CONCEPTS RIGHTS: NATURAL, HUMAN, LEGAL Like authority and justice, rights are frequently referred to in political discussion

without much attempt at denition. Rights are generally associated with individuals and are thus part of the broad liberal tradition dominant in modern political thought. By denition a right may be thought of not only as an authority to act possessed by an individual but as universally possessed by individuals (in the same situation), or by individuals within a specic legal system. This is so by denition because the term privilege would apply if only some individuals have power to do something in a given situation. The doctrine that all men possessed natural rights started to come to prominence in the seventeenth century as part of the debate, of which Hobbes and Locke were a part, on the limitations on the power of the British Crown. In the eighteenth century the revolutionary potential of these ideas was dramatically realised in the American and French revolutions. Such ideas were associated with deism a rational reformulation of Christian ideas which stressed that the Creator had instituted not only natural laws which governed the motions of the planets and all other natural objects, but similar moral laws governing human relationships. Man had been given the power to discover all these laws by reason. By examining how men lived together in existing societies we can see that there are certain prerequisites for civilised co-operative living which all men should recognise. Thus the American Declaration of Independence proclaimed inalienable and God-given rights to the pursuit of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These were elaborated in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Much of modern history could be read as the broadening of the concept of rights from a narrow legalistic application of the idea only to civilised white men, to a broader concept of social and cultural rights applicable to women, non-whites and children as well (some readers may wish to add animals to the list). The concept of human rights as expressed in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is thus a modern development of the earlier theory of natural rights. It, too, represents a moral claim to equal political treatment on behalf of those for whom it speaks. Such natural, human or universal rights that are largely a moral claim for equal and just treatment should be distinguished from legal rights that are enforceable in the courts of a specic legal system. These can be subdivided into the rights given by any specic piece of legislation and rights that are guaranteed by a constitution. In many systems, such as the United States, rights guaranteed by the constitution (e.g. that in the Fifth Amendment to remain silent under legal interrogation) supersede any contrary statement in ordinary legislation. EQUALITY Equality is a politically emotive word that has played a key role in modern politics from the French Revolution of 1789 to the present day. Equality in politics clearly does not mean everyone, regardless of circumstances, should be treated equally e.g. the blind and sighted to be equally entitled to free white sticks! Equality in this sense would mean inequity (unfairness, injustice). Most modern commentators and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights endorse equality of rights and of dignity. But how far does equality of rights go? Equality before the law is important but in a capitalist economy does not in itself guarantee education, health or a pension in old age (the law may merely give everyone an equal right to buy these things but not establish any sources of income to enable this to be done). Article 25 of the Universal Declaration (1948) does envisage the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control and Article 26 talks of a right to a free universal system of education. Maurice Cranston (1962), however, argued against placing these social rights on a par with older civic rights on the grounds that they cannot be achieved for all in some poor countries and that such thinking encourages the idea that civic rights may be legitimately traded for social rights, or are also only a longterm aspiration.

Equality before the Law does imply freedom from sexual and racial discrimination. A modern issue is the legitimacy of positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups such as women and ethnic minorities such as untouchables in India. Equal rights are normally interpreted as relating to some minimum standard e.g. a house, a job, etc. not that all have the same standard of housing or equal pay. Another related but separate issue is the extent to which social policy can and should be directed toward reversing social inequalities (LeGrand, 1982). The short answer would seem to be that most of these rest much more upon the nature of the scal, economic and legal systems than on social policies in a narrow sense. Distinctions should also be drawn between social inequalities that are the result of economic differences, and those that result from attempts to maintain social distance between different status groups. For instance British social class or Indian caste differences may not reect the economic circumstances of those concerned. A British national lottery winner might still be refused admission to a golf club on the grounds of an uncouth accent or unconventional appearance, whilst an Indian untouchable (even if a well-paid professional) could still be rejected as a dining companion by those of Brahmin caste. BOX 3.3 CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY: SUMMARY CONCEPTS 63 Treating everyone the same. Treating everyone appropriately. Equality before the law Equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary courts (Dicey, 1941: 202203). Political equality equal political rights (e.g. voting, citizenship) to all. Equality of opportunity success or failure [in careers] must be made to depend only upon the capacity or character of the persons concerned, not on the accidents of wealth (Benn and Peters, 1959: 128). Social equality reducing or eliminating the social distance (attitudes of superiority/inferiority) between social groups (e.g. classes or ethnic groups) (see Benn and Peters, 1959: Ch. 5). POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FREEDOM One of the most used and controversial words in the political vocabulary is liberty or freedom. Because it has such a good emotive ring to it (i.e. it is what Weldon (1953) calls a hurrah! word), no one can appear to be against it. Therefore philosophers and politicians redene freedom as that of which they approve. The result is that a wonderful confusion of denitions of freedom has been produced by political philosophers (Box 3.4). By way of a heroic simplication which may help to get an initial grasp of the differences at stake, we may adopt Berlins terminology of positive and negative concepts of freedom (Berlin, 1958). Berlin himself went on to elaborate four concepts of freedom (Berlin, 1969). The negative view is that of the classic English writers that I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no human being interferes with my activity (Berlin, 1958: 7). The positive view is one which denes freedom as being ones own master (Berlin, 1958: 16). To put the matter more baldly, negative freedom is freedom from, whilst positive freedom is freedom to. At rst sight such distinctions appear trivial and unimportant. However, one important consequence of the positive view may be that paradoxically it may be used to argue that, as Rousseau (1913: 15) puts it, one can be forced to be free. If one is forced to obey a morally justied law that conicts with ones immediate inclinations the impulse of appetite then ones real self is said to be realised. Conversely opponents of the negative view of freedom would argue that those legal freedoms of speech, assembly, equality before the law and so on are of little benet to Indian peasants with insufcient means to maintain themselves.

BOX 3.4 DEFINITIONS OF FREEDOM 64 CONCEPTS consists in having of Government, and those laws by which their Life and Goods may be most their own. It is not having a share in Government. (Charles I, Speech from the Scaffold, in Works, 1662: 454) The assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes to be his duty against the influences of authority and majorities, custom and opinion. (Lord Acton, History of Freedom, 3) the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, whilst obedience to the law which we prescribe ourselves is liberty. (Rousseau, Social Contract, Book I, Ch. 8: 16) the absence of opposition. (Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XXI: 204) the power a man has to do or forbear any particular action. (Locke, Essay, II, Ch. XXI: 15) necessity transfigured. (Hegel, Logik, 158) a participation in the revelation of what-is-as-such. (Heidegger, Existence and Being, 334) control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity (Engels, Anti-Duhring, Ch. XI) (From Cranston, 1954: 8, 12, 2324)