1

Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1940)

Brooke Hutchins GOVT 451: Conflict in Asia December 7, 2012

1 World War II- Pacific War-Events, Kidport Reference Library. <

http://www.kidport.com/RefLib/WorldHistory/WorldWarII/WorldWarIIPacificEvents.htm > [accessed 20, November 2012]. An example of Chinese Anti-Japanese propaganda spread during the war.

Table of Contents 1. Introduction....3

2. Before 1937: The Context of the Chinese Guerilla Counter-

Offensive Military Campaigns .4

Japan: The Aggressor or The Aggrieved? ...........................................................4 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Sheks Policy of Appeasement.8 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)10 The Bridge that Changed Everything .12 The KMT-CCP United Front13

3. Wartime Objectives: The GMD-CCP United Front versus the Japanese Imperial Army.14
Imperial Japanese Army .14 The United Front 15

4. Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Campaigns...17

Mao Tse-tung .18 The Application of Maos Guerilla Strategy within the Anti-Japanese War...20 Battle at Pinghsingkuan .21 The Hundred Regiments Offensive.......22 Analyzing the Damage .23

5. The End of Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Tactics 26

The New Fourth Army Incident .26

6. A Concluding Evaluation of Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War 27 7. Bibliography..29

3 We Communists, together with all the other anti-Japanese political parties and the whole people, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors.2 - Mao Tse-Tung, 1938

1. Introduction
The eruption of war between China and Japan culminated after years of brooding hostility. However, it was the Marco-Polo Bridge incident on July 7, 1937, that marked the beginning of Japans all-out aggression against China and Chinas Anti-Japanese War. Forced into an uneasy united front, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Communist (CCP) forces joined together to resist the Japanese invasion. It was during the Anti-Japanese War that Communist military leader and strategist, Mao Tse-Tung, applied his theory of guerilla warfare, which enabled the Chinese to unexpectedly weaken the dominant Japanese military aggression scheme and ultimately defend Chinese territory. Maos tactics, executed by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army National Revolutionary Forces, demonstrated how guerilla warfare could be used to build power and weaken a more powerful aggressor. Due to the exhausting surprise it gave the Japanese, this paper will examine Chinese guerilla counter-offensive military strategy and campaigns during the Anti- Japanese War. First, it will provide historical background of the years leading up to 1937. Second, it will explore both the Chinese and Japanese objectives during the war. The third section of the paper will then explicate Maos theory of guerilla warfare and its application during the war, highlighting battles that emphasize the effect of guerilla counter offensive-methodology on the Japanese. The essay will end with an evaluation of the application of guerilla warfare, exploring the significance of Chinese guerilla warfare tactics relative to the overall Chinese agenda. Proceeding chronologically throughout the decade, this paper will provide a detailed analysis of
2 Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific,

2001); 2-3. This quotation was taken from a series of lectures delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from May 26 to June 3, 1938, at the Yenan Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

4 Maos guerilla counter-offensive military campaign tactics and overall attest their effectiveness against the Japanese military from 1937 until 1945 during the War of Resistance.

2. Before 1937: The Context of the Chinese Guerilla Counter- Offensive Military Campaigns
In order to comprehensively understand the use of guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War, it is important to explore the historical context from which they were developed and implemented. Japan: The Aggressor or The Aggrieved? Prior to 1937, Japan imperialism persistently besieged China. Although from the Chinese point of view, Japan was the aggressor. It is necessary to explore both sides of the conflict and understand Japans motive for making the decision to invade China. As a country that was characteristically resource deficient, Japan held a strong interest in Chinas valuable raw resources. Therefore, an invasion was viewed as the sufficient means for satisfying Japanese needs. That being said, Manchuria, in northeast China, rich with minerals, fertile soil, and nearly 200,000 square kilometers of land, was a suitable province, for Japan to seize control over3 and on September 18, 1931, Japan invaded accordingly. Japanese military leaders of the Kwantung Army, an army group of the Imperial Japanese Army, initiated a plot to seize control of Chinas three northeastern provinces, illustrated on the map on page six.4 In his text Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, Parks M. Cole describes the invasion, which came be known as the Manchuria or Mukden Incident. Coble writes:

3 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012); 183. 4 Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937,

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); 11

5 Within hours, the major cities of southern ManchuriaMukden Mukden (Shengyang), Yinkou, Antung, and Changchun fell under Japanese control. Within days, most of Liaoning and Kirin provinces were brought inside the Kwantung Armys orbit; and within weeks, the Japanese military established a puppet government over the entire northeast.5 As described in the passage above, Japanese armed forces successfully occupied the entire Manchuria including the Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Provinces.

This attack arguably marked the beginning of Japans all out aggression against China. However, it is important to note that this apparent Japanese hostility was neither impulsive nor random. It instead occurred following a sequence of events during which Japan, made sincere and strenuous efforts to befriend China.7 In fact, in his K.K. Kawakami wrote in 1938, in the course of the war, that Japan believed, herself the aggrieved part in the present conflict.8
5 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 11. 6 Li Tien-yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1959); 10. Map 7 Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, Japan in China, Her Motives and Aims, (London: John Murray,

shows provinces that Japanese invaded during the Manchuria Incident. 1938); 54.

8 Ibid., 54.

6 Even before the Manchuria incident of 1931, anti-Japanese agitation was

rampant in China, while Japans policy was distinctly conciliatory. China developed a technique of anti-Japanese agitation and used it with deadly effect. In June 1928, the National Convention of Anti-Japanese Societies, subsidized by the Nanking Government, issued the following declaration: The objective of our anti-Japanese movement is to ruin the Japanese by causing our economic rupture with them. The pressure will next be brought to bear upon all the rest of the Imperialist nations, with the ultimate object of nullifying all unequal treaties.9 Additionally, until August 1929 the Nanking Government subsidized Societies for the Revocation of Unequal Treaties and openly enforced an anti- Japanese boycott directly punishing Chinese merchants handling Japanese goods, thereby triggering diplomatic complications with Japan. Meanwhile, all educational institutions were utilized to instill hostility toward Japan. For example, in May 1928, the National Education Conference at Nanking adopted the following resolutions: 1. Ample material regarding national humiliations should be included in the text-books of middle and primary schools.10 2. On every available opportunity, the schools should be used to propagate the facts regarding our national humiliations and to impress upon the people what nation is Chinas foremost enemy.11 3. Maps and drawings illustrative of national humiliations should be provided, and attention of the students should be directed to these at every opportunity.12 4. The teachers and students should study together the methods whereby Chinas foremost enemy may be overthrown.13

9 Kawakami, Japan in China, Her Motives and Aims,71. 10 Ibid.,72. 11 Ibid.,72. 12 Ibid., 72. 13 Ibid,, 72.

7 Chinas foremost enemy mentioned above was referring to Japan and the

unforgivable historical humiliation it caused China was accentuated. Even before this plan was adopted, childrens textbook contained passages stating: Japan is an enemy nation!14 The effect of this type of propaganda was significant, as the whole country became, aflame with hatred of Japannot a spontaneous combustion, but a conflagration ignited by the Nationalist Government itself.15 As a result, anti- Japanese incidents occurred in rapid succession over the years leading up to the wars as displayed by the following timeline:
May 1935: Two Chinese newspaper editors with proJapanese leanings were murdered in Tientsin.

January 6, 1936: Two thousand Chinese students of middle schools held demonstrations in Swatow demanding war against Japan.

September 18, 1931: Mukden Incident

August 24, 1936: A correspondent of the Osaka Minichi and the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi and another Japanese press correspondent were pounced upon by a mob of 10,000 Chinese, mostly young boys and girls, and were most brutally murdered at Chengtu, Szechuan province. Two other Japanese were seriously wounded.

July 7, 1937: Marco Polo Bridge Incident

December 21, 1935: About a thousand Chinese students paraded through the center of the Shanghai International Settlement shouting Down with Japanese Imperialism! Drive out every Japanese from Shanghai! They distributed anti-Japanese pamphlets.

June 19, 1936: A Japanese was shot dead by Chinese at Fangtou, Shangtung province.
March 1937: The Kuangsi provincial authorities, for no other reason but to fan antiJapanese feeling, expelled all Japanese from the province.

The timeline above shows the violent result of years of anti-Japanese propaganda, financed and encouraged by the Nanking Government. However, as
14 Kawakami, Japan in China, Her Motives and Aims, 72. 15 Ibid., 74.

8 revealed by his Appeasement Policy, Chiang Kai-shek had no intention of going to war with Japan, but instead meant to exploit the Japanese for an ulterior purpose of uniting the country under his power and strengthening his own position. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Sheks Policy of Appeasement Japans 1931 attack augmented Chinese fury, not only because of Japanese During the 1931 Manchuria Incident, General Chang Hseuh-liang, pictured below as leader of Manchuria and much of northern China, could have put up a credible defense against the Japanese. The Japanese Kwantung Army numbered 11,000, while Chang reportedly controlled at least one-quarter of a million troops. In addition, his arsenal at Mukden was considered Chinas most modern: His air force contained sixty planes; his forces ad tanks, 4,000 machine guns, and modern field artillery.16Nevertheless, Chang refused to resist. Following the attack on September 20, 1931, Chang told reporters17: As soon as I sensed that Japan was about to take certain action in Manchuria, I used an order to all my subordinates that when and if Japanese troop attacked, all the forces under their respective commands, including the police, should not resistThat is why Chinese troops did not retaliate in an authorized, organized way.
18

audacity, but also due to the initial policy of the Chinese Government to not resist.

History later revealed that Chang Hseuh-liang, at the time, was being pressured by Chiang Kai-shek and the government to uphold the policy of
16 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 12. 17 Ibid., 12. 18 Zhang Xueliang, Wikipedia, < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Xueliang > [accessed 20,

November 2012]. Photograph of Chang Hseuh-liang Warlord of Manchuria.

9 appeasement. Chiangs policy demanded, first internal pacification, then external resistance.19 Chiang created the policy first because he believed that his army was inferior to Japans military machine and thus war would be disastrous both for China and himself politically. Second, Chiang was also more concerned with domestic issues, such as defeating the rebellious Chinese Communists and secure control of fractionalized China under his central authority. As a result, Chiang decisively chose to avoid war with Japan and his policy of appeasement ensued. Chiangs appeasement policy carried high political risks.20In fact it can even be argued that, the entire Nanking government lost prestige among the Chinese public over the appeasement issue.21Overall appeasement proved to be unpopular as an emotional charged Chinese populace demanded resistance to Japan. The city of Shanghai particularly bristled with hostility between Chinese and Japanese. The metropolis was the center of the anti-Japanese boycott and student movements, as well as Japanese presence in China as nearly 30,000 Japanese resided in the city. Japanese business and industrial leaders in Shanghai had been hurt by the boycott and pressured by their military authorities to take action. On January 28, 1932, a Japanese carrier aircraft bombed Shanghai. Three thousand Japanese troops then proceeded to invade the city: The destruction from this assault was frightful. Bombs and shells landed in densely populated areas, killing and wounding thousands and destroying untold numbers of house and shops.22 Ending in a ceasefire, the fighting at Shanghai electrified public opinion in China even more. As demonstrations, anti-Japanese boycotts, and even attacks on Japanese citizens augmented dramatically throughout China, as illustrated in the timeline on page eight, Chiangs opponents took the political opportunity to attack him. Parks M. Coble explains that, Nearly every one of Chiangs opponents cloaked himself in an

19 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 1. 20 Ibid., 2 21 Ibid., 2 22 Ibid., 43

10 anti-Japanese mantle and publically assailed Chiang for catering to Japanese demands;23 most notably the Chinese Communist Party of China (CCP). The Chinese Communist Party of China (CCP) As the Kuomintang Governments most deadly enemy,24 the Chinese Communist Party was the first to appeal to the masses for armed resistance. When the Japanese began to take over Manchuria, following the Mukden Incident, in September 1932, the Chinese Communists responded with the following resolutions: The Manchurian Incident will have decisive influence on future events in ChinaAll these things will prompt the collapse and bankruptcy of the Kuomintang ruleWe shall exploit the popular disappointment in a hatred for the Kuomintang rule so as to organize the broad masses and guide them toward a struggle to eliminate the KuomintangWe shall lead the masses...25 Communist sentiments to take action won over the increasingly anti- Japanese population and simultaneously aided the Communists tactical goal to gain supporters. This caused the Nanking government to further lose popularity and legitimacy. From the KMTs view, the Communists inadvertently helped facilitate Japanese aggression in China, by attacking the Governments rear.26Thus it was these communist activities that further compelled the KMT to uphold the policy of giving first priority to internal peace in order to resist external aggression. Hence, suppressing the Communists would take precedence over resisting Japan. However, in January 1933, when the Communists issued a proclamation stating its readiness to stop fighting and negotiate with the KMT, in order to rally all forces against Japanese invaders and save the motherland,27 Kai-shek launched a full-scale encirclement campaign against the Communist Red Army. As a result of Nationalist
23 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 2. 24So Wai Chor, The Making of the Guomindangs Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-

Shek and Wang Jingwei, Modern China, vol. 28, (2002): pp. 214
25 John C. Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Asia and World

Institute, 1976); 3.

26 Ibid., 3 27Tien-yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, iii.

11 aggression against the Communists, the Communist Party gained a positive reputation and even more support. On August 1, 1935, the Chinese Communist party called for the establishment of a national anti-Japanese united front and put forward a Ten-Point Program to save the nation. Although the Declaration, like other CCP documents, contained vehement attacks on the KMT and its leadership, it omitted repetition of the slogan calling for the overthrow of the National Government. The Declaration stated: as soon as any troops want to go to war with the Japanese, the Red Army shall immediately stop its hostilities and be willing to cooperate closely with them [Kuomintang troops] in the common task of national salvation, regardless of their past and present grievances with the Red Army, as well as any differences they may have with the Red Army over domestic issues.28 Despite mounting opposition however, their cooperation in dealing with the Japanese threat did not evolve until after 1935. Furthermore, it was not until the attack at Lukou-chiao on July 7, 1938 that Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to go to war and jointly directed the policy toward Japan with the Communists. Below is a map showing areas under Nationalist Control from 1928 until 1937. The map demonstrates how divided China was prior to 1937.

28 Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945, 3.

12

The Bridge that Changed Everything What happened on the night of July 7, 1937, near the Lugouqiao Marco Polo Bridge, ten miles outside Beijing in Hebei, is not entirely clear. Allegedly Japanese forces fired blank cartridges, while undergoing training exercises; which prompted Chinese soldiers to retaliate with live fire. The Japanese then discovered that one of their soldiers was missing. Thinking the Chinese might have captured him, the Japanese demanded permission to search Wanping for him. Refusing the Japanese entry, a shot was heard, and the two sides began firing. Both sides sent more troops to the area and early in the morning of July 8th , Japanese infantry and armored

13 vehicles attacked the Marco Polo Bridge. Attempts were made to settle things, but the Chinese government, under strong anti-Japanese pressure, refused to make any concessions in the negotiation of the dispute. Concurrently, the incident gave Japanese the excuse to mount a full-scale invasion of China. Chiang Kai-shek saw the Incident as the boldest attempt yet by Japan to completely separate northern provinces from Chinese control and incorporate them into the Japanese puppet state, Manchukuo. In his account, General Li Tien-yu further explains that, after the Lukouchia (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) which the Japanese precipitated on July 7, 1937, Japan arrogantly expected to conquer China in three months. Hordes of Japanese troops capture Peking, Tientsin, Nanknow, Changchiakou (Kalgan), and later Tehchow and Paoting, like a flood let loose by broken dykes.29The position of China was daily deteriorating and the entire Chinese people were on the brink of national subjugation.30 As a result it was this event that broke Chiangs tolerance of Japanese aggression as Chiang finally agreed to initiate a full-scale war with Japan. The KMT-CCP United Front Following the attack at Lukou-chiao, Mao Tse-tung and high-ranking Communist military leaders sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek expressing their wishes to join forces to fight the Japanese under Chaings leadership. In response, on August 22, 1937, the National government formally issued orders to incorporate the Communist forces. Under agreement, the main force of the CCPs Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army establishing the Eighth Route Army National Revolutionary Forces, with Chu The and Peng The-huai as Commander and Deputy commander. The army, composed of three divisions with a total strength of 46,00031 men, was assigned to the Second War Area in Northern Shansi province under the command of Yen His-shan. Meanwhile, Lin Tsu-hu and Chang- Kuo-tao were appointed Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Shansi-Kanus-Ningsia 29 Tien-yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, 1.
30 Ibid., ii. 31 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, 469.

14 Border Area Government. Chu The and Peng The-huai assumed their new command on August 25, 1937 and pledged their sincere support to Chiang as Generalissimo. In the south, the Red Armys guerilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army of the National Amy, totaling 10,30032 men, including four field divisions. Ye ting would command the New Fourth Army National Revolutionary Forces. The Chinese people, now unified, embarked on the War of Resistance against Japan. More significantly, it is within this framework that the Chinese performed their guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns against the Japanese.

3. Wartime Objectives: The GMD-CCP United Front versus the Japanese Imperial Army
In order to fully value the guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns performed by the Chinese, it is beneficial to review the objectives of each party involved in the development and execution of the campaign. The following section will provide a comprehensive outline of the Chinese objective to unite and effectively weaken the dominant Japanese Army versus the Japanese military objective to conquest Chinese territory. Imperial Japanese Army Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Empire of Japans main objective was to establish a newly advanced position in Asia. In order to guarantee its supremacy in the East, Japan adhered to a policy of self-preservation. This policy was adopted in response to a range of external problems. In the late 1920s Japan experienced serious economic turmoil. Protectionism and trade tariffs introduced by the United States to protect its industry placed high barriers on Japanese trade. In addition, due to an increasing Russian presence and influence with China, Japan was facing a looming political threat. Furthermore, Japan was experiencing the detrimental economic, diplomatic, and political effects of anti-Japanese propaganda spreading throughout China perpetuated by the Nanking
32 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, 469.

15 Government. As a result of these various issues, high unemployment, growing over- population, and acute shortage of raw materials plagued the Japanese economy. In order to solve these problems, Japan implemented their self-preservation policy and set out to gain new territory hoping to preserve their East Asian supremacy. Logically, Japan, held a strong interest in Chinas abundance in valuable natural resources. Moreover, because of the chaotic and instable situation in China, which was at the end of a large-scale civil war and vulnerable, Japan was provided with an excellent opportunity to expand and enhance foreign trade and industry. That being said, when the Japanese resumed their military operations in North China in July 1937, they informed the world that they meant to chastise the Chiang Kai-shek government, and eradicate the anti-Japanese activities in China. Overall, they viewed an invasion as the vehicle to secure Japanese supremacy. The United Front The goal of the Chinese United Front in short was to unite and fight the encroachment of Japanese imperialism on Chinese sovereignty. However, being only a temporary and exceedingly shaky military and political coalition, the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party should be further examined separately. It is important to note that with the establishment of the United Front came the formation of two fronts: first, the Kuomintang Front and second, the front of the liberated areas and that of the Communist Party. Although the goal of the Kuomintangs National Revolutionary Army was to resist Japanese aggression, because of looming tensions and continual paranoia towards the Communists, controlling the growth, expansion, and influence of the Communist Party remained a priority. That being said, Generalissimo Chiang Kai- sheks wartime platform included both armed resistance and national reconstruction. On the other hand, the Communist Chinese forces fought as a nominal part of the National Revolutionary under the United Front. However, a distinctive feature of their wartime policy was their belief in defeating the enemy by extending the

16 duration of the war. Mao-Tse-tung further explicates this policy in his 1938 treatise, On Protracted War. He explains that although the political aim of the War of Resistance against Japan is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality, to reach that goal the object of the Chinese must be to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy, meaning disarm him or deprive him of the power to resist.33 This policy resulted in the Communist forces guerilla status and furthermore their efforts to expand their military strength by absorbing Chinese guerilla forces, an objective, which unsurprisingly irritated Chiang Kai-shek, as explained later, in section four. The basic Communist strategy to achieve their objective of a protracted war was to engage in guerilla warfare and expand their strength and territories thereby preserving their ability to resist relentlessly and eventually exhaust the Japanese. Below is an overview of Communist bases during the war.

33 Tse-tung, On Protracted War, 61-62

17

34

The subsequent section will explore Maos remarkable strategy, as Maos guerilla style tactics during this war are a solid example of an effective counter- offensive guerilla warfare campaign.

4. Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Campaigns

34 Kataoka, Tetsuya, Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United

Front. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974); 53.

18 Mao Tse-tung

35

Mao Tse-tung, pictured above, adopted a Chinese nationalist and anti- imperialist outlook early in life. He was particularly influenced by the events of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Qing Dynasty and May Fourth Movement of 1919, a populist movement, which prepared the ideological foundation for the establishment of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He was one of the early members of the CPC, quickly mounting to a senior position. In 1922 when the Communists first agreed to an alliance with the KMT, Mao aided in creating a revolutionary peasant army and organizing rural land reform. In 1927 however, Chiang Kai-shek, the KMTs military leader terminated the alliance and enforced an anti-communist purge. In response, the CPC formed an army of peasant militia and the two sides fought in the Chinese Civil War. Mao was responsible for commanding part of the CPCs Red Army. That being said, during the Anti-Japanese War, Mao agreed to help lead the Red Army forces incorporated into the United Front. Numbering only 20,000 men, the Communist Army was numerically inferior to the Nationalist Government troops, and therefore could not be expected to play a decisive role no matter how good their performance was on the battlefield. That
35 The Key Codes: The Asian Leopard, (Bible Code Research); (White Stone Foundation for

Research, Inc., 2010), < http://biblecoderesearch.org/Key_Codes/Leopard_Files/Index.html > [accessed 20 November 2012].

19 being said, from the beginning of the war against Japan Communist military leader and strategist, Mao argued against having his Communist troops join in regular warfare battle. Mao presented three tenets that gave guerrilla warfare a new potential.36First, he admitted that guerillas troops could not win unaided. He therefore envisaged an effort to create regular forces while guerrillas waged their hit and run tactics.37He argued that at a later phase, the guerillas and regular units would collectively coordinate their campaigns against the opponent. He overall stressed that both styles of fighting were needed to win. Second, Mao demanded a mass effort in organizing popular, political, logistical, and moral support for guerrillas and regulars. He argued that the entire population should be actively enlisted in either organization and fighting for the cause. According to Mao, youths, farmers, teachers, workers, artists, and both men and women were eligible to participate in the common cause of waging war. He asserted that mass support was extremely vital. Finally, Maos doctrine established that it was essential the war be a protracted one. He made no promises of quick victory, but argued for prolonged sacrifice. He explained that effective guerrilla warfare took time. Overall, Mao viewed guerilla warfare as a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them. It is a way for the Chinese to expel an intruder that has more arms, equipment, and troops. His overarching goal was thus to adopt a policy of protracted war characterized by guerilla operations. He believed that this technique could at least partially destroy the Japanese. In order to effectively execute guerilla operations Mao argued that it would be important for Communist troops to undergo an all-out effort to increase Communist military strength. He therefore concluded that during the initial stage of the war, it would be therefore be important for the Communist troops to act in
36 Rod Paschall, Guerrilla Warfare, The History Channel, <

http://www.history.com/topics/guerrilla-warfare > [accessed 19 November 2012].

37 Ibid., < http://www.history.com/topics/guerrilla-warfare >.

20 accordance with the assignments orders of the Nationalist Government in order to create a good image and thereby reap propaganda advantages. This caused already suspicious Chiang to believe the Communists were trying to infiltrate the Kuomintang on a large scale.38 Consequently, making the initial execution of his strategy was initially difficult to accept by the KMT. The Application of Maos Guerilla Strategy within the Anti-Japanese War Mao argued that there were six requirements to ensure to conservation and development of Chinese strength and the destruction of the Japanese: 1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategically defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted, tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducts strategically on interior lines. 39 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.40 The establishment of bases.41 A clear understanding of the relationship that exits between the attack and the defense. 42 The development of mobile operations.43 Correct command.44

38 Chinas Bitter Victory: The War With Japan 1937-1945, edited by James C. Hsiung and Steven I.

Levine (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992); pp. 98

39 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, Maoist Documentation Project, <

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch07.htm > [accessed 19 November 2012] 40 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >. 41 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >. 42 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >. 43 Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch07.htm > [ 44 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm >.

21 Of these requirements, the most evident during the Anti-Japanese War was Maos contention that guerilla activities could be carried out directly complementary to traditional operations of the Nationalist army. He further explained his strategy in following terms: The division of labor between the KMT and the CCP in the anti- Japanese war, in which the former carries on frontal regular warfare and the latter carries on guerilla warfare behind enemy lines, is both necessary and proper, and is a matter of mutual need, mutual coordination and mutual assistance.45 Guerilla operations during the Anti-Japanese War are best exemplified in the following two cases. Battle at Pinghsingkuan The Battle at Pinghsingkuan46 on September 1937 is an example of the execution of Maos division of labor strategy. During the battle, the Communists managed to ambush an entire Japanese division, inflicting about 5,000 casualties in the process. In this battle, the casualties of the Government troops, which carried on regular frontal warfare were double those of the Communist troops which carried out ambushes on the flank.47 Below is a map of the 8th Route Armys movements from September Movements from September until November 1937.

45 Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945, 24. 46 Ibid., 24. 47Kang-jih chan-cheng shih-chi ti Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang-chun (The Chinese Peoples

Liberation Army during the Anti-Japanese War), (Peking: Jen mi chu-pan-she, 1945), p. 18 Cf. Hu Hua, Lectures, p. 365 reprinted in John C. Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Asia and World Institute, 1976); 3.

22

48

The Hundred Regiments Offensive A second execution of Maos division of labor strategy was during the Hundred Regiments Offensive. Beginning on December 5, 1940, the Communist division commanded by Peng Dehuai launched a surprise massive guerrilla offensive against the Japanese counterinsurgency campaign led by General Tada Hayao. The eighth route army began the battle with 400,000 troops, about half guerrillas and half regular troops. The attacks focused on the Shihchiachuang- Taiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, and Tatung-Fenglingtu rail lines. Catching the Japanese off-guard the offensive, which lasted three months, managed to greatly annoy the Japanese. There were 25,000 Japanese casualties and another 20,000 prisoners.
48 Kataoka, Tetsuya, Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United

Front. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974); 62.

23 Material damage was fairly significant, with 600 miles of railroad destroyed and the Chingching coal mine near Taiyuan shut down for six months. Due to this damage, Japanese occupation of North China was disrupted. The following is a photograph of a Communist guerilla soldier waving the Nationalist Flag of China after a victorious battle against the Japanese during the Hundred Regiments Offensive.

49

Analyzing the Damage In both of these Chinese soldiers fought relentlessly utilizing Maos non- traditional guerilla tactics. An historical account from the time exemplifies this persistence: The Japanese people are disillusioned and the army is baffled by the stubbornness and courage of the Chinese soldiers in the act of defending their national honour and existence.50 Another account states:
49 Hundred Regiments Offensive, Wikipedia, < 50 National Southwest Associated University Library. Japans Aggression and Public Opinion

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Regiments_Offensive > [accessed 20 November 2012]. (Kunming, China: 1938); pp. iii.

24 In China there is an increasing conviction that right will finally overcome might, as the war of attrition is protracted, there has been manifested in the whole nation an indomitable will and power of resistance to the bitter end, in spite of Chinas immense sacrifice which is the greatest she has ever experienced in the course of her long history. As illustrated by this remarkable passages Communist guerilla campaigns can be recognized for exhausting the Japanese forces. This claim can be further accredited by the Japanese responsive three all policy, which included killing, burning, and destroying all Chinese. (A map of the Japanese 1941 plan can be seen on the subsequent page) Although the vicious counterinsurgency program by the end of 1942 severely eroded Communist power as it reduced the Red Army from 400,000 to 300,000 and the population of Communist base areas from 44,000,000 to 25,000,000, the Japanese lacked the military resources needed to prosecute this campaign to its conclusion, allowing the communist army to survive and recover. Mao himself acknowledged that the enemy was in a weak strategic position. The Japanese Empire had grievously and with Communist satisfaction, overextended itself.

25

51

51 Patrick Clancey, China Defensive: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II,HyperWar

Foundation, < http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-C-ChinaD/index.html > [accessed 19 November 2012].

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5. The End of Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Tactics

Although the guerilla campaigns were arguably successful, the Kuomintang Government remained adamantly against the Communist Party. Chiefly due to the expansion policy that supplemented the guerilla campaigns, friction with the Government troops was inevitable. In addition, the friction grew partly out of the nature of guerilla warfare itself, which requires independent operations. In his treatise, On Guerilla Warfare, Mao explains that guerilla warfare should be decentralized to allow quickness and detachment, a concept inconsistent with Nationalist Government policy and which perpetuated their mistrust. As a result, from 1939 onwards, the Kuomintang made many criminal attacks against the Communist areas, secretly ordered large numbers of Kuomintang troops to surrender to the Japanese invaders, and eventually collaborated with the Japanese in attacking the Eighth and New Fourth armies.52 The New Fourth Army Incident It can be asserted that the New Fourth Army Incident also known as the Wannan Incident of 1941 marked the significant end of real cooperation between Nationalists and Communists. Fearing the Communists were attempting to politicize the peasants in order to gain support and popularity in the Yangzi River delta and areas south of the river, GMD officials issued a directive on December 9, 1940, demanding that the Communists withdraw their forces north of the Yangzi River by December 31, 1940. The Communists delayed executing this movement as they indeed were attempting to win mass support and remain south of the river. As a result, on January 4, 1941, seven Nationalist divisions surrounded and attacked the headquarters of approximately 9,000 New Fourth Army troops near Maolin in Jiangsu Province. From January 7 to 13th, Nationalist troops killed about 3,000 New Fourth Army troops and captured the remainder. Then, on January 17, 1941, the government of

52 Tien-yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, vii.

27 Jiang Jieshi dissolved the New Fourth Army and closed CCP military liaison offices in many GMD held cities. Although this incident was a detrimental to the Communist effort, it was also an advantageous for their popularity as it drew party support. The Incident provided the Communists with a powerful propaganda tool by which they could present themselves as martyred patriots.53 The Nationalist Party of China was criticized for creating internal strife when the Chinese were supposed to be united against the Japanese, while the Communist Party of China seen as heroes at the vanguard of the fight against the Japanese and Nationalist treachery.54 Overall, no single event during the Anti-Japanese war did more to elicit sympathy for the CCP and establish its patriotic credentials both at home and abroad.55 In 1939, Mao Tse-tung issued a declaration stating: we [CCP forces] will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack.56 Maos remark signaled the start of Communist military attacks, which aggravated the already strained KMT-CCP relations. Overtime, KMT influence in North China was greatly lessened as Government troops were either absorbed by the Communists or expelled by the Japanese.

6. A Concluding Evaluation of Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War
When evaluating Chinese guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns against the Japanese throughout the Anti-Japanese War, it is both important and necessary to note that at no point did the Chinese threaten to completely dislodge the Japanese occupation. Even Samuel Griffith, Maos sympathetic American translator admits:, No authentic records support the proposition that Communist military operations succeeded in forcing the Japanese invaders from an extensive

53 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, 319. 54 Ibid., 319. 55 Ibid., 320. 56 Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945, 24.

28 territory they physically occupied and wanted to hold57 However, Maos military writings and possibly this paper thus far may create a mistaken impression that Chinese Communist were engaged in constant fighting against the Japanese, that most of Japanese war effort was directed against the Communists and that in the end the Japanese were defeated chiefly because of the relentless attacks of the Communist divisions. In reality, even after 1940 only about one-quarter of the Japanese forces in China were operating against the Communists. However, although the Communists never succeeded in destroying the forces of the Japanese occupation, a successful application of guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns did occur during the Anti-Japanese War. During the eight-year war of resistance, the Communists indeed achieved their basic strategy to engage in guerilla warfare to expand their strength and exhaust the Japanese. In fact, Japanese Army Archives recall that Chinese Communist forces carried out successful guerilla operations against the Japanese Army, and that Communist forces created numerous, popularly supported anti- Japanese enclaves in each of the provinces in North China. Overall, as comprehensively demonstrated throughout this essay, Maos guerilla style-tactics were supplementary to Chinese efforts to destroy the Japanese aggressor as they effectively exhausted and thereby weakened Japanese army during the Anti- Japanese War. Moreover, the legacy of Maos guerrilla operations led to a successful defeat of Chiang Kai-sheks Nationalists after World War II, and inspired emulation by many insurgent leaders thereafter.

57 Benjamin Borgeson, The Principles of Destruction in Irregular Warfare: Theory and Practice,

Small Wars Journal, (4 January 2012), < http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-principles-of-destruction-in-irregular-warfare-theory- and-practice#_ftnref127 > [accessed 19, November 2012].

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7. Bibliography
Bisson, Thomas Arthur. Japan in China (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1937); Borgeson, Benjamin. The Principles of Destruction in Irregular Warfare: Theory and Practice. Small Wars Journal, (4 January 2012). < http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-principles-of-destruction-in- irregular-warfare-theory-and-practice#_ftnref127 > [accessed 19, November 2012]. Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945 (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1962); Chiang Kai-shek, Resistance and Reconstruction: Messages During Chinas Six Years of War 1937-1945, (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1945); China at War: An Encyclopedia. Edited by Xiaobing Li. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012); Chinas Bitter Victory: The War With Japan 1937-1945. Edited by James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992); Chor, So Wai. The Making of the Guomindangs Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Modern China. vol. 28, (2002); Clancey, Patrick, China Defensive: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II, HyperWar Foundation. < http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-C- ChinaD/index.html > [accessed 19 November 2012]. Coble, Parks M. Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Guerilla Warfare Wikipedia. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Guerrilla_Warfare > [accessed 20, November 2012]. Hu Pu-yu, A Brief History of Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), (Taipei, Taiwan: Zhong Wu Pub. Co., 1974); Hundred Regiments Offensive. Wikipedia. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Regiments_Offensive > [accessed 20 November 2012]. Kuan, John C. The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Asia and World Institute, 1976);

30 Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Encyclopedia Britannica. < http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/364275/Marco-Polo-Bridge- Incident#tocBiblio > [accessed November 20, 2012]. National Southwest Associated University Library. Japans Aggression and Public Opinion (Kunming, China: 1938). Paschall, Rod. Guerrilla Warfare. The History Channel. < http://www.history.com/topics/guerrilla-warfare > [accessed 19 November 2012]. Tetsuya, Kataoka. Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974). The Key Codes: The Asian Leopard, (Bible Code Research); (White Stone Foundation for Research, Inc., 2010), < http://biblecoderesearch.org/Key_Codes/Leopard_Files/Index.html > [accessed 20 November 2012]. Tien-yu, Li. Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1959); Tse-tung, Mao. On Guerilla Warfare, Maoist Documentation Project. < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla- warfare/ch07.htm > [accessed 19 November 2012]. Tse-tung, Mao. On Protracted War. (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2001); World War II- Pacific War-Events, Kidport Reference Library. < http://www.kidport.com/RefLib/WorldHistory/WorldWarII/WorldWarIIPa cificEvents.htm > [accessed 20, November 2012]. Zhang Xueliang. Wikipedia. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Xueliang > [accessed 20, November 2012].