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FINANCE AND TAXATION

Rutledge v Chandler

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants sought review of a decision from a trial court order that enjoined appellant Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting taxes, imposed pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 83-349, 17, against appellees' inventory of alcoholic beverages. The First District Court of Appeal (Florida) certified this matter for direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court as requiring immediate resolution. OVERVIEW: After a trial court concluded that Fla. Stat. ch. 83-349, 17, which imposed a "floor tax" against appellees' retail inventories of alcoholic beverages, was an unconstitutional ad valorem tax, under Fla. Const. art. VII, 1(a), and permanently enjoined appellant Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting the taxes, the appellate court certified appellants' challenge to the trial court's order. The court reversed the trial court's order. The court ruled that 17 was not a property tax because it was not levied on value assessed by assessors and that it also affirmatively satisfied the criteria for an excise tax. The court noted that 17 tax was imposed against appellees' retail inventory as it existed on the effective date of a statewide increase in the alcoholic beverage tax, and that the 17 tax was intended, among other things, to ensure that all alcoholic beverages sold by retailers after the effective date bore the same tax rate. As such, the court concluded, the tax was not on inventory, but on a privilege as measured by appellees' inventory, and was therefore not an unconstitutional ad valorem tax. OUTCOME: The court reversed an order that permanently enjoined appellant Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting taxes that were imposed against appellees' inventory of alcoholic beverages. The taxes imposed by the statute at issue were not impermissible ad valorem taxes on appellees' inventory, but were taxes on appellees' privilege to sell alcohol, measured by their inventory. The tax was thus a constitutionally imposed excise tax.
direct v indirect tax...it looks like an ad valorem tax; but ad valorem is a tax on the value so there would need to have been an appraiser

that went out there All taxes, other than polls, are either direct or indirect property

taxes. A direct tax is one that is imposed directly upon property, according to its value. It is generally spoken of as a property tax or an ad valorem tax. An indirect tax is a tax upon some right or privilege, or corporate franchise, and is most often called an excise or occupational tax. An excise and a property tax, when the two approach each other, ordinarily may be distinguished by the respective methods adopted for laying them and fixing their amounts. If a tax is imposed directly by the legislature without assessment, and its sum is measured by the amount of business done, income previously received, or by the extent to which a taxable privilege may have been enjoyed or exercised by the taxpayer, irrespective of the nature or value of such taxpayer's assets or his investments in business, it is to be regarded as an excise tax. But if the tax is computed upon the valuation of the property, and assessed by assessors, either where it is situated or at the owner's domicile, although privileges may be included in the valuation, it is considered a property tax.
Bd of Pub Instruction v Treasurer

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant county school board, having brought a declaratory judgment against appellee state officials, sought reversal of the order of a Brevard County (Florida) trial court declaring Fla. Stat. chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7) to be constitutional. OVERVIEW: Appellant county school board filed suit against appellees state treasurer, state board of education and education commissioner, and junior college board of trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment that Fla. Stat. chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7) (1967) were unconstitutional. Appellant contended that it had the exclusive power to set local school taxes and to regulate the free educational system in the county, and that in consequence, junior colleges either should be controlled by it or should not be permitted to receive local funding under the provisions of chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7). The trial court found the statutes constitutional. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court held that when a local district which promoted the establishment of a junior college later withdraw that funding, the state

could likewise withdraw state support for the local school district pursuant to the challenged statutes. The court determined that junior colleges were part of the public school system authorized by Fla. Const. art. IX. OUTCOME: The trial court's order that declared statutes regarding junior college funding to be constitutional was affirmed. The state constitution's provisions dealing with the state's free educational system permitted the state to require local governments to help fund junior colleges within their localities.
Facts: a community college system that isn't governed by the state; but state law requires that it be supported by funds created by ad valorem taxes but constitution divies up to allow diff municipal bodies to create *** but argument is that counties don't control the community collges, but are being forced to give up some funds to support these state things

Fla. Const. art. IX, 1 recognizes that there are three areas of public education (1) a uniform system of free public schools, (2) institutions of higher learning and (3) other public education programs Fla. Const. art. IX, 3 authorizes long terms for any appointive board dealing with education, and that provision clearly contemplates that boards may be established by law to function in the operation of the various phases of the state school program subject, of course, to the control of free public schools by the local boards Fla. Const. art. IX, 4(b), in addition to authorizing local school boards to operate, control and supervise the free public schools within their districts, also requires that they determine the rate of school district taxes within the constitutional limits - however, some of the taxes so levied by the local school district can properly be used for local school purposes other than the support of the free public schools when so provided by law (see following note) Fla. Const. art. VII, 9 places a limit of 10 mills on taxes for all school purposes. "All school purposes" is certainly broader than the phrase "free public schools" used in Fla. Const. art. IX. This implies that while the local school board must determine the rate of all school district taxes, some of the taxes so levied by the local school district

can properly be used for local school purposes other than the support of the free public schools when so provided by law. Fla. Const. art. VII, 8 provides that state funds may be appropriated to the several counties, school districts, municipalities or special districts upon such conditions as may be provided by general law Subject to the power of the legislature to establish a uniform system of free public schools, the control of the free public schools in each district is vested in the local school board. This does not prohibit the legislature from placing upon the local school districts the duty to render financial support to junior colleges which are not under the control of the local school boards but which have been established at their request. Thus, statutes providing for local support of junior colleges which aren't under the control of the local board of public instruction but which have been established at board's request are constitutional and valid. Fla. Const. art. VII, 1 prohibits state ad valorem taxes. Ad valorem taxes levied by school districts for support of junior colleges are local taxes levied for local purposes. Thus, even ad valorem taxes levied by county board of public instruction for support of junior colleges which aren't under the control of the local county board but which have been established at board's request are "local taxes" levied for local purposes, rather than prohibited state ad valorem taxes.
Legislature may not circumvent prohibition against state ad

valorem taxation by any scheme or device which requires local ad valorem taxes and then channels proceeds into essentially state functions which are not also local functions
State v City of Port Orange - Impact Fees

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant state sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court for Volusia County (Florida), which found appellee city's proposed transportation ordinance valid. OVERVIEW: Appellee city enacted a transportation ordinance requiring its citizens to pay a fee based on their usage of appellee's roads.

Appellant state contended that the ordinance was not valid because it was a tax, and as such, it had to be authorized by general law. The trial court held that the ordinance was valid because it imposed a user fee on appellee's residence, rather than a tax. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the ordinance imposed a tax on appellee's residents that was not authorized by general law. The supreme court determined that the fee was a tax because it was a mandatory charge imposed on all residents. Moreover, the supreme court determined that the ordinance did not impose a user's fee because a user's fee was paid voluntarily. The supreme court concluded that if a resident did not pay the fee imposed by the transportation ordinance, a lien would be placed on the resident's property. The supreme court further concluded that residents had no choice but to pay the fee. OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision because appellee city's proposed transportation ordinance imposed a tax on appellee city's residents that was not authorized by general law. The supreme court held that the ordinance did not impose a valid user's fee because residents were required to pay the fee or have a lien placed on their properties.
Facts: city wanted citizens to pay a fee based on use of roads - tax ct said it was ok b/c it's like a user fee Sup ct of FL said it's a tax, not a user fee - held that transportation utility fees used to finance bonds were unauthorized tax, rather than a valid user fee something about voluntariness user fee for a road would be a toll - b/c there's a meaningful connection b/w actual use *** driving on the road is pretty voluntary constitution draws a line b/w taxes and fees - two kinds; user fee and impact fee impact fee - Contractors and Builders Assoc v Dunedin (talked about in this case) this case is a nice discussion on tax user fees and impact fees, Rutledge is a nice discussion on ad valorem tax Canaveral Port Auth v Dept of Rev

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner port authority and respondent revenue department moved for rehearing and clarification of the

decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Brevard County (Florida), holding that petitioner's fee-simple interest in property was not immune from ad valorem taxation. OVERVIEW: The county in which petitioner port authority was located assessed ad valorem taxes against petitioner pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. 196.199(4) on the fee interest of real property owned by petitioner and leased to private entities engaged in nongovernmental activities. Petitioner filed suit challenging the assessment. Immunity from ad valorem taxation, which was necessary for the proper functioning of state government, was to be kept within narrow bounds, and not extended to exempting of commercial establishments operated for profit on property leased from the government. Therefore, fee interest in petitioner's property was not exempt from ad valorem taxation because the property was leased to a nongovernmental entity for a nongovernmental use. OUTCOME: Decision holding that petitioner's fee-simple interest in property was not immune from ad valorem taxation was affirmed, where the property was leased to a nongovernmental entity for nongovernmental use.
o def of states Facts: so states are immune, but what's a state? FL Dep of Rev v Gainesville

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, the Florida Department of Revenue, challenged the judgment of the District Court of Appeal (Florida), which affirmed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee city. The city had brought suit seeking a declaration that the portions of Fla. Stat. ch. 97-197, imposing the tax obligation on its telecommunications facilities, were unconstitutional under Fla. Const. art. VII, 3(a). OVERVIEW: The city became involved in the business of providing telecommunication services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and declared 2 and 3 of Fla. Stat. ch. 97 - 197

facially unconstitutional. The lower court affirmed, holding that the property in question was being used by the city for a municipal purpose and that the legislature's attempt to condition the provision of those municipal services on the payment of an amount equal to any ad valorem tax liability was in direct conflict with Fla. Const. art. VII, 3(a). The court, upon reviewing the applicable statutes and the meaning being various terms such as municipal purpose, held that providing telecommunications services did not, as a matter of law, always serve municipal or public purposes and, therefore, ad valorem taxation of a municipality's telecommunications facilities was not facially unconstitutional. The court agreed that telecommunications services were essential services but that, in providing those services, a municipality did not as a matter of law engage in an activity essential to the welfare of the community. OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision of the lower court that held that the statutory provisions imposing ad valorem taxation on telecommunications facilities were facially unconstitutional.
what's a public purpose? Strand v Escambia County

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant intervenor challenged a final judgment validating a proposed bond issue from the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, in and for Escambia County, Florida. Appellees were Escambia County, Florida, etc., et al. OVERVIEW: The intervenor raised three issues: (A) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance, (B) whether the circuit court's final judgment was supported by competent, substantial evidence, and (C) whether the bonds required a referendum pursuant to art. VII, 12, Fla. Const. On the first issue, given the adequacy of the notice provided and the circuit court's accommodation, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. With regard to the second issue, the intervenor argued that the circuit court's adoption of the County's proposed final judgment was an improper delegation of authority. This contention was without merit because the intervenor was afforded a meaningful opportunity to review the County's proposed final judgment, make objections, and

make his own proposals. Next, the court stated that the findings in the Ordinance and Resolution were not shown to have been clearly erroneous. Finally, the third issue was controlled by the court's decision in Penn, in which the court previously affirmed the Circuit Court's validation of bonds issued under a similar tax ordinance and resolution and issuance structure. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the final judgment of validation of the Escambia County Circuit Court.
Facts: o Ct said what was critical was constitutionality of the bonds bonds were going to create a trust fund non ad valorum revenue available? Jackson-Shaw

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On appeal from a federal district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions. It asked the present court to determine whether an aviation authority had become a joint owner with a private entity or whether it had given, lent, or used its credit to aid a private entity in violation of Art. VII, 10, Fla. Const. OVERVIEW: The agreement was for a private commercial development company's long-term use of vacant land owned by the authority. The court held that the agreement did not violate the constitutional prohibition against joint ownership. Although an option to ground lease required the authority to construct a road extension, it had already been planned and budgeted, so the authority was not using public funds to create a prohibited joint ownership. The authority was also obligated to provide land for wetlands mitigation, but this provision did not make the parties to the agreement joint owners. Furthermore, the agreement did not meet all of the elements of the test for a joint venture. Next, the authority was not impermissibly pledging its credit to aid the company. The constitutional prohibition contemplated not just the use of public funds but the imposition of a new financial liability and a direct or indirect obligation to pay a debt of

a third party. Under this standard, the authority had not given, lent, or used its credit to aid the company. Thus, the transaction needed to only serve a public purpose, which was fulfilled to the extent that the revenue might ultimately provide tax relief. OUTCOME: The court answered the certified questions in the negative and returned the case to the Eleventh Circuit.
Gallant v Stephen

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant taxpayer sought review of the decision of the Pinellas County Circuit Court (Florida) upholding the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r) in an action brought by appellant against appellee county board members to block the creation of municipal service taxing units. OVERVIEW: Appellee county board members adopted a resolution under Fla. Stat. chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r) creating a municipal service taxing unit spanning the unincorporated area of the county to fund the services provided to that area. Appellant taxpayer and property owner in this area, sued appellees challenging the newly imposed tax under Fla. Const. art. VII, 9. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r). The court affirmed the trial court's order. In finding ch. 125.01(1)(q), ( r) constitutional, the court relied on the language of art. VII, 9, which provided for the imposition of taxes by a county in order to provide municipal services separate and apart from the requirement that other types of taxes be approved by a referendum. The court also relied on the legislative intent that ch. 125.01(1)(q), (r) was to ensure that individuals living in the unincorporated area of the county also receive municipal services. Moreover, the court found that the tax did not violate Fla. Const. art. VII, 2 because the tax was applied in a uniform rate within the unincorporated area. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court order's declaring the law authorizing a county to furnish municipal services funded by ad valorem taxes in an unincorporated area without a referendum constitutional because the legislative intent was to provide such services, and the state constitution contemplated the imposition of

such taxes without a referendum.


Fl Dept of Rev v Howard

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant Florida Department of Revenue sought review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District (Florida), which declared that Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001) violated the mandate of Fla. Const. art. VII, 4. OVERVIEW: The appellate court had ruled that Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001) was unconstitutional because it interfered with a property appraiser's discretion to determine just value, and it favored tangible personal property owners who had received a reduced assessment from an administrative value adjustment board (VAB) in a previous tax year. The supreme court disagreed. Chapter 193.016 required an appraiser to consider the results of an appeal before VAB in the year prior in determining the current just value of tangible personal property. Fla. Stat. ch. 193.011 (2001) set out eight factors that were to be considered in valuing property. Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001) merely provided a ninth factor for consideration. It did not arbitrarily create a class of property for favored tax treatment. Further, ch. 193.016 did not require an appraiser to follow the VAB's assessment, it only required an appraiser to "consider" it. The statute's second sentence, which required an appraiser to justify his or her reasons for a decision to depart from a VAB assessment, simply regulated the procedural, not substantive, method of assessment where there had been a successful appeal to a VAB. OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the supreme court's decision
Capital City Country Club
CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The First District Court of Appeal (Florida) affirmed the judgment that Fla. Stat. Ann. 196.199(4) (1991) did not exempt petitioner, a private lessee of city property on a lease entered into before 1976, from paying real estate taxes and that petitioner's payment of tangible tax on the lease did not cause the value of the lease to be excluded from the

value of the property, and certified these questions to the court. OVERVIEW: Petitioner entered into a 99-year lease in 1956 to lease city-owned land for the use as a private golf course. The lease required petitioner to pay all ad valorem taxes. Petitioner paid intangible tax on the lease, and sued for an exemption from real estate taxes under Fla. Stat. Ann. 196.199(4) (1991), or to have the value of the lease excluded from the value of the land for real estate tax purposes. The trial court entered judgment against petitioner, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment and certified the question of the exemption and the exclusion. The court held that because 196.199(4) (1991) did not expressly exempt leases entered into before 1976 from taxation, and because Fla. Const. art. VII, 3(a) exempted city owned property from taxation only if it were being used for a public purpose, petitioner was not exempt from paying real estate taxes. Because the intangible tax on the lease and the real estate tax were two separate taxes on different types of property, there was no double taxation and the value of the lease could not be excluded from the value of the land for real estate for tax purposes. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision. OUTCOME: The court approved the decision affirming the denial of a real estate tax exemption or reduction to petitioner because the state constitution did not give petitioner, a private lessee of city land on a lease entered into before 1976, an exemption, thus the statute could not give exemptions to pre-1976 lessees, and because the value of the lease did not affect the value of the real estate and could not be excluded for tax valuations Volusia County v State CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant County of Volusia, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, challenged a judgment from the circuit court (Florida), where appellant's complaint for validation of capital improvement bonds was denied. Appellant claimed that it would pledge all unused revenue from regulatory fees. OVERVIEW: Appellant County of Volusia, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, challenged a judgment from the circuit court, which denied the complaint of the County of Volusia for validation of capital improvement bonds in the amount of $ 40,000,000, pledging unused revenues from regulatory fees and user charges to pay for the bonds. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the order denying validation. The pledge of all available funds had more than a mere incidental effect on the exercise of ad valorem taxing power. It required a referendum under the Fla. Const. art. VII, 12. The pledge of all available revenues, together with a promise to maintain the programs, would have had a substantial impact on the future exercise of ad valorem taxing power. The taxpayers of Volusia County had to have an opportunity to vote on the bond issue. OUTCOME: The state supreme court affirmed the circuit court's denial of appellant county's complaint to validate capital improvement bonds because the pledge of funds, offered by appellant, required a referendum under the state constitution Donovan v Okaloosa County CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee county filed a bond validation complaint pursuant to Ch. 75, Fla. Stat. (2008) seeking a determination of its authority to incur bonded debt relating to a

beach restoration project. Appellant owners of property subject to the related assessments intervened, filing an answer and counterclaims. The Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County (Florida) issued an order validating the bonds. The property owners appealed. OVERVIEW: The owners argued, among other things, that, in adopting the Assessment Resolution, the county failed to comply with its Municipal Service Benefit Unit (MSBU) Ordinance, and as a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to validate the bonds. The appellate court found, however, that the county fulfilled the 75.03, Fla. Stat. condition when it adopted the bond resolution, authorizing issuance of bonds to finance the underlying project. With this condition satisfied, the county was authorized to file the complaint. As all the requirements of the initial assessment resolution were fulfilled before the hearing, a separate hearing was not needed for consideration of the initial resolution and both the initial and final resolutions could be adopted jointly. Further, the requirements of the MSBU Ordinance were met. The MSBU Ordinance did not require a separate hearing to adopt first an initial and then a final assessment resolution. The property subject to the assessment derived a "special benefit" and the assessment was properly apportioned among the specially benefitting properties. Even if the paramount public purpose test applied, the project met that standard. OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed

GENERAL AND SPECIAL LAWS


Village of North Palm advanced via the PLs are arguing equal protection - which supports Gillen's theory that that's the *** commission did not have jx if the pop is over 100k..? if municipality doesn't exercise jx, the commission gets jx..? argument is that it doesn't treat all public utilities the same? public utilities commission is going to set rates that aren't in the best interest of ppl who use the services...so trying to undo the jx of the railroads over these utilities ct holds that there isn't a prob - railroad have ability to regulate utilities within their powers 1964 case still trying to tack on idea that state commission is too far removed from the *** ct says no, there is a rational difference also provided a distinction bw laws that function universally vs laws that function uniformly - law isn't necessarily discriminatory.. question is whether the.....is predicated on a fair, rational and reasonable classification so equal protection is idea that law should treat all similarly situated ppl the same way...this here, discussing distinction bw gen and special laws...discussion becomes whether ******** are differently situated in light of purpose of the law (which is to provide regulation of public

utilities) ct finds it is reasonable - so much so that it takes judicial notice of it Gulfstream Park Racing 25 mile radius only 3 tracks could be run argued that it was unconstitutional - b/c it only applied to one area of FL see beginning of prob of ppl going to legislature and trying to get special deals - passing laws as general laws that aren't truly general he likes this one b/c requires you to look at operation of law to see that it isn't a general law Statute prohibiting thoroughbred permitholders from engaging in intertrack wagering in any area of the state where there were three or more horse race permitholders within 25 miles of each other applied to precisely one 25-mile area in state, and there was no reasonable possibility that it would ever apply to another area of state, and thus statute was unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law and without compliance with the specific requirements for the enactment of special laws if there is no reas possibility that other ppl can enter the class - *** just like w appropriations bill, it is masquerading as a general law ct will take into account how it actually operates meaningful analysis of face of statute as well as (gillen finds it similar to dormant commerce clause scrutiny) description of class generally means its a general law bc all are situated similarly...but have to look at how statute is actually operated - if it is made so that only narrow **** Ocala Breeders
CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff gaming center filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant breeders and defendant Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, asking the trial court to declare Fla. Stat. ch. 550.615(9) unconstitutional. After the trial court declared the statute unconstitutional, the breeders and the division appealed to the Florida First District Court of Appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court. The breeders appealed. OVERVIEW: The breeders owned a permanent thoroughbred horse racing/sales facility and conducted horse sales. The breeders applied for and received a license to conduct intertrack wagering pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 550.61(8) (Supp. 1990), an earlier version of Fla. Stat. ch. 550.615(9), containing the same licensure criteria. The trial court found the statutory provisions created an impenetrable barrier to all intertrack wagering applicants except the breeders. The Florida Supreme Court agreed. The statute was unconstitutional as a special law enacted under the guise of a general law in violation of Fla. Const. art. III, 10. Fla. Stat. ch. 550.615 was enacted to increase revenues at pari-mutuel wagering facilities by providing protection to thoroughbred horse breeders from the state policy against off-track betting, but no rational relationship existed between this purpose and the detailed licensure criteria in the disputed statute. Curiously, the breeders were the only business entity that had ever obtained a

nonwagering thoroughbred racing permit. Fla. Stat. ch. 550.615 violated the equal protection rights of other potential licensees. OUTCOME: The supreme court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

wanted a permit in order to run tracks only ppl who could get permits were the breeders b/c of how ppl qualified for it theoretically other ppl could get the permit for this kind of gambling, but they have a tiebreaker provision that says - length of time applicant has **** Statute governing intertrack wagering license application was unconstitutional as a special law enacted under guise of a general law, as statutory provisions in tandem created impenetrable barrier to all intertrack wagering applicants except currently licensed wagering facility; under tiebreaker provision, current wagering facility would always prevail against another applicant because criteria essentially described current wagering facility Statute governing intertrack wagering license violated potential licensees right to equal protection of the law, where statute was enacted to increase revenues at pari-mutuel wagering facilities by providing protection to thoroughbred horse breeders from state policy against off-track betting, but no rational relationship existed between this purpose and detailed licensure criteria in statute found no rational basis bw licensing requirements and general purpose of the statute example of open class; general also shows adding of equal protection analysis - once you have args abouat gen vs special law, you're gonna make them under equal protection fed law - rational basis = legit interest; very deferential review; any rational basis bw means chosen and the legit public purpose of the statute o this one has gen vs special problem o then what are the purposes of the statte Schrader v FL Keys Aqueduct
CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority (FKAA) filed a complaint under Fla. Stat. ch. 75 in the Circuit Court in and for Monroe County, Florida, seeking validation of its sewer revenue bonds and a judgment that its service area was wholly within the Florida Keys area of critical state concern and that 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 395, 4 was a general law applicable in that area. The circuit court granted this relief; appellant citizen sought review. OVERVIEW: Under the authority of 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 395, 4, the FKAA and a city enacted connection ordinances which included package plants within their scope and required mandatory connections within 30 days of receipt of notification that a publicly-owned or investor-owned

sewage system was available. The citizen argued in the circuit court that as 4 pertained only to local governments within the Florida Keys area of critical state concern, it was a special law unconstitutionally passed as a general law in violation of Fla. Const. art. III, 10, and that the connection ordinances were unenforceable because their provisions regarding package plants were based solely on the authority granted by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 395, 4. The circuit court held that 4 was properly enacted as a general law and that the connection ordinances were valid and binding. The supreme court agreed. Though 4 affected a limited geographic area of the state, its primary purpose was one of statewide importance and impact, and that purpose was rationally related to the designation of the Florida Keys as an area of critical state concern; therefore, it was a valid general law. OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

FL Keys Aqueduct Auth law allowed those that were already there to connect to public utility sewage treatment plans, but didn't include those from package system later on passed law that reqd FKAA so law that applies to one part of the state that gives authority that requires this *** authority to *** b/c so specifically related to that specific area - specific law and not general law this is a local law Art 3, Section 10 - special laws Art 10, Section 12 g - defines special law to include local law special law b/c it has an intended localized impact this case gives you exception for areas of critical state concern...all boils down to is that whether this law that gives FKAA special power to require ppl auth to do mandatory hookups... a special law is not universal... it operates uniformally.... are all package *** uniformly ... A local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal A general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function or instrumentality If particular physical conditions exist in only a portion of the state, enactments with reference thereto nonetheless may be general laws; so long as a law materially affects the people of the state, it need not have universal application to be a general law. held that primary purpose of state statute, authorizing local governments

of single county designated as being an area of critical state concern to pass waste water laws more restrictive than those provided for under general law, was to protect natural state resource, the nearshore waters of states keys, and thus statute related to a state function such that it constituted a general law rather than a special law. if it looks like a population act, but pop is determined by a fixed point in time - that won't be **** - b/c no ppl will be able to enter that class looks at purpose of statute and det if there are legit reasons for treating this area differently o primary purpose of statute is to address tourism and impact of statute is in keeping w that purpose - FL keys uniquely impacts that purpose o area of critical state concern idea that an act targets on one locality - FL keys - would tend to look like a special law...schrader gives us test that it isn't special law b/c there isn't other area that looks like this - and it is area of critical state concern..and statute impact is to address that area of crit state concern barbri ? H2 sub a ? where they cite Schrader concern is that they are passing special laws treated as general laws schrader is ex of something that looks like special law that is not - as long as you can ID state concern and illustrate that impacts area of state concern ? (whereas other cases are ones that look like general law that arent) RJR Tobacco v Hall
CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee personal representative obtained a $ 15.75 million judgment against appellant tobacco company. The tobacco company appealed and obtained a stay of the judgment by posting a $ 5 million bond pursuant to 569.23(3), Fla. Stat. The Circuit Court for Alachua County (Florida) denied the personal representative's motion to determine the sufficiency of the bond. The personal representative sought review of that order. OVERVIEW: Under Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(1), the bond required for a stay would have been about $ 17.6 million. The personal representative argued that 569.23(3) was an unconstitutional special law under Art. III, 11(a)(12), Fla. Const. because it applied only to the five tobacco companies that signed an underlying settlement agreement in the Engle progeny cases. However, the appellate court found that the statute was not limited to judgments entered for Engle plaintiffs; it applied in any civil case against a settlement agreement signatory brought by or on behalf of a member of a decertified class action. It was not unreasonable to expect that the settlement agreement signatories, which included the nation's four largest tobacco companies, may have been the subject of other class actions that ended up being decertified. Thus, it was not a special law. Further, Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(a) recognized that general law and the rule itself may have provided different requirements for obtaining a stay, and 569.23(3) fell within the "except as provided by general law" clause of Rule 9.310(a). The statute did not violate the separation of powers mandate in Art. II, 3, Fla. Const. OUTCOME: The trial court's order denying the personal representative's motion to determine the sufficiency of the bond was affirmed. A question of great public importance was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida.

Hall was pers rep of companies agreement bw FL and tobacco companies for billions of dollars - FL became dependent on it class action - decertified to individual groups FL amended the bonding reqmts to put a cap on it litigation by states against tobacco companies...settlement agreements...some companies settled w FL - the class action was decertified the generally applicable bonding reqmt would force tobacco companies to put up so much money as security that they wouldnt be able to make their payments to FL idea is that they are going to exempt those 5 companies from general bonding reqmts in order to protect the money this is a Schrader case- ability of 5 companies to make their payments is a critical state concern - so this statute that treats these 5 companies differently from other companies wrt bonding reqmts - it is a general law Statute limiting the bond payment required for stay of judgment pending appeal for cigarette manufacturers which signed Florida Settlement Agreement (FSA), was not special law, subject to constitutional provision prohibiting special laws pertaining to grant of privilege to a private corporation; settlement agreement was important state revenue stream, and although statute was designed to apply to certain class action plaintiffs, it was likely in the future that other cases would be subject to the statute they say theoretically its an open class - but they focus not on the defending class, but the PL class, which is burdened 2 ways to get to okay land - one is if its open class...other is if **** o *** who's the beneficiary of the statute - **** o here though, ct flips that around o argument is that its a specific law.... o gillen thinks its plainly a schrader case o it's not universality, its uniformly...have to look at whats the difference o no question that this is right - only 5 signatories whose revenue stream implicates *** o they ask on top whether its an open class, but gillen doesn't think you have to answer that quesiton - if you satisfy schrader, you don't have to det whether its an open class...but he thinks lower cts are confused why barbri says "compare" - but open class where *****LISTEN **** o open class vs class that looks closed o schrader thing
Barndollar v Sunset

have to have reas notice CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants challenged a decision from the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit for Charlotte County (Florida), granting defendant corporation summary judgment on the grounds that the Gasparilla Island Historic and Conservation District Act, Fla. Stat. ch. 79-490, was unconstitutional. OVERVIEW: The legislature enacted the Gasparilla Island Historic and Conservation District Act (Act), Fla. Stat. ch. 79-490, which dealt with the creation of a historic and conservation district. A special government entity would be established after approval by a majority vote in a referendum. Appellee corporation owned real property within the proposed district and sought to enjoin the referendum. The trial court granted appellee summary judgment and held that that the Act was unconstitutional because of the method the act was to be submitted for voter approval. On appeal, the court affirmed the order finding the pre-enactment notice was legally inadequate because it was clearly inadequate to apprise interested persons of the scope and purpose of the proposed regulatory scheme. The court ruled that the provision allowed nonresident property owners to vote which violated Fla. Const. art. III, 10. The court found the provision was not severable, and thus, the entire Act was void because the valid and void parts of the chapter were mutually connected with and dependent upon each other and severability was not compatible with the legislative intent. OUTCOME: Summary judgment in favor of appellee corporation was affirmed on the grounds that the Gasparilla Island Historic and Conservation District Act (Act) was unconstitutional because the provision permitting nonresident property owners to vote violated the Florida Constitution, the provision was not severable, and thus, the entire Act was void

Lawnwood Medical CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant corporation brought an action seeking to have the St. Lucie County Hospital Governance Law (HGL), ch. 2003-372, Laws of Fla., declared constitutional. Appellee president of the corporation's medical staff opposed the petition. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court held that the HGL violated Art. III, 11(a)(12), Fla. Const. The Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed. The corporation appealed. OVERVIEW: The intermediate appellate court found, inter alia, that the HGL altered many of the rights and obligations specified in the contract between the corporation's medical staff and its board of trustees, constituting an impermissible privilege. The appellate court found, among other things, that the HGL provided the hospital with a complete override of medical staff bylaws. Moreover, Ch. 2003-372, 5, at 448, Laws of Fla. granted the corporation's board of trustees the right and power to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws, something it could not do before enactment of the HGL. The HGL altered the framework for governing, and the medical staff's important role in it pursuant to the bylaws, in a manner favorable to the board, and essentially gave the board plenary power to take independent action in these areas. These facets of the HGL granted the corporation a "right" and placed it in an advantageous position, one that it did not possess before the law was enacted. The HGL granted the corporation rights, benefits, or advantages and thus, a "privilege" in contravention of Art. III, 11(a)(12), Fla. Const. The unconstitutional provisions were not severable.

OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

Pinellas County Planning Council CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, the Pinellas County Planning Council, challenged a Pinellas County Circuit Court (Florida) decision for appellee property owners, which held that the special act, 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-594, which established appellant, violated Fla. Const. art. III, 11(a)(1) because it affected the jurisdiction or duties of the Board of County Commissioners. Appellant argued that the law was constitutional. OVERVIEW: Appellant, the Pinellas County Planning Council, established a countywide land use plan which affected appellee property owners. Appellees brought an action which claimed that the special act which created appellant, 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-594, violated Fla. Const. art. III, 11(a)(1) because it affected the jurisdiction or duties of the Board of County Commissioners. The trial court held that the special act was unconstitutional. Appellant challenged that decision. The court reversed the trial court and held that the act was constitutional. The court noted that other special acts have created similar local authorities in the state. The court found that this act, like the others, created an authority which served a useful and valid county function. The court reasoned that the constitutional limitation appellee alleged under art. III, 11(a)(1), was merely incidental to the act's main objective. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the matter. OUTCOME: The court reversed the trial court decision, which held that the special act that created appellant, Pinellas County Planning Commission, was unconstitutional. The court rejected appellee property owners' argument that the act violated the Florida Constitution by infringing upon the responsibilities of the Board of County Commissioners and remanded the matter to the trial court.

IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT
Pomponio CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners sought review of judgment which granted rent payments to the court registry under a recreational lease provision under Fla. Stat. Ann. 718.401(4) (1977), in respondent condominium association's favor. OVERVIEW: Petitioners, condominium developer and lessors, sought review of decision which required the payment of rent into a court registry during pendency of litigation under Fla. Stat. Ann. 718.401(4), in respondent condominium association's favor. Petitioners claimed the provision impermissibly interfered with contractual rights. The court reversed the decision below, in petitioners' favor, concluding the provision impermissibly impaired contract rights when it was not the least restrictive means possible to achieve the police power interest in requiring a unit owner's deposit to protect from lessors' foreclosure for non-payment of rent during litigation. The court

noted no documentation of the underlying premise of massive condominium foreclosure threat was shown. The court explained it began its analysis of reasonableness of a contract impairment through application of two accepted principles: he who pays too late, pays less and virtually no degree of contract impairment was tolerable in Florida. The court determined the rent deposit provision's effect, absent contractual consent, unreasonably impaired significant contract rights to receive bargained for rent. OUTCOME: The court reversed judgment requiring petitioners' deposit of rent in a court registry during pendency of litigation with respondent condominium association because the rent deposit statute unreasonably impaired significant contractual rights to receive bargained for rent when the means wielded to achieve state police power goals was not the least restrictive possible. Chiles v United Faculty of FL CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, governor and state, sought review from the judgment of the Circuit Court in and for Leon County (Florida), which issued a judgment for appellees, unions representing public employees, in their action against appellants after appellants eliminated pay raises agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement. OVERVIEW: Appellees were unions representing public employees and were unable to resolve a collective bargaining process for pay and benefits. Appellants, governor and state, authorized a raise for the employees and the unions ratified the raise. Appellants eliminated the raises in order to meet a revenue shortfall. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision issuing judgment for appellees. Appellants' elimination of the raises was an impermissible impairment of contract and violated Fla. Const. art. I, 6, 10. Appellants and appellees agreed on a fully enforceable contract because appellants accepted and funded the agreement. Appellants were parties to that contract. Appellants failed to show that they had no alternative means of preserving the contract with the public employees and, thus, had no authority to breach the contract. The savings clauses in the contract were not an escape hatch for appellants but were included only to preserve the contact in the event of partial invalidity. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the circuit court's decision for appellees, unions representing public employees, and found that appellants, governor and state, violated the Florida constitution when they eliminated raises for the public employees after appellants had agreed to and funded the raises because appellants failed to show they had no alternative means of funding the raises.

Florida v FL PBA CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Appeal, First District (Florida) for appellees, declaring a proviso in a state appropriations bill unconstitutional after appellants enacted legislation altering the leave policy for appellees' career service employees. OVERVIEW: Appellants enacted legislation that altered the leave policy for appellees' career service employees. Appellees claimed that appellants' actions abridged their right to collectively bargain, which was guaranteed by the state constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment for appellees. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision declaring Fla. Const. 9.3 (A) 5 of the 1988 Appropriations Act unconstitutional. The court stated that where the legislature provides enough money to implement the benefit as negotiated, but attempts to unilaterally change

the benefit, the changes will not be upheld, and the negotiated benefit will be enforced. Where the legislature does not appropriate enough money to fund a negotiated benefit, as it is free to do, then the conditions it imposes on the use of the funds will stand even if contradictory to the negotiated agreement. OUTCOME: The court's decision declaring a proviso in the state appropriations bill unconstitutional was reversed because appellants had the right to impose conditions on the use of funds so long as they appropriated enough money, even if it was contradictory to the negotiated agreement with appellees. Scott v Williams CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, Florida's Governor and others, acting as the State Board of Administration of Florida, and others, appealed a circuit court judgment to the First District Court of Appeal, which certified that the appeal, which dealt with the constitutionality of provisions of ch. 2011-68, Laws of Fla., presented issues of great public importance that required immediate resolution by the supreme court. OVERVIEW: Ch. 2011-68, Laws of Fla., enacted Senate Bill 2100, which as of July 1, 2011, converted the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from noncontributory by employees to contributory, required all current FRS members to contribute 3% of their salaries to the retirement system, and eliminated the retirement cost-of-living adjustment for creditable service after the effective date of the act. Ch. 2011-68, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 17, 24, 26, 29, 32, 33, 39, and 40, Laws of Fla. were facially constitutional. There was no violation of Fla. Const. art. I, 10. The preservation of rights statute, 121.011(3)(d), Fla. Stat., was not intended to bind future legislatures from prospectively altering benefits for future service performed by all members of the FRS. The prospective changes made by ch. 2011-68 were made within the authority of the legislature and did not impair any statutorily created contract rights. As no contract was breached, there was no unconstitutional taking under Art. X, 6, Fla. Const. Finally, nothing on the face of ch. 2011-68's "Plan Amendment" removed the subject of retirement from the collective bargaining process. Thus, there was no violation of Art. I, 6, Fla. Const. OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed

EMINENT DOMAIN / TAKINGS


St John's River Management v Koontz
CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Fifth District Court of Appeal (Florida) certified a question to be of great public importance, asking whether U.S. Const. amend. V and Art. X, 6(a), Fla. Const. recognized an exactions taking where there was no compelled dedication of any interest in real property to public use and the alleged exaction was a non-land-use monetary condition for permit

approval, which never occurred and no permit was ever issued. OVERVIEW: A landowner requested permits from the water management district to develop commercial property. When the permits were denied, he brought an inverse condemnation claim asserting an improper exaction by the district. The trial court held that the district had effected a taking of the property. Pursuant to 373.617(3), Fla. Stat. (2002), the district issued the permits, and the trial court subsequently awarded the landowner a sum for a temporary taking of the property. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. However, the intermediate court erroneously applied the Nollan/Dolan exactions test because the district did not condition approval of the permits on the landowner dedicating any portion of his interest in the property in any way to public use. Further, the landowner never expended any funds towards the performance of offsite mitigation, and nothing was ever taken from him. U.S. Const. amend. V and Art. X, 6(a), Fla. Const. did not recognize an exactions taking where there was no compelled dedication of any interest in property to public use and the alleged exaction was a non-land-use monetary condition for permit approval, which never occurred and no permit was issued. OUTCOME: The court rephrased the certified question, answered the rephrased question in the negative, and quashed the decision under review

Keshbro, Inc. v Miami


CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In separate cases, petitioner motel and respondent apartment sued respondent first city and petitioner second city for inverse condemnation. The trial courts granted summary judgment to the motel and apartment, and the cities appealed. The Third District Court of Appeal (Florida) reversed the first trial court's judgment; the Second District Court of Appeal (Florida) affirmed the second court's judgment. The motel and the second city appealed. OVERVIEW: The cities ordered a motel and an apartment to close temporarily under the cities' nuisance ordinances, due to illegal activities occurring there. The motel and apartment sued the cities for compensation for losses caused by the closures, and both were granted summary judgment. The first intermediate appellate court reversed; the second affirmed. The motel and the second city appealed, and the cases were consolidated, The instant court held that, as the temporary closures rendered the properties economically idle, the cases were to be analyzed under Lucas. Lucas's "nuisance exception", under which a regulation that eliminated the value of property was not a taking if the purpose of the regulation was to control a public nuisance, applied to the motel but not to the apartment. The motel was the scene of numerous drug- and prostitutionrelated arrests, and the first city acted reasonably in ordering its temporary closure. No compensation was due the motel. But there was no such record of illegal activity at the apartment, and so closing it for one year was not specifically tailored to abate the drug nuisance, making its closure a compensable taking. OUTCOME: The judgments were approved.

Stop the Beach Renourishment (focus on section "IV")


CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner nonprofit corporation, the members of which were owners

of beach-front property, brought an action against respondents, local governments and a state agency, alleging that the governments' beach restoration projects approved by the state were unconstitutional takings of the owners' property. The corporation challenged the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court which held that no takings occurred. A writ of certiorari was granted. OVERVIEW: The projects involved placing sand along beaches seaward from the mean highwater line, which was the boundary between the state's submerged land and the owners' properties. The corporation contended that the state's ownership of the new dry land to seaward deprived the owners of their rights to accretion and a water boundary, and that the state court's decision was a taking of the owners' properties. While their was no consensus concerning whether a judicial decision could effect a taking, or whether it was even necessary to address the issue, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that there was no taking of the owners' property rights. Since the change in the mean high-water line resulted from a relatively sudden avulsion, rather than a gradual accretion, the newly exposed land remained property of the state and the previous mean high-water line remained the boundary between the properties of the state and the owners. Thus, prior to the state court's decision the owners had no rights to future accretions and to contact with the water superior to the state's right to fill in its submerged land, and any further seaward accretion became property of the state. OUTCOME: The judgment holding that no takings occurred was affirmed

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