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[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Paul Thumser.
POINT 16 on tape.
Extensive flight experience.

Became operations supervisor. Area a, area b. was supervising area b on 9/11. Goes
through operations supervisor position. Would report to the OMIC. On 9/11 Bruce
Barrett was the OMIC. He reports to the deputy facility manager, air traffic manager,
then mike McCormack. On 9/11 McCormack would report to acting AEA501 Rick
duCharme. Now AEA500.

Based on Paul's experience as a pilot, an ELT cannot be triggered by a pilot in a 767. In

767 does not believe it could have been set off by a pilot. A testing ELT at 00-05 of the
hour. On a 767 impact would be the only way to trigger one. It could have come from
anywhere 121.5 civilian 243.0 military. A lot of times when an ELT is received off the
testing time a pilot will report that they set it off. RCC is the rescue coordination center of
the air force and they are contacted for credible ELTs. Parameters for that type of
airplane to be set off due to a hard turn or a hard landing aren't credible. The sensitivity
setting on those ELTs are not set low. On the Egyptian air crash into the ocean there was
no ELT set off. Thumser was the midnight supervisor, which is the OMIC at night. He
vectored an airplane to investigate, and that plane did not pick up one. So it would have
to be a serious impact to set the ELT off.
There is detection equipment when airplanes are within 5 miles or Ik or 2k feet of each
other. An alarm goes off and a print out comes through at the watch area. That went off
that morning. First they have to be relieved from that position. They request downstairs
an NTap - a computer printout with targets, altitudes and times. Match the times and
altitudes to check if someone has an error. If it is concluded that there is less than a 5 mile
separation, then they check the voice tapes to see what the controller and the pilot said.
Request airways facilities to check the voice tape. Puts Ivonna Dowis in charge of area b.
Thumser goes to begin investigation of operational error. At about 0835edt bruce Barrett
had the real, and then informed Thumser of possible hijack and Thumser goes back to
area b.

Handoff position sits to right of controller.

Mark Merced on r56. Ivonna briefs Thumser on what was happening. Thumser takes
charge of area again. Merced starts tracking AA11. Merced is having conversations with
ZBW. He has a headset on so isn't hearing the ZBW side of the conversation. The last
known altitude was fl290. Everyone is aware of that. Dave finds out about it. Protecting
fl290. Not allowing anyone within 2k ft. aware of no radio contact with AA11 for 15 or
20 minutes. Primary target. Course deviation. AA11 was not supposed to come through
area, did not know destined to lax, but AA11 flight plan was not through ZNY airspace.
Last known was f!290. The people who need to know do, and are tracking the primary.
R42 controller, Dave Bittiglia, started a track on AA11. In order to partially validate,
Thunmser asked Merced to take an eagle936 to f!310. Vectored with a slight adjustment,
the eagle went just to the left of the American. Possibly 10 to 15 miles northwest of
LaGuardia. Eagle did not spot AA11. Major trouble that eagle did not see it. They had
high confidence if AA11 was at f!290 eagle would have spotted it. Thumser became
extremely concerned because of the high volume of traffic at all altitudes in the ZNY
New York City airspace. Sense of urgency translated to area.

When Thumser first got to the area had only heard of a possible hijacking, NORDO, shut
off transponder, and off course. Had received no information of the threatening hijack.

Telling the 68 controller, who is controlling departures coming down out of LaGuardia
and Kennedy that AA11 may enter airspace. Has told 4 out 5 sectors of his area.

Goes back to Merced, and primary is lost right over Manhattan. Radars are overlapping in
ZNY, so think the plane has gone very low. Tells whole area lost primary target, doesn't
know lat/long/alt or anything else.

At that exact point Dave Bittiglia informs Thumser of the lost UAL 175. Data block was
there but was no longer tracking altitude. The point went into coast after 4 hits. The first
four based on history are projected by the computer. Each hit is 12 seconds. Notices
UAL 175 goes to coast track. Dave calls a few seconds later and informs he is not getting
UAL 175. They notice on Bittiglia's screen the limited data log on a different code.
Bittiglia says it is UAL 175, but it's changed altitudes. McCormack and in area now.
UAL 175 starts to descend. Needs to tell sector 39 that UAL175's limited data log may be
entering space. Before UAL175, 10 or 13 miles before he turns to the southeast east.
Have a good fix on altitude, unlike AA11. Mode c transponder still on. At that point the
area was informed (after descent, before turn) that a "small airplane" had hit the world
trade center. Information had at that time was - had a hijacked airplane (AA11) that lost
primary directly over Manhattan, immediately equated that it was AA11 that hit the
WTC.

But now was dealing with UAL 175. At this point safety and control in area b is
compromised, so Thumser tells to stop all traffic in area b. UAL 175 is turning at this
time. Chaos in area related to attempting to clear all traffic in UAL175's path. 20 miles
southeast of Allentown, turning southeast, descending. An extremely abnormal situation.
Can put in 7600, 7700 or even 7500 at that point since they knew he had the ability to
broadcast. Point between j6 and J48 20 miles northeast of Pottstown VOR.

Awareness of hijack begins at beginning of turn, and tells Dave LaCates to scramble
McGuire. Doesn't say I think this is a hijack. McGuire doesn't have fighters, but was
thinking something was going to happen, and was reaching for possibilities to get
military assistance. Lacates never acknowledged or responded. Said quietly to LaCates,
so didn't say loudly, didn't want to disturb area. "If had authority.. .knowing what I
know.. .with the background I have.. .1 would have shot that plane down" - when working
at Kennedy had worked hijacks. Used procedure to provide fighter escorts. Paine
Stewarts Lear jet example. Had been done in past. Is part of that protocol ability to shoot
down aircraft? Thought it would have to be directed by white house.

If there wasn't the AA11 event, would not have thought hijack. Would have thought
UAL 175 had a serious equipment problem and would land at Kennedy. Kennedy has a
large maintenance base. In the old days would have treated like an emergency and would
have told Kennedy, possibly Newark to get ready. Too many coincidences. Maybe three
people with the information of area b could have put that together.

About 20 miles northeast of Potsdam . UAL 175 made turn, and Thumser was thinking
headed towards WTC. Not at turn towards northeast, at point of turn at southeast
understood UAL 175 headed towards WTC. UAL 175

Meanwhile, Chris Tucker pointing out 3321, and speaking on r55 telling r9 a compilation
of his overheard remarks. He was confusing the overheard on UAL 175 with AA11.
Would have never known based on his scope. As looking at transcript it is 0853 when he
states American 75 hijack. So had information that a small airplane was hit. Don't have
verification that it was all that hit WTC. But tucker's spread of information was from
overheard. UAL175 was in a high rate of descent, was traveling 350 or 400 knots as
headed towards into the ground. After lost target soon thereafter, nearly instantaneous
heard of second WTC hit. Doesn't have a visual on the towers, but has a mental
understanding of what was ongoing.

Thumser notes that after it was over, shut down traffic, combined sectors, got other
people to watch area B's scopes, management Robert Ott, one of the office managers,
was asked to guide area b through the process. Not abnormal procedure to give
statements. Robert Ott gave Thumser and area b direction not to call home or friends.
Sequestered everyone in a conference room.

Went to old operations room and Marty Fournier recorded statements with bob Ott. Mark
Merced, Dave Bittiglia, Chris tucker, Tony Palmieri, Thumser - for whatever reason
wanted these recordings. Rarely done. Gave a verbal recorded statements. Did not want
to say everything because of what was in room.

Never heard of possibility of a terrorist using a plane for a suicide mission.

After thumper's statement is reviewed by staff, Thumser says he told LaCates to

scramble McGuire after the north bound turn of UAL 175.

Mike and Dave were on phones at this point.

While handling the descent of UAL175, said "tell 'em he's com'n." wanted to help stop
the plane. Even had a thought of running another airplane into them at that time. It was a
bizarre enough to tell someone to scramble.

Assumed the chief and the deputy on the phones was relaying all the information.
Looking at profile and what they did it was a projection of what they did. It seemed
simple to project where they were going. Notes thought UAL 175 was going to hit WTC
about seven minutes before impact. Point describing 085436 based on commission
staffs radar. Before he made a northeast turn.

It was like driving the wrong way down the street.

"What I thought it was going to do was conjecture, not fact."

Pre 9/11 ATC would receive communication from pilot of hijack. Code words,
transponder. Neither of those happened on 9/11. Any other way to detect the hijack -
suspect- not talking to ATC, and extremely off course. How to confirm without
communication? No.
Pre 9/11: communication - pilot reports hijack, gets info, reports to area supervisor, area
supervisor reports to watch desk, OMIC follows up. Doesn't believe operation manager
would have been doing that. Thinks goes beyond that.
Prior and or on 9/11: NORAD and NEADS. Reasonable awareness, pre9/l 1 it would take
5 or 6 phone calls to get there. Would probably call local air force base.
DynSim - not familiar with. No computer or training for hijacking. Operations
supervisors do not go through them. As a controller your information for hijacking was a)
get information and pass it and b) do what they ask to do. Very few hijacks pre-9/11 for a
controller to respond to in the real world. Were no exercise or drills, very little emphasis
and drills. No knowledge of any sponsored by FAA or military. None with multiple
hijacking events.
Post 9/11: hasn't personally gone through any, and does not believe controllers have gone
through any either. Only review they've gotten is what to do in case of known hijacking.
Were only told a "suspected hijacking".

Pilots reported communications to ATC, ATC communicated that to Thumser. "even

united said everybody stay in seats blah blah blah" - Thumser.

Area b was treating UAL 175 and AA11 as hijacking. Thought not confirmed hijacking.
Would have said absolutely a hijack, but was not a confirmed hijacking. No one said to
Thumser don't say it's a hijack until it is confirmed a hijack.

AA11 rebirth: never heard any rumors of that sort. But did here within ZNY that it might
not have been AA11 that hit WTC. Made the logical assumption that it was AA11.
Wouldn't see a fire from the world trade center if a small aircraft hit it. Would be a small
fire. But didn't hear anyone say anything about at not being AA11 hitting the center.
Doesn't recall anything from outside the center of AA11 still being airborne. Nothing
heard about a plane lost in pequebsi.

Error that r39 had in the morning did not have anything to do with the events of 9/11.

When each sector was clear of aircraft Thumser combined the sector.

R5002 based out of Bradley in Hartford ct. they do routinely train with live ammunition,
to his knowledge.

Does not believe wrote an AA11 statement. Usually facility that has control of the
airspace or the airplane that is involved in the accident does the incident. So much of
AA11 happened in Boston a little surprised that they didn't ask for a statement from
Thumser.

Last known alt at f!290. Transponder on at that point. In hindsight, after accidents occur,
any way can you get from Boston center to hit WTC without hitting ZNY airspace? Yes.
Without hitting New York Tracon space? No.

Told by FAA if anyone wants a statement on AA11, Sam Shelton told him the FAA
would ask for it. Shelton administrator in charge of area b. Following protocol if FAA
wanted a statement would go through Shelton.

Verbal statement given to bob Ott Paul Thumser would not have a problem with
commission staff reviewing it.

Recommendations: security at gates, security at airports (ramps, cleaners, maintenance,

fuelers) - that's where access to planes is. Clamp down on security in ramp area. ATC
perspective very little that can be done except cooperate with the hijacker. If the situation
was similar, minutes to New York, would be very difficult without already airborne
combat ready pilots with authority to shoot down. Better military cooperation right now,
with NEADS/NORAD direct line. Could be hotlines distributed throughout, but not
confident that every operational supervisor should be given that responsibility.

Pre911 military communications very difficult. Relationship only dealt with aircraft in
and out of practice bombing range. Involved in desert storm. Developed good
relationship during that. Limited direct communication. Manufacturers of transponders.

Believes UAL 175 might have had an updated transponder that can not be turned off. One
that will always give you a transponder code and it can't get turned off. Original code
1470, then 3020, then a minute later 3021 changed it. Why turn 4 knobs when you could
turn it off with one switch? - does that seem an attempt by United Airlines pilot to signal,
hijackers to shut off, or c hijackers change code for confusion? If flying would have gone
to the first digit, right to the side of the pilot. Probably not an office switch, and then
scrambled it up. Even switching one digit would have come up a limited data block. In
flight school taught early on the codes, etc? for that level to fly manually a 767 would
have definitely known.
 (incident #)

(call sign)
PERSONNEL STATEMENT • • • -
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
NEW YORK AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER

ACTION: Complete in accordance with FAA Order 8020. 1 IB, Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, investigation, and
Reporting, paragraph 75, Personnel Statements.

BACKGROUND: Much of the information concerning the circumstances surrounding this accident/incident can be retrieved via
some type of recorded data source. However,, some of the facts concerning what you saw and what you did may not have been
completely captured. The purpose of this statement is to provide any Era within your peoooal knowledge ttaty^
provide a more complete understanding of the circumstances sunouixling this acddentfmcioent. Therefore, speculations, hearsay
opinions, conclusions, and/or other extraneous data arc not to be irxdudcd m thb statement Additkmalry, thb statement ma^
released to the public through FOIA or litigation activities including retrial discovery, deooshions, and artualcoimtestimooy.

mSTOUCtlONS: This statement is to be PRINTED and signed by you. Statement times and dates shall correspond with SISO.
Your signature below certifies the accuracy of mis statement It willneithcr be edited nor typed, and, once signed, will constitute
your original statement .

This statement concerns the acddcnt/iroadcnt C7<T Tat M

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i, PAUL. P. ,
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I am employed as an me FAA at tfacNew York ARTOX Roafconkbma. New Yotfc.

I was working Ac _OSK positionfrom UTCto H SQ

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