Passenger ship safety

Page Content Passenger ships - usually defined as a ship carrying more than 12 passengers - on international voyages must comply with all relevant IMO regulations, including those in the SOLAS and Load Lines Conventions. Passenger ships in operation today are subject to a vast array of regulations and standards covering every aspect of ship construction and operation. A number of incidents over the years have led to improvements in safety requirements, including those relating to fire safety measures - such as escape routes and fire protections systems for the large atrium typical of cruise ships - and life-saving appliances and arrangements. Besides improvements in the technical regulations, the entry into force of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code for passenger ships in 1998 was an important step in focusing on the "human element" side of shipping, by providing an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. Meanwhile, the entry into force on 1 February 1997 (with a phase-in period to 2002) of the 1995 amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 has paved the way for greatly enhanced seafarer standards as well as giving IMO itself powers to check Parties' compliance with the Convention. The STCW Convention, as amended since 1995, includes specific training requirements for crew on passenger ships, such as training in crowd management, for use in emergency evacuation. Large passenger ships can produce a tremendous amount of waste - regulations on garbage and sewage management are contained in MARPOL 73/78. Roll-on, roll-off ferries; high-speed craft and new craft such as Wig-in-Ground effect craft all have their own particular safety concerns. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) at its 82nd session in November-December 2006 adopted a package of amendments to SOLAS, the result of a comprehensive review of passenger ship safety initiated in 2000 with the aim of assessing whether the current regulations were adequate, in particular for the large passenger ships now being built. The work in developing the new and amended regulations has based its guiding philosophy on the dual premise that the regulatory framework should place more emphasis on the prevention of a casualty from occurring in the first place and that future passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability so that, in the event of a casualty, persons can stay safely on board as the ship proceeds to port. The amendments include new concepts such as the incorporation of criteria for the casualty threshold (the amount of damage a ship is able to withstand, according to the design basis, and still safely return to port) into SOLAS chapters II-1 and II-2. The amendments also provide regulatory flexibility so that ship designers can meet any safety challenges the future may bring. The amendments include:
alternative designs and arrangements; safe areas and the essential systems to be maintained while a ship proceeds to port after a casualty,

which will require redundancy of propulsion and other essential systems;

 on-board safety centres, from where safety systems can be controlled, operated and monitored; fixed fire detection and alarm systems, including requirements for fire detectors and manually operated

call points to be capable of being remotely and individually identified;

fire prevention, including amendments aimed at enhancing the fire safety of atriums, the means of

escape in case of fire and ventilation systems; and

time for orderly evacuation and abandonment, including requirements for the essential systems that

must remain operational in case any one main vertical zone is unserviceable due to fire. The work on passenger ship safety has based its guiding philosophy on the premise that the regulatory framework should place more emphasis on the prevention of a casualty from occurring in the first place and that future passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability so that, in the event of a casualty, persons can stay safely on board as the ship proceeds to port. With regard to the five pillars of the guiding philosophy for the Committee's passenger ship safety initiative, the following have been achieved since the work was initiated in 2000: Prevention: Amendments to SOLAS and the STCW Conventions and supporting guidelines that focus on fire prevention, navigation safety, training and contingency planning. Improved survivability: Amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1 and II-2 and supporting guidelines that focus on essential system redundancy, management of emergencies and casualty mitigation. Regulatory flexibility: Amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1 and III and supporting guidelines that focus on promoting, through rigorous evaluation and approval procedures, the regulatory approval of new safety technologies and arrangements. Operations in areas remote from SAR facilities: Action taken to develop amendments to SOLAS chapter III and supporting guidelines that will focus on reducing the time it takes to recover persons from survival craft and the water; supporting guidelines approved on external support from SAR Authorities, as well as guidance to assist seafarers taking part in SAR operations. Health safety and medical care: Supporting guidelines that focus on establishing medical safety programmes and a revised Guide on Cold Water Survival. The approved draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1, II-2 and III and the FSS Code relate to:
alternative designs and arrangements; safe areas and the essential systems to be maintained while a ship proceeds to port after a casualty,

which will require redundancy of propulsion and other essential systems;

on-board safety centres, from where safety systems can be controlled, operated and monitored; fixed fire detection and alarm systems, including requirements for fire detectors and manually operated

call points to be capable of being remotely and individually identified;

fire prevention, including amendments aimed at enhancing the fire safety of atriums, the means of

escape in case of fire and ventilation systems; and

 time for orderly evacuation and abandonment, including requirements for the essential systems that

must remain operational in case any one main vertical zone is unserviceable due to fire. The MSC agreed that the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE) should develop performance standards for recovery systems for all types of ships, by 2008, with a view to preparing further draft amendments to SOLAS chapter III on recovery arrangements for the rescue of persons at sea. The Committee agreed that the new amendments and guidelines should be enforced by 2012. The MSC also agreed that the Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW) should develop relevant training standards after the performance standards have been finalized. The idea is that ships should be equipped to recover persons from the water and/or survival craft and rescue craft, and give functional requirements for achieving this. The following circulars were approved:
Guide to recovery techniques; Guidelines on the provision of external support as an aid to incident containment for SAR Authorities

and others concerned;

Enhanced contingency planning guidance for passenger ships operating in areas remote from SAR

facilities, which includes Criteria for what constitutes an area remote from SAR facilities;
Guidelines on training of SAR service personnel working in major incidents; and Guide for cold water survival.

A draft Assembly resolution on Guidelines on voyage planning for passenger ships operating in remote areas was agreed for submission to the next Assembly, scheduled for late 2007. Further consequential work to be carried out includes the development of guidelines for the approval of novel life-saving appliances (DE); and guidelines on the lay-out and ergonomic design of safety centres on passenger ships (Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV)). The MSC also instructed the Sub-Committee on Stability, Load Lines and Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF) to consider draft amendments for water ingress detection and flooding level monitoring systems; and for a safe return to port capability for passenger ships in damaged condition. The STW Sub-Committee is instructed to review the guides for recovery techniques and cold water survival from the point of view of training.

Background to the passenger ship safety initiative The initiaitve was launched at the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 2000 to evaluate current regulations and to ascertain whether they are adequate for some of the colossal cruise ships being built today. While there could be no doubt that such ships were being built, designed and operated in compliance with applicable IMO standards, the time had come for IMO to undertake a holistic consideration of safety issues pertaining to passenger ships, with particular emphasis on large cruise ships. The concern was not whether such ships complied with the SOLAS requirements applicable to ships of their category, but whether SOLAS and, to the extent applicable, the Load Line Convention requirements, several of

which had been drafted before some of the large ships in question had been built, duly addressed all the safety aspects of their operation - in particular, in emergency situations. Also, whether the training requirements of the STCW Convention relating to personnel operating large cruise ships were in need of any review or clarification. The working group on large passenger-ship safety began work at the MSC in November-December 2000, with input from the cruise industry and Member States who have carried out studies into large passenger ships and areas of potential concern. The work reflects IMO's proactive stance on future legislation and includes the use of tools such as formal safety assessment, used in other areas of IMO's work such as bulk carrier safety. What became clear from the initial work was that concern over large passenger-ship safety would be centred on the difficulty in safely evacuating some passengers, such as the elderly and injured, from lifeboats to rescue vessels. It is clear that the difficulties would not end, even with successful evacuation. Thousands of people, unfamiliar with ships and the sea, crowded into lifeboats and liferafts, would present a unique search-andrescue challenge. Fire also represents a particular vulnerability for large cruise ships. Every passenger is a potential ignition source and the hotel services have an inherent risk. The MSC has agreed that future large passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability based on the time-honoured principle that "a ship is its own best lifeboat". This approach envisages that passengers and crew should normally be able to evacuate to a safe haven on board and stay there. In addition, this envisages that a ship should always be able to proceed to port at a minimum safe speed. Since 2001, the Sub-Committees on Radiocommunications, Search and Rescue (COMSAR), Ship Design and Equipment (DE), Fire Protection (FP), Safety of Navigation (NAV), Stability, Load lines and Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF) and Standards of training and Watchkeeping (STW) have been working on tasks assigned to them and have reported back to the MSC. At its 79th session in December 2004, the MSC agreed that as many of the issues discussed under the agenda item "Large Passenger Ship Safety" applied equally to all passenger ships, the agenda item should be renamed "Passenger Ship Safety". The Committee approved a revised work plan for passenger ship safety and the revised guiding philosophy, strategic goals and objectives, developed by the Working Group on Large Passenger Ship Safety which met during the session. The revised guiding philosophy for future work on passenger ship safety is based on the premise that the regulatory framework should place more emphasis on the prevention of a casualty from occurring in the first place and that future passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability so that, in the event of a casualty, persons can stay safely on board as the ship proceeds to port. At its 80th session in May 2005, the MSC agreed a revised work plan for the on-going work by the relevant Sub-Committees on passenger ship safety, the guiding philosophy for which is based on the premise that the regulatory framework should place more emphasis on the prevention of a casualty from occurring in the first

place and that future passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability so that, in the event of a casualty, persons can stay safely on board as the ship proceeds to port. The MSC approved the definition for the time for orderly evacuation and abandonment as "the time, beginning when the casualty threshold is exceeded until all persons have safely abandoned the ship, in which the ship remains viable for this purpose". The MSC agreed that, in the event that the casualty exceeds the threshold for return to port, an additional casualty scenario, for design purposes, should be developed. The MSC instructed the Fire Protection (FP) and Stability, Load Lines and Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF) Sub-Committees to develop these scenarios to support the concept that a passenger ship should remain viable for at least three hours, to allow for safe, orderly evacuation and abandonment. It was agreed that the casualty threshold is the amount of damage a ship is able to withstand, according to the design basis, and still safely return to port. MSC 80 also agreed that the World Maritime University (WMU) should begin a project to co-ordinate a search and rescue (SAR) research programme related to passenger ship safety. The first phase, to be implemented from May 2005 to April 2006, will include initial data collection and reporting on the state of the art and current research efforts and results in the subject area. The MSC requested the IMO Secretary-General to include in his budget proposal for the 2006-2007 biennium an amount equivalent to US$90,000 in order to implement phase 2 of the project, which would include further work in data collection from sources not identified by the Member States; development of an on-line database of current research; and the organization of a workshop/seminar on the subject area, to include the research community as well as other stakeholders. Recommended interim measures aimed at enhancing the safety of passenger ships, in the wake of the Costa Concordia incident in January, were agreed by IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), when it met at the Organization's London Headquarters for its 90th session from 16 to 25 May 2012. The MSC adopted a resolution, which invites Member States to recommend that passenger ship companies conduct a review of operational safety measures, to ships flying their flag, on a voluntary basis and with all possible urgency and efficiency, taking into consideration the recommended interim operational measures listed in an MSC circular. The recommended interim measures include: carrying additional lifejackets, to be readily accessible in public spaces, at the muster/assembly stations, on deck or in lifeboats, so that in the event of an emergency passengers need not return to their cabins to retrieve the lifejacket stored there; reviewing the adequacy of the dissemination and communication of the emergency instructions on board ships; carrying out the muster for embarking passengers prior to departure from every port of embarkation, if the duration is 24 hours or more;

 limiting access to the bridge to those with operational or operationally related functions, during any period of restricted manoeuvring, or while manoeuvring in conditions that the master or company bridge procedures/policy deems to require increased vigilance (e.g. arrival/departure from port, heavy traffic, poor visibility); and ensuring that the ship's voyage plan has taken into account IMOs Guidelines for voyage planning, and, if appropriate, Guidelines on voyage planning for passenger ships operating in remote areas. The adoption of the resolution followed consideration of information provided by the Government of Italy on the investigation into the Costa Concordia incident, as well as preliminary proposals on enhancing the safety of passenger ships brought to the Committee's attention by the Government of Italy and other Member States, as well as by the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review. The resolution encourages Member States and the passenger ship industry to take the necessary actions to ensure that their current safety standards, procedures and best management practices are fully and effectively implemented. The MSC also agreed, in principle, to an action plan on long-term work for passenger ship safety, pending the review of the report of investigation into the loss of the Costa Concordia. IMO Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu welcomed the appropriate and timely actions in response to the loss of the Costa Concordia. The MSC also approved, for adoption at MSC 91, new draft SOLAS requirements (new regulation III/17-1) to require ships to have plans and procedures to recover persons from the water, as well as related Guidelines for development of plans and procedures for recovery of persons from the water. The MSC also approved a draft MSC resolution on Implementation of SOLAS regulation III/17-1 to ships other than those engaged in international voyages

THE PASSENGER SAFETY INITIATIVE

All too often, domestic and international shipping regulations are developed in reaction to a casualty to prevent a similar accident from reoccurring. The image of a large number of people in distress at sea is very unsettling and rightly results in a public demand for quick action. It should therefore be no surprise that the worlds first international convention for addressing safety of life at sea the SOLAS Convention** - was developed in response to the Titanic disaster in 1912. Although many of the international passenger ship safety regulations in force today were developed in response to passenger vessel tragedies, ensuring that the international regulatory framework retains its relevance in light of technical advancements is a huge and complex undertaking and, contrary to public perception, much of this routine work is proactive. The technological development over the past twenty-five years have effected all sectors of the shipping industry and have literally altered the fundamental nature of passenger shipping. This sector of the industry

has witnessed phenomenal growth on all fronts numbers of passengers, numbers of ships, new destinations and, perhaps most startlingly of all, in ship sizes and the types of amenities on board. This phenomenal success is largely attributed to the economic growth in many parts of the world and the resulting capital investment in the building of new cruise ships with a trend toward building bigger, more sophisticated ships such as the Queen Mary 2. The benefits of the economies of scale have rendered cruises more affordable to the travelling public and contributed the boom in the cruise shipping industry. It was against these unprecedented developments of the last decade that questions began being asked regarding the safety of these new gigantic cruise ships. In particular, how quickly could these mega-ships be evacuated in an emergency and whether search and rescue (SAR) services were capable of effectively rescuing thousands of persons from survival craft. The direct recipients of these questions were initially the companies owning these large cruise ships and the States whose flag they flew, and generally they were companies and States with a remarkably high safety record. But increasingly, given its global mandate over safety and environmental protection, such questions began to be asked of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Consequently, in May 2000, the entire IMO Membership, including the cruise industry, agreed to undertake a holistic consideration of safety issues pertaining to passenger ships, with particular emphasis on large cruise ships. The outcome of this proactive initiative has resulted in an entirely new regulatory philosophy for the design, construction and operation of passenger ships that will better address the future needs of the passenger ship industry. NEW INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY IMO From the outset, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the IMO body responsible for the work to be undertaken, decided to establish an ad hoc Working Group on Passenger Ship Safety to facilitate the deliberations on the complex issues to be considered. To assist the group in its deliberations, the MSC approved a guiding philosophy and strategic goals to provide unambiguous instructions on the objectives to be achieved. The following guiding philosophy agreed to guide the group in its deliberations:

The regulatory framework should place more emphasis on the prevention of a casualty from occurring
in the first place. Future passenger ships should be designed for improved survivability so that, in the event of a casualty, persons can stay safely on board as the ship proceeds to port. The regulatory framework should permit alternative designs and arrangements in lieu of the prescriptive regulations provided that at least an equivalent level of safety is achieved. Passenger ships should be crewed, equipped and have arrangements to ensure the safety of persons on board for survival in the area of operation, taking into account climatic conditions and the availability of SAR functions.

 Passenger ships should be crewed and equipped to ensure the health-safety, medical care and security of persons on board until more specialized assistance is available. The guiding philosophy formed the foundation of the groups work and primarily focused on improving the survivability of future passenger ships. Of course prevention is always the first goal in achieving any safety objective. Nevertheless, casualties will happen and mitigating the consequences is essential to saving lives. In this regard, the MSC agreed that the best way to avoid having thousands of persons in survival craft was to ensure that future passenger ships were robustly designed so that, after a casualty, the passengers and crew would normally be able to evacuate to a safe area on board as the ship proceeds back to port under its own power. A more detailed explanation of the casualty threshold, safety return to port and safe area concepts related to the guiding philosophy is discussed later in the article. After six years of complex and extensive deliberations, the draft regulations and draft guidelines to supplement their application were adopted at MSC 82 in November 2006 in Istanbul, Turkey. Taking into account the five main pillars of the guiding philosophy (in bold), the following has been achieved: Prevention: Draft amendments to the Seafarers Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code and supporting guidelines that focus on navigation safety and resource management were approved. Improved survivability: Draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1 and II-2 adopted and supporting guidelines on essential system redundancy, management of emergencies and casualty mitigation were approved. Regulatory flexibility: Draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1 and III were adopted and supporting guidelines to providing the methodology for the approval of new safety technologies and arrangements was approved. Operations in areas remote from SAR facilities: Action taken to develop amendments to SOLAS chapter III by 2012 to address the time it takes to recover persons from survival craft and the water. Guidelines were also approved on external support from SAR Authorities as well as guidance to assist seafarers taking part in SAR operations. Health safety and medical care: Supporting guidelines that focus on establishing medical safety programmes and a revised Guide on Cold Water Survival were approved.

It should be noted that the MSC did not develop the above mandatory and non-mandatory standards in isolation but relied on the expertise and work carried out by other expert bodies within IMO as well by the cruise industry. The new SOLAS regulations are expected to enter into force on 1 July 2010 and apply to passenger ships having a length of 120 metres or more or three or more main vertical (fire) zones.

NEW PREVENTION MEASURES The work associated with the new prevention measures focused on matters related to the human element such as operations, management and training. Existing training standards were modified and new guidance developed to support matters primarily related to navigation, resource management and training. To this end, the following prevention measures were approved and/or endorsed by the MSC: Guidelines on voyage planning for passenger ships in remote areas, for adoption by the IMO Assembly Amendments to the STCW Code on guidance on engine-room resource management Amendments to the STCW Code to provide additional guidance to administrations, shipping companies and training institutions regarding training of seafarers of large passenger ships in advanced firefighting and damage control Revision of the IMO model courses on crowd and crisis management to incorporate the safe area concept IMPROVED SURVIVABILITY PROVISIONS As previously mentioned, two new concepts related to casualty thresholds and safe areas were incorporated into the new SOLAS regulations. The new casualty threshold provisions specify the design criteria for the extent of damage future passenger ships must be able to withstand and still safely return to port under their own power. If this casualty threshold is exceeded (i.e., the damage is such that return to port under power is not possible), then the ship is to remain viable for a minimum of 3 hours to allow for safe and orderly abandonment. During the development of the safe return to port criteria a number of questions began to surface, such as where the passengers and crew go during such a casualty bearing in mind that the fire and/or flooding may still be active (but contained) as the ship races to the nearest port, which could take more than a day to reach. To deal with the above concern the safe area concept was developed. The new safe area provisions establish that the persons on board the ship must be protected from hazards to life or health and provided with basic services. Essentially, a safe area is any space which is not flooded or any space outside the main vertical (fire) zone in which a fire has occurred. The basic services, which include such necessities as water, medical care, protection from weather, etc., must be available in the safe areas. The MSC adopted new draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-1 and II-2 and associated guidelines to support the above concepts. These new regulations focus on essential system redundancy, management of emergencies and casualty mitigation.

Safe return to port and time for evacuation The new SOLAS regulation II-2/21 (Casualty threshold, safe return to port and safe areas) establishes the design criteria for a passenger ships safe return to port under its own propulsion, which includes functional requirements and performance standards for safe areas.

In the future, new passenger ships will have to be designed to be capable of safely returning to port after fire or flooding damage that has render any one space or watertight compartment a complete loss (e.g., the main propulsion space, navigation bridge, etc.). To be deemed capable of returning to port, the following essential systems are to remain operational after the casualty: Propulsion Steering systems and steering-control systems Navigational systems Systems for fill, transfer and service of fuel oil Internal communication between the bridge, engineering spaces, safety centre, fire-fighting and damage control teams, and as required for passenger and crew notification and mustering External communication Fire main system Fixed fire-extinguishing systems Fire and smoke detection system Bilge and ballast system Power-operated watertight and semi-watertight doors Systems intended to support safe areas; Flooding detection systems Other systems vital to damage control efforts

For the sake of simplicity, the new regulation essentially requires that all of the above systems must remain operational after the loss of any one space enclosed by A class boundaries (e.g., steel bulkheads, etc.). Therefore, for example, if the propulsion space is lost due to a fire, an alternative means of propulsion must still be available on board to bring the ship to the nearest port. In order to meet the safe area requirements, the following basic services are to be available to ensure that the health of the passengers and crew is maintained as the ship proceeds to port: Sanitation Water Food Alternate space for medical care Shelter from the weather Means of preventing heat stress and hypothermia Light Ventilation

The design criteria for systems to remain operational for supporting the orderly evacuation and abandonment of a ship is based on the loss of one main vertical zone. Thus, if the return to port casualty threshold is exceeded, but the ship has not lost more than one main vertical (fire) zone, then the following essential systems are to remain operational: Fire main Internal communications (in support of fire-fighting as required for passenger and crew notification and evacuation) Means of external communications Bilge systems for removal of fire-fighting water Lighting along escape routes, at assembly stations and at embarkation stations of life-saving appliances Guidance systems for evacuation Passenger ship designers will now have to design a ships systems to be operational if any one main vertical zone is lost. A number of additional supporting regulations were adopted as part of this comprehensive package of amendments including, but not limited to, flooding detection systems and enhanced fire safety provisions.

SAFETY CENTRES ON PASSENGER SHIPS To assist with the management of emergency situations, new regulations have been adopted to require safety centres on or adjacent to the navigation bridge. These new provisions were based on best cruise industry practices. The operation, control and monitoring of the following safety systems will be available from the safety centre: All powered ventilation systems Fire doors General emergency alarm system Public address system Electrically powered evacuation guidance systems Watertight and semi-watertight doors Indicators for shell doors, loading doors and other closing appliances Water leakage of inner/outer bow doors, stern doors and any other shell door Television surveillance system Fire detection and alarm system Fixed fire-fighting local application systems Sprinkler and equivalent systems Water-based systems for machinery spaces

 Alarm to summon the crew Atrium smoke extraction system Flooding detection systems Fire pumps and emergency fire pumps

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY From the very outset of this passenger ship safety initiative, the MSC was of the view that any future requirements should incorporate mechanisms to allow for the approval of new technologies and concepts in ship design, which was deemed essential for addressing future safety challenges. Examples of similar regulatory regimes include the philosophies used in the development of the revised SOLAS chapter II-2 (fire safety) and the revision of High-Speed Craft Code (2000). New alternative design and arrangements regulations and guidelines were developed to provide a methodology for approving designs that do not strictly meet the prescriptive requirements in SOLAS chapters II-1, II-2 and III, but still provide an equivalent to or greater level of safety than that required in the prescriptive requirements. This new approach will require significantly more time in calculation, testing and documentation than a typical prescriptive design because of the increased engineering rigor required by the new regulations. The potential benefits include more design flexibility to address safety issues, cost effective designs for unique applications, promotion of the latest safety technologies and an improved knowledge of loss potential.

OPERATIONS IN AREAS REMOTE FROM SAR FACILITIES One of the most difficult issues that had to be addressed as part of the passenger ship safety initiative were matters dealing with search and rescue. Rescuing a large number of persons at sea is difficult even under ideal conditions, not to mention the growing industry trend to take large passenger ships into remote areas with scarce shipping traffic and varying weather conditions. From the outset, the MSC and the IMO Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue vigorously debated what constituted a remote area of operation. The basic consensus was that it depends on the number of people at risk, the capacity and capability of SAR facilities (additional SAR facilities in particular) and/or other assistance available, and the weather and sea conditions, which affect both survival times and recovery capability. It also depends on the effectiveness of possible mitigation strategies. Therefore, the solution was multi-faceted and covered a wide range of issues. The work on this issue resulted in the approval of the following recommendations and guidelines by MSC 81: Voyage planning for passenger ships operating in remote areas Amendments to the IAMSAR Manual Guidance on recovery techniques External support provided to ships by SAR Authorities Contingency planning for ships operating in areas remote from SAR facilities

 Guidance on cold water survival Training of SAR service personnel

The work on this initiative has prompted the develop of standards to also address the some aspects of the safety of other types of ships. Bearing in mind that all ships are required to assist in SAR efforts, it only makes sense that such ships be appropriately equipment to recover people from survival craft. Therefore, in addition to the above guidance, the MSC agreed to develop mandatory performance standards for recovery systems for all types of ships. The new performance standards, once adopted, will require that all types of ships be equipped with an efficient means for rapidly recovering people from survival craft and safely transferring them to the ship. This new work will be undertaken by the IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment with a view to preparing mandatory performance standards for implementation by 1 July 2012 for all types of new and existing ships.

HEALTH SAFETY AND MEDICAL CARE Last, but not least, was the approval by the MSC of guidelines to address health safety programmes and a revised Guide on cold water survival, which had not been updated since 1992. The new medical safety guidelines provide for the establishment of medical and sanitation-related programmes for all passenger ships.

CONCLUSION There is more consequential work that remains to be accomplished, not the least being the completion of the mandatory performance standards for recovery systems for all types of ships. However, it is safe to say that cruise ship passengers, and the passenger ship industry as a whole, are better served today than ever before. Whilst not allowing ourselves to indulge in any complacency, we can feel proud of the transformation of this vibrant sector of the shipping industry into a safer and cleaner one than ever before. Rescue of persons from a vessel in distress While international conventions are clear on the duties of various parties to assist persons in distress at sea, there are no conventions which specify where survivors are to be taken, beyond the requirement that they are to be taken to a place of safety. Traditionally, it has been assumed that a ships master will consult with ship owners and relevant authorities on the best place to take survivors, depending on the individual circumstances surrounding each case, and for survivors to be processed by border control authorities or the relevant port State. This tradition and conventions are based on the assumption of small numbers of survivors who are genuinely shipwrecked as crew or passengers of a ship.

In recent years, cases have emerged of people attempting to enter countries illegally by boat, often in overcrowded and unseaworthy craft that may get into distress, either accidentally or by design. A more recent development has been the use of force or threat to persuade masters and crews of rescuing ships to transport survivors to a particular destination. These guidelines are therefore intended to provide guidance to ships masters involved in the rescue of persons at sea in relation to arrangements for landing survivors. The guidelines should be read in conjunction with Resolution MSC.167(78)1, adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization on 20 May, 2004. Because it is not possible to cover all scenarios, these guidelines are of necessity general in nature. In particular, they do not prescribe how ships masters should manage the transfer of persons to the ship. This is a matter for the master who is responsible for the security of employees and assets. These guidelines do not make any distinction between persons who may or may not be suspected of being unauthorised boat arrivals and they make no distinction between the flags of ships. However, where a ship has a direct connection to Australia, the Australian Government may make representations to other Governments on its behalf.

Compliance with International Obligations

All States which are signatories, and the international shipping industry, are committed to upholding their respective obligations under all relevant international conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention on Search and Rescue, and the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea. Nothing in these guidelines is inconsistent with or will derogate from Australias or the shipping industrys international obligations under these conventions or the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. Normal search and rescue procedures for distress signal reception and relay will be followed at all times, consistent with the International Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual). Australias compliance with its international obligations will not be compromised.

Recognition of Principles
As well as complying with convention obligations, it is recognized that Search and Rescue (SAR) co-ordination responsibility remains with the search and rescue centre responsible for the SAR Region in which the rescue takes place in accordance with the IAMSAR Manual; Any decision to disembark rescued persons at a particular port of a State should not be made without the consent of that State;

 The involvement of any ship in a rescue is likely to have commercial consequences and these consequences should be taken into account in determining the arrangements for disembarking rescued persons from the rescuing ship; Every state has an obligation to give expeditious consideration to the identification of suitable options for the disembarkation of rescued persons and to not unreasonably withhold consent to use its port or ports for disembarkation; Disembarkation arrangements for survivors need to be consistent with any security or border protection arrangements developed nationally, internationally or regionally; There should be no encouragement or incentive for persons to be deliberately put at risk in pursuit of entry to the state or for rescuees to use threat in an endeavour to dictate the place of disembarkation; and Australia has a sovereign right to determine who comes into Australia.

Response by shipping to distress alert

Ships (including available naval ships) respond according to international conventions and deviate from courses to effect rescue. Normal practice would be for the Master to advise the owner of deviation. If no ships respond to the distress alert, RCC will examine any available ship reporting system, and contact any ships in the general area to see if they can attend the rescue.

Completion of the rescue

Rescuing ships arrive at distressed ship and determine appropriate course of action, for example effect repairs, provide medical assistance, place distressed ship in tow or embark persons. Rescuing ship releases other ships responding to the alert as appropriate. Master advises RCC of situation and would normally also advise owner and maritime safety authority of the ships flag State. On completion of the rescue, the Master of each vessel participating in the rescue should advise RCC that the rescue is completed and provide the following information: details of rescuing ship(s); the number of rescued persons on each ship; the name, flag, description, call sign and intended destination of the ship in distress; the port of origin of the ship in distress, if known; the nationality of those rescued, if known; the countries where those rescued have right of entry, if known; the port(s) of disembarkation preferred by the Master and why; and

 if the Master intends to deviate from the originally intended voyage as a result of pickup up shipwrecked survivors, the reasons for the deviation. Having provided this information the Master should then await further instructions from the State Government, through RCC. The Master would normally also copy all communications with RCC as outlined above to the vessels owner/operator/manager and the maritime safety authority of the vessels flag State.

Identification of method of disembarkation of rescued persons

Taking into account the information and preferences provided by the Master (including commercial considerations), as well as the principles outlined above, RCC, acting on instructions from the Government, will advise the Master where the passengers can be disembarked. Amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions aim at maintaining the integrity of the SAR services, by ensuring that people in distress at sea are assisted while minimizing the inconvenience for the assisting ship. They require the Contracting States/Parties to co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation from the ships intended voyage; and arrange disembarkation as soon as reasonably practicable. They also oblige masters who have embarked persons in distress at sea, to treat them with humanity, within the capabilities of the ship. Were developed in order to provide guidance to governments and to shipmasters in implementing these amendments. They contain the following provisions: The government responsible for the SAR region in which survivors were recovered is responsible for providing a place of safety or ensuring that such a place of safety is provided. A place of safety is a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate, and where: the survivors safety or life is no longer threatened; basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met; and transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors next or final destination. While an assisting ship may serve as a temporary place of safety, it should be relieved of this responsibility as soon as alternative arrangements can be made. Disembarkation of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea, in territories where their lives and freedom would be threatened should be avoided. Any operations and procedures such as screening and status assessment of rescued persons that go beyond rendering assistance to persons in distress should not be allowed to hinder the provision of such assistance or unduly delay disembarkation.

International Refugee Law

If people rescued at sea make known a claim for asylum, key principles as defined in international refugee law need to be upheld. While the ship master is not responsible to determine the status of the people on board, he needs to be aware of these principles.

The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, An asylum-seeker defines a refugee as a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country.

This refers principally to the country from which the individual has fled but also includes any other territory where he [or she] faces such a threat. An asylum-seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection and whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker. Procedures The following checklists are intended to define action that needs to be taken by the various parties involved in rescue at sea.

Action by the shipmaster Inform the Rescue Co-ordinator Centre (RCC) responsible for the region as to: assist the ship: its name, flag and port of registry; name and address of the owner and the owners agent at the next port; position of the vessel, its next intended port of call, its continuing safety and current endurance with additional persons on board; the survivors: name, age (if possible) gender;

 apparent health, medical conditiona and special medical needs; actions completed or intended to be taken by the master; masters preffered arrangement for disembarking the survivors; any help needed by the assisting ship; any special factors (e.g. prevailing weather, time sensitive cargo, etc).

If people rescued at sea claim asylum alert the closest RCC; contact UNCHR; do not ask for disembarkation in the country of origin or from which the individual has fled; do not share personal information regarding the asylum seekers with the authorities of that country, of with others who might convey this information to those authroties.

Action by Governments and Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCCs) The RCCs have an important role to play to ensure co-operation and co-ordination arrangements under the Amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions. They need to maintain effective plans of operation and coordinating arrangements (interagency or international plans and agreements if appropriate) in order to respond to all types of search and rescue situations, notably: a recovery operation; disembarkation of survivors froma ship; delivery of survivors to a place of safety; arrangements with other entities (such as customs, border control and immigration authorities, ship owner or flag State), while survivors are still aboard the assisting ship with regard to nationalities, status or circumstances of the survivors; including temporary provisions for hosting survivors while such issues are being resolved; and measures to relieve the ship as soon as practicable, avoiding undue delay, financial burden or other difficulties incurred by assisting persons at sea.

Rescue

Rescue of Persons from a Vessel in Distress or from a Wreck A ship proceeding for a rescue operation should during the time it arrives at the position prepare itself for the rescue. The searchlights should be checked. Boarding nets should be made of cargo slings and other strong netting available and this should be prepared on the ship side (not lowered as yet). Boat ropes should be laid on both sides of the ship. The rescue boats should be emptied of all unnecessary things like provisions and excess water. The boats should be stocked with extra rescue quoits, life jackets, immersion suits, blankets,

warm beverages, towels etc. things that may be useful for a person lifted out of the water. The searchlight on the boat should be checked and an extra set taken from other boats supply including the batteries. W/T sets with spare batteries should be taken, the SART should be ready for mounting. The rescue ship once it reaches the position of the disabled ship should turn around and allow a lee to be made for launching the rescue boats. Once the boats are away the ship is to steam and lie to windward of the rescue boats so that the rescue boat after picking up the survivors has a downwind travel to the rescue ship. Oil should be used to quell the seas between the two ships and the oil should be streamed from forward so that the entire ship area would be spread evenly. If possible both the ships should spread the oil thus the area in between the ships would have a quelled and calm sea. The boats should pick up the survivors from the sea allowing the survivors to swim to the boat by being down wind of the survivors. As the first persons are taken in they should be asked as to how many had jumped into the water this would give a better chance for survival for the others. The rescue ship meanwhile should lower the nets and the boat ropes and lower pilot ladders and safety lines to the water level so that any survivor in the water and around the ship would be able to clamber up. The searchlights should be trained into the sea if at night. The rescue boat after a few survivors are picked up may come alongside and disembark the survivors and then go back to look for others. If the disabled ship is a wreck and if the boat cannot approach the ship then a line is to be tossed to the ship tied to a lifebuoys at the centre of the line. The survivors are to attach themselves to this line and should get down with the help of a pilot ladder or other ladder and then haul themselves along the main rope resting if required at the lifebuoy. If a ladder is not possible them the survivors are to jump into the water keeping the lifeline attached to the main rescue line and the above procedure then may be effected. Once the survivors have been all picked up the boat is to come alongside on the lee side of the rescue ship. The ship should provide the lee and until such is done the rescue boat may wait. The survivors should be helped to board the rescue ship by pilot ladders and with safety lines attached. Once the survivors are aboard the rescue boat is to be picked up. All along the rescue boat is to hold on to the boat ropes rigged especially for them. If the sea is too rough to launch boats then a breeches buoy would have to be rigged between the two ships and the survivors taken on board. If there are people in the water then the ship should stand a distance away and wait for the survivors to come to the nets. Engines are not to be used. However this method would be difficult since the survivors would have to get on the windward side.

Emergencies in Port
Preliminary

Fire-Fighting Equipment Plans Fire-fighting equipment plans must be permanently displayed in prominent positions showing clearly, for each deck, the location and particulars of all fire-fighting equipment, dampers, controls, etc. These plans should also be displayed, or be readily available, at the access points to the ship when it is in port. This would help the shore fire fighting personnel from gauging the requirement of the fire fighting equipment that would be required.

Preliminary Action The person who discovers the emergency must raise the alarm and pass on information about the situation to the officer on duty who, in turn, must alert the emergency organisation. While this is being done, those on the scene should attempt immediate measures to control the emergency until the emergency organisation takes effect. Each group in the emergency organisation should have a designated assembly point, as should those persons not directly involved as members of any group. Personnel not directly involved should stand by to act as required. The ship must then raise the alarm by sounding the recognised alarm signal consisting of a series of long blasts on the ships whistle, each blast being not less than 10 seconds in duration, unless the terminal has notified the ship of some other locally recognised alarm signal. All cargo, bunkering, or ballasting operations must be stopped and the main engines and steering gear brought to a stand by condition. Once the alarm has been raised, responsibility for fighting the fire on board the ship will rest with the master or other responsible officer assisted by the ships crew. The same emergency organisation should be used as when the ship is at sea with an additional group under the command of an officer or senior rating to make preparations, where possible, for preparing the vessel for sea. On mobilisation of the terminal and, where applicable, the civil fire-fighting forces and equipment, the master or other responsible officer, in conjunction with the professional fire fighters, must make a united effort to bring the fire under control. A pilot ladder should be put over on the offshore side. Ships Fire Alarm Signal At a terminal the sounding of the ships fire alarm system should be supplemented by a series of long blasts on the ships whistle, each blast being not less than 10 seconds in duration, or by some other locally required signal.

Action by Vessels at Other Berths On hearing the port alarm being sounded or on being otherwise advised of a fire at the berth, a ship whose berth is not involved in the fire should shut down all cargo, bunkering and ballasting operations; bring her fire-

fighting capability to a state of readiness; and make engines, steering gear and mooring equipment ready for immediate use. If the fire is not brought under control within a short time or if the danger exists of the hazardous cargo catching fire or if there is danger of the ship listing and sinking, the ship should cast off and put out to sea.

FIRE AT SEA OR AT ANCHOR Ships personnel who discover an outbreak of fire must immediately raise the alarm, indicating the location of the fire. The ships fire alarm must be operated as soon as possible. Personnel in the vicinity of the fire should apply the nearest suitable extinguishing agent to attempt to limit the spread of the fire, to extinguish it, and thereafter to prevent re-ignition. If they are unsuccessful, their actions should very quickly be superseded by the operation of the ships emergency plan. Any cargo, ballast, tank cleaning or bunkering operations should be stopped immediately and all hatches closed. Any craft alongside should be removed. After all personnel have been evacuated from the vicinity, all doors, and openings should be closed as quickly as possible and mechanical ventilation should be stopped. Decks, bulkheads and other structures in the vicinity of the fire, and adjacent hatches which may contain hazardous cargoes, should be cooled with water. The ship should be manoeuvred so as to resist the spread of the fire and allow it to be attacked from windward.

Action to take from colliding with a vessel dragging her anchor If at anchor in an open roadstead and it is observed that the ship ahead is dragging anchor and it is determined that there is a chance of a collision then depending on the distance between the ships the following may be undertaken: Ship at some distance away, the main engine should readied and the anchor heaved short so that dredging with the anchor would be possible. The engines should go astern with the rudder used to give a shear, this would make the own ship move away from the line of the dragging ship. If the time does not permit such a move then the cable may be buoyed and slipped from the bitter end. The main engines then must be used to fall back.

Assisting a Vessel in Distress Much before arrival at the scene the two ships should have established communication and should have agreed on the arrangements for the tow and the equipment that would be required. Once at the scene the rescue ship should slacken her speed to just about 3-4 knots and slowly approach the disabled ship from stern and on her (disabled ship) starboard side. The distance should be adjusted to about 2 ship lengths athwartship at the beginning of the manoeuvre. Once the bow of the rescue ship has reached the midship of the disabled ship the rocket should be fired the distance would be closing in if there is any drift of the disable ship. The rescue ship would have taken all way off and drifting.

Once the rocket is received on board a 24 mm rope would be passed from the rescue ship this would have to be taken in by the disabled ship. The rope ends would now be taken to the fore end of the disabled ship and to the after end of the rescue ship. The rescue ship could now pass a wire rope strong for hauling a length of the disabled ships cable. Once this is received on the disabled ship, one length of her cable should be attached to the wire and a towing wire should be attached to this cable. The wire with the cable would be heaved up on the rescue ships stern, the cable would be partly out of the fairlead. The cable would now be lashed to several bitts. The disabled ship would now cut off the towing line and make an eye and then attach another length of cable to the new eye and the rest of the towing line would be attached to the other end of the cable. This done the wire and cable would be lowered. The length of towing wire between the two lengths of cable being noted only that length of wire would be sent after the second length of cable. Once this is done the free end of the towing wire would be attached to the cable on deck through the chain stopper. The vessels would now be arranged for towing. The cable that had been passed to the rescue ship and which lay within the fairlead would prevent any chafing damage that would have occurred to a towing wire had it been passed. Thus the total arrangement would be as cable wire cable wire cable. The cable attached at the centre of the wire acts as a shock absorber by forming a catenary in the water.

Precautions While paying out any cable or wire the same has to be done under control. It would be prudent to pass the towing wire from a winch under power. The towing wire if it is not carried on a power winch should be transferred to a power winch. The connections to the cable should be with shackles, the eye of the wire should be inserted into the shackle. The clearances should be checked to see that the cable or the shackle does not rub against the wire eye. The cables at either of the ship should be lashed to several bitts. The disabled ship if possible may stopper the cable. The wire and the cable connections should be checked for any wear down. In general the fairlead or the cable passing through the fairlead would not wear down

A man should be stationed continuously on both vessels to check up on the towing arrangement and the ships should communicate all navigation data. The towed ship should be steered as this would effect a lesser drag on the arrangement, by preventing too much yaw by the towed ship. Prior casting off the master of the towing ship should obtain an assurance from the master of the towed ship to the effect that he is satisfied that his vessel has been brought to a place of safety. The towing ship should very slowly reduce speed such that the towed ship does not overtake the towing ship. Once the speed drops to less than a knot the towed ship should anchor, the towing ship should be careful of not going astern on the engines as the propeller would not be clear. The towing ship should also anchor since her speed would also be about zero. The towing ship would now have to cast off the towing arrangement. The cable end is secured to a wire (of adequate strength) and the wire would be hove on a winch. The cable now would be unlashed from the bitts one at a time the slack on the cable lying on deck being taken up. Once the last of the lashings is cast off the cable would have to be pushed out of the fairlead. The wire would hold the weight and pay out as the cable is lowered, once the cable is completely out the wire would be held and a chain stopper would be taken on the cable last link; and the winch wire cast off. Lastly the chain stopper would be released letting the cable arrangement to fall into the water. The towed vessel would pick up the arrangement. Emergency Towing Arrangement for tankers greater than 50,000 tonnes deadweight Ready Availability of Towing Arrangements The aft emergency towing arrangement should be pre-rigged and be capable of being deployed in a controlled manner in harbour conditions in not more than 15 minutes. The forward emergency towing arrangement should be capable of being deployed in harbour conditions in not more than one hour. Strength of the Towing Components Towing components should have a working strength of at least 1,000 kn.. for tankers of 20,000 dwt and over but less than 50,000 dwt and at least 2,000 kn.. for tankers of 50,000 dwt and over (working strength is defined as one half ultimate strength). Length of Towing Pennant The towing pennant should have a length of at least twice the lightest seagoing ballast freeboard at the fairlead plus 50 meters. Length of Chafing Chain (ETA chain) The chafing chain shall extend from the strongpoint to a point at least three meters beyond the fairlead.

Requirements for Implementation of IMO Resolution An emergency towing arrangement shall be fitted at both ends on board all tankers of 20,000 dwt and above The emergency towing arrangement on the towed vessel should be rigged within 1 hour in harbour conditions. The arrangement aft of the towing vessel which is pre-rigged should be capable of being rigged in 15 minutes by one person sending out the pendant. Both the above conditions are for harbour conditions. The arrangement and the deployment is shown pictorially in the following figures: Aft to rig in harbour conditions in 15 mins. Equipment towing wire on drum with steel disc stopper, messenger with S.I. Light contained in steel box:

Forward to rig in harbour conditions in 1 hour Equipment 1 short length of chain and bow stopper:

Man-overboard manoeuvres
Practice has shown that different man-overboard manoeuvres may be required, depending upon the situation prevailing and the type of ship involved. The effectiveness of the manoeuvres described below has been proved in many man-overboard casualties, including the following situations: "Immediate action" situation Casualty is noticed on the bridge and action is initiated immediately; "Delayed action" situation Casualty is reported to the bridge by an eye witness and action is initiated with some delay; "Person missing" situation Person is reported to the bridge as "missing"

When a ship makes full speed ahead, the following three standard manoeuvres are used: .Single turn (2700 manoeuvre) .Rudder hard over (in an "immediate action" situation, only to the side of the casualty). .After deviation from the original course by 2500, rudder to midship position and stopping manoeuvre to be initiated. Williamson turn Rudder hard over (in an "immediate action" situation, only to the side of the casualty). After deviation from the original course by 600 rudder hard over to the opposite side. When heading 200 short of opposite course, rudder to midship position and ship to be turned to opposite course.

It is actually quite hard to steer a boat of any size back to a particular spot in the water. There are a couple of manoeuvres that make this easier. One is the Williamson Turn it requires no equipment, although a compass is helpful, and puts the boat on a return course back along its original track. To start, steer a straight course away from the victim Put the helm hard over and wait until the boat has turned 90 degrees. Put the helm hard over the other way, and wait until the boat has turned 270 degrees. Be careful to keep the victim in sight during this second turn. Do not change speed. The boat should now be heading directly towards the victim If a compass is available, the course change may be made based on compass heading. If not, pick a mark on the horizon off the boats beam (on land, or a distinctive cloud, or just use a best guess), and steer until the boat is heading for it. Then turn the other way until the boat is heading for the victim. It doesn't matter which way the initial turn is made, or how fast the boat is going, or how sharp the turn is. All that matters is that the speed is consistent and the turns are of equal radius. If a GPS waypoint was saved where the victim went overboard, it may be used as an aid to returning. However, the victim (and marker pole) will drift with current or tide while the GPS waypoint will not. A wellexecuted Williamson Turn will give better results.

Scharnow turn (not to be used in an "immediate action" situation.) Rudder hard over. After deviation from the original course by 240, rudder hard over to the opposite side. When heading 20 short of opposite course, rudder to midship position so that ship will turn to opposite course.

Assessment of the manoeuvres described for Scharnow Turn in relation to the types of situation described for Williamson Turn: "Immediate action" situation SINGLE TURN will take the ship back to the scene of the casualty most quickly. WILLIAMSON TURN requires more time and will temporarily take the ship farther away from the scene of the casualty. SCHARNOW TURN is not appropriate. "Delayed action " situation WILLIAMSON TURN will take the ship to the scene of the casualty most surely. (When the ship has reached the manoeuvre commencement point, search speed must be reduced so as to enable fast stopping.) SCHARNOW TURN cannot be carried out effectively unless the time elapsed between the occurrence of the casualty and the commencement of the manoeuvre is known. "Person missing" situation Both WILLIAMSON TURN and SCHARNOW TURN will take the ship back into her wake. Less distance is covered, and thus time is saved, when carrying out SCHARNOW TURN. When the ship is on opposite course after carrying out SCHARNOW TURN, the manoeuvre commencement point will be some ship's lengths behind her stern. Depending on the type of ship involved, between one and two nautical miles may be saved. Since standard man-overboard manoeuvres are not guaranteed to return a ship into its wake, these turns should be regularly practiced to account for the particular ship characteristics and the effects of environmental conditions on the ship and the person in the water.