The

Decisive Factors in the UN Forces Defense of the Pusan Perimeter in the 1950 Korean War GOV-451 Kyle Gaines 11/19/12
1

1 Battle of Pusan Perimeter, Wikipedia Series on the Korean War, (Wikipedia, 4 September
2012). <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Pusan_Perimeter_Sept_4.jpg>

1. Introduction
Historical Context and Overview of the Korean War The Korean War is also known as the forgotten war because of the relative dearth of scholarship and writing on the subject.2 Despite this scarcity however, the Korean War was a tremendously significant conflict with Asian security implications lasting until the present day. The Korean War was the first proxy war that was a part of the overarching struggle between the United States and the USSR. Although the USSR contributed advisers and military resources to the conflict, no Soviet soldiers physically engaged in combat operations. Conversely, American soldiers formed a critical component of the UN coalition that reacted in response to North Korean aggression. This conflict began on 25 June 1950, when North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) forces crossed the 38th parallel with the support of a massive artillery barrage and Russian advisers without warning.3 After this action, the U.N. responded with a call to arms, and a coalition of nations including the Republic of Korea (ROK), The United States, Britain, Australia and Japan committed troops and resources to the defense of South Korea.4 The UN commitment of troops and American efforts to stem the North Korean advance led to the creation of the defensive perimeter called Pusan by August 1st under US Eighth Army General Walton Walker5(See Figure 2). The war had changed character, and no longer was the primarily American and South Korean force relying on ineffective weapons and a lack of armor to stem the tide of a relatively well-organized and equipped enemy.6 Miraculously, the under equipped and ill prepared UN force was able to hold the

Harry G Summers, Jr., Korean War Almanac, (New York, NY: Facts on File Inc., 1990). Xiii Ibid. xiii 4 Ibid. xiv 5 Edwin P. Hoyt, The Pusan Perimeter, Korea, 1950, (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day Publishers, 1984). 139 6 Ibid. 139
3 2

NKPA at the Pusan Perimeter, which bought time for Gen. Douglas MacArthurs famous Inchon invasion on 15 September 1950.7
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After the invasion at Inchon, UN forces not only successfully drove NKPA forces back to the 38th parallel, but also continued their advance up the peninsula to the Yalu River.9 At this stage in the war, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) entered the fray and between December 1950 and June 1951, launched an offensive that drove UN forces back down to the 38th parallel.10 From July 1951 until the armistice in July 1953, the war resembled the static trench warfare that comprised
Summers, Korean War Almanac, xiv McCracken, A Brief Timeline of the Korean War (15 November 2012). <http://jmccrackenworld.com/KoreanWarBrief.jpg> 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid.
8J.
7

Figure 8

World War I, and resulted in a ceasefire between the North and the South that has lasted until the present day.11 North Korean Goals The goals of the NKPA were pretty clearly evident from the start of the war. In a manifesto published on 8 June 1950, newspapers in Pyongyang printed a pamphlet released by the Central Committee of the United Democratic Front of North Korea outlining its aims for the next few months.12 The manifesto sought elections to be held in the north and the south and the new parliament to sit no later than 15 August.13 Of course there was no mention of the Republic of South Korea, so by implication it seems as though North Korea was announcing its intention to invade the South as early as 8 June 1950.14 Politically, the North Koreans sought to collapse the government of Dr. Syngman Rhee and militarily they sought to cause the disintegration of the ROKs army.15 In both of these endeavors the North Koreans failed, and the successful defense at Pusan was a major reason why. This paper will investigate the factors contributing to that defense. UN Coalition Goals One of the fascinating aspects of the Korean War is that the goals of the United States changed multiple times during the course of the conflict even though the UN had approved only one set of objectives. Despite the decision by MacArthur to drive past the 38th parallel in pursuit of the NKPA after the invasion of Inchon, this paper is limited to a discussion of the UN goals up until the NKPA was driven back to the 38th parallel. The initial goal of the UN coalition was articulated in a U.N.

11

Ibid. This Kind of War, 3

12 Fehrenbach, 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.

3 3 15 Millett, The Korean War, 18-19

resolution that was passed in a record 4 hours.16 Passing this resolution was only possible due to a major tactical error by the USSR, which was their decision to boycott the U.N. for a few months.17 They were protesting Taiwans retention of their Security Council seat in the wake of the Communist takeover of Mainland China, and as a result they forfeited their vote and could not veto the resolution.18 The UN resolution had three parts: 1) the immediate end of fighting; 2) the withdrawal of North Korea behind the 38th parallel; and 3) and all members assist the U.N. and refrain from assisting North Korea.19 Although not all members assisted and the end to the fighting was not immediate, the UN coalition did achieve its principle goal of driving North Korea back behind the 38th parallel shortly after Inchon. Argument This paper seeks to investigate the reasons why the UN coalition was able to defend the Pusan Perimeter successfully. The conventional wisdom of the Korean Conflict suggests that U.S. airpower interfered with North Korean logistics to such an extent that the ability of the NKPA to breach and exploit the perimeter was dramatically undercut. This paper however, will partially challenge the conventional wisdom by examining five potential factors that led to the successful defense of the perimeter. 1) NKPA logistical ineffectiveness as a result of its inherent incompetence and U.S. air attacks on supply lines, 2) North Korean tactical and strategic ineptitude, 3) U.S. naval, air and technological superiority and the successful application of these advantages in supporting the defense of the front, 4) the simple fact that the UN coalition had a smaller, more concentrated area to defend with interior lines of communication and superior logistics and finally 5) that the friction of war, as Clausewitzs called it, wore on the NKPAs extended lines 16 T.R. Fehrenbach, The Fight for Korea, (New York, NY: Grosset and Dunlap, 1969). 61-62
17

Ibid. 62 62 19 Ibid. 62
18 Ibid.

and caused a deterioration in troop strength and equipment relative to increasing UN troop levels. Through an examination of these 5 factors, this paper will arrive at the conclusion that a synthesis of US technological air, naval and technological superiority along the front, the smaller and more concentrated line and effective logistics, and the friction of war were the most compelling factors that explain the halt of the NKPAs advance at Pusan. Scope The scope of this paper is necessarily limited to the establishment, defense and holding of the Pusan Perimeter by UN coalition forces. Although the attack at Inchon on 15 September was a major turning point in the conflict, this paper will show that by September 15th, NKPA efforts to breach the Pusan Perimeter had stalled and ground to a halt. Thus, examining the successful Pusan Perimeter defense is worthy of analysis on its own merits separate from Inchon. Reaching beyond these limits would lead to an unsatisfactory and insufficient treatment of the features of the defense of the perimeter. Also of note, the Battle of Pusan Perimeter was actually a series of simultaneous assaults by NKPA forces in an attempt to breakthrough the perimeter and conquer the whole peninsula.20 As a result, the chronology of the battle gets somewhat convoluted. This paper will present a rough timeline of the Battle of Pusan and how it fit into the broader Korean War. More important than the details of the individual skirmishes along the line are the overall factors and prevailing conditions that led to the successful defense of the perimeter. This paper will investigate these trends rather than provide anecdotal descriptions of clashes along the front. Not only would such descriptions obfuscate the core argument of the

20 Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1992). P. 289

paper, but also the frequencies and distinctions between such clashes are extremely complex and difficult to differentiate. Structure This paper is broken into 3 sections. First, it will examine the historical context and overview of the defense of the perimeter, starting with the NKPA invasion of the 38th parallel and ending with the invasion of Inchon. Second, it will analyze the five potential arguments for why the defense of the Perimeter was successful by examining their evidence and the challenges to each argument and then synthesizing the argument previously outlined. Finally, this paper will discuss the consequences of the successful defense of Pusan for the Korean War and the Cold War more broadly.

2. Historical Context and Timeline of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter

Delaying Action The Korean War began on 25 July with the NKPAs predawn storming of the 38th parallel behind a thunderous Soviet-Style artillery barrage.21 Figures 1 and 2 show the progression of the invasion from different angles, and what is most striking is the rapidity with which the attack occurred.
22

Allen R. Millett, The Korean War, (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007). 18 and Flow, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/03/uk_korean_war/html/3.stm
22 Ebb
21

Figure 1

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Figure 1 shows how drastically the frontline changed from the wars start to its conclusion. The massive inequality between the ROK and the NKPA in both quantity and quality of forces became evident very early in the conflict. NKPA forces were 17 miles north of Seoul by 25-26 June when the U.S. government first began to act on the invasion.24 U.S. troops were engaged in combat actions by 5 July and between July 5 and 1 August, ROK and American soldiers were engaged in a delaying action in order to rush as many men and equipment into the remaining ROK held territory as possible.25 As of 1 August, the Pusan Perimeter was established, and ROK and American forces were no longer trying to stem the tide of 23 Donald Pittenger, An Anniversary, (25 June 2008).
<http://www.2blowhards.com/archives/2008/06/an_anniversary.html> 24 Hoyt, Pusan Perimeter, 24 25 Ibid. 40-139

Figure 2

the NKPA advance with inferior weapons and organization.26 Figure 2 shows the contours of the perimeter during the defense of the perimeter beginning on 1 August 1950. The Battle of the Pusan Perimeter Between August 1st and September 1st, The NPKA forces launched a series of attacks that were repeatedly beaten back by UN forces. Korean War scholar Roy Appleman effectively explains the nature of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter: The North Koreans, in preparing to attack the Pusan Perimeter and its communication system, had available four lines of advance toward Pusan: (1) through or past Masan south of the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, (2) through the Naktong Bulge to the rail and road lines at Miryang, (3) through Taegu, and (4) through Kyongju and down the east coast corridor. They tried them all simultaneously in August, apparently believing that if they did not succeed at one place they would at another.27 Although all of these engagements have unique features, the central unifying tenet of each encounter was that UN forces successfully held the line. Although in some cases NKPA forces were able to break through the perimeter, they were never able to exploit this advantage and were always eventually driven back.28 As August wore on, NKPA advances were continually unsuccessful.29 As T.R Fehrenbach writes, as August waned, the North Koreans began to realize that the only way they could now hope to gain a decision was by a frontal attack against the perimeter30 Fehrenbach describes the Great Naktong Offensive as the heavest

26

Ibid. 139

North to the Yalu, p. 289. Appleman, South to the Naktong, P. 466 29 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, The Classic Korean War History, (Washington DC: Brasseys inc., 1963). 138
28

27 Appleman,

30 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 138

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fighting of the Korean War where every American Division immediately came under heavy pressure.31 In the early days of September the fighting was fierce and indecisive, but by 15 September the UN forces had held their ground and the fighting along the Perimeter became quiet.32 The Great Naktong Offensive had failed to breakthrough and take Taegu or Pusan, and UN forces were now in the position to take the offensive.33 On 15 September that is exactly what happened, and the resulting invasion of Inchon and a subsequent breakout from positions in Pusan on 18 September ended the fighting around Pusan for the rest of the war. 34

3. Analysis of the Factors Leading to the Successful Defense of the Perimeter and the NKPA Failure to Penetrate
The possible explanations for the defense of the perimeter can be divided into 5 broad factors including 1) NKPA logistical ineffectiveness both due to inherent problems and U.S. air attacks, 2) NKPA tactical and strategic mistakes, 3) U.S. firepower superiority along the line, 4) the smaller, easier to defend perimeter with superior UN logistics and 5) the friction of war argument. 1) NKPA Logistical Ineffectiveness The conventional wisdom of the Korean War emphasizes poor, disorganized and ineffective North Korean logistics caused by innate problems within the NKPA and an aggressive American bombing campaign aimed at disrupting NKPA supply lines. The logic of this argument is that UN forces interfered with NKPA logistics to such an extent that its ability to supply the frontline was greatly hindered. James 31 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 141
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 148-159 Hoyt, Pusan Perimeter, 273 34 William T. Bowers, William M. Hammong, George L. MacGarrigle, Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific 2005). p. 175
33 32

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Stokesbury argues that the American bombing campaign destroyed logistics, transport and infrastructure and forced the NKPA resupply to hide during the day and travel by night.35 According to Stokesbury, these actions prevented the NKPA from being supplied in the south.36 Indeed, The supremacy of the Fifth Air Force in the skies over Korea forced the North Koreans in the first month of the war to resort to night movement of supplies to the battle area.37 While it is true that supply and communications problems inhibited the North Koreans from exploiting breakthroughs to their full potential, this factor as the principal reason for the failure to penetrate the Perimeter is flawed for a two reasons. First of all, even in spite of the pressure put on supply lines, it is actually quite remarkable how well NKPA forces were still able to supply the front.38 Appleman writes: The United Nations air effort failed to halt military rail transport. Ammunition and motor fuel, which took precedence over all other types of supply, continued to arrive at the front, though in diminished quantity. There was still a considerable resupply of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and mortars, at the front in early September...39 Secondly, T.R. Fehrenbach argues that airpower alone was certainly not decisive in the Korean conflict because of the fragmentation of the country, and the ability of the NKPA to transport supplies to the front by whatever means possible, including foot transport.40 He asserts that a good deal of supplies still arrived at the front and Western perspectives of masses of military materiel simply did not exist in North Korea in the first place.41 Figure 3 shows the initial North Korean axis of 35 James L .Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, (New York, NY: Harper Perennial 1990.) 47-48, 66. 36 Ibid. 47-48, 66 37 Appleman, North to the Yalu, p. 377
38

Ibid. 394 394 40 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 114 41 Ibid. 114
39 Ibid.

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advance and the relatively connected albeit damaged network of roads that still allowed for transport of supplies to the front. Considering these challenges to the conventional wisdom, there must be other explanations for the failure of the NKPA and the success of the UN.
42

42 Hoyt, Pusan Perimeter, 99

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2) NKPA Military Incompetence One potential reason for a military failure that must always be considered in warfare is military incompetence, whether tactically or strategically, on the part of the losing side. Although poor decision-making is often the culprit in military failures, this argument does not hold much water in the case of the assault on the Pusan Perimeter by the NKPA. The only real defense of this argument is the suggestion that attacking at multiple points along the perimeter caused a diffusion of military resources and ineffectively employed the principle of mass to break through the UN line. North Korean commanders were apparently operating under the assumption that if they did not succeed in one place that they would in another.43 It is a compelling argument that given the nature of the limitations on North Korean resources, the NKPA should have pursued a more concentrated main effort, but this is a significant tactical question that would require much military know-how to debate in the first place. It is possible that the overextended North Korean supply lines and attrition prevented the successful concentration and exploitation of breakthroughs in the line, but this reason is more connected to factor #5, the friction of war, rather than military incompetence. Contrary to this argument, North Korean military commanders seem to have been highly adept tacticians in the early stages of the war. Their rapid push to Pusan in the first place and the fact that they tactically outmaneuvered UN forces on a number of occasions and broke through the Perimeter at various points in the month-and-a-half long battle suggests that factors other than military incompetence were at the root of the failure to penetrate the Perimeter. North Korean commanders successfully flanked and infiltrated troops to the enemys rear all the way down the Korean Peninsula to Pusan.44 Once the Perimeter was established, NKPA commanders also realized that with a smaller, harder-to-flank front, that 43 Appleman, North to the Yalu, p. 289 44 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 138

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other tactics would have to be adopted, namely the frontal assault that they pursued.45 It seems hard to contend that NKPA commanders were incompetent in light of these well thought-out decisions and realizations combined with their initial successes. 3) US Air, Naval, and Technological Quality The third potential factor that explains the UN defense of the Pusan Perimeter is superior air and naval firepower, and more advanced technology to support the front. This factor will be called the firepower argument for the purposes of this paper. Rather than focusing on UN attacks on supply lines, which this paper already challenged as a legitimate factor, this argument focuses more on the unique superiority of UN firepower along the front. The logic of the firepower argument is that UN firepower superiority was partially a result of a more eclectic coalition contributing supplies and troops to the conflict and partially as a result of the extreme material advantages conferred to the UN by the U.S. war machine. The firepower argument has significant evidence to support its claims. T.R Fehrenbach articulates this argument when he writes, Without complete control of the air and seas during the dark days of mid-summer 1950, the UN presence on the Korean Peninsula would have ended.46 According to Fehrenbach, UN air superiority was less important for attacking NKPA supply lines, but absolutely essential for support along the front.47 The relative lack of artillery in Korea during the Battle of Pusan Perimeter elevated the importance of airpower because it was used to support the front lines to great effect.48 Fehrenbach goes so far as to say that Without constant air cover over the perimeter, without strafingthat greatly 45 Ibid. 138
46 47

Ibid. 114 Ibid 114 48 Ibid. 114

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hampered NKPA attacksit is probable that the Perimeter would have been breached fatally.49 For Fehrenbach and other scholars, airpower was essential to the war effort. Another aspect of the firepower argument more loosely construed is the unique technological advantages of the UN relative to the NKPA. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) specifically was a major advantage held by the UN in the defense of the perimeter.50 UN forces used a subset of SIGINT, Communications Intelligence (COMINT) to locate airfields and aircraft for bombing, locate centers of artillery distribution and give General Walton Walker information on NKPA troop movements.51 This advantage provided a new and unique form of technological support that certainly improved the UN defense effort and although not kinetic firepower, it can still be considered an important force in the defense of Pusan. UN forces also had superior firepower capabilities on the ground according to Appleman. He discusses these advantages when he writes, {North Korean Forces} were not capable of exploiting a breakthroughin the face of massive air, armor, and artillery...52 The only real challenge to this argument is that all of these advantages considered, North Korean forces were still very close to overrunning the Pusan Perimeter, especially in the Great Naktong Offensive.53 Even in spite of the support provided by firepower superiority, there still must be other factors that at least partially contributed to the successful defense of the perimeter. It is clear from the evidence that U.S. air, naval and ground firepower superiority combined with technological advantages had a significant impact on the Battle of Pusan Perimeter. The effect of UN firepower cannot be understated and 49 Ibid. 114 50 David A. Hatch and Robert Louis Benson, The Korean War: The SIGINT Backround, (Fort
Meade, MD: NSA 2000) Accessed Electronically. The Pusan Perimeter 51 Ibid. Pusan Perimeter 52 Appleman, North to the Yalu, p. 466 53 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 141-142

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was certainly a necessary albeit probably not sufficient factor in the UN defense of the Perimeter. 4) Smaller Line, Superior Logistics, Forces to Space One of the more intriguing explanations for why the UN held the line at Pusan is a simple arithmetic argument and was first presented by B.H. Liddell Hart. Known as the ratio of forces to space, this argument was published in his 1960 book Deterrent or Defense.54 The ratio of force to space observes that for at least a century and a half, it has taken relatively less soldiers to hold a front of equal distance.55 Hart observes that the defense has been gaining a growing a material ascendancy over the offense56Implicit in this theory is that not only was defense growing relative to offense during this time in history, but the concentration in density reduced maneuverability and more easily allowed for the holding of the front by UN forces. Simultaneously, the poor roads and mountainous terrain along the Pusan Perimeter only exaggerated the superiority of the defense and allowed an initially smaller force to establish a defensive perimeter. Figure 4 shows the mountainous conditions and broken terrain that favored the defenders of the perimeter.

54 55 Hart,

B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense, (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1960). Deterrent, 97 56 Ibid. 97

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57

If we develop the ratio of force to space theory to its more specific context at Pusan, it gains even more weight. According to the logic of what this paper will call the arithmetic argument which incorporates the ratio of forces to space but also 57 Hoyt, Pusan Perimeter, 122

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examines other factors, the simple fact that UN forces had a much smaller and concentrated perimeter to defend with interior lines of communication and increasing troop levels relative to their NKPA enemies, allowed for the successful defense of the Perimeter.58 This paper links logistics to the smaller line because this much more compact and more easily controlled perimeter enabled UN forces to pour troops and equipment into the port of Pusan more easily and increased logistical effectiveness more than before the Perimeter was established. Interior lines, considered to be of the utmost importance by Jomini, were also more easily maintained in the smaller Perimeter. Korean War scholars Allan Millett, Roy Appleman and T.E. Fehrenbach all recognize the significance of the smaller front as at least a partial explanation for the successful defense of the Perimeter. Appleman writes: However, with the establishment of the Pusan Perimeter in August, the UN troops held a continuous line which the North Koreans could not flank, and their advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN army.59 This point by Appleman is twofold, including both the smaller line and the increasing troop levels. Considering troop levels first, Figure 5 below shows a side- by-side comparison of UN and NKPA troops as of 1 September 1950 to further illustrate this point.60 58 Appleman, North to the Yalu, p. 393 59 Ibid. 393 60 Appleman, North to the Yalu, p. 382 and 395 (Figure 4)

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UN troops, 1 September 1950 NKPA troops, 1 September 1950 September. If we combine the numerical advantages with Applemans second point about a continuous line that could not be flanked by the NKPA, the arithmetic argument begins to gain steam. Ever increasing troop levels, crammed into a much smaller defensive Perimeter that could not be flanked increases the concentration of forces along the Perimeter, and makes a frontal assault much harder to accomplish. Figure 5: Totals at top of Chart

From this chart we can see the numerical advantage held by UN troops as of 1

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Fehrenbach eloquently articulates this challenge to the NKPA in This Kind of

War on page 138: In pushing the Americans into a corner, the NKPA probably made its greatest tactical errorit had poor odds of smashing the Americans with direct hammer blows.61 The same tactics that NKPA commanders had used to push the ROK and U.S. forces to Pusan no longer worked, and as a result, NKPA forces had to switch to the unappealing and ultimately ineffective direct frontal attack.62 Appleman ironically also presents the only substantive challenge to the arithmetic argument. On page 466 of South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, he discusses the fatal weakness of the NKPA as not being able to exploit breakthroughs in the line rather than an inability to breakthrough at all.63 If the NKPA was able to breakthrough at all, then this rules the arithmetic argument out as the sole explanatory factor in the successful defense of the Perimeter and suggests that there are other factors that must be combined with the arithmetic argument to have decisive explanatory power. 5) The Friction of War The final potential factor that explains the successful defense of the perimeter is one advanced by Carl Von Clausewitz in Chapter VII of his famous manuscript, On War.64 Known as the Friction of War concept, Clausewitz describes military forces and operations as much different on paper than in actuality. The unaccounted and unexpected physical and mental toll that an army incurs over time and the deteriorating effect of moving and fighting on men and equipment led Clausewitz to conclude that the defense was dominate, all other things equal.65 In addition, the NKPA extended and strained its supply lines as it continued its advance down the Peninsula. Every mile the NKPA traveled was
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 138 Ibid. 138 63 Appleman, North to the Yalu, p. 466 64 Patrick M. Cronin, Clausewitz Condensed, Air War College Nonresident Studies, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/clauswtz/clwt000b.htm 65 Ibid.
62 61

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another mile that exacerbated the logistical challenge of resupply and another mile of friction acting against NKPA efforts. Although written more than 100 years before the Korean Conflict, one compelling line of argument explaining the failure to penetrate the Pusan Perimeter is the friction concept applied to the Korean War. Although none of the scholars that have been referenced explicitly mention Clausewitzian friction, Appleman and Fehrenbach both make points that support this argument. Fehrenbach describes how by late August, NKPA forces combat efficiency was lower than at any previous time in the war and it had lost much of its military equipment such as tanks, artillery and veteran soldiers.66 Similarly Appleman writes, By the end of August the North Korean troops had been pushed beyond their limits and many of the original units were at far reduced strength and effectiveness.67 It is possible that the NKPA simply just ran out of steam, and the drive from the 38th parallel and the subsequent slowing of their momentum after the Pusan Perimeter was established prevented any legitimate shot at victory. As the balance of troops swung in the UNs favor during the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, their (NKPA) advantages in numbers decreased daily68 and it became only a matter of time before the North Korean effort collapsed. The loss of men, extended supply lines, breakdown of equipment and the many other uncontrollable impacts of war that comprise friction were combined with an increasingly stubborn defense by ROK and American soldiers and stymied the North Korean advance. According to the argument, by the time the NKPA had begun their offensives on the Perimeter they simply didnt have enough gas left in the take to really take advantage of any minor punctures in the line. Figure 6 shows a red-blue breakdown of the perimeter, and even though NKPA forces appear to have a rough parity in the number of units along the front, the actual numbers of capable soldiers had diminished greatly. According to T.E.
66 67

Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 138 Appleman, North to the Yalu, p. 393 68 Ibid. 393

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Fehrenbach, when the Perimeter was established around 1 August the NKPA had already sustained 60,000 casualties mostly at the hands of the ROK.69 By 5 August, many of the NKPAs units were at half strength and its 11 divisions probably did not have more than 70,000 troops altogether.70 Also, significantly, the NKPA did not have more than 40 tanks by 4 August.71 After a month of fighting and slow resupply and reinforcement, the NKPA was more than undermanned compared to the rapidly growing UN force. At the time of the Great Naktong Offensive which began around 1 September, the NKPA had 13 infantry divisions (5,000-9,000 men each), 1 armored division (1,000 men), and 2 armored brigades (500 men each).72 100 new T-34 tanks had arrived and the NKPA was able to muster 98,000 troops total.73 Compare these figures with the 500 American tanks and 180,000 fighting men on the UN side, and the effects of attrition become clear.74

69 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 113 70 Ibid. 113 71 Ibid, 113 72 Ibid. 139 73 Ibid. 139 74 Ibid 113

Figure 6

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75

Another piece of evidence supporting this argument is the rapidity of the success of the Inchon Invasion. Although Inchon was a strategic surprise, one would still expect more of a resistance from NKPA forces. Instead, they were rapidly driven up to the Yalu within a few months, suggesting by this time that their 75 Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter: Volume 1, (Washington, D.C., USMC G-3,1954). Inside Cover

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offensive and the subsequent stalemate at Pusan had taken such a toll on their combat effectiveness that a stubborn resistance was not possible.76 Again, one salient challenge to this argument is how close the NKPA came to breaching the Pusan Perimeter. Fehrenbach went so far as to say, For thirty days the outcome would hang by a slender thread77 It would seem that if the friction of war was the decisive factor, the outcome of the battle would not have been so ambiguous throughout its conduct. In spite of this challenge, the logic and evidence presented suggests friction had a significant impact. A Synthesis of Arguments From the above analysis it is clear that there was no single factor that tipped the balance one way or the other and that the defense of the Perimeter was more of a result of a synthesis of factors. The question is, which factors were the most important contributors to the UN defense of the Perimeter and the failed North Korean offensive? Simply based on the strength of the arguments presented and whether the evidence examined seriously challenged the various conclusions, there are three factors that appear to have the most explanatory power in the holding of the Perimeter. First, American firepower was an essential component of slowing the NKPAs advance and supporting the defense of the Perimeter in place of the lack of artillery. The technological advantage of SIGINT also provided the UN with better intelligence to redistribute its forces to danger spots. Second, the arithmetic component of a smaller Perimeter combined with increasing troop numbers and easier logistical operations were problematic for the NKPA because their earlier tactics of flanking and exploiting were no longer effective. As resources and soldiers poured into Pusan, the NKPA had more of an uphill battle as each day passed. Finally, the friction of war argument helps explain the stalled NKPA advance and the 76 Appleman, North to the Yalu, 729-745. 77 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 114

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failure to exploit any minor punctures in the Pusan Perimeter. The long fight that led to the Pusan Perimeter took a toll on the NKPA, and when it came time to mount an aggressive offensive and exploit successes, the resources and manpower required were simply not there.

4. The Significance of the Defense of the Perimeter

The Significance to the Korean War The defense of Pusan is one of the most remarkable events of the war because it prevented the complete collapse of the ROK and the domination of the Korean peninsula by the north. Unquestionably, had NKPA forces successfully penetrated the perimeter and captured Pusan the war would have turned out much differently. It is almost certain that the ROK military would have collapsed in the event of a NKPA victory at Pusan. Whether the ROK government could have survived in exile, a UN coalition would still have intervened and invaded the Peninsula, or the NKPA would eventually still be defeated in an attack similar to Inchon are all counterfactuals outside of the scope of this paper. What is clear at a minimum is that the outcome of the war would have been radically different and in all likelihood would have turned out worse for UN forces than it eventually did. The ceasefire of 1953, although by no means decisive in either direction, preserved the status quo of the war and in that sense, the UN coalition accomplished its major goal. The Significance to the Cold War The significance of the successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter to the Korean War is much more obvious and concrete than the more global Cold War implications of this victory. If we conclude that the defense of Pusan was critical in the preservation of the ROK at least in the short term, then it is logical to conclude that there were global implications to this success. Any conclusions drawn here are

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largely speculative, but nonetheless grounded in logic and history as a guide for what might have happened. Had the NKPA taken Pusan and in effect, the whole Peninsula and the UN had not intervened, the United States would have lost a critical strategic location in East Asia on the heels of the Communist takeover of China in 1949. If both of these events had occurred, the United States strategic position in Asia during the Cold War would have been incredibly debilitated. The United States has maintained and still maintains a strong military presence in South Korea, and military forces in this nation were a core component of the U.S. Asian presence to hedge against Soviet threats in Asia. Had the NKPA taken Pusan and the UN had intervened, the loss of life would have almost certainly been much greater than was actually the case, which is a significant impact in its own right. The amount of resources, equipment and manpower that would have been required to retake the peninsula with no initial friendly landing zone would have also been tremendous. For these reasons, the defense of the perimeter was a crucial event both in the war and in the broader strategic environment of the Cold War.

5. Conclusions
This paper has presented an argument for the principle factors that contributed to the successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter during the Korean War. After discussing the context and overview of the Korean War and the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, this paper presented 5 possible factors for the successful UN defense and failed NKPA attack of the Pusan Perimeter: 1) NKPA logistical ineffectiveness as a result of U.S. airpower and inherent NKPA logistical deficiencies, 2) NKPA military ineptitude, 3) superior UN firepower and technology along the front, 4) a smaller front to defend with better logistics and increasing manpower and 5) the friction of war. Through an analysis of each of these factors by examining the logic and evidence of each explanation, this paper concluded that a combination of superior

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firepower and technology, a smaller front with better logistics (and manpower) and the friction of war are the three most explanatory factors for why the UN was successful in its defense of the Pusan Perimeter. This paper then examined the implications of the UN victory at Pusan for the Korean war as a whole, concluding that at a minimum it prevented the collapse of the RKO military, and led to a more acceptable conclusion of the war for UN forces. This paper also examined the implications for the Cold War as a whole, speculating that had UN forces lost at Pusan and the entire Peninsula was taken by the north, there would have been a negative impact on the US strategic position in Asia during the Cold War and the potential for a much greater loss of life if the UN conducted an invasion to retake the Peninsula.

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6. Bibliography
Allen R. Millett, The Korean War, (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007). Battle of Pusan Perimeter, Wikipedia Series on the Korean War, (Wikipedia, 4 September 2012). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Pusan_Perimeter B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense, (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1960) David A. Hatch and Robert Louis Benson, The Korean War: The SIGINT Backround, (Fort Meade, MD: NSA 2000). Donald Pittenger, An Anniversary, (25 June 2008). http://www.2blowhards.com/archives/2008/06/an_anniversary.html Ebb and Flow, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/03/uk_korean_war/html/3.stm Edwin P. Hoyt, The Pusan Perimeter, Korea, 1950, (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day Publishers, 1984). Gen. Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan to Panmunjom, (Washington DC: Brasseys inc., 1992). Harry G Summers, Jr., Korean War Almanac, (New York, NY: Facts on File Inc., 1990). James L .Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, (New York, NY: Harper Perennial 1990.) J. McCracken, A Brief Timeline of the Korean War (15 November 2012). <http://jmccrackenworld.com/KoreanWarBrief.jpg> Kenneth W. Estes, Into the Breach at Pusan, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press: 2012). Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter: Volume 1, (Washington, D.C., USMC G-3, 1954) Patrick M. Cronin, Clausewitz Condensed, Air War College Nonresident Studies, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/clauswtz/clwt000b.htm> Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1992).

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Russel A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, (Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1987). T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, The Classic Korean War History, (Washington DC: Brasseys inc., 1963). T.R. Fehrenbach, The Fight for Korea, (New York, NY: Grosset and Dunlap, 1969). William T. Bowers, William M. Hammong, George L. MacGarrigle, Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific 2005).