Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 143 FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A.

Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system

of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government. In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the

National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. HELD: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

G.R. No. L-26979: Government vs MiltonSpringer

Executive Power Act 2705 created the National Coal Company. It was amended by Act 2822 which provided that the officers of NCC may be voted upon by a select committee comprising of the senate president, house speaker and the governor general [as ex officio officers]. The GG excepted and he issued EO 37 which declared the amendments introduced by Act 2822 as null and void. The GG then ordered that he have the sole power to appoint pursuant to his appointing power as provided in the Administrative Code. The voting committee however ignored the EO and proceeded to the election w/o the GG and they elected Springer et al as officers of the NCC. The government then filed suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendments introduced by Act 2822 is constitutional. HELD: Section 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-General." The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen is authorized to create corporations and offices. The Legislature has lawfully provided for the creation of NCC, but has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in the committee for the same is considered as a public office. Hence, section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. DISSENTING OPINION: (Avancea CJ, Villamor & Villareal JJ) The only prohibition to the appointment of members of the Philippine Legislature to executive public offices is that contained in section 18 of the Jones Law, which says that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to any office the election to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any office of trust or profit which shall have been created or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term." The present Speaker of the House of Representatives is clearly not within said prohibition, as Act No. 2705 creating said committee was enacted in 1917, before his term of office began in 1922; so the now President of the Senate, for which the said Act was passed during his term of office, that term had already expired in 1922, and he is not serving another term (1922-1928). Therefore, the Philippine Legislature may not only create the voting committee but designate the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of said committee, always granting, for the sake of argument, that membership therein is a public office. The minority averred that: 1. That the National Coal Company is not an agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Philippine Islands. 2. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, as mere corporator, if it had to vote its own stock would have to do so in the capacity of a private citizen, and not in its sovereign capacity.

3. That the voting committee in exercising the power delegated to it does so in the same capacity as its principal. 4. That the voting of the stock of the Government is a private act, and the committee in doing so performs a private function, and therefore membership therein is a private and not a public office. 5. That membership in the voting committee being a private position and not a public office, the designation by the Philippine Legislature of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members thereof was not an encroachment upon the power of supervision and control over all executive functions of the Government vested in the Governor-General. 6. That even granting that membership in said committee is a public office, still the Philippine Legislature has the power to designate the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of said committee, by virtue of the residuum of power placed in its hands by the Congress of the United States. 7. That whether we consider the delegation of the voting power as for public or private purposes, the Governor-General alone cannot exercise that power as it requires discretion and judgment, and at least a majority must concur. 8. That, finally, the Congress of the United States by its reserved power and authority to annul any law of the Philippine Legislature, has by its silence impliedly ratified Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822. NOTE: The Administrative Code provides the following: "In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth," including th special powers and duties "(a) To nominate and appoint officials, conformably to law, to positions in the service of the Government of the Philippine Islands. (b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the Government of the United States, the Governor-General may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by the Governor-General. (Sec. 66.)

U.S. Supreme Court

Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928)
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands Nos. 564 and 573 Argued April 10, 1928 Decided May 14, 1928 277 U.S. 189 Syllabus 1. Acts of the Philippine Legislature creating a coal company and a bank, the stock of which is largely owned by the Philippine government, provide that the power to vote the stock shall be vested in a "Committee," in the one case, and in a "Board of Control," in the other, each consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Held, that the voting of the stock in the election of directors and managing agents of the corporations is an executive function, and that the attempt to repose it in the legislative officers named violates the Philippine Organic Act. P. 277 U. S. 199. 2. In the Philippine Organic Act, which divides the government into three departments -- legislative, executive, and judicial -- the principle is implicit, as it is in state and federal constitutions, that these three powers shall be forever separate and distinct from each other. P. 201.. 3. This separation, and the consequent exclusive character of the powers conferred upon each of the three departments of the government, is basic and vital -- not merely a matter of governmental mechanism. Id. 4. It may be stated as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power, the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power, and the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power. Id. Page 277 U. S. 190 5. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or to appoint the agents charged with the duty of enforcing them. The latter are executive functions. P. 277 U. S. 202. 6. Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection. Id. 7. The appointment of managers (in this instance, corporate directors) of property or a business in which the government is interested is essentially an executive act which the legislature is without capacity to perform, directly or through its members. P. 277 U. S. 203. 8. Whether or not the members of the "board" or "committee" are public officers in the strict sense, they are at least public agents charged with executive functions, and therefore beyond the appointing power of the legislature. Id. 9. The instances in which Congress has devolved on persons not executive officers the power to vote in nonstock corporations created for governmental purposes lend no support to a construction of the Constitution which would justify Congressional legislation like that here involved, considering the limited number of such instances, the peculiar character of the institutions there dealt with, and the contrary attitude of Congress towards governmentally owned or controlled stock corporations. P. 277 U. S. 204.

10. The powers here asserted by the Philippine Legislature are vested in the Governor-General by the Organic Act -- viz., by the provision vesting in him the supreme executive power, with general supervision and control over all the departments and bureaus of the government; the provision placing on him the responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws, and the provision that all executive functions of the government must be directly under him or within one of the executive departments under his supervision and control. P. 277 U. S. 205. 11. Where a statute contains a grant of power enumerating certain things which may be done, and also a general grant of power which, standing alone, would include those things and more, the general grant may be given full effect if the context shows that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. P. 277 U. S. 206. 12. In 22 of the Organic Act, the clause in the form of a proviso placing all the executive functions directly under the Governor-General or in one of the executive departments under his direction Page 277 U. S. 191 and control, and the proviso preceding it which grant certain powers to the legislature, are both to be construed as independent and substantive provisions. P. 277 U. S. 207. 13. An inference that Congress has approved an Act of the Philippine Legislature reported to it under 10 of the Organic Act cannot be drawn from the failure of Congress to exercise its power to annul, reserved in that section, where the Act reported contravenes the Organic Act, and is therefore clearly void. P. 277 U. S. 208. Affirmed. Certiorari, 275 U.S. 519, to two judgments of ouster rendered by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in proceedings in the nature of quo warranto, which were brought in that court by the Philippine government against the present petitioners to test their right to be directors in certain corporations described in the opinion. Page 277 U. S. 197

Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261 FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis. HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission Decided 7 December 2010 Ponente Jose C. Mendoza G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036 Majority: 10 Corona, Velasco, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Bersamin, Villarama,Perez, Mendoza Dissent: 5 Carpio, Carpio Morales, Nachura, Abad, Sereno After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration. The main issues raised before the High Court were: (1) Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of Congress; (2) Whether the PTC supplants the powers already vested on the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ); and, (3) Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The Court's Ruling The president has the authority to create the Truth Commission Majority of the members of the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC finds basis on the presidents power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that control is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected the OSGs claim that that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly, restructure under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of

economy or redundancy. This presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Nonetheless, the ponencia agreed with the argument of the OSG that the presidents power to create the PTC may find justification under the presidents duty under sec. 17, Article VII of the Constitution to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The Court held that while it is true that the authority of the president to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes, it does not necessarily mean that he does not have such authority. The president has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees (whether from past or present administrations) faithfully comply with the law. The purpose of ad hoc investigating bodies such as the PTC is to allow an inquiry into matters which the president is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. The PTC will not erode the powers or independence of the Ombudsman The Court also held that the investigative function of the commission will not supplant nor threaten the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. If at all, it will complement the functions of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the function of the PTC is merely to recommend prosecution, which is just a consequence of its fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the PTC. The purpose of the PTC offends the equal protection clause While the Court was almost unanimous in holding that the president indeed had the authority to create the PTC and that it would not unduly duplicate the powers of the Ombudsman, nine (9) of the justices joined Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza in refusing to uphold the constitutionality of E.O. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution. Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was joined by four (4) others in their strong dissent. Laying down a long line of precedents, the ponencia reiterated that equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. Applying this precept, the majority held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is just being used as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution and that E.O. 1 is only an adventure in partisan hostility.

While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with noble intentions, the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that the end does not justify the means. It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds, for ours is still a government of laws and not of men.

Bayan Muna vs. Romulo G.R. No.159618 February 1, 2011 BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents. VELASCO, JR., J.: Facts: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92. Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law. Held: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC. The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles. The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the

Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With this view, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements . Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle. International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country

and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.