A

Dangerous Trade: An Analysis of Potential Motivations and Implications of Chinese Arms Transfers with the Middle East
Jenna Sackler

GOVT-451 20 NOVEMBER 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction.2 Chinese Arms Sales....4 Possible Motivations.....14 Possible Implications....25 Conclusion.30 Works Cited...33 IMAGES Fig. 1: Top Global Arms Suppliers, 2010-11...5 Fig. 2: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Pakistan7 Fig. 3: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Iran9 Fig. 4: Top Arms Suppliers to Middle East, 2004-8......12 Fig. 5: 2001-11, Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East14 Fig. 5: China's Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2009...17 Fig. 6: Map of China with Xinjiang Highlighted........21 Fig. 7: China's Increasing Participation in International Organizations.26

INTRODUCTION Weapons proliferation is a delicate issue, but it has become a key manifestation of the growing global competition between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). All states partake in physical arms transfers, and especially with the advent of the Internet and other electronic technology, information transfer is impossible to completely prevent. Shaping trends in international weapons transfers to U.S. will is a priority of the United States, and the most disconcerting problems arise when powerful states vital to U.S. interests engage in arms transfers with adversaries of the United States. First on the list of states with whom the United States has a complex relationship encompassing both partnership and opposition is, of course, the PRC. Since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, Beijing has, as has almost every powerful state, used arms sales as a means to project political or military influence and contain its foes. A significant problem in studying Chinese arms transfers, however, is Beijings noted history of underreporting information in many categories, of which arms transfers is one. While Chinese arms have found their way all over the globe, many of the most important deals, especially over the past decade or two, have been with the Middle East. Particularly notable arms deals between the PRC and the Middle East have been those with both Iran and Iraq during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and countless arrangements with other regional players transferring information or materiel for nuclear and chemical weapons.1 These and other weapons transfers are a physical manifestation of the Sino-Middle Eastern relationship, one that is fraught with complexities. China and the Middle East first interacted in the 1930s as Nationalist-controlled China, in the throes of warsexternal against Japan, and internal between the
1

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, (report prepared for members of Congress by the Congressional Research Service; Washington, DC: US GPO, August 2012), p. 10.

Nationalists and the Communistsrealized that in order to update its military and industry enough to be victorious in either war, it needed greater energy supplies.2 Oil deals began with the Middle East, primarily Saudi Arabia and Iran. That underlying theme, energy security, has driven the Sino-Middle East relationship, as it has the USMiddle East relationship and, in the modern world, it pervades much of international relations. Other cultural factors deepen the ties between China and many Middle Eastern governments. Two of the most important ones are: Anti-American feeling, or a need (whether real or imagined) to counter perceived United States hegemony in the region; and admiration by some despotic Middle East governments of the PRCs astronomical growth under a totalitarian regime.3 Communism never took hold in the Middle East, but many dictatorships in that region implement similar tactics of repression and censorship as does the CCP. Thus, those governments look to China as a shining example of the possibility for ascension to global superpower-status under authoritarianism. Another important factor in the relationship between China and the Middle East is Israel. In many arenas, Israel can be considered a proxy for the United States, on top of posing its own set of sociocultural, religious, and political challenges. This instance is no differentthe United States encouraged Israel to interact with the PRC on arms in the 1960s in order to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet split, though the relationship did not heat up until the 1980s.4 Mainly aircraft and missile technology, some of which had a US background, was transferred. However, after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, the United States wanted to distance itself from China, so became wary when Israel continued its military and diplomatic relationship with the PRC, with Beijing recognizing Israel as a state in 1992 despite alternate directions from Saudi Arabia.5 Israels primary motivation behind engaging diplomatically with China lies in attempting to stem Chinese sales of weapons or technology to Israels adversaries in the Middle East, especially Syria and Iran, whose arms relationship with China will be a primary focus of this paper.
2

Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), p. 5. 3 Ibid, p. 3. 4 Ibid, p. 71. 5 Ibid, p. 38.

CHINESE ARMS SALES For the past half-century, and even more so recently, China has been one of the top suppliersand receiversof international arms. As of 2011, China was ranked the fifth largest exporter and fourth largest importer of arms.6 The majority of arms imported by Beijing are advanced conventional weapons, largely originating in Russia. Throughout the mid-2000s, China spent over two billion dollars annually on arms from Russia alone, though that number has fallen in the past few years.7 These weapons are brought in to supplement Chinas vast military overhaul, with the purpose of modernizing to what China believes to be the standard set by other, primarily Western, powers today. Facets of this modernization include shrinking the physical size of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), expanding and updating Chinas cyber capabilities, and ensuring that their arsenal is as up-to-date and powerful as possible.8

Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China. Arms Control Association, (updated August 2012), <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chinaprofile>. 7 Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 10. 8 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, (London: Praeger Security International, 2008). Not mentioned on any specific page, but demonstrated throughout book.

Figure 1: Top Global Arms Suppliers, 2010-11 (figures expressed in 1990 $US millions)9

Chief in Chinas arsenal is its small, but effective, nuclear cache, purportedly for deterrence only. Beijing has claimed in the past that China will never strike first under any circumstances, but recent tensions with the United States over Taiwan have led to an edit of that statement which leads US analysts to believe that should the United States intervene in a Chinese conquest of Taiwan, Beijing would respond with a nuclear strike.10 On a similar note, China has had, and continues to have, a bustling trade in the exchange of nuclear information and materiel, which is not only economically advantageous, but also supports nuclear proliferation to states China chooses with whom it (and perhaps Russia) has a relationship, but other nuclear powers do not. The primary recipients of Chinese arms sales, whether conventional or nuclear, are Pakistan, Iran, various other Middle Eastern states to a lesser degree (especially prerevolutionary Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia), and North Korea.11 This paper will focus
9

Arms Transfers Database, TIV of arms exports from the top 10 largest exporters, 2010-2011, (Table, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 10 November 2012). 10 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 78. 11 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.

on those states within the Middle East, including Pakistan due to its importance vis--vis Chinas continuous struggle to contain India. In the period between 2007 and 2011, the same period that saw China fall to fourth place in arms imports, Beijings arms exports increased 95%, landing them at a close sixth behind the United Kingdom.12 In 2011, Chinese arms exports totaled $2.2 billion US, down slightly from its 2005-07 high, but enough to push China into the number five spot.13 Although most Chinese arms deals are negotiated by external companies, the relationship between the state and companies especially the largest ones, such as China North Industries Corporation (Norinco), the majority of which are state-ownedresults in most arms sales having governmental approval.14 Perhaps the largest portion of that amount, at least in recent years, has come from Pakistan. Chinas history of selling weapons to Pakistan stretches back decades, to the beginning of the Sino-Indian border conflicts.15 Beijing viewed Pakistan as a strategic asset in order to contain India and distract it from Chinese movements in Tibet. With Chinas help, Islamabad started its nuclear program in force in 1974, in response to Indias nuclear tests.16 Since then, China has been key in selling Pakistan the material, information, and training necessary to maintain and update its nuclear arsenal. For example in 2010, Beijing signed a deal to export two more reactors to Pakistan, adding to the Chasma-2 reactor that had been sold in 2004 with the expectation of being ready for use by 2011.17 The United States and other Western powers claim that this deal transgresses against Chinas promises as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG), which it has been since 2004. In response, China cites the increasingly unstable

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Rise in international arms transfers is driven by Asian demand, says SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (19 March 2012) <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/rise-in-internationalarms-transfers-is-driven-by-asian-demand-says-sipri> (accessed 5 November 2012). 13 Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 10. 14 China North Industries Group (NORINCO (G)), (description; GlobalSecurity.org, 7 November 2011) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/norinco.htm> (accessed 7 November 2012). 15 China at War, ed. Xiaobing Li, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), p. 399. 16 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan. Arms Control Association, (updated August 2012), < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile>. 17 Mark Hibbs, Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness, (Nuclear Energy Brief; Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 April 2010). <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/27/pakistan-deal-signals-china-s-growing-nuclearassertiveness/4su> (accessed 5 November 2012).

situation in South Asia, pointing especially to growing United States presence in and around India.18

Figure 2: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Pakistan19

Conventional weapons deals between the PRC and Pakistan have also contributed to a large portion of Chinese arms exports. Most recently, these deals have focused on surface-to-surface missile technology, J-17 fighter aircraft (2007), Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft (2008), and a contract for future J-10 aircraft (2009).20 However for perspective, recent agreements between the United States and Pakistan have resulted in multi-billion dollar sales to Pakistan of F-16 fighter aircraft and other updates.21

18 19

Ibid. Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Pakistan, (Table, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 24 November 2012). 20 Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 15. 21 Ibid.

Beijing is certainly not the only power from whom Pakistan imports weapons, but it is the only nuclear power to supplement conventional trades with nuclear ones, helping Islamabad combine the two and truly enhance its military capabilities. Recently, Pakistan requested Chinese help in building a naval base at Gwadar, a strategically important location due to its proximity to the Straits of Hormuz and thus the Persian Gulf.22 Increased Chinese presence near the Persian Gulf presents the United States with a serious problem, especially as U.S. military priorities shift away from the Middle East and Indian Ocean to the Pacific, leaving the 5th Fleet stationed off Bahrain with little help. Another of Chinas primary clients is Iran. Arms contracts with Iran began during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88; China supplied both sides during that conflictand was one of few states to do sobut has not had any significant deals with Iraq since the early 1990s.23 Iran, however, has been a constant recipient of Chinese assistance, whether arms or not. On both the conventional and nuclear side of the weapons business, Iran has benefitted from Chinese exports, or at least Chinese technology. While its most advanced ballistic missiles, primarily the Shahab-3 and Sejjil-2, are based on North Korean technology, North Koreas arsenal is in turn built to Chinese standards.24 China has also assisted Iran is procuring or developing cruise missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers, or about 1,864 milesmore than enough to reach Tel Aviv from Tehran.25 On the nuclear side, China has had a large impact on the Iranian program. China and Iran signed two nuclear cooperation pacts, in 1985 and 1990, and both China and Russia heavily aided the Iranian nuclear program throughout the 1990s, including a 1991 deal in which China sold Iran uranium compounds that was not declared to the

22

Farhan Bokhari and Katherine Hille, Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base, Financial Times (22 May 2011) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Banp5kBP> (accessed 7 November 2012). 23 Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 10 24 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Iran. Arms Control Association, (updated August 2012), < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iranprofile>. 25 Ibid.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).26 The relationship deepened in 1992 when then-President Rafsanjani visited Beijingafter that, China became a primary supplier of arms and nuclear information.27 Iran also benefitted from the knowledge of rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, linking China indirectly to Iran.28 Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Chinas involvement in Irans nuclear program has been subtler. No overt deals have transpired, but Chinese geologists have assisted in finding sites for Iranian mines or factories, and Chinese scientistseven from official government institutionshave provided valuable information.29

Figure 3: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Iran30

In the mid-2000s, when the Western world began to seriously worry about the Iranian nuclear program, China effectively blocked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from reaching a resolution of the issue, and when the crisis reemerged in 2011,

26

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, (report; Iran Watch, March 2012) <http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/wmd-nuclearessay-footnotes.htm> (accessed 8 November 2012). 27 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, Middle East Journal, vol. 61, no. 2 (Spring 2007): p. 14. 28 Ibid, p. 15. 29 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit. 30 Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Iran, (Table, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 24 November 2012).

China and Russia refused to increase UNSC economic sanctions on Iran.31 Due to its continued economic relationship with Iran, China is considered a leader in talks to curtail Irans nuclear proliferation; whether or not China (and Russia) can be trusted to seriously help the effort to prevent Iran from acquiring fully-functional nuclear weapons is a question that the United States and its allies continuously consider.32 Libya has been a more indirect recipient of Chinese arms. In September, 2011, while Libya was in the midst of its revolution to overthrow the dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi, reports surfaced indicating that representatives from the Gaddafi regime had signed a weapons deal with China. Beijing has since claimed that the government had no knowledge of that trade, preferring a spectator role in the Libyan conflict.33 The international community has accepted Chinas version of events, but Libyan-Chinese relations are still under stress because Beijing refused to support the rebels during the war, and only slowly accepted the National Transitional Council as a legitimate government.34 Libya is important to China, and China to Libya, because China imports about 10% annually of Libyas oil exports (11% in 2010), and many Chinese firms, both state-owned and private, have billion-dollar interests in Libya.35 While there is no documented link between Tripolis former nuclear program and China other than a failed deal in 1970 between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Muammar Gaddafi, IAEA scientists suspect Chinese involvement in the Libyan program.36 Syria also has a proliferation relationship with China. During the 1980s, Syria attempted to buy ballistic missiles from China; experts are still unsure whether or not that
31 32

Ibid. John Irish, China says Iran nuclear talks at "crucial stage" Reuters (27 September 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-un-assembly-iran-usa-idUSBRE88Q1U820120928> (accessed 5 November 2012). 33 James Hardy and Christopher F. Foss, China Denies Selling Arms to Ghaddafi Regime, Janes Defence Weekly (6 September 2011) <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1188032> (accessed 30 September 2012). 34 Steven Sotloff, Chinas Libya Problem, The Diplomat (14 March 2012) <http://thediplomat.com/chinapower/china%E2%80%99s-libya-problem/> (accessed 5 November 2012). 35 Ibid. 36 Jon Grevatt, China to tighten arms export controls in wake of Libyan controversy, Janes Defence Industry 2011 (7 September 2011) <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1151453> (accessed 30 September 2012).

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sale was actually completed.37 In the period between 2003 and 2010, Syria imported approximately $300 million worth of conventional weapons from China, though that pales in comparison to the $1.2 billion from Russia. China has assisted Syrias nuclear program, donating a reactor and information, which Syria claims is unrelated to weaponry, though the IAEA does not agree.38 Syria has also received North Korean nuclear technology, again creating an indirect link between China and the Syrian nuclear program. Most recently, China and Russia have continued to support Bashar al-Assads regime and prevented international intervention by utilizing their veto power and influence in the UNSC. As the Western community has quietly provided weapons to the rebels so, many Western experts assume, have Russia and China been maintaining the governments weapons supply and trade health.39

37

Kelsey Davenport and Lauren Weiss, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria. Arms Control Association, (updated July 2012), < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile>. 38 Ibid. 39 Matthew Bell, Arms sales at root of Russian/Chinese 'ruse' to veto UN resolution against Syria, says Washington, Janes Defence Weekly (6 October 2011) <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1188357> .

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Figure 4: Top Arms Supplier to Middle East, 2004-840

The weapons trade relationship between Saudi Arabia and China has been comprised less of trade of actual weapons, and more of access, information, and privileged influence. Concerning the actual acquisition of weapons, Saudi Arabia has received much more from the United States and its Western allies, with import totals between 2008 and 2011 exceeding $10 billion.41 China, conversely, has not sold Saudi Arabia weapons since the 1980s. However, China is increasingly becoming a vital client for Middle Eastern oil, and Saudi Arabia is not only one of the biggest oil producers, but also acts as a leader of OPEC states. Beijing and Riyadh signed a strategic oil contract in 1999, tightening relations and ensuring their connection.42 Saudi Arabia is also suspected to have played a financing role for Chinese assistance of the Iranian nuclear program.43 In exchange, experts fear that Saudi Arabia would be given access to Iranian weapons should the need arise. The Sino-Saudi relationship is much more strategic than involved
40

Sam Perlo-Freeman, Arms Transfers to the Middle East, (Backgrounder paper; Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, July 2009), p. 4. 41 Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 14. 42 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 8. 43 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East. Middle East Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 2, (Spring 2005).

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in actual weapons transfers, but it could prove a serious issue for US interests in the region. Finally, Chinas record of participation in international institutions combating dangerous proliferation, especially nuclear, is spotty at best. As one of five recognized nuclear powers, China ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992.44 China also ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 1989, and the CPPNM 2005 amendment in 2009, which ensures that party states will enforce the prevention, detection and punishment of offenses relating to nuclear material.45 The 2005 amendment allows for greater cooperation between states to the same goal. Further, China is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. As of 2010, China had ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.46 As previously mentioned, China is a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group. It is also a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the IAEA Additional Protocol, and has fulfilled the requirements of the UNSC Resolutions 1540 and 1673, which preclude the proliferation of nuclear materiel to allegedly problematic states.47 Chinas record on nuclear proliferation has improved in recent years, a symbol of Beijings effort to, in some ways, pacify Western powers. However, China is not party to either the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.48 In 2004, China applied for membership to the MTCR, but its bid has not yet been approved by a sufficient number of member states. Chinas record, both historic and recent, has shown an unwillingness to curb missile proliferation; Beijing claims to not proliferate missiles capable of carrying a nuclear payload, but intelligence reports from many states and watchdogs have proved
44 45

Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit. IAEA, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, (international convention; Vienna: IAEA, 1979), (accessed 5 November 2012). 46 Rohan Perera, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, April 2005 (report on international convention; New York, NY: United Nations, 2008) <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/icsant/icsant.html> . 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.

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otherwiseespecially concerning surface-to-surface missiles, China has been spreading technology with abandon.49

Figure 5: 2001-11, Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East50

POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS The question raised by Chinas close arms relationship with the Middle East is why would China want to arm the Middle East? How can China benefit from an armed Middle East? The answers to those questions are manifold, but they can generally be divided into two broad categories: economic and strategic. Economic benefits China could reap from an armed Middle East range from simple and not too vital, to extremely necessary for Chinas continued ascension to power. The most basic benefit is simply a transaction that gives China money, another source of revenue for the PLA and state in general. A more important one, among the most important possible motivations across either camp, is lucrative oil deals, which could have a huge effect on Chinas ability to compete.

49

2011 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, (annual report prepared by the Department of State; Washington, DC: US GPO, August 2011). 50 Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11, Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East, (Table, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 30 November 2012).

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Strategic benefits, on the other hand, tend to be more sensitive. The first involves a historic adversary. Since the inception of the PRC, India and China have clashed over their extensive border, particularly over Tibet. India is bordered on its Western side by Pakistan, which could explain Chinas extreme interest in that state. Another interest of Chinas is to curry favor with Middle Eastern, especially Islamist, governments as that region becomes more and more vital. If China can pacify and appease Islamist governments, then perhaps Beijing can feel less fear over the potential radicalization of Muslims in Xinjiang and, to a much lesser extent, Ningxia, already problematic regions. This idea of gaining the friendship of Middle Eastern and particularly Islamist governments has another extremely appealing benefit to China: it would combat perceived United States hegemony in the region. Diverting some of the influence that the United States has, or could have, in the Middle East would not only increase Chinas influence in the region, but would also be another battlefield in the growing global maneuver for power between the United States and China. The simplest and most easily explained, and perhaps least beneficial when weighed on balance, motivation behind Chinas arms sales to the Middle East is the driving force behind, of course, all economic interaction everywhere in the world. That is, of course, to gain money. In 2011, as previously noted, Chinese revenue from arms exports was over $2.2 billion.51 Though that number puts China comfortably within the top six arms suppliers in the world, especially to developing or Third World states, it is paltry when compared to the revenue from other Chinese export industries. According to Chinas Ministry of Commerce, China finished 2011 with a trade surplus of $155.1 billion; compared to that massive number, just over $2 billion is tiny.52 It is also only a fraction of revenues derived from United States arms exports, or $12.2 billion in 2011 alone. The U.S. accounted for approximately 30% of all global arms

51 52

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 8. China Resource Center, (fact sheet; Washington, DC: Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2012). <http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china> (accessed 5 November 2012).

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exports.53 Thus arms export revenue is not a decisive motivation for Beijing to pursue arms deals. It is certainly a bonus, and one that adds to Chinas overall economic improvement, especially by opening roads for trade with some states it might not otherwise have, but it is certainly not a factor that greatly impacts Beijings export financial profile. A more significant economic impetus for Chinas selling copious amounts of arms to the Middle East involves oil. As China further cements its status as an industrial and economic powerhouse, a reputation largely based on manufacturing, it will continue to rely on oil, or even increase its dependence on foreign oil. The CCPs 10th Five-Year Plan, which covered 2001-2005, was the first to mention energy security explicitly, identified guaranteeing and protecting access to oil as a priority.54 The vast majority of oil produced today originates in the Middle East, so it follows that China would be interested in the region. Beijing imported 55% of its oil in total, and 51% of that was brought in from the Middle East.55 The two largest exporters of oil to China are Iran, which provides around 12% of Chinas oil, and Saudi Arabia, which in recent years has reached as much as 20%.56 As one report in The Atlantic notes, this means China is becoming the new United States in regards to oil diplomacy with the Middle East.57 That means, first and foremost, protecting the region from which the oil originates.

53

Big Guns: The Worlds Biggest Arms Exporters (Daily chart; The Economist online, 20 May 2012) <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/03/daily-chart-13?fsrc=gn_ep> (accessed 5 November 2012). 54 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 1. 55 Damien Ma, Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil: Now its Chinas Problem, Too, The Atlantic (19 July 2012) <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/dependence-on-middle-eastern-oil-nowits-chinas-problem-too/259947/ > (accessed 5 November 2012). 56 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 42. 57 Damien Ma, Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil: Now its Chinas Problem, Too, op cit.

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Figure 6: China's Crude Oil Imports by Source, 200958

Much of the United States interest in the Middle East throughout the second half of the twentieth century stemmed from its oil needs. Now, as the United States draws closer to regaining energy independence, Washington appears to have started to feel more freedom to take stronger oppositional stances in the Middle East, for instance siding wholeheartedly with the citizens of a state attempting to overthrow a dictator, rather than needing to appease that dictator to secure oil imports.59 That would tend to deepen Chinese fears of the United States either constraining or opposing behaviors China would support. United States action in the Middle East could cause and, in fact, already has caused problems in Chinas acquisition of oil. Chinas primary goal in all policy, foreign and domestic, is to maintain its economic growth, to which oil is

58 59

Ibid. Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 4

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indispensable. To combat those fears, China has begun to manipulate weapons sales in order to secure access to oil.60 Primarily, this means favorable arms sales to states with which China has a strong oil relationship. Iran demonstrates perhaps the greatest example of this. China imports over 12% of the oil that Iran produces per year, making China Irans largest oil trading partner. In 2010, China became Tehrans largest economic partner in any arena.61 In 2004, a Chinese state-owned company (SINOPEC) and Iran signed a strategic cooperation agreement stating that in exchange for importing 10 million tons of Iranian liquid natural gas annually, China would take the lead in developing the oil field at Yadavaran, Irans largest undeveloped oil field at the time of signing.62 It went into effect in 2007. China is also helping Iran create pipelines from the Caspian Sea through Kazakhstan to China, which would ease Chinas access (especially since Chinas naval capability to protect shipping lanes is not as effective as its land capability).63 Iran has also received countless shipments of conventional weapons from China, stretching back to the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988coincidentally, right after China began its policies of economic opening and reform under Deng Xiaoping.64 Iran has also received tremendous help from Norinco, a massive Chinese state-owned industry proficient in every type of industrial manufacturingespecially weaponry. Norinco built Line 4 of the Tehran subway in the 1990s and, through a proxy company it owns, shipped Iran large quantities of steel piping necessary for chemical and explosive weapons.65 The first of the strategic geopolitical motivations for arming the Middle East refers mainly to Chinas involvement in the Pakistani military. That, of course, is containing India. China and India share a border through the contested Tibetan region,

60 61

Ibid, p. 2. Najmah Bozorgmerh and Geoff Dyer, China Overtakes EU as Irans Top Trade Partner, Financial Times (8 February 2010) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f220dfac-14d4-11df-8f1d00144feab49a.html#axzz2BlMvq625> (accessed 9 November 2012). 62 Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle, op cit., p. 39. 63 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p 8. 64 Ibid, p. 4. 65 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit.

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which has been the site of many conflicts between the two states.66 Tibet, which contains the Himalayan mountain range, identifies ethnically and religiously closer to India. Its Buddhist government, headed by the Dalai Llama, finally fled to India to escape PLA suppression following a 1951 revolt.67 Throughout the 1950s, there were many skirmishes along the McMahon Line, the border between China and Tibet drawn in 1914 by British forces.68 By 1959, clashes had escalated and, with both sides claiming the other fired first, appeared to be poised to devolve into war. PLA troops were constantly stationed at the border, and the CMC ordered regiments from the border with Tibet and nearby Xinjiang to prepare for a frontier counteroffensive.69 In the fall of 1962, the conflict between China and India escalated into a war. Chinese reports cite 2,400 PLA casualties and 8,700 Indian casualties.70 During the leadup to, and actually in the midst of, the war, India sought assistance from many foreign powers, including both the United States and the Soviet Union (during the Sino-Soviet split), leaving China very isolated.71 Most sources cite the war as a Chinese victory, and it certainly reflected the increased technological and operational capabilities of the PLA. But it did not fully end the conflict, especially because the Tibetans created a hostile environment in which Beijing had to enforce its policies. Since then, Tibet has been a flashpoint not only between China and India, but also between China and the rest of the world. In 2005, perhaps at least partially as an attempt to further normalize Sino-Indian relations, China welcomed India, Iran, and Pakistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose mission is combating regional terrorism and extremism.72 To attempt to contain India and distract its forces from Tibet, China has grown a close weapons relationship with Indias neighbor and rival to the west, Pakistan. As discussed above, Islamabad is one of the primary recipients of Chinese weaponry and technology. In 1974, in response to Indian nuclear testing, China assisted Pakistan in

66 67

China at War, ed. Xiaobing Li, op cit., p. 399. Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid, p. 400. 71 Ibid. 72 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 16.

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starting its own nuclear program, and has helped maintain it ever since, giving updates in both information and technology as needed. China sold Pakistan two updated reactors in 2010 to be in use by 2011.73 Pakistan has also bought huge quantities of conventional weapons from China, and presumably will continue to do so. Bolstering the Pakistani military provides China with an ally on the other side of India, either to distract India during times of peace or to create a second front in the case of a war. Though the SinoPakistani relationship is clearly the foremost example in regards to containing India, Chinese (or indirectly Chinese) interaction in Afghanistan and even nearby Iran would serve to give India trouble to its west as it, too, strives for continental power in Asia. Another strategic geopolitical motivation is much broader and affords China a larger range of benefits. The majority of the governments in the Middle East are controlled by Islamist factions or monarchs, which means they are governed by the laws of Islam, and several have the desire to export political Islam as far around the world as possible, through mainly peaceful means, but violent if necessary.74 Paradoxically, the PRC is an atheist nation and has had a poor relationship with various religious institutions; perhaps the most repressed religious group under PRC rule is Muslims. Of the thirty-three high level administrative regions in China, two are majority Muslim: Ningxia and Xinjiang.75 Citizens of Ningxia assimilated into the PRC at the very beginning, and thus have been allowed basic religious freedom so long as they abide by PRC law.76 Xinjiang, however, has been a different story. Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is located in western China and covers about 1/6 of its total land area. Its population is over twenty million, and over eight million of that are of Uighur ethnicity, a Turkic group that is predominately Muslim.77 Since 1955, after two suppressed independence attempts, it has been a registered autonomous region, which means that in theory, it has more legislative rights than do

73 74

Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan, op cit. The Harsh Reality of Chinas Uighur Muslim Divide, Al-Jazeera (12 October 2012) <http://m.aljazeera.com/se/201210493210185606 > (accessed 5 November 2012). 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and Chinas Xinjiang Region, (Backgrounder Report; New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 29 May 2012).

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regular provincesalthough the reality of that is often challenged.78 Though the plurality of the population is Uighur Muslim, the PRC has steadily been encouraging Han (the PRC majority ethnic group) workers to emigrate to Xinjiang. The Han population has risen from 6.7% to 40%, according to a Council on Foreign Relations report.79 Although Beijing claims to not discriminate against Uighurs, all reports on the region find differently; until a 2011 policy change, 800 out of 840 public service jobs were reserved for Hans.80 In the 1990s, even the Chinese minister of religious affairs, Zhou Guohai, expressed Beijings deep fears of the Quran and what it teaches to followers.81

Figure 7: Map of China with Xinjiang Highlighted82

Beijing greatly fears, and regularly attempts to suppress, any activity viewed by Beijing as extremist, known as any public moves to politicize Islam.83 PRC
78 79

Ibid. Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit., p. 15. 82 Uyghur, (Map; Verbix, 7 July 2009, <http://wiki.verbix.com/Languages/Uyghur> ) (accessed 10 November 2012).

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government forces insist that many Uighurs during the 1980s and 90s traveled to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states and learned extremist views, some even joining the Taliban or Taliban-opposition force the Northern Alliance.84 The most militant of the Uighur rebel groups was known as EMIT and was very active in the 1990s. They and others have relationships with the Pakistani Taliban, as Pakistani officials have openly admitted along with their promise to help contain terrorism in Xinjiang.85 Tensions between Beijing and Uighur forces always run high, but in 2009 they came to a head in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, leaving nearly 200 people dead. Amnesty International reports that even as late as 2011, dissenters who spoke out against Beijings treatment of the rebels were being jailed or even executed.86 Beijing also restricts Uighur Muslims ability to build mosques or other Muslim-interest institutions, subverting their ability to practice their religion and culture. If the PRC nurtures its relationship with outspoken Islamist governments, perhaps it can prevent those same governments from attempting to help Uighur Muslims in their pursuit of an independent state. This particularly applies to Chinas close relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, two states certainly bent on spreading political Islam as much as possible. In 1997, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia wrote an opinion article emphasizing the moral obligation to our Muslim brothers, referring to those systematically oppressed in Xinjiang.87 China has recently done more to appease Muslim governments, especially powerful ones such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The primary way to do that is through economic cooperation. While oil accounts for perhaps the largest portion of the economic cooperation (including a 2004 strategic contract between Saudi Arabia and China), weapons sales are certainly a powerful factor as well.88 If China can build up

83 84

Ibid. Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and Chinas Xinjiang Region, op cit. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit., p. 16. 88 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 6.

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these Middle Eastern and Muslim governments security forces, they will not only be indebted to China financially, but should also feel affinity towards that state which provided them with their power. Thus these governments, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan, will have a greater chance of viewing the PRC favorably and be less likely to support the separatist Uighur Muslim elements. A fifth potential motivation for Chinas arming the Middle East, under the category of strategic or geopolitical motivations, is perhaps the most important arguably the overarching motivation for all of Chinas military modernization and actions outside of the East and Southeast Asian region. That goal is to contain what is perceived to be American hegemony.89 Despite ever-increasing economic cooperation between China and the United States, the two states are ideologically opposed, and that opposition is reflected in many arenas, but none more so than foreign policy. The PRC is a communist statethe most powerful communist state in the world since the fall of the Soviet Union, and as such is the leading voice in spreading communismthat claims to focus on domestic issues, only intervening in another states problems if a Chinese interest is at risk.90 The United States, on the other hand, has built a reputation over the twentieth century as a global police force, protecting not only U.S. interests but also spreading democracy and fighting on behalf of peoples seeking freedom. Those two goals often led to contradictions in U.S. policy, seen especially in the Middle East in the twentieth century, as the United States covertly supported numerous coups and revolutions to install rulers indebted to U.S. will. Unless either the United States or the CCP drastically changes its perspective on international relations, Beijing and the Washington will never be as close as their trade relationshipwhich in 2011 reached $539 billionmight suggest.91 The Middle East, as has already been discussed, is a particular point of tension between the two; continued safe access to oil is of utmost importance to both states, and both import a vast quantity of oil from the region. Further, the Middle East is a strategically and historically important area as a link between the East and the West, so control of it (or in modern
89 90

Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 215. Ibid, p. 120. 91 China Resource Center, op cit.

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terms, greatest influence over it) affords a huge advantage.92 Finally, just as first Japan, then China and other East Asian states were the most rapidly developing states of the twentieth century, it appears that in the twenty-first century, Middle Eastern states will develop fastest. As the primary superpower in the current global balance, the United States interest in the Middle East is obvious. China is interested in the Middle East for two layers of reasons: one is the same interests that the United States, and all other powers, have in the Middle East. The other is to block the United States from achieving its goals in the region. There are many specific examples of Chinas blocking the United States and its allies in the Middle East through the medium of arms sales. Despite direct warnings from the United States and its allies against doing so, China has assisted in the nuclear program of many states deemed dangerous by the international community, primarily Iran and Pakistan.93 Particularly regarding Iran, in 2006, when the United Nations endeavored to bring tougher sanctions on Iran and create some sort of comprehensive admonition to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to shut down the nuclear program, China utilized its UNSC veto to block it.94 That action gave Iran several more years to develop its program before it once again took center stage in autumn of 2011. China, along with Russia, has also continued to back Bashar al-Assads despotic regime in Syria, a major recipient of Chinese missiles and related technology.95 Although international mobilization to support Syrian rebels may have been lacking even with Chinese and Russian support, it cannot be ignored that their opposition is a major hindrance. Beyond those examples, the PRC certainly has a lengthy history of encouraging regimes that the United States might view differently. Sudan is a friend of Chinas, despite Western disapproval of al-Bashirs government. China also encourages parties with ties to terrorism or at least violent anti-Western or anti-democratic sentiments, particularly in powerful or problematic states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.96

92 93

Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle, op cit., p. 10. Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit. 94 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit. 95 Kelsey Davenport and Lauren Weiss, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, op cit. 96 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit., p.17.

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This type of strategic blocking of U.S. interests further improves the relationship between China and various Middle Eastern governments who may be anti-Western, desiring freedom and power on their own terms rather than through some U.S. program. It is also a forum to test out US reaction to Chinese intervention. Knowing how the United States reacts is very important to the PRC.97 In East Asia, particularly those states of Southeast Asia that border China and islands in the South China Sea, China appears to have aims to increase its territory and reintegrate those areas that historically belonged to various dynasties or empires. Of course, the most important of those lands is Taiwan. However, Taiwan has signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, so deterring U.S. intervention in a PRC-Taiwan military conflict would be difficult, even if vital. Although the United States official diplomatic ties with China are with the PRC mainland rather than Taiwan, a PRC invasion of Taiwan would still spark U.S. intervention.98 Thus, it is critical for Beijing to understand what lines are not crossable and what manner of retaliation can be expected. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS The two most significant implications of Chinese arms sales, and increased Chinese influence in general, in the Middle East are: an inability of the international community, especially the United Nations, to intervene effectively in any situation in the region; and a further complication between China and the United States. The former implication proves especially dangerous as transnational security issues, such as climate change, cyber security, terrorism, and energy security, become ever more important. The latter reflects Chinas clearly stated goal to become a superpower, to shift the international system from unipolar centered around the United Statesas it has been since the fall of the Soviet Blocto bipolar (with the PRC as the second pole) or, even better, multipolar with numerous superpowers, perhaps one per region.99 China obviously sees itself as the pole for the Asia Pacific region, but the United States has powerful influence and vital interests in the region, complicating Chinas plans.
97

Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012, (report prepared for Congress by the Office of the Secretary for Defense; Washington, DC: US GPO, May 2012), p. 18. 98 Ibid, p. 17. 99 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 28.

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In the current globalizing world, international cooperation is becoming more important than ever. Not international cooperation in the style of treaties and alliances that were popular in past centuries, but the type of joint work that began after World War I and grew in force after World War II, particularly the United Nations. Institutions, though flimsy and not often successful at enforcing their resolutions, have also increased in reputation on the international stage.

Figure 8: China's Increasing Participation in International Organizations100

Although China belongs to many international institutionseven having one of five coveted permanent seats in the United Nations Security Counciland is party to numerous important treaties, the manner in which the CCP conducts its foreign policy is not always conducive to the growing interconnection among states.101 Particularly, Beijings emphasis on militarization and constant desire to annex what it considers historically Chinese territory (Taiwan and surrounding islands, and to some extent continental Southeast Asia) harkens to an earlier century in which each state jealously

100

Nina Hachigian, Winny Chen, and Christopher Beddor, Chinas New Engagement in the International System: In the ring, but punching below its weight, (report; Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, November 2009), p. 11. 101 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.

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protected its own interest even to the detriment of the international community.102 Perhaps this is because during the first iteration of that feeling, China was on the opposite enda territory to be divided. Now, as arguably one of the most powerful, certainly one of the most important, states in the world, China desires an arena to flex its muscle. The most important issues that affect not one state or region but the whole globe are terrorism, cyber security, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and energy security. China is a pivotal player in curbing all of those problems, although its record on climate change is questionable at best, because for the past several decades China has favored economic advancement over sustainability. Concerning terrorism, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and energy security, the Middle East is among the central regions, impossible to discount from the conversationBeijing knows that. China, as does any powerful state, uses its influence to achieve its goals when dealing with less powerful states. However, concerning many of the abovementioned issues, China has different goals than does the international community in general (as led by the United States). When discussing terrorism, Chinas official line supports the U.S. -led war on terrorism. But, CCP spokespeople often repeat, China only supports U.S. action in concert with a fully UN-approved plan that avoids civilian casualties.103 Any brief look at the war on terror or modern war tactics in general displays that civilian casualties are an inevitable, tragic consequence of war. Thus China can simultaneously claim to support U.S. action while still condemning it. Another unavoidable problem that U.S. policymakers will find in the Middle East as a result of Chinas rising influence concerns nuclear proliferation. Most of the international community desires a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Chinas proliferation record, especially with nuclear information or technology, or nuclearcapable missiles, demonstrates that China does not necessarily agree.104 This was proven absolutely in the mid-2000s, when Beijing effectively blocked the United Nations from passing a workable resolution to halt the Iranian nuclear program or placing effective
102 103

Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 40. Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit. 104 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.

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sanctions on Iran.105 In a more indirect manner, Chinese encouragement of nuclear or chemical weapons programs around the Middle Eastparticularly Iran, Pakistan, and to a lesser degree Syriahinders international efforts to limit nuclear proliferation to unstable states.106 As the 2011-2012 year of endless upheaval and revolution throughout the Middle East showed, the region is not stable. Warring factions and parties utilize every tactic available to gain power; possession of nuclear weapons, either by despotic governments or desperate revolutionaries, would have inflamed the situation much further. However, at the moment, Beijing cares more for increasing Chinas influence in a region as vital as the Middle East than it does for Middle East stability, so long as its main oil providers (Iran and Saudi Arabia) remain relatively stable.107 The basis for Chinas incongruent action concerning terrorism and nuclear proliferation, in fact the basis for much of Chinese foreign policy, as noted previously, is to balance United States influence, both in the Middle East and globally. The United States has, over the past century, taken up the mantle of global police force; U.S. foreign policy has involved pressing U.S. will on other states, primarily in the form of spreading democratic ideals. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, the United States main adversary in this fight for global influence was the Soviet Union. Since its collapse, which was coincident with Chinas economic rise, the PRC has actively sought to become the alternate global power to the United States. Chinas primary arena for combating U.S. influence has been through nuclear proliferation. The United States view is complicated: it tends to advocate no development of weapons by states that are not already nuclear capable, but not total destruction of current nuclear caches, and spread of nuclear energy technology. China takes a different approach: officially, Beijing fights for lowering the global number of nuclear weapons to zero, but China repeatedly proliferates technology and materiel.108

105 106

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit. Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit. 107 Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle, op cit., p. 3. 108 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.

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Clearly Beijing wants to counter the U.S. position, no matter how many contradictions that creates. Another impetus for Chinas balancing of U.S. influence in the Middle East is to redirect some of the tension between Beijing and Washington to an arena further from Chinas sovereign territory. China and the United States have continually clashed over land in Asia, with the United States fighting on behalf of those smaller states against China. For example, China has, numerous times, invaded territory around its border regions and nearby islands, such as Vietnam, Tibet (as already discussed), andthrough the proxy of North KoreaSouth Korea.109 However, the most important of these is, of course, Taiwan. Taiwan, home of the democratic Republic of China, claims independence, but the PRC contends it is Chinese territory. Many scholars, including Richard D. Fisher, believe that China will, within the next century, launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan to reclaim it.110 Based on the Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and the United States, that would spark a conflict between the United States and China. The United States recent implementation of multiple Ballistic Missile Defense systems in rings throughout Asia (areas protecting Japan, South Korea, India, and potentially Taiwan) increase Beijings fears that the United States is attempting to isolate China similar to its treatment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.111 Further, China feels that such physical protection of Taiwan would allow Taiwan to more emphatically fight for independence. Despite Chinas rapid and extensive military modernization, the United States remains significantly more powerful. Thus, Beijing would be determined to divert U.S. attention, particularly attention to tensions with China, to regions further from Chinas territory. A prime candidate for that diversion is the Middle East. The Middle East would be a convenient space for a proxy confrontation between China and the United States, because it is important enough that both sides care deeply about it, but far enough from
109 110

China at War, ed. Xiaobing Li, op cit., various sections. Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 124. 111 Richard Weitz, China Steps Up Rhetoric Against US Missile Defense, The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, vol. 12, no. 20 (October 2012), p. 12.

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each sides own territory that each would react militarily there. However, any true military confrontation between China and the United States is unlikely. Not only for the reason of military disparity, but also because both China and the potential battleground the Middle Eastunderstand the importance of United States cooperation to increasing economic power, regardless of current problems. The most likely reasoning behind Chinas constant balancing of the United States, particularly in a region as vital as the Middle East, is merely to demonstrate Chinas growing power. Chinese foreign policy implies that Beijing has no designs in becoming embroiled in a confrontation with the militarily superior United States in the near future, but believes that one of the hallmarks of a superpower is to demonstrate its power and exert influence on weaker states. After an immensely successful economic rise to power, over the past decade China has realized that it must further modernize in other ways particularly militarily and has adjusted its foreign policy to reflect that change. Naturally, especially considering Chinas huge energy consumption needs, the first place Beijing would look to exert influence would be the Middle East. As in the Asia Pacific region, pursuing hegemony there would necessitate a run-in with the United States; China is simply attempting to play the role of superpower in the hopes of eventually reaching that status. CONCLUSION Chinese arms sales to the Middle East, whether conventional or nuclear, present a threatthough not a huge oneto the United States. As China continues to grow in physical power and influence, especially as it continues to modernize the PLA, it will naturally turn its eye to perhaps the most vital, and certainly most unstable, region in the world today. The Middle East matters to China as the historic link between the East and West, and today as an oil source and canvas for Beijings political and military influence. Though China has increased its arms sales (the majority of which are to the Middle East), it is still a small enough player on the global arms field that the United States need not worry overmuch. In fact, the United States is selling significantly more weapons to many of the same states; the only truly problematic state with which China has a flourishing

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arms transfer relationship is Iran, which China has helped develop a nuclear program as well as other infrastructure and economic needs.112 Despite legitimate fears throughout the international community that China is not dedicated to global limitations on arms deals, the PRC has been making large strides toward becoming more involved diplomatically and economically. This particularly applies to the Middle East, on whose oil and strategic location China so relies. On November first, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released its version of a plan to end the conflict in Syria.113 Much like Kofi Annans plan earlier this year, it allows a significant amount of the Assad regime to remain in power, though it calls for a transitional authority and immediate humanitarian aid to those affected by the conflict.114 Importantly, it bars any international military action. Chinaand Russiahas blocked any attempts by the international community to intervene in the Syrian conflict; though they claim to desire an end to the violence, they still support the legitimacy of Assads government.115 Neither wants to lose another fellow nondemocratic regime to Western ideals. Nonetheless, though Beijings approach to the Syria problem is vastly different from that of the United States, the fact that both powers are fighting more loudly for an end to the conflict could present a starting point for closer relations. The United States should also take care to note that Chinese ideals of exceptionalism are largely based on U.S. examplesdespite ideological differences, China desires the same superpower status achieved by the United States.116 Therefore perhaps one of the most effective ways to shape Chinese actions to U.S. will, or at least to engage Beijing to attempt the same, in the arena of foreign policy is not to shirk its duty (whether real or perceived) to the international community, as it arguably has in Syria, but rather to be involved.

112 113

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., various pages. Neil Mc Farquhar, China Presents a Four-Point Proposal for Resolving the Civil War in Syria, New York Times (1 November 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=1&> (accessed 10 November 2012). 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Nina Hachigian, Winny Chen, and Christopher Beddor, Chinas New Engagement in the International System, op cit., p. 52.

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Chinas selling arms to the Middle East, much like the majority of Chinas other military or political posturing against the United States, is merely to demonstrate its growing power and begin to build a foundation of influence. U.S. policymakers should not fear an imminent conflict with the PRC, nor that PRC sales to the Middle East will block the United States from gaining access to oil and trade with the region. Nonetheless, the U.S. should not become complacent: competition is heating up in the region and a 21st Century renewal of the great game could be afoot.

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WORKS CITED PERIODICALS Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East. Middle East Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 2, (Spring 2005): pp. 11-19. Richard Weitz, China Steps Up Rhetoric Against US Missile Defense, The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, vol. 12, no. 20 (October 2012): pp. 11-14. Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, Middle East Journal, vol. 61, no. 2 (Spring 2007): pp. 199-218. Ziad Haider, Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiangs Uighurs, Asian Survey, vol. 45, no. 4 (July-August 2005): pp. 522-545. NEWS ARTICLES Damien Ma, Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil: Now its Chinas Problem, Too, The Atlantic (19 July 2012) <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/dependence-on-middleeastern-oil-now-its-chinas-problem-too/259947/ > (accessed 5 November 2012). Farhan Bokhari and Katherine Hille, Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base, Financial Times (22 May 2011) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3914bd36-8467-11e0afcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Banp5kBP> (accessed 7 November 2012). James Hardy and Christopher F. Foss, China Denies Selling Arms to Ghaddafi Regime, Janes Defence Weekly (6 September 2011) <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+ ++1188032> (accessed 30 September 2012). Jon Grevatt, China to tighten arms export controls in wake of Libyan controversy, Janes Defence Industry 2011 (7 September 2011) <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+ ++1151453> (accessed 30 September 2012). John Irish, China says Iran nuclear talks at "crucial stage" Reuters (27 September 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-un-assembly-iran-usaidUSBRE88Q1U820120928> (accessed 5 November 2012). Matthew Bell, Arms sales at root of Russian/Chinese 'ruse' to veto UN resolution against Syria, says Washington, Janes Defence Weekly (6 October 2011) <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+ ++1188357> (accessed 30 September 2012). Najmah Bozorgmerh and Geoff Dyer, China Overtakes EU as Irans Top Trade Partner, Financial Times (8 February 2010) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f220dfac14d4-11df-8f1d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2BlMvq625> (accessed 9 November 2012).

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Neil Mc Farquhar, China Presents a Four-Point Proposal for Resolving the Civil War in Syria, New York Times (1 November 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=1&> (accessed 10 November 2012). Rise in international arms transfers is driven by Asian demand, says SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (19 March 2012) <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/rise-in-international-arms-transfers-is-drivenby-asian-demand-says-sipri> (accessed 5 November 2012). Steven Sotloff, Chinas Libya Problem, The Diplomat (14 March 2012) <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china%E2%80%99s-libya-problem/> (accessed 5 November 2012). The Harsh Reality of Chinas Uighur Muslim Divide, Al-Jazeera (12 October 2012) <http://m.aljazeera.com/se/201210493210185606 > (accessed 5 November 2012). BOOKS Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008). Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, (London: Praeger Security International, 2008). Xiaobing Li, China at War, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012). GOVT PUBS Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, (report prepared for members of Congress by the Congressional Research Service; Washington, DC: US GPO, August 2012). Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012, (report prepared for Congress by the Office of the Secretary for Defense; Washington, DC: US GPO, May 2012). 2011 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, (annual report prepared by the Department of State; Washington, DC: US GPO, August 2011). FACT SHEETS China Resource Center, (fact sheet; Washington, DC: Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2012). <http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china> (accessed 5 November 2012). Kelsey Davenport and Lauren Weiss, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria. Arms Control Association, (updated July 2012), < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile> (accessed 9 November 2012).

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Big Guns: The Worlds Biggest Arms Exporters (Daily chart; The Economist online, 20 May 2012) <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/03/daily-chart13?fsrc=gn_ep> (accessed 5 November 2012). Kyra Stoddart, Shocking Facts About Whos Arming Human Rights Abusers [INFOGRAPHIC], (Infographic; New York, NY: Amnesty International Human Rights Now Blog, 12 April 2012). <http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/shocking-facts-about-whosarming-human-rights-abusers-infographic/> (accessed 5 November 2012). Uyghur, (Map; Verbix, 7 July 2009, <http://wiki.verbix.com/Languages/Uyghur> ) (accessed 10 November 2012). INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IAEA, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, (international convention; Vienna: IAEA, 1979), (accessed 5 November 2012). Rohan Perera, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, April 2005 (report on international convention; New York, NY: United Nations, 2008) <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/icsant/icsant.html> (accessed 5 November 2012).

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