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I. Whatisconsequentialism? A. Whatweoughttodoisdeterminedbytherelativegoodnessofthewaythings wouldbe(i.e.thevalueofoutcomes). B. Deonticfactsarereducibletoevaluativefacts. C. Otherdisagreementsareopenquestionswithinconsequentialism. II. Whyisitimportanttolearnhowtodefendconsequentialism? A. Oftenunavoidable B. Strategicflexibility C. Refuteoropenupnarrowstandards D. Bigimpactscenarios E. Choosethepositionfirst,andtheframeworksecond. III. Responsestrategies A. Delink B. Refute C. Bitethebullet IV. Utilitarianism A. Classicalutilitarianism B. Objection:Nozicksexperiencemachine1 C. Delink:preferenceutilitarianism 1) Objection:Haresfanaticismproblem2 2) Response:malleablepreferences D. Objection:ParfitsRepugnantConclusion 1) Delink:averageutilitarianism 2) Response:truegenius(ortruehell) 3) Bitethebulletvs.pluralism E. Whyconsequentialismisnotastandard V. ConsequentialismanditsDemands A. Agentneutral,maximizingconsequentialism 1) Objection:overdemandingness3 2) Response:begsthequestion 3) Revisedobjection:unrealistic 4) Response:notimpossible,sonoimpact 5) Revisedagain:wrongtoblamethem 6) Response:blameisanact 7) Strongestversion:alienationfromagentrelativevalues B. Objection:agentrelativereasonstocaremoreaboutourfriends4orourselves.5 1) Delink:Schefflershybridtheory 2) Response:toopermissive,tooadhoc 3) Delinkagain:satisficingconsequentialism 4) Response:arbitrary 5) Delinkyetagain:indirectconsequentialism C. RuleConsequentialism6(followUAoptimificprinciples) 1) A2demandingness:fairshares 2) A2alienation:UAoptimificprincipleswouldincludeagentrelativeconcerns7 3) Objection:exceptions.Impact:convergencewithAC. 4) Response:compliance(following)vs.acceptance(believing)

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5) Objection:universalacceptanceisstupid (a) Caseswheremotivations,desires,anddispositionsareorthogonaltomoral beliefs (b) Caseswhereevildoersaresensitivetomoralbeliefs8 VI. TwoKindsofReasons A. A2agentrelativetheories 1) Parfit:collectivelyselfdefeating9 2) Parfitsbetteranswer:incompleterelativity10 B. Delink:accommodateagentrelativereasons 1) Restricttogovernmentcitizenrelationship11 2) Incorporateagentrelativevaluesintogood12 C. Backtoagentneutrality 1) Esotericmorality13 2) Selfeffacingbutnotselfdefeating14 D. Otherusefuldistinctions 1) Rightnessvs.decisionprocedure 2) Objective(actualoutcomes)vs.subjective(expectedoutcomes) VII. AttackoftheKantians A. Universalizability 1) Universalizability:FUL (a) Wood:itsuseless15 (b) Specificmaximsandtheproblemofrelevance16 (c) ReviseFULtodefendconsequentialism? (i) Hare:universalprescriptivism17 (ii) Pettit:universalizabilityandagentneutrality18 (iii) Parfit:FULtoKantianContractualismtoRuleConsequentialism19 2) Humanity:FH (a) Conceptualclarification (i) Humanity=rationalnature,notthespecies (ii) Alreadyexistingend,notanendtobebroughtabout(answersPettits arbitrarinessargument) (iii) Dignity,sonoprice (b) Kantswarrant20 (i) Differentflavors,e.g.Korsgaard21 (ii) Woodsreconstruction22 (iii) Commontheme:regressonconditions (iv) Committedtosubjectivismaboutreasons23 (c) Keypoint:valueofrationalnature (i) Response:matterofdegree24socannotbeinfiniteworth25 (ii) Response:eitherimplausibleorcircular26 (iii) Response:nonmoralactivityisnotgood27 (iv) Response:cantexplainwhywecareaboutsuffering28 (v) Response:biologicallyimmaturebeings29 (vi) Response:Humanityrationalnature30 (d) CanFHsupportconsequentialism? (i) Cummiskey:Kantianconsequentialism31

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(ii) Assumption:agentneutralimpartiality32 3) Freedom (a) WhyKantianismrequiresfreedom (i) Agency (ii) Valueofrationalnature (iii) Maximshavemoralworth (iv) Wrongdoingmeritsblame (v) Kantshighestgood (b) Aballsystrategy:harddeterminism (i) Kantssolution:thenoumenalself (ii) UnderminingfreewillmayalsounderminetheCategoricalImperative33 (iii) Hasspecificlinkstoappliedareas,e.g.punishment(retributivism assumesfreewill)34 VIII. ShouldtheNumbersCount? A. Nozick:separatenessofpersons35 1) Badresponse:tradeoffsandparalysis 2) Betterresponse:denytheseparatenessofpersons36 3) Nozickhimself:perhapsathresholddeontologist37 4) Generalproblemswithabsolutesideconstraints (a) ParadoxofDeontologicalConstraints38 (b) Begsthequestion,soofferapositiveargumentforconsequentialismfirst (c) Honoringvs.promoting39 (d) Nonmoralrationality40 (e) Noactomissiondistinction41 (f) Uncertaintyandinfinity42 (g) Spectrumargument43orscalarpropertiesvs.binaryjudgments44 B. Taurek:moreisntworse45 1) Response:violatesintransitivityforindifferencerelation46 2) Response:nooutcomecanbebetterorworse?!47 3) Response:conflatesdifferentsensesofaggregation48 4) Response:prudential,sowhynotmoral?49 5) Whataboutamoreradicalstance? C. Thomson:worldscantbegood50 1) Possibleworldisnotagoodnessfixingkind51 2) Response:Consequentialismisaboutadifferentsenseofgood(goodnesswith somemotivationalcomponent52orgoodinthereasonimplyingsensethatitis fittingtodesire53) D. Bostrom:infinitarianobjection54 1) Delink:nonfundamentalprinciple55 2) Bitethebullet:fine,nottheuniverseasawhole 3) Response:goodandbadmakingfeaturesonlyonEarth 4) Response:finiteexpansions56 IX. Conclusion

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CARDSANDCITATIONS
1RobertNozick,Anarchy,State,andUtopia(1973),4243.

Supposetherewereanexperiencemachinethatwouldgiveyouanyexperienceyou desired.Superduperneuropsychologistscouldstimulateyourbrainsothatyouwould thinkandfeelyouwerewritingagreatnovel,ormakingafriend,orreadinganinteresting book.Allthetimeyouwouldbefloatinginatank,withelectrodesattachedtoyourbrain. Shouldyouplugintothismachineforlife,preprogrammingyourlifeexperiences?...Of course,whileinthetankyouwon'tknowthatyou'rethere;you'llthinkthatit'sallactually happening....Wouldyouplugin?


2BernardWilliams,EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy(1985),87.

Thereis,firstofall,thepointthatthesumshavetocomeoutright.Itisnaturally characteristicofutilitarianismthatitsresultsdependoncalculationsbut,inconnections suchasthis,thatfeatureisparticularlyundesirable.Ifracistprejudiceisdirectedtowarda smallminoritybyamajoritythatgetsenoughsatisfactionfromit,itcouldbegintotouch andgowhetherracismmightnotbejustified.Thepointisnothowlikelythatistoarise,or inwhatcircumstances,butthatthewholequestionofhowmanyracistsareinvolved cannotbegintobeanacceptableconsiderationonthequestionwhetherracismis acceptable(contrastRawlsstreatmentofslavery).Moreover,ontheutilitarianargumentit emergesasaconsiderationthough,ifthesumscomeoutright,notadecisiveorwinning considerationthatracistsgetsomesatisfactionoutofthesufferingsoftheJews;butthis cannotbeaconsiderationatall.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthesufferingsofracistsnever count.Itmeansthatthesufferingstheyexperiencesolelybecauseoftheirracistopinions donotcount.Harsanyi,indeed,hasbuiltintohissystemaprovisionthataimstodealwith thiskindofproblem,byratherbrisklyexcludingantisocialpreferencesfromthecount. Buthedoesnotexplainhowtheyaretobedefined;hisrationalefortheprovisionsuggests thatwhatisinquestionareantiutilitarianpreferences.
3BernardWilliams,EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy(1985),7778.

Anyformofconsequentialismlocatesethicalvalueultimatelyinstatesofaffairs.... [A]gencycomesinonlysecondarily:ourbasicethicalrelationtotheworld,asagents,isthat ofbeingthecauseofdesirableorundesirablestatesofaffairs....Thismeansthatthereare statesofaffairsIcanaffectwithrespecttowelfarewhich,becauseIcandoso,turnoutto bemyownconcernwhen,onnonutilitarianassumptions,theywouldbesomeoneelses concern.Moreover,becausetheclassofbeneficiariesislargerthanthatofagents,thereare situationsthatturnouttobesomeonesconcernwhenonnonutilitarianassumptionsthey wouldhavebeennoonesconcern....Thedemandsofutilitarianismformaximumwelfare productionareboundless.Thereisnolimittowhatagivenpersonmightbedoingto improvetheworld,exceptthelimitsoftimeandstrength.Moreover,becausetherelations ofpossiblestatesofaffairstoanygivenpersonsactionsareindeterminate,thedemands areboundlessinthefurthersensethatthereareoftennoclearboundariesbetweenthe demandsonmeandthedemandsonsomeoneelse.

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LaFollette,3rdedition(2007),39.

4DavidMcNaughtonandPiersRawling,Deontology,EthicsinPractice,ed.Hugh

Loyaltyisessentialtofriendship.Loyaltyinvolvestherecognitionofanunderivativeagent relativeobligationtoonesfriends.Consequentialismhasnoplaceforunderivativeagent relativeobligations;thusithasnoroomforfriendship.Butfriendship,asisgenerally acknowledgedbyconsequentialists,isanimportantintrinsicgood.Consequentialismholds thatthegoodistobepromoted;buthereisagoodthatitapparentlycannot accommodate....Evenifweabandonthethoughtthatwearerequiredtofavorfriends, surelywemustbepermittedtofavorthemifourbondstothemaretobespecial.Thatis, wemustbemorallypermittedtofavorourfriendsevenwhenwecoulddomoregood overallbynotdoingso.Butactconsequentialismdeniesusthispermission:anactiswrong ifitfailstomaximizethegood.
5DavidMcNaughtonandPiersRawling,Deontology,EthicsinPractice,ed.Hugh

LaFollette,3rdedition(2007),40. Doessomeonehavespecialpersonalreasontopursueherownbenefit,justinvirtueofit beinghers?Wethinkshedoes.Theseagentrelativepersonalreasonsarisebecauseeachof ushasourownpointofview.IhavepersonalreasontocareaboutmypainthatIcannot havetocareaboutyours,namelythatitismine.ThisdoesnotmeanthatIhavenoreason tocareaboutyourpain,nordoesitcommitmetodenyingthatpainisequallybadwhoever hasit.Optionscanbejustifiedbyappealtothepersonalperspective.Eachagenthasmoral permissionnottomaximizethegoodwhenthecosttoherwouldbesignificant.Anagentis allowed,indeterminingwhatsheismorallyrequiredtodo,toaccordgreaterweighttothe costbornebyherthaniswarrantedbyitsimpersonalbadness. Howcanthisbe?SinceIamacreaturewithapersonalpointofview,amoralitythat requiredmetotranscendthatpointofviewandthinkoftheworldasifIhadnoparticular placeinitwouldnotmerelybeunreasonablydemanding,itwoulddenyallmoral significancetothefactthatmylifeis,inasense,allIhave.Therehas,therefore,tobesome balancebetweenthedemandsthattheneedsofothersputonusandourrighttoliveour ownlives.Determiningwherethatbalanceliesisnotoriouslydifficult.Butthisdoesnot entailthatthereisnobalancetobestruck.
6BradHooker,IdealCode,RealWorld:ARuleConsequentialistTheoryofMorality(2000). 7DerekParfit,OnWhatMatters,vol.1(2011),404405.

AsSidgwickargued,theanswerisNo.Ifeveryonealwaystriedtodowhateverwouldmake thingsgobest,theseattemptswouldoftenfail.Whenpredictingtheeffectsofpossibleacts, peoplewouldoftenmakemistakes,ordeceivethemselvesinselfbenetingways.Itwould beeasy,forexample,tobelievethatwewerejustiedinstealingorlying,becausewe falselybelievedthatthebenetstouswouldoutweightheburdensthatouractswould imposeonothers.IfwewereallActConsequentialists,thatwouldalsoundermineor weakensomevaluablepracticesorinstitutions,suchasthepracticeoftrustrequiring promises.IfeveryonehadthemotivesofanActConsequentialist,thatwouldbebadin otherways.Forittobetruethateveryonenearlyalwaystriedtomakethingsgobest,most

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ofuswouldhavetolosetoomanyofthestrongloves,loyalties,personalaims,andother motivesinwhichmuchofourhappinessconsists,andthatalsomakeourlivesinother waysworthliving.Fortheseandothersuchreasons,wecanclaimthat (A)ifeveryoneacceptedAC,thingswouldgoworsethantheywouldgoifeveryone acceptedcertainotherprinciples. Theseother,UAoptimificprincipleswouldpartlyoverlapwiththeprinciplesofcommon sensemorality.Theseprincipleswouldoftenrequireus,forexample,nottosteal,lie,or breakourpromises,evenwhensuchactswouldpredictablymakethingsgobest.These principleswouldpermitustogivesomekindsofstrongprioritytoourownwellbeing. Andtheywouldoftenpermitus,andoftenrequireus,togivesomekindsofstrongpriority tothewellbeingofcertainotherpeople,suchasourcloserelativesandfriends,andthose towhomwemayberelatedinvariousotherways,suchasourpupils,patients,clients, colleagues,customers,neighbours,andthosewhomwerepresent.SinceACisnotthe principlewhoseuniversalacceptancewouldmakethingsgobest,theKantianFormula doesnotrequireustobeActConsequentialists.
8GideonRosen[Princeton],TheSupremePrincipleofMorality,Ratio2009,8687.

Theexamplescanbeadaptedtoundermineeventhisweakclaim.Supposethatthegremlin willdohisworstifunanimityisachieved,unlesstheconsensusembracesthemoralsystem of(say)theRomanaristocracyunderCaligula.Itisthenanontrivialfactaboutthisworld thatthisrepugnantmoralsystemisthesystemwhoseuniversalacceptancewouldmake thingsgobest.(UARC)entailsthatiftheworldcontainsthissortofgremlin,itismorally permissibletobeatonesslaves,evenifthegremlinwillnevermakehispresencefelt.But thatsabsurd. [...] SupposethatSadewillretaliateagainstJulietteandherfamilyunlesssheacceptshisown corruptmoralsystem.Thenitmaybeahardquestionwhetheranydecentmoralsystem thatincludestheprohibitionagainstrecreationaltortureamountstoanoptimicsystem. ThebenetsofuniversalacceptancewouldhavetobeweighedagainstthecoststoJuliette andherfamilyofsuchacceptance.Butwhilethismightbeahardquestion,itwouldnotbe ahardquestionwhetherordinaryactsoftorturearemorallypermissible.Thisshows conclusively,inmyview,thatitisonethingtoaskwhetheranactismorallypermissible, andquiteanothertoaskwhetheritispermittedbyprincipleswhoseuniversalacceptance wouldmakethingsgobest.Inagremlinworldthesetwoquestionsmayhaveverydifferent answers.
9DerekParfit,ReasonsandPersons(1984),98.

TwoPersonParentsDilemmasareunlikelytooccur.ButweoftenfaceManyPerson Versions.Itisoftentruethat,ifallratherthannonegiveprioritytoourownchildren,this willeitherbeworseforallourchildren,orwillenableeachtobenefithisownchildrenless. Thustherearemanypublicgoods:outcomesthatwouldbenefitourchildrenwhetheror notwehelptoproducethem.Itcanbetrueofeachparentthat,ifhedoesnothelp,thiswill

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bebetterforhisownchildren.Whathesaveswhetherinmoney,time,orenergyhecan spendtobenefitonlyhisownchildren.But,ifnoparenthelpstoproducethepublicgood, thiswillbeworseforallourchildrenthanifalldo.Inanothercommoncase,suchasthe FishermansDilemma,eachcouldeither(1)addtohisownearningsor(2)(byself restraint)addmoretotheearningsofothers.Itwillherebetrueofeachthat,ifhedoes(1) ratherthan(2),hecanbenefithischildrenmore.Thisissowhateverothersdo.Butifalldo (1)ratherthan(2)eachcanbenefithischildrenless.Theseareonlytwoofthewaysin whichsuchcasesoccur.Therearemanyothers....Theproblemcomesfromthegivingof priority.Itmakesnodifferencewhetherthisisgiventooneselforothers.


10DerekParfit,ReasonsandPersons(1984),141.

Consideranypairofclaimsthatarerelatedinthefollowingway:Thefirstclaimcontains thewordI,butdoesnotcontainthewordnow.Thesecondclaimisjustlikethefirst, exceptthatitdoescontainthewordnow.Callsuchapairofclaimsanalogous.Ifthefirst claimconflictswiththesecond,itisincompatiblewithfullrelativity,andshouldtherefore berejected.Ifthefirstclaimdoesnotconflictwiththesecond,itisanopenquestion whetherweshouldacceptthefirstclaim.But,ifweacceptthefirstclaim,weshouldalso acceptthesecond.Thisisbecause,ifweacceptthefirstbutrejectthesecond,ourviewis incompatiblewithfullrelativity.Andwearenot,asweoughttobe,givingtoIandnow thesametreatment.


11CassSunsteinandAdrianVermuele,IsCapitalPunishmentMorallyRequired?The

RelevanceofLifeLifeTradeoffs,ChicagoPublicLaw&LegalTheoryWorkingPaperNo.85 (March2005),p.17. Themostfundamentalpointisthatunlikeindividuals,governmentsalwaysandnecessarily faceachoicebetweenoramongpossiblepoliciesforregulatingthirdparties.The distinctionbetweenactsandomissionsmaynotbeintelligibleinthiscontext,andevenifit is,thedistinctiondoesnotmakeamorallyrelevantdifference.Mostgenerally,government isinthebusinessofcreatingpermissionsandprohibitions.Whenitexplicitlyorimplicitly authorizesprivateaction,itisnotomittingtodoanythingorrefusingtoact.Moreover,the distinctionbetweenauthorizedandunauthorizedprivateactionforexample,private killingbecomesobscurewhengovernmentformallyforbidsprivateactionbutchoosesa setofpolicyinstrumentsthatdonotadequatelyorfullydiscourageit. PhilosophicalQuarterly38(2001). EsotericMorality,Ratio(2010).
14DerekParfit,ReasonsandPersons(1984),section17. 15AllanWood,TheSupremePrincipleofMorality,inTheCambridgeCompaniontoKant 12DouglasPortmore,CananActConsequentialistTheorybeAgentRelative?American

13PeterSingerandKatarzynaDeLazariRadek,SecrecyinConsequentialism:ADefenseof

andModernPhilosophy,ed.PaulGuyer(Cambridge,2006),p.345.

16OnoraONeill,ConstructionsofReason(CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),p.85

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UtilitarianMorals:ReconsideringHaresArgumentforUtilitarianism,draftpreparedfor theConferenceonIssuesinModernPhilosophy:TheFoundationsofMorality,NYU PhilosophyDepartment,November7,2009,34. Moraljudgments,inotherwords,cannotbebasedonjustanyreason.Inparticular,we cannotmakeexceptionsforourselves.IfIclaimthatyououghttogivetothepoor,Imust eitheragreethatItoooughttogivetothepoor,orImustfindareasonwhyitisnotthe casethatIoughttogivetothepoor,andthisreasonmustbespecifiablewithoutreference toindividuals.ThatreasonmightbethatyouareabillionaireandIamstrugglingtokeep upwithmymortgagepayments.ButitcannotbethatIamtheonewhowillbenefitifI keepallmymoney,whereasyouwillbenefitifyoukeepallyourmoney. AlthoughHareswordssometimesgavetheimpressionthatheunderstood universalizabilitytobearequirementofreason(forexample:touniversalizeistogivethe reason)hisconsideredpositionleavesroomforamoralism,andtheamoralist,inhisview, neednotbeinconsistentorirrational.Morallanguageexcludesnonuniversalizable judgments,butthereisnologicalrequirementthatoneusemorallanguage,orguideones lifebyuniversalizableprinciples.Ifthatisright,thesignificanceofanyconclusionsthatwe maybeabletoreachbydrawingouttheimplicationsofuniversalizabilitywillbeweakened. Onecanalwaysescapethoseconclusionsbyrefusingtomakemoraljudgments. Nevertheless,sincemanyofusdowanttousetermslikeoughtandright,thepossibility ofrationalamoralismdoesnotrenderpointlesstheexerciseofexploringtheimplications ofuniversalizability,andseeingwhatnormativeconclusionsmayfollowfromits application. WhenIprescribesomething,usingmorallanguage,myprescriptioncommitsmetoa substantivemoraljudgmentaboutallrelevantlysimilarcases.Thisincludeshypothetical casesinwhichIaminadifferentpositionfrommyactualone.Sotomakeamoral judgment,Imustputmyselfinthepositionoftheotherpersonaffectedbymyproposed actionortobemoreprecise,inthepositionofallthoseaffectedbymyaction.WhetherI canacceptthejudgmentthatis,whetherIcanprescribeituniversallywillthendepend onwhetherIcouldacceptitifIhadtolivethelivesofallthoseaffectedbytheaction.
18PhilipPettit,NonConsequentialismandUniversalizability,PhilosophicalQuarterly50

17PeterSinger[IraW.DeCampProfessorofBioethics,Princeton],TheGroundworkof

(2000). TheupshotisthatifasanonconsequentialisttheoristIstraightforwardlyuniversalizethe prescriptionthatinacertainsituationIshouldinstantiateafavoredpattern,P,thenthe prescriptiontowhichItherebycommitmyselfthatinthatsituationanyXoughtto instantiatepattern,Pmayforcemetorevisemyoriginalselfprescription.Ihaveequal reasontopreferboththatIinstantiatePandthatanyagentinstantiatePthisreasonis expressedbytheuseofthewordrightoroughtineachcaseandthespiritof universalisabilityblocksmefromtreatingmyselfasinanywayspecial.Thus,ifthe preferencesareinconsistentinacertainsituationifthechoiceisbetweenmy instantiatingPalone,forexample,ormyactingsothatmanyothersinstantiatePinstead

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thenIwillhavereasonnottoinstantiatePmyself.Asawouldbenonconsequentialist thinker,myinitialclaimmusthavebeenthatthepointistoinstantiatePinmyownlife,not promoteitgenerally.ButIcountenancethegeneralclaimsofthePpatternwhenI universalizeinthestraightforwardway:Iprescribegeneralconformitytothatpattern,not justconformityinmyowncase.ThusitnowseemsthatwhatImustthinkisthatthis generalconformityistobepromoted,evenifthatmeansnotmyselfinstantiatingthe patterninmyownbehaviororpsychologyorrelationships.ItseemsthatwhatImust embrace,ineffect,isaconsequentialisminwhichconformitytopatternPistheultimate valuetobepromoted.


19DerekParfit,OnWhatMatters(2011).QuotedinMichaelOtsuka,TheKantianArgument

forConsequentialism,EssaysonDerekParfitsOnWhatMatters,p.62. A.Everyoneoughttofollowtheprincipleswhoseuniversalacceptanceeveryonecould rationallywill,orchoose. B.Everyonecouldrationallychoosewhatevertheywouldhavesufficientreasontochoose. C.TherearesomeUAoptimificprinciples. D.Thesearetheprinciplesthateveryonewouldhavethestrongestimpartialreasonsto choose. E.Noonesimpartialreasonstochoosetheseprincipleswouldbedecisivelyoutweighedby anyrelevantconflictingreasons. Therefore, F.Everyonewouldhavesufficientreasonstochoosetheseoptimificprinciples. G.Therearenoothersignificantlynonoptimificprinciplesthateveryonewouldhave sufficientreasonstochoose. Therefore, H.Itisonlytheseoptimificprinciplesthateveryonewouldhavesufficientreasonsto choose,andcouldthereforerationallychoose. Therefore, Everyoneoughttofollowtheseprinciples.
20Kant,Groundwork(4:429).

Thehumanbeingnecessarilyrepresentshisownexistenceinthisway;sofaritisthusa subjectiveprincipleofhumanactions.Buteveryotherrationalbeingalsorepresentshis existenceinthiswayconsequentonjustthesamerationalgroundthatalsoholdsforme; thusitisatthesametimeanobjectiveprinciplefromwhich,asasupremepracticalground, itmustbepossibletoderivealllawsofthewill.Thepracticalimperativewillthereforebe thefollowing:Soactthatyouusehumanity,whetherinyourownpersonorinthepersonof anyother,alwaysatthesametimeasanend,nevermerelyasameans.

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Harvard.PhDinPhilosophyFromHarvard].ValuingOurHumanity.

21ChristineM.KorsgaardWorkingPaperasofMay2010.[ProfessorofPhilosophyat

ThisquestionbringsusbacktotheissueswithwhichIbegan.InKantsFormulaof HumanityandevenmoreinTheSourcesofNormativity,Iarguedthatthereisasensein whichwemustvalueourmoralnature,thatis,ourpracticalidentityasmoralbeings, becauseitistheconditionofthevalueofanythingelse.InTheSourcesofNormativity,in particular,IarguedthatwemustvalueourmoralnatureaswhatIcallaformofpractical identity,adescriptionunderwhichwevalueourselvesandfindourlivesworthliving.I claimedthatourmoralidentity,whichItooktobeequivalenttoourhumanidentity,isthe ultimatesourceofreasons,becausethemorallawistheultimatesourceofjustification aconsiderationmustbecapableofbeingembodiedinauniversalizablemaximifitisto countasareasonatall.Soifwearetohaveanyreasons,ortoseeanythingasbeing valuable,wemustvalueandidentifywithournatureasmoralbeings.Buthowcanwe valueourmoralnatureifwecanthinkneitherthatitispraiseworthynorthatis prizeworthytohaveit?
22AllenW.Wood,KantsEthicalThought(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),pp.

124125. (1)Thisishowthehumanbeingnecessarilyrepresentshisownexistence;tothisextentit isasubjectiveprincipleofaction. (2)Buteveryotherrationalbeingalsorepresentsitsexistenceinthisway,basedonthe samerationalgroundwhichisvalidforme. (3)Thereforeitistherationalgroundofanobjectiveprinciplewhichcanserveasthe foundationforallmorallaws. (4)Thepracticalimperativewillthereforebe:actsothatyouusehumanityinyourown person,aswellasthepersonofeveryother,alwaysatthesametimeasend,andnever merelyasameans. 23DerekParfit[Oxford],OnWhatMatters(July10,2010draft),67. Korsgaardsremarksprovideoneexample.Toillustrateherclaimthatsomethingcanbe goodbecauseitisdesiredforitsownsake,Korsgaardwrites:chocolategetsitsvalue fromthewayitaffectsus.Weconfervalueonitbylikingit.Suchexamplesdonot,I believe,showthatourdesirescancreateorconfervalue,ordisvalue,bymakingwhatwe wanttohave,ortoavoid,goodorbad.Ourfuturepleasuresorpainsarenotmadetobe goodorbadbyourpresentdesirestohavethesepleasures,andtoavoidthesepains.And whenweareingreatpain,byhavingsomesensationthatweintenselydislike,whatmakes ourconsciousstatebadisourintensedislike,notourpresentdesirenottobehavingthe sensationthatwedislike.Sinceourmetahedonicdesiresdonotmaketheirobjectsgood orbad,theexamplesofpleasureandpaindonotdecisively,oreven,Ibelieve,strongly supporttheviewthatourotherdesireshavesuchvaluecreatingpower.Thoughitisgood tohavesensationsthatwelike,nothingisgoodmerelybecausewewantthisthing.
24JeffMcMahan[Rutgers],ChallengestoHumanEquality,TheJournalofEthics(2008).

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Eachofusbeganlifebelowthethresholdofpsychologicalcapacitythatwehadtoreachin ordertobecomethemoralequalofothers.Wearenowaboveit.ButasIhavenoted, equalityisallornothing,anditisimplausibletosupposethattherewasapointwheneach ofuswassuddenlytransformedintothemoralequalofothers.Forthedevelopmentand maturationofourpsychologicalcapacitiesisgradualandcontinuous,withoutabrupt discontinuities.Giventhatthedifferencebetweenbeingandnotbeingwithinthescopeof liberalegalitarianprinciplesisprofoundlysignicant,itisimpossibletomakethe transitionfromonetypeofstatustotheotherthroughamerelyincrementalincreasein psychologicalcapacity.Becausetherelevantcapacitiesaremattersofdegreeandlack sharpboundaries,thedifferencebetweenanindividualjustabovethethresholdandan individualjustbelowitcannotbethedifferencebetweenthepossessionofsomecapacity andthefailuretopossessthatcapacity.[Evenif]Assumingthatproblem2canbeovercome andwecanidentifyasharpthresholddividingthosewhoareourmoralequalsfromthose whoarenot,wheredoesthethresholdlie?Ifitissufficientlylowthatveryyoungchildren areaboveit,thensomenonhumananimals,suchaschimpanzees,shouldbeaboveitaswell. Ifitishighenoughtoexcludeallanimals,itwillalsoexcludeyoungchildrenandadults whosepsychologicalcapacitiesarepermanentlyarrestedatorbelowthelevelofyoung children. ofHardPaternalism,LegalTheory(2005).
25RichardArneson[UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego],JoelFeinbergandtheJustification

Moreover,partofwhathasgonewrongistheKantianextravagancethatFeinberg pinpoints.Rationalagencycapacityisacomplexofabilities,eachofwhichvariesbydegree. Itsvalueisgreat,nodoubt,butnite,notunsurpassable.Butastheseparatecomponents ofrationalagencycapacitydwindleandoverallcapacityshrinks,theoverallvaluealso shrinks.Moreover,ourreverenceforrationalagencycapacityis,toalargedegree, reverenceforthepotentialthatrationalagencycapacitygivesthebearerinmostnormal circumstancesofhumanlife.Thisispotentialtodeveloponesindividualityinparticular ways,tomakesomethingworthwhileofoneslifeforoneselfandothers,toachieveanyof anenormouslywiderangeofgreatgoodsaccordingtoourchoicesandtheluckof circumstances.Inabnormal,unfortunatecircumstanceswhenthispotentialdisappearsor almostentirelydisappears,whatisleftcanbeofverymodestvalueindeed,anditcanbe perfectlyreasonabletotradeoffthegoodofcontinuedexistenceforsomeextraperiodof timeasa(somewhat)rationalagentagainstothergoodsthatonecansecurebycutting shortonesexistence.Theideathatthesetradeoffs,whicharesometimesdifcultand complexandsometimesobviouslyfavorcuttingshortoneslife,arealwaysautomatically wrongtocontemplatebecausetheyoffendagainsttheunsurpassablevalueofrational agencycapacityitselfissimplynotcredible.Butevenrationalagencycapacityinfull owering,possessedbyacapable,intelligenthumaninfortunatecircumstances,is reasonablyassessedatsomelargebutnitevalue.Thebasicideaofthenoexchange constraintismisguided.
26DerekParfit,OnWhatMattersvol.II(2011),p.161.

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Ifthedignityofpersonswereakindofsupremegoodness,andHitlerandStalinhadthis kindofgoodness,thatwouldimplythatHitlerandStalinweresupremelygood.Sincethat isclearlyfalse,asKantwouldhaveagreed,weshouldconcludethat,atleastwhenhadby persons,dignityisnotakindofgoodness.AsWood,Hill,andothersclaim,thedignityof personsisakindofmoralstatus,oravaluetoberespected.ThoughHitlerandStalin werenotgood,theyhaddignityinthesensethat,asrationalbeings,theyhadthemoral statusofbeingentitieswhooughtalwaystobetreatedonlyincertainways. ReturnnowtoWoodsFoundationalThesis.Ifwetakerationalnaturetorefertorational beings,orpersons,thisthesisimpliesthat(1)ourreasontotreatallpersonsonlyincertain waysisprovidedbythefactthatpersonshavesupremevalue.Thissupremevalue,aswe havejustseen,isnotakindofgoodnessbutakindofmoralstatus.Sowecanrestate(1)as (2)ourreasontotreatallpersonsonlyincertainwaysisprovidedbythefactthatpersons havethemoralstatusofbeingentitieswhooughttobetreatedonlyintheseways.Inthis restatement,WoodsThesisbecomeslessappealing.Norcould(2)beclaimedtoground moralitysrequirementsinwhatHermancallsacorrectanalysisoftheGood.(2)claims onlythatourreasontofollowtheserequirementsisprovidedbythefactthatmorality requirestheseacts.ThisclaimdoesnotgivemoralitywhatHermancallsavaluethatcould beitsendorpoint,showinghowmoralitysdemandsmakesense.
27DerekParfit,OnWhatMattersvol.II(2011),165.

Kantusesrationalnaturetoreferbothtorationalbeingsandto therationalityofthese beings.Thevalueofrationalnaturetherefore consistsinpartinthedignityofallrational beings,orpersons.Aswe haveseen,thisdignityisnotakindofgoodness,butisthemoral status ofbeingentitieswhooughttobetreatedonlyincertainways.Theclaim that personshavethisstatusdoesnothelpustodecidehowpersons oughttobetreated. When Woodreferstothesupremevalueofrationalnature,heis moreoftenreferringtothevalue ofnonmoralrationality,suchas prudentialrationality.ThoughWoodnolongerclaimsthat ourcapacity tosetanendconfersgoodnessonwhatwechoose,hestilltakes Kanttobe claimingtrulythatthecorrectexerciseofonesrational capacities ... mustbeesteemedas unconditionallygood.OnKants view,Hermansimilarlywrites,thedomainoftheGood isrational activityandagency:thatiswilling. Theseclaimsarenot,Ibelieve,justied. Somekindsofrationalactivitymayhavegreatintrinsicvalueasachievements,andthis wouldsupportKantsclaimthatweoughttodevelopanduseour variousrationalabilities. Butunlikegoodwills,nonmoralrationalitycannotbeclaimedtobesupremelygood.The rationalagencyof HitlerandStalinwas not good.Nor,Ibelieve,wouldKanthavemade this claim.OnKantsview,asHermannotes,whatisgoodisonly good willing.
28DerekParfit,OnWhatMattersvol.II(2011),p.161.

Woodalsoclaimsthatconcernforalleviatinghumansufferingis groundedinthe fundamentalvalueofnonmoralrationality.Thatis not,Ibelieve,true.Ourconcernto relievepeoplessufferingshouldbe grounded,notinthevalueofthesepeoplesrationality, butintheways inwhichsufferingisbadforthesepeople,bybeingastatethattheyhave strongreasonstowantnottobein.Wehavesimilarreasonstorelieve thesufferingof

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thoseabnormalhumanbeingswhohavenorational abilities,andthesufferingofnon rationalanimals.AsBenthamsaid, ourquestionshouldnotbeCantheyreason?butCan theysuffer?


29JeffMcMahan[Rutgers],ChallengestoHumanEquality,TheJournalofEthics(2008).

Mostmaturehumanbeingshavearationalnatureandmostimmaturehumanbeingsdo seemtobeinherentlyorinternallydirectedtowardthedevelopmentofthecapacityfor rationality.SupposewegrantwhatIbelievetobeplausiblethattheactualpossessionof arationalnatureissufcienttobringanindividualwithinthescopeofliberalegalitarian principles.10Thereremainsthefamiliarquestionaboutthepotentialforrationalityasa basisforthismoralstatus:namely,whyshouldanimmaturehumanbeingsinternal directednesstowardthedevelopmentofarationalnatureaffecthowweoughttotreatthat individualnow?Thereis,ofcourse,agoodanswertothatquestionincasesinwhichhow wetreattheindividualnowwillaffectherforbetterorworselater,whensheactuallyhasa rationalnature.Buttherearecertaintypesofacttheeffectsofwhicharelimitedentirelyto thepresent,includingcruciallyactsofkilling.Whyshouldthemoralityofanactof killingbegovernedbythekindofrespectthatisappropriateforanaturethatthe individualkilleddoesnothavenowbutmayhavelater,thoughonlyifitisnotkilled?Why shouldanactofkillingnotbegovernedinsteadbydueconsiderationforthenatureofthe individualatthetimeofaction(orofthedeath,ifitoccurslater)?
30JeffMcMahan[Rutgers],ChallengestoHumanEquality,TheJournalofEthics(2008).

Ibelieve,asIarguedinTheEthicsofKilling,thattherearenogoodanswerstothese questions.IwillnotrehearsethoseargumentsherebutwillinsteadraisewhatIthinkisa moredifficultquestion.Whatreasonistheretosupposethatallhumanbeingsareinfact internallydirectedorprogrammedtowardthedevelopmentofarationalnature?Thereare somehumanbeingsthosewhoarecongenitallyandradicallycognitivelyimpaired (henceforththeradicallyimpaired)whoinatleastoneobvioussenselackthepotential forthedevelopmentofarationalnature.Whilemostimmaturehumanbeings(embryos, fetuses,newborninfants)will,givenafavorableenvironment,developacapacityfor rationality,thoseimmaturehumanbeingsthatareradicallycognitivelyimpairedcannot developthiscategory,evenwiththemostextensiveformsofassistancethatweare currentlyabletoprovide.
31DavidCummiskey,KantianConsequentialism(Oxford,1996).

Insuchasituation,whatwouldaconscientiousKantianagent,anagentmotivatedbythe unconditionalvalueofrationalbeingchoose?Wehaveadutytopromotetheconditions necessaryfortheexistenceofrationalbeings,butbothchoosingtoactandchoosingnotto actwillcostthelifeofarationalbeing.SincethebasisofKantsprincipleisrationalnature existsasanendinitself,thereasonablesolutiontosuchadilemmainvolvespromoting, insofarasonecan,theconditionsnecessaryforrationalbeings.IfIsacrificesomeforthe sakeofotherrationalbeings,IdonotusethemarbitrarilyandIdonotdenythe unconditionalvalueofrationalbeings.Personsmayhavedignity,anunconditionaland incomparablevaluethattranscendsanymarketvalue,but,asrationalbeings,personsalso

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haveafundamentalequality,whichdictatesthatsomemustsometimesgivewayforthe sakeofothers.Theformulaoftheendinitselfthusdoesnotsupporttheviewthatwemay neverforceanothertobearsomecostinordertobenefitothers.Ifonefocusesontheequal valueofallrationalbeings,thenequalconsiderationdictatesthatonemaysacrificesometo savemany. ConsequentialistAssumption,Analysis1992,244.


32PaulHurley[ProfessorofPhilosophy,ClaremontMcKennaCollege],TheHidden

Iftheagentneutralrestrictiononprinciplesisabandoned,andcertainagentcentred principlesorstandardsareallowedtoberelevanttothedeterminationofthebest availablestateofaffairs,thenappealtothevalueofstatesofaffairscanresultinagent centredrestrictions,i.e.initsbeingwrongtoact,insomecases,soastobringaboutthe beststateofaffairsasdeterminedfromanimpersonalpointofview.Suchvaluebased restrictionsonbringingaboutthebeststateofaffairsfromanimpersonalpointofviewcan resultifthebeststateofaffairsavailabletoanyagentAisnotthebeststateofaffairs availabletoAasdeterminedfromanimpersonalpointofview.Suchafailureof coincidencecanoccurwhenevertheprinciplesorstandardsrelevanttothedetermination ofthebeststateofaffairsavailabletoAarenotallagentneutralprinciplesorstandards. 33AllenWood,KantsCompatibilism,SelfandNatureinKantsPhilosophy(1984)77. ThefreewillproblemarisesforKantbecausehebelievesthatpracticalfreedomrequires transcendentalfreedomandthatthereisnoroominthecausalmechanismofnaturefora transcendentallyfreebeing.Allcausesinthenaturalworldaresensibleorempiricalandall necessitatetheireffects.Consequently,ifouractionsweredeterminedbythem,thenthey wouldbenecessitatedbysomethingsensuous(sothatwewouldlackpracticalfreedomin thenegativesense)andtherewouldbenoroomforanonsensuousmotiveforouractions (sothatwewouldlackpracticalfreedominthepositivesense).Practicalfreedomrequires thatwebeabletodetermineouractionsentirelyfromwithinourselves,throughourown legislativereason.Naturalcauses,however,belongtoanendlessregressivechaininwhich thereisnospontaneousorfirstcause.Wecanthinkofourselvesaspracticallyfree, therefore,onlybythinkingofouractionsassubjecttoatranscendentallyfreecauselying outsidenature. Becausepracticalfreedom,thefreedomrequiredformoralresponsibility,mustinvolvethe capacitytodowhatmoralitydemandsofus,itisobviousthatanyaccountofpractical freedommustdependonsomeaccountofthedemandsofmorality.InKantsphilosophy moralityhasanespeciallycloseassociationwithpracticalfreedom.ForKant,moralityis autonomy,itistheconformityofthewilltoaselfgivenlawofreason.Actingmorally,then, isnotmerelyonethingamongothersthatapracticallyfreebeingcando,butitisthe peculiarfunctionofmoralitytoactualizepracticalfreedom.
34JoshuaGreeneandJonathanCohen,Forthelaw,neurosciencechangesnothingand

everything,Phil.Trans.R.Soc.Lond.B(2004).

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Theforwardlookingconsequentialistapproachtopunishmentworkswithallthree responsestotheproblemoffreewill,includingharddeterminism.Thisisbecause consequentialistsarenotconcernedwithwhetheranyoneisreallyinnocentorguiltyin someultimatesensethatmightdependonpeopleshavingfreewill,butonlywiththelikely effectsofpunishment.(Ofcourse,onemightwonderwhatitmeansforaharddeterminist tojustifyanysortofchoice.Wewillreturntothisissueinx8.)Theretributivistapproach, bycontrast,isplausiblyregardedasrequiringfreewillandtherejectionofhard determinism.Retributivistswanttoknowwhetherthedefendanttrulydeservestobe punished.Assumingonecandeservetobepunishedonlyforactionsthatarefreelywilled, harddeterminismimpliesthatnoonereallydeservestobepunished.Thus,hard determinismcombinedwithretributivismrequirestheeliminationofallpunishment, whichdoesnotseemreasonable.Thisleavesretributivistswithtwooptions:compatibilism andlibertarianism.Libertarianism,forreasonsgivenabove,anddespiteitsintuitiveappeal, isscientificallysuspect.Attheveryleast,thelawshouldnotdependonit.Itseems,then, thatretributivismrequirescompatibilism.Accordingly,thestandardlegalaccountof punishmentiscompatibilist. York:BasicBooks,1974.p3133
35RobertNozick.MoralConstraintsandMoralGoals.Anarchy,StateandUtopia,New

Individualsareendsandnotmerelymeans;theymaynotbesacrificedorusedforthe achievingofotherendswithouttheirconsent.Sideconstraintsexpresstheinviolabilityof otherpersons.Butwhymaynotoneviolatepersonsforthegreatestsocialgood? Individually,weeachsometimeschoosetoundergosomepainorsacrificeforagreater benefitortoavoidagreaterharm:wegotothedentisttoavoidworsesufferinglater;we dosomeunpleasantworkforitsresults;somepersonsdiettoimprovetheirhealthor looks;somesavemoneytosupportthemselveswhentheyareolder.Ineachcase,some costisborneforthesakeofthegeneraloverallgood.Whynot,similarly,holdthatsome personshavetobearsomecoststhatbenefitotherpersonsmore,forthesakeoftheoverall socialgood?Butthereisnosocialentitywithagoodthatundergoessomesacrificeforits owngood.Theyareonlyindividualpeople,differentindividualpeople,withtheirall individuallives.Usingoneofthesepeopleforthebenefitofothersuseshimandbenefits theothers.Nothingmore.Whathappensisthatsomethingisdonetohimforthesakeof others.Talkofanoverallsocialgoodcoversthisup.Touseapersoninthiswaydoesnot sufficientlyrespectandtakeaccountofthefactthatheisaseparateperson,thathisisthe onlylifehehas.Hedoesnotgetsomeoverbalancinggoodfromhissacrifice,andnooneis entitledtoforcethisuponhimleastofallastateorgovernmentthatclaimshisallegiance (asotherindividualsdonot)andthatthereforescrupulouslymustbeneutralbetweenits citizens.Themoralsideconstraintsuponwhatwemaydo,Iclaim,reflectthefactofour separateexistences.Theyreflectthefactthatnomoralbalancingactcantakeplaceamong us;thereisnomoraloutweighingofoneofourlivesbyotherssoastoleadtoagreater overallsocialgood.Thereisnojustifiedsacrificeofsomeofusforothers.
36DerekParfit,ReasonsandPersons(1984),338339.

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Theseclaimscanbeexplainedinadifferentway.Eventhosewhoobjecttobalancingthink thatitcanbejustifiedtoimposeburdensonachildforhisowngreaterbenefitlaterinhis life.Theirclaimisthatapersonsburden,whileitcanbemorallyoutweighedbybenefitsto him,cannoteverbeoutweighedbymerebenefitstoothers.Thisisheldtobesoevenifthe benefitsarefargreaterthantheburden.Theclaimthusgivestotheboundariesbetween livesortothefactofnonidentityoverwhelmingsignificance.Itallowswithinthesame lifewhat,overdifferentlives,ittotallyforbids. ThisclaimwouldbemoreplausibleontheNonReductionistView.Sincethefactofidentity is,here,thoughttobedeeper,thefactofnonidentitycouldmoreplausiblyseemtohave suchimportance.Onthisview,itisadeeptruththatallofapersonslifeisasmuchhislife. Ifweareimpressedbythistruthbytheunityofeachlifetheboundariesbetweenlives willseemtobedeeper.Thissupportstheclaimthat,inthemoralcalculus,these boundariescannotbecrossed.OntheReductionistView,wearelessimpressedbythis truth.Weregardtheunityofeachlifeas,initsnature,lessdeep,andasamatterofdegree. Wemaythereforethinktheboundariesbetweenlivestobelesslikethosebetween,say,the squaresonachessboarddividingwhatisallpurewhitefromwhatisalljetblackand moreliketheboundariesbetweendifferentcountries.Theymaythenseemlessmorally important.
37RobertNozick,Anarchy,State,andUtopia(BasicBooksPress,1974),pp.2930atfn.6.

Unfortunately,toofewmodelsofthestructureofmoralviewshavebeenspecified heretofore,thoughtherearesurelyotherinterestingstructures.Henceanargumentfora sideconstraintstructurethatconsistslargelyinarguingagainstanendstatemaximization structureisinconclusive,forthesealternativesarenotexhaustive.(Onpage46wedescribe aviewwhichfitsneitherstructurehappily.)Anarrayofstructuresmustbeprecisely formulatedandinvestigated;perhapssomenovelstructurethenwillseemmost appropriate.Theissueofwhetherasideconstraintviewcanbeputintheformofthegoal withoutsideconstraintviewisatrickyone.Onemightthink,forexample,thateachperson coulddistinguishinhisgoalbetweenhisviolatingrightsandsomeoneelsesdoingit.Give theformerinfinite(NC)weightinhisgoal,andnoamountofstoppingothersfromviolating rightscanoutweighhisviolatingsomeonesrights.Inadditiontoacomponentofagoal receivinginfiniteweight,indexicalexpressionsalsoappear,forexample,mydoing something.Acarefulstatementdelimitingconstraintviewswouldexcludethese gimmickywaysoftransformingsideconstraintsintotheformofanendstateviewas sufficienttoconstituteaviewasendstate.Thequestionofwhethertheseside constraintsareabsolute,orwhethertheymaybeviolatedinordertoavoidcatastrophic moralhorror,andifthelatter,whattheresultingstructuremightlooklike,isoneIhope largelytoavoid.
38SamuelScheffler2003[ProfessorofPhilosophyatUniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley],

TheRejectionofConsequentialism,inStephenDarwall(ed.)Consequentialism(Maldin, MA:Blackwell,2003),p.127

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[]The[Nozicks]passagesuggeststhattherationalityofagentcenteredrestrictionslike Rasaresponsetotheseparatenessofpersonsderivesfromthefactthattheviolationof sucharestrictionharmssomevictimwithoutcompensatinghimforthisharm.Butthe relevanceofthisfactisunclear.Whydoesthisconsiderationmakerationaltheviewthatit iswrongtoviolatesucharestrictioneveninordertopreventastillgreaternumberof equallyweightyviolationsoftheverysamerestriction?WhetherA1harmsP1,inour schematicexample,orA2...A6harmP2...P6,someonesseparateanddistinctlifewillbe violatedwithoutcompensation.Thereisnoquestionhereofavoidinguncompensated violationsaltogether.Thequestioninsteadis:whyisntitatleastpermissibletodisrupt onedistinctindividuallife,withoutcompensation,inordertopreventtheuncompensated disruptionoffiveequallydistinctlives?Itisobviouslynoanswertothisquestiontosimply reiteratethatpeoplearedistinct,thateachhasonlyonelifetolead,andthatP1willnotbe compensatedfortheharmhesuffersifA1violatesR.Thisrestatementprovidesno explanationwhatsoeveroftheimpermissibilityofA1sinflictingoneuncompensated violationinordertopreventA2...A6frominflictingfivesimilarlyuncompensated violations. ConsequentialisminACompaniontoEthics,ed.PeterSinger(1993),238.
39PhillipPettit[ProfessorofPoliticsandPhilosophy,PrincetonUniversity],

Thereareatleastthreerespectsinwhichconsequentialismscoresonsimplicity.Thefirstis thatwhereasconsequentialistsendorseonlyonewayofrespondingtovalues,non consequentialistsendorsetwo.Nonconsequentialistsallcommitthemselvestotheview thatcertainvaluesshouldbehonouredratherthanpromoted:say,valueslikethose associatedwithloyaltyandrespect.Buttheyallagree,whetherornotintheirroleasmoral theorists,thatcertainothervaluesshouldbepromoted:valuesasvariousaseconomic prosperity,personalhygiene,andthesafetyofnuclearinstallations.Thuswhere consequentialistsintroduceasingleaxiomonhowvaluesjustifychoices,non consequentialistsmustintroducetwo. Butnotonlyisnonconsequentialismlesssimpleforlosingthenumbersgame.Itisalsoless simpleforplayingthegameinanadhocway.Nonconsequentialistsallidentifycertain valuesassuitableforhonouringratherthanpromoting.Buttheydonotgenerallyexplain whatitisaboutthevaluesidentifiedwhichmeansthatjustificationcomesfromtheirbeing honouredratherthanpromoted.Andindeeditisnotclearwhatsatisfactoryexplanation canbeprovided.Itisonethingtomakealistofthevalueswhichallegedlyrequire honouring:values,say,likepersonalloyalty,respectforothers,andpunishmentfor wrongdoing.Itisanothertosaywhythesevaluesaresoverydifferentfromtheordinary runofdesirableproperties.Theremaybefeaturesthatmarkthemofffromothervalues, butwhydothosefeaturesmattersomuch?Thatquestiontypicallygoesunconsideredby nonconsequentialists.Notonlydotheyhaveadualitythenwhereconsequentialistshavea unity;theyalsohaveanunexplainedduality. Thethirdrespectinwhichconsequentialismscoresonthesimplicitycountisthatitfits nicelywithourstandardviewsofwhatrationalityrequires,whereasnonconsequentialism isintensionwithsuchviews.Theagentconcernedwithavalueisinaparallelpositionto

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thatofanagentconcernedwithsomepersonalgood:say,healthorincomeorstatus.In thinkingabouthowanagentshouldactontheconcernforapersonalgood,we unhesitatinglysaythatofcoursetherationalthingtodo,therationallyjustifiedaction,isto actsothatthegoodispromoted.Thatmeansthenthatwhereastheconsequentialistline onhowvaluesjustifychoicesiscontinuouswiththestandardlineonrationalityinthe pursuitofpersonalgoods,thenonconsequentialistlineisnot.Thenonconsequentialist hastheembarrassmentofhavingtodefendapositiononwhatcertainvaluesrequirewhich iswithoutanalogueinthenonmoralareaofpracticalrationality. PhilosophicalIssues19(2009).


40MichaelSmith[ProfessorofPhilosophy,Princeton],TwoKindsofConsequentialism,

Thefirstpartisareminderofwhysomepeoplethinkthattheargumentsinfavourofsome formofconsequentialismareoverwhelming.AsJosephRazpointsout,oneofthe dominantviewstheoristshaveheldaboutreasonsforactionhecallsitthe"classical view"isthatanagenthasareasontoactinacertainwayjustincasesomethinggoodwill resultfromhisactinginthatway(Raz1999,especiallyChapters1113).Raztracesthis viewbacktoPlatoandAristotle,butitisalsoextremelywidelyheldbycontemporary theorists,bothconsequentialists(see,forexample,Parfitforthcoming),andnon consequentialistsalike(see,forexample,Anscombe1957,andofcourseRazhimself).But itisdifficulttoseehowthosewhoholdthisviewofreasonsforactioncouldgiveanything otherthanaconsequentialistexplanationofwhatagentsoughttodo.Inordertoseethat thisisso,considersideconstraints.Ifthosewhoaccepttheclassicalviewaretoresista consequentialistexplanationofsideconstraintsofthekindgivenabove,suchtheorists mustsuppose,ontheonehand,thatweeachhaveanobligationnottoviolatepeople's rightsourselves,andyetalsohold,ontheother,eitherthatwehavenoreasontoactinthat way,whichisinconsistentwiththenormativityofobligation,orthatwehaveareasonthat doesn'tentailthegoodofwhatwilltherebycomeabout,whichisadenialoftheclassical view.Onthefaceofit,thiscombinationofviewslookstobeflatoutinconsistent.Those whoholdtheclassicalviewthusseemtobecommittedtosomeformofconsequentialism. Ofcourse,manywhoholdtheclassicalviewdon'tseethingsthiswaythemselves.Butwe arenowinapositiontohazardaguessastowhynot.
41IngmarPersson,TheTwoActOmissionParadox,2004.Jul.2004.

Therearetwowaysinwhichtheactomissiondoctrine,whichimpliesthatitmaybe permissibletoletpeopledieorbekilledwhenitiswrongtokillthem,givesrisetoa paradox.First,itmaybethatwhenyouletavictimbekilled,youletyourselfkillthisvictim. Ontheassumptionthat,ifitwouldbewrongofyoutoactinacertainfashion,itwouldbe wrongofyouletyourselfactinthisfashion,thisyieldstheparadoxthatitisboth permissibleandimpermissibletoletyourselfactinthisfashion.Second,youmaylet yourselfkillsomebodybylettinganactionyouhavealreadyinitiatedcausedeath,e.g.,by notlendingahelpinghandtosomebodyyouhavepushed.This,too,yieldstheparadoxthat itisbothpermissibleandimpermissibletoletyourselfkillifyouareinasituationinwhich killingisimpermissiblebutlettingbekilledpermissible.

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UniversityandPrincetonUniversity],AbsolutistMoralTheoriesandUncertainty,The JournalofPhilosophyCIII(2006). Askierisheadinginadirectionyouknowforsurewilltriggeranavalanchethatwillkill tenpeople.Youknowtheonlywaytosavethetenpeopleisforyoutoshoothim.The probabilitythattheskierintendstotriggertheavalancheandkillthetenpeopleis1p.We canagreethatourtargetabsolutisttheorysaysitisrightforyoutoshootifitiscertainthat theskierintendstokilltheten,thatis,ifp=0,forinthatcaseyouwouldnotbekilling someoneinnocentyouwouldbeprotectingthetenintheonlywaypossiblefroman unprovokedattack.Wecanagreethatourtargettheorysaysthatitwouldbewrongforyou toshootifyouarecertainhesimplyhappenstobeskiinginthatdirection,thatis,ifp5=1, forthenyouwouldbeintentionallykillingsomeoneinnocent,andthatisneverrightno matterhowmanyyouwillbeallowingtodiebyyourfailuretoshoot.Thenumberoflives thatwouldbesavedintheexampleasdescribedisten,butofcoursethedistinctive positionofabsolutismisthatthenumberdoesnotmatter:itisneverrightintentionallyto killtheinnocentnomatterhowmanyliveswouldbesavedbydoingso.Ourquestionis, Whatshouldthetheorysayforothervaluesofp? [] Thetroublewiththisresponseisthatthereisnearlyalwayssomegreaterthanzerochance thatsomeoneisinnocent.Alltheevidencemaybeagainstthem,butinductionfromthe pastrecordofoverturnedverdictsincasesthatlookedwatertightatthetimetellsusthat thereisnearlyalwayssomechancethatsomeonewholooksclearlytobeguiltyisinfact innocent.Wewillgettheresultthatitisnever,orhardlyever,righttoshoottheskier. Indeed,itwillbehardtofindanycaseswhereitisrightintentionallytokillsomeoneas thereisalwayssomechancethatthesomeoneisinnocent,andasmallchancetimesan infinitedisvalueequalsaninfinitedisvalue.Wewillhaveaquick(tooquick)argument fromabsolutismagainstintentionallykillingtheinnocenttoanextremekindofpersonal pacifism. [] Theproblemnotedinsectioniiiwithgivingintentionallykillingtheinnocentaninfinite disvalueisthatwheneverpisnonzero,thatis,nearlyalways,(A)willcomeoutworsethan (B),whichmeansthatitisneverrightforyoutoshootintheskiercaseclearlythewrong answerbyalllightsexceptextremepersonalpacifism,aswenoted.Theproblemnotedin sectionivwithgivingintentionallykillingtheinnocentafinitebutverylargedisvalueis thatitthreatenstomakeitthecasethatincreasingthenumberallowedtodiein(B)can make(B)worsethan(A)evenwhenp,thatis,theprobabilitythatshootingisindeedthe killingoftheinnocent,ishigh(infact,ashighasyoulike).Thiswouldmeanthatwelose thedistinctivefeatureofabsolutism,aswenoted.
43TimMulgan,CriticalNoticeofJeffMcMahon,TheEthicsofKilling:Problemsatthe

42FrankJacksonandMichaelSmith[ProfessorsofPhilosophy,AustralianNational

MarginofLife,CanadianJournalofPhilosophy34(2004).

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44LarryAlexander,ScalarProperties,BinaryJudgments,JournalofAppliedPhilosophy25

Inthemoralrealm,ourdeonticjudgmentsareusually(always?)binary.Anact(or omission)iseithermorallyforbiddenormorallypermissible.Yetthedeterminationofan actsdeonticstatusfrequentlyturnsontheexistenceofpropertiesthataremattersof degree.InwhatfollowsIshallgiveseveralexamplesofbinarymoraljudgmentsthatturn onscalarproperties,andIshallclaimthattheseexamplesshouldpuzzleus.Howcanthe existenceofapropertytoaspecificdegreedemarcateaboundarybetweenanactsbeing morallyforbiddenanditsnotbeingmorallyforbidden?Whyarentourmoraljudgmentsof actsscalarinthewaythatthepropertiesonwhichthosejudgmentsarebasedarescalar,so thatacts,likestatesofaffairs,canbemorallybetterorworseratherthanrightorwrong? Iconceiveofthisinquiryasoperatingprimarilywithintherealmofnormativetheory. Presumablyitwillgiveaidandcomforttoconsequentialists,whohavenotroublemapping theirbinarycategoriesontoscalarproperties.Forexample,astraightforwardact utilitarian,forwhomoneactoutofallpossibleactsismorallyrequired(andhence permissible)andallothersmorallyforbidden,can,intheoryatleast,provideananswerto everyoneofthepuzzlesIraise.And,intheory,socanallothertypesofactandrule consequentialists.Theywillfindnothingofinterestherebeyondembarrassmentfortheir deontologicaladversaries. Thedeontologists,however,mustmeetthechallengesofthesepuzzles.Andforthem,the puzzlesmayraisenotjustnormativequestions,butquestionsofmoralepistemologyand moralontology.Justhowdoweknowthattheactconsequentialistswayof,say,tradingoff livesagainstlivesiswrong?Forexample,dowemerelyintuitthattakingoneinnocent, uninvolvedpersonslifetosavetwoothersiswrong?Canourmethodofreflective equilibriumworkifwehavenotheorytorationalizeourintuitions?Andwhatthingsinthe worldmakeittrue,ifitistrue,thatonemaynotmaketheactconsequentialiststradeoff?I donotprovideanyanswerstothesequestionsanymorethanIprovideanswerstothe normativeones.Buttheysurelylurkinthebackground.
45JohnTaurek,ShouldtheNumbersCount?PhilosophyandPublicAffairs6(1977).

Icannotseehoworwhythemereadditionofnumbersshouldchangeanything.Itseemsto methatthosewho,insituationsofthekindinquestion,wouldhavemecounttherelative numbersofpeopleinvolvedassomethinginitselfofsignificance,wouldhavemeattach importancetohumanbeingsandwhathappenstotheminmerelythewayIwouldto objectswhichIvalued.IfsixobjectsarethreatenedbyfireandIaminapositiontoretrieve thefiveinthisroomortheoneinthatroom,butunabletogetoutallsix,Iwoulddecide whattodoinjustthewayIamtoldIshouldwhenitishumanbeingswhoarethreatened. Eachobjectwillhaveacertainvalueinmyeyes.Ifithappensthatallsixareofequalvalue,I willnaturallypreservethemanyratherthantheone.Why?Becausethefiveobjectsare togetherfivetimesmorevaluableinmyeyesthantheone. Andsoitisintheoriginalsituation.Icannotbutthinkofthesituationinthisway.Foreach ofthesesixpersonsitisnodoubtaterriblethingtodie.Eachfacesthelossofsomething

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amongthethingshevaluesmost.Hislossmeanssomethingtomeonly,orchiefly,because ofwhatitmeanstohim.Itisthelosstotheindividualthatmatterstome,notthelossofthe individual.Butshouldanyoneofthesefivelosehislife,hislossisnogreateralosstohim because,asithappens,fourothers(orfortynineothers)losetheirsaswell.Andneitherhe noranyoneelselosesanythingofgreatervaluetohimthandoesDavid,shouldDavidlose hislife.Fiveindividualseachlosinghislifedoesnotadduptoanyone'sexperiencingaloss fivetimesgreaterthanthelosssufferedbyanyoneofthefive. Now,addingstillotherstoournumber,notoneofwhomwillsufferasmuchasyouare askedtobear,willnotchangethingsforme.Itoughtnottochangethingsforanyofus.If notoneofuscangiveyouagoodreasonwhyyoushouldbewillingtoundergoagreater sufferingsothathemightbesparedalesserone,thenthereissimplynogoodreasonwhy youshouldbeaskedtosuffersothatthegroupmaybespared.Sufferingisnotadditivein thisway.Thediscomfortofeachofalargenumberofindividualsexperiencingaminor headachedoesnotadduptoanyone'sexperiencingamigraine.Insuchatradeoffsituation asthiswearetocompareyourpainoryourloss,nottoourcollectiveortotalpain, whateverexactlythatissupposedtobe,buttowhatwillbesufferedorlostbyanygiven singleoneofus.
46GregoryKavka[ProfessorofPhilosophy,UCLA],TheNumbersShouldCount,

PhilosophicalStudies36(1979). Letusnamethesixstrangers,callingtheonewhoneedsallthedrugSam,andtheothers Mel,Tim,Art,Cal,andLen.LetA1betheactofgivingthewholedosetoSam,andA2bethe actofgivingonefifthofittoeachoftheothers.AccordingtoTaurek,weshouldbe indifferentbetweenA1andA2.Butnotethatthereareotheractstheownercouldperform. Hecould,forexample,giveonefifthofthedrugtoeachofMel,Tim,Art,andCal,andpour therestontheground.CallthisactA3.6CompareA3andA1AccordingtoTaurek's analysis,oneshouldbeindifferentbetweenthem,betweensavingthefourandsavingthe one.Butitisageneralpresuppositionofrationalchoicethatindifference(i.e.theabsence ofpreference)isatransitiverelation.Itfollows,therefore,thatweshouldalsobe indifferentbetweenA2andA3.ButthisistobeindifferentbetweensavingMel,Tim,Art, andCal,ontheonehand,andsavingallfourofthemplusLen,ontheother.Noneofus (especiallyLen)islikelytofindthisimplicationofTaurek'sviewacceptable.
47DerekParfit,InnumerateEthics,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs7(1978).

Atcertainpoints,Taureksuggeststhatnooutcomecanbeworsethanitsalternative.Oneof thetwooutcomesmaybeworseforparticularpeople,butitcannotbesimplyworse.On thissuggestion,Taureksfirstpremisebecomesimplausible.Itimpliesthat,intheabsence ofspecialobligations,wehavenomoralreasontopreventanything.Wehavenoreason eventopreventthoseoutcomeswhichareworseforeveryone.EvenTaurekwouldnot acceptthis.Ifhekeepsthesuggestionthatnooutcomecanbeworsethanitsalternative, hemustthereforeabandonhisfirstpremise.


48DerekParfit,InnumerateEthics,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs7(1978).

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WhatdoesTaureknotunderstand?Apuzzlingpassagereads:Sufferingisnotadditivein thisway.Thediscomfortofeachofalargenumberofindividualsexperiencingaminor headachedoesnotadduptoanyonesexperiencingamigraine.Ifadduptomeantbe thesameas,thiswouldbetrue.Butitwouldnotberelevant.Thosewhobelievethat sufferingisadditivedonotbelievethatmanylesserpainsmightbethesamethingasone greaterpain.Whattheybelieveisthatthelesserpainsmighttogetherbeasbad.


49GregoryKavka[ProfessorofPhilosophy,UCLA],TheNumbersShouldCount,

PhilosophicalStudies36(1979). TherearealsomoregeneralreasonsfordoubtingTaurek'scontentionthatthenumbers shouldnotcountatallincasesofthiskind,reasonsbasedonaplausibleanalogybetween moralityandprudence.ConsiderTaurek'sclaimthatonepartyshouldnotbeforcedto undergoalargepain(onthegroundsthatthetotalamountofpainsufferedwouldbeless) tosavealargenumberofpersonsfromeachsufferingsmallerpains.8Thisseemscorrect inmanycases.Butthesameprincipleappliestoarationalperson'schoicesbetweenhis ownpains.Somepainsaresoawfulthatitmaywellberationalforapersontopreferto sufferseveralsomewhatlesserpainsthantosuffersuchapainonce,evenifthisincreases thetotalamountofpainhewillsuffer.9Yetonecanadmitthiswithoutjumpingtothe absurdconclusionthatarationalpersonwillbeindifferentbetweensufferingonepainofa givenintensityandmanypainsofthatsameintensity.Thefactthatpainsshouldnotbe summedintheneatwayutilitarianssuggestdoesnotmeantheirnumbersdonotcountat allforrationalprudenceorformorality.
50JudithJarvisThomson[MIT],Normativity(2008). 51(1)BeingagoodKisbeinggoodquaK,incontrasttobeinggoodandaK.(Thelatter

cantbetruebecauseagoodK1whoisalsoagoodK2neednotbeagoodK2.)Sogoodnessis attachedtothekindinquestion. (2)ThereissuchapropertyasbeinggoodquaKifandonlyifKisagoodnessfixingkind. Ifgoodnessisattachedtothekindinquestion,theremustbesomestandardsformembers ofsomekindtobegood. (3)Possibleworldisnotagoodnessfixingkind.Goodnessfixingkindsincludefunctional kinds(e.g.,knives),kindsdesignedforcertainpurposes(e.g.,organs),biologicalkinds(e.g., dogs),kindswithcapacitiesthatmembersofthekindmightormightnotexercise(e.g., humanbeingswithmoralcapacities).Butpossibleworldisnotoneofthesekinds.


52MichaelSmith[Princeton],OnNormativity,Analysis(2010).

Certainusesof'good',Harewouldsay,liketheoneusedinthestatementof Consequentialism,accordwiththedoctrineknownasJudgementInternalism.Thescope andstrengthofthisdoctrinearecontroversial,butinHare'sviewitisadoctrineaboutthe judgementsthatareinplaywhenwedeliberateaboutwhattodo.WhatJudgement Internalismsaysisthat,first,suchjudgementsareaboutthevaluesofthepossibleworlds thatareavailabletoagentsthroughthepursuitoftheiroptions,andsecond,thatwhen someonejudgesthatacertainavailablepossibleworldisbetterthanalternatives,hehasa

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preferenceforthatpossibleworldoverthealternatives(Hare1981pp.2024).Note, however,thatifJudgementInternalism,sounderstood,isindeedaconstraintonthe legitimateuseof'good'asitisusedwhenwedeliberateaboutwhattodo,thenthis suggestsonewayinwhichwemightmarkoffthesenseof'good'thatisinplayinthe statementofConsequentialismfromthesenseof'good'thatThomsonisconcernedto analyze.ImaginesomeonewhojudgesthataparticularKisgoodquaK.Itplainlydoesnot followfromthisthatheprefersthatparticularKtoalternatives.Agoodvirusis presumablyonethatreplicatesinawholevarietyofhosts.Howeveritdoesnotfollowthat someonewhojudgesaparticularvirustobeagoodoneimagineascientistwhodiscovers thatsomevirusheisstudyinginthelabreplicatesinnearlyeveryhostprefersthatvirus toalternatives.Hemightconsistentlydespisethatvirus,preciselybecauseitissogoodqua virus.JudgementInternalismisthusnotaconstraintonthemeaningofgoodquaK.Noris itaconstraintonthemeaningofgoodmodified.Someonewhojudgesthatacertainbrand oftoothpastewould(say)begoodforuseininfectingwholepopulationswithacertain virusneedhavenopreferenceforthatbrandoftoothpasteoverotherbrands.Butifthe senseof'good'asitisusedinthestatementofConsequentialismisdifferentfromthe sensesthatThomsonisconcernedtoanalyzeiftheformerisconstrainedbyJudgement Internalism,whereasthelatterarenotthenherobjectiontoConsequentialismlapses.
53MichaelSmith[Princeton],OnNormativity,Analysis(2010).

Ifthisisright,however,thenitseemstomethatThomson'searlierargumentagainst Consequentialismwasbasedonamiscommunicationofideas.Thatargument,youwill recall,assumedthatConsequentialistsascribethepropertyofbeinggoodtopossible worlds,where'good'in'goodpossibleworld'meansthesameas'good'in'goodK'whereK isagoodnessfixingkind.ThisiswhyThomsonthoughtthatConsequentialismmakes senseonlyifpossibleworldisitselfagoodnessfixingkind,whichitisn't.Againstthis,I suggestedthatConsequentialistsmightinsistthattheirtheoryshouldbestatedintermsof auseof'good'as'good'isusedindeliberativecontexts,andIpointedoutthatScanlon's suggestionthatsomethingisgoodjustincaseithasthehigherorderpropertyofhaving somepropertythatprovidesareasontodesireitseemstheperfectcandidateforwhat's pickedoutby'good'insuchcontexts.Butitnowturnsoutthatthislineofreplyisonethat ThomsonherselfcouldhavegivenontheConsequentialist'sbehalf.Forshebelievesthat thehigherorderpropertythatScanlonidentifieswiththepropertyofbeinggoodexists, andsheagreesthatitisanevaluativeproperty,shejustdoesn'tthinkthatitistheproperty ofbeinggood:instead,shethinksthatitisthepropertyofbeingdesirable.Thomsonmight thereforehaverestatedConsequentialisminmoreplausibletermsbeforeattackingit.So stated,Consequentialismistheviewthatthatwecananalyzethedirectivesthataretrueof agentsintermsofthedesirabilityofthepossibleworldsinwhichthoseagentsperformthe actionsthatareavailabletothem.AsfarasIcantell,Thomsonisinnopositiontothink thatConsequentialism,sounderstood,isincoherent.Indeed,itseemsthatherown accountofwhatitisforapossibleworldtobedesirabletellsusnotjustthattheviewis coherent,butalsowhatitsattractionsare.AccordingtoConsequentialism,sounderstood, someone'singisimpermissiblejustincase,whenyoucomparethepossibleworldin whichheswiththepossibleworldsinwhichheperformseachofthealternativeacts

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availabletohim,whatyoudiscoveristhatthereisapossibleworldinwhichheperforms analternativeactthathasafeaturethatmakesitdeservetobedesiredmorethanthe possibleworldinwhichhes.ThequestiontowhichtheConsequentialistsquite reasonablydemandanansweriswhatcouldpossiblyjustifytheagent'singinthese circumstances.Howcoulditbepermissibleforanagenttoactinacertainwayifhisacting inthatwaydidnotdeservebeingdesired?


54NickBostrom,TheInfinitarianChallengetoAggregativeEthics,FutureofHumanity

Institute(2008). Recentcosmologicalevidencesuggeststhattheworldisprobablyinfinite.Moreover,ifthe totalityofphysicalexistenceisindeedinfinite,inthekindofwaythatmoderncosmology suggestsitis,thenitcontainsaninfinitenumberofgalaxies,stars,andplanets.Ifthereare aninfinitenumberofplanetsthenthereis,withprobabilityone,aninfinitenumberof people.Infinitelymanyofthesepeoplearehappy,infinitelymanyareunhappy.Likewise forotherlocalpropertiesthatareplausiblecandidatesforhavingvalue,pertainingto personstates,lives,orentiresocieties,ecosystems,orcivilizationsthereareinfinitely manydemocraticstates,andinfinitelymanythatareruledbydespots,etc.... Supposetheworldcontainsaninfinitenumberofpeopleandacorrespondinginfinityof joysandsorrows,preferencesatisfactionsandfrustrations,instancesofvirtueand depravation,andothersuchlocalphenomenaatleastsomeofwhichhavepositiveor negativevalue.Moreprecisely,supposethatthereissomefinitevaluesuchthatthere existsaninfinitenumberoflocalphenomena(thiscouldbeasubsetofe.g.persons, experiences,characters,virtuousacts,lives,relationships,civilizations,orecosystems) eachofwhichhasavalueandalsoaninfinitenumberoflocalphenomenaeachofwhich hasavalue().Callsuchaworldcanonicallyinfinite.Ethicaltheoriesthatholdthat valueisaggregativeimplythatacanonicallyinfiniteworldcontainsaninfinitequantityof positivevalueandaninfinitequantityofnegativevalue.Thisgivesrisetoapeculiar predicament.Wecandoonlyafiniteamountofgoodorbad.Yetincardinalarithmetic, addingorsubtractingafinitequantitydoesnotchangeaninfinitequantity.Everypossible actofoursthereforehasthesameneteffectonthetotalamountofgoodandbadina canonicallyinfiniteworld:nonewhatsoever.Aggregativeconsequentialisttheoriesare threatenedbyinfinitarianparalysis:theyseemtoimplythatiftheworldiscanonically infinitethenitisalwaysethicallyindifferentwhatwedo.Inparticular,theywouldimply thatitisethicallyindifferentwhetherwecauseanotherholocaustorpreventonefrom occurring.Ifanynoncontradictorynormativeimplicationisareductioadabsurdum,this oneis.
55NickBostrom,TheInfinitarianChallengetoAggregativeEthics,FutureofHumanity

Institute(2008).
Wereonetorejectaggregativeconsequentialismasafundamentalmoraltheory,one maystillfindanimportantplaceforitscoreideaasalowerlevelmoralprinciplea principleoflimitedvaliditythatwouldbeembeddedinamoreencompassingnormative frameworkandthatwouldcomeintoplayonlyinparticularcircumscribedcontexts.For example,onemightholdthatcertaininstitutionsoughttotakeanaggregativemaximizing

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stancewithregardtotheinterestsoftheirconstituencies;or,moreweakly,thatsuchastance reflectsonetypeofconsiderationthatsomeinstitutionshaveadutytoincorporateintotheir decisionmaking.Thiswouldleadtononeofthedifficultiesdescribedinthispaper,solong astheconstituenciesarenecessarilyfiniteandthereisanupperboundontheamountof harmorbenefitthatcanbeimposedonanymember.Totheextentthatutilitarianandother aggregationistideasmaketheirwayintotheworldoutsidephilosophydepartments,itis usuallyinsuchacircumscribedcapacity.Socialchoicetheoryoftenfindsitconvenientto proceedontheassumptionthatpoliciesandsocialinstitutionsexisttoservefinitepopulationsofin dividualswhoseinterestsaredefinedintermsoftheirpreferencestructures insuchawayastoavoidproblematicinfinities.Wealsofindechoesofaggregationist consequentialisminsuchpolicytoolsascosteffectivenessanalysis,impactstatements,andQALY basedevaluationsofhealthcarepolicies.Properlycircumscribedandqualified,thesereal worldapplicationsareimmunetoinfinitarianparalysis.46
56PeterVallentyneandShellyKagan,InfiniteValueandFinitelyAdditiveValueTheory,

TheJournalofPhilosophy94(1997). Thepointhereisthatitisnotnecessaryforjudgmentsofbetternessthatoneworldbe betterthanasecondrelativetoallfinitesetsoflocations.Itissufficientforthissortofcase, itseems,thatanyfinitesetcanbeexpandedsufficientlysothat,relativetoallfurtherfinite expansions,thefirstworldisbetter.Theroughideaisthat,if,nomatterwhatfinitesetof locationsyoustartwith,youcanexpandenoughsothat,relativetoallfurtherexpansions, oneworldisbetterthananother,thentheformerworldisbettertoutcourtthanthelatter world.(Inexample2,nomatterwhatfinitesetoneconsiders,ifoneexpandsittoincludeat leasttwolocations,wlisbetterthanw2,relativetoallfurtherexpansions.) Finitelyadditivetheoriesofvaluerankworldswithafinitenumberoflocations(peoples, times,andsoon)onthebasisofthetotalgoodnesstheycontain.Itiscommonlysupposed thattheonlywaythatsuchtheoriescanapplytoworldswithunboundedinfinitenumbers oflocationsistorankthemonthebasisofthetotalgoodnesstheycontain.Butthishasthe crazyresultthatwheretime(forexample)isunbounded,aworldwith2unitsofgoodness ateachtimeisnotbetterthanaworldwiththesamelocationsbutonly1unitateach location.Fortunately,thiswayofdealingwiththeinfinitecaseisnotnecessaryforfinitely additivetheories.Andgiventheimplausiblerankingsitgenerates,itisnotplausible.We havearguedinfavorofadifferentapproach.AtthemostbasiclevelwehavedefendedBI, whichsaysthat,iftwoworldshavethesamelocations,and,relativetoeveryfinitesetof locations(andafortiori,everylocation),oneworldisbetter,thenthatworldisbettertout court.Somewhatmoretentatively,wehavedefendedthestrengtheningofBItoGM.GMisa strengtheninginthat,aslongasthetwoworldsarelocationisometric,itappliesevenwhen thelocationsarenotthesameinthetwoworlds.Furthermore,itdoesnotrequirethatone worldbebetterthantheother,relativetoallfinitesetsoflocations,butonlytoallbounded uniformexpansionsofsomeboundeduniformexpansionofanyboundedregionof locations.Althoughwecanimaginethat,duetoafaultyunderstandingoftheissues,we maybemistakenabouttheplausibilityofthesestrengthenings,weareveryconfidentthat somestrengtheningsofBIareplausible.Anditshouldberememberedthatweareonly

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claimingthatGMisplausibleasfarasitgoes.WecertainlydonotthinkthatGMisthe strongestplausiblemetaprinciplefordealingwithunboundedlocations.

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