia l postulate in the searchf or a principle ?!individuation. The very idea
of a " princi ple" sugges ts a certain quality that prefigures the sor t of const it ute d indi -
vidual at whi ch we will arrive, and the properties it will have once th e process of con -
st it ut ion is complete.
To a ce r tain extent, the idea of a principle ?!i ndividuation has been derived fro m a
genesis that works backward, an ontogenes is " in reverse," because in ord er t o account
for the genesis of th e individual and its defining characte r ist ics one mu st assume th e
existe nce of a fir st term, a pri nciple, whi ch would provide a suffic ient explanat ion of
how the individual had come to be individual and account for its singularity (ha ecce-
ity) - but this does not prove that the essent ial pr econdition of ontogenes is need be
anything resembling a first term. Yet a ter m is itself already an indi vidual, or at least
something capa ble of being indiv iduali zed, some t hing th at can be th e cause of an ab-
solutely specific existe nce (haecceit:y), something th at ca n lead to a proliferati on of
many new haecceities. Anything that cont ributes to establishing relations alrea dy be-
longs to the same mo de of existence as the individual, wheth er it be an at om, whi ch
is an indivisible and eternal par t icle, or prime matter, or a form. T he atom intera ct s
with other at oms th rough th e clinamen, and in this way it can consti t ute an individual
(though not always a viable one) across th e enti re expanse of th e void and t he whol e of
en dless becoming. Matter can be impressed with a form , and th e source of ontogene -
sis can be deri ved from this matter-form relati on. Indeed , if haeccei ti es wer e not
somehow inher ent wi thi n the atom, or matter, or indeed form , it would be impossibl e
to find a pr inc iple of individuation in any of th e above- me nt ioned rea lit ies. To seek the
principle ?!individuation in something that preexi sts this sam e individuati on is tantamount to
reducing individuation to nothing more than ontogenesis. The principle of individuation
here is t he source of haecceity.
It is clear t hat both ato mist subs tant ialisrn as well as th e th eory of hylom orphism
avoid giving a direct de scription of ontogenes is it self. Atomism describes t he gen esis
of the complex unit, such as a living body, enjoying only a precarious and transitory
unity; it is considered to be the result of a purely chance association, one that will
break up into its original elements when overtaken by a force more powerful than the
one currently holding it together as a complex unity. Those cohesive forces themselves,
which may be taken as the principle of individuation of the complex individual, are in
fact negated by the finer structure of the eternal elementary particles, which are the
real individuals here. For atomism, the principle of individuation is rooted in the very
existence of an infinity of atoms; it is always already there as soon as thought seeks to
grasp their essential nature. Individuation is a fact: for each atom it is its already
given nature, and for the complex unit it is the fact that it is what it is by virtue of a
chance association.
In opposition to this, hvlomorphic theory decrees that the individuated being is not
already given when one comes to analyze the matter and form that will become the
sutiotos (the whole): we are not present at the moment of ontogenesis because we have
always placed ourselves at a time before this process of ontogenetic formation actually
takes place. The principle of individuation, then, is not grasped at the point where
individuation itself occurs as a process, but in that which the operation requires before
it can exist, that is, a matter and a form. Here the principle is thought to be contained
either in the matter or the form, because the actual process of individuation is not
thought to be capable ofjurnishing the principle itsel f, but simply of putting it into ifJect.
Thus, the search for the principle of individuation is undertaken either before or after
individuation has taken place, according to whether the model of the individual being
used is a physical one (as in substantialist atomism) or a technological and vital one (as
in hylomorphic theory). In both of these cases, though, there remains a region if uncer-
tainty when it comes to dealing with the process of individuation, for this process is
seen as something that needs to be explained, rather than as something in which the
explanation is to be found: whence the notion of a principle of individuation. Now, if
this process is considered as something to be explained, this is because the received
way of thinking is always oriented toward the successfully individuated being, which it
then seeks to account for, bypassing the stage where individuation takes place, in order
to reach the individual that is the result of this process. In consequence, an assumption
is made that events follow a certain chronology: first, the principle of individuation;
then, this principle at work in a process that results in individuation; and finally, the
emergence of the constituted individual. On the other hand, though, were we able to
see that in the process of individuation other things were produced besides the indi-
-I"' .... ......_ .. .._ .. ... ... .....-
one currently holding it together as a complex unity. Those cohesive forces themselves,
which may be taken as the principle of individuation of the complex individual, are in
fact negated by the finer structure of the eternal elementary particles, which are the
real individuals here. For atomism, the principle of individuation is rooted in the very
existence of an infinity of atoms; it is always already there as soon as thought seeks to
grasp their essential nature. Individuation is a fact: for each atom it is its already
p'iven nature. and for the complex unit it is the fact that it is what it is bv virtue of a
The Gen esi s of the I nd ividual
vidu al, t her e would be no such attempt to hurry past th e stage whe re individuat ion
ta kes place in order to arrive at the ul timate reality that is t he individual. In stead, we
woul d t ry t o gra sp th e ent ire unfolding of ontogenesis in all it s vari ety, and to under-
stand the ind ividualIrom the perspective ifthe process ifindividuat ion rather than the process
ifindividuation by means if the individual.
It is my intentio n to demonstrate the need for a complet e cha nge in the gen eral
approach to t he pr inc iple govern ing individuation. The pro cess of indi vidu ati on must
be considered primordial, for it is thi s process that at once br ings th e indi vidu al into
being and de termines all th e di stinguishing characteristics of its developmen t , orga -
nizat ion and modali t ies. Thus, the individual is to be underst ood as having a relati ve
rea lity, occupying only a ce r tain phase of t he whol e bei ng in quest ion - a phase th at
t herefore carries the implicati on of a precedin g preindi vidu al state, and th at , even
after ind ividu at ion, doe s not exist in isolat ion , since individu at ion does not exhaust in
t he Single act of its appearance all th e pot enti als embedded in t he preindividual sta te .
Individuat ion, moreover, not onl y bri ngs th e ind ividu al to light but also t he individ-
ual-mil ieu dyad. ' In th is way, the indi vidu al possesses on ly a relat ive exist ence in two
sense s: because it does not represent the totalit y of t he being, and because it is me rely
the result of a phase in t he bei ng's deve lopment d ur ing whic h it existed nei th er in the
for m of an individu al nor as the pri ncipl e of indi vidu ati on.
Thus, individuat ion is here considered toform o n ~ v one part ifan ontoBenet ic process in
the development if the larqer entity. Ind ividuat ion must t herefor e be t hought of as a par-
ti al and rel ative resolution mani fested in a system that con tains latent potent ials and
har bor s a ce rt ain incompatibility wit h itself, an incompati bility du e at once to forces
in t ension as well as to the impossibility of interaction bet ween ter ms of ext remely
disparate dimensions.
The meaning of the expression "ontogenesis" will be given its full weig ht here if,
instead of being understood in th e more limit ed and secondary sense of the genes is
of t he individual (as opposed to a mor e extensive idea of genesis, such as th at involv-
ing th e who le species), it is made to designat e th e development of th e being, or its
becomin g - in other words, that whi ch ma kes the being develop or become, insofar
as it is, as be ing. The opposition hol din g bet ween the being and it s becoming can only
be valid when it is seen in the cont ext of a cer tain do ctri ne according to which sub-
stance is t he very model of bei ng; but it is eq ually poss ible t o mainta in that becoming
exists as one of th e dimensions of t he be ing, t hat it corresponds to a capacity beings
possess of falling out of step with themselves [se dephaser par rapport aJui-meme], of
3
0 0
resolving th emselves by th e very act of falling out of st ep. The preindividual beina is the
beiru; in which there are no steps [phases]. The being in which indi vidu ati on comes to
frui t ion is that in which a resolut ion appea rs by its division into stages, which impli es
becoming: becoming is not a framework in which the being ex ists; it is on e of th e
dimen sion s of th e being, a mode of resolving an initi al incompati bili ty that was rife
wit h pote ntials. ' Indi viduation corresponds to the appearance c:f stas es in the beins, which
are the stages c:f the being. It is not a mere isol at ed consequence arising as a by-product
of becoming, but th is very process itself as it unfold s; it can be under stood only by tak-
ing into account thi s initi al supersaturation of the bei ng, at fir st homogeneous and
static [sans devenir], th en soon after adopting a cert ain st r uct ure and becoming - and
in so doing, br inging about the emergence of both indi vidual and mili eu - following
a cours e [devenir] in whi ch preliminary tensions are resolved but also preserved in the
sha pe of t he en suing st ruct ure; in a certain sense, it could be said th at th e sole princi-
ple by whic h we can be gu ided is that c:f the conservation c:f beitu; throuo]: becominq. This
conse rvat ion is effecte d by means of th e exchanges made between st r uc t ure and pr o-
ces s, pr oceding by qu antum leaps through a serie s of succ essive equilibr ia. In orde r
to grasp firml y the nature of indi viduation , we mu st conside r the bei ng not as a sub-
sta nce, or matter, or form, but as a tautl y extende d and supersat ura ted syste m, which
exists at a higher level t han th e unit it self, which is not suffic ient un to it self and can-
not be adequa tely concept ualized according to the pri nciple of th e excl uded middle.
The concre te be ing or t he full being, which is t o say, the preindividu al being, is a being
that is mor e th an a unit. Unity (characteristic of th e indi vidu at ed being and of iden-
tity), whi ch autho r izes the use of the principle of th e excluded middle, cannot be ap-
pli ed to t he preindividual being - which explains why one cannot recreate the world
out of monads afte r th e fact, even if one introduces other pr inc iples, such as that of
sufficient reason , to allow oneself to organize them into a univer se. Uni ty and identity
ar e app licable only to one of the being's stages, which comes after t he pr ocess of indi-
viduat ion . Now th ese not ion s are useless in helping us discove r t he act ual process of
indi viduati on it sel f. They are not valid for under st andi ng ont oge nes is in the fuJI sense
of t he term, that is, for t he becoming of t he be ing insofar as it doubles it sel f and falls
out of step wit h itself [se dephaser] in the pr ocess of individuatin g
Individuati on has resist ed th ought and descripti on until now because we have rec-
ognized th e existence of only one form of equilibri um: stab le equilibrium. The idea of
"me tas table equilibrium" had not been recognized. A being was impli citly presumed
to be in a sta te of sta ble equilibr ium at all times. Stable equilibrium excl udes the idea
rr umon ISmar 111 wruc n a resorut ron appear s Dy us OIV1Slon \11(0 s(ages, wmc n Impli es
becoming: becoming is not a framework in which the being ex ists; it is on e of th e
dimen sion s of th e being, a mode of resolving an initi al incompati bili ty that was rife
wit h pote ntials. ' Indi viduation corresponds to the appearance c:f stas es in the beins, which
are the stages c:f the being. It is not a mere isol at ed consequence arising as a by-product
of becoming, but th is very process itself as it unfold s; it can be under stood only by tak-
ing into account thi s initi al supersaturation of the bei ng, at fir st homogeneous and
C' +- ..... .. ; ,... rr-.....,r\ ... ,In.'''..... ; ..., .. h ""n 0:>...... ...... "" ..... fi-or ..... rl"' r>t-;Y\ rT ..... r.o ..-t-"';..... .-+-..-., ...... +- .. .... "'" .... ..... rl h O',-.,-.. YY\;n.... ..... ....rl
The Genes i s of the Individual
of be coming becau se it cor responds to the lowest level of potential energy pos sibl e; it
is t he sort of equilibrium that is attained in a system when all the possible transforma-
ti ons have been achieved and no other force remains to enact any further changes .
Wi th all t he po tent ials ac t ualized, and the system having rea ched its lowest energy
level, it ca n no longer go through any more transformations. The anci ents recognized
only th e st at es of inst ability and st ability, movement and rest, but th ey had no clear
and object ive idea of metast abi lity. In order to define metastabili ty, it is necessary to
int rod uce th e no t ion of the potential energy residing in a given system, the noti on of
orde r and t ha t of an increase in entropy. In t his way it is poss ible to define th e being
i n it s metast able state, whi ch is very different from sta ble equ ilibr ium and rest. The
anci ent s were not able to introduce such a concep t into their search for the pr inciple
govern ing individuati on because no clear physical par ad igm could be enl iste d to
reveal how such noti on s were to be used 3 So first I shall at te mpt to present physical
individuation as a case ifthe resolution ifa metastable system, beginn ing wit h one of the
syst em's states, suc h as those of superfusion or supersat urati on, whi ch pr eside over t he
ge nesis of crysta ls. Crystalli zat ion has at its di sposal an abundant fun d of not ions th at
are well understood, whic h can be employed as paradigms in other domains; but it
does not provide us with an exhaust ive analysis of physical individ uat ion .
Now, it can also be pre sumed th at t he phenomenon [fa realit e ], in its pri mi tive
state, in it self, is like the supersaturat ed solut ion and, a forti ori in t he preindi vidu al
stage, is somethiriq beyond a uni ty and an identity, somethi ng ca pable of bei ng mani-
fested as either wave or corpuscl e, mat te r or ene rgy - because any process, and any
relation within a process, is an individuati on t hat do ubles t he preindividu al being,
pushing it out of step with it self, all t he whi le co rrel at ing th e ext re me values and
orders of magnitude without th e refinements of mediati on. The resulti ng comple-
mentarity, then, would be th e epi st emol ogi cal effect of preser ving the or iginal and
primitive metastability of the phenomen on [Ie del ]. Neither mechanism nor ene r-
Betism, both theories of identity, ca n account for thi s reali ty in a co mp rehe nsive ma n-
ner. Field theory, when combine d with the theory of corpuscles, and even the t heory
of the interaction between field s and cor puscles , is still par t ially du alist, but is well
on the way to formulating a theory of the prei ndi vidual. By anot her route, th e t heory
of quanta has perceived th e existe nce of thi s preind ividual regime, whi ch goes beyond
unity: an exchange of ene rgy is brought about in elementary qu antiti es, as if there
had been an indi viduati on of ene rgy in the relati on between the particles, which one
can consider to be physical individu als in a sense. It would perhaps be in this sense
Serra Pelada gold mine in Para, Br azil .
Sebastiao Salgado
32
The Genes is of t he In di vi d u al
th at one could foresee how t he two theories (of quant a and of wave mechanics), which
had up to now remained impenet rabl e to each other, migh t finally converge. They
coul d be envi saged as two ways dexpressing the preindi vidual state by means of th e vari -
ous ma nifestat ions exhibited whe n it appears as a preindividual. Underlying the con-
tinuou s and the discont inuous, it is th e quant um and th e metasta ble ompl ementarity
(th at which is beyond uni ty) th at is th e true preindividual. Th e necessit y both of cor-
recti ng and of coupling th e bas ic concepts in physics expresse s, pe rhaps, th e fact th at
the concepts are only an adequate representati on d individuated reality, and not preindi-
vidual reality.
Conseque ntly, the exemplary value of the study of the cryst al's gene sis as a process
of individuation would become all the mor e comprehensible. It would allow us to grasp,
on t he macroscopic level , a pheno menon t hat is rooted in th ose st ates of t he syst em
belonging to t he microphysical domain , molecul ar and not mo lar. It would ma nage to
grasp that acti vity which is at the vel)' boun dary of the cryst al in t he proce ss of for ma-
tion. Such an individuatio n is not to be thought of as the meeting of a pr evious form
and matt er exis t ing as already const it ute d and sepa rate te rms, but a res olu ti on taking
place in the hear t of a metast able system r ich in potential s:jorm, matter and ener8Y pre-
exist in the system. Neither form nor matter are sufficie nt . The t rue princi ple of indi-
viduatio n is media t ion, whi ch gene rally presumes t he existe nce of the ori ginal duality
of the or de rs of magni t ude and the initi al absence of interact ive communicat ion
between th em , followed by a subsequent commu nicati on bet ween orde rs of magni-
t ude and stabi lizat ion.
At the same time t hat a quant ity of potent ial energy (the necessary condi t ion for
a higher order of magnitude) is actualized , a port ion of matter is organized and dis-
tribut ed (the necessary condit ion for a lower order of magn itude) int o structu red
individuals of a middle order of magnit ude, developing by a mediate process of ampli-
ficatio n.
It is the organizat ion of energy in a metas table system th at leads to cryst allizat ion
and subtends it, but the form of the cryst als expresses certain molecular or atomic
characterist ics of t he const it uen t chemical types.
In the do main of living th ings, the same notion of met ast abi lity can be employed to
character ize individuati on . But individuation is no longer produced, as in the physical
domain, in an instantaneous fashi on, quantumli ke, abrupt and definiti ve, leaving in
its wake a duali ty of milieu and ind ividual- the milieu having been de pr ived of t he
indi vidual it no longer is, and the individual no longer possessing the wider dimensions
zan e
of the mi lieu. It is no do ubt true th at such a view of indi viduati on is valid for t he living
being when it is considered as an absolute or igin, bu t it is matched by a perpet ual indi-
viduati on that is life itself foil owi ng th e fun dament al mo de of becoming: the ]ivina
beina conserves in itselfan act ivity ofpermanent indi viduat ion. It is not onl y th e result of
individuat ion, like t he crysta l or th e mol ecul e, but is a veri tabl e t heater of indi vidu a-
ti on . Mor eover, the en t ire acti vity of th e living bei ng is not, like th at of th e physical
individual, conce nt ra te d at its bo undary with t he outside world. There exist s wi thin
th e being a more complete regime of internal resonance requiring permanent commu-
nicati on and maintaining a me tas tab ility that is t he precondit ion of life. This is no t t he
sole characteri sti c of th e living being, and it cannot be seen as an automa-t on t hat
mai nt ains a ce rtain nu mb er of equilibr ia or th at seeks t o find compati bilit ies between
its various requi rements, obeying a formula of complex equ ilibrium composed of sim-
pler ones. The living being is also t he being t hat results from an init ial indi viduati on
and amplifies thi s individuati on, no t at all t he ma chine t o which it is assimilated fun c-
t ionally by th e mo de l of cybe rn et ic mec han ism. In the living being, individuation is
brouph: about by the individual itself, and is not simp ly a functioning obj ect that results
from an ind ividuati on previously accomplished , comparable to t he product of a man u-
fact ur ing proc ess. The living bei ng resolves its problems not only by adapting itself -
which is t o say, by modi fying it s rel at ion ship to it s milieu (somet hing a machine is
equally able to do) - but by modifyi ng it sel f th rough t he invention of new intern al
st r uct ures and its compl ete sel f- insert ion into th e axiomat ic of organic problems."
The li vina indi vidual is a system ofindi viduat ion, an individuat i nq system and also a system
that indi viduates itse!f. The intern al resonance and th e translati on of it s relat ion to itsel f
into informat ion are all containe d in the livi ng be ing's system. In th e physical domain ,
int ernal resonance character izes the limit of t he individual in th e process of ind ividuat -
ing it sel f. In the domain of t he living being, it becomes th e cr iterion of any individual
qua indi vidual. It exi st s in th e system of th e indivi dual and not only in th at whi ch is
formed by th e individual vis- a-vis its mil ieu. The intern al st r uct ure of th e orga nism is
brought to complet ion not only as a result of the act ivity th at takes place and th e mod-
ulat ion th at occurs at th e fronti er bet ween t he int erior domai n and the exte rior - as
is the case with a cryst al; rather, th e physical individual - pe rpet ually ex-cent ric, per-
pet ually per ipheral in relat ion to it self, acti ve at th e limit of it s own terrain - cannot
be said t o possess any genuine interi ori ty. But th e living ind ividual do es possess a gen-
uine int er iori ty, because indi vidu ati on does indee d take place within it . In t he living
individual, mo reover, the int er ior plays a consti t ut ive role, whereas only the fronti er
The Ge nes i s of the I ndi vidua l
plays thi s rol e in th e physical individual ; and in th e latter case, whatever is located on
th e inside in topologi cal terms must also be thought of as geneti cally prior. The living
individual is its own cont emporary with regard to each one of its elements; this is not
the case wit h the physical individual, whi ch contains a past th at is radically "past," even
when it is in the throes of gro wth. The living being can be consi de red to be a node of
informati on that is being transmitted inside itself - it is a syst em within a system, con-
tain ing within itse!f a medi ati on between two different orders of magnitude.5
In conclusion, I can put forward the hypothesis - analogous to that of quanta in phys-
ics and also to that concern ing the relativity between the levels of potential energy -
that it is fair to assume that t he process of individuation do es not exhaust everything
that came before (t he preindi vidual ) , and th at a met astabl e regime is not onl y ma in-
t ained by the individual, but is actually borne by it, to such an extent th at the finally
const it ut ed individual carri es with it a ce rt ain inheritance associated with its pr eindi-
vidual realit y, one animated by all the pot entials tha t characte r ize it. Individuation,
then, is a relative phenomenon, like an alte rat ion in the st r uc t ur e of a physi cal system.
There is a ce rt ain level of pot ential that remains, meaning th at further individuations
are still possibl e. The preindividual nature, whi ch remains associate d with the indi-
vidual, is a source of future metastable states from which new individuat ions could
eventuate. Accordi ng to thi s hypothesi s, it would be possible to consider every gen uin e
relati on as having the status ifa being, and as un dergoing development withi n a ne w indi-
vidu ati oti . A relation does not spring up between two terms that are alrea dy separate
individuals, rather, it is an aspect of th e internal resonance ifa ~ s t e m if individuation. It
form s a part of a wider syst em . Th e living being, which is simult aneously more and less
than a unity, possesses an internal probl em ati c and is capabl e of being an element in a
problematic that has a wider scope th an itself. As far as th e individual is concerned,
participati on here means bei n8 an element in a mu ch larger process ifindi viduation by
means of the inheritance of prei ndividual reali ty that the indi vidual contai ns - th at is,
due t o the potentials it has retained.
Thus, it now becomes feasible to th ink of both the int ernal and exte rn al rel ationship
as one of parti cip ati on, wit hout having to adduce new substances by way of explana-
tion . Both the psyche and th e collectivity are const it uted by a process of ind ividuation
supervening on t he individu ation th at was productive of life. The p ~ c h e represents the
conti nuing :ffort ifindi viduation in a beiru; that ha s 10 resol ve its own problematic through
its own involvement as an element of th e probl em by ta kin g act ion as a subj ect . The
subject can be th ought of as the unity of the being when it is thought of as a living indi-
2Q
Z 0 n e
vidual, and as a being that represents its activity to itself in the world both as an ele-
ment and a dimension of the world. Problems that concern living beings are not just
confined to their own sphere: only by means of an unending series of successive indi-
viduations, which ensure that ever-more preindividual reality is brought into play and
incorporated into the relation with the milieu, can we endow living beings with an
open-ended axiomatic. Affectivity and perception are seen as forming a single whole in
both emotion and science, forcing one to take recourse to new dimensions. However,
the psychic being is not able to resolve its particular problematic within its own orbit.
Its inheritance of preindividual reality allows collective individuation - which plays
the role here of one of the preconditions of psychic individuation - to contribute to
resolution, at the same time as this preindividual reality is individualized as a psychic
being that goes beyond the limits of the individuated being and incorporates it in a
wider system of the world and the subject. Individuation in its collective aspect makes
a group individual, one that is associated with the group through the preindividual
reality it carries within itself, conjoining it to all other individuals; it individuates as q
collective unit. The two individuations, psychic and collective, have a reciprocal effect
on each other; they allow us to define a transindividual category that might account
for the systematic unity of internal individuation (psychic) and external individuation
(collective). The psychosocial world of the transindividual is neither the social in its
raw immediacy nor the interindividual state. It requires that one postulate the previ-
ous influence of a veritable process of individuation rooted in a preindividual reality,
associated with individuals and capable of constituting a new problematic with its own
metastability. It expresses a quantum condition, correlative to a plurality of orders
of magnitude. The living being is presented as a problematic being, at once greater and
lesser than the unit. To say that the living being is problematic means considering its
becoming as forming one of its dimensions, and thus that it is determined by its be-
coming, which affords the being mediation. The living entity is both the agent and
the theater of individuation: its becoming represents a permanent individuation or
rather a series cd' approaches to individuation progressing from one state of metastability
to another. The individual is thus no longer either a substance or a simple part of the
collectivity. The collective unit provides the resolution of the individual problematic,
which means that the basis of the collective reality already forms a part of the indi-
vidual in the form of the preindividual reality, which remains associated with the
individuated reality. In general , what we consider to be a relation, due to the substan-
tialization of the reality of the individual, in fact forms a dimension of the process of
The Genesi s of t he Indivi d ual
A bat t al i on of fa r mer m i l it ia p r ior t o i t s depar t ure f or t he Chi nes e f r on t , 1895.
Suzu k i Shi nic hi
Z 0 n e
indiv idua tion by which the individual becomes. In oth er wor ds, t he rel ation to both
the world outside and to the coll ective is in fact a dimension ifthe individuation in
which the individual participates du e to its connection with th e preindividual reality
that undergoe s grad ual individuat ion.
Mo reover, psych ology and group theory are connected, since.ontogenesis reveals the
nature of the contribution made to the collective unit and also to that of the psychic
process conceived as the resoluti on of a probl emati c. When we con sider individuation
to be life itself, th en it can be seen as a discovery, in a sit uatio n of conflict, of a new
axiomat ic inc orpor at ing and u n i ~ ' i n g all the vari ou s eleme nts of thi s sit uat ion in a sys-
tem th at embraces t he ind ividu al. In order to understand the ro le played by psychic
activity in the th eory of individuati on as that whi ch resolves t he conflict ual char acter
of a metastable st at e, it is necessary t o uncover th e true paths by which metast able sys-
te ms are cons t r uc ted in life. In th is sense, both th e notion of an adaptive relati on ifthe
indi vidual to it s milieu
6
and th e cr it ical noti on of th e relati on ifthe kno wina subject to the
obj ect known mu st be modified . Knowledge is not built up through abstracti on from
sen sat ions, but through a probl emati c deriving from a primary tlopistic unity, a couplinq
ifsensa tion and tropism, the orient ation ifthe li vina beino in a polarized world. Her e once
again it is ne cessary to di stance ours elves fro m the hylomor phic schema. There is no
such th ing as a sensa t ion that would be the mat ter co nst it ut ing a given a posteriori for
the a priori forms of the sens ibility. The a priori forms are in fact a first resoluti on,
utili zing the discovery of an axiomati c of tensions res ult ing from th e confro nta tion of
the primary tropisti c uni ties. The a pr ior i forms of t he sensibility are not obt ained eithe r
a priori or a post eri ori by abst rac tio n, but rather mu st be underst oo d as the st ructures
of an axiomat ic th at appears in a process of individuation. Th e world and th e liVing
being are already conta ined in the t ropistic unity, but the world her e only serves as a
direc t ion , as a pol ar ity of a gradi ent th at locates the individuated bein g in an indifi nit e
dy ad at whose medi an poi nt it ca n be found, and upon whi ch it bases its furt he r exfoli-
ati on. Perce ption, and later Scien ce itsel f, con t inu e to resolve thi s problema t ic, not
only with the invention of spatiotemporal frameworks, but also with the constitution
of th e notion of an objec t , which th en becomes th e "source" of th e or iginal gradients
and organ izes th em among themselves as if th ey wer e an actual world. The distinct ion
bet ween the a pri or i and the a post er iori, an ec ho of the hvlornor phic sche ma in t he
th eory of knowl edge, ob scures, with it s dark central zone, the true process of individ-
uati on that is the seat of knowledge. The very idea of a qualitative or intensive seri es
woul d do well to be thought along the Jines of a theory ifphases or steps through which
The Gen esi s of t he Indivi d ual
a bei ng passes. Thi s th eory is nonreIati onal and is no t maintained by preexi sti ng pol ar
ter ms; rathe r, it devel ops from a primitive median st at e th at localizes the living being
an d in ser ts it in th e gr adi ent th at confers meaning on the tropisti c unity. The series is
an abs t ract vision of mea ni ng by means of which th e t ropi sti c unity or ients it self. We
must begi n with individuation, wi th t he bei ng grasped at it s center and in rel ati on to
its spa t iality and it s becoming, and not by a realized [subsw ntialisel indi vidual face d with
a world th at is ext ernal to it.
W ha t I mean by t his is t hat t he a pri ori and the a po st erior i ar e not to be found in
knowl edge it sel f. 7 They rep resent neither t he form nor th e matter of knowledge -
since t hey themselves are not knowledge - but t he ex t reme pol es of a prei ndividual
dyad , and are consequent ly prenoeti c. The illusion t hat th ere are a priori for ms der ives
from th e preexi st en ce of prior condi ti onsoi totality in the preindividu al system, wh ose
di mensions are gre ate r than that of th e i ndividua l un dergoing ontogenesis. On the
ot he r hand , t he ill usion th at th e a po sterior i ap pl ies can be explaine d by th e existen ce
of a r eality wh ose or der of magni tu de is inferior to t hat of th e individu al seen in th e
light of spatiotemporal modifi cati ons. A concept is neit he r a pri or i nor a post eri ori
but a praesenti , because it is an informative and inte ractive communi cation between
t hat which is larger t han t he individual and th at whi ch is smaller.
The same meth od o utl ine d above can be used to explor e the affect ivity and th e
emot ivity t hat co ns t it ute th e resonance of th e bei ng in rel ati on to itself, and that con-
nec t the indivi du at ed being to t he preindividual reality associat ed wi t h it in the same
way t ha t the t ropi st ic unity an d perception put it in rel at ion wi t h t he mi lieu . The psy-
che is co mposed o f successive indi viduations, wh ich allow th e bei ng to resolve it s
problemat ic sta tes by effec t uat ing permanent co mmunicati ons between that whi ch
is larger than it and th at which is smaller.
Resolution of th e psych e, t hough, cannot t ake place at th e level of t he ind ividu at ed
be ing alone. It forms the basi s of participation in a wider indivi duati on, th at of t he
co llect ivity. If th e individual bei ng puts itself, but no t hing els e, into qu estion, th en it
will not be able to move beyond th e limits of anx ie ty, for anxiety is a process with ou t
act ion , a permanent emotion th at does not succee d in resol ving affec t ivity, a challenge
in which the ind ivid uated bei ng ex plores th e dimen sions of it s bei ng wi t hout bein g
able to progress beyond them. To the collecti ve understood as an axiomatic that resolves
the psychi c problematic corresponds the tiotion oi the transindividual.
This se t of revised not ions is supp or t ed by the hypot he sis sta t ing that a pi ece of
infor mat ion is never rel ati ve to a unique and homogeneous reali ty, but rather to two
31 0
Z 0 n e
orders t hat are in t he process of "dispatation" The piece of infor mat ion , whet her it be
at t he level of th e t ropi sti c unity or at t he level of the t rans individual, is never deliv-
ered in a forma t th at can be given in a sim ple way. It is t he tension bet ween two di s-
parate reali ti es, it is the signific ation that emerges when a process ifindi vidua tion reveals the
dimensio n thro ugh which t wo disparate real ities togeth er become a rystem. If this is th e case,
th en th e piece of in form at ion acts in fact as an inst igation to individuatio n, a necessi ty
to in dividua te; it is never something that is just given. Unity an d identit y are not inher-
ent in th e informati on because th e informat ion is itself no t a term. For there to be
informati on presupposes that th ere is a tension in th e syst em of the being: the infor-
mat ion mu st be inherent in a problema t ic, since it represent s that by which the incom-
pati bili ty within the unresolved rystem becomes an organiZing di mension in its resolu tion. The
information impli es a change ifphase in the system because it implie s t he existen ce of a
pr imit ive prei ndivid ual state t hat is indi vidu ated according to t he di ct ates of th e
emergi ng organizat ion. The infor mation pr ovides the formula th at is foll owed by indi-
viduat ion, and so t he formula could no t possibly pr eexist this individu ati on. One could
say that the information always exist s in the present, th at it is always conte mpo rary,
because it yie lds th e meaning according to which a syste m is individuat ed. f
The conce pt ion of being th at I put forth, then, is th e following: a bei ng do es not
possess a uni ty in its ident ity, which is that of t he sta ble sta te wit hin whi ch no t ran s-
for mat ion is possible; rather, a being has a tran sdu cti ve unity, t hat is, it ca n pass out of
ph ase with it self, it can - in any ar ea - break its own bou nds in relat ion to it s center.
What one assumes to be a relat ion or a du ali ty ifprinciples is in fact the unfoldi ng of
th e be ing, which is more th an a unity and more th an an ident ity; becoming is a dimen-
sion of th e being, no t something t hat happ ens to it following a succ ession of events
th at affect a being already and origin ally given and substant ial. In dividuation must be
grasped as the becoming of t he being and no t as a model of th e being wh ich woul d
exhaust its significati on. The individuated being is nei th er th e whole bei ng nor the
p ri mary being I nst ead ifgras ping individ uat ion 1iSing the in di vidua ted being as a starting
point, we must gra sp the indi viduated bei ng]rom the viewpoint ifindividuation, and individ-
uat ionfrom the viewpoint ifpreindi viduo! being, each operat ing at ma ny different or ders
of magnitude.
I int end therefore to study thef orm s, modes and degr ees ifindi viduation in order to
sit uate accurately th e ind ividual in t he wid er be ing accord ing to th e th ree levels of th e
physical, th e vital and th e ps ychosocial." I nstead of presupposing t he exist ence of sub-
stances in order to account for individuat ion, I intend, on the cont rary, to take t he dif-
3 I J
The Ge nesi s of t he Individu al
fer ent regi mes of individuati on as provi ding the foundation for differ ent domains such as
mat ter, life, mind and society. The separ ation, th e gradat ion and the relations of these
domains appear as aspects of individuatio n according to its di fferent modalit ies . The
not ions of substance, form and matter are repla ced by t he mor e fundamental not ions
of primary information, internal res onance, potential ene rgy and orde rs of magnit ude.
However, in ord er to modify our notions in thi s way, we will have to employ bot h
a new method and a new no t ion. The me t hod woul d encourage, on t he one hand, a
refusal to const r uct th e esse nce of a give n reali ty by means of a conceptua! I-e1at ion
between two opposed t erms, and on t he other, a cons ide rat ion of any veritable rela-
t ion as something exi sti ng in its own ri ght. The re latio n, then, repres ents one of the
mod aliti es of the being, since it is contemporaneous wit h both of t he terms whose
exist ence it underwrites. A relat ion must be underst ood in it s role as a relat ion in the
context of the being it self, a relation belonging to th e being, th at is, a way of be ing
and not a Simple connecti on between two terms th at could be ade quat ely comp re -
hended usi ng co nce pts because they bo th enjoy wh at amounts t o an indep endent ex-
istence. It is becau se t he t erms are conceived as subs tances th at t he relat ion is seen
as a connection between two terms, and the being is di vide d into these ter ms because
it is fir st co ncieved of as a substa nce, before any ques t ions about individuati on have
been asked. On t he ot he r hand , t hough , if the being is no longer conceived using the
mode l of a substance, it becomes possible to th ink of the relati on as one of the non-
identi ty of th e being with itself, meani ng t hat t he be ing conta ins no t only t hat whic h
is identi cal to itself, with the result t hat the being qua being - pre vious to any indi-
viduation - ca n be grasped as something more th an a unity and more th an identity. 10
This me t hod pres upposes a postul ate of an onto logical nature. The principles of the
excluded midd Ie and of ident ity are inapplicable at t he level of t he being si nce at thi s
point indi viduation has not yet occurred; they only apply t o the being after individua-
t ion has t aken place, and th ey refer to a rather di minished being due to it s having been
separated out int o mil ieu and indi vidual . They do no t refer to t he whol e of t he being,
whi ch is to say, t o t he to t ality th at wi ll be formed lat er by the ind ividu al together with
the mili eu , but rather only to th at which be came the individual, derived fro m the pre-
ceding pre individual be ing. So one sees that class ical logi c can not be used to under-
sta nd individuati on beca use it forces us to deal wit h t he process of ind ividuati on usin g
concepts and th eir interrelati on s, which are only valid for th e resul ts of the process of
indivi duation, a limited view at bes t.
A fres h notion, enjoying a great variety of aspects and ma ny areas of applicat ion,
Z 0 n e
can be drawn from t his met hod which treats the pr inciple of identity and t he excluded
mi ddl e as be ing too narrow: tran sdu ction . Th is term denotes a proces s - be it physical,
biological , ment al or socia l - in which an act ivity gradually sets itself in mot ion, prop-
agati ng wit hin a given ar ea, th rou gh a structurat ion of the di fferent zon es of th e area
over which it op erates. Eac h region of the st ruct ure th at is consti tuted in thi s way then
ser ves to const itute th e next on e to such an extent th at at th e very time t his st r uctura-
ti on is effec ted there is a progressive modi ficati on t aking place in t and em wit h it . The
simplest image of th e trans duct ive pro cess is furn ished if one t hin ks of a crystal, begin-
ning as a tiny seed, which grows and extends it self in all direct ions in its mot her-wa ter.
Each layer of molecules t ha t has already been const ituted ser ves as t he st r uct ur ing
basis for th e layer that is being for med next , and the result is an amplify-i ng reti cu lar
structure . The t ran sductive pr ocess is th us an ind ividuat ion in progress. Physically, it
might be said t o occur at its simplest in t he form of a progressive ite ration; however, in
th e case of more complex doma ins, such as t hose of living met astability or psyc hic
problematics, it migh t progress at a cons t antly variable rate and expand in a heteroge-
neou s area. Transd uct ion occurs when ther e is act ivity, bot h st r uct ural and funct ional,
whi ch begins at a center of the bein g and exte nds it sel f in var ious direct ions from thi s
center, as if multiple dimension s of the being were exp andi ng around this central point.
It is th e correlati ve app earan ce of dimension s and st r uct ures in a being in a stat e of
prei ndi vidual t ension, wh ich is to say, in a being th at is more t han a uni ty and more
th an an iden tity, and whi ch has not yet passed out of ste p with itself into othe r multi -
ple dimensions. The ult imate terms at which t he transduct ive process finally arrives
do not preexist thi s process. Its dynamism der ives from t he pr imiti ve t ension of t he
he t erogeneous being's syste m, which moves out of ste p wit h it self and develops fur -
ther dime nsion s upon which it bases its st r uct ure. It does not der ive from a ten sion
bet ween th e t er ms th at will be found and registered at t he furthes t edges of trans-
du ct ion." Transduction can be a vital pro cess; in par t icular, it ex presses the sense of
organic individ uat ion. It ca n also be a psychic pr ocess and in effec t a logi cal proce-
dure, alt hough one th at is in no way restrict ed to th e logical mind- set . In the ar ea of
knowl edge, it maps out t he actual course th at invention foll ows, which is neither in-
ducti ve nor dedu cti ve but rather t ransdu ct ive, meaning th at it correspo nds to a dis-
covery of th e dimensions accordi ng to which a probl ematic can be defi ned . It is the
analogical process ins ofar as it is valid. Thi s not ion ca n be used to underst and all of
t he different areas of individuati on ; it applies to all th e cases whe re an ind ividuat ion
occu rs and reveals th e ge nesis of a network of relat ions based on t he bei ng. The possi-
3
13
Th e Genes is of the Ind ividual
bility of using an analogical transduction in order to understand a given area of reality
shows that thi s area is really the place where an analogical structuration has occurred.
Transdu cti on corres ponds to the presence of those relations create d when t he preindi-
vidu al bein g becomes individuated. It expresses individuation and allows us to un der-
sta nd it s workings, showing that it is at once a metaphysical and also a logi cal noti on.
While it may be applied to ontogenesis, it is also ontogenesis itself. Obj ectively, it allows us
t o compre he nd th e syst ematic preconditions of individuation, internal reson ance 12
and the psychi c problemati c. Logically, it can be used as the foundation for a new
species of analogi cal paradigms so as to enable us to pass from physical individuation
to organ ic ind ividuat ion , from organic individuation to psychi c individuati on , and
from psyc hic ind ividuat ion to the subject ive and obj ective level of th e transindividual
t hat forms th e basis of our investigation.
Clear ly, transdu ction cannot be pres ented as a logi cal procedure te rminating in a
concl usive proof. Nor is it not my int ention t o say t hat tran sdu cti on is a log ical proce-
dure in th e currently accepted meaning of thi s expression. I see it as a ment al proce-
dure, or better , the course taken by the mind on its journey of di scover y. This course
wou ld be toJollow the beingJrom the moment ol us genesis, to see the genesis of t he thought
through to its complet ion at the same t ime as t he ge nes is of the objec t reaches its own
co mplet ion. In this investigation, the above- me nt ioned course is obliged to play a role
t hat th e di alectic is unable to play, because the st udy of th e pr ocess of individuati on
does not seem to correspond to the app earance of th e negati on t hat foll ows as the
second st ep, but rather to an immanen ce of th e negat ive in th e pr imary st ate, the pre-
condit ion for what follows, in the ambivalent form of ten sion and of incompat ibility.
Ind eed, it is the most positive element in th e pr eindividual being - namely, the exis-
te nce of potentials - that is also the cau se of the incompatibility and the nonstability
of thi s st ate. The negation is primarily an ontogene t ic incompatibility, but it is also
the ot her side of the richness of potentials. It is not th er efor e a negation that is a sub-
stance. It is never a step or a stage, and individuati on is not synt hes is, a return to unity,
but rather the being passing out of ste p with it self, through the potentialization of the
incompatibilit ies of its preindividual center. In thi s ontogenet ic perspective, time it-
self is considered to be the expression of the dimens ionality oi the being as it is becoming
individualized.
Tr ansduction, then, is not only a path t aken by the mind , it is also an intuition, since
it allows a st r uct ure to appear in a domain of problema t ics yielding a solution to the
problems at hand. In the sen se co ntra ry to deduction, however, transduction does not
Z 0 n e
seek elsewhere a principle to resolve th e problem at hand; rat her, it deri ves the res olv-
ing structure from t he ten sions themselves with in t he domain just as the supersatu-
rated solut ion is crys tallized due to it s own po tent ials and the nature of the chemicals
it cont ains, and not t hrough the help of some foreign bod y. Nor is it comparabl e to
induction , be cau se induct ion retains t he characte r of th e terms of the reality as it is
understood in the area und er investigation - deri ving the st r uct ures of the analysis
from these terms th em selves - but it only retains t hat which is positive, which is to
say, that which is common to all th e ter ms, eliminating wh atever is singular. On the con-
trary, transduction represent s a d iscover y of d ime ns ions t hat are made to co mmuni -
cate by the syst em for eac h of t he te r ms suc h that the t ot al reality of each of the areas'
terms can find a place in th e newly di scovered st r uctu re s without loss or reduction .
The transducti on th at resolves things iffeets the reversal ifthe negative into the posit ive:
meani ng, th at which makes the terms fail to be identical with each other, and that which
makes them disparate (in t he sense in whi ch thi s ex pression is un derst ood in t he th e-
ory of vision), is integrated wit h t he syste m t.hat resolves thi ngs and becomes a condi-
tion of meani ng. There is no impoverishment in t he informati on contained in the terms:
transduction is c haracte rized by t he fact that the res ult of th is process is a conc rete
network including all t he or igin al terms. The resulti ng syst em is made up of t he con-
crete, and it comprehend s all of t he concre te. T he t ransduc t ive order retains all t he
co ncrete and is character ized by t he conservation ifir:!ormation, whereas inductio n re-
qui res a loss of in for mat ion . Foll owing th e same path as th e dialect ic, transducti on
co nserves and integr ates t he opposed aspe cts. Unl ike t he di alectic, transduction does
not presuppose th e ex iste nce of a pr evi ou s t ime per iod to act as a framework in whi ch
th e genesis unfold s, time it sel f being the solut ion and dimen sion of the discovered
systematic: time comesf rom the preindividual ju st lik e the other dimensions that determine
individuation. 13
Now, in order to compre hend th e t ran sducti ve process, which forms the basis for
individuation at all of it s var ious levels, th e notion of for m is insufficient. It is part of
the same syste m of th ought t hat subst ance is, or t hat in which a co nnecti on is consid-
ered to be a rel ati on th at postdates th e existence of the terms. These latter not ions
have be en elaborated based on the results of individuati on . They are capable of grasp-
ing only an impoveri shed reali ty, one th at does not take pot ent ials into accoun t , and
are t herefore incapable of be ing individualized.
The notion ifform must be replaced by that ifinf ormation, which presupposes t he exis-
tence of a syste m in a st ate of metast able equil ibrium capable of being indivi duated .
The Gen esi s of th e I ndi vidual
Information, unlike form, is never a unique term, but rather th e meaning that arises
on th e heels of a disparati on . The old noti on of form, as it is given by t he hyJomorphi c
schema, is too independent of any notion of system and met ast ability. That given by
the Theory of Form includes, on th e cont rary, the notion of system, and is defined as
th e st ate toward which th e syste m t ends when it seeks equilibrium, meaning that it is
a resol ut ion of tension. Unfortunat ely, our reliance on a superficial physical paradigm
has meant that the Theory of Form views only the stable state of equilibr ium as that
sta te of a syst em capable of resolving tensions. It has totally ignor ed met ast ability. I
wish t o consider the Theory of Form anew and, by introducing a quantum precondi-
ti on, show that the problems pr esented by the Theory of Form can be directl y resolved
- not by using the notion of stable equilibrium, but onl y by using that of metast able
eq uilibri um. The True Form, t hen, is not the simple form, the pr egnant geo met ric
form, but the significantf orm, th at is, t he one that establishes a t ransdu ctive order with-
in a system of reality replete with pot entials. Th is Tr ue Form is the one th at maintains
th e energy level of the syste m, sus tai ni ng it s potentials by making th em compat ible.
It is t he st r uct ure of compati bility and viability, it is the invented dimen sion ality fol-
lowing whi ch there is compatibility wit hout degradation. 14 The notion of Form deserves
th erefore to be replaced by that of information. In the course of thi s re place me nt , the
noti on of information must not be associ at ed with that of the signals or sup po rts
[supports] or vehicles of information, as the technological theory ifinformOlion tends to
do, derived by abstraction as it is in thefi rst instanceJom transmission technology- The pure
noti on of for m mu st t herefor e be retrieved twi ce over fro m the evils result ing from
a supe rficial use of a technol ogi cal paradigm: in th e first place, in relati on to the cul-
ture of the anci ent s, due to the reducti ve use made of this notion in the byloniorphic
schema; in t he seco nd place, wher e it exists as a notion of information, in or de r to save
informa tio n as meaning from th e technologi cal theory of information in modern cul-
ture. For in th e successive theories of hylomorphism, it is indeed the same aim th at
we find in th e case of the True Form, and th en information: the effort t o discover th e
inh er en ce of t he given meanings in th e being. Myobj ect is to discover th is inhere nce
in the process ifindividuation.
In t his way, an investi gation concerni ng ind ividuat ion can lead to a reform of our
fundament al philosophical notions, because it is possible to consider individu at ion
as th at which has to be understood before all else in th e case of a given being Even
before one as ks to what exte nt it is legiti mat e or otherwise to make judgments about
any being wha tsoever, the being can be seen as expressing itself in two senses: the fir st,
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fundamental, that the being is insofar as it is; but in a second sense, whi ch is always
super imposed on th e first in the theory of logic, that the being is a being insofar as
it is indi vidu ated. If it were true that logic is not appli cable to any affirmati ons con-
cerning the being unti l after individuati on has occurred, then a theory of being as it
exists previous to any logic ought to be developed. Thi s theory could in fact serve as
a foundat ion for logic, since nothing proves in advance th at ther e is onl y one possible
way for th e be ing to be indivi du at ed. If many typ es of individuation exi sted, similarly
there ought to be many types of logic, each one corresponding to a definite type of indi -
viduat ion. The classific ation of ontogeneses would allow us to pl urali ze logic relying on
a valid basis of plurality. As for the axi omat ization of our knowledge of t he preindivid-
ual being, it cannot be restricted to one of the previously establi shed logi cs because it is
impossibl e to define any norm or system with out t aking its content int o acco unt . On ly
t he indi vidu ati on of thought coming to frui t ion can acco mpany the individuation of
bei ngs that are not thought. Therefore, we cannot have eit her an immediate or a medi-
ated knowl edge of individuatio n, but onl y one that is a process parallel t o the process
wit h whi ch we are already famili ar. We cannot know individuation in the common sense
of the phrase; we can only indivi duate, individuate ourselves and in ourselves. On th e
margins of knowledge proper, t his comp rehe nsion is an analogy between two processes,
which is a specific mode of communicati on. Individuati on of the reali ty beyond the
subject as gras ped by the subj ect thanks t o th e analogous indi vidu ation of knowl edge
within the subject. But it is bymeans of the individuat ion ofkno wledge and not knowl -
edge alone t hat the indi viduat ion of bei ngs th at are not subjects is grasped . Beings ca n
be known by means of t he knowl edge of the subj ect, but the individuati on of beings
cannot be understood except by the individuation of the kno wledge of the subject .
N OTES
1. Mo reover, it is guite possibl e t hat the milieu is not to be thought of as a Simple, homogeneous
and uniform phenomenon, but somethi ng that, from its very incept ion, is characterized by a tension in
force between two ext reme orde rs of magni tude that mediatize the individual when it comes into being.
2. And const it ut ion, between t he two extremes, of a medi ate ord er of magnitude; in a cert ain
sense, ontogenetic de velopment [devenir] itself ca n be consider ed as mediation .
3. No rmative and int uit ive equi valen ts of the notion of metastability di d exist in t he ancie nt
world; but since the noti on of me tast ability generally requires the simul taneous existence of two
orders of magnitude and t he abs ence of interacti ve communicat ion bet ween them, t his conce pt
owes mu ch to t he di scoveri es made by scient ific ad vance.
The Ge nesis of the Individual
4. It is by means of this self-insertion that the living being can be seen as the product of infor-
mational exchange, by becoming a node of interactive communication between an order of reality
climensionally superior to its own , and an inferior order whose organization it undertakes.
5. This internal mecliation can occur as a continuance of the external mecliation that is accom-
plished by the living individual, thereby allowing the living being to bring two different orclers of
magnitucle into relation with one another: that of the cosmic level (as in the luminous energy of the
sun, for example) with that of the intermolecular level.
6. Specifically, the relation to the milieu cannot be envisaged, either before or during individua-
tion, as relation to a unique ancl homogeneous milieu. The milieu is itself a ~ s r e m , a synthetic group-
ing of two or more levels of reality that did not communicate with each other before individuation.
7. This paragraph appeared as a footnote in the original French - TRANS.
8. This statement is not meant to contest the validity of quantitative theories of information and
of orders of complexity, but it works uncler the assumption that there is a fundamental state - that
of the preindividual being - that precedes any duality of sender and receiver, thus any transmitted
message. The residue of this fundamental state in the classic example of information transmitted in
the form of a message is not the source of the information but the primordial precondition without
which there is no information-effect, which means no information. This precondition is the meta-
stability of the receiver, whether it be that of a technical being or the living individual. This informa-
tion could be called "primary information."
9. ['I ndividu et sa 8enese phvsico-bioloqique: L'lndividuauon ala lumiere des notions deforme et
d'iriformation (Paris: P.U.F., 1964). Th.e present essay forms the introduction to that work - TRANS.
10. Above all, it should be noted that the multiplicity of orders of magnitude and the primor-
dial absence of interactive communication between them forms an integral part of any such under-
standing of the being.
11. On the contrary, it expresses the primordial heterogeneity of the two levels of reality, one
larger than the individual - the system of metastable totality - the other smaller than it, such as a
piece of matter. Between these two primordial orders of magnitude the individual develops th.rough
a process of amplifying communication of which transduction is the most primitive form, one already
l)resent in the physical individuation.
12. Internal resonance is the most primitive form of communication between realities of differ-
ent orders. It is composed of a clouble process of amplification and condensation.
13. This process is paralleled by that of vital individuation. A plant institutes a mediation between
a cosmic order ancl an inframolecular order, classifying and distributing the clifferent chemicals con-
tainecl in the soil and the atmosphere by means of the solar energy obtained from photo-synthesis.
It is an interelemental focal point and it develops as an internal resonance of this preindividual sys-
3 J 8
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te m co mpo sed of two layers of reality that or igi nally had no co nt act wit h ea ch ot her . T he inrercle-
mentary focal point effects an infraeiement arv funct ion .
14. In th is way, the for m appears as an act ive communicati on , th e intern al res onance th at effects
indi vid uation - it ap pears with t he indiv idu al .
Translate d fr om the French by Mark Cohe n and Sanfo rd Kwi nte r