Eric Lynch Professor Nelson GOVT-315 23 November 2010 PA-11 House Race Analysis One of the most watched

races of the 2010 Congressional Elections was the House of Representatives race for Pennsylvanias District 11. The incumbent, Democrat Paul Kanjorski, had occupied the seat for thirteen consecutive terms. His Republican challenger, Lou Barletta, had served as the mayor of Hazleton for eleven years. This election marked the third time the candidates ran against each other; Barletta lost to Kanjorski in 2002 and 2008. However, this election was not like the candidates past contests. Political tides were changing and voters were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their elected representatives in Washington. Much of this frustration has been directed towards the Democratic Party, which held the majority in both houses of the legislature. Seats that were once safe Democratic bets became vulnerable to Republican takeovers. A significant number of Democratic incumbents were in danger of losing their seats, including Kanjorski. Campaign strategy and message Kanjorskis main strategy throughout the election cycle was to focus on Barlettas faults while serving as the mayor of Hazleton. Kanjorski constantly blamed Barletta for his mismanagement of the city, and criticized him over Hazletons unemployment rate and this years property and income tax increases.i Kanjorskis strategy in this years election was a far cry from his strategy in 2008, where he was constantly drawing parallels between Barletta and the Republican president, George Bush. In 2008, Kanjorskis campaign thrived

off of the dissatisfaction constituents felt with the Republican Partys performance in Washington. Kanjorski also benefitted from the popularity of the Democratic presidential nominee, Barack Obama. In fact, Obamas favorability is often credited for Kanjorskis narrow win in 2008. Given that the current president is no longer an unpopular Republican, but an unpopular Democrat, it was impossible for Kanjorski to nationalize the race through such comparisons, like he did in 2008, for his benefit. Barlettas campaign staff accused Kanjorski of attempting to localize the election. Democrats cannot run on their records, whether it's votes for bailouts, health care, [or] cap-and-trade energy legislation," said Barlettas campaign spokesman.ii Since Kanjorski was forced to distance himself from the national Democratic Party, criticizing Barlettas local performance was one of the few alternatives the incumbent could focus on. Barletta, on the other hand, was able to take a similar strategy to Kanjorskis in 2008. By associating Kanjorski with Nancy Pelosi, Barack Obama, and other powerful Washington Democrats, he could blame Kanjorski for health care reform and other issues that party elites have supported recently which have split public opinion. For those voters who were not satisfied with the job the Democrats had done in the past two years, nationalizing the election would put Kanjorski in a negative light by association. Another part of Barlettas strategy was being open, available and accountable to constituents, which he argued Kanjorski was not. Barletta held five open town halls over the course of his campaign, and also asked that a series of debates be held between himself and Kanjorski.iii However, Kanjorski did not agree to additional debates or participate in the town halls.

Instead, Kanjorski opted to hold multiple telephone town halls during the campaign. Kanjorskis rationale was that he can interact with as many as 8,000 Northeastern Pennsylvanians on a single phone call.iv Kanjorski came under fire for not doing regular town halls, and the move was seen as trying to avoid his constituents. When interviewed on a local radio station about foregoing the traditional town halls, Kanjorski said that he didnt want to allow nuts to record him and take his words out of context.v However, when a cameraman from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee was found to be videotaping Barlettas speech and sending it to the state party, Barletta seized the moment to take a swipe at Kanjorski and the Democrats in light of his previous comments. vi Kanjorski has encountered further criticism for changing his mind and allegedly holding six traditional town halls in September, but not advertising them to the public.vii Despite the fact that media advisories were issued, Kanjorskis lack of advertising for the town halls did not give citizens the open forum that Barletta provided them with. One of the primary issues that Barletta focused on throughout his campaign is health care, and the recent reform bill passed through Congress. Barletta promised voters that one of the first actions he would take as a member of the House would be repealing the legislation, and if that was not possible he would attempt to block funding of the reforms. viii In addition, Barletta is best known for his tough stance on illegal immigration. In 2005, he made national headlines after Hazleton passed a law preventing illegal immigrants from working or getting housing in the city. ix Barletta chose to distance himself from the immigration issue throughout the campaign, fearing that he would become a one-issue candidate and that his other positions would be overshadowed. x

Only one debate took place between the candidates during this election cycle on October 28th, less than a week before the congressional elections. Kanjorski and Barletta stuck to their campaign strategies throughout the debate. Barlettas strategy was to emphasize Kanjorskis ties with Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other Washington elites. Kanjorski continued to criticize Barlettas tenure as mayor, and also disapproved of his decision to appeal Hazletons overturned immigration law in the federal courts. xi Advertising Barletta supporters spent roughly 1.8 million dollars on over 4,000 television commercials, while Kanjorskis backers spent over 2.6 million dollars on 8,500 commercials. xii Barlettas campaign released its first commercial in July. Barletta started his advertising campaign on a positive note, emphasizing his stance against illegal immigration and the tough decisions he made as mayor of Hazleton. xiii In Kanjorskis first advertisement, released at the end of August, he called Barletta a failed mayor, and referred to Hazleton as the worst run city in the state. The ad referenced Barlettas decision to drastically increase property and income taxes, and the citys high unemployment rate of 16.5 percent. xiv Barlettas staff considered the attack ads release so early in the campaign a desperate move, and that Barletta was more than willing to debate his opponent on jobs and taxes. xv Both sides were accused of misleading constituents with false information in their television commercials. Another ad released by Kanjorskis campaign implied that Barletta wanted to end Social Security, saying that Republicans wanted the programs recent 75th birthday to be its last. The commercial went on to state that changes Barletta would have made to the program would have resulted in the loss of the programs money in the stock

market, depicted in the ad by a jar of pennies slowly emptying. xvi A fact checking organization found these claims to be false, and Kanjorski was then on the defensive, arguing that the advertisements were not actually making such insinuations. The 60 Plus Association, an organization that funded some of Barlettas advertisements, released a commercial about the health care reform bill targeting Kanjorski. The ad claims that the health care plan cut $500 billion from Medicare and that it will raise taxes. The same fact checking organization found that the tax increases and raised premiums are targeted towards the wealthy, and that the $500 billion cut from the program was expected future growth, not current funding.xvii Despite these controversies, advertising clearly played an enormous role in the election. Barletta ran into some advertising difficulties due to limited funds, the campaign was unable to run any advertising on broadcast stations during five nonconsecutive days in October. Fortunately, each campaign had access to outside organizations that also helped them advertise. The candidates received a great deal of support from their political parties. Among the backers was the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, which spent nearly $500,000 on commercials for Kanjorskis campaign. In addition, the Pennsylvania Democratic Party spent about $60,000 on advertising for the incumbent. Similarly, Barletta received assistance from the National Republican Congressional Committee, which purchased a staggering $900,000 of both cable and broadcast commercial space in support of the challenger. xviii The NRCCs contribution was extremely beneficial for Barletta, especially during the handful of days when his campaign was unable to fund its own commercials. xix

Barlettas campaign also received advertising from independent organizations such as the 60 Plus Association, the Commission on Hope, Growth and Opportunity, and the Center for Individual Freedom. In total, their advertising expenses exceeded $650,000. Kanjorskis main advertiser was the National Association of Realtors, which spent approximately 1.2 million dollars on cable and broadcast commercials. xx Fundraising According to the candidates October 13th campaign finance reports with the Federal Election Commission, Kanjorskis campaign had raised nearly 1.8 million dollars, and Barlettas campaign had raised just over one million dollars. xxi Kanjorski and Barletta had approximately $390,000 and $220,000 on hand, respectively. xxii Roughly 65 percent of the money Kanjorski received throughout the election cycle came from Political Action Committees, compared to only 20 percent of Barlettas funds. xxiii 73 percent of Barlettas funds came from individual donors, while Kanjorskis individual contributions totaled only 35 percent of his contributions. Kanjorski was criticized by the Barletta campaign for hosting expensive fundraisers that cost upwards of $1,000 a plate, and for taking significant donations from the insurance, securities, and real estate industries. xxiv Kanjorski serves as the head of the Financial Services Capital Markets Subcommittee, leading Barletta to portray Kanjorski as a creature of Washington who was beholden to the contributors from these industries. xxv Although Barletta had raised significantly less money than Kanjorski overall, his quarterly funds raised began to keep pace and eventually surpass his opponents. Barletta raised $20,000 more in the second quarter, and $10,000 more in the third quarter than

Kanjorski. xxvi In the week and a half leading up to the election, Barletta continued this trend, raising $75,000 to Kanjorskis $44,000. xxvii Political elites Kanjorski had the support of prominent politicians during his campaign. In midSeptember, the White House reached out to Kanjorskis staff, asking if Kanjorski was interested in receiving an endorsement. On September 16th, President Obama emailed his supporters in District 11, endorsing Kanjorski. xxviii Interestingly, Kanjorskis campaign did not advertise the endorsement during the campaign, despite welcoming the offer from the White House. Kanjorskis campaign likely did this in an attempt to distance Kanjorski from Obama, so he would not be characterized as a Washington insider. On October 26th, former president Bill Clinton stumped for Kanjorski in the representatives hometown of Nanticoke. Clinton emphasized that the election should not be a referendum, but a choice between two candidates. He also cautioned voters who are frustrated with the Democratic Partys performance in Congress not to make an impulsive and angry decision, and defended the party, saying that two years is not enough time to fix the Bush administrations mistakes. xxix Although Barletta did not have such high-caliber endorsements, former New York governor George Pataki stumped for Barletta in Hazleton in October, criticizing health care reform and supporting Barlettas plans to repeal it.xxx Polling and results As early as August, Barletta held a substantial lead over Kanjorski in various polls. Polls conducted by the American Action Forum and Times Leader had Barletta leading Kanjorski by eleven points in August and September. In October, polls by the Times

Leader, The Hill, and Franklin & Marshall saw Barlettas lead slip to single digits. The Hill poll conducted less than two weeks before the election had Barletta leading by five points, 48-43. xxxi However, in the week leading up to the election, a new poll released by the Times Leader predicted Kanjorski was ahead 47-39, by eight points, with a 4.9 percent margin of error. xxxii This poll contrasted directly with The Hills poll, the findings of which were released on the same day. However, Kanjorskis office said that this change was consistent with trends they had been seeing, and they were expecting a win at the voting booths on Election Day. Despite the optimism from Kanjorskis staff, Barletta was declared the winner of the race, winning 54.5 percent of the vote to Kanjorskis 45.5 percent. Even though Kanjorski was a long serving incumbent in a district that leans Democratic, District 11 voters were just as frustrated with Washington politicians as the rest of the country was. The low approval rating of Obama reflected across all of the Democratic Party. Although Kanjorski tried to distance himself from this negative association, the comparisons were inevitable. Kanjorskis conduct throughout the election also likely contributed to his downfall. From the telephone town halls to refusing to take reporters questions, Kanjorski appeared very aloof and disconnected from citizens throughout the election. His decision to only debate Barletta once and the lack of advertising in his actual town hall meetings also reflected poorly on his campaign. It appeared to voters that Kanjorski felt he had better things to do than truly hold himself accountable to his constituents. Barletta successfully emphasized Kanjorskis lack of availability throughout the campaign to sway the electorate in his favor. He appealed to voters who were frustrated that their representative was not

addressing their concerns and needs. Regardless of Kanjorskis fundraising capabilities, resources, political allies, and incumbency, they were not enough in this campaign. Barlettas availability and man of the people attitude resonated with District 11 citizens and ultimately was a huge factor in his ousting of Kanjorski.
i

Borys Krawczeniuk, Kanjorski alters campaign strategy, The Citizens Voice, September 2,

2010, accessed November 19, 2010, http://citizensvoice.com/news/kanjorski-alterscampaign-strategy-1.987333

ii iii

Krawczeniuk, Kanjorski alters campaign strategy. Steve Urbanski, Kanjorski stays local, Barletta goes national in WVIA debate, Scranton

Public Policy Examiner, October 29, 2010, accessed November 1, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/public-policy-in-scranton/kanjorski-stays-local-barletta-goesnational-wvia-debate
iv

Bill OBoyle, Kanjorski town halls under fire, The Times Leader, September 22, 2010,

accessed October 3, 2010, http://www.timesleader.com/news/Kanjorski-town-hallsunder-fire.html

v

Ed Morrissey, Kanjorski: No town halls because I dont want to talk to nuts, Hot Air, July

2, 2010, accessed October 3, 2010, http://hotair.com/archives/2010/07/02/kanjorski-notown-halls-because-i-dont-want-to-talk-to-nuts/

vi

Andrew Staub, Barletta at town hall: Kanjorski out of touch, The Standard Speaker,

October 6, 2010, accessed November 21, 2010, http://standardspeaker.com/news/barletta-at-town-hall-kanjorski-out-of-touch1.1044209

vii viii ix

OBoyle, Kanjorski town halls under fire. Urbanski, Kanjorski stays local. Andrea Stone, Democrat Paul Kanjorski Battles Anti-Immigration Folk Hero in

Pennsylvania, Politics Daily, October 23, 2010, accessed October 28, 2010, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/10/23/democratic-warhorse-kanjorski-battles-antiimmigration-folk-hero/
x

Stone, Anti-Immigration Folk Hero.

xi xii

Urbanski, Kanjorski stays local. Borys Krawczeniuk, Big money pours in to fund attack ads for congressional

candidates, AllBusiness, October 29, 2010, accessed November 19, 2010, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/elections-politics-politics-politicalparties/15248559-1.html
xiii

PoliticsPA: Barletta touts credentials in first TV ad, PoliticsPA, July 13, 2010, accessed

November 21, 2010, http://www.politicspa.com/politicspa-barletta-touts-credentials-infirst-tv-ad-video/13360/

xiv

Alex Roarty, In first ad, Kanjorski calls Hazleton worst run in the state, PoliticsPA,

August 27, 2010, accessed November 21, 2010, http://www.politicspa.com/politicspa-infirst-ad-kanjorski-calls-hazleton-worst-run-in-the-state-video_/15602/

xv xvi

Roarty, In first ad. AD WATCH: Kanjos Social Security stretch, Pennsylvania Political News, September 16,

2010, accessed October 15, 2010, http://www.pa2010.com/2010/09/ad-watch-kanjossocial-security-stretch/

xvii

AD WATCH: Health care hits and misses from conservative groups, Pennsylvania

Political News, September 21, 2010, accessed October 15, 2010, http://www.pa2010.com/2010/09/ad-watch-health-care-hits-and-misses-fromconservative-groups/
xviii

Borys Krawczeniuk, Barletta, Kanjorski get help for TV, other ads, The Standard

Speaker, October 29, 2010, accessed November 19, 2010, http://standardspeaker.com/news/barletta-kanjorski-get-help-for-tv-other-ads1.1055927

xix xx xxi

Krawczeniuk, Big money. Krawczeniuk, Barletta, Kanjorski get help. 2010 House and Senate Campaign Finance for Pennsylvania, Federal Election

Commission, http://www.fec.gov/DisclosureSearch/HSRefreshCandList.do?category=disH&stateName= PA&congressId=11&election_yr=2010

xxii

2010 Campaign Finance.

xxiii xxiv

2010 Campaign Finance. Bill Swindell, Industry Bolsters a Democrat In Kanjorski, Sunlight Foundation, October

12, 2010, accessed November 19, 2010, http://sunlightfoundation.com/presscenter/articles/2010/10/12/industry-bolstersdemocrat-kanjorski/

xxv xxvi

Swindell, Industry Bolsters a Democrat. PoliticsPA: Congressional Fundraising Cheat Sheet, PoliticsPA, July 12, 2010, accessed

October 15, 2010, http://www.politicspa.com/politicspa-second-quarter-fundraisingcheat-sheet/13324/

xxvii

Andrew M. Seder, Barletta surpasses Kanjorski in campaign donations, The Times

Leader, November 6, 2010, accessed November 19, 2010, http://www.timesleader.com/news/Barletta_surpasses_Kanjorski_in_campaign_donations _11-06-2010.html

xxviii

Bill OBoyle, President throws his support behind Kanjorskis re-election, The Times

Leader, September 17, 2010, accessed November 21, 2010, http://www.timesleader.com/news/President_throws_his_support_behind_Kanjorski_rsqu o_s_re-election_09-16-2010.html
xxix

Mike Sadowski, Update: Former President Clinton campaigns for Kanjorski, Pocono

Record, October 26, 2010, accessed November 19, 2010, http://www.poconorecord.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20101026/NEWS/10260323

xxx

Tom Ragan, Ex-N.Y. gov. slams 'ObamaCare,' stumps for Barletta at city stop, The

Standard Speaker, October 16, 2010, accessed November 21, 2010, http://standardspeaker.com/news/ex-n-y-gov-slams-obamacare-stumps-for-barletta-atcity-stop-1.1049640
xxxi

Pennsylvania 11th District - Barletta vs. Kanjorski, last modified October 30, 2010,

Real Clear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2010/house/pa/pennsylvania_11th_district_barl etta_vs_kanjorski-1299.html

xxxii

Pennsylvania 11th District.