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a
Nuclear
North
Korea
Theresa
Lou
GOVT
451
Professor
Karber
December
7,
2012
Lou 1
Introduction
The
Democratic
Peoples
Republic
of
Korea
(DPRK
or
North
Korea)
has
been
the
center
of
many
foreign
policy
debates.
The
regimes
nuclear
weapons
program
has
long
been
a
threat
to
regional
stability
and
international
security.
After
the
death
of
Kim
Jong-il,
North
Korean
society
is
further
shrouded
in
mystery
as
the
world
wonders
which
direction
the
young
leader,
Kim
Jong-un,
will
take
North
Korea.
Tensions
have
escalated
when
the
DPRK
claimed
to
have
missiles
that
can
reach
the
American
mainland,1
early
October
2012.
Though
Mr.
Kim
has
demonstrated
his
intentions
of
a
new
leadership
style2,
the
world
has
no
reason
to
believe
that
the
security
threat
North
Korea
poses
will
subside
any
time
soon.
This
paper
therefore
aims
to
analyze
how
various
levels
of
DPRK
nuclear
capabilities
might
affect
international
relations
in
northeast
Asia.
After
first
reconstructing
the
history
of
North
Koreas
nuclear
program
and
analyzing
the
current
U.S.
extended
deterrence
strategy
in
the
region,
this
paper
will
answer
the
following
questions.
What
are
some
of
the
real
world
nuclear
effects
of
an
attack
of
the
different
magnitudes
described?
What
are
the
political
effects
of
the
attacks?
Is
there
the
possibility
of
preemption,
inception,
or
mitigation?
What
are
some
scenarios
in
which
such
capabilities
could
become
a
useful
coercive
mechanism?
Finally,
given
these
premises,
what
are
some
political
consequences
of
North
Korea
acquiring
such
nuclear
capabilities?
To
conclude,
this
paper
assesses
the
U.S.
nuclear
deterrence
strategy
and
how
Washington
could
proceed
in
the
three
different
scenarios
provided.
1
Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Says Its Missiles Can Reach U.S. Mainland, New York Times, (9 October 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/world/asia/north-korea-says-its-missiles-can- reach-us-mainland.html> [accessed 4 November 2012]. 2 Kim Jong-Un has allowed more women to dress in Western clothing and also publically admitted to failure when the rocket launch in April 2012 went awry. Both actions greatly deviate from traditional North Korean leadership. Kim Jong-un, New York Times, (15 October, 2012), <http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/k/kim_jongun/index.html> [accessed 4 November 2012].
Lou 2
William E. Berry, Jr., The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: A Comparison of the Negotiating Strategies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations, in Perspectives on U.S. Policy Towards North Korea: Stalemate or Checkmate?, edited by Sharon Richardson, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 1-22. 4 Ibid., pp. 3. 5 David E. Sanger, U.N. Agency Finds No Assurance on North Korean Atomic Program, New York Times, (3 December 1993), <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/03/world/un-agency-finds-no- assurance-on-north-korean-atomic-program.html>, [accessed 5 November 2012]. 6 Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, International Atomic Energy Agency, (2 November 1994), <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf>, [accessed 5 November 2012].
Lou 3
and
normalized
economic
and
diplomatic
relations.
The
ambiguous
language
and
controversial
nature
of
the
document,
however,
led
to
serious
problems
in
implementation
as
became
evident
when
the
DPRK
fired
the
Taepodong-1,
a
three-stage
intermediate-range
ballistic
missile
(IRBM)
over
Japan
in
1998,
suggesting
that
North
Korea
had
significantly
increased
the
range
of
its
missiles.7
Tensions
escalated
when
Pyongyang
formally
withdrew
from
the
NPT
in
2003.
Series
of
Six-Party
talks
yielded
little
result,
and
the
North
conducted
two
rounds
of
missiles
tests
in
July
of
2006.
The
DPRK
fired
at
least
seven
separate
missiles
over
the
Sea
of
Japan
including
two
new
Taepodong-2
missiles
designed
for
long
range
but
exploded
42
seconds
after
it
was
launched.
The
North
claimed
to
have
conducted
a
nuclear
test
in
October
later
that
same
year.
Despite
Pyongyangs
claims
that
the
blast
had
an
explosive
force
of
around
four
kilotons,
most
estimate
the
explosive
force
to
have
been
less
than
one
kiloton.
The
UNSC
adopted
multiple
resolutions8
condemning
the
DPRKs
actions
and
calling
for
it
to
return
to
Six-Party
talks,
which
resumed
on
October
31,
2006.
Despite
a
tentative
agreement
to
provide
North
Korea
with
roughly
$400
million
in
fuel
oil
and
aid9
in
2007,
Pyongyang
defied
the
international
community
yet
again
and
conducted
both
nuclear
and
missiles
tests
in
2009.
Most
recently,
the
compromise
between
the
United
States
and
the
DPRK
struck
in
Februarywhereby
North
Korea
agreed
in
principle
to
give
up
nuclear
and
long-range
missile
tests
in
exchange
for
food
aidfell
apart
as
the
North
launched
a
probably
long-range
rocket
test
on
April
13,
2012.10
Though
this
abridged
version
of
the
history
of
North
Koreas
nuclear
program
only
highlights
the
major
events
that
occurred
throughout
the
years,
it
7
Sheryl WyDunn, North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory, New York Times, (1 September 1998), <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/01/world/north-korea-fires-missile-over-japanese- territory.html>, [accessed 5 November 2012]. 8 UNSCR 1695 and 1718. 9 Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger, In Shift, Accord on North Korea Seems to Be Set, New York Times, (13 February 2007), <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/world/asia/13korea.html?_r=0>, [accessed 5 November]. 10 U.S.-North Korea compromise ends with failed missile test, Council on Foreign Relations Global Governance Monitor, <http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/global-governance- monitor/p18985?breadcrumb=%2FthinKtank%2Fiigg%2Fpublications#/Nuclear%20Proliferation/Time line/>, [accessed 5 November 2012].
Lou 4
hopefully provides the reader with the understanding that the issue at hand is a complicated one. The two steps forward, three steps back nature of the situation has frustrated scholars and politicians alike, and there is no simple solution to the problem.
Richard C. Bush, The U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views, and Implications, Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/2/arms%20control%20bush/02_ar ms_control_bush>, [accessed 27 November 2012]. 12 Ibid., 2.
Lou 5
an Alliance deterrent has been constituted, with multiple Allies involved in consulting on policy, maintaining the posture, and preparing for possible operations.13 Secondly, the weapons provided credibility for U.S. commitments to responding in the event of a crisis. Last but not least, the arrangement divided the responsibility of financial costs and political risks amongst the Allies instead of Washington bearing the burden alone. Turning then to the current deterrence strategy in East Asia, it aims to protect and reassure regional allies, provide regional security management, and limit the chances of an arms race. However, there are two key differences between the security environments in Europe and East Asia that may make U.S. allies in East Asia question the U.S. security umbrella. Firstly, the U.S. nuclear deterrent in Europe is embedded in the American commitment to the NATO alliance,14 whereas no parallel multilateral alliance structure exists in Asia. Secondly, the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe is underpinned in part by the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of NATO allies,15 a relationship Washington has never had with its Asian allies. The United States also withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and removed nuclear weapons from its submarines and surface ships during the George H. W. Bush administration. Since then, the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for the region has therefore been provided by U.S. strategic nuclear forces.16 Despite these key differences, the Cold War experience provides valuable lessons for ways to think about the extended deterrence strategy in East Asia. Americas fundamental problem in confronting the Soviet Union was that
13
David S. Yost, U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO and North-East Asia, Foundation pour la Recherche Stratgique, (March 2010), pp. 16. 14 Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael OHanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges, Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear%20deterrence/06_nucle ar_deterrence>, [accessed 6 November 2012]. 15 Ibid., pp. 29. 16 Ibid., pp. 30.
Lou 6
Washington could deter only certain behavior.17 Figure 118 provides a chart indicating that despite the success of U.S. nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, the Soviet Union nonetheless retained considerable scope for destabilizing and even threatening conduct.19 Washington could only credibly threaten nuclear war in circumstances when its vital interests, such as the survival of U.S. allies, were at stake. Such was the case during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israels existence was threatened.
Figure
1
South
Korea
South
Korea
doubts
whether
it
can
absolutely
trust
the
United
States
to
supplement,
where
necessary,
its
own
efforts
to
ensure
security.20
This
fear
of
17
Paul J. Saunders, Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia: A U.S.-Japan-South Korea Dialogue, Center for the National Interest, <http://www.cftni.org/2012-Extended-Deterence-In-East- Asia.pdf>, [accessed 28 November 2012]. 18 Ibid., pp. 3. 19 Ibid., pp. 3. 20 Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael OHanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges, Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear%20deterrence/06_nucle ar_deterrence>, [accessed 6 November 2012].
Lou 7
abandonment
and
its
perceived
relative
weakness
to
its
larger
neighboring
countries
has
resulted
in
a
strong
need
for
American
reassurance.
Seouls
fears
of
being
marginalized
by
bilateral
discussions
between
Pyongyang
and
Washington
were
ameliorated
by
the
Obama
administrations
responses
to
DPRK
provocations,
but
it
nonetheless
worries
about
U.S.
commitment
to
a
denuclearizing
the
North.
It
worries
that
Washington
may
be
willing
to
tolerate
[North
Koreas]
retention
of
nuclear
weapons
and
try
to
manage
the
proliferation
problem.21
Thus,
what
Seoul
seeks
is
for
the
United
States
to
unequivocally
state
that
it
will
not
accept
a
North
Korea
with
nuclear
weapons
capability.
Japan
Though
Tokyo
has
at
multiple
points
considered
beginning
its
own
nuclear
program,
it
never
took
action,
as
did
some
of
its
other
neighbors.
Japan
has
a
substantial
amount
of
plutonium,
but
it
is
unlikely
to
build
a
nuclear
weapon.
The
nuclear
bombing
of
Hiroshima
and
Nagasaki
left
much
of
the
Japanese
population
opposed
to
nuclearization.
Though
the
mainstream
view
has
been
continued
reliance
on
the
U.S.
nuclear
deterrent
as
an
indispensable
component
of
Japanese
defense
policy,22
Tokyo
nonetheless
supplements
with
dependence
on
the
U.S.
deterrent23
through
multiple
strategies:
increased
cooperation
with
Washington
to
reduce
incentives
for
ignoring
Japans
interests;
periodically
suggest
it
might
consider
the
nuclear
option
to
solicit
U.S.
reaffirmation
of
its
commitment;
and
build
up
its
own
land
and
sea
based
missile
defenses.24
21 22
Ibid., pp. 32. James L. Schoff, Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence, Project Report by: the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, (March 2009), <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>, [accessed 6 November 2012]. 23 Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael OHanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges, Foreign Policy at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear%20deterrence/06_nucle ar_deterrence>, [accessed 6 November 2012]. 24 Ibid., pp. 35.
Lou 8
Figure
2
Figure
226
provides
a
reference
for
the
range
of
these
missiles.
As
was
laid
out
in
the
introduction,
each
scenario
would
include
an
analysis
of
the
political
consequences
of
North
Korea
acquiring
each
of
the
mentioned
nuclear
capabilities.
Some
of
the
questions
this
paper
will
ask
include:
1. What
are
some
of
the
real
world
nuclear
effects
of
an
attack
of
the
different
magnitudes
described?
2. What
are
the
political
effects
of
the
attacks?
25
Bruce W. Bennett, Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2010). 26 MRBMs and IRBMs, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/part04.htm>, [accessed 6 November 2012].
Lou 9
3. Is
there
the
possibility
of
preemption,
inception,
or
mitigation?
4. What
are
some
scenarios
in
which
such
capabilities
could
become
a
useful
coercive
mechanism?
Before
analyzing
the
implications
of
a
North
Korea
with
the
aforementioned
capabilities,
it
is
necessary
for
the
author
to
recognize
that
the
scenarios
are
not
entirely
realistic.
Firstly,
the
yield
for
North
Koreas
nuclear
tests
in
2006
and
2009
are
both
disputed,
as
the
DPRK
government
never
announced
the
exact
yield.
The
Comprehensive
Test
Ban
Treaty
Organization
Preparatory
Commission
assessed
that
the
2009
nuclear
test
yield
was
only
slightly
larger
than
the
2006
test,
which
was
less
than
one
kiloton.
The
scenarios
provided
in
this
paper
where
North
Korea
possess
a
nuclear
weapon
with
a
10
Kt
yield,
therefore,
is
an
intended
exaggeration,
as
is
true
regarding
the
range
of
Taepodong-2.
The
Federation
of
American
Scientists
does
not
believe
North
Korea
currently
possesses
a
functional
version
of
a
Taepodong-2
ICBM.27
For
the
sake
of
argument
and
to
make
analysis
interesting,
however,
this
paper
will
proceed
to
analyze
the
implications
of
a
nuclear
North
Korea
under
these
doomsday
scenarios.
Furthermore,
it
is
difficult
to
predict
the
damages
of
a
North
Korean
nuclear
attack.
Factors
that
might
affect
the
damage
include:
the
height
above
ground
at
which
[the
weapon]
is
detonated,
the
atmospheric
conditions,
the
terrain,
buildings,
and
other
shielding
near
the
explosion,
the
physical
characteristics
of
the
people,
and
the
medical
care
and
other
emergency
response
available.28
The
following
sections
therefore
aim
to
provide
approximate
information
on
the
consequences
of
a
nuclear
attack
with
existing
research.
27
Missiles, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/index.html>, [7 November 2012]. 28 Bruce W. Bennett, Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2010).
Lou 10
Section
5.0
Effects
of
Nuclear
Explosions,
Nuclear
Weapons
Archive,
(15
May
1997),
<http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq5.html#nfaq5.1>,
[accessed
19
November
2012].
30
Nuclear
Bombs,
Solcom
House,
(2011),
<http://www.solcomhouse.com/nuclearholocaust.htm>,
[accessed
19
November
2012].
31
Section
5.0
Effects
of
Nuclear
Explosions,
Nuclear
Weapons
Archive,
(15
May
1997),
<http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq5.html#nfaq5.1>,
[accessed
19
November
2012].
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
35
Ibid.
Ibid. 36 Nuclear Detonation: Weapons, Improvised Nuclear Devices, Radiation Emergency Medical Management, (28 December 2011), <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm#size>, [accessed 19 November 2012].
Lou 11
37
About Us, Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/about/about.html>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 38 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 39 Ronald ORourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, (19 April 2011). 40 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing, Missile Defense Agency, <http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis_tests.pdf>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 41 5 at Yokosuka, Japan, 6 at Pearl Harbor, HI, and five at San Diego, CA. Ronald ORourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, (19 April 2011).
Lou 12
the
Atlantic
Fleet.42
The
Japanese
Maritime
Self
Defense
Forces
has
two
classes
of
Aegis
configured
destroyers
and
the
South
Korean
government
has
plans
to
build
Aegis-equipped
ships.43
Ground-based
Midcourse
Defense
(GMD)
The
GMD
is
the
United
States
system
for
engaging
and
destroying
limited
intermediate-
and
long-range
ballistic
missile
threats
in
space.
It
is
composed
of
Ground-Based
Interceptors
and
Ground
Systems
components.
A
total
of
31
GBI
silos
have
been
deployed
to
Fort
Greely,
Alaska
and
Vandenberg
Air
Force
Base
(VAFB),
California
as
of
2010.
VAFB
has
5
launch
facilities,
3
of
which
are
dedicated
for
operational
use,
1
intended
for
either
test
for
operations,
and
the
last
1
dedicated
for
testing.
All
26
silos
at
Fort
Greely
are
designated
for
operational
use.44
Terminal
High
Altitude
Area
Defense
(THAAD)
The
THAAD
element
provides
the
BMDS
with
a
globally
transportable,
rapidly
deployable
capability
to
intercept
and
destroy
ballistic
missiles
inside
or
outside
the
atmosphere
during
their
terminal
phase
of
flight.45
It
carries
no
warhead
and
instead
relies
on
kinetic
energy
of
the
impact
to
destroy
incoming
ballistic
missiles.
The
THAAD
program
has
completed
11
successful
tests,
including
9
intercepts
and
three
operationally-realistic
tests
since
200946,
but
a
THAAD
Battery
nonetheless
has
a
limited
capability
against
ICBMs.
42
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 43 Ronald ORourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, (19 April 2011). <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33745_20110419.pdf>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 44 Report to Congress on Assessment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, Department of Defense, (May 2010), <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/homeland_defense/missile_defense_agency/10_F_1399Report_toCo ngress_onAssessment_of_the_GBMD_Element_of_the_BMDS.pdf>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 45 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/thaad.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 46 Ibid.
Lou 13
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) The PAC-3 is a surface-to-air missile that is operational and fielded by the U.S. Army. It provides simultaneous air and missile defense capabilities and works with THAAD to provide an integrated, overlapping defense against missile threats in the terminal phase of flight.47 Since 1981, Patriot systems have been sold to various nations including Taiwan and Japan. After North Korea test- launched ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan in 2006 and proceeded with under ground nuclear testing, South Korea also purchased second-hand PAC-2 missiles from Germany.48
Scenario
Analyses
Given
the
general
effects
of
a
nuclear
explosion
as
well
as
the
most
prominent
types
of
anti-ballistic
missile
systems
currently
deployed,
this
paper
will
now
focus
on
the
three
various
forms
of
North
Korean
nuclear
capability
and
assess
the
implications.
10
Rodong-1
MRBMs
with
a
10
Kt
warhead
According
to
the
National
Air
and
Space
Intelligence
Center,
North
Korea
possesses
fewer
than
fifty
Rodong-1
MRBMs.
With
a
range
of
approximately
800
miles,49
the
Rodong-1
can
hit
almost
any
part
of
South
Korea
with
near
certainty
and
potentially
threaten
parts
of
Japan.
According
to
RAND,
a
10
Kt
nuclear
weapon
could
have
a
lethal
radius
of
about
1,100
meters
and
a
seriously
casualty
radius
of
almost
1,500
meters
if
ground
burst.50
Figure
351
illustrates
47
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Military Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.mda.mil/system/pac_3.html>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 48 Lee Tae-hoon, PAC-2 missiles to go for upgrade, The Korea Times, (28 October 2012), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/10/281_123339.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 49 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, (March 2006), <http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NASIC2006.pdf>, [accessed 7 November 2012]. 50 Bruce W. Bennett, Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2010). 51 Courtesy of NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein. NUKEMAP is a new tool that lets anyone experiment with the effects of some of historys famous nuclear explosions on cities around the world. <http://www.nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/>, [accessed 7 November 2012].
Lou 14
the qualitative effects of a 10Kt nuclear bomb on Seoul, and Figure 4 is a color legend indicating the effects radii of the blast of said bomb.
Figure
3
Figure 4
Lou 15
If a 10 Kt nuclear weapon be reliably delivered and ground burst in Seoul, there could be 125,000 to more than 200,000 fatalities and 290,000 to more than 400,000 fatalities and casualties combined.52 Casualties would increase in the direction that the winds would blow the fallout.53 If targeted at ground forces, a nuclear weapon with such a yield could case 19-percent casualties to a ground force division, which is not significant given that South Korea would have thirty ground forces prepared to advance into the DPRK. Should these nuclear weapons be launched at airfields, however, they would cause about 70-percent casualties to a single airfield.54 Given that South Korea is the third largest economy in Asia and the 13th in the world,55 a nuclear weapon exploding in Seoul would also have serious consequences for the world economy. RAND predicts that a 10 Kt nuclear attack on Seoul would be at least $1.5 trillion. A North Korean nuclear attack on any part of South Korea would receive global condemnation and invite U.S. retaliation, as is laid out in Washingtons existing security umbrella. Not only would this be consistent with U.S. nuclear deterrence policy since the days of the Cold War, U.S. military action against Pyongyang post-nuclear attack would also be necessary to ensure that U.S. security guarantees to its allies are perceived as credible. If Washington did not uphold its end of the bargain, U.S. allies around the world would likely ignore Americas security umbrella and start developing individual nuclear programs to protect themselves. In a South Korean poll conducted shortly after the North Korean nuclear test in 2006, 65-percent of the people wanted their country to 52 Bruce W. Bennett, Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand
2010). The RAND report cited provides a detailed analysis of the approximate counts of casualties and potential numbers of those who could seek medical attention for apparent serious injuries, lesser injuries, and those who would be afraid that they had been injured without actually having been physically injured. 53 The RAND report also analyzes the various effects of a nuclear attack given factors such as height of detonation, fallout patternsetc. The information provided in the report is extremely technical and is outside of the scope of this particular paper, but it is nonetheless very interesting. <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2010/RAND_DB589.pdf> 54 Ibid., ix. 55 South Korea profile, BBC News Asia-Pacific, (10 October 2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15289563>, [accessed 11 November 2012].
Lou 16
have a nuclear weapon.56 East Asia could spiral into a regional arms race if U.S. allies perceived that Americas nuclear deterrence could no longer be trusted. Given these improved nuclear technologies in the DPRK, China would become an even more important actor. The Peoples Republic has traditionally been Pyongyangs supportive ally, but its leverage over North Korea seems to have slowly waned. A North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea, therefore, would be a complete slap in the face for Beijing, who has long advocated for diplomatic resolutions to the North Korean problem. Chances for South Korea to intercept a North Korean MRBM are, as of now, uncertain. Though Seoul possesses PAC-2 missiles, they have been evaluated as unable to counter North Korean missile threats.57 Its interception rate is currently below 40-percent, well below the 70-percent interception rate the South Korean military desires. To accomplish that, Seoul must upgrade to the PAC-3 system. Military officials forecast that the PAC-3 system or an upgraded version of the PAC-2 will be introduced as early as in 2014.58 In the mean time, Washington and Seoul reached an agreement in October of 2012 that allows South Korea more flexibility with its ballistic missiles. Under the revised agreements, South Korea can increase the payload and range of South Korean ballistic missiles as well as develop and deploy more powerful drones that carry more reconnaissance equipment and weapons.59 Seouls ballistic missile range has now increased from 300 km to 800 km, and it can now load warheads weighing up to two tons on missile with shorter ranges as opposed to the previous limit of 500 kilograms regardless of range.60 Given this agreement, it is
56
Shin Chang-un, In poll, 78% say engagement policy should change, Korea JoongAng Daily, (11 October 2006), <http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2825906>, [accessed 13 November 2012]. 57 Lee Tae-hoon, PAC-2 missiles to go for upgrade, The Korea Times, (28 October 2012), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/10/281_123339.html>, [accessed 19 November 2012]. 58 Ibid. 59 Choe Sang-Hun, U.S. Agrees to Let South Korea Extend Range of Ballistic Missiles, The New York Times, (7 October 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/us-agrees-to-let-south- korea-extend-missile-range.html?_r=0>, [accessed 20 November 2012]. 60 Ibid.
Lou 17
likely
that
North
Korea
would
be
deterred
from
any
excessively
provocative
acts,
such
as
a
nuclear
attack,
against
South
Korea.
Pyongyang
has
historically
used
its
nuclear
weapons
for
deterrence
and
coercion
in
peacetime.
The
DPRKs
immediate
neighborsSouth
Korea,
Japan,
China,
and
even
Russiaare
all
very
cautious
about
using
military
force
against
North
Korea
for
fear
of
the
ramifications
escalations
could
cause.
One
can
realistically
envision
a
nuclear
North
Korea
that
attempts
to
threaten
South
Korea
into
inaction
or
even
submission.
Whether
these
scare
tactics
would
yield
much
success,
however,
is
a
different
question.
The
political
consequences
of
North
Korea
acquiring
the
nuclear
capabilities
outlined
in
this
section
are
not
too
detrimental.
Pyongyang
has
already
demonstrated
that
it
possesses
MRBMs
with
the
range
indicated.
Its
regional
neighbors
would
be
not
be
pleased
if
the
DPRK
acquires
a
nuclear
warhead
with
a
10Kt
yield.
South
Korea
would
most
likely
still
rely
on
Washingtons
security
umbrella
instead
of
attempting
to
proliferate,
but
it
may
still
be
concerned
with
the
ramifications
of
a
North
Korean
nuclear
attack.
For
the
South
Korean
government,
a
nuclear
weapon
launched
at
any
of
its
territory
would
be
unacceptable,
regardless
of
whether
the
United
States
would
retaliate.
Nonetheless,
chances
of
North
Korea
being
reckless
enough
to
nuke
Seoul
for
any
reason
with
this
level
of
nuclear
technology
are
slim.
10
Taepodong-1
IRBMs
with
a
20
Kt
warhead
Taepodong-1
IRBMs
are
liquid-fueled
missiles
intended
to
deliver
a
1,000
to
1,5000
kg
warhead
to
a
range
of
approximately
1,500
to
2,500
km.61
They
are
expensive
for
an
impoverished
country
such
as
the
DPRK
and
are
unlikely
to
be
produced
in
large
quantities.
Thus,
the
Taepodong-1
only
makes
strategic
sense
if
targeted
at
limited
numbers
of
high
leverage
targets.62
Nonetheless,
the
IRBM
61
Steven A. Hildreth, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, (24 February 2009), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21473.pdf>, [accessed 12 November 2012]. 62 North Koreas Taepodong and Unha Missiles, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/Taepodong.html>, [accessed 12 November 2012].
Lou 18
in question could put Japan and Okinawa into range. Figure 5 and 663 provide illustrations for the qualitative effects of a 10Kt nuclear bomb on Tokyo and Okinawa, respectively. The legend is provided with Figure 7. A 20 Kt nuclear weapon launched at Tokyo or another major city would result in high casualties. The numbers would vary depending on the time when North Korea chose to attackcasualty numbers would be higher during the night than during daytime.
Figure
5
A
nuclear
attack
on
U.S.
airbases
in
Okinawa,
however,
poses
a
different
set
of
threats
and
damages.
As
mentioned
previously,
a
nuclear
attack
could
cause
approximately
70-percent
casualties
to
a
single
airfield.64
The
model
bomb
in
Figure
6
is
detonated
over
the
Kadena
Air
Base,
the
largest
U.S.
Air
Force
base
in
the
Pacific.
It
is
the
home
to
the
18th
Wing,
the
5th
Air
Forces
largest
combat
wing,
and
a
variety
of
associate
units.
With
up
to
4,000
Japanese
workers,
the
United
States
Air
Force
estimates
that
Kadena
contributes
$700
63
Courtesy of NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein. <http://www.nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/>, [accessed 7 November 2012]. 64 Ibid., ix.
Lou 19
million to Okinawas economy each year.65 A nuclear attack on Kadena, for example, would not only cause severe damage not only to U.S./Japanese infrastructure and personnel, but would also hinder U.S. ability to efficiently respond to regional provocations with its aerial force.
Figure
6
The political ramifications of a nuclear attack on Japan, especially on Okinawa, would be significant. The United States could perceive this as an attack on U.S. facilities and personnel and retaliate with full force. Given the relatively robust BMDS the United States has in the region, however, interception does not seem to be a problem. Both the current Aegis BMD, of which 5 are deployed to
65
Map: US Military Bases in Okinawa, The International institute for Strategic Studies, <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-voices/map-us-military-bases-in-okinawa/>, [accessed 13 November 2012].
Lou 20
Figure
7
Japan
in
addition
to
those
employed
by
the
Japanese
Royal
Navy,
as
well
as
the
PAC-3
have
had
relatively
high
successful
interception
rates
against
MRBMs
and
IRBMs.
Furthermore,
Japan
could
theoretically
acquire
and
deploy
elements
of
at
least
four
general
types
of
BMD
systems,66
including
lower-tier
systems,
upper-tier
systems,
boot-phase
intercept,
and
national
missile
defense.
Given
such
defense
mechanisms,
North
Korean
IRBMs
are
unlikely
to
penetrate
and
cause
severe
damage
to
Japan.
There
are
nonetheless
two
possible
results
from
the
DPRK
acquiring
such
nuclear
capabilities.
Firstly,
the
United
States
may
diplomatically
engage
Pyongyang
more
actively
in
attempts
to
disarm
it
through
economic
incentives
and
normalized
relationships.
It
would
have
to
involve
other
regional
actors,
such
as
China
and
South
Korea,
to
coax
North
Korea
to
the
negotiation
table.
Or,
Washington
may
consider
a
North
Korea
with
missiles
with
the
range
and
accuracy
to
hit
U.S.
airbases
to
be
a
red
line
that
must
not
be
crossed.
If
this
is
the
case,
Washington
could
respond
much
more
militaristically.
It
may
flex
its
muscle
to
threaten
the
DPRK,
indicating
that
a
nuclear
North
Korea
will
not
be
66
Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swagner, Takashi Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001).
Lou 21
tolerated.
It
may
attempt
to
impose
harsher
sanction
the
DPRK
in
the
UN
Security
Council.
For
Japan
and
South
Korea,
however,
the
fear
would
be
a
scenario
where
the
United
States
focuses
on
containing,
even
appeasing,
a
nuclear
North
Korea
instead
of
actively
attempting
to
disarm
it.
Given
that
DPRK
missiles
can
hit
American
targets,
Tokyo
and
Seoul
may
get
the
impression
that
the
United
States
now
has
considerable
stake
in
the
matter
and
would
not
want
to
risk
American
facilities
or
personnel
by
agitating
Pyongyang.
If
U.S.
allies
get
this
perception,
chances
of
a
regional
arms
race
may
increase.
The
instant
either
Japan
or
South
Korea
feels
insecure
about
Washingtons
nuclear
deterrence
strategy,
one
may
choose
to
proliferate
and
ultimately
destabilize
the
East
Asia
region.
The
likelihood
of
this
occurring,
however,
is
nonetheless
limited.
Washington
understands
the
importance
of
upholding
its
security
agreements
to
its
allies.
It
has
demonstrated
much
political
will
in
the
past,
especially
during
the
Cold
War
against
a
much
stronger
adversary.
Neither
Japan
nor
South
Korea,
therefore,
would
have
much
reason
to
doubt
the
U.S.
security
umbrella
even
if
North
Korean
IRBMs
can
hit
U.S.
airbases.
10
Taepodong-2
ICBMs
with
a
40
Kt
warhead
As
the
successor
to
the
Taeopodong-1,
Taepodong-2
has
potentially
the
longest
range
in
the
North
Korean
missile
arsenal,
but
most
estimates
of
its
performance
are
speculative.
Some
scientists
have
calculated
that
the
Taepodong-2
could
deliver
a
one
ton
payload
to
a
range
of
6,000
kmand,
with
a
500
kg
payload,
would
have
a
range
of
9,000
km.67
Though
the
accuracy
and
range
of
the
missile
with
a
40Kt
warhead
is
still
questionable,
this
paper
assumes
that
the
DPRK
has
acquired
the
nuclear
capability
to
detonate
a
nuclear
weapon
in
a
major
U.S.
city,
such
as
Los
Angeles.
This
assumption
is
held
in
place
to
analyze
the
effects
such
nuclear
capabilities
may
have
on
the
East
Asian
region
as
67
North
Koreas
Taepodong
and
Unha
Missiles,
Federation
of
American
Scientists,
<http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/Taepodong.html>,
[accessed
12
November
2012].
Lou 22
well as on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Figure 868 provides a visual aid to understand the scope a nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach.69 The legend is provided in Figure 9.
Figure
8
A nuclear attack on the Port of Long beach would destroy the infrastructure and ships in the port, as well as those situated in the adjoining Port of Los Angeles. More than sixty thousand people will die due to either direct blast effects or radiation poisoning. The radioactive fallout of water and sediment from the port would expose over 150,000 people to hazardous radiation levels, and six million people will try to evacuate the city to avoid
68
Courtesy of NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein. <http://www.nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/>, [accessed 7 November 2012]. 69 This paper chose to analyze the affects of a nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach for a few reasons. Firstly, the destruction of such a major port would have catastrophic consequences for the U.S. economy. Secondly, given that there are over 20,000 shipping containers each day from ports all over the world that are unloaded in the United States, it is difficult to implement comprehensive in- port security programs for all 361 seaports. Lastly, the RAND Corporation had previously researched the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach, meaning that this paper could provide tangible analysis with real world facts.
Lou 23
Figure
9
further
risks
of
contamination.
Given
that
Long
Beach
refines
approximately
a
third
of
gasoline
west
of
the
Rockies
and
there
is
no
pipeline
infrastructure
to
import
supplies
to
the
region,
gasoline
would
be
in
critically
short
supply.70
The
chances
of
interception
in
the
event
of
a
North
Korean
nuclear
attack
exist.
There
are
only
two
systems
currently
that
can
intercept
ICBMs,
one
of
which
is
the
GMD
system
deployed
in
Fort
Greely,
Alaska.
It
provides
Combatant
Commanders
with
continues,
operational
capability
to
protect
U.S.
homeland
against
limited
IRBMs
and
ICBMs.
Nonetheless,
there
are
skeptics
who
are
concerned
with
the
systems
abilities
to
intercept
incoming
ICBMs
and
have
cautioned
Washington
to
maintain
a
robust
anti-ballistic
missile
capability.
North
Korea
could
attempt
to
coerce
the
United
States
by
threatening
to
attack
its
regional
allies,
air
bases,
and
U.S.
homeland,
yet
it
is
difficult
to
see
such
threats
yielding
fruitful
results.
Not
only
would
an
attack
on
U.S.
home
soil
would
almost
inevitably
result
in
a
full
scale
U.S.
military
response,
but
also
such
provocation
might
prompt
Washington
to
take
unilateral
action
to
ensure
that
70
Charles Meade, Roger C. Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2006).
Lou 24
North Korea never acquires such nuclear capabilities. There are several possible calculations. South Korea and Japan may be concerned that the United States would be more willing to concede and focus on containing North Korea as opposed to actively disarming Pyongyang given its ICBM technology. If not properly managed, this perception could easily result in a regional arms race. Thus, Washington may find it more beneficial to take active measures, whether diplomatically or militarily, to ensure that the DPRK does not acquire nuclear capabilities that could threaten U.S. homeland. Regardless of whether Washington preemptively or preventively strikes North Korea to deny it the stated nuclear capabilities, the United States has a vested interest in assuring its regional allies. During the Cold War, the United States demonstrated its resolve to protect its European allies even if it meant being on the receiving end of a nuclear attack. Given such a track record, neither Japan nor South Korea has much reason to doubt that Washington would not uphold its end of the bargain. The United States should nonetheless clearly communicate with its allies and other regional actors, such as China and Russia, to ensure there are no misunderstandings that could lead to an arms race.
Conclusion
The
East
Asian
region
has
been
plagued
by
the
North
Korean
problem
for
decades,
and
chances
of
it
resolving
in
the
immediate
future
are
slim
to
none.
This
paper
therefore
has
analyzed
the
real
life
and
political
consequences
of
various
North
Korean
nuclear
capabilities.
Despite
the
certain
unrealistic
aspects
of
the
scenarios,
it
is
nonetheless
important
to
recognize
that,
if
left
unaddressed,
the
North
Korean
nuclear
problem
would
only
escalate.
The
delicate
balance
between
diplomacy
and
U.S.
military
action
(or
inaction)
would
have
a
grave
impact
on
its
regional
allies
and
their
responses
to
the
problem.
Given
that
Japan
and
South
Korea
could
decide
to
proliferate
if
the
North
Korean
threat
grows
severe,
it
is
in
the
United
States
best
interest
to
assure
its
allies
through
diplomatic
engagements
and
to
maintain
credible
nuclear
deterrence.
Lou 25
After all, the only thing worse than a nuclear North Korea would be to have to manage a nuclear Japan and South Korea as well.
Lou 26
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