IN THE COURT OF THE CITY CIVIL JUDGE AT BANGALORE CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SUIT No.

2527 OF 2011 (DEFAMATION) Between: Nithyananda Swamy And Madan Patel And Anr. WRITTEN ARGUMENT 1. It is respectfully submitted that the defendants have failed to note the fundamental difference between the burden of proof imposed in a criminal trial and the standard of proof applicable to a civil trial. In this regard, the ratio of the following case may be noted: Title: Macherlappa and Sons vs. Government of Andhra Date of Decision: 07-Nov-1957 Citation: 1958 (9) SALES TAX CASES 156 (AP) High Court of Andhra Pradesh 17...In Ramanamma v. Appala Narasayya (62 M.L.J. 230), a criminal complaint and a suit for damages for defamation were filed. The suit was dismissed. The judgment of the Civil Court was sought to be admitted as evidence in the criminal case. It was the converse of the present case. The Court held against admissibility observing:"Can we not have the Civil Court trying over again a matter which has been decided by a Court of competent Defendants Plaintiff

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jurisdiction and coming to a different conclusion ? The truth is that, although the civil suit and the prosecution may be based on exactly the same cause of action, the parties are, strictly speaking, not the same, the burden of proof is differently placed and different considerations may come in. The result may, therefore, be a conflict in decision. For instance, A is tried for murdering B, but acquitted, because a confessional statement by him is, in a criminal trial, inadmissible in evidence. C, B's widow, sues him for damages for the murder and gets a decree, the confessional statement being admissible in a civil suit. In the matter of defamation again, there is a good deal of difference between a suit for damages and a criminal prosecution. The prosecution is governed by the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the suit by the English law of slander and libel. A defence which is open to the accused in the prosecution is not open to him as the defendant in the suit. The question of special damages may arise in the suit, but cannot arise in the prosecution 18We need hardly emphasise the fundamental

differences in the very object, approach and procedure relating to civil and criminal actions. The standard of proof for imposing a liability, it is well known, varies within wide limits as the action is criminal, civil or fiscal. While in a civil suit a defendant can be made liable on probabilities or the action decided on a mere consideration of the burden of proof in the absence of other evidence, no accused can be convicted on such uncertain grounds. The principle governing criminal justice that the State would rather allow a score of real

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offenders to escape than see a single innocent man convicted, can hardly find an echo in civil litigation 2 Similarly, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court has stressed on the paramount difference between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah [2005 (4) Supreme Court Cases 370]. The Court held that: 24. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given 3 It is most respectfully submitted that the defendants have failed to comprehend the critical distinction between a civil trial and a criminal trial and on the burden of proof applicable to a civil trial. 4 Further, by offering a vague and an evasive denial, the defendant No.1 is deemed to have admitted the allegation of facts made by the plaintiff as contained in the numerous documents of a public nature annexed to the plaint. The plaintiff has verified and stated on oath, the truth of the existence of the public documents containing: a) statements uttered by the defendant No.1 and b) the analysis presented by the publication itself and intended to serve as an advertisement and publicity

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for the film Sathyananda produced and directed by defendant No.1: 5 In an interview given by the defendant No.1 to the magazine SuperGoodMovies.Com, the following summation appears: ANNEXURE No.5 Page No: 30 of the plaint The strength of film maker, politician Madan Patel is quite good before the controversial film Satyananda - a film on the misdeeds of God man Nithyananda. 6 Vijaya Karnataka is the most read newspaper in the State of Karnataka and holds a daily circulation of 5.77 lakhs and a daily readership of 35 lakhs. The following portion of the news report from Vijaya Karnataka may be noted: ANNEXURE No.13 TRANSLATION OF: FALSE GAME OF SATHYANANDA VIJAYA KARNATAKA-NEWSPAPER (KANNADA) Dated 11-Mar-2011, PAGE-3 Bangalore Edition Page No: 44 of the plaint But, Patel is having a group of fourteen advocates and telling 'action- cut' for this film. The reason for that is the story of this film and character in the film. Misdeeds and prostitution which take place in the Ashram, are going to be reflected in this film. As his

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disciples are there all over the world, this is a film at the international level in that sense 7 Udaya Vani, a Kannada newspaper with a daily

circulation of 2.5 lakhs published a news report that is relied upon to the following extent: ANNEXURE No.14 TRANSLATION OF: SMILING KILLER UDAYAVANI NEWSPAPER (KANNADA) Bangalore Edition SMILING KILLER PageNo: 48 of the plaint Some preparation is a must for a film to be produced on the basis of real facts. Especially when a film is being produced on a saffron-clad person, who has become famous in the world, excessive training must be there for it. This is especially a film on a Swamiji. That Swamiji will be smiling always under any circumstance. As such there is smile always on his face 8 Kannada Prabha, a Kannada daily newspaper with a circulation of 1.77 Lakh copies everyday published a news report which is also relied upon and the same states that: ANNEXURE No.15 TRANSLATION OF: MADANS RAINBOW

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KANNADA PRABHA NEWSPAPER (KANNADA) 11Mar-2011; Supplement Page 3; Bangalore Edition Madans Rainbow Page No: 51 of plaint It is special that Madan Patel, who often makes films to show his juiciness, is going to show Nithyananda's Leelas. He is making a movie by name Sathyananda based on the Nithyananda raasaleela scandal. Ravi Chetan is the hero of the film. He says " When the Nithyananda scandal was exposed, a thought of making a film based on this came to my mind. But, I Page No: 52 of plaint Madan says 'In case Nithyananda gives trouble saying that his story is being made as a film and goes to seek legal help, then it confirms that he has committed the mistake. He spoke like a pukka advocate having said so 9 Praja Vani, the second most widely read Kannada daily newspaper with a daily circulation of 3.6 lakhs also published a news report concerning the film Sathyananda and the first defendant. The same is relied upon and, in pertinent part, the news report says that: ANNEXURE No.16

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TRANSLATION OF: SATHYANANDA: PLAY STARTS PRAJAVANI NEWSPAPER (KANNADA) 11-Mar-2011; Film Entertainment Page No: 2 Bangalore Edition SATHYANANDA: PLAY STARTS... Page No: 54 of the plaint Madan who is making Sathyananda film resembling the life of controversial Swamiji was in high spirits 10 Further, Annexure No.4 is a copy of a banner placed by the defendant No.1 in the inauguration function (Muhurat) of his film, Sathyananda at Freedom Park, Bangalore on 06-Mar-2011. It may be noted that Freedom Park is a public garden and park situated in the heart of the city of Bangalore and any person is free to walk in and walk out of this public place. On 06-Mar-2011, throughout the inauguration function of the film, the defendant No.1 got a promotional banner displayed in the Freedom Park. Video and photographs from that venue stunningly establish that during the entire inauguration, the photographs of plaintiff were prominently displayed in the invitation banner. As may be seen from Annexure No.4, the photograph of plaintiff has been displayed prominently on the banner of the film Sathyananda itself. As such, by launching their film itself in the name of the plaintiff, the plaintiffs have thereafter chosen to defraud this Honble Court as well by swearing on oath to this Honble Court that they do not even know who is Nithyananda Swamy. The conduct of the defendants

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tantamounts to the grossest form of perjury, disregard and contempt of this Honble Court. 11 Further, as established by Annexure No.2 which is a videograph of the interview of defendant No.2 conducted by media persons during the inauguration of the film Sathyananda at the Freedom Park at Bangalore on 06Mar-2011, no manner of doubt can be entertained on the true intent and purpose behind the making of the film Sathyananda. In his interview to the media at Freedom Park on 06-Mar-2011, the defendant No.2 who is the lead actor in the film made these statements: ANNEXURE No.2 and 3 TRANSLATION KANNADA) MEDIA PRESENTATION BY DEFENDANT No.2, SRI RAVI CHETAN, AT FREEDOM PARK, BANGALORE Page No: 26 of the plaint: Question: How have you prepared for this role? Answer: To do homework for this is very important. OS I did some homework for this that smile, that style, mannerism, how to talk, how he delivers the discourses. Some friends and writers went to ashram, studied and came back and told me. Our director also helped me. Director told, What is to be done legallyThey will bring a stay orderFor that not to happen, what all needs to be done, we built a legally enforceable fort and started doing this. OF MEDIA PRESENTATION (FROM

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And over the internet, I found out how he will be, and practiced at home Page No:27 of the plaint As you all know , this Swamiji Nithyananda , you may be knowing only 20% of it. But if you say it is 100%, it is not so, it is at least 50% let us say. What is going on, what has happened, we are trying to keep that in front of the people. Yes, Nithyananda sex scandal and 12 Further, the plaintiffs learnt subsequent to the filing of the suit that the defendant No.1 had also given an interview to a television news channel, tv9, which was telecast by that channel on 22-Dec-2010 in a program titled Filmy Funda. The content of the said interview by defendant No.1 is wholly consistent and fully supports all the annexures originally filed with the plaint. Accordingly, a copy of the video was furnished by the plaintiff to this Honble Court on 27-Apr-2011 by the filing of an Interlocutory Application No.6. The interview of the defendant No.1 is in Kannada in the said video. Upon translation, the same reads as under: Madan Patel: I might get pressured from the higher authorities; they might ask me not to do the cinema. But in future, people might question me, Though you knew about the issues of the society, why didnt you do it? So whatever the pressure might be, I am definitely going to do, this Satyananda cinema a true story of Nithyananda. Definitely, I will do. I am going to tell everything about him to the public. So in future, let the people awaken to issues like this, and

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not support people like him. The injustice that he did and the cheating that he did, I am going to show this directly in the movie. Madan Patel: I am looking for a suitable person for that. He should be very similar to Nithyananda. Anyone for that role, they can come and meet me directly. That height, and the cunning smile, and if they are suitable for this, I will take them. And, whoever is related to that, I will take them. 13 It may be noted that tv9 is the most popular television channel in Karnataka and is amongst the most viewed news channels in India, even catapulting to the status of the most watched news television in India for a brief period in 2010. In the aforesaid interview aired by tv9 on 22-Dec-2010, the defendant No.1 has unmistakably expressed his desire to make a film on Nithyananda Swamy, the plaintiff herein. 14 Further, on 02-Sep-2011, the plaintiff has presented to this Honble Court through his counsel, copy of facebook entry belonging to defendant No.1. Facebook.com is a website where any person is free to open an account without paying anything and to write whatever he wishes on his page. Further, any person who holds an account on facebook may befriend any other person who also holds an account with facebook. Any person may converse publicly with another friend on facebook. Accordingly, the defendant No.1, Madan Patel holds an account in facebook with the name MADAN PATEL. His facebook page is located at: www.facebook.com/madanpatel.

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15

The plaintiff learnt about the facebook page of the defendant No.1 on 31-Aug-2011 and was utterly shocked to read what the defendant No.1 had posted on his own facebook page (www.facebook.com/madanpatel) on 30Dec-2010. The defendant No.1 had put up a photo lifted from the internet wherein 3 women of chinese descent are scantily clad and seated around a bathtub and in the centre of that photo, a picture of plaintiff, Nithyananda Swamy has been attached with the tag THE GOD BAD MAN.

16

The aforesaid photo contains a description in Kannada that reads as under: HINDOO NAMBIKE SAMAAJAKKE MATTU BHAKTARIGE KAMISWAMI ANYAYA,

DHROHAVESAGIDA

NITHYANANDANINDA

ATHYACHAARAKKOLAGAADA HAAGU HANA, AASTHI, MAANA, SHEELA KALEDUKONDAVARU SAMPARKISI: MADAN PATEL, NO.173, IST FLOOR, 6TH CROSS, GANDHINAGARA, BANGALORE 560 009 17 When translated into English, the said description reads as under: WHOEVER HAS BEEN CHEATED, RAPED OR HAS LOST MONEY, PROPERTY, HONOUR, CHASTITY DUE TO KAMISWAMI NITHYANANDA WHO HAS BETRAYED HINDU SOCIETY AND DEVOTEES CONTACT MADAN PATEL, NO.173, IST FLOOR, 6TH CROSS, GANDHINAGARA, BANGALORE 560 009. 18 Again, the aforesaid photo contains an additional

description as under:

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The first news paper ad. Thanks to Achu Ads for the design. Launching SATHYANANDA a true story of Nithyananda feature film in Jan 11. 19 Further, the defendant No.1 has responded to his numerous friends who have wished him well and success for the proposed film Sathyananda and all of those words are contained in the additional documents furnished to this Honble Court on 02-Sep-2011. 20 The only response offered by defendant No.1 to the aforesaid material is as under: WRITTEN STATEMENT filed by defendant No.1 on 07Jul-2011. Para 5: It is submitted that the documents such as website reports, newspaper reports, cannot be the basis for granting injunctive relives. None of the news paper reports and the website reports can be believed and should not be believed in as much as they are the outcome of an understanding and conception of a particular reporter/media entity 21 Further, the defendant No.1 has provided no other response to the video, photographs of the banner of his own film, website reports, newspaper reports, his own facebook page. 22 In the context of the fact that the defendant No.1 has not even bothered to specifically deny any of the allegations of fact made by the plaintiff in pursuance of the aforesaid material appended to the plaint, the defendant No.1 should be held to have admitted to the truth of what is contained in the aforesaid materials video, photographs,

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website reports, newspaper reports, facebook page of defendant No.1. 23 It is too well established that the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes its own set of rules and procedures for determining and adjudicating the substantive rights of parties whose disputes are agitated in a proceeding to which the Code applies. Accordingly, the counsel for the plaintiff relies on the following judgments which set out comprehensively, the law squarely applicable to the facts before this Honble Court. Case No.1 Title: Asha Kapoor vs Hari Om Sharda Date of Decision: 05-Aug-2010 Citation: 171 (2010) DELHI LAW TIMES 743 Court: Delhi High Court 1.. This petition under Article 227 of judgment Additional dated 6th April, 2010, passed the by

Constitution of India has been filed against impugned Rent Control Tribunal (for short as

Tribunal) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi allowing the eviction petition of the landlord-respondent herein, under Section 14 (1) (h) of Delhi Control Act 1958 (for short as Act). Petitioner has also prayed to confirm the judgment dated 30th March, 2009 passed by Additional Rent Controller (for short as Controller) Delhi, vide which eviction petition of the respondent, under Section 14 (1) (h) of the Act was dismissed.

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2Brief facts are that, respondent filed an Eviction Petition under Section 14 (1) (a), (j) and (h) of the Act against petitioner, inter alia on the allegations that he is landlord/owner of property bearing No. 1/6595, East Rohtas Nagar, Ludhiana Building, Shahdara, Delhi. Petitioner is a tenant in respect of two rooms, kitchen, open verandah and open courtyard at a monthly rent of Rs.100/-.. 13In para 18(a) (iii) of eviction petition, there appears to be a typographical error with regard to mentioning of this para as 18(a) (iii). In fact, this para should be read as para 18(a) (IV). Averments made in this para are: That the respondent has also acquired vacant and physical possession of the premises bearing No. C91, IIIrd Floor, West Gorakh Park Ext., Shahdara, Delhi, and is not residing in the premises in question. 14Petitioner/tenant in reply to this para in her written statement has stated: The contents of para 18(a)(iv) of the petition under reply are not only mischievous, motivated and false the same are untenable and are thus vehemently denied. Each and every averment in the para under reply is hereby individually adverted to and specifically denied. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent is still occupying and /or residing at the suit premises with her two married sons and her grand children. The petitioner is put to strict proof of any allegations to the contrary.

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15Thus, as per written statement of petitioner it is apparent that, she has nowhere specifically denied that she has not acquired vacant and physical possession of premises No. C-91, IIIrd Floor, West Gorakh Park Ext., Shahadra, Delhi. 16Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short as Code) read as under: 3. Denial to be specificit shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the ground alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. 4. Evasive denialwhere a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. 5. Specific denial[(1)] Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability;

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Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. 17The effect of Order 8 Rule 3 read along with Rules 4 and 5 of the Code is that, defendant is bound to deal specifically with each allegation of fact not admitted by him; he must either deny or state definitely that the substance of each allegation is not admitted. The main allegations which form the foundation of the suit should be dealt with in that way and expressly denied. Facts not specifically dealt with will be taken to be admitted under Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code. 18Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code is known as doctrine of non-traverse which means that where a material averment is passed over without specific denial, it is taken to be admitted. The rule says that any allegation of fact must either be denied specifically or by necessary implication or there should be a statement that the fact is not admitted. If the plea is not taken in that manner, then the allegation should taken to be admitted. 19.Supreme Court in M. Venkataraman Hebbar (D) By L.Rs. v. M. Rajgopal Hebbar and Ors., V (2007) SLT 395=III (2007) CLT 49 (SC)=2007 (5) SCALE 598, observed: Thus, if a plea which was relevant for the purpose of maintaining a suit had not been specifically traversed, the Court was entitled to draw an inference that the same had been admitted. A fact

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admitted in terms of Section 58 of the Evidence Act need not be proved. 20...In the written statement of the petitioner, there is no specific denial to the fact that petitioner has acquired vacant and peaceful possession of the premises bearing No. C-91, IIIrd Floor, East Gorakh Park Ext., Shahdara, Delhi. 23.(v)..Turning to the case in hand, in the written statement, there was no denial of the fact of acquisition of the property 24Thus, after going through the judgment of the Tribunal and in view of the fact that there is no specific denial on behalf of the petitioner with regard to acquiring vacant peaceful possession of premises bearing No. C-91, IIIrd Floor, East Gorakh Park Ext., Shahdara, Delhi, no infirmity or ambiguity can be found in the impugned order of the Tribunal. 25.As such present petition is hereby dismissed. 24 Case No: 02 Title: Smt. Sonakka Gopalagowda Shanthaveri and others vs U.R. Anantha Murthy Date of Decision: 02 Dec 1987 Citation: AIR 1988 Karnataka 225 JUDGEMENT:- This appeal is directed against the interlocutory order made by the learned Civil Judge in O.S. No. 4029 of 1987 dismissing the application filed by the plaintiffs (who are appellants herein and

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who are hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) under the provisions of O.39 Rr.1 and 2 of C.P.C.(in short the Code). 2. Interim reliefs sought for by the plaintiffs in the suit were to restrain defendants-1, 2 and 3 from republishing the Kannada novel written by defendant-1 under the title "Avasthe" and to restrain defendants 4 to 8 from exhibiting and screening the picture based on the aforesaid novel going by the name "Avasthe" 3. According to the plaintiffs, late Gopala Gowda had led a very clean life and was an affectionate husband to the 1st plaintiff and never violated the sanctity of the matrimonial lifeThe 1st defendant who had admitted in the written statement that he was a close associate of late Gopala Gowda authored a novel, as noticed earlier in the year 1978 called "Avasthe" which has given rise to this dispute between the parties. In that book according to the plaintiffs, the 1st defendant had depicted this leader of the socialist movement in not very edifying terms, that he was shown as a person whose ideals were very confused, that he did not have the courage of the convictions to face life as it should have been faced; that his personal life was not very clean in that he had extra-marital relationship with more than one woman other than his wife; that his treatment of his wife was not on equal terms since she was found to be intellectually incompatible to his outlook on life and his ideals and she did not even care to meet ordinary whims and requirements of her husband as she was a miser with no inclination to spend any

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money for him. It cannot be disputed that the novel is based on the life of late Gopala Gowda but defendant-1 has taken the contention in his written statement that the book is not a biography of late Gopala Gowda. On the material on record there is a prima facie case to show that the book is based on the life of Gopala Gowda. Certain documents produced before the Trial Court and which came into existence before the suit was filed clearly show that this book was based on the life of late Gopala GowdaIn the plaint, the plaintiffs have referred to as many as 10 specific incidents where the characters mentioned in the book bear a close resemblance to the events and incidents in the life of Gopala Gowda and those of his family members. 6. So, from these averments which are also supported by four affidavits of persons who were close to Gopala Gowda, the point for consideration by the Trial Court was whether the book prima facie is a biography of Gopala Gowda or whether it was based on the life of Gopala Gowda 11. It should be noticed at this stage that the averments of the plaintiffs in the plaint both as regards the book and the picture in question were supported by the verbatim quotations from the novel and also certain quotations from the dialogue in the picture. Plaintiffs have quoted extensively from the various portions in the book which have a bearing on the character of Krishnappagowda both in his political life and also in his personal life. A reference to a couple of those passages which have been

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quoted verbatim from the book should be noticed at this stage 13. So, on these allegations in the plaint duly supported by uncontroverted passages from the novel in question, the plaintiffs have based their cause of action against the defendants for the various reliefs claimed in the plaint as also for the interim reliefs. 14. The defence of Defendant-1 should be noticed at this stage.that it is purely a work of art and fiction and not a biography and any remote resemblance of characters or persons in real life cannot be a ground to say that it was intended to be the biography of Gopala Gowda or was intended to sketch the character of Gopala Gowda. According to him, the book is pure fiction and nothing more and the characters in the book are all fictitious characters and there is no resemblance to the personal life of Gopala Gowda or to any other person in real life; that no reader will get the impression that the book was meant to defame the members of the family of Gopala Gowdathat any similarities of characters are only a matter of coincidence and therefore the allegations of defamation and character assassination are unfounded and that these allegations are not made by the members of the family of Gopalagowda 16. The defence of Defendant-8 who is the distributor of the film in question is that whatever found in the book is the responsibility of Defendant-1 and they cannot be made a scapegoat for what he has written in the book. In para 7 of the written statement, they

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have stated that 'this defendant is leaving the allegations and counter allegations regarding the contents of the novel' to be met by Defendant-1 17. On these pleadings of the parties and the application filed by the plaintiffs and the counter affidavits filed by the defendants opposing the grant of interim relief, the trial Court framed the following points for its consideration: i) Whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs; ii) Whether the allegations made in the plaint make out a case for defamation against the defendants; iii) Whether any irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiffs by the reprint of the book as also by exhibiting the film in question; iv) In whose favour the balance of convenience lies. 18. The trial Court answered all these points against the plaintiffs 19. On the question whether there was a prima facie case against the defendants the trial Court posed itself the following question: Whether the suit (sic) is a biography of Gopala Gowda ? 20. It found that there were only 2 or 3 similar characters in the life of Gopala Gowda and of

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Krishnappa Gowda in the novelThe trial Court also found that no material had been placed before it to show that any of these characters found in the book had any similarities with the persons in the real life of Gopalagowda and his family 21. The trial Court relied on certain passages in Halsbury's Laws of England and also on a couple of other decisions to come to the conclusion that no right thinking person would, after reading the book or seeing the picture, come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs would be held to ridicule or that a low opinion about them could be formed. The trial Court had also the benefit of viewing the picture and it was of the view that the picture was produced in good taste and it contained many good artistic features. But the trial Court did not discuss either cursorily or in detail what exactly the scenes and the dialogues in the film represented and in what way these scenes and dialogues had no connection with the main characters and events in the life of Gopala Gowda. 24. The limitations of this Court in a matter like this while dealing with the interlocutory order of the trial Court which had the benefit of going through the novel as also viewing the film in question should be noticed first. The law is very well settled. i.e., if the trial Court has given a finding of fact on a proper appreciation of the material on record, the pleadings, etc. and it has applied the law correctly to the facts of the case, it is not open to this Court to interfere with that finding of the trial Court merely because it is open to this Court to take a different view in the

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matter. So, the first consideration in this appeal is whether the trial Court had come to proper conclusions even on questions of facts. 25The trial Court made no effort to go into these characters numbering more than 10 before coming to the conclusion that the book is a pure work of art and fiction and not based on the life of Gopala GowdaWhat is more, the defendants have also gone on record to say presumably with a view to acquire publicity for the picture or publicity for themselves that the novel is based on the life of Gopala Gowda. In 'Times of India', dt. Nov. 14, 1986, under the caption Kannada Film Letter - Politicians And Cinema, there is a reference to the participation of Ministers. J.H. Patel and M.P. Prakash in the film and their names figured in that news letter. The news letter states that Sri J.H. Patel and Sri M.P. Prakash had dabbed their faces with make-up to feature in the movie based on the 1st defendant's novel. It also states that "Krishna Mazadi, a forceful short story writer and journalist, who wields the megaphone for the film has already completed shooting one schedule in Bangalore and is busy shooting in Shimoga at present". Further it is said in that letter that "The story is reportedly inspired on the life of the veteran Socialist, Gopala Gowda, who had a very powerful political career. Anant Nag plays Krishnappa Gowda, Archana Vishwanath, daughter of B.S. Vishwanath, who had lost the elections to Gopala Gowda, ironically plays Krishnappa Gowda's girl friend Gowri Deshpande. She makes her debut

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with this film. Other political leaders who feature in this film include Sriyuths Chandre Gowda, B.K. Chandrashekar. Abdul Nazir Sab and Rajvardhan". In another publication called India Today (Current events) dated 15-12-1986 under the caption 'Karnataka Screen Test' there is a reference to the production of this picture. There also names of politicians whose names had appeared in 'Times of India' are found. Additionally it is stated that "The film Avasthe (phase), the shooting of which was in full swing last fortnight, is the brainchild of Director Masadi who conceived of it two years ago. He said, the idea of involving politicians was to give the film a natural effect'; Patel, was once a close associate of Gopala Gowda, the main character in the film, and so readily agreed to associate himself with the project. 'Other Politicians soon followed.' Based on a novel by noted Kannada writer U.R. Anantha Murthy, it chronicles the life of Gopala Gowda, a socialist leader of Shimoga District who played a considerable role in the State's politics in the '50s and '60s." In another article which appeared in Sunday 6-12 September 1987 under the caption 'personality' there is a writing about Anant Nag who played the role of Krishnappa Gowda. In that article there is a reference to the film 'Avasthe' and it is stated therein that the picture is based on the life of Karnataka politician Gopalagowda. If any more proof is needed, if at all it is indeed required, it is found in the article that appeared in the Deccan Herald dated 11-9-1987 under the caption 'Idealism and Compromise in Politics' It reads as under ?:

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"Awasthe, a Kannada film with a political theme, which is to be released in the State next week, will go down in the annals of Indian film history as a unique event. It features seven politicians in important roles. Among them are three Ministers (Mr. M.P. Prakash Mr. J.H. Patel and Mr. Abdul Nazir Sab), one Member of Legislative Council (Prof. B.K. Chandra Shekar), two members of the Legislative Assembly (Mr. B.R. Yavagal and Mr. Rajvandhan, Chief Whip of Karnataka Assembly)." Again in pages 3 and 4 (Pages 171 and 172 of the record) of the article it is stated: "The highly rated novel is supposed to have drawn its material from the turbulent and ideologically committed socialist leader the late Gopala Gowda who hailed from Malnad. In the 60s he rose to be a leader of great consequence in the political scene of Karnataka. The peasant leader who waged a relentless battle to live up to his uncompromising honesty and ideals was the prototype for the hero of the novel and was decidedly the inspiration for the novelist. Though the plot encompasses many events and characters from the life of Gopala Gowda, the director is averse to the idea of looking at the film as a truelife biography of any individual. He said the central character is portrayed as embodying the qualities associated with a strong-willed idealist caught up in a system which has a debilitating influence on his ideology.

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Krishna

Masadi

said,

the

predicament

of

the

character and the sequences reflecting various stages in his heroic struggle are portrayed in such a way that they have a universal appeal and strong contemporary relevance. Awasthe presents a slice of political life through the 'existentialist protagonist' Krishnappa Gowda. Into the plot are woven several contradictions in society those between illusions and realist, profession and practice, idealism and triviality." Further in page 8 of this Article (Page 176 of the record) there is a reference to the character Gowri Deshpande. It says: "It is an interesting coincidence that Archana

Viswanath, daughter of Viswanath who had lost to Gopala Gowda in an Assembly election in 70's, is making her acting debut (as the heroine) in the film. 26. These materials have come into existence at an undisputed point of time, i.e., before this matter reached the Court some time in the 3rd week of September, 1987. Neither defendant-1 nor the other defendants came forward with any disclaimer by publishing in the press or by issuing notices to the editors of various newspapers to say that their assertion that this book was based on the life of Gopala Gowda is not correct. But, only when the matter was taken to the Court at the instance of the plaintiffs, these defendants pleaded that the characters in the book and the picture are fictitious characters who have no resemblance to the life of

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Gopalagowda or to the persons who figured in his life. In the circumstances, on a question of fact, the trial Court gravely erred in coming to the conclusion that the novel in question is not based on the life of Gopala Gowda. It is not necessary to give a finding on the prima facie nature of the case against the defendants, that this book should be a biography of the life of Gopalagowda. It is sufficient if the book is based on certain important incidents and aspects in the life of Gopalagowda and some of the characters found in the novel have some connection with the characters and personalities who had figured in the real life of Gopalagowda. Therefore, it is open to this Court even on a question of fact to come to the conclusion that the trial Court gravely misdirected itself by not noticing the unchallenged material on record in coming to the conclusion that the book was not based on the life of Gopalagowda. Mere mentioning of 3 incidents in his life in book would not be sufficient to make out a case against the plaintiffs that nothing in the book would remotely suggest any defamatory materials either against Gopalagowda or against the plaintiffs. 27. The trial Court also misdirected itself in not noticing the defences available to the defendants in a suit for defamation. As a matter of fact, there is no reference at all regarding the defences taken up by the defendants. It is well settled that in a suit for defamation what the Court has to examine is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words found in the book and the inference that could be drawn by

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the ordinary man. The learned authors Sir Brian Neill and Richard Rampton in "Duncan and Neill on Defamation" have quoted the decision of the House of Lords in Rubber Improvement Ltd. v. Daily Telegraph Ltd., (1963-2 All ER 151) on this point. Lord Reid has observe as follows: "There is no doubt that in actions for libel the question is what the words would convey to the ordinary man: it is not one of construction in the legal sense. The ordinary man does not live in an ivory tower and he is not inhibited by a knowledge of the rules of construction. So he can and does read between the lines in the light of his general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs...What the ordinary man would infer without special knowledge has generally been called the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. But that expression is rather misleading in that it conceals the fact that there are two elements in it. Sometimes it is not necessary to go beyond the words themselves, as where the plaintiff has been called a thief or a murderer. But more often the sting is not so much in the words themselves as in what the ordinary man will infer from them, and that is also regarded as part of their natural and ordinary meaning." Lord Morris of Borth-y-Guest in the Privy Council in Jones v. Skelton (1963) 3 All ER 952, has said: "The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that

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does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words...The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction would draw from the words." 37. It was contended by the learned counsel for Defendants 4 to 8 that their case stands on a different plane. Mr. Channabasappa and Mr. Reddy invited my attention to the stand taken by them in their written statement. They submitted that all the stigma that could be attached to the author and the publisher cannot be fastened on their clients since the portions which would affect the plaintiffs' reputation have been omitted in the picture produced by them. The picture is admittedly based on the novel and without the novel the picture would not have come into existence in the form in which it is now. As a matter of fact the picture was given wide publicity by associating the characters in the novel with the life of Gopalagowda and, therefore, Defendants 4 to 8 cannot take the benefit of the characters in the life of Gopalagowda and at the same maintain that the picture by itself would not in any way affect the reputation of Plaintiffs 1 to 3Therefore, it is a fit case to go for the trial and till the trial is concluded,

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Respondents 4 to 8 should be restrained from exhibiting and screening the picture. 40. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the order of the trial Court is set aside. There shall be an order restraining Respondents 4 to 8 from exhibiting and screening the picture in question for a period of 2 months from today. 25 Case No: 03 Title: George V Records, Sarl vs Kiran Jogani and Anr Date of Decision: 11-Mar-2004 Citation: 111 (2004) DELHI LAW TIMES 43 Court: Delhi High Court 1By this order I propose to dispose of plaintiff application being IA 3812/2003 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC and defendants application being IA 4665/2003 under Order 39 Rule 4, CPC for vacation for ex parte ad interim injunction granted by this Court on 1st April, 2003. 2This Court on consideration of documents and material on record, granted an ad interim ex parte injunction restraining the defendants from reproducing, replicating, distributing, manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, directly or indirectly dealing in any manner in music albums under the trade mark BUDDHA-BAR. 3The defendant aggrieved by the said order and hence his application under Order 39 Rule 4, CPC.

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4.It is the plaintiffs case that the plaintiff is proprietor of the trademark BUDDHA-BAR being used in relation to music albums in several countries around the world since the year 1999. The mark was registered in many countries in Class 9 and 4The plaintiff claims that its reputation generated across the world spilled over to India and the plaintiffs mark became distinctive of the plaintiffs goods and the same were identified as goods of the plaintiffsThe reputation of the plaintiff spilled over on account of news items in TIME Magazine, New York Times, The Times, Evening Standard, ES Magazine, Detroit News and Free Press, Daily Herald, Las Vegas Review Journal. Several Indian newspapers and magazines in India also wrote in their columns of the reputation and goodwill generated by the mark BUDDHA-BAR in relation to music albums. Indian celebrities and the media also publicized the popularity of mark BUDDHA-BAR in relation to music albumsThe plaintiff contends that the adoption of the identical trademark by the defendants is patently dishonest and is likely to create confusion and deception in the minds of the public causing the defendants goods to be associated or identified as the goods of the plaintiff 6...The defendant contends that plaintiff is not entitled to continuation of ad interim injunction as he has failed to establish proprietary rights in the mark BUDDHA-BAR because restaurant business was owned by its affiliate company, who is not a party in the present suitReliance placed on newspaper

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reports and magazines etc. do not further the case of the plaintiff as the material relied upon by the plaintiff is not admissible in evidence and is hearsay evidence. BUDDHA-BAR has been used by third party both in relation to the restaurant and music businessThe plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence showing the use of the mark in the country of its origin, internationally or in India. Newspaper reports cannot be relied upon. The most of the documents filed by the plaintiff are of no assistance to the plaintiff 7I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 8It is settled law that passing off is an action of deceit where the defendant attempts to pass of his goods as those of the plaintiffs 9.In order to succeed the plaintiff must establish prior adoption and use of the mark and on account of use the mark has acquired a reputation and goodwill and become and distinctive of the plaintiffs goods in the country of origin 10The reputation claimed by the plaintiff is on account of news items in several international newspapers such as Time Mazazine, New York Times, The Times Evening Standard, ES Magazine, Detroit News and Fees Press, Daily Heralds, Las Vegas Review Journal, who devoted their column to BUDDHA-BAR restaurant and BUDDHABAR music albums and both were linked to high fashion and to celebrities. These publications have wide circulation abroad and in India and moreover the

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circulation of these news items were prior to February, 2002. Several Indian Newspapers and magazines such as Times of India, Mid-Day, The Hindustan Times, Indian Express, The Hindu etc. spoke of the international renown of mark BUDDHA-BAR in connection with the restaurant and music albums and praised their high quality of music linking it with well-known celebrities. The Indian Press/ Media coverage of the mark BUDDHABAR and the music associated therewith suggest spillover trans-border reputation into IndiaThe plaintiff placed on record a large number of documents by way of articles, pictures, interviews and write-up to establish spill over reputation extending right up to the date of the suit. It does not make any difference in case the said items are downloaded from the internet when actual excerpts of news items appeared in original publicationsThe plaintiff has been selling CDs since 1999 in abroad and these music albums are in demand abroad. Circulation of the music albums to is internationally recognized as would be evidence from the various articles in the journals and newspapers, magazines copies whereof have been placed on record. There is spate of Indian publications and foreign publications on record where the mark BUDDHA-BAR and music albums recognizing the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff in the mark BUDDHA-BAR and music albums and its popularity in foreign country, which spilled over into India. The music albums have also been sold through internet 11What is sought to be contended by the defendant is that the plaintiff has failed to establish proprietary rights

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over the trademark BUDDHA-BAR as the restaurant business is own by its affiliate, who is not party the present suitThe documents filed by the plaintiff being in the nature of newspaper reports are not admissible in evidence and cannot, therefore, be relied upon. 12The contention of the defendant that the plaintiff has not established proprietary rights to the mark BUDDHA-BAR as the restaurant business was owned by its affiliate, who was not a party to the suit is without force. There is sufficient evidence produced on record to show that the plaintiff was the user of the mark BUDDHA-BAR in relation to music albums 15The next contention of the defendant that the documents filed by the plaintiff in the nature of newspaper reports are not admissible in evidence and cannot be relied upon cannot be considered at this stage. This can be if at all considered at later stage as it may require evidence to be led by the parties to determine this contention. The Court at this stage is to see whether a prima facie case is made out to grant an interim relief to the plaintiff at the interlocutory stage. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecution, 1 WLR 965 observed: Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The fact

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that it was made quite part from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the matter of Haw Par Bros. International Ltd. v. Tiger Balm Co. (P) Ltd. & Ors., reported in 1996 PTC (16) (DB) 311, inter alia observed that There is nothing on record at present to reject the correctness of the reports found in standard newspapers which have a reputation of correct reporting 16Reliance placed by the defendant onare of no help to the defendant in the present case. They are distinguishable on facts. In some of the decisions referred to there were no write-up or publication which went out to the public like in the present case wherein large amount of publicity material in local and overseas publication have been produced on record 25In light of the aforesaid, it is prima facie established that plaintiff is the prior adopter and user of the mark BUDDHA-BAR in abroad. The plaintiff prima facie established proprietary rights for the mark BUDDHABAR in relation to music albums. The mark enjoys reputation and goodwill in the country of its origin and several other countries by way of advertisements/news reports in reputed newspapers and reputed magazines and spill over the same to India, which is also evident from the newspaper reports and magazines, amount to user of the trademark in relation to the music albumsThe matter is only at an interlocutory stage for

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confirmation/vacation of the injunction. Trial has yet to take place. The objections raised by the defendant shall be considered at the time of trial as they may require evidence to be led by the parties to determine the objections. The plaintiff cannot be declined interim protection at this stage 27Grant of an injunction is a discretionary relief. Three guiding factors have to be kept in mind while refusing or allowing the relief of ad interim injunction namely whether there exists a prima facie case; balance of convenience between the parties and if injunction is not granted, it will cause irreparable loss to the plaintiffThere can be no dispute with regard to proposition of law. It is indeed a sad reality that the trial of the case does not reach hearing for several years. Therefore, at the interim stage itself if the Court is prima facie satisfied that the plaintiff is the prior adopter/user and registered proprietor of the trademark and the defendants adoption is dishonest, not granting an injunction would amount to encouraging the tainted and dishonest to seek benefit of the delay in the disposal of the suit. Refusal of injunction shall result in irreparable injury to the plaintiff as already observed that the defendants adoption of the trademark is not honest. Plaintiff in these circumstances would be entitled to injunction. 28In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am satisfied that there is sufficient material on record to prima facie establish the reputation, goodwill and distinctiveness of the plaintiff in relation to the music albums under the mark BUDDHA-BAR internationally and spill over of the

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reputation into India. The plaintiff must succeed in the present application. The plaintiffs application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC is allowed. The injunction is confirmed. The application of the defendant under Order 39 Rule 4, CPC is dismissed. No order as to costs. ...The observations made by me herein are only for the dealing with this interim application and would in no way affect the final determination of the controversy after the trial of the suitSuit decreed. Application dismissed 26 Case No: 04 Appeal order and judgment of case no : 3 Title: Kiran Jogani and Anr vs George V Records, Sarl Date of Decision: 06-Nov-2008 Citation: 155 (2008) DELHI LAW TIMES 739 (DB) Court: Delhi High Court 2..The respondent-plaintiff filed a civil suit on the Original Side of this Court. An interlocutory application for injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the said Code for short) was filed along with the plaint. The respondent-plaintiff was granted an ad interim ex parte injunction and thus the appellants-defendants moved an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the said Code for vacation of the interim injunction. The learned Single Judge in terms of the impugned order dated 11.3.2004 has confirmed the interim injunction. 6.It would naturally be presumed that these were the pleas advanced on behalf of the appellants-defendants

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as there was no review application filed by the appellants-defendants seeking to contend that there were other pleas raised which had not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge. 7The pleas raised by the appellants-defendants, as mentioned afore-said, have been comprehensively dealt with by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order 8Learned Single Judge has relied upon large amount of published material placed on record by the respondent-plaintiff in the form of newspaper reports and magazines which would show that there was even television coverage beamed to India on satellite television of a fashion show held by Indian designer Ritu Beri in the BUDDHA-BAR restaurantAt the stage of interlocutory injunction, the learned Single Judge has taken a prima facie view on the material brought on record. 13.The result of the aforesaid is that it would have to be considered whether the prima facie view formed by the learned Single Judge on the basis of the evidence placed on record by the respective parties can be said to be arbitrary, capricious or perverse. The learned Single Judge has, in fact, dealt with the evidence brought on record in-depth 14We are unable to accept the plea of the learned Counsel for the appellants-defendants that the material in the form of newspaper reports, magazines and other publications has to be ignored because it is in the nature of secondary evidence. No doubt, the plaintiff would

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have the duty to prove the evidence on record by leading appropriate evidence, but that stage had not arisen. The reference by the learned Counsel for the appellantsdefendants to the judgments of the Supreme Court are in relation to a final trial of a matter where hearsay or secondary evidence cannot be considered. However, at the interlocutory stage, where the parties are yet to have the opportunity to produce witnesses to prove the documents, such material cannot be shut out especially taking into consideration the nature of controversy in the present matter. 15What would be the best material which the respondent-plaintiff could have produced to establish its trans-border reputation? In our considered view, it would be material akin to the one produced by the plaintiff which would be relevant. It is not as if there is a motivated article in one newspaper or magazine, but the vast coverage given to the restaurant and the music in international press and the magazines including transmission of programs through television channels to show even the participation of Indian designers 23.We having clarified the aforesaid two aspects in respect of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, feel that the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge for grant of injunction and dismissing the application for vacation of injunction cannot be doubted. The material has been rightly appreciated by the learned Single Judge to come to a prima facie view. In fact, even if we were to weigh this material again, there would beno different prima facie conclusion. We must also emphasize that the object of grant or refusal of interim

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injunction is to protect the inter se rights of the parties till the Trial Court is able to reach a final conclusion posttrial REBUTTAL OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT:
27 The learned counsel for the Defendant No.1 has submitted seven judgments of the Honble Supreme Court for the kind consideration of this Honble Court. It is respectfully submitted that not one of the seven judgments cited by the counsel for defendant No 1 has any relation to the facts of this specific case. It is further submitted that the ratio decendi or the conclusion in the said seven judgments do not even remotely advance the argument of the first defendant in any manner. Case No: 1 Title: S. Rangarajan Etc vs P. Jagjivan Ram Date of Decision: 30-Mar-1989, Citation: 1989 SCC (2) 574 28 29 This judgment answers the following question: When a film secures a certificate for public exhibition from the Central Board of Film Certification as stipulated under the Cinematograph Act 1952 and thereafter generates a controversy due to the nature of its theme or content, is it open to a High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, to sit on judgment over the content of such a film and to substitute its own judgment for that of the Censor Board? Further, upon such substitution, is the High Court also entitled to revoke the certificate granted by the Central Board of Film Certification to such film? 30 The Honble Supreme Court answered the above question in the negative by holding that the Central Board of Film Certification is required take into account the very concerns expressed in Article

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19(2) of the Constitution. That is, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression was never absolute and that reasonable restrictions were permitted to be imposed on such speech. Further, the Supreme Court held that, once the Central Board of Film Certification came to a decision to sanction a film for public exhibition, a High Court could not substitute its own judgment to that of the Central Board of Film Certification and thereafter revoke the certificate granted to the film on the ground that the film in question criticizes Government Policies and Programmes. 31 This Judgment does not even have a remote connection to the facts of this case. In fact, the judgment does not even address the law relating to defamation. The counsel for the plaintiff are led to thoroughly wonder about the relevance of this judgment to the facts of the case before this Honble Court. 32 Further, Sathyananda, the film that is the subject of this case has not even been certified for public exhibition. Whereas Ore Oru Gramathile a national award winning Tamil feature film that was the subject of the Supreme Court judgment had been granted a certificate for public exhibition by the Central Board of Film Certification. 33 Moreover, here, the plaintiff has invoked the ordinary civil jurisdiction of this Honble Court to recover damages from the defendants for their past acts and utterances against the plaintiff and for the further relief of restraint upon continuing defamation of the plaintiff through the production of a Kannada feature film titled Sathyananda. As such, the law that is invoked b y the plaintiff in this case is the law of civil defamation. Whereas, the law discussed in the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court is the law contained in the Cinematograph Act, 1952, the scope and extent of judicial power vested in a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the extent of freedom available to a film producer to criticize Governmental policies and programmes.

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34

Further, no individual had sought any restraint upon the release of the film Ore Oru Gramathile on the ground that the said film was insulting or defamatory to his reputation or character. As such, the said judgment of the Supreme Court contains no reference whatsoever on the nature of right available to a producer of a film to defame another living individual person by depicting him in a bad or defamatory light.

35

In fact, the following passages from the judgment of the Supreme Court may be noted: 8....Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expressionBut this right is subject to reasonable restrictions on grounds set out under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The reasonable limitations can be put in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. The Framers deemed it essential to permit imposition of reasonable restrictions on the larger interests of the community and country. They intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed and the social interests specified under Article 19(2) 12The Cinematograph Act 1952 ("The Act") which permits censorship on movies is a comprehensive enactment 13Section 5(B) provides principles for guidance in certifying films. It is significant to note that Article 19(2) has been practically read into Section 5(B)(1). 17 It will be thus seen that censorship is permitted mainly on social interest specified under Article 19(2) of the Constitution with emphasis on maintenance of values and standards of society

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34We find it difficult to appreciate the observations of the High Court. We fail to understand how the expression in the film with criticism of reservation policy or praising the colonial rule will affect the security of the State or sovereignty and integrity of India. There is no utterance in the film threatening to overthrow the Government by unlawful or unconstitutional means. There is no talk for secession either. Nor there is any suggestion for impairing the integration of the country. All that the film seems to suggest is that the existing method of reservation on the basis of caste is bad and reservation on the basis of economic back- wardness is better. The film also deprecates exploitation of people on caste considerations. This is the range and rigor of the film. 51We are amused yet troubled by the stand taken by the State Government with regard to the film which has received the National Award. We want to put the anguished question, what good is the protection of freedom of expression if the State does not take care to protect it? If the film is unobjectionable and cannot constitutionally be restricted under Article 19(2), freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or threats of violence. 36 As may be seen from the above passages contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court, a producer of a film is required to honour the limitations contained in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. One such limitation is derived under the law of defamation. The case before this Honble Court is a defamation suit and as repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court itself in the above judgment, a producer of a film possesses a freedom of free speech and expression subject to the various restrictions contained in Article 19(2). As such, the said judgment can be of no assistance whatsoever to the defendants.

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Case No: 2 Ajay Goswami vs Union of India & Ors 2006 Date of Decision: 12-Dec-2006 Citation: AIR 2007 Supreme Court 493 37 Again, this judgment of the Honble Supreme Court speaks nothing about the law relating to defamation. The counsels for the petitioners are led to wonder about the relevance of this judgment to the facts of this case. This judgment answers the following question: 38 Whether a Court of law could direct the issuance of suitable legislation for the protection of minors from exposure to obscene, harmful and disturbing materials published by the newspaper industry and others? 39 Dismissing the petition that came before the Court, the Supreme Court expressed its hope that the Government of India would pass appropriate legislation to protect minors from exposure to obscene, harmful and disturbing materials published by the newspaper industry. The last paragraph of the said judgment says that: 64. We, therefore, dismiss the writ petition 40 The counsel for the plaintiff submits that the said judgment makes no reference whatsoever to the law relating to defamation. To the contrary, the judgment stresses on the constitutional restrictions against free speech. 58On the other hand the Constitution of India guarantees the right of freedom to speech and expression to every citizen. This right will encompass an individuals take on any issue. However, this right is not absolute, if such speech and expression is immensely gross and will badly violate the standards of morality of a society. Therefore, any expression is subject to reasonable restriction..

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41

As such this judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be of no assistance to defendant No.1. Case No: 3 Laxmi Raj Shetty and another vs. State of T.N. Date of Decision: 26-Aug-1988. Citation: 1988 CRI. L. J. 1783

42

The counsel for the defendant No 1 has argued that news paper reports are not admissible as evidence in a Court of Law and has cited the following paragraph from this judgment 25We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in S. 78(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of genuineness attached under S. 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as proved of the facts reported therein

43

However, the proper meaning and context for the aforesaid observation of the Court is contained in the very next paragraph of the judgment which reads as under: 26It is now well-settled that a statement of fact contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the statement appearing in Court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported. The accused should have therefore produced the persons in whose presence the seizure of the stolen money from appellant No. 2's house at Mangalore was effected or examined the press

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correspondents in proof of the truth of the contents of the news item. 44 It is submitted that reliance by the counsel for defendant No 1 on certain passages contained in the said judgment is wholly misplaced and misconceived. 45 This judgement of the Honble Supreme Court is delivered in the context of a criminal trail whereas the proceeding before this Honble Court is of an interlocutory nature conducted in a civil suit under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 46 The facts before the Honble Supreme Court may be noted. Paragraph1 of the judgement recites the circumstances under which the appeal came before the Supreme Court. 1Appellant No. 1 Laxmi Raj Shetty is under sentence of death on his conviction under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for having committed the murder of the deceased P.N. Gnanasambandam, Actg. Manager of the Karnataka Bank, Main Branch, Madras by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Madras by his judgment and sentence dated October 28, 1985. He has further been convicted under S. 392 for having committed the offence of robbery of Rs. 13,97,900 from the strong room of the Bank and also under S. 449 for having committed house trespass with intent to commit the said robbery and murder. He has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years on each of these counts and the sentences are directed to merge in the sentence of death. Appellant No. 2 Shivaram Shetty, father of appellant No. 1, a retired Sergeant Major of the Indian Air Force, re-employed as Security Officer, Karnataka Bank, Main Branch, Mangalore has been convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge under S. 212 for having harboured his son Laxmi Raj Shetty having known or having reason to believe that he had committed the murder of the Bank Manager and disappeared with a very

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large sum of money from the Bank and also under S. 411 for having with dishonest intention retained possession of the huge sum of Rs. 12,27,500 knowing the same to be stolen and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years on both counts; the sentences have been ordered to fun concurrently. On a reference by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated September 1, 1986 has confirmed the sentence of death passed on appellant No. 1 Laxmi Raj Shetty under S. 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as also the conviction and sentences passed on him under Ss. 392 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code and those under Ss. 212 and 411 on his father Shiva Ram Shetty 47 Amongst the various arguments advanced by the accused, one argument relied upon newspaper reports wherein it was stated that recoveries of stolen money by the police had taken place in the city of Mangalore in Karnataka whereas the prosecution version was that the recoveries were made at a railway station in Madras, State of Tamil Nadu. To support such an argument during trail, the accused had even summoned the editors of Tamil Dailies, Malai Murasu and Makkal Kurral and had also summoned the news reporters of Indian Express and Dina Thanthi newspapers to depose during trial. However, as reproduced in paragraph 25 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the accused chose to not examine the said persons on the date fixed for the defence evidence. Yet, the accused proceeded to argue before the Supreme Court that the prosecution version should not be believed in view of a different version appearing in newspaper reports though not examined by the accused despite an opportunity to do so at trial. The Honble Supreme Court rejected such arguments of the accused and refused to give any benefit of doubt to them merely on the ground that some newspapers had reported a different version of money recovery. The Court said that:

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25.As to the first, the accused Laxmi Raj Shetty was entitled to tender the newspaper report from the Indian Express of the 29th and the regional newspapers of the 30th along with his statement under S. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Both the accused at the stage of their defence in denial of the charge had summoned the editors of Tamil dailies Malai Murasu and Makkal Kurral and the news reporters of the Indian Express and Dina Thanthi to prove the contents of the facts stated in the news item but they dispensed with their examination on the date fixed for the defence evidence. We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in S. 78(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of genuineness attached under S. 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as proved of the facts reported therein 26It is now well-settled that a statement of fact contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the statement appearing in Court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported. The accused should have therefore produced the persons in whose presence the seizure of the stolen money from appellant No. 2's house at Mangalore was effected or examined the press correspondents in proof of the truth of the contents of the news item. The question as to the admissibility of newspaper reports has been dealt with by this Court in Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Fernandez, (1969) 3 SCR 603 : (AIR 1969 SC 1201). There the question arose whether Shri George Fernandez, the successful candidate returned to Parliament from the Bombay South Parliamentary

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Constituency had delivered a speech at Shivaji Park attributed to him as reported in the Maratha, a widely circulated Marathi newspaper in Bombay, and it was said: "A newspaper report without any further proof of what had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at best a second-hand secondary evidence. It is well known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who edits the news item and then publishes it. In this process the truth might get perverted or garbled. Such news items cannot be said to prove themselves although they may be taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence is forcible." We need not burden the judgment with many citations. There is nothing on record to substantiate the facts as reported in the newspapers showing recovery of the stolen amount from the residence of appellant No. 2 at Mangalore. We have therefore no reason to discard the testimony of PW 50 and the seizure witnesses which go to establish that the amount in question was actually recovered at Madras on the 29th and the 30th as alleged. 48 The counsel for the plaintiff submits that the proposition of law contained in this judgment of Honble Supreme Court is too well known and established to require any discussion However, the counsel for the plaintiff are unable to ascertain the relevance of this judgment to the facts of the case before this Honble Court. The defendants are not sought to be prosecuted under any penal law. As such, there can be question of prosecuting the defendants on the basis of any newspaper report. It is respectfully submitted that the defendants have failed to wholly recognize the fundamental difference between the standard of proof in a civil trail and the burden of proof in criminal trial. Having so failed to recognize the basic difference between the

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burden of proof in a civil and criminal trail, the defendants have fallen into a massive error. 49 The counsel for the plaintiffs refer to the earlier judgments cited by them in relation to the standard of proof in civil proceedings and more so, in relation to interlocutory proceedings thereat and submit that reliance by the defendants upon the above judgment rendered in the context of a criminal trial is wholly misconceived and misplaced. In fact, a few similar judgments of the Honble Supreme Court delivered in the context of criminal trials are routinely cited by counsel in various sub-ordinate courts even during interlocutory proceedings in civil proceedings and when faced with a like situation, as may be seen from Case No.4 cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs, the Delhi High Court rejected the argument of the counsel by holding that: 14The reference by the learned Counsel for the appellantsdefendants to the judgments of the Supreme Court are in relation to a final trial of a matter where hearsay or secondary evidence cannot be considered. However, at the interlocutory stage, where the parties are yet to have the opportunity to produce witnesses to prove the documents, such material cannot be shut out

50

Finally, as noticed by a five-judge constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in

Iqbal Singh Marwah vs.

Meenakshi Marwah [2005 (4) Supreme Court Cases 370]: 24. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given

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51

Accordingly, the judgment cited by the defendant is of no assistance whatsoever to the defendants. Further, the reference to Article 141 of the Constitution of India by the defendants is misplaced. The defendants cannot refer to irrelevant propositions of law and then take recourse to Article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141 of the Constitution cannot help the defendants in any manner as they have wholly failed to produce any judgment of the Honble Supreme Court that exposits the principle of law applicable to the facts before this Honble Court. Case No: 4 S. Khushboo vs. Kanniammal & Anr Date of Decision: 28-Apr-2010 Citation: 2010 (5) Supreme Court Cases 600

52

The counsels for the plaintiff are again sled to wonder on the relevance of this judgment to the facts of this case. In this case, Khushboo, a leading actress from the Tamil film industry had made certain statements to a magazine, India Toda y. Later, Dina Thanthi, a Tamil Daily newspaper had also published an article attributing certain statements to the said actress, Khushboo. The news articles appearing in both these publications drew criticism from some quarters. Soon thereafter, several persons owing allegiance to a particular political party, Pattali Makkal Katchi, filed criminal complaints against Khushboo for criminally defaming women from Tamil Nadu (Sections 499 and 501 of the Indian Penal Code), for outraging the modesty of women (S.509 of the IPC), for obscenity (S.292 of the IPC) and for indecent representation of women (Sections 3 and 4 of the Indecent Representation of Womens Act,1986).

53

The only reference in the said judgment to the law of defamation is to the law of criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code. This judgment is without any relevance to the law of civil defamation as is the case at present. In fact,

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none of the complainants in the said judgment case had even alleged that Khushboo had defamed him or her personally. Rather, the allegation was merely that Khushboo had defamed a class and that the said class was women from Tamil Nadu. So, the complainants had alleged that because they were also women from Tamil Nadu, they were aggrieved within the meaning of Section 191(1)(b) of the Criminal procedure Code, 1973. Perceiving no merit whatsoever in any of the complainants filed against her, actress Khushboo had approached the Madras High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking quashing of all such complaints filed against her. Upon refusal of the Madras High Court to quash complaints against her, she then approached the Honble Supreme Court. 54 The Honble Supreme Court looked into the content of

Khushboos statements to India Today magazine and held that no offence was made out by any of her utterances to the said magazine. The Honble Supreme Court dealt with the law relating to obscenity, criminal defamation and indecent representation of women. By carefully analyzing the words and statements uttered by actress Khushboo, the Court concluded that 35As mentioned earlier, the appellant's statement

published in `India Today' (in September 2005) is a rather general endorsement of premarital sex and her remarks are not directed at any individual or even at a company or an association or collection of persons. It is difficult to fathom how the appellant's views can be construed as an attack on the reputation of anyone in particular. Even if we refer to the remarks published in `Dhina Thanthi' (dated 24.9.2005) which have been categorically denied by the appellant, there is no direct particular.. 55 This judgment, as may be seen from the above, has no connection of any kind to the facts of the case before this Honble attack on the reputation of anyone in

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Court. In this judgment, a set of individuals had made vague claims that the utterances of Khushboo against a class had somehow injured them as members of that class. The case of the plaintiff before this Court is that he has been personally and deliberately defamed by the acts and utterances of the defendants. Extensive materials have been furnished in support of the plaintiffs claim and in support of the relief sought in the plaint. 56 Further, the defendants have chosen to not specifically deny any of the materials produced by the plaintiff. As such, the counsel for the Plaintiff respectfully submits that no Court of law could come to a conclusion that the defendants have not defamed the plaintiff even after perusing the extensive materials furnished by the plaintiff in the plaint. In the Khushboos case, the Honble Supreme Court had considered all material against Khushboo and had come to the conclusion that no criminal offence was made out against her. Further, the Honble Supreme Court also noted that all complaints against Khushboo had been made by persons who owed their allegiance to a particular political party and were also unable to show any personal reference to them in any of Khushboos utterances to the media. As such, the said judgment is wholly divorced from the facts of this case and has nothing whatsoever with any aspect of this case. 57 However, the counsel for the plaintiff would like to submit for the attention of this Honble Court, the following passages from the judgment: 5However, soon after the publication of dated 2.10.2005 to the Editor of `Dhina the above Thanthi',

mentioned news item, the appellant had sent a legal notice categorically denying that she had made the statement quoted above. In fact, the appellant had asked the publisher to withdraw the news-item carried on 24.9.2005 and to publish her objections prominently within three days of

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receipt of the notice, failing which the appellant would be constrained to take appropriate legal action against the newspaper.Even if we refer to the remarks published in Dhina Thanthi' dated 24/09/2005 which have been categorically denied by the appellant, there is no direct attack on the reputation of anyone in particular 58 As may be seen from the conduct of actress Khushboo, she had owned statements published in India Today magazine while also disowning her purported statements published in Dina Thanthi daily newspaper. Further, she had even sent a legal notice to the publisher of Dina Thanthi newspaper and sought a prominent retractment. The Honble High Court of Karnataka had insisted on similar conduct for the distributors of Avasthe in its judgment cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs. The Honble High Court of Karnataka had further observed that the distributors had proceeded to gain publicity for their film through news reports and that they had nowhere averred that they had sent legal notices to the newspapers for false reporting. In contradistinction, the conduct of the defendants in the case before this Honble Court is drastically opposite to what was done by Khushboo to establish her bonafides. The defendants in this case have neither owned nor disowned any of their statements contained in the leading newspapers and television channels of Karnataka materials that have all been produced as annexure to the plaint. Accordingly, rather than support the argument of the counsel for the defendants, this judgment clearly goes to establish lack of bonafides on part of defendant no 1. Case No: 5 Title: R.Rajagopal and Anr v. State of Tamil Nadu and others Date of Decision: 07-Oct-1994 Citation:1994(6) Supreme Court Cases 632

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59

This judgment of the Honble Supreme Court is also wholly irrelevant to the case before this Honble Court. In this case, the Supreme Court was dealing with a convict who was sentenced to death by a Sessions Court for as many as six murders. His conviction was confirmed by the High Court of Madras on 17Sep-1992 and his further appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 05-Apr-1994. The question before the Honble Supreme Court was this:

60

Does the Government or other public servants have any legal power to prevent the press from writing the life story of a convict as it appears from public records even without the consent of the convict?

61

The Court answered in the negative by holding that neither the Government nor the public servants would have any power under any law to prevent the media from writing about the life story of a convict by looking to public records.

62

In the case before this Honble Court, the plaintiff has merely been charged by the Karnataka Police and the plaintiff has denied all wrong doing and has steadfastedly maintained his innocence. Though he has been summoned to stand trial, he is yet to be tried for the offences with which he has been charged. This judgment of the Honble Supreme Court is of no use whatsoever to the Defendants. In fact, the counsel for the plaintiffs have stressed in this Court on the very principle contained in this judgment that the defendants may make a film on the plaintiff only in terms of public records that capture the finality on all current charges against the Plaintiff. When the Plaintiff has not even been tried for the offences for which he has been charged, the defendants possess no manner of right to make a film by depicting the plaintiff in their film. Further, the public records built up so far against the plaintiff are by their very character, incomplete. All that the public records built upon in relation to the plaintiff give is the version of the prosecution

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and a public record that contains nothing more than the prosecution version does not qualify as a complete public record about the person charged with criminal offences. Moreover, the authority of a Court of law would be gravely eroded should a member of the public proceed to make a film and to pass a judgment or comment about the very matter due to receive a criminal trial. No country in the world permits the making of a film on a person merely charged with criminal offences and who is yet to receive a trial for determining the truth of such charges. The reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court is wholly misconceived and this judgment can be of no assistance to the defendants. The conclusion of the Supreme Court is contained in the following passage: 26(6).There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit, or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media. 63 As may be seen from the above conclusion of the Court, the question before the Honble Supreme Court was simply whether the Government and Police officials could prevent the publication by media of stories based on public records. The case before this Honble Court does not have any Governmental defendant. The law invoked by the plaintiff is the law relating to civil defamation and the defence of the defendants is not based on any public record as there is no public record worth the name to establish conviction of the plaintiff on any offence with which he has been charged. The defendants have failed to note that, is the Judgment of the Supreme Court, the persons who sought restraint upon publication were police officials and the mode they had used to so restrain the media were certain laws based on Prison Rules. As such, the Honble Supreme Court was called upon to decide upon the legality of such prior restraint by the Government. The Court had no difficulty in saying that a Government cannot prevent publication defamatory to itself as there was no such law in the country. Further, the Court

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proceeded to hold that should a publication defame the Government, the Government could always avail of its remedy by invoking the law of criminal defamation as contained in Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This judgment does not even remotely touch the law relating to civil defamation. That is, this judgment does not delve upon the extent of right available to a private person against other private persons in a suit for civil defamation of reputation and character. The final passages in the judgment may be noted: 29.Applying the above principles, it must be held that the petitioners have a right to publish, what they allege to be the life story/autobiography of Auto Shankar in so far it appears from the public records, even without his consent or authorization. But if they go beyond that and publish his life story, they may be invading his right to privacy and will be liable for the consequences in accordance with law. Similarly, the State or its officials cannot prevent or restrain the said publication. The remedy of the affected public officials/public figures, if any, is after the publication , as explained hereinabove. 64 The word public figures in the above passage is best understood when read with the passage contained in paragraph 26 as follows. 26(1)Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. 26(2)The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others ..

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65

The use of the words voluntarily in the above passage may be noted. The plaintiff was charged with criminal offences and he has become a public figure not because he voluntarily thrust himself into controversy or voluntarily invited or raised a controversy. Rather, the plaintiff has been thrust into the public knowledge by criminal charges against him. Further, as already emphasised earlier, the defendants are free to make a film on the plaintiff only after referring to public records that are built after the charges against the plaintiff are answered and finally concluded upon appeals. As such, the only support that can be offered to the defendants by this judgment is that should the defendants elect to produce a film on the plaintiff after all charges against the plaintiff in a criminal trial are finally concluded and all appeals therefrom are exhausted, the plaintiff would not be in a position to restrain the defendants so long as the defendants undertake to produce the film only to the extent of public records relating to the plaintiff. Even in such a scenario, should the plaintiff be able to demonstrate to a competent civil court that the defendants intend to traverse beyond public records and to invade the plaintiffs privacy, there is nothing in this judgment to restrain even such a civil court from injuncting the defendants from traversing beyond the public records.

Case No: 6 Title: Union of India vs Motion Picture Association and Ors Date of Decision: 15-Jul-1999 Citation: (1999) 6 Supreme Court Cases 150 66 The counsels for the plaintiff are led to wonder on the relevance of this judgement to the facts of this case. The facts of this judgement are as under: 67 Under the Constitution of India, the power to make law for the purpose of imposing censorship upon films is vested in

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the Parliament of India and the Central Government. And, the power to make laws regulating the licensing and safety aspects of cinema theatres is vested in State Legislatures and State Governments. Considering poor levels of literacy in the country and also considering the mass appeal towards films, the Central Government had insisted that every cinema theatre should play a scientific and educational film for a few minutes before the commencement of a film in each show. The Central Government would itself produce and distribute such educational and scientific films to all theatres in the country. Further, in order to make sure that cinema theatres would compulsorily exhibit educational and scientific films in such manner, a certain element of compulsion was imposed by the Central Government. The compulsion to the cinema theatres was that no cinema theatre could renew its license unless it had complied with the condition of compulsory screening of educational and scientific films. Also, the Central Government had imposed a further condition that cinema theatres should pay a nominal sum of money as the rental for exhibiting such educational and scientific films supplied by the Central Government. Cinema Theatre owners did not question these regulatory measures introduced in 1958 for several decades. However, in 1993 cinema theatre owners from the States of Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal approached the Delhi High Court and challenged the aforesaid scheme of the Central Government. The Delhi High Court partially agreed with the argument of cinema theatres and struck down a part of the scheme as being unconstitutional .The Central Government appealed to the Honble Supreme Court thereafter. The Honble Supreme Court reversed the order of the Delhi High Court and dismissed the writ petition filed by cinema theatre

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owners. The Honble Supreme Court held that the scheme was very reasonable and that it was laudable and issued in public interest and that the burden on cinema theatre owners was very minimal and that cinema theatre owners had not even shown how they were put to a financial detriment. 68 The counsels for the plaintiff most respectfully submit that the defendants have produced numerous judgments of the Honble Supreme Court for the sole purpose of inconveniencing and burdening the counsel for the plaintiff. No part of this judgment of the Supreme Court +has any relevance whatsoever to the case before this Honble Court. Case No.7 Title: Director General v. Anand Patwardhan Citation: (2006) 8 Supreme Court Cases 433 Date of Decision: 25-Aug-2006 69 The counsels for the plaintiff are clueless on the relevance of this judgment to the facts of the case before this Honble Court. 70 71 The facts in this judgment are as under: A prominent film maker produced a three part documentary titled Father, Son and Holy War and submitted the same to Dooradarshan, a public television broadcaster for the purpose of telecast. Thereafter, Dooradarshan refused to telecast this documentary on various grounds, despite recommendation to telecast by two committees constituted by Dooradarshan itself. The producer then sued Dooradarshan by preferring a Writ Petition to the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court directed Dooradarshan

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to telecast the documentary within a period of 12 weeks from the date of its Order. Dooradarshan thereafter appealed to the Honble Supreme Court. The Honble Supreme Court refused to intervene in the decision of the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court observed that the the recalcitrant attitude of Dooradarshan in refusing to telecast the films of this particular producer for well over 10 years was highly irrational and a blatant violation of the right guaranteed to the producer under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. 72 The counsel for the plaintiff respectfully submits that there is nothing in this judgment to assist the defendants in any manner howsoever. 73 WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honble Court be pleased to issue in entirety, the relief sought for by the plaintiff, in the interest of fairness and justice.

Date: 12-Sep-2011 Place: Bangalore ADVOCATE FOR PLAINTIFF

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