COPYRIGHT LAW

Introduction

1-6, 504-532

CH. 5: TRADEMARKS: CREATING SIGNPOSTS FOR CONSUMERS IN THE MARKET PLACE

Overview
I. A trademark is any word, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [that is] A. (1) used by a person or B. (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principle register, C. To identify or distinguish his or her good, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and D. To indicate source of goods, even if that source is unknown 15 U.S.C. sec. 1127 A mark is attached to a product or service to refer to the manufacturing or selling source of the product of the service. Mark NOT attached to product or service, BUT refers to manufacturer or seller A. Mark is trade name Mark attached to a product or service, DOES NOT refer to manufacturer or seller A. Mark is generic name Trademark Law A. Tied almost exclusively to the function of buying and selling goods and services . Objective to Prevent consumer confusion 1. Rights are created by use in commerce B. Trademarks cover any word, symbol, or device , or any combination of these three. C. Applies to certification marks and collective marks. 1. Certification marks: Trademarks used by certification organizations (IE: ABA, God Housekeeping) to certify that a product or service meets a specified quality standard. 2. Collective marks: Used by collective bodies, such as unions or trade associations, to represent the affiliation with the body. D. Trademarks should be distinguished from trade names or commercial names. 1. Any name used by a person to identify hid or her business or vocation 2. Protected through state law Federal trademark law is codified in Lanham Act ( Trademark ct of 1946)

II. III. IV. V.

VI.

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What Can be Trademarked?

TRADEMARK & TRADE NAMES: OVERLAPPING APPROACHES ALDERMAN V. IDITAROD PROPERTIES, INC.
I. Trade name: Symbol used to distinguish companies, partnerships, and business

A. TYPES OF TRADE NAMES 1. Arbitrary or fanciful a. Arbitrary: Common word or symbol that is applied in a manner not suggestive or descriptive of the business Most i. Example: Stork Club, Nov (tv services), Sun Microsystems distinctive b. Fanciful: A word coined expressly for use as a trade name or an obscure Lanham or archaic term not inherently familiar with buyers. Act i. Example: Exxon, Polaroid, Clorox protection c. Broadly protected as strong trade names because their novelty identifies them uniquely to consumers. Common 2. Suggestive Law a. Connote , rather than describe some particular product or service; they require use of consumers ingenuity to envisage the nature of the product or service. i. Example: Citibank, Orange Crush, Tie Rak 3. Descriptive (including geographic or personal name) a. A term is descriptive if it describes the intended purpose, function, or use of the goods, the class of the users of the goods, a desirable characteristic of the goods, the nature of the goods, or the end effect upon the user. i. Example: Beer nuts, Fashion-knit, Raisin-Bran. b. Falls between generic and Suggestive.

c. Categories (Needs to show secondary meaning to get protection)

i. Inherently Non distinctive: 1) Entitled to protection by showing secondary meaning or a mental connection between the trade names and single business. Geographically descriptive term: 1) Example: Bank of America, Boston, Alaska. Personal Name 1) Gucci and Waterman

ii. iii.

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4. Generic (NOT PROTECTED) a. Actual names of goods or services, and cannot be distinctive of a unique source. i. Example: convenience Store, Discount Mufflers , Lite beer. b. Not protectable because doing so would remove words from common usage B. Composite Trade Names (Anti-Dissection Rules) 1. Terms that are a combination of two or more types. 2. Analysis: Look at name as a whole. Generic-descriptive may result in protectable trade name. C. Secondary Meaning 1. Descriptive mark that otherwise could not be registered under the Lanham Act may be registered if it has become distinctive of the applicants good in commerce. 2. Factors that support finding secondary meaning include both direct & circumstantial evidence. a. Direct Evidence i. Consumer testimony and consumer surveys b. Circumstantial Evidence: (every element need not be proven) i. Exclusivity, length, and manner of use ii. Amount and manner of advertising iii. Amount of sales and number of customers iv. Established place in the market v. Proof of intentional copying. vi. Unsolicited media Coverage (some courts) 3. Secondary meaning exists if significant number of prospective purchasers connects the term with particular entity. Trademark: Symbols used to distinguish goods and services. Likelihood of Confusion Test A. Basic test of both common-law trademark infringement and federal statutory trademark infringement. B. An appreciable number of reasonable buyers must be likely to be confused by the names for trade name infringement or unfair trade practice liability. C. Likely: Probable D. Confusion: 1. Point of sale, post-sale, pre-sale and reverse confusion 2. Not limited to confusions as to the source of goods or services includes confusion s to affiliation, connection, or association.

II. III.

E. Three ways to prove a likelihood of confusion

1. Survey evidence 2. Evidence of actual confusion

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3. Argument based on a clear inference arising from comparison of the conflicting marks and the context of their use. F. Factors used to determine likelihood of confusion 1. Degree of similarity of the names 2. Manner and method in which the plaintiff and defendant used the names 3. Strength of the name 4. Length of time the parties used the names without evidence of confusion 5. Intent of a party in adopting the name 6. Other factors about the name that would tend to reduce any tendency to confused the purchaser about the source or origin . IV. Protection A. Federal (Lanham Act) & State 1. Trademarks 2. Lanham Act Protection for registered and unregistered marks B. State 1. Unfair competition 2. Trade names

TRADEMARKS , COPYRIGHTS, & PATENTS

Statutory Provisions:The Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. 1127, 1114(imitation of a registered mark),1125(a),(false designation of origin) 1125(c),1125(d),1151a-d(trademark applications) 2 Federal Trademark Registration 532-563

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3 4 5

Trade Dress Famous Marks

564-574 574-609

Infringement Claims 609-635

Cybersquatting Claims 635-667 CHAPTER 5. TRADEMARKS: CREATING SIGNPOSTS FOR CONSUMERS IN THE MARKETPLACE

WHAT CAN BE TRADEMARKED? Trademark and Other IP Federal Trademark registration what counts as a trademark?

HOW TRADEMARKS ARE PROTECTED Registered Marks: INFRINGEMENT claims under 15 USC sec. 1114 & 1125(d)

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Registered or Unregistered Mrks Cyber Squatting Claims Under 15 USC sec. 1125(d) LAMPARELLO V. FALWELL
I. To prevail on a cyber squatting claim: a. Must shoue that had a bad faith intent to profit using the domain name, and b. The domain name is identical or cofusinglt similar to, or diutive of, the distinctive and famous mark The Act was also intended to stop the registration of multiple marks with the hope of selling them to the highest bidder, distinctive marks to defraud consumers or to engage in counterfeiting activities, and wellknown marks to prey on consumer confusion by misusing the domain name to divert customers from the mark owners site to the cybersquatters own site, many of which are pornography sites that derive advertising revenue based on the number of visits, or hits, the site receives.

To distinguish abusive domain name registrations from legitimate ones, the ACPA directs courts to consider nine nonexhaustive factors: if any, in the domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; (III) the persons prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services; (IV) the persons bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the persons intent to divert consumers from the mark owners

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online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site; (VI) the persons offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the persons prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the persons provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the persons intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the persons prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VIII) the persons registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of the registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and (IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the persons domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section.

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NOTES 1. The anticybersquatting provisions of the Lanham Act were implemented in 1999 to protect trademark owners against individuals who register marks as domain names in order to make money by making the owners buy the domain names back. A presumption behind the provisions is that ownership of a trademark entitles the owner to the domain name that uses the mark. But if the registrant does use the domain name and does not trade off the goodwill of the trademark owner, there is no cause of action for cybersquatting. The problem arises when someone registers many trademarks and their variants as domain names without any use of the domain names. Do you think Lamparello was a cybersquatter? Would he be one if he had never used the domain name? If he had used it to market and sell a book critical of Falwell?

2. In addition to the Lanham Act, trademark owners have rights under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Process (UDRP) that all registrants submit to when they register a domain name. This process says that the domain name registrant agrees to resolve disputes over rights in the domain name through a dispute resolution process that is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva. The following is a table that summarizes the main difference between UDRP and 1125(d) of the Lanham Act. Note that undergoing mediation under the UDRP does not foreclose bringing an 1125(d) claim. For a discussion of UDRP procedures and cybersquatting more generally, see Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1361 (2005).

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INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES RESCUECOM CORP V. GOOGLE INC.
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision, holding that Google's use of the "Rescuecom" trademark constituted a "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act.[2][6] The court noted this case as distinct from 1-800, rejecting the argument advanced by Google and accepted by a number of district courts in the Second Circuit, that the inclusion of a trademark in an internal computer directory cannot constitute trademark use. The court proceeds to distinguish that Google had made direct use of the 'Rescuecom' trademark, whereas WhenU did not make direct use of the '1-800 Contacts' trademark (instead it displayed ads that were triggered by the plaintiff's mark)
[2][7]

"Googles recommendation and sale of Rescuecoms mark to its advertising customers are not internal uses. Furthermore, 1-800 did not imply that use of a trademark in a software programs internal directory precludes a finding of trademark use. Rather, influenced by the fact that the defendant was not using the plaintiffs trademark at all... If we were to adopt Google and its amicis argument, the operators o f search engines would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to deceive and cause consumer confusion. This is surely neither within the intention nor the letter of the Lanham Act."
[6]

The court further distinguished the appearance of ads in 1-800 Contacts compared to Rescuecom. In 1-800 Contacts, ads were displayed in a different window and did not affect the end-user's ability to access the plaintiff's website (note that the ads appeared in synchrony with the plaintiff's website). The court accepted Rescuecom's assertion that Google's placement of "sponsored links" above organic search results could lead to user confusion as required under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, Google's argument that a sponsored link is analogous to placement of a generic brand next to a trademarked brand
[8]

was rejected by the court.

Search Engine's Sale Of Plaintiff's Trademark As Keyword Held Not To Be Actionable Trademark Use Federal District Court holds that Google's use of plaintiff's trademark "Rescuecom" as a keyword in Google's "Ad words" program to trigger the display of "sponsored link" advertisements from third party competitors for a fee is not a "trademark use" of plaintiff's mark, as the mark is not being used to identify the source of any goods or services. The same holds true of Google's use of plaintiff's trademark in its "Keyword Suggestion Tool," in which Google recommends to potential advertisers, including plaintiff's competitors, keywords they may be interested in using, for a fee, as a trigger for the display of their advertising. Notably the advertisements themselves, which appear along with search results for plaintiff's mark, were not alleged to display plaintiff's Rescuecom mark.

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As a result, the Court grants Google's motion to dismiss trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution claims brought by plaintiff under the Lanham Act, as such claims require a showing of actionable "trademark use" which, the Court holds, Rescuecom cannot make. Having dismissed plaintiff's federal claims, the Court declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, including a claim for tortuous interference. In reaching this result, the District Court elected not to follow decisions reached by the courts in Geico v. Google, 330 F.Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) andEdina Realty v. MLS Online.com, 2006 WL 737064 (D.Minn., March 20, 2006) which had denied motions to dismiss trademark infringement claims arising out of similar activity. The Court, instead, followed the path taken by the court in Merck & Co. Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), which dismissed similar claims on the ground, inter alia, that there was no "trademark use." Google Sells Competitors The Right To Have Listings Displayed In Response To Searches For Plaintiff's Trademark Plaintiff Rescuecom is a computer service franchise business offering, among other things, computer repair services. Plaintiff operates a website at Rescuecom.com, at which it does substantial business, and holds a federal trademark registration for its "Rescuecom" mark, under which mark it markets its products and services. Defendant Google operates the Internet's premier search engine. The Complaint arose out of Google's alleged use of plaintiff's "Rescuecom" trademark in both its "Adwords" and "Keyword Suggestion Tool." As alleged in the Complaint, Google offered and sold to third party competitors the right to have links to their sites appear on search result pages triggered by user searches containing plaintiff's mark. These advertisements appear either to the right, or at the top of the search results page, and are denominated "Sponsored Links." The third party advertisements were not alleged to contain plaintiff's trademark. Nor does Google display the mark itself. Rather, its use of the mark is internal, and unseen by the computer user. An internal program run by Google triggers the display of advertisements when plaintiff's mark is entered. The complaint further alleged that Google also included plaintiff's Rescuecom mark in its Keyword Suggestion Tool, thereby suggesting to plaintiff's competitors that they purchase advertisements triggered by plaintiff's mark. As a result, plaintiff commenced this suit, advancing claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution under the Lanham Act. No Actionable Trademark Use Relying on the Second Circuit's opinion in 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005) the Court held that to prevail on a claim for trademark infringement, a plaintiff "must establish that (1) it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act; and that (2) the defendant used the mark, (3) in commerce, (4) 'in connection with

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the sale or advertising of goods or services,' 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a), (5), without the plaintiff's consent. Plaintiff must also show that defendant's use of that mark is 'likely to cause confusion'". More particularly, held the Court, trademark use, use in commerce, and likelihood of confusion are each separate elements a plaintiff must demonstrate to prevail. To establish a trademark use, the mark holder must demonstrate the use of its mark as "indicating source or origin." As Google did not place plaintiff's mark on any goods or services it offered for sale, or in any advertisements offering services for sale, it had not used the mark as a trademark, which mandated dismissal of plaintiff's Lanham Act claims. This was true, held the Court, even accepting plaintiff's allegations "that defendant is capitalizing on the good will of plaintiff's trademark by marketing it to plaintiff's competitors as a keyword in order to generate defendant's own advertising revenues, that plaintiff's competitors believed defendant is authorized to sell its trademark, or that Internet users viewing the competitors' sponsored links are confused as to whether the sponsored links belong to or emanate from plaintiff ". The Court held that "none of these facts, alone or together, establish trademark use." Nor would plaintiff prevail even if it demonstrated that defendant's use diverted users from plaintiff's site, or altered the search results a user receives in response to plaintiff's search request. Finally, an internal use of plaintiff's mark in software to trigger the display of a competitor's ad, held the Court, such as that at issue, did not constitute a trademark use of plaintiff's mark. Said the Court: Defendant's internal use of plaintiff's trademark to trigger sponsored links is not a use of a trademark within the meaning of the Lanham Act, either, because there is no allegation that defendant places plaintiff's trademark on any goods, containers, displays, or advertisements, or that its internal use is visible to the public. * * *

Thus, in the absence of allegations that defendant placed plaintiff's trademark on any goods, displays, containers, or advertisements, or used plaintiff's trademark in any way that indicates source or origin, plaintiff can prove no facts in support of its claim which would demonstrate trademark use. The Court accordingly dismissed plaintiff's Lanham Act claims, finding each required a showing of trademark use. Other Courts Have Differing Views In reaching this result, the Court found support in the decision of the court in Merck & Co. Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). It declined to follow the lead of the courts in either Geico v. Google, 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) or Edina Realty v. MLS Online.com, 2006 WL 737064 (D.Minn., March 20, 2006) which had both denied motions to dismiss trademark infringement claims arising out of similar activity.

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The 1800 [Contacts Inc. v. WhenUCom, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005)] opinion looked to the definition of the term use in commerce provided in 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 1127. That definition provides in part that a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce TTT (2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce. 15 U.S.C. 1127. Our court found that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant made a use in commerce of the plaintiffs mark, within that definition.

notes

1. One purpose of trademark law is to facilitate consumer search and avoid consumer confusion. 2. Use in commerce vs. Likelihood of confusion The term use in commerce means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce (1) on goods when (A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such place- ment impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported in commerceTTTT

III.

THE SCOPE OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS Defenses FAIR USE

KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP, INC. V. LASTING IMPRESSION I, INC. Issue: Whether a party raising the statutory affirmative defense of fair use to a claim of trademark infringement has a burden to negate any likelihood that the practice complained of will confuse consumers about the origin of the goods or services affected?

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Facts of the case: This case is about two permanent make up companies that both use the term Micro Colors either as one word or two. KP Permanent Make Up (KP) has used the term since 1990 or 1991. Then in 1992, Lasting Impression I (Lasting) registered a trademark under 15 U.S.C. 1051, consisting of the terms micro and colors, and then in 1999, the registration became incontestable as defined in 15 U.S.C. 1065. Lasting demanded that KP stop using the word microcolor. Because of these demands, KP sued Lasting for declaratory relief. Procedural Posture: After KP sued for declaratory relief, Lasting counterclaimed alleging that KP had infringed Lastings trademark. KP responded to this allegation by asserting the affirmative defense of fair use under 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4). Because Lasting agreed that KP only used the term microcolor to describe its goods, not as a trademark, the District Court found that KP was acting fairly and in good faith as is required under 1115(b)(4) because KP had undisputedly used the mark continuously since before Lasting used the mark. The District Court found that KP had proved its affirmative defense and, without deciding on whether KPs practice was likely to cause consumer confusion, entered summary judgment for KP under Lastings trademark infringement case. The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts ruling stating that the Court erred in finding an affirmative defense without examining the issue of whether there was consumer confusion about the origin of KPs goods. The Ninth Circuit appears to have placed the burden of proof on KP to show the absence of such consumer confusion when arguing its affirmative defense. This case was granted certiorari and was then heard before the Supreme Court of the United States. Holding: A party raising the statutory affirmative defense of fair use to a claim of trademark infringement does not have a burden to negate any likelihood that the practice complained of will confuse consumers about the origin of the goods or services affected. The Supreme Court found (1) that 1115(b) places a burden of proving likelihood of confusion on the party charging infringement, and (2) that Congress said nothing about the likelihood of confusion when establishing the elements of the fair use defense under 1115(b)(4). The Supreme Court also found that Congress not mentioning anything about a defendant's burden on this fair use defense was almost

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certainly not an oversight, since the House Trademarks Subcommittee refused to forward a proposal expressly providing likelihood to deceive the public as an element of the fair use defense. Critical Analysis: This case confirms the notion that a defendant does not have to disprove the likelihood of confusion to win its affirmative defense case. In cases such as these, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove consumer confusion, not on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving some element (like confusion). The only job of the defendant is to leave the factfinder unpersuaded that the plaintiff has carried its own burden on that point. CENTURY 21 REAL ESTATE CORP. V. LENDINGTREE, INC.
Nominative fair use is said to occur when the alleged infringer uses the mark to describe the [trademark holders] product, even if the alleged infringers ultimate goal is to describe his own product. Nominative fair use also occurs if the only practical way to refer to something is to use the trademarked term. By contrast, classic fair use occurs where the defendant uses the plaintiffs mark to describe the defendants own product.

Today we adopt a two-step approach in nominative fair use cases. The plaintiff must first prove that confusion is likely due to the defendants use of plaintiffs mark. * * * Once plaintiff has met its burden of proving that confusion is likely, the burden then shifts to defendant to show that its nominative use of plaintiffs mark is nonetheless fair. To demonstrate fairness, the defendant must satisfy a three-pronged nominative fair use test, derived to a great extent from the one articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Under our fairness test, a defendant must

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show: (1) that the use of plaintiffs mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiffs product or service and the defendants product or service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiffs mark as is necessary to describe plaintiffs product; and (3) that the defendants conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendants products or services.

Notes

FIRST AMENDMENT LAMPARELLO V. FALWELL BOSLEY MEDICAL INSTITUTE, INC. KREMER

D created a website to criticize the services of the plaintiff, who sued for trademark infringement

Notes

1. Trademark fair use vs. Copyright fir use a. Trademark i. If the infringers uses the mark to refer to the trademark owners product or service or to refer to his own product or service, then the trademark infringing use is fair. ii. Whether the mark is being used in a trademark sense or in a descriptive sense. b. Copyright: i. Fair use was originally a justification for infringement that developed along equitable lines.

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ii. If used to further some other end (criticism) and not to interfere with owners rights to expression it is deemed fair iii. Copyright ct 1976 multifactor test most important effect on potential market

Remedies
Remedies available under the Lanham Act

GRACIE V. GRACIE

Notes 1. Injunctive relief is a standard remedy subject to the usual equitable defenses, but is discretionary. 2. An injunction will not be granted to prevent trademark in geographic area that the trademark owner has not entered.

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3. Profits and damages are both recoverable, but there cannot be double recovery. 4. The award of profits and damages are subject to the principles of equity. 5. To establish profits, the trademark owner must establish the amount of the defendants sales. The defendant as the burden to establish its costs in selling the infringing items. 6. The court has the discretion to enhance or diminish the profits award is they are deemed inadequate or excessive. 7. Attorneys fees and costs and awarded to the prevailing party in exceptional cases under sec. 1117(a).

1. The principal case presents the analysis of remedies fairly comprehensively and should give you a sense of the issues that arise in determining how to remedy trademark infringement. There are several points worth highlighting: a. Injunctive relief is a standard remedy subject to the usual equitable defenses, but is discretionary. However, likelihood of success on the merits (which in the context of trademark, means likelihood of confusion) is usually enough to establish that there is irreparable injury that only an injunction can remedy. See DialAMattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). b. An injunction will not be granted to prevent trademark use in a geographic area that the trademark owner has not entered. In such situations, the possibility of confusion is not considered grave enough to merit injunctive relief. See Dawn Donut Company, Inc. v. Harts Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); National Association for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2001). c. Profits and damages are both recoverable, but there cannot be double recovery. To the extent, that the defendants profits are money that the plaintiff would have made absent infringement, the plaintiff cannot recover that amount twice, once as disgorged profits and once as damages. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992). d. The award of profits and damages are subject to the principles of equity. Since profits are viewed as a form of unjust enrichment, some courts do not award profits unless the defendant has acted in bad faith. See Quick Technologies, Inc. v. The Sage Group, PLC, 313 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the conflict and rejecting the requirement of bad faith). e. To establish profits, the trademark owner must establish the amount of the defendants sales. The defendant has the burden to establish its costs in selling the infringing items. The difference between the sales as established by the plaintiff and the costs as established by the defendant are the profits that can be disgorged to the trademark owner. See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992). f. The court has the discretion to enhance or diminish the profits award if they are deemed inadequate or excessive. The court also has the discretion to increase the

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damage award up to three times the amount awarded by the jury. The statute states that the enhancement of either profits or damages is for the purposes of compensation, and not punishment. See Sands, Taylor, supra. g. Attorneys fees and costs and awarded to the prevailing party in exceptional cases under 1117(a). Courts vary in the standard for exceptional cases, with some courts requiring willful or malicious conduct (see Gracie v. Gracie, above), some requiring the plaintiff failing to show any damage (see CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1992)), and others appealing to equitable principles to determine when a case is exceptional (see Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 2000).

Statutory Provisions: Uniform Trade Secrets Act 7 Overview, Elements 7-44 E.I. DUPONT DENEMOURS & COMPANY, INC. V., CHRISTOPHER

BREACH OF CONFIDENCE SMITH V. DRAVO CORP. Smith v. Dravo Corp. (1953) pg. 67 Here we have two parties that are involved, but they dont have an agreement. Smith created a cargo or shipping container that could easily be transferred from ship to rail or truck, this technology allows easy transportation of goods. Smith dies and the estate needs the money to pay off inheritance taxes and in comes Dravo to buy Smiths company, but the deal falls through and Dravo, having acquired plans in the negotiations, develops his own container. (FYI patents used to not be published until they were granted) So, we have secrets inn the form of blueprints and plans. And Dravo takes the information, which leads to the issue here: Did Dravo misappropriate trade secrets? There was no express agreement, but there was an implied relationship.

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You could argue that this case was decided incorrectly because Dravo innovated here, building a better container, though he did it in an underhanded way taking something that wasnt his and now the Smith business could be valueless. Take away from this case: a) Its one thing if you are blabbing, but another if you were told in confidence as it was here. b) Again, we must always ask 1) was there a secret and then 2) was there a position of trust and confidence that would protect against disclosure. BN mentioned looking up ARROWS INFORMATION PARADOX. Which gets to the idea of the need to disclose and the need to keep secret. Reverse Engineering (RE) is a defense to trade secret information. Ex. Dravo creates his own container; RC Cola creates their own coke like product. RE is a proper means that does not constitute taking a trade secret. So, even where there is a Trade Secret, you can independently invent the product yourself. (Not so with patents) We justify this because we reward hard work and there is nothing immoral when you reverse engineer, you could argue that it is slightly unethical, but this is part of our American way, work hard, develop, compete.

DEFENSES TO MISAPPROPRIATION AND RIGHTS AGAINST OTHERS

Unlike patent infringmetn which is a strict liability offense, liability for trade secret misappropriation depends on how the protected information was misapprpriated. Party must I. II. Aquired information Usedi nformation in an improper manner The honest Discoverer a. Actual Indepednent invention isa complete defense Reverse Engineering

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a. Starting with the known product and working backward to find the method by which it was devloped. The innocent wrongful User

III.

CIVIL REMEDIES WINSTON RESEARCH CORP V. MINNESOTA MINING AND MANUFACTURING CO.

CHICAGO LOCK CO.

V FANBERG

Defenses to Trade Secret 44-78 Misappropriation, Civil and Criminal Protection Research Methods Presentation PEOPLE V. PRIBICH

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Copyright: Public and Private Rights 78-109 Overview, constitutional and statutory bases for Copyright: originality and fixation. CHAPTER 3. COPYRIGHT PUBLIC & PRIVATE RIGHTS

The prequel and Foundations of copyright

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTYFYING ND DEFINING

The public domain intelectual content use is conceptual, rather than tangible. It represents relative rights, duties, privileges, powers and immunities that exist between and amond memders of the public domain. I. Definition a. The public domain is the priceless repository of works that are: i. Ineligible for copyright ii. Were created before copyrigh law existed iii. Have had their copyrights expire iv. Or have been freeely given to the public by their authors

Constitutinal and Statutory Basas for copyright BAKER V. SELDEN

Selden wrote a how-to book that described a new, exciting method of bookkeeping, including example ledgers for better ways to keep track of revenues and expenses. Baker wrote a book on bookkeeping also. It used ledgers that were pretty much the same as the ones Selden proposed. Selden sued for copyright infringement. o Selden argued that Baker had stolen his method. o Baker argued that you can't copyright a method, only an expression of that method. Because his book didn't slavishly copy Selden's, it was not a violation of Selden's copyright.

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Baker didn't copy any of the text from Selden's book, he just used the same bookkeeping system. The Trial Court found for Selden. Baker appealed. o The Trial Court found that Baker's books were "in large and material part identical with and infringements of the books of Selden system." The US Supreme Court reversed. o The US Supreme Court found that a copyright did not give an author the right to prevent others from using the same method. "The copyright of a book on bookkeeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell, and use account books prepared upon the plan set forth in such a book." o The Court found that Selden couldn't copyright the forms because the forms are necessary to the use of the bookkeeping system (aka merger). The concept of merger is that if an idea can only be expressed in one way or a few ways, granting a copyright on that expression would effectively lock up anybody from using the idea. Therefore, since you can't copyright ideas, you can't copyright those limited ways to express the idea because the idea behind the work merges with its expression. The Court found that the forms are functional and not expressive, so Selden couldn't copyright the forms for that reason either. o The Court found that what Selden was really trying to protect was a patent on his method, but he didn't have a patent. He only had a copyright. Patents are used to protect ideas and methods (aka "useful arts"). Copyrights can only be used to protect expressions. "The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself." At the time, Selden's method would probably not have been eligible for patent protection, but he could probably patent it now under 35 U.S.C. 101.

SATAVA V. LOWRY

The prerequisites of copyright

Once subject mtter is determined to be within the purview of cpyright, the question is whether the act of authorship meets the criteria for protection.
Sect. 102. Subject matter of copyright: In general (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title [17 USCS Sects. 101 et seq.], in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;

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(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.

ORIGINLITY FIEST PUBLICATIONS, INC V. RURL TLEPHONE SERVICE COMPANY, INC Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. (Rural) (plaintiff) provides telephone service to communities in northwest Kansas. Under state regulation, Rural is required to issue a telephone directory every year. Because Rural is the sole telephone service provider to these areas, Rural easily collects the contact information of its subscribers and compiles them alphabetically in its white pages. Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist) (defendant) is a publishing company that also issues telephone directories. Because Feist does not provide telephone services, compilation of subscriber information is more difficult. For this reason, Feist approached 11 different telephone companies, including Rural, and offered to pay to use their white pages listings. Although Rural refused, Feist nevertheless copied 1,309 of Rurals listings. Rural brought suit alleging copyright infringement.

Rural was a telephone company in Kansas. They were required by State law to give away phone books, and they made money by selling ads in their Yellow Pages. o Rural was a legal monopoly, which meant that no one else could provide local telephone service within their area. Feist was in the business of making phone books. They had a book that contained all of Rural's area plus the areas of 11 other phone companies. They also made money by selling ads in their Yellow Pages. o Rural got their white pages information by looking at their own customer records. Feist didn't have that option, since they weren't a phone company.

COPYRIGHT LAW
They approached all 12 telephone companies and asked to pay for the right to use their white pages listings. Rural refused. o Feist got a copy of Rural's directory and copied the information out of it. Feist enhanced their directory by adding street addresses, which Rural didn't have in their directory. Rural learned that Feist was using Rural's data and sued for copyright infringement. o Interesting, Rural learned of the copying because phone companies include a few fictional persons into their phone books to detect if someone is copying them! The Trial Court found for Rural. Feist appealed. o Feist argued that it was economically impractical to travel door-to-door to collect the information. o Plus, Feist argued that phone numbers are just facts, and facts aren't copyrightable. o Rural argued that compilations of facts are copyrightable. The Appellate Court affirmed. Feist appealed. The US Supreme Court reversed. o The US Supreme Court rejected the idea that a compilation copyrightable just because the author put effort into building the compilation. aka the sweat of the brow approach. See International News Service v. Associated Press (248 U.S. 215 (1918)). o The Court found that facts are not copyrightable, but compilations of facts might be, if the author chooses which facts to include and how to arrange the data. That satisfied the requirement for originality. Basically, if you select or arrange the facts in an original way, you can copyright that original selection/arrangement. However, the facts themselves are not copyrightable, so the only thing Rural could copyright is the original selection and arrangement of facts. o The Court found that Rural had done no real selection or arrangement in their phone book. Therefore Rural's directory was not copyrightable. Rural's phone book was "not only unoriginal, it was practical inevitable." All they did was put the names in alphabetical order. What other way could they have done it? Copyright is intended to award "originality, not effort." o On the other hand, the Court found that although Feist copied the numbers out of Rural's phone book, they merged it with other data and changed the selection and arrangement, so it became original. 17 U.S.C. 102(a) identifies three elements to qualify as a copyrightable compilation: o The collection and assembly of preexisting material, facts or data. o The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials.

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o

The creation, by virtue of the particular selection of an 'original' work of authorship.

Facts cannot be copyrighted, however compilations of facts can generally be copyrighted. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author, which means that the work was independently created by the author, and it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. A work may be original even thought it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. Facts are not original. The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he has merely discovered its existence. Facts may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person. Factual compilations may possess the requisite originality. The author chooses what facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected date so they may be effectively used by readers. Thus, even a directory that contains no written expression that could be protected, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement. But, even though the format is original, the facts themselves do not become original through association. The copyright on a factual compilation is limited to formatting. The copyright does not extend to the facts themselves. To establish copyright infringement, two elements must be proven: ownership of a valid copyright and copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. The first element is met in this case because the directory contains some forward text. As to the second element, the information contains facts, which cannot be copyrighted. They existed before being reported and would have continued to exist if a telephone directory had never been published. There is no originality in the formatting, so there is no copyrightable expression. Thus, there is no copyright infringement.

Copyright Law-Statutory Provisions: 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101- 103; 105 - 107, 109, 110, 113, 201

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10 The Subject Matter of Copyright Copyright formalities, infringement and remedies 109-142 FIXATION

1. In order for a work of authorship to be protected by copyright law, not only must that work be original, it must also be fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 2. Requirement is derived from Constitution a. A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is fixed for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission. 3. Another way to state the fixation requirement is as extending copyright protection only to works that are recorded by some medium. 4. Live performances are not protected. a. If a live performance is recorded, copyright law protects against i. unauthorized copying, ii. distribution, iii. adaptation, and iv. public performances of the recording.

COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES
1. Past a. The stat prerequisites of publication, deposit, registration and notice were originally mandatory. 2. Present a. A work does not have to be published,

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b. no notice of copyright is required to be inscribed on copies of the work and deposit of the work and c. registration is treated as a condition subsequent not to perfection, but as provided in 17 U.S.C. 411(b) * * * d. no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. 3. 1976 Copyright Act a. Removed the forml requirements of i. Registration ii. Publication iii. Notice to obtain copyright protection 4. Under contemporary law copyright is created as soon as a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. a. In order to bring a suit for infrngment timely registration is required.

Subject Matter of Copyright, Boundaries and Enforcement

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMTN ND REMEDIES BOISSON V. BANIAN, LTD.

BOISSON V. BANIAN, LTD. PIVOT POINT INTERN. INC V. CHARLENE PRODUCTS, INC.
ISSUE Is the mannequin head subject to copyright protection? HOLDING -Mannequin head is useful. The Mara head is subject to copyright protection (that hungry look...). RULES-If an article is not useful, then the article is a pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work entitled to protection. -A useful article falls within the definition of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works only if and only to the extent that such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article. TESTS (1) Artistic features = primary, utilitarian features = secondary.

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(2) The useful article would still be marketable to some significant segment of the population simply because of its aesthetic qualities. (3) Article stimulates in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function (Temporal Displacement Test). (4) The artistic design was not significantly influenced by functional considerations. (5) Artistic features can stand on their own as a work of art traditionally conceived and the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it. (6) Artistic features are not utilitarian. ANALYSIS -Ornamental belt buckles: The primary ornamental aspects of the buckles is conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function. -Clothing display torsos: Not copyrightable - to the extent the forms possess aesthetically pleasing features, even when these features are considered in the aggregate, they can not be conceptualized as existing independently of their utilitarian function. -Ribbon bicycle rack: not copyrightable. It was, in its final form essentially a product of industrial design. -If the elements reflect the independent artistic judgment of the designer, conceptual separability exists. -Court says: Mara face is subject to protection. -Its easy to conceptualize a human face independent of all Maras specific fac ial features. Hungry Look = protected from copying. The creative aspects of the Mara statue were meant to be seen and admired. Mannequin heads are copyrightable even though they are also useful articles.Pivot Point manufactured the Mara mannequin head, which was designed toimitate the hungry look of high-fashion, runway models. Charlene Productss u b s e q u e n t l y b e g a n ma r k e t i n g i ts o wn L i z a m a n n e q u i n h ea d , w h i c h b o re a striking similarity to the Mara head. After reviewing the doctrine of separab-ility, the court found that Charlene had infringed Pivots copyright to the Marah e a d . T h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t c o py r i g h t a b il i t y s h o u l d de p e n d o n t he e xt e n t to which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considera-tions and that [c]onceptual separability exists [ ] when the artistic aspects of a n a r t i c l e c a n b e c o n c e p t u a l i ze d a s e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n de n t l y o f t h e i r u t il i ta r ia n function. Applying this standard to the Mara head, the court observed that o n e i s n o t o n l y a b le t o c o n c e i v e o f a di f f e r e n t fa c e t h a n t h a t p o rt r a y e d on t h e Mara mannequin, but one easily can conceive of another visage that portrays thehungry look on a high-fashion runway model.

11

Copyright Software, &

143 172 Architectural Work

SOFTWARE COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERN, INC. V. ALTAI

ARCHITECTURAL WORKS

COPYRIGHT LAW
T-PEG, INC. V. VERMONT TIMBER WORKS, INC.
1. What is a copyright? 2. How do we define what it is in terms of copyright law 3. What is the scope of copyright? (parameters of protections that copyright law offers with this particular issue) 4. What is infringement 5. How do you as a plaintiff establish 6. How do you prove one of elements 7. In suit for infringement who has the burden of proof

Substantial similarity is the entire test Probbtive similarity is just a prong . probabtive is what you use is when you are trying to prove access its more likely than not you copied

DERIVATIVE WORKS
A derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a derivative work.

SCHROCK V. LEARNING CURVE INTERN., INC

12

Copyright-Selected Authorship Problems 172 192 [Classroom presentations continue until the end of the semester]

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SELECTED PROBLEMS OF AUTHORSHIPAND CO-AUTHORSHIP

CCNV V. REID

13 14 15

Moral Rights

192 206 Fair Use

207 - 237

Copyright Term Extension 237-257 Class Participation presentations Patents-Introduction to Patent Law 257 - 271 Discussion on newly enacted patent reform

CHAPTER 4: PATENT
Overview
I. Congress a. Art. I sec. 8, claus 8. Of Constitution provides basis for patent law. b. 1st Congress passed Patent Act of 1790 c. Patent Act of 1952 grants patent protection for 17 years from the date of issuance d. Jan 1995 Paptent protection extends for 20 years from the date of filing, to conform for internationlk trade agreements Under federal law, a patent grants the patent holder the exclusive right to prevent others from making, using , or selling any patented invention within the US and importing a patented invention.

II.

Introduction to Patent Law

A BRIEF HISTORY
I. II. III. The Venetian Patent System England Patent System American Patent System a. The 1st const conventiona nationalied the patent system in the Patent ct of 1790 b. Thoms efferson ( contributed original statute, and served as 1st patent administrator.)

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c. Original Patent System Required registration instead of formls examiniation process. Revisions a. 1836 revision changed rgistration to formal examination b. Inventice leap became nonobviousness requirement c. After war a desire for greater patent protection led congress to pass the Patent Act of 1952 which codified the ideas of novelty and infrinement

IV.

International Patent Concerns

I. The US is ap art to 4 agreements hta llow inventors from foreign countries to receive equal patent protection in the country a. The International Convention for the Protection of Industril Property (Paris convention) b. Greement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) c. Part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) d. The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

THE PARIS CONVENTION

I. II. III. Instituted in 1883 adopted by the US in 1887 Revised in 1967. Established reciprocal rights and sets rules to establish priority Reciprocal Rights a. Asures inventors that patents acquired in a foreign country wil provide the same protectionsgranted to the countrys nationals, but it does not gurantee that patent protection will be the same from country to country. Provides assuance tha signatory countries wi;; treat all patent holders equally. Priority a. The ight to priority estabished a filing date that holds for subsequent filings in other signatory countries duringa given period. b. Utility patents period of priority is 12 months

IV.

PCT PATETN COOPERATION TREATY

TRIPS

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INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

Overview of the Patent Document

I. A patent must include: Section 112 a. A drawing b. Specification i. A written description of the invention ii. That is clear and concise iii. Which should enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention described iv. Discloses the best ode for carrying out the invention c. At least one claim i. Used to determine the scope of the intellectual property patented ii. Defines the boundaries of protection using limitations that confine IP either by quali or by steps in a process. iii. May be written as either independent of, or dependent on, the limitations of other claims. iv. Claims determine the extent of the inventor Patent Prosecution a. A process where an applicant must file patent application with the Patent and Trademark office in order to obtain a patent. Interference a. US uses first to invent system if there is a dispute about inventorship the first inventor is determined using interference Infringement a. Involves i. making, ii. using, offering for sale, or iii. selling any patented invention within the US or its territories b. Importing patented inventions or their components may also qualify s infringement c. Procedure i. District courts first hear patent claims ii. On appeal lll claims go to Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit d. Remedies (2 types) i. Award damges 1. Lost profits 2. If inuredp arty can show willful infringement attorneys fees

II.

III.

IV.

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ii. Grant injunctive Relief e. Defenses to infringement i. Invalidation ii. Inequitable conduct iii. Patent Misuse iv. General defenses equitable estopple, laches, expiration of stat period orp protection

Patent Law-Statutory Provisions-Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. Sec 1 -376 16 Patentability-What is patentable? 271 298 Patentability What is Patentable?

SECTION 101: INVENTIONS PATENTABLE

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
DIAMOND V. CHAKRABARTY

Chakrabarty applied for a patent for a genetically-engineered bacteria that could eat all the different components of oil. There were three parts to the patent: o Method for producing the bacteria, o Composition of a slurry of bacteria and carrier liquids, and o The bacteria themselves. The USPTO allowed the first two claims, but denied the third. Chakrabarty appealed. o The USPTO looked to 35 U.S.C. 101 and found that living things are not patentable subject matter. 101 requires that an invention be manufactured or a composition of matter (or a machine, or a process). Living things aren't manufactured, they are 'grown', and they aren't composition of matter, they are living organisms. So they didn't fit under any of the definitions of things that are patentable. The USPTO had a rule saying that things like new strains of plants (aka 'products of nature') were not patentable.

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Chakrabarty argued that the genetic engineering he did on the bacteria was a form of manufacture, therefore it met the standard. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and awarded the patent. The USPTO appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. o The US Supreme Court noted that laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas cannot be patented. That includes plants and minerals you find in the environment, as well as mathematical formulas. o However, the Court found that genetically-engineered organisms fall within the definition of manufactured. "Chakrabarty's claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matterHis discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own, accordingly it is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101." Basically, 'products of nature' are not patentable because the discoverer isn't really an 'inventor' they didn't do anything themselves, they just found something that preexisted. However, that argument doesn't apply to Chakrabarty because he did work to create the new bacteria. o The Court also found that bacteria could technically meet the definition of a composition of matter. o The Court noted that Congress had in the past excluded certain inventions from patent (like nuclear bombs), so if Congress didn't want people patenting genetically-modified organisms they were free to change the law. The Court felt that the patent system should be read broadly to encompass new fields that Congress didn't foresee when they wrote 101. o The Plant Protection Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act (see 25 U.S.C. 161-164) were passed by Congress specifically to create a patent regime that would cover living things, implying that Congress felt that the general patent system wouldn't cover living things. If bacteria (and presumably plants) are covered by 101, then doesn't 161-164 become superfluous? The Court considered this argument, but rejected it.
o

NOTES
1. Chakrabarty includes plant life nd products of plant innovation such as genetically modified seeds and plants 2. Naturally Occurring Organisms. Combination of bacteria not patentable subject matter 3. Natural Products. 4. Natural Phenomena Unpatentable 5. Research in the field of Biotechnologym m 6. Patenting Federall Supoorted Inventions

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WHAT IS A PROCESS
According to Chakrabarty Section 101 may include anything under the sun that is made by man

17 18 19 20 21 22

Patentability-Utility Patentability Patentability Patentability Patentability Infringement

298 312

312 - 335 335 365 365 395 395 417 420 486 (Certain Text portions to be assigned)

23

Moral Rights, Overview of State Provisions

669-692

24 25 26

Rights of Publicity

724 - 762 1124 1136 1136-1152

Criminalizing Intellectual Property Law Intellectual Property In Developing Countries