MAGALLONA VS.

ERMITA FACTS: Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA 9522 adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baselines of nearby territories. RA 3046 (year 1961) demarcates the maritime baselines of the Philippines was amended by RA 9522 in March 2009 to comply with the UNCLOS requirement. It shortened one of the baselines of the Philippine territory. Petitioners allege that RA 9522 reduced Philippine maritime territory and the Phils sovereign power in violation of Art. 1 of the 1987 Consti.

ISSUES: Whether the petitioners possess locus standi. Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

HELD: Yes, Petitioners have locus standi.

Owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped RA3046. KIG and Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine Archipelago, if included will violate international laws. Sec. 2 of RA9522 states that the Phils has continued claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, determined as regime of islands, Hence the Phils. Still have sovereign power and jurisdiction over the disputed islands.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 2ND DIVISION FACTS: PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all properties of private respondent, Benedicto. Among the properties sequestered and taken over by PCGG were 227 shares of Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club (NOGCC). PCGG did not pay monthly membership fee of the shares totaling to 2, 959, 471 and were eventually declared delinquent and be sold at public auction. Republic thru PCGG and Benedicto entered into a compromise agreement and passed a resolution directing PCGG to release and deliver to the Clerk of Court the shares which they failed to do. To escape liability, the Representative through PCGG invokes state immunity from suit.

ISSUE: Whether the Republic through PCGG is immune from suit. HELD: NO. By entering into a compromise agreement with the Private Respondent, Petitioner Republic stripped of itself from immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the state enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to Constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual and reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom. The State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract, the sovereign descends to the level of a citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering to such contract, breach on its part gives right to the other party.

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC FACTS:

Petitioner, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a male transsexual, filed a petition for his change of name and sex in his birth certificate which the lower granted. Its relevant portions read:

(a) Petitioner filed to present petition solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex; (b) Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. (c) Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. (d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition as it would only grant the petitioner his much awaited happiness and the realization of their (his fiance) dreams. On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On February 23, 2006, the CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the change of the petitioners name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed under Articles 4007 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. HELD: No. It is not allowed. A persons name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Statutes control petitions for change of name. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. Article 412 provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The petition is DENIED.

SENATE VS. ERMITA

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the socalled Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

REPUBLIC vs. HIDALGO FACTS: Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an actionfor the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession aproperty against the Republic of thePhilippinesin the RTC of Manila.It is also known as the Arlegui Residence which housed two Philippine presidents and which now holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau. The case was initially dismissed by the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35) on the ground of state immunity. The case was re-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), with respondent Vicente A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge. In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared the Republic in default for failure of SolicitorGabriel Francisco Ramirez, the handling solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayed for in his motion for extension. It is contended that the respondent Judge violated the Constitution and the fundamental rule that government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic.

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunity from suit. HELD: NO. It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. NEDA DIR.-GENERAL FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 that directs a unified ID system among government agencies and Government owned and controlled corporations in order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and other respondents assailed this executive order for being a usurpation of legislative powers by the president and it infringes the citizens right to privacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 420 is valid. HELD: YES, Executive Order 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the executive department, as well as the presidents constitutional duty to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, thus said executive order is not a usurpation of legislative power. Furthermore, it is not usurpation of legislative power because the act of issuing ID cards and the collection of some necessary information to imprint in them do not require legislation. What needs legislation is the system of appropriation to enforce the unified ID system, when unified ID system includes the citizens and when personal data that are beyond of what is routinely needed is collected for the ID.