How Do Leaders Make Decisions?: A Poliheuristic Perspective Author(s): Alex Mintz Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.

48, No. 1, The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Feb., 2004), pp. 3-13 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176265 . Accessed: 26/03/2013 13:12
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How Do Leaders Make Decisions?

A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE

ALEX MINTZ
Departmentof Political Science TexasA&M University UnitedNations Studies YaleUniversity

Poliheuristictheory(PH)bridgesthe gapbetweencognitiveandrationaltheoriesof decision making.PH postulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reducedby with an unacceptable returnon a critiapplyinga "noncompensatory principle"to eliminateany alternative cal, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set has been reducedto alternativesthat are acceptableto the decision maker,the processmoves to a second stage,duringwhichthe decision makeruses more analyticprocessing in an attemptto minimize risks and maximizebenefits. In this article,the author decision settings.Subsequent articlesin appliespoliheuristictheoryto individual,sequential,andinteractive this issue offer theoreticalextensionsandmultipletests of the theoryusing multiplemethods(formal,statistical, experimental). approach Keywords: Decision analysis; poliheuristic theory;multimethod

How do foreign leaders, such as YasserArafatand Bashir Assad, make decisions? How did American presidents, such as George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Dwight Eisenhower,and Ronald Reagan, decide to use force or to refrainfrom using force? The leadingdecision paradigmin international relationsis the rationalactor,expected utility theory.According to this theory,nations are led by rational,forward-looking leaders who seek to maximize the expected gains of policy choices in a holistic and compensatory(additive)fashion (Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman 1992).' to the expected utility (EU) theory of deciThis special issue offers an alternative sion and other rational-analyticdecision models. Poliheuristic (PH) choice theory inipostulatesa two-stage decision process in which the menufor choice is narrowed analysisthateliminatesoptionsby the use of one or more tially by a noncompensatory heuristics (cognitive shortcuts). Remaining alternativesare then evaluated in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits (Mintz 1993). Examples of the noncompensatoryheuristic that guides the elimination of options are threats to a leader'spolitical survivaland political constraintson the use of force.
1. Otherimportant decision theoriesarebureaucratic politics,cybernetictheory,andprospecttheory.
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol.48 No. 1, February2004 3-13 DOI: 10.1177/0022002703261056 ? 2004 Sage Publications

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RESOLUTION JOURNALOF CONFLICT

TABLE 1

Types of Decisions Studiedby PoliheuristicTheory

Typeof Decision Use of force Nonuse of force Diversionaryuses of force Tests of nuclearweapons Initialcrisis reaction Wartermination Coalition formation rivalry Intraparty Level of force used in a crisis Learning Influence of advisers Warand peace decisions Framing Militaryuprising Defection and retaliation Decisions by expertsand novices Negotiation Conflict resolution Author Mintz (1993) DeRouen (2003) DeRouen (2001) Sathasivam(2003) DeRouen and Sprecher(2004) Mintz and Geva (1998) Mintz (1995) Mintz (1995) Redd (2002) Yang (2003) Redd (2002) and Trusty(2000) Astorino-Courtois and Redd (2003) Taylor-Robinson Mintz and Mishal (2003) Clare (2003) Dacey and Carlson(2004) Eisenband(2003) Astorino-Courtois and Trusty(2000); Mintz and Mishal (2003)

elements By focusing on a two-stageprocess,poliheuristicchoice theoryintegrates of the cognitive psychology school of decision makingwith elements of the rational choice school. The first stage of poliheuristictheory involves a noncompensatory, nonholisticsearch.It uses decision heuristicsandprimarilycorrespondsto the cognitive school of decision making.The second stage involves analyticprocessingof surviving alternatives.It correspondsto rationalchoice theory.Cognitive heuristicsare more important in the first stage of the decision, whereasrationalchoice calculations are more applicableto the second stage of the poliheuristicdecision process. The poliheuristicmodel is applicableto single decisions, groupdecisions, sequential decisions, and decisions in strategicsettings.Poliheuristictheoryfocuses on both the process of decision making and the outcome of decisions and explains why and how decisions aremadeby worldleaders.A key premiseof poliheuristictheoryis that policy makersuse a mixtureof decision strategieswhen makingdecisions, including strategiesthat are suboptimal(Mintz et al. 1997). Although poliheuristic theory has been in existence only since 1993, the PH researchprogram has alreadyreceivedconsiderableattentionin such leadingjournals as theAmericanPoliticalScience Review,Journalof ConflictResolution,andInternational Studies Quarterly,as well as in book chapters,edited volumes, and numerous conferences, including those sponsored by the American Political Science Association (APSA), International Studies Association (ISA), Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Peace Science Society International (PSSI), and the International Society for Political Psychology (Redd 2003, 101).

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MAKEDECISIONS? Mintz/ HOWDO LEADERS

TABLE 2

The PoliheuristicDecision Calculusin AmericanForeignPolicy

President Crisis Author

Eisenhower Eisenhower Reagan BushSr. Clinton

DienBienPhu,Vietnam (1954) Guatemala (1954) Grenada (1983) (1991) Iraq Kosovo (1998)

DeRouen (2003) andRedd(2003) Taylor-Robinson DeRouen (2001) Mintz(1993) Redd(2000)

Poliheuristictheory has been applied to a rich menu of decisions in international relations:decisions on the use of force, nonuse of force, initialreactionto crisis, crisis escalation, crisis termination,framing,learning,negotiation,peace, rivalrytermination, and conflict resolution(see Table 1 and articlesin this issue). Table2 lists cases of poliheuristicdecision makingby Americanpresidents(Eisenhower, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton) previously analyzed by DeRouen (2001, 2003), Mintz (1993), Redd (2000), andTaylor-Robinson andRedd (2003). Thereis evidence for the use of the noncompensatoryprinciple of poliheuristictheory in all of these cases. Goertz (2004) provides additional examples of noncompensatory,poliheuristic decision makingby Americanpresidents: wanted to return the Panama Canalto Panama. The 1. TheU.S. politicalestablishment andGerald Fordandsupported "wasnegotiated under HenryKissinger by the treaty for this administration. Carter However, publicopinionpolls showedlittle support in the Senateregarding ratification" move. As a result,therewas muchhesitation 2004,20-21). (Goertz
2. "Realists,such as Eisenhower,Nixon, andKissinger,consideredusing nuclearweapons

in warbutwereconstrained 2004,27). (Goertz by publicopinion"

Several scholars have applied poliheuristictheory to decisions by leaders in the Middle East: the late PresidentHafez al-Assad of Syria (see Astorino-Courtois and 2003), Trusty2000), formerPrimeMinisterNawaz Sharifof Pakistan(see Sathasivam former President Saddam Hussein of Iraq (see Mintz 2000), and ChairmanYasser Arafatof the PalestinianAuthority(see Clare 2003; Mintz and Mishal 2003). Clare (2003), Mintz (1995), and Mintz andMishal (2003) have also appliedelements of the theory to cases involving Israeliprime ministers(Shamir,Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, and Sharon).These case studies are listed in Table 3. Obviously, noncompensatory political constraintsin nondemocraticsocieties are differentfrom those imposed on democraticleaders. Poliheuristictheory has also been used to explain other theories of international relations.For example, DeRouen (2001, 70) claimed thatdiversionarytheoryis consistent with the noncompensatoryprinciple of poliheuristicchoice theory "for the presidentis unlikely to select any alternativein which the political dimension is not

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JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

TABLE3

PoliheuristicStudies of Decisions by Leadersin the Middle East

Leader Hafez al-Assad YasserArafat Country/Entity Syria Palestinian Authority Palestinian Authority Iraq Israel Israel Pakistan Israel Decision Syria's peace and war decisions vis-a-vis Israel Patternsof conflictual and cooperativeinteractions with Israel Author and Trusty Astorino-Courtois (2000) Clare (2003)

YasserArafat SaddamHussein Netanyahu,Peres, Rabin YitzchakShamir Nawaz Sharif Ariel Sharon

Decisions duringthe Palestinian Mintz and Mishal (2003) Intifadaof 2000-2002 Gulf Warof 1991 Decisions before and afterthe Oslo Accord of 1993 Mintz (2000) Clare (2003)

Decisions on coalition formation Mintz (1995) in 1992, 1994 Pakistan'sdecision to test the Sathasivam(2003) bomb in 1998 Decisions duringthe Intifada Mintz and Mishal (2003)

satisfied for fear of political repercussions." Mintz and Geva (1993) showed that the of principle poliheuristictheoryhelps explainthe democraticpeace noncompensatory because leadersof democraciesrefrainfrom attackinganotherdemocphenomenon is placedon demoracybecauseit is politicallytoo costly.However,no suchconstraint cratic leaders when the opponent is nondemocratic(Mintz and Geva 1993). The authorsalso showed that the noncompensatoryprinciple played a role in President Bush's 1991 war terminationdecision not to pursue Saddam Hussein in Baghdad when then-presidentBush was enjoying very high levels of public approval(Mintz and Geva 1998). Studiesof poliheuristictheoryhave thusfar only used case studiesandexperimental analysis. The contributors to this special issue offer multipletests of poliheuristic theory with multiple methods (formal,statistical,and experimental). WHAT IS POLIHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING? The termpoliheuristiccan be brokendown into "theroots poly (many)andheuristic (shortcuts),which alludes to the cognitive mechanismsused by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions" (Mintz et al. 1997, 554). "Poli"also refers to the notion thatpolitical leadersmeasuregains and losses in political terms. Poliheuristictheory postulatesthat when makingdecisions, policy makersemploy a two-stage decision process consisting of (a) rejectingalternativesthat are unacceptable to the policy makeron a critical dimension or dimensions and (b) selecting an alternativefrom the subset of remainingalternativeswhile maximizing benefits and

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MAKEDECISIONS? Mintz/ HOWDO LEADERS

minimizing risks (see Mintz 1993, 2003; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997; Payne, Bettman,and Johnson 1993).2 Poliheuristictheorysees domesticpolitics as "theessence of decision."Highpolitical audiencecosts arenonadditive.Avoidingmajorloss is noncompensatory (see also Goertz2004). Domestic political audiencecosts are an integralpartof foreign policy decision making.Policy makersarepoliticalactorswhose self-interestin politicalsurvival is paramount (RussettandBarzilai 1992; Sathasivam2003). Consequently, polare thatposes potentiallyvery high makers icy likely to rejectoutrightany alternative political costs, even if that same alternativealso yields potentiallyhigh benefits on other dimensions (although military and strategicconsiderationsare also noncompensatoryundercertainconditions).
TWO-STAGE GAMES

Poliheuristictheory identifies a process by which leaders make decisions by first simplifyingcomplex foreignpolicy decisions while focusing on the dimensionsof the decision. They thenevaluateremainingalternatives using analyticprocessing.The set is reducedto a moremanageablesize by employinga noncompensatory of alternatives decision analysis. Sathasivam(2003, 57) thereforearguedthat poliheuristictheory goes beyond previousattemptsto predictforeign policy decisions thatused "rational actor"or "bureaucratic politics" models by looking not only at why decisions were andRedd2004). madebutalso at how these decisions were made(see also Christensen in Whereasseveraltheoriesof politicaldecision makingoriginated economics, PH is a theoryof politicaldecision makingbecauseit specificallypostulatesthatleadersavoid major political loss and that such a loss is noncompensatoryfor political decision makers. Poliheuristictheory is compatiblewith a host of contingencytheories of decision to the decision makersufficientflexibility in adaptingthe andjudgmentthatattribute decision process to changing problems and conditions (Beach and Mitchell 1978; of the Payne, Bettman,and Johnson 1993; Tetlock 1992). The main characteristics are as follows: theory * Poliheuristic is dimension and based,noncompensatory, nonholistic, theory satisficing, ordersensitive distin(Mintz,Geva,andDeRouen1994).Thisset of characteristics of decision it from other theories theguishes making (expected utility theory, cybernetic ory,prospect theory). * In strategic suchas thosethatcharacterize (see settings, manywarandpeacedecisions Morrow thepoliheuristic decision maker inthefirststage, notonlyhis eliminates, 1997), or her noncompensatory alternatives but also alternatives to be politically perceived infeasible foranopponent seeAstorino-Courtois andTrusty (foranexample, 2000).The reduced choicesetscanthenbe subjected to a standard in the game-theoretic analysis secondstageof thedecision(Mintz andAstorino-Courtois 2001).
2. Experimental studies have shown thatanalyticdecision models, such as expected utility,are most of alternatives availableto the leaderis small. likely to be employedby decision makerswhenthe number

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JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

* In sequential eachdecisionin the sequence of decisionsis a two-stage settings, poliheuristic decision. Saddam Hussein's decisions infall2002andspring 2003canbe Thus, asa sequence viewed of poliheuristic decisions onwhether tocooperate with (minimally) United Nations inspectors. * Insequential andinteractive eachdecision of a sequence is part of situations,3 (strategic) decisions in a strategic eachemploying calculainteraction, byboth players poliheuristic tionsin eachdecision nodein a strategic to this (seeEisenband 2003).According setting Hussein andGeorge Bushhaveengaged in a sequential andinteractive thesis,Saddam of numerous mini-decisions. poliheuristic gameconsisting Because it uses decision shortcutsand rules of thumb, poliheuristictheory can explain complicatedforeign policy decisions. It is unique in its ability to deal with andmultipledimensions,such as those characmultipleplayers,multiplealternatives, arms decisions. races,N-nationalliancedecisions, andenvironmental terizingN-adic It is inherentlybuilt on the assumptionthatpolicy makerssimplify complicateddecision problemsby first using simple cognitive shortcutsand then applyingan analytic decision calculus to arriveat a choice. Poliheuristictheorycan be refutedand falsified by finding the decision process to be compensatory,alternativebased, holistic, or order insensitive. As the authorsof articlesin this issue show, however,the theory is quite robust.

AN EXAMPLE OF PO,IHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING At the core of the poliheuristictheoryis the noncompensatory principleof decision It in serves to eliminate alternatives the first of the decision making. stage process. For on March the Turkishparliament vetoed the proposeddeployment 1, 2003, example, of 62,000 U.S. troopsto Turkeyas a launchingpad for a possible attackagainstIraq. This decision was reportedlydue to strongpublic opposition to deploymentof U.S. troopson Turkishsoil despitepromisesfromthe UnitedStatesfor a huge economic aid package, worth $30 billion in grantsand loan guarantees,and U.S. pressureon the to acceptTurkeyinto the European Union. Althoughthe economic andmilEuropeans itarybenefitsassociatedwith cooperationwith the UnitedStateswere huge, the political costs for the Turkish were apparently parliament negativeandnoncompensatory. The move by the Turkishparliamentis a good example of the use of the noncompensatoryprincipleof poliheuristictheoryin decisions by stateleadersandother politicians.Despite a very high score on the economic aid dimension,a low score on the political (public opinion) dimension did not compensate for the expected eco3. In these situations,the poliheuristic(PH) model resembles the logic of the iterateddominanceeliminationprocedurein game theory,yet the PH model specificallypredictsthatthe political dimensionis thanan iteratedeliminationprocessconsistingof sevassumesa two-stageprocessrather noncompensatory, eral steps, uses decision weights, and is also applicableto very complex decision situationswith multiple playerswith multipleoptions.In dynamicsituations,the PH modeloftenpredictsoutcomesthataredifferent from those reachedusing games of strategicinteractionsthat are based on rationalchoice because in such alternatives (such as doing nothing),andthese alternasettings,PH eliminatesfromthe outsetunacceptable tives do not reappearduringthe decision process.

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MAKEDECISIONS? Mintz/HOW DO LEADERS

nomic benefits,andthe deploymentof force alternative was not approved by members of the parliament.In noncompensatoryterms, there were no substitutioneffects or trade-offsbetween the political and economic dimensions of the decision.4 Turkeyhas been torn between widespreadpublic opposition to a war against a fellow Muslim state and intense pressurefrom Washington.At the time the decision was made, the expectations,accordingto Reuters(March1, 2003), were thatAnkara would, "almostcertainly,lose an almostconcludedfinancialaidpackageamountingto some $6 billion in U.S. grantsand up to $24 billion in loan guarantees." The proposal for deploymentof U.S. forces was rejectedby the Turks,even in face of a massive aid commitmentto Turkeyfromthe packagefromthe UnitedStatesandmilitary-strategic United States and GreatBritain.OppositionleaderDeniz Baykal welcomed the outcome andsaid, "Thishas shownagainthatthe whole worldnow has to give importance of parliament when approaching to national[public]opinion and show understanding Turkey"(Reuters,March 1, 2003). Once the option to deploy U.S. forces on Turkishsoil had been rejectedby parliament, the Turkishgovernmentevaluatedthe remainingalternativesthat advancedto the second stageof the decision processanddecided,in an attemptto minimizefurther costs and maximize benefits, to allow air passage over Turkey'sairspaceto coalition planes. The noncompensatory politicalloss aversionvariablein poliheuristictheorycan be in several operationalized ways as follows: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to a leader's survival Threat fora policy Significant dropin publicsupport Significant dropin popularity Theprospects of anelectoral defeat Domestic opposition Threat to regimesurvival andcompetition Intraparty rivalry to theregime Internal orexternal challenge of Potential the orregime coalition, collapse government, Threat to political or of a leader honor, power, dignity, legitimacy riots,andso forth Demonstrations, of vetoplayers in parliamentary Theexistence parties (e.g.,pivotal government)

NEXT STEPS IN THE POITHEURISTIC RESEARCH PROGRAM The next steps in the PH researchprogramare as follows:
* Apply poliheuristic theory to key issues and puzzles in international relations: decisions

onalliance formation anddissolution, deterrence armament anddisarmament decisions,

4. A reviewerof this articlehaspointedout thata muchlargeramountof economic aidto Turkey might have eventually"compensated" for domestic oppositionto the deploymentof U.S. troops.

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JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

* *

decisions, diversionaryuses of force, counterterrorism, enduring rivalry,and so on. Apply PH to other importantdomains in internationalrelations-e.g., International Political Economy (IPE)-while analyzingeconomic aid and tradedecisions, environmentaldecisions, financialdecisions, andso on. Apply PH decision makingto the coalition formationprocess and to bargaining. Develop empiricalcriteriato identify (a) "key"decision dimensions,(b) the cutoff point for when the noncompensatory (avoid majorloss) principleapplies, and (c) the conditions underwhich decision makersswitch from the first stage of decision makingto the second stage in the PH decision calculus. AutomatepoliheuristictheoryandPH decisionrules.This will makeit easierfor scholars to applyandtest the theoryusing differentdatasets on a varietyof geographicalandhistoricalcontexts. Identifypoliheuristicequilibria,thatis, spell out the conditionsunderwhich playersin a strategicsetting reach an equilibriumin an interactivetwo-stage poliheuristicprocess. ComparePH conceptuallyand empiricallyto cyberneticand expected utility models of the use of force. For example, compare PH findings to Ostrom and Job's (1986) and Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman's(1992) findings. Assess whether bureaucratic/organizational political constraintsor domestic political constraints aremore salientandinfluentialas noncompensatory domesticdimensionsof decision making. Examine the impact of framing and marketingon poliheuristicchoice. In contrastto dimenexpected utility,PH is ordersensitive. Is it also affectedby the way alternatives, sions, and implicationsare framed?Examine the link between affect and PH decision making. Extendthe PH model to groupdecision makingand sequentialdecision making,which characterize of PH is as a sinmanyforeignpolicy situations.The simplestrepresentation decision principle.Howgle individualmakingchoices based on the noncompensatory or democraticsettings are often the productof ever, political choices in bureaucratic group and societal processes in which an individualleader must interactwith othersto make and implementchoices.

MULTIMETHOD TESTS OF THE THEORY

As pointed out above, most studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far employed case studies and experiments in studying leaders' decisions. The contributors to this special issue go beyond the case study method and process-tracing analysis in presenting multiple tests of poliheuristic theory with multiple methods (statistical, formal, experimental).5 Stoll (forthcoming) points out that research that relies on any one methodology is usually inferior to research that makes use of several methods. It is a rare situation in which "one method is so superior that the others can safely be ignored." The use of a multimethod approach in international relations is rare (but see Maoz et al., forthcoming, for a multimethod analysis of conflict management and conflict resolution, as well as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's 1992 work applying multiple methods to decisions to initiate wars).
5. Consistentwith the policy of the Journalof ConflictResolution,articlesin this issue were reviewed by at least two anonymousreferees.

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MAKEDECISIONS? Mintz/HOW DO LEADERS

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A multimethodapproachto foreign policy analysis can 1. cross-validate of inquiry, results basedon different methods a specificcase, 2. helpgeneralize results beyond case study) to theory because different methods 3. contribute development (e.g.,formal, and thatmaybe reincorporated intoa refined findings theory mayuncover unexpected retested, 4. enhance confidence in results andsubstantiate orrefute theory, in results differences andsimilarities basedon methods 5. identify used, thuscontributing in 6. leadto robust andstandardized to scientific advancement results, international relations 2003). (Mintz Specifically, in this special issue, Goertz (2004) uses formal theory and spatial analysisto formalizeand extendpoliheuristictheory.Dacey andCarlson(2004) use a formalmodel to comparedecision makingof expertsandnonexpertsin foreignpolicy. DeRouen and Sprecher(2004) use probit analysis on a data set of N-nations'initial reaction to international crisis. Christensenand Redd (2004) and Mintz (2004) use experimentaltests of the theory,and Stern (2004) provides a qualitativeoverview of poliheuristictheory relatingit to other emerging theories of foreign policy decision decision units, and cognitive constructivism. making:problemrepresentation,

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