Richard L. W.

Clarke LITS3304 Notes 03A

CLAUDE LVI-STRAUSS "STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN LINGUISTICS AND ANTHRO POLOGY" (1945) Levi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Analysis in Linguistics and Anthropology. Structural Anthropology. Vol. 1. Trans. Clair Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Shoepf. New York: Basic, 1963. 31-54. Lvi-Strauss begins by arguing that linguistics is a social science and m ay very well be the only one which can claim to be a science (31), having achieved both the form ulation of an em pirical m ethod and an understanding of the nature of the data subm itted to its analysis (31). Other disciplines, notably psychology, sociology and anthropology are learning from m odern linguistics the road which leads to the em pirical knowledge of social phenom ena (31). The close methodological analogy which exists between the two disciplines [i.e. linguistics and anthropology] im poses a special obligation of collaboration upon them (32). Lvi-Strauss is m ost interested in the assistance which linguistics can render to the anthropologists in the study of kinship(32) which is, he argues, the m ost elem entary structure of the social relationships shared by hum ans and which differentiates the hum an being from other anim als. Clearly, for Lvi-Strauss, a grasp of the nature of the kinship system ought to provide crucial insights into the nature of society as a whole and, ultim ately, hum an nature. Prior to Saussure, Lvi-Strauss argues, linguistic research leaned m ost heavily on historical analysis (33) (this would be, in Saussurean term inology, a diachronic em phasis) but this has been changed by the advent of structural linguistics (33) and a new synchronic em phasis. The old linguistics (34) sought its explanatory principles first of all in history (34), that is, in diachronic analysis (34) and historical contingency (35). Its em phases were on individualism and atom ism (34). He quotes the sum m ary of the teleological em phases inherent in the diachronic approach offered by one of Saussures m ost im portant heirs, Nikolai Troubetzkoy: the evolution of a phonem ic system at any tim e is directed prim arily by the tendency toward a goal . . . . This evolution thus has a direction, an internal logic, which historical phonem ics is called upon to elucidate (35). In short, the diachronic or historical approach to the study of language inherited from the nineteenth century, which sought to discover the meaning of a word in the present through an exploration of its historical roots (or etym ology) and via cultural comparison, predom inated in the field. However, Lvi-Strauss argues, the advent of Structuralist linguistics, inspired by Saussures critique of the sign, initiated nothing less than a revolution (33) in how we understand the production of meaning. He again sum m arises Troubetzkoy, this tim e his account of the four basic operations (33) in which the structural m ethod (33) consists: First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenom ena to study of their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat term s as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the relations between term s; third, it introduces the concept of system Modern phonem ics does not m erely proclaim that phonem es are always part of a system ; it shows concrete phonem ic system s and elucidates their structure ; finally, structural linguistics aim s at discovering general laws , either by induction or . . . by logical deduction, which would give them an absolute character. . . . Thus, for the first tim e, a social science is able to form ulate necessary relationships. This is the m eaning of Troubetzkoys last point, while the preceding rules show how linguistics m ust proceed in order to attain this end. (33) Lvi-Strauss stresses that Structuralist linguistics, as exem plified by Troubetzkoy him self and, perhaps m ost im portantly, Rom an Jakobson, has em phasised the im portance of the

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phonem e (the signifier or sound-im age, according to Saussure), that is, the tangible oral component of the sign, as opposed to the signified or m eaning which can only be accessed indirectly through the signifier. It is the differences between phonem es which is responsible for the assignation of m eaning, the differences in sound being prim ary and the the production of accom panying m eanings secondary. Lvi-Strauss contends that the historical or diachronic approach has, to this point at least, also prevailed within anthropology and its focus on kinship problem s: Each detail of term inology and each special m arriage rule is associated with a specific custom as either its consequence or its survival. We thus m eet with a chaos of discontinuity. No one asks how kinship systems, regarded as synchronic wholes, could be the arbitrary product of a convergence of several heterogeneous institutions (most of which are hypothetical), yet nevertheless function with som e sort of regularity and effectiveness. (35) Philology, he argues, has played and continues to play an im portant role in this regard, being utilised by anthropologists to study the historical developm ent of the m eaning of each of the term s designating the m ain participants in the kinship system , meanings that were not always im m ediately apparent. Philology furnishes anthropology with etym ologies (32) which permit the establishm ent between certain kinship term s [of] relationships which were not im m ediately apparent (32). In short, philologists helped to show how the roles of the various actors in the kinship system has changed over tim e. This has been very useful, for exam ple, in the case of the role of the uncle and, by extension, the role played by the so-called avuncular relationship (32) in the kinship system . By historically and com paratively exploring the roots of the term uncle in various cultures, Lvi-Strauss points out, the philologist has contributed to the solution of the problem by revealing the tenacious survival in contem porary vocabulary of relationships which have long since disappeared (32). All in all, Lvi-Strauss argues, the study of kinship problem s is today broached in the sam e term s and seems to be in the throes of the sam e difficulties as was linguistics on the eve of the structuralist revolution (34). The Structuralist m odel of language has, however, opened up fresh perspectives for the anthropologist: in the study of kinship problem s . . ., the anthropologist finds him self in a situation which formally resem bles that of the structural linguist. Like phonem es, kinship term s are elem ents of m eaning; like phonem es, they acquire m eaning only if they are integrated into system s. Kinship system s, like phonem ic systems, are built by the mind on the level of unconscious thought. Finally, the recurrence of kinship patterns, m arriage rules, sim ilar prescribed attitudes between certain types of relatives, and so forth, in scattered regions of the globe, leads us to believe that, in the case of kinship as well as linguistics, the observable phenom ena result from the action of laws which are general but im plicit. The problem can therefore be form ulated as follows: Although they belong to another order of reality , kinship phenom ena are of the sam e type as linguistic phenom ena. (34) A Structuralist approach to linguistics perm its the kinship system at the core of any culture to be studied not only historically (or diachronically) but also as a synchronic system , in the process shifting the study from the phenom ena them selves (e.g the role of the father) and their origin to the relationship between phenom ena (e.g. to what degree is the role perform ed by the father a function of his relationships to other m em bers of the kinship system ). The focus shifts, therefore, from the term s them selves which constitute a particular kinship system to their unconscious infrastructure (the rules by which certain roles are unknowingly assigned to particular participants). Such an approach does not treat the term s which com prise that system as independent entities but rather analyses the necessary relations between what are at best autonom ous term s. The goal in so doing is to

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uncover the general laws or rules that govern hum an culture universally. Having m ade a case for the applicability of Structuralist m ethods drawn from linguistics to the field of anthropology, Lvi-Strauss then proceeds to warn that the phonem ic m ethod (35) cannot be applied without difficulty to the study of the kinship system . It is, he claims, incorrect to equate kinship term s and linguistic phonem es from the viewpoint of their formal treatment (35): W e know [following the work of Rom an Jakobson] that to obtain a structural law the linguist analyses phonem es into distinctive features, which he can then group into one or several pairs of oppositions. Following an analogous m ethod, the anthropologist m ight be tem pted to break down analytically the kinship term s of any given system into their com ponents. In our own kinship system , for instance, the term father has positive connotations with respect to sex, relative age, and generation; but it has zero value on the dim ension of collaterality, and it cannot express an affinal relationship. Thus, for each system , one m ight ask what relationships are expressed and, for each term of the system , what connotation positive or negative it carries regarding each of the following relationships: generation, collaterality, sex, relative age, affinity, etc. It is at this m icrosociological level that one m ight hope to discover the most general structural laws, just as the linguist discovers his at the infraphonem ic level. . . . (35) However, Lvi-Strauss argues that a threefold objection im m ediately arises (35) in that a truly scientific analysis m ust be real, sim plifying, and explanatory (35). While the structural m ethod when applied to the analysis of phonem es m ay accomplish these three goals, this is not the case with the study of the kinship system which, through too literal adherence to linguistic m ethod (36), actually becom es m ore abstract, rather than concrete, em erges as m ore com plex rather than sim plified, and ultim ately has little explanatory value, allowing us little insight into the nature of the system (36). Lvi-Strauss contends, firstly, that one reason for the foregoing is that we often forget that where Structuralist linguistics deals not with parole but with langue, that is, the theoretical principles which m ake parole possible, the kinship system is both langue and parole in that kinship term s . . . are also elem ents of speech (36), they have a sociological existence (36). Structuralist linguistics allows one to understand the workings of langue, the universal principles underlying all acts of signification, but do not shed any light on the meanings of actual, specific utterances. This is what he means when he writes that structural analysis cannot be applied to words directly, but only to words previously broken down into phonem es (36). This is inadequate where the kinship system is concerned because it com prises both a system from which the m eaning of com ponent term s such as uncle m ay derive their signification or role and an application of these principles. Secondly, while in language there can be no question as to function; we all know that language serves as a m eans of com m unication (37) (what structural linguistics alone has allowed him to discover is the way in which language achieves this end. The function was obvious; the system rem ained unknown [37]), the opposite is true of anthropology: he writes that we have long known that kinship term s constitute a system (37) but we still do not know their function (37). In short, while it is possible to conceive of the kinship system as a system of differences, it has proved m uch harder to discern the function or purpose thereof Thirdly, Lvi-Strauss argues that there is another im portant difference between the phonem ic system which linguists focus on and the kinship system of the anthropologist. W here the linguist can ignore the level of the signified in order to focus on the signifier, the anthropologist cannot ignore the equivalent of the level of the signified in the kinship system . He contends that any kinship system actually consists of two quite different orders of reality (37): a system of term inology (37) or nom enclature (37), that is, the term s

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through which various kinds of fam ily relationships are expressed (37) (this is analogous to the level of the signifier or phonem e in language), and a system of attitudes (37) which is both psychological and social in nature (37) that is analogous to the level of the signified in language: the individuals or classes of individuals who em ploy these term s feel (or do not feel, as the case m ay be) bound by prescribed behaviour in their relationships with one another, such as respect or fam iliarity, rights or obligations, and affection or hostility (37). W here we understand how the system of nom enclature works but do not understand to what end it functions, the opposite is true of the system of attitudes, the function of which we can guess, he avers (to insure group cohesion and equilibrium [37]), but the nature of the interconnections between the various attitudes (37) and their necessity (38) we do not. In other words, as in the case of language, we know their function, but the system is unknown (38). Just as there is no necessary bond between the signifier and the signified, there is no necessary correlation between the system of term s assigned to participants in the kinship system and the system of fam ily attitudes. In other words, just as different signifieds m ay be attached to the sam e phonem e in m ore than one language, so too various attitudes m ay be attached in different cultures towards term s perform ing roughly the sam e function in different system s. Moreover, he contends, it is also necessary to distinguish between two different types of attitude: those which are diffuse, uncrystallised, and noninstitutionalised (38) and those which are stylised, prescribed, and sanctioned by taboos or privileges and expressed through a fixed ritual (38). The latter, far from autom atically reflecting the nomenclature, often appear as secondary elaborations, which serve to resolve the contradictions and overcome the deficiencies inherent in the term inological system (38). Having discussed the differences in perspective which a synchronic or Structuralist, rather than diachronic or historical, approach to anthropology ought to bring about, LviStrauss turns his attention finally to what he believes offers a clear illustration of the analogy between linguistics and anthropology and the insights which a Structuralist m ethod ought to produce: the case of the relationship between nephew and m aternal uncle (39) in different cultures. He spends several pages surveying the literature dom inant to that point on the subject by celebrated anthropologists such as A. R. Radcliffe-Brown on this issue and which all sought to explain the im portance of the uncle by m eans of a historical approach, that is, by seeking to trace the origin of such term s. What is im portant here is not the specifics of Lvi-Strausss survey of different views of the avunculate, but the conclusions to which Lvi-Strauss com es about the nature of the kinship system and, ultim ately, what this says about hum ans. He argues that in order to understand the avunculate we m ust treat it as one relationship within a system , while the system itself must be considered as a whole in order to grasp its structure. This structure rests upon four term s (brother, sister, father, and son), which are linked by two pairs of correlative oppositions in such a way that in each of the two generations there is always a positive and a negative one. Now, what is the nature of this structure, and what is its function? The answer is as follows: This structure is the m ost elem entary form of kinship that can exist. It is, properly speaking, the unit of kinship . (46) He puts it a different way: In order for a kinship structure to exist, three types of fam ily relationship m ust always be present: one of consanguinity, a relation of affinity, and a relation of descent in other words, a relation between siblings, a relation between spouses, and a relation between parent and child. . . . The prim itive and irreducible character of the basic unit of kinship . . . is actually a direct result of the universal presence of an incest taboo. This is really saying that in hum an society a m an m ust obtain a wom an from another m an who gives

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him a daughter or a sister. Thus we do not need to explain how the maternal uncle em erged in the kinship structure: He does not em erge he is present initially. Indeed, the presence of the m aternal uncle is a necessary precondition for the structure to exist. The error of traditional anthropology, like that of traditional linguistics, was to consider the term s, and not the relations between the term s. (46) Lvi-Strauss concludes that the avunculate is a characteristic trait (48) of an elem entary structure which is the product of defined relations involving four term s (48). This structure, he proposes, is the true atom of kinship (48) and becom es the sole building block of m ore com plex system s (48). In the final analysis, Levi-Strauss argues, the idea that it is the biological fam ily which is the point of departure from which all societies elaborate their kinship system s (50) is a dangerous one. While the biological fam ily is ubiquitous in hum an society (50), what confers upon kinship its socio-cultural character is not what it retains from nature, but, rather, the essential way in which it diverges from nature. A kinship system does not consist in the objective ties of descent or consanguinity between individuals. It exists only in hum an consciousness; it is an arbitrary system of representations, not the spontaneous development of a real situation. (50) The kinship system, in other words, is not a natural or biological phenom enon but an expression of nurture or culture. It is not the fam ilies which are truly elem entary, but rather the relations between those term s. No other interpretation can account for the universality of the incest taboo; and the avuncular relationship, in its m ost general form , is nothing but a corollary, now covert, now explicit, of this taboo (51).