Morality, Altruism, and Religion in Economics Perspective *

James A. Montanye Consulting Economist Falls Church, Virginia USA Recent brain imaging studies support sociobiologys earlier claims about morality, altruism, and religion being rooted in evolved brain function. Despite these insights, however, neuroscience and sociobiology, like theology, provide incomplete answers to persistent what and why questions regarding the metaphysical aspects of human behavior. This essay addresses some unsettled issues along these lines by combining a priori economics principles with the standard consilience of natural science and moral philosophy. harles Darwin devoted two chapters in The Descent of Man (1871) to the idea that morality, and by implication other metaphysical aspects of human behavior as well, could be investigated from the side of natural history (p. 68). He argued in particular that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would eventually acquire a moral sense of conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man (p. 69). Conflating evolution and morality in this manner troubled Darwins supporters and critics alike. Thomas Huxley (1896), whose proselytizing for natural selection earned for him the sobriquet Darwins Bulldog, articulated a logical concern: what we call goodness or virtue ... involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence (p. 83). Darwin evidently was similarly conflicted, as seen, for example, in these words drawn from his private correspondence: I fear that Cooperative [labor] Societies ... exclude competition. This seems to me a great evil for the future of mankind ([1872] qdt. in Weikart 1995, 611). Philosophers joined with scientists in criticizing Darwins link between evolution and morality (Ruse 2009). The distinguished utilitarian Henry Sidgwick (1876) read Darwins insights as being sustained by an immense force of scientific presumption, independent of all special evidence (p. 53). Sidgwick found no means by which any argument is gained for or against any particular ethical doctrine. For all the competing and conflicting moral principles that men have anywhere assumed must be equally derivative: and the mere recognition of their derivativeness, apart from any particular theory as to the modus derivandi, cannot supply us with any criterion for distinguishing true moral principles from false (p. 54). Later philosophers argued that the naturalistic fallacy precluded the derivation of moral oughts from the evidence of natural selection. Many philosophers and theologians cleaved instead to the principle of moral realism, which posits the existence of mind-independent evaluative (moral) facts, forged (perhaps by god)

A version of this papers appears in Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 20(2): 1944.

at the time of creation and accessible only through reason; Darwinism, by their lights, merely opened a back door to moral relativism. Modern philosophers, by comparison, go so far as to meld Darwinism and rationality with metaethical concepts, arguing that morality per se is a myth and that all moral judgements are unjustified and probably false, albeit perhaps pragmatically useful in situations where evolution and rationality yield (normatively) imperfect outcomes (Joyce 2001 and 2006). The upshot of these and other disparate endeavors is described (with some exaggeration) by the philosopher Paul Lawrence Farber (1994): Twentieth-century AngloAmerican philosophers have failed to come to any agreement on the foundations of ethics. ... That is, [they cannot] identify natural properties to characterize objects or actions that [are] good. ... [Consequently] they have all but abandoned attempts at the construction of a rational foundation for ethics (pp. 144, 148). Scientific interest in natural selections contribution to morality, god, and religion arose in the 1960s as nascent work in sociobiology (and its modern form, evolutionary psychology) promised testable hypotheses and predictions concerning the evolutionary foundations of metaphysical phenomena. Researchers sought value-free scientific theories that had built into them the criterion of repeatability so that their assumptions, speculations, and hypotheses can be falsified if they are indeed false, and their results can be verified by careful repetition to test their accuracy (Alexander 1987, 128). Decades later, however, biologists and evolutionists continued spinning just-so and often contradictory stories about natural selections contribution to the metaphysical aspects of human nature. Consider, for example, the conflicting interpretations of god and religion offered by two distinguished biologists, Richard Alexander and Richard Dawkins. Alexander (1987): I think that, as with the concept of morality, the concept of God must be viewed as originally generated and maintained for the purposenow seen by many as immoralof furthering the interests of one group of humans at the expense of one or more other groups (p. 207). Dawkins (2006): I am one of an increasing number of biologists who see religion as a by-product of something else. ... religious behavior may be a misfiring, an unfortunate by-product of an underlying psychological propensity which in other circumstances is, or once was useful. On this view, the propensity that was naturally selected in our ancestors was not religion per se; it had some other benefit, and it only incidentally manifests itself as religious behaviour (pp. 172174). Both views associate god and religion with natural selection. However, the consequences that Alexander characterize as instrumental are dismissed by Dawkins as further evidence of Darwins (1859, 201202) claim that evolution rarely produces absolute perfection. Sociobiology presently offers no positive method for judging which of these two interpretations, from among the many competing interpretations on offer, is nearer to being the correct one.

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The science of brain imaging recently took the lead in promising to shed light on the biological foundations of morality, god, and religion. Insular research programs in neuroscience, neurotheology (investigating how the brain processes religious experiences), and neuroeconomics (a symbiosis between neuroscience and experimental economics) compare real-time, scanned images of spiritual and rational thoughts against known classes of brain functions. The National Library of Medicines (2012) PubMed/MEDLINE database alone contains scores of studies along these lines. Other studies are scattered across the Internet and scientific journals. Imaging research, like sociobiology, requires heuristic interpretation to make sense of the underlying science. The neurotheology pioneer Andrew Newberg avers that neuroscience is more of an art than a science, particularly in the way it evaluates complex mental processes. It is filled with assumptions, conjectures, postulates, and rationalizations (Newberg and Waldman 2009, 27). Newbergs own work is no exception. He startles readers at one point by noting that the neurology of transcendence borrows the neural circuitry of sexual response, and so the inherited ability to experience spiritual union is the real source of religions staying power. It anchors religious belief in something deeper and more potent than intellect and reason; it makes God a reality that cant be undone by ideas, and that never goes away (Newberg, DAquillo, and Rause 2001, 139). The only overarching certainty appears to be that all thoughts, including private perceptions of sex, god, and morality, share a common neurobiological substrate. Newberg explains elsewhere that a single structure in the brain can be simultaneously involved in dozens of different functions, some of which specifically relate to the religious ritual and others of which do not. For example, the anterior cingulate cortex, which plays a crucial role in spiritual practices, is involved with learning, memory, focused attention, emotional regulation, motor coordination, heart rate, error detection, reward anticipation, conflict monitoring, moral evaluation, strategy planning, and empathy (Newberg and Waldman 2009, 42). God may exist, Newberg writes, but we could experience Godor anything else for that matteronly through the functioning of our brains (Newberg and Waldman 2006, 7). While the creation of humans by god is a theological matter, the creation of god by human beings is entirely neurological (Newberg 2010, 232). The brain imaging program in neuroeconomics, whose goal is to develop an algorithmic description of the human mechanism for choice (Glimcher and others 2009, 503), shares neurotheologys technical limitations while experiencing unique conceptual difficulties of its own. The neuroeconomist Paul Glimcher explains that [m]any neurobiologists outside the emerging neuroeconomics community argued that the complex models of economics would be of little value for understanding the behavior of real humans and animals. Many economists, particularly hardcore neoclassicists, argued that algorithmic-level studies of decision making were unlikely to improve the predictive power of the [economics conventional] revealed-preference approach (p. -3-

7). Observation and experiment do reveal that the behavior of humans and other animals can be less (or perhaps just differently) rational than theoretical models predict. Neuroeconomics makes the best of this discrepancy: When we find neural circuits that deviate from optimal economic computations in the same way that the behavior of our animals deviates from optimality, this serves as evidence that we may have identified the neural circuitry that underlies a mathematically described, though imperfect, behavior. ... This suggests that neuroeconomic approaches may be, somewhat paradoxically, most useful when animals do not behave in the optimal manner predicted by theory (Glimcher 2002, 334335). Insular neurscientific inquires do not explain metaphysical phenomena with apodictic certainty. As Glimchers apologia suggests, however, comparative imaging studies can be used to identify functional similarities among disparate phenomena that the fragmentation of scholarship causes to be studied as if unrelated; for example, the similarities between morality, god, and religion on one hand, and economic rationality on the other hand. Scant effort so far has been devoted to studying metaphysical phenomena comparatively. The present essay endeavors to stimulate interest along this line. Neoclassical economics has generated a moderately thick literature showing that the demand and supply functions for moral norms and religious institutions are products of rational choice (Gauthier 1986 and 1990; Ekelund and others 1996; Farina, Hahn, and Vannucci 1996; A. Hamlin 1996; Oslington 2003; R. Nelson 2010). The Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises ([1922] 1981) explained the theoretical basis for this work: The economic principle is a general principle of ... all rational action [that is] capable of becoming the subject matter of a science. ... All rational action is economic. All economic activity is rational action. All rational action is in the first place individual action. Only the individual thinks. Only the individual reasons. Only the individual acts (pt. II, I, ch. 5, p. 12). Research provides no compelling evidence suggesting either that moral and religious choices require different analytical assumptions, or that religious organizations are functionally dissimilar from other public institutions (e.g., civic associations, corporations, and governments), which economists readily examine through the lens of microtheory, industrial organization, and public choice (Olson 1993; Ekelund and others 1996; Fukuyama 2011). Studying the nexus between evolutionary development and metaphysics nevertheless remains a tricky business. In the first place, theory and experience show that entrepreneurial creative destruction can prevent moral norms and religious institutions from becoming as efficient as the instrumental (rational) ideals that spawn them (Quigley [1961] 1979, 101103; Leibenstein 1966; Montanye 2006). Second, [t]he systems that generate intuitive moral judgements are often in conflict with the systems that generate principled reasons for our actions, because the landscape of today only dimly resembles our original state (Hauser 2006, 418). -4-

Third, navely rational first-best outcomes can be eclipsed in practice by comprehensive, secondbest choices (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). Finally, the simple rules of natural selection that give rise to complex, emergent phenomena are not necessarily deducible from observations (Gazzaniga 2011, 105-142; Wolfram 2002). Circumspection therefore is warranted when tracking metaphysical phenomena to the natural selection pressures that create them. Economists have devoted substantial effort to studying the public aspects of morality and religion. Unlike evolutionists and neurotheologists, however, mainstream economists have been reluctant to theorize about the ontology of morality, god, and religion. This essay, by comparison, develops a comprehensive understanding of metaphysical phenomena that captures the underlying unity of scientific truth. The endeavor entails a consiliencethat is, a coming together of knowledgethat overcomes [t]he ongoing fragmentation of knowledge and resulting chaos in philosophy [that] are not reflections of the real world but artifacts of scholarship (E.O. Wilson 1998, 8). The goal is an overarching, explanatory theory whose components are testable using the combined methods of economics, sociobiology, and neuroscience. The arguments and conclusions of this essay are essentially consistent with those offered by evolutionists and neuroscientists. This is unsurprising. The biologist E.O. Wilson (1998) notes that economics and biology address a single subject matter, although he chides neoclassical economics methods and models for being insufficiently naturalisticthis despite economics having incorporated many aspects of Darwinian thinking (Nelson and Winter 1982; Laurent and Nightingale, 2001; Laurent 2003). The neuroeconomist Paul Glimcher (2002, 336) takes a more aggressive view, arguing that economics is a biological science in the sense that the capacity for rational thought and entrepreneurial action is a biologically evolved phenomena. Glimchers claim also holds in reverse; that is, evolutionary biology is applied economics in the sense that natural selection tends to allocate scarce resources efficiently in the long run, as the growing economicsand-biology literature attests (Rothchild 1990; Rubin 2002; Beinhocker 2006). The consilience between biology and economics leaves little space for glaring analytical discrepancies to arise. Even so, the overt incorporation of economics principles is seen to generate fresh insights into metaphysical phenomena, while adding depth to conventional biological and evolutionary explanations. This essay argues that morality, god, and religion are emergent phenomena that result from naturally selected behavioral propensities working in tandem with pragmatic, ad hoc economic rationality. Economic scarcitythat is, the insufficiency of available resources to satisfy all possible needs and desiresis the first-cause-uncaused that drives the natural selection process, and consequently underlies all metaphysical thoughts and related actions. Scarcity explains not only the nature of metaphysical phenomena, but also the significance of cooperation,

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reciprocity, and exchange, and the essence of rational behavior that often is mistaken for pure altruism. Beginning with Scarcity Without conflicts of interest, writes Alexander (1987), ... the very concepts of ethical and unethical, moral and immoral, and right and wrong would not exist. ... If ethical and moral problems arise out of conflicts of interest, then, to some extent, humans must be striving for the same things, and things which not everyone can possess, or possess equally, or to a degree that satisfies (pp. 3435). Alexander goes on to explain moral and religious behavior in relation to evolved propensities for survival, reproduction, cooperation, and a class of related actions termed direct and indirect reciprocity (pp. 8188, 139143, 194195). His approach distinguishes clearly between scientific analysis on one hand, and the spirit and values of moral philosophy and theology on the other hand. His assumptions are broadly consistent with those of modern economics, although his discussion touches only lightly on the nature of economic scarcity and its significance for natural selection and evolved behavior. Scarcity is the fundamental challenge of life. It is the sufficient first-cause-uncaused that is logically prior to all self-interested behavior which gives rise to conflicts of interest. Identifying scarcity as a first cause is crucial in this context because modern physics has shrunk the gap traditionally occupied by a designer/creator god. The physicist Steven Hawking argues that science now explains the fine-tuning of physical law without the need for a benevolent creator who made the universe for our benefit (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, 165; Hawking 1988, 9, 173175), a conclusion that also is implied in work by other leading physicists and mathematicians (Penrose 2010; Greene 2011). Attributing first-causes to god, as a few prominent scientists still do, distorts the process of scientific argument by conflating positive science (i.e., We know that something is so) with double-negative science (i.e., We dont know that something isnt so). Efficiency is the rational complement to scarcity, and it is the keystone of modern economic analysis. Colloquially, economic efficiency implies getting the most bang for the buck. Technically, it is a measure of the extent to which scarce resources flow (become allocated) to the production of those things that individuals value most highly (e.g., survival and reproduction). Scarcity implies the need for living organisms to extract the greatest possible value from available resources. Natural selection operates by promoting those organisms that perform most efficiently. Scarcity provides the auxiliary postulate that transforms naturally efficient behavior from an objective is into a moral ought. Economists regard efficiency as being communicatively, strategically, and instrumentally moral (McCloskey 1985 and 1994; R. Nelson 2010). -6-

A simple thought experiment illuminates the relationship between scarcity, efficiency, and natural selection on one hand, and morality on the other. Immanuel Kant ([1782] 1922) assumed that reason was gods gift to humanity. However, if Kant had used reason to inquire into the ontology of reason itself, then he would have been on track to realize that reason owes its existence to scarcity. Kant characterized reason instead as being concerned with nothing but itself, nor can it have any other occupation (p. 680). Mises (1949), by contrast, argued that the primary task of reason is to cope consciously with the limitations imposed upon man by nature (pt. 4, ch. 14:1). Reasons other occupation, therefore, is to fight against scarcity (ibid.). To this end E.O. Wilson (1978) notes that [t]he human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques (p. 2). This appreciation of reasons relationship to scarcity could have led Kant not only to deduce different deontological (moral) imperatives, but also to anticipate the as yet undiscovered principles of natural selection. Scarcity and Competition All life competes for scarce resources. Darwin (1859) characterized this competition as a struggle for existence ... either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life (p. 63). This struggle has contributed to the subsequent extinction of roughly 99 percent of all species that evolved between the beginning of life on Earth and the present time. As Dawkins (1995) notes, however, nature is not cruel, ... simply callousindifferent to all suffering, lacking all purpose (p. 96). In the absence of scarcity, all species could exist blissfully in perpetuity, in which case both natural selection and morality would be empty concepts, as would economics, and perhaps religion and government as well. But scarcity is objectively real, and all living species have evolved means for mitigating its adverse effects. Darwin (1871) observed (perhaps in the writings of David Hume) that as the reasoning powers and foresight of [individuals] became improved, each man would soon learn from experience that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return (p. 157). This notion of rational, mutual aid stands opposite John Lockes ([1690] 1988) theocentric view of cooperation as being that which God hath given to be the Rule betwixt Man and Man, and the common bond whereby humane kind is united into one fellowship and society (II: 172). Modern biologists side with Darwin, terming the intrinsically selfish pattern of cooperation and reciprocity reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1985), and characterizing it as being entirely compatible with the hard-boiled arithmetic of survival in an unremittingly cold-eyed and competitive environment (Nowak and Highfield 2011, xvi). Neuroscience and sociobiology establish that natural selection has fought against scarcity by creating in humans an efficient arrangement of brain structures comprising literally millions of -7-

specialized processing units (Gazzaniga 2011, 44). These structures, along with neurochemical stimuli and conditioning (principally by the neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin, whose effects give rise to sensations of pleasure or anxiety, satisfaction or remorse, etc.) are the means by which natural selection has predisposed humans for cooperation and reciprocal altruism. The zoologist Matt Ridley (1997) describes an evolved module he calls the social-exchange organ. He writes: We dont know for sure where the social-exchange organ is, or how it works, but we can tell that it is there as surely as we can tell anything about our brains (p. 131). The neuroscientist Marc Hauser (2006) identifies a related moral module that is an evolved faculty of the mind that generates universal and conscious judgements concerning justice and harm (p. 63). The neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga (2011) explains that [m]any examples of moral circuits have been identified, and they seem to be distributed all over the brain. We have many innate responses to our social world, including automatic empathy, implicit evaluation of others, and emotional reactions, and all of these inform our moral judgments (p. 177). Innate responses of this sort prime humans for mutually beneficial, cooperative behavior. Natural selection has produced not only a predisposition to cooperate with others, [but also] to punish (even at personal cost if necessary) those who violate the norms of cooperation, even when it is implausible to expect these costs will be recovered at a later date (Ginitis and others 2005, 3; Nisbett and Cohen 1996). Cooperation is seen to flourish when altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out (Fehr and Gchter 2002, abstract). Natural selection has created the propensity for eusocial cooperation in only a few species, including H. sapiens and the order of social insects classified as Hymenoptera. The evolution of cooperation in humans differs fundamentally from that of other eusocial species, however (E.O. Wilson 2012, 52). E.O. Wilson (2012) describes human cooperation as a unique product of the inherited regularity of mental development common to our species. They are the epigenetic rules, which evolved by the interaction of genetic and cultural evolution that occurred over a long period in deep prehistory. These rules are the genetic bases in the way our senses perceive the world, the symbolic coding by which we represent the world, the options we automatically open to ourselves, and the responses we find easiest and most rewarding to make. ... As epi- in the word epigenitic implies, the rules of physiological development are not genetically hardwired. They are not beyond conscious control, like the autonomic behaviors of heartbeat and breathing. ... The behaviors created by epigenetic rules are not hardwired like reflexes. It is the epigenetic rules instead that are hardwired, and hence compose the true core of human nature. These behaviors are learned, but the -8-

process is what psychologists call prepared. In prepared learning, we are innately predisposed to learn and thereby reinforce one option over another (pp. 193194). Biologists often grouse about the term epigenetic becoming a pop-science buzzword. Wilsons use of the term, however, is consistent with scientific discussions about the evolution of human eusociability. Scarcity and Cooperation The evolution of cooperation, reciprocity, and complementary forms of morality and moral aggression is sufficiently remarkable to encourage the false inference that [h]uman society must primarily be considered something pertaining to the spiritual (Vatican 1995, art. 1886). By contrast, the economist and Nobelist James Buchanan (1975) argues that [w]e live together because social organization provides the efficient means for achieving our individual objectives and not because society offers us a means of arriving at some transcendental common bliss (p. 1). Buchanans perspective implies that social institutions develop in order to mitigate scarcitys adverse effects. This occurs because individuals value scarce resources differently, according to their private needs and desires at the moment. The upshot is that individuals live together and cooperate in order to exchange, in an efficient manner, the things they havelike the fruits of their own effort and sacrificefor other goods and serviceslike food, education, and recreationthat yield subjectively greater economic value at the margin. Adam Smith ([1776] 1976) identified this behavior as the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another (bk. 1, ch. 2). This propensity not only mitigates scarcitys adverse effects, but also fosters specialization and divisions of labor that create the productive efficiencies and technical innovations which increase resource availability. Exchange thus begins the cumulative economic and social process that economists call catallaxy and catallactics (Mises 1949, pt. 4). These terms are derived from an ancient Greek word meaning not only to exchange but also to receive into the community and to turn from an enemy into a friend (Hayek 1988, 112). This etymology indicates that exchange, rather than tribal, ideological, and religious ties, is the phenomenon that establishes the far boundary between in-groups and out-groups. Jesus Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:3037) extoled this aspect of Hellenistic morality by contrasting it with prevailing local norms. The sociologists of religion Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000) observe that [m]ost of the worlds religious scriptures abound in the language of exchange (p. 40), which arguably makes scripture the word of a god that fully appreciated the value of cooperation, exchange, and the division of labor.

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Among eusocial species, the exchange process is unique to Homo sapiens (thinking man). This has led glib economists to reclassify the species informally as H. economicus (implying rational man) and H. mercatus (market man). Neanderthals evidently lacked the neural capability for economic exchange despite having physically larger brains than modern humans. Moreover, H. sapiens closest living relation, the chimpanzee, cannot be taught to exchange goods and services despite the marked propensity for reciprocal altruism evidenced by mutual grooming behavior (Ridley 2010, 59, 75). Ridley (2010) notes that there was a point in human prehistory when ... people for the first time began to exchange things voluntarily with each other, and that once they started doing so, culture suddenly became cumulative, and the great headlong experiment of human economic progress began (p. 7). He conjectures that this shift resulted from an evolved change in the brains oxytocin system (p. 97), oxytocin being a neuropeptide that increases trust by moderating anxiety and fear within a mid-brain structure called the amygdala. Trust matters not only for cooperation and exchange, but also for the development of efficient moral norms (Alexander 1987; Niebuhr 1989; Fukuyama 1995; Seligman 1997; Montanye 2009; Putnam and Campbell 2010). Natural selection has not (at least not yet) equipped humans to exchange with blackboard economic efficiency under conditions of risk, uncertainty, and delayed reciprocity (Akerlof and Schiller 2009; Glimcher 2002; Glimcher and others 2009). Exchange also is affected by the way choices are framed (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Moreover, the heightened capacity for trust that makes exchange possible collaterally increases humans vulnerability to a wide range of unethical deceptions and frauds. Entrepreneurial humans exploit natural selections variations and imperfections in order to capture the wealth and productive potential of other individuals. Evolved propensities for cooperation and exchange notwithstanding, [t]he most pervasive hostile force that remains, for any human individual or group, is other members or groups of the human species itself. Apparently no other species has accomplished this peculiar evolutionary feat, which has led to an unprecedented level of group-against-group within-species competition (Alexander 1987, 228). Moral and ethical norms moderate parasitic behavior of this sort. Conversely, political ideology and legislative corruption encourage it by creating perverse economic incentives. All things considered, the ultimate moral good is the minimization of scarcitys adverse effects through the process of mutually-beneficial exchange behavior. Accordingly, the most apt categorical imperative (pace Kant) is this: Always respond to scarcity with voluntary cooperation and exchange, and conversely, do not shift scarcitys adverse effects onto other individuals through force, fraud, and free-riding. The thrust of this imperative underlies the biblical ideal (Genesis 1:17) of responding to scarcitys evil temptations with charitable love and faith in gods benevolence (however stingy), and not through the original sin of knowledge combined with reason. It is evident as well in classical moral philosophy and spontaneous -10-

behavioral norms (Fukuyama 1999; E. Posner 2000), and in both the old common law and modern theories of law-and-economics (R. Posner 1998). The complementary practical imperative is this: Always relate to others as a trustworthy cooperator. Empirical work in game theory demonstrates both the evolutionary and rational significance of this categorical (Axelrod 1984 ). The evolved propensity for cooperation and exchange predisposes humans to associate with naturally charismatic and numenous individuals (Bailey 1988), whose personal qualities mark them as desirable exchange partners. This propensity gives rise to the collateral sense of a perfect cooperating partner that is both trustworthy and unconstrained by scarcitythe sort of counterparty that desperate soldiers in foxholes turn to at times of greatest need. We call this idealized partner God, or more aptly, a personal god. This twist on the familiar ontological argument makes gods nature, like the nature of natural selection, reason, and morality, deducible from the a priori concept of scarcity. Saint Anselms ([1078] 1939) characterization of god (subsequently elaborated by Descartes and ostensibly refuted by Kant) is at least partly correct when describing a being [i.e., counterparty] than which nothing greater can be conceived. ... And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist (p. 8). Neuroeconomics and neurotheology surprisingly fail to consider gods cooperative nature as an artifact of scarcity, cooperation, and exchange. Research in these disciplines nevertheless produce results that are consistent with the notion of god as an idealized counterparty. Functional brain imaging establishes, for example, that the innate sense of justice is rooted in a sense of fairness ... [that] is not the product of applying a rational deontological principle, but rather results from emotional [neural] processing (Hsu and others 2008, 1094). Imaging further reveals that praying to God is an intersubjective experience comparable to normal interpersonal interaction (Schjoedt and others 2009). Similarly, the brain areas identified in ... fMRI studies are not unique to processing religion, but play major roles in social cognition. This implies that religious beliefs and behavior emerged not as sui generis evolutionary adaptations, but as an extension (some would say by product) of social cognition and behavior (Kapogiannis and others 2009). These findings indicate the utility of explaining morality, god, and religion as artifacts of cooperation and exchange.

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Scarcity, Morality, and Virtue Introduction Morality anchors a system of social norms and virtues that foster mutually-beneficial cooperation and exchange. The Mosaic law, for example, comprised 613 hyper-rational commandments that were tailored to a tribal society that interacted on the basis of relatedness. Jesus Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 57) articulated 105 moral principles that universalized these commandments, and Hillel distilled everything into a stylized version of the Golden Rule. Rules and norms of this sort alleviate costly uncertainties regarding the intentions and likely conduct of intrinsically self-interested individuals, and so served to increase the extent of cooperation and exchange within ancient societies. The economist Deirdre McCloskey (2006) argues that antiquitys seven canonical virtues remain relevant today. This canon comprises the four cardinal, pagan virtues of prudence, courage (fortitude), temperance, and justice, along with the three Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charitable love (Vatican 1995, arts. 18031845). Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1998, ch. 31) later tenet that agreements must be kept also has become explicit, both in religion (Vatican 1995, art. 2410), and in modern theories of law and economics. Cooperative norms and virtues appear to parallel the classical notion that the goal of a virtuous life is to become like God (Vatican 1995, art. 1803). God, however, is unconstrained by scarcity, and so this overarching goal is humanly unattainable. Humans tend to be guided instead by a moral sense wrought from evolved biological propensities and pragmatic reason. Ridley (1997) describes an evolved propensity he calls parasitism of reciprocity, by which individuals are predisposed to extort [their fair] share of others good fortune, like the good fortune of a successful hunt (p. 124; Hsu and others 2008). This propensity presently shapes the moral, political, and entitlement sensibilities of modern Western societies (Rosen 2010; Fukuyama 2011). Pragmatic reason, in turn, shapes rational, second-best norms of moral conduct. Second-best in this context is an economics term of art (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). Second-best theory holds that the failure of any first-best conditionin this case the condition of superabundancemeans that other first-best conditions, like the moral imperatives of classical deontology, might not hold in the next-best, or second-best, optimum. Two examples show this principle at work. First, scarcity often obliges individuals to consent to be treated as employees rather than insisting upon being treated as ends in themselves. Second, Lockes ([1690] 1988) moral theory of property, which requires leaving enough and as good ... in common for others ( II: 27) would result in the wasteful depletion of scarce resources through tragedy of the commons effects (Hardin 1968). Morality is contingent upon scarcity, and so it is better described as originating in -12-

suffering, as Leibniz argued, rather than as flowing from Kants reasoned concept of freedom. The philosopher Max Hocutt (2000) aptly concludes that morality is a product of natural law, but this is no Higher Law. It is a Lower Lawthe law of evolution, both biological and cultural (p. 18). In sum, metaphysics role in the fight against scarcity falls conveniently under six heads: (i) facilitating cooperation, reciprocity, and exchange; (ii) moderating parasitism of reciprocity; (iii) compensating for the shortcomings of evolution and reason; (iv) reducing costly uncertainties regarding the intentions and likely conduct of other individuals; (v) constraining the indifferent impositions of costly burdens on others; and (vi) fine-tuning human behavior to suit changing conditions of scarcity. Scarcity and Contractarian Theory Contractarian moral philosophy shares this essays fundamental premises regarding economic scarcity and rationality. The philosopher David Gauthier (1986 and 1990) explains that [t]he problematic of modern moral theory is set by three dogmas which philosophy receives from economics. The first is that value is utilitya measure of subjective, individual preference. The second is that rationality is maximization: the rational individual will maximize the extent to which his objective is achieved. The third is that interests are non-tuistic: interacting persons do not take an interest in one anothers interests. Modern moral theory determines the possibility of morality in relation to these dogmas (1990, 11, footnotes omitted). Quoting in part from John Rawls Theory of Justice (1971, 4), Gauthrier cleaves to the economics argument when averring that [a] contractarian views society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage (1986, 10, footnote omitted). Contractarianism, therefore, is essentially the theory of optimizing constraints on [private] utility-maximization (p. 78). It describes [w]hat rational persons would agree to, were they by their agreement to determine the terms and conditions of their future interactions (1990, 1). To choose rationally, one must choose morally. ... [therefore, morality] can be generated as a rational constraint from non-moral premises of rational choice (1986, 4). Superficial appearances aside, the contractarian is not a utilitarian who seeks the greatest good for the greatest number, but is instead an empirical libertarian who seeks the greatest good of each, compatible with the like good of everyone else. ... Moralityor at least that part of it constituted by justiceis a matter of agreement. And although agreement is arrived at by individual maximizers, it is not an agreement to maximize anything. ... When these people agree, they agree on a mode of cooperation that better enables each of them to assure that his life is a good one by his own standards (1990, 2, 205). Notions of altruism and moral realism are absent in this account. -13-

Gauthier argues that morality and cooperation arise from the failure of market interaction to bring about an optimal outcome because of the presence of [economic] externalities (1986, 84, 128). Standing against this argument, however, is the immovable fact that mutually beneficial behavior (short of exchange) first appeared among the pre-market proto-species from which humans are descended. Morality therefore owes its existence, not to market failure (however defined), but more broadly to natural selections adaptations to scarcity. Gauthier claims that [t]he reconciliation of morality with rationality is the central problem of modern moral philosophy (1990, 150). If so, then the next most central problem surely is the identification of moral principles that are self-enforcing without being merely prudential, or which at least minimize the need for legal compulsions and threats of coercion. Where morality is not self-enforcing, a sovereign of some sorteither temporal (e.g., Hobbes) or divine (e.g., Locke)presumptively is needed to act as a moral arbitrator, judge, and enforcer in order to prevent navely rational egoism from provoking prisoners dilemma outcomes, collective action failures, and Hobbesian war. Contractarian moral and political theory frames legitimate sovereign authority in terms of property rights, market process, and the rule of law, which prompts Gauthier to worry (seemingly against interest), that practicing contractarian ideology too overtly would corrode the [cooperative] underpinnings of the market ... [without which] the bargaining order will collapse into competitive chaos (p. 353). Gauthier touches upon contractarian theorys inherent weakness when acknowledging that the contractarian must relate the conventional character of society to a natural base in human nature in order to avoid charges of arbitrariness (1990, 334). Relating in this way weakens contractarian theory, as for example in favor of the Lockean theory that contract [merely] supplements and completes mans natural social relationships (p. 342). Lockes view of social relationships was narrowly theocentric; to wit, [p]romises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all (Locke [1689] 1824, 30). Gauthier accepts Lockes characterization of promises, covenants, and oaths as being a literal version of social contractarianism, but resists, as alien to our way of thinking, the claim that god (or merely a common belief in god) is the glue binding society together (1990, 24). One obvious alternative to Lockes argument is to ground contractarian theory on natural selection. Gauthier claims instead that familial love and patriotism are the natural forces making moral behavior self-enforcing (p. 351), although he does not consider why these phenomena operate as claimed. Familial love in fact is biologically driven, while patriotism is a secular religion that replaces Lockes god with a civil state consisting of charismatic and numinous (but otherwise all to human) political leaders that superficially resemble idealizedthat is, godlikecooperators.

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Synthesis Rational, efficient, and self-enforcing morality arises spontaneously whenever similarlysituated individuals interact repeatedly (Ostrum 1990; Ellickson 1991). These outcomes do not flow perforce from premeditated contractarian ideals. They occur instead because natural selection has produced specialized brain structures and modules that equip individuals for trust, cooperation, reciprocity, bargaining, and exchange, all of which are implicit, constituent elements in the contractarian moral model. The evolved social exchange and moral modules described earlier are complemented, for example, by specialized neurons called spindle cells that generate the innate sense of unfairness (natural selections hardware solution to fairness considerations obviates rational, but biologically costly calculations that Baumol [1987] shows to be both complex and ambiguous), and by mirroring neurons that allow individuals to penetrate the fog of deception by means of accurate empathy. These and other evolved brain mechanisms circumvent the cost, risk, uncertainty, incompleteness, and opportunism inherent in contracting and, in doing so, overcome sticking points that contractarian philosophers and Chicago-style economics thinkers (e.g., Becker 1976) cannot resolve either fully or convincingly by means of hyper-rationality alone (the philosopher Richard Joyce [2001] wryly asserts in a related context that the rationalist is someone who invents an unnecessary riddle and then tries to solve it [p. 105]). Rationality instead operates in tandem with evolved genetic predispositions in order to generate the conventional [moral] character of society that Gauthier evokes in passing, and which sociologists, political scientists, and other scholars study in depth ( J.Q. Wilson 1993). Recharacterizing Lockes explanation of social cohesion quoted above, it is the taking away of natural selection, not god, that would dissolve all. Evolved predispositions for cooperation and exchange are default settings that guide human behavior along a moral course. Individuals nevertheless remain free to choose whether to act cooperatively (i.e., to act as they ought), or else to pursue instead narrowly selfinterested courses of action with respect not only to other individuals, but also with respect to god, nature, animals, and other entities with which humans can be said to cooperate in some fashion. Default settings serve to benchmark moral judgements concerning ones own behavior, as well as the behavior of others. Individuals recognize that others make similar judgements, and that they gossip extensively about their verdicts. The moral judgments of others matter because, for individuals to benefit from cooperation and reciprocity, they first must signal their own positive qualities of cooperativeness and trustworthiness to potential counterparties. Consequently, they must be alert to the moral character of their actions. The importance of cooperative signalseven inadvertent onesbecomes evident in infancy; children aged six to ten months choose to play with objects (toys) that act cooperatively in staged, experimental -15-

encounters, and to shun objects that behave otherwise (J. Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2007). These findings mark the inherent moral sense as an evolved artifact of cooperation. As Joyce (2006) notes, [t]here is no gene for morality, any more than there is a gene for breathing. Nor is there a little chunk of brain devoted specifically to making moral judgements. ... moral thinking has been selected for in our lineage (p. 140). Scarcity, Altruism, and Cooperative Signaling Natural selection has shaped modern humans to be both intrinsically and rationally selfinterested, although not to the fantastic extent of Ayn Rands hyper-competitive characterization (1961). Natural self-interest is responsible for the frequent and often spectacular failure of wistfully utopian schemes for creating a contrived common good by exploiting humanitys hypothetical perfectabilitywhat the biologist Richard Dawkins ([1976] 1989) famously described as the human potential to rebel against the tyranny of ... selfish replicators (pp. 3, 200201). Dawkins is one among many scientists, philosophers, political theorists, sundry intellectuals, and wannabe benevolent despots that persist in thinking, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the capacity for genuine, disinterested, true altruism ... [is] yet another unique quality of man. (p. 200). Dawkins derivative proposal for teaching generosity and altruism (p. 3), instead of teaching the mechanics and benefits of cooperation, reciprocity, and exchange, similarly is misbegotten. Emphasizing generosity and altruism as Dawkins recommends doing would convey the undesirable dual lesson that all humans owe each other a living, thereby weakening the spirit of individual responsibility and collaterally reinforcing the human instinct for dealing with scarcity through parasitisms of reciprocity rather than cooperation and exchange. Rational self-interest is the quality that distinguishes the evolutionary principal of reciprocal altruism from the moral concept of pure altruism, the latter concept having been introduced by Aristotle and brought to fruition by Augustine and Aquinas (AltruismBiological 2011; Mueller 2010). Pure altruism, in stark contrast to reciprocal altruism, posits self-sacrificing behavior, arising out of moral duty and charitable love, and constrained only by scarcity. The idea of self-sacrifice raises two perplexing questions. First, how could either natural selection or reason lead autonomous individuals to sacrifice scarce, private resources voluntarily. Second, under what conditions, other than the contractarian ideals examined above, ought individuals to refrain altruistically from privately beneficial actions that impose collateral burdens (i.e., negative economic externalities) on others?a moral question that theologians call kenosis; that is, individual self-limitation for the benefit of others (Polkinghorne 2001).

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Biologists and economists avoid these pitfalls by attributing seemingly-altruistic behavior to subtle self-interest, miscalculation, or external manipulation. Biologists describe it in terms of genetically-selfish kin selection and inclusive fitness and, to a lesser but growing extent, in terms of group selection (Alexander 1987, 169; D.S. Wilson 2002; Nowak and Highfield 2011, 81111; E.O. Wilson 2012). Economists characterize altruism as any self-interested entanglement of utility functions that makes one individuals subjective satisfaction contingent upon another individuals welfare (Arrow 1972; Becker 1976, 251294). A few economists claim to have isolated pure altruism experimentally, but more recent work appears to vitiate these results (Levitt and Dubner 2009, 113123, 238241). Seemingly-pure altruism appears to be an artifact of instinctive signaling behavior, of the sort commonly observed in biology (Signaling Theory 2011) and economics (Honest Economics 2011). For mutually-beneficial reciprocal altruism to work reliably, individuals must identify suitable partners with whom to cooperate and exchangethe prisoners dilemma of game theory substantially disappears in practice when individuals are permitted to choose their partners and communicate freely with them. Potential partners, especially those that are not naturally charismatic and numenous, must signal convincingly that they are trustworthy cooperators and reciprocators rather than parasites. Adam Smith ([1753] 1996) characterized signaling of this sort as the propensity of individuals to seek approbation and esteem. Alexander (1987) describes it in terms of indirect and generalized forms of reciprocity occurring in the presence of interested audiencesgroups of individuals who continually evaluate the members of their societies as possible future interactants from whom they would like to gain more than they lose (pp. 9394). Cooperative signals of this sort are shaped by evolution, reason, experience, and culture, and are targeted both broadly and at particular groups and individuals. H. sapiens, like many animal species, are predisposed to signal their moods and intentions. Natural selection also has primed these species to scan for corresponding signals emitted by others, and even to react violently in particular situations when appropriate signals are absent (Darwin 1896; de Waal 1996; Montanye 2009). Darwin (1896) catalogued numerous autonomic signals, which he termed expressions of emotion, that are emitted routinely and involuntarily by humans and other animals. Involuntary expressions, which natural selection has internalized for efficiency reasons, are both less costly to produce and interpret than deliberate, rational signals, and their meaning is less likely to be ambiguous. Conversely, low-cost, deceptive signaling also is commonplace in nature (Alexander 1987, 7175), and complementary, low-cost capabilities for detecting deception have evolved in response (Barkin, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992). This implies that rationally-based cooperative signals must be conspicuously costly to produce if they are to be credible. Costly signals are effective because they entail rational and easily recognizable investments in the future production of mutually-beneficial outcomes. High-cost signals pre-17-

commit the individual to cooperation and trustworthiness because their substantial investment is at risk and would be forfeit if they subsequently default on reciprocal commitments (Schelling 1960). The voluntary and faithful performance of high-cost religious obligations radiates cooperative signals that are credibleboth to peers and presumably to god (the ultimate counterparty)precisely because they are easy to identify while being difficult and costly to fake. This explains not only religions cohesive effect (the word religion is a cognate of the Latin verb ligo, ligare meaning figuratively to unify), but also its pervasiveness and durability. Evidence of this phenomenon abounds. The sociologist Robert Putnam (2000) reports that half of all personal philanthropy is religious in character, and half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context (p. 66). Putnam and Campbells (2010) comprehensive study of religious behavior in America reports that communities of faith seem more important than faith itself (p. 443), and that religious Americans are more trusting and (perhaps) more trustworthy than others (p. 458). The authors do not examine religious behavior in signaling terms, although their findings are consistent with this interpretation. The sociologist Robert Bellah (2011) grounds religion in ritual without recognizing that ritual is a facet of signaling. Trustworthiness and cooperative intentions can be signaled effectively in other ways as well. Giving away free-samples of costly reciprocity in hopes of priming-the-pump for cooperation (e.g., dating) is one obvious method. Active participation in secular (civil) religions (e.g., nationalism and environmentalism) is another method, as is conspicuous involvement during the aftermath of natural and man-made disasters. Rationally self-interested, cooperative signals of this sort are easily and often mistaken for pure altruism. Adam Smiths ([1776] 1976) most famous dictum is apposite here: the individual is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that is was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectively that when he really intends to promote it (bk. IV, ch. 2). The functioning of religious institutions as signaling media necessarily entails costs. Analysts and atheists often misinterpret these costs as being irrationally wasteful. The anthropologist Scott Atrans (2002) characterization is representative: From an evolutionary standpoint, the reasons why religion shouldnt exist are patent: religion is materially expensive and unrelentingly counterfactual and even counterintuitive. Religious practice is costly in terms of material sacrifice (at least ones prayer time), emotional expenditure (including fears and hopes), and cognitive effort (maintaining both factual and counterintuitive networks of beliefs) (p. 4). Economists, by comparison, tend to net the costs of religion against the benefits it produces. An empirical study by Robert Barro and Rachael McCleary (2003) finds that [economic] growth responds positively to the extent of religious beliefs, notably in hell and [to a lesser extent] heaven, but negatively to church attendance (abstract). The authors conclude that higher church -18-

attendance depresses growth because it signifies a larger use of resources by the religion sector for the production of religious beliefs (p. 24, italics added). This conclusion perhaps inadvertently encourages the false inference that religion is probably, if not necessarily, wasteful. The argument of this essay, by comparison, is that religions purpose is to mitigate the adverse effects of scarcity. Scarcity and competition operate to optimize religions net economic benefits (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) over time. Matthew 6:6 teaches that god rewards worshipers who pray in private, and so the prevalence and durability of public religious institutions richly suggests that the outward expression of religion contributes positively in the long run (except in pathological cases) to both individual welfare and the aggregate welfare of local communities (Montanye 2011). Inferring that religion depresses economic performance instead of optimizing it would entail either overlooking or misconstruing religions role in the fight against scarcity. Summary

Figure 1. The Dynamic Relationship Between Scarcity and Human Nature The dynamic relationship between scarcity, evolution, morality, and religion, as characterized in this essay, is sketched in Figure 1. Human nature is depicted as consisting of two co-evolved regions, with biological propensities and reason (genes) located at the top of the larger box, and institutions and culture (memes) located at the bottom. Cooperation/Exchange and mankinds inherent Moral Sense represent biologically co-evolved consequences of scarcity. The propensity for cooperation and exchange gives rise to the private concept of an ultimate exchange partner called god, which influences the moral sense. The god-concept also provides the kernel around which public religious institutions form. Civil (secular) religions (e.g., nationalism and environmentalism) form around other conceptual kernels, but also can be (and -19-

frequently are) influenced by this god-concept as well (R. Nelson 2010). Religious institutions mitigate scarcitys adverse effects by fostering cooperation and exchange. This in turn fosters specialization and divisions of labor leading to the productive efficiencies and technical innovations that diminish scarcity by increasing resource availability. This cybernetic pattern of feedback loops locks scarcity and human nature in dynamic equilibrium. Conclusion Morality, altruism, god, and religion are metaphysical phenomena that emerge when naturally-selected behavioral propensities interact with pragmatic reason (rationality). The nature of these phenomena is deducible from the a priori concept of resource scarcity. The phenomena themselves support the positive-sum and mutually-beneficial games of cooperation and exchange that are played competitively in the shadow of binding resource constraints. The conclusions of this essay complement the evolutionists claim that there do not seem to be any remaining reasons for regarding morality, as normally expressed, as necessarily self-sacrificing, or for invoking anything other than nepotism and reciprocity to account for human societal structure (Alexander 1987, 195). They also complement the contractarian philosophers claim that [t]o choose rationally, one must choose morally. ... [morality, therefore,] can be generated as a rational constraint from non-moral premises of rational choice (Gauthier 1986, 4). Acknowledgement A version of this essay was presented at a 2011 conference on evolution and morality sponsored by Oxford Universitys Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion. A differentlytuned version was presented at a 2013 conference sponsored by the Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture. Both presentations, along with other writings on economics and religion, are available online at www.scribd.com/JAMontanye. References Akerlof, George, and Robert Shiller. 2009. Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Alexander, Richard. 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.

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