Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
-I
..
.
~
ARMOR
Tbe Magazine of Mob& Wdrjarc
C0dhdhdTHECAVALUYKXlll)rUL
PAWON
W'. AS I KNEW I T
JEB STUART
The Unid statts
Volume LXI
NOVEbSBEB-DEWE& 1932
NO.6
pyTo.uu
-To
A
w ) -
p u I M
.....................................................
AxmoBm =AWARE ......................
t
4 6
..............................................................
w.Lu m & % K M l 8 8
..c.Lrlw-G.Dmhh
p . w I c
m 111 -NU
-mN
..........................................................
10
16
.......................................
3-
sun
-.lr.tr~mm
m
' L *
AnD
.mrrAmcn
.........................................................
8rM.IL.rrJ.W
tCII.oOJllY
aa
mmwm-:mrn~RTlu
$7.50
tWI'v.mn
m m mnw mr A
_.. .......................................
rn
0
4s Y
B U F O R DF O R R B T -
ROWEL
THE DESERT FOX
b r J r - l J . m xgwa Nmm ....................._.......................................... POW GAUBT OWEN AND CLOII .............................................. ty . . r * r .Jr. By m 1 w m you DO? ....................................................... p .......................................................... OB ..........................................
w OM m a d
ON BEaPlam
S4
Y
a .
a
Y
a .
' I )
mudu---
BOO8 n
...........................................................
.................................................
DlvlDm W E IDuc.2..., A mk b m
= . . a
........................................................
?S
n
78
noDptovoLoIL.Ln.uQ
The
Frontier
b
. .
Courseof Empire
by Bapud DeVo8o
t h 8 l B X h t a n a o f O C a l h U l d em-
~Amcrico.
. .-.
. .
, .
1 '1
..
.
HAGAZIIlE SilOW 1952
!Ut TUL
I
M d i Z e An&ank Weapons
In Armored Warfare
a recoilkss ri& c d d be what d d be its empbyment? How would it fit into our
=.
pesntroaic41C3XMXpS:
Tbar PTC those who believe that thir Lhd d vehicle is w only the aaswes to d t a n k defense. but also
vebjckpsthircaJdnotdo. This
~ n m ! 5 c s d t h e s e v e on the otknse as defrnse. using
hit+d-runtaCtia. Thereareorhen
lrahdtEpaeccioll fa front-line ekmc1l0 i n dcfcasRe stuariars. In other wads, they would take over one of the mkisions c u m t l y per-
I-..
4
equal m n n t of eflort to +d 911 efectiwe and kss expensire swbrtitrk for t h . W e mnst not let an antitad-cost comspkx n n d e d n e our s d doch.irrc.
P 19S2 ,
I
, A R M -
1952
'
.8
A SOLDIER'S READING
A I M ( U 4 o c o d a r n
. .
. .
1952
11
s I .
,,
....,-
i n E u r o p e c a J d r t v d ~ o t h i s nnrwm6rewiKnthin&gabaGQ--bYbY bearwin- d y , thrc k a small ach d Mhrsdinthis potitianzl war- l i n e a t c o c h p c & i o n f a & ~ g a K n t a d c o k m p l ~ f t fare also. Lets start at the begmmng: you Sbouldbedugin. Ev&qthiqtusto receive a wanting ada that you are bedugin. Eventhetaakrrdpporit o take your platom ap to &ringpori- t i o n b e ~ t h h i l l s b o u l d b c p tions on t h e line. Right away you reaed. r-aokovertbelattineIpdurinal &odd alert your s o that they situation. sanitatiam i s doubly imcan hpish up any havy mainportant rhere d n o t h i n g but an airpjecrsandbegintheirpreparatiolls. * u t a that you kart a& on your reconruhaace R r p o r t i n t o t h e c p o f tionam&.pcoaChatothe6ringpodthe unit that you ate relieving and, whatthea if passible, get a guide to the poriu 05 nons. Study the sinudon map & p o a a a t i f p a t w a n t t o n a buny. you start out and fiad out the situa- pull out i aon in that sector from the people the drainage,and see if the route J covered oc f,sm&gd The firing i n the CP. On your way 10 the SriagpoPitions position should be well dug in and 6nd out what areas are exposed to camoda@ too. Its oalv sporting to to ShKU M Y) your lead enemobservation down because a d fire those and peopk Lcp expect those &e you might as well present the smallat are pretty accurate. b k for turn- and bestpmtecd targetpossiMcYou arounds, alwmate tautes, and th can over& the SpORing angk you 10catiDn of otha uait CPS and in- b W . The tankers at t k position SbaJd s t a l l a h on your tri Ranemba s well that you may have to ght OVCT that have two liming stakes set up a o that tbey can 6re at same route so bok or bkcking p i -as markers s tions and muntemttack rolites too. night. If you a t know the two Tick 08F the miland dont be limingn?Ltmabodsfornight~ n M 17-12 It will redly ah.aidtomakeMws.Thiscauntry lodt it up i looks a lot diEerent at night a d you hlppou. studytheteminiufront f the position d karn What the doat get bst often witbout paying o targets=. Getacopyoftherange for it. OK, lets say that you are approach- card. I t w i u h l p y a u g a d o n awn. ing the position You will 6nd your h k around for alternate firing that it is a pretty hmely bdring spot. N o t many people d be wandering positions. Youmaybeabletodevelop around and it may be M y chewed up. You may have to do a lotofclimbingto there.Weput tanksinth Theres no such thing as a perfect position, so you want to start seeing what theyve p t and then start h d ing out what you will bave t o do to im m e it. Firb, stay behiad the hill an seebowtheranLenareliving. ~thbuakenfortheir~tion and &e. 1 1 1 tell pou mote abw bunLmlater. L o d t d t h e a r e a and see bow well it is policed. If that i s any trash. ammunition 01c brass hying aroun& youve got a job waiting for yau beuluse we expect tbes?mestaad;rrdrd licethereas
%xec
H.
-.
p, .1952
ply tnrt CbSL to sce wbot the podtion has i n the m y of alilmud tiaabunker%Yarartnsmmunitiar b?s to be dug in if you want to have P 1-2 ,
it
.i
TANK POSITIONS,
FRONT VIEW
p , 1952
. .
I.
. .
editor ia I s
OH AN ARYI-WIDE ASSOCIATION
AND AN ARMY-WIDE M A W M E
if mak
d ada for tbe tank unit cumma&r, but it also aids t k infantq unit comrmoder i n *id identibcadoa o f tbe zpcific tanks mud rapidly obscure armpvrlr whichacctonrppathim. Dustand PULP
mmmm
s.srlpI.trr.F&8tT8ak
P 1952 ,
exate "an w h e e l s " ; additionof a h u r t h squad to each vmored engineer plaooan or a fourth platoon to each ar-
m a c d ~ c a m yallowing c o m m a i m d a X ~ r e serve i n each combat unnmand to b?odk the urgent situations which arise; development of
acLedtrailasWhiChCan
bridges, demolitions and river lines. Tbenonn?lkidge equipage of this )pmttr, L the familk M-2 T d way Bridge which will pobobly be
repbadintheIlaufuhlrebydmillr
cquipmcnt@ofsustliningthe heavier beds in today's d divibon. H a w kidge trvrsport and is relatively i n k and d v vulnaable t o k and th; reluctance
dbotb -and ~ g i n s a ~ d as to march sucb equipment near dspprbeds is undent?ndab k . In rr~ponsc t o a need for suitable combat type bridgingwhich can move with annorrdcolumn~ and be a~sembled witbout heavy d o n e q u i p ment, the 17tb Armored Engineer Badion has pioneered in develop ment ot a combat bridge s e t utilizing t k aluminum balk of the M 4 Ponton Bridge and accessories fabricated i n the b a d i o o shops e q u i p age lodcd on organic mailers and towed by annaedpasonnel carriers a tanks provides a rapid means of apbsing medium tanks, over e&ctive ps up to twentytight feet in blown ~4gC%crsm*CaMlSanddl so am^. Anarmoredengineersquad
--na
the battalion.
Eleven &&rent vctions comprise Seven o f these belong to the command portion. and four are usually associated with the t r a i n s . This is a highly d i v d e d
H/S Company.
unit composed
04
some sixtp-three
=.
LL-uANm .
vehicles two hundred'men, and twenty& Myvehicles from cranes, graders, dozer T d u m p tru& to half tndy weapons carriers, and jeeps. Before the echo o f a divisim march order dies, the ampany is baded and roars out in three march units. T b e a r m m a n d p tllresdFasme
unit cosLsisting A R M O R -
r . . Y ' Y , 1952
c y t rprinnr.
B M " drill
bbcL
a road with a
pltoand8and10ATmina,com-
pktclyMand-in
lboutsixminutcx The"AbatisDrill" enable the squad to bbck a road with trees in 1 0 to 1 2 minutes de-
"By the
job ranging
hpm the
. . .
--
er=
quires Quchluy x l e x t e d parking ueas, m orda oot to beanne m i d inwetweather. Roadsmusthavea 6rm subgrade, be at least 10 feet in width ad be cwertd from observatian by enany as the bridge d bps a greater silhouette than tbe M47 tank and QLMOC easily take
eva!+e & fran enemy &e. In tbe 17th we keep our Bridge Canpenyfaremughfurward to move
witbanddayto
site% yet bdngcacrulnottobloc themads dimpcdethe of combat vehicle% we wc that wbem "Hen an whak" needs a bridge, aursirattberightplPceattheright time, COmpIeb and xady.
CM. J l l l l ~L s .STILWELL
P 1952 ,
He has been criticized f a hir postattitude toward tbe Gamvlr He is rcuscd of being lenient and too forgiving but all of us have seal forced upon us a change in our national attitudes from that o f disdainful victor to wooing swain, while \Vestern Germany's position has
war
i n t a n a t i d scene. Still. for all the brilli?nt taaical thearies he has conceived and all the thought-pmvoking c(RIIIIcpD he has made on s t c a r and tegv,andfor his* of famous militarp p a s o n a p a d campaigns, he has been and his great trurhs sometimes have been buried u n d a an a.aaache of languagc, interesting to 4perhaps but mare entaraining than schobrlp. In many way thk has been unfarmnate because it gave b r UlavrialwithWhiChtO thurl. Yet, as a purn?liq such vduminaus but sonmmcs * p o i n h writing w a s tobearpaxcd. He has another fault in h i s habit of lifting para of old essays a repeatingthanmtheitentirap. somcat
e,
miadatLasmsfnmtbe~pa.
MIrrdy,
free
himcclc is
not h y 5
at
alm
p, 1952
. .
. .
31
P 1952 ,
*M R A -
1952
37
.-
..
. "
Help Fisht TB
NUMBER ofutider have beenpuwinvariGls r a v i a p u a ? k ~ t h e m e r i t s o f d a r t i l k y . This rype of anilley is very versatile. Huwever, I fed it i s a walmeo of these articles that they coasiaently compare the arpylced artillery with towed anilley t o the g a d disperagementof 9F to mc dMt tbe weahus It i the n the inclination statement to of stress thecertain ULSe lies charin
aneristirr of equipwat while hiling to place enough weight on the man operating it. Examples qporting
armored
artillery hply
ahnost with-
out exception that the only reason towed artilkry har been ~ p ~ n i nm combat is becauseit was towed rather than ~elf-pmpelkd. I do not thiak that is true. The net result o f disadvant?gcous comparison of tbe towed arnlkry with df-propelkd has bern to inspire among manyyoung artilkrymcu the profaund hqe that they will m e r be assigned t o a towed out6t. This i n turn might well afkct e&ckncyintowedrmih Lt. colonel Lson F. Lade's a d cle on this s u b j j of towed VQSUS self-proplkd d e r y (ARMOR sepumbaoctoaa, 1952. pnge 10) was highly mteusting. Y e it ap pears to support the thesis tbnt tbc ptimaq reason tor the OPQTulllljag of meral of our units in Korca w a ~
A R M O C ,-
1952
31ce Amy%
ATOMIC GUN
=.
. .
p , 1952
ARMORU---IL--,
1952
. -
p , 1952
A R M O R ,-
1952
TEREPPLACEMENT SYSTEM
by
thra;drm& ingintheirrnlleadtbeinsauaors
Themar for
ente?edtbcirraringtbaamktbe
etr, assipalhisMq6andsrg#dit.
believe wae essential to assure good mining. Thp are not rewludonq, but arejust hosed on common sense. Fint: U p assuming command of ARTC in August of 19)r I got auM t y horn General h e r s ? then c a m m d b g the Annored Face, to bald cnm aaining battal' ions not needed at thir time as replacemena and to give tban two Weeks of field bpkirrg not then given to replacem e n t s . Scad: U initiating this field trpining,a w l a z day w a s Spent testing d q a e k m i q each nainee on all subjects given in p i o u s training pzld finally m p i n g his ideas on training. Thistestrcvealedthe!5eexa a d y important matters: That the companp &ks were keeping the paper 4 of a man's training but tbeiewac DO steps taken to assure that this rrcord conforwd with acda;dning. A s a d t , s o m e m e n aaded as tank driver had not driven, .phikotbasarrisdas gunner hadn't l i d cpc: That the soldier himself didn't hum what subjects should be cwacdintrainin~bowhe had been rated i n the ones awered. or what his MOS was: That he had never beenaskedfaranysu onsorany opiniarrmtrainiug: tmenabsent a d d r fur a d a r more rarely ever d p p th training they had missed were ksual at the end o f training paioa~thcrome. 'Ihird: T o correct these conditions I rlrr;lrl t o bhrg the trainee as fully s popribk into his trainin and to p h i m r o m c ~ o n L m a i n -krbarldrecdve. Therebe was isnrtd a d durable ad, similar i n size t o a driver's licenreaidmti6cptiaoard.Thiscard rbarrrd the small anus trpining, the lmcbiUegrms~befired,vehide!sto be dzivea, d mnk weapoos to be
v e r p few bst ths cards and d l q were eadlp r e p M i n aining. M e n d e d than "our dipbrms" a d bey kicked if any mining was omitted. Thee cards at 6rst g a thrargh to Fort Meade, Maylad, whrr they were reported mo6t udul, aad then to units reaeiviag nm in the .active
theaters. u n s o l i d t e d reports paised them high]? as just What was needed to show training of pm and td help in proper assignment H o w e v e r . after
six m o n t h s they wae taken up and desnoyed at embarkation points as "riolating security mcdsures" and "as u n n paper wd." Fourth: Sten o f ach battalion, b e fore being shipped out, were q u e tioned on their traibin and were &y connib. *ed uted many for Y uabkrdeas as to where time was too long a too short, where inspuction was ma6t &elxive and where it was poor. A surpkingly large number dgimi manuals and reading material op t a n k gunnery. etc. -4s a result, a book store was eqablished where as many as 10,000 training manuah nRfe pufihased in a training cycle. A b , the Anaored school pro\ided free f o r this purpoJe a number of very valuable pamphlets on driving, motor maingunnery and tactics Thy were simple, profusely illustr3ted, and far mare readable and understandable than the dry, finely printed, complicated government-issue litenturt. InvaIuabIe as aainingaids, they were issued frec This leads me to state here that somc timeIthinlrinOUrtniaingmahods h a t we have and procedure we forget t h@ly intelli t mldias the ma+ty o f whom E h o w t o r e a d a n d write and so can instrua themselves for &tar). duties j u s t as they do for
" F
Si:Based on my obsavation of tank u n i t s in bade in the Middle East with the British E&& Army, the folbwing (not thn taught in RTC)were introdwed into training: Overhead h e with the machine gun and tank cannon; simpk h e prob lansfordcrrwsaadfortanks within the platoon; boobp trap mine laying and remoIlal All i m v t
sub-
sso,ooo,~.>
, 1952
at t h i s that ( A 1942) were i n the it was the canpan? whac an NCO was CarIied out i a bad wc?tba, hat or s t r u g g l i n g t o p u t a n r 2 6 ~ t o drainarshinc 12men. ThisQpwmDIcbedmc scvcnth: Tbe Anwred scbod A R M U .L C L a s , 1952
prdnlsly taught were r e viewed and tied m at this training. Men questioned for a year rated this rho01 work. peziaioffield'~ tionasthebest . Fifth: &lostof tbe subjects taught OEau' rcgardkad
a;iined,frsquently m combat, ddatbcqoolya ment n u s t b c f i ~ d 6 c i e n c y of combat units invariably loweredby Lc. I've never sa a rddier &oroug& i d Pggb & fa OIKarmWbD tprrtaservice in that a n & Mislscignment, thereforr,Qaliwm~annyorhr
a c t c a n d o t D h m a a k . ?be soldier b o k u p his bodc urn
Painingaadhistimeasbang . wastedud, funbarnore, belicva his chances to survioe i n cambat are lasaKd by his I l l k S i g n m a r L I believe the wi
evinced by forma w o r l d
o&m.
3"*r-
' 3
w a r I1
1atimsrcsforpmonnel
and-rcrvices
v i v e d i f p o p a , .rsigDe& To me it i s mog hllpcitipg to see that th W a r aPprtmmt abdicated in mattas patliatrg toorctinutes, orsanizptioa and ' d a r e plxanaat wbac
d. Finally,wedonotknowhow
q-
--
ddlon,weRprovidedtotrain tban;mininnrdmilliansof lollLyk d 75mm. s(hnm, and 105rmn and otha ammunitionneeded, too, in combat-were Lred in brpining them. Millions of gal-
-kd
bas d gasoline-needed
every-
wkeI.l-cwercalsoused. And s o go tbe otha casts involved in this training. Much of it was wasted by misassignment! b. Repom from hundreds <f sources show that tank replacemmts issued to other arms were actupElp needed m annored units; -be not on the day or in the wrdt when they wem misassigned, but within a relatively short period.
Rplpammp this error was compamdrdby sendin& to fill armored lKakinhcllrydorherreplaCc ments. These men had to be
P
t
I
Haoing~edtheannored
r e s e c v c Wac aepenw upon f o r conand i n e x c u m b e waste of everything tinuityofrtion. A s a d t , w e s e e essential to winning a w a r . thatt&Army~FaEa,ck Third: Where repLawnts beSaViCecnmrmnd SeAirForcCaad f a theater each thrraR in 00 Q)otdi- come the main rtlknce o i & in nated manner, but anda d i k t cammaadex for k p m g h systans and, in mamy cases, in my continuous operation tap assume an opinion, not on any d estimates, impottance equal to that of the armies. but on meratim?ter and poor guess- nercfae, correct estimates, by arm m*W of replacees. Of all the && it and nvi~e, ? beis also my opinion, that only AGF ment depw, cocrect issues ". come a major c o m d respm.sbility gave the replacement a P k which cannot be delegated to an in its its importance plans and a n = fpzf'"wonby time of AGO, to a G1, or to a Senice Commade conscientious &om to keep mand. Fourth: Everyone in the chain of overhead down and to get prop" estimates. Any o f its suggestions or command. eveqwhere. in peace and recommendations far active cheaters in war- should be required to study received rant if any consideration; the past inefficient handling of ret to s mdmtand thorthus teamwork was completely lack- p l ~ ~ and oughly the inexcusable waste of maning, in my opinion. I believe the following things es- power, training &om and national sential to an e&critre replacement resources and other ill @ects that asystem for the Army i n a majur war: cur through misacsignment and poor
rrplraacats?inncdofdnidansin
v?rYLlr
metbods f a lwldliag d issuing repLcewnp. -Tbe and organization in the U n i d StUes and i n eacb cheater must be similar in m k . Second: Arms and services should handle tbe training and b e of tbcir own replacements in depots in the United States and in each tharcr. T o train by arm and SCrpjQ in the United Suts and then to have men mixedupovasasd~issued like sheep aut of a chute is a complete
&kt
Fifth: G r e a t e r care needs to be exand orpization Sa all plps and servkes are re4in ordet t o s t erdsed in scartingreplacement depots c u r r a c c u n t e ~ a n d u n i f a r m l v in the United Stata so that t+ have
A R m o R ~ D M n r k r 1952 ,
First:
estimates.
I
I
'
'
'
--
agree with this proposition and wish to e m p b tbe technical means of our time to prove its auth. Movement serves to king the tmops in contact with the enemy: for chis purpote onecan use the lep a men o r of borvs the railways or-recently-the a u d e and the aem plane engine. Once contact with the enemy bas been
enemy must either be destroyed or made inoperative a driven from his positions This can be done by emplo).in 6re power s o superior that his powers of resinance co pse. Fire powet from fixed pasitions has an & d v e range tmmsponding atactly to the observed range of ttK mas of the weapons employed. That is as far as the infantry can make use of its covering k , when that point is reached the havy weapons and the artillery m w change tbdr position in or& t o parnit a M e r advance under Q M of ~ their Lre power. Vast numbers of weapons and an e v m vaster uantity o f aminunition are needed to fight this sort o f tattle The preparations for an attackof this san require considexable time and aredi&ult to d. surprise, that impartaot element o f surres,
is very hard to a c k . And even if the o r i e l a d doescatch theenangunawam, the m ~ ~it n is launched t the attackin force will have shown its hand, and the resemes d dctorse will amverge an the point of attack and bbdr it; since meme forces will now be xwtorized,thebuildingu ofnewddcnsivcfrantsiseasier b i t ad t o ~ t L e k c a o ~ r ~ ~ ff of n -bas~don the tifilcroblc of u d h y and infantvy cwperackm ore, as
&
o d t , cpen*todpr EvcryJIirrg i s
move fortatiunr kahithavbcrndonc: t o keepmovhlg c(rfnui.c fire ana thus t o 6 it tlu hsaafor hirn tvbwildUpfmhdrfcns)ocpositiocrr a d finauy to csry the& deep into the ruyf hfcnwt The popanents of tank warfare believe thaG in favorabk
despite
drormrrpra,~posserrthemansfm~his; theJLptiq on theocbahapd say that since the k t c~ll DO bnga be p o d u a d 1~ in I918 "4-
A R M O R O u a m b w ,
4-0
noacamrmsmolnd&wouldk
morrCOCPOfaS&
IK)
derls,wseIgeants i n t c l y s a s
supply clerks or Ma!aer sergeants as dnftsmen. The p o k m gknwswouldbctborechargadspc with tbe mponsibility of g and dirrcting other men. So mucb f o r a start. But there are
fi
=campan).
22iln
more evik to coI1sidQ. -rhcoeffcauscdpoor~ bas been the usurpation of the posir tion and authority o f the noncommissioned o&ezby the junior otfra. I first saw this+ t o happen i n 1942 i n my unit w k n orders were issuedEbatallixlsmam * wouldbe oarriedonbyo86cmonly. Ihave since kaIned that rmoy other out6ts put out thsvneLindof orders whik ab t of capable NCO's stood by gritting their teeth as-a green, young lieutenant, who was not yet sure o f
company pu"ishment? That's right, a lieutenant! The odd pan d i t all i s that tbe good NCO w m u toioorE He wants t o be given respomibiliry and a hand inbuildinghisunit. Hebashis and he is able. Lds let him AU h wants i s to k giveo a job to do and the necesslrp badring and authority t o get it done. Then vou might no3 hear ramirs d i n g a Sa-
when this has bsar rcamplisbcd, one o f the most i d link!3 in the ch?inofcammandwinbesbong
again.
The laa fault I Lnd is in our motiondreducrionspsrrm. -ap=y d, 10 spondble fot the hmcrian o f h i s ~ 0 ~ 1 -
~ 1952
ARmOBY------4.~,
1952
"THE
IS I N THE PUDMN"
.
I-
a m w e e tbe move of tbe berdtrrrten rrd elitatitl offices clffectire 01 October 1,1352 to
Duringmyprioddseniceaitb solutiolr for all the WOCI of the army, nor do I pretend to grasp the b q i~tbcbamlionvariedwiddybe picture in its entirety; I do feel, how- nrnenthrcextmmes:uDdanrrngth o unever, that the most is not king d e to overstrength, Ovmcrmgth t rivedframourmastpedousmili~ dersaength and uadennength back commodity, manpowa. A surebe about twelve bet i s being overlooked. levLike every other o$cer of the line, months, however, this h&on I am vitally interested in, and dirsctly elled and, quite accidenrally, we were concerned with, the conrervation and left with a workable, eejcient, presAoWmen e v e use of m i l i w manpower. ent-fadut)l m g t h . 'v It rakes noTIP T a l k to convince me Came in, no old ones went home. that m order to ensue the success o f our nation on any potential battlefield, must exploit to the f u l l e s t the fightin ability of our soldiers. formed my beliefs. During the freeze the men in my We can a& to overlook no single factor which might innease this fi ht- unit were certainly no "Plaster ing ability. Yet I a m uneasy; I ear Saints." Our equipment,weapons and that OUT presemt system of training vehicles were strictly of World War most replacement parts and replacement is amstmcted with a missing pillar, t h i s pillar being the coddo ybefoundonudledreqinniuation of a sense of unit pride, uisitions, and finally, we su&red of oneness and of belonging, among our fighting men. M y thoughts along these lines have been influenced mainly by two ment and making it fit the new ore ~ snuces. Thebntdthesein9uences ~ t i c m s k w Inspite is my recent mtum to the P after ofth=chollengesto flR&ytwomonths o foreign revice fiaency it is mv i n a nonwbat theater. I t this that pcrioa the baaalilm reached and entite paiod as a platom=, a maintained company executive &ca and a a m pan? armmander in a rroonnaissancc batnlian. constantooptaawithRcg ubr Armp; with i n enlincd I am positive that lm could marunde!rthepeaoetimecoaditians fully have acamplished any mksion tLerotatiaafree2e withinaawidenngeofnpabilitia : ~ ~ L ~ o u r b e p L o f w a Irbare this belief, not QI any egocireic in Kana; and finanp,duringtbemass opinion of supda kodaship by mpturnover which accom anied the self OT by the otba aifims and nmt b a w i n g o f t b e ~ L k f t m e comroftkbatmlb,butmarmrc ofopit&capswhichaistedlmarg . .
theouoccxfrdyedmit
t'~~TPri
? l r
alltktbemanbasofthe All of Ilr, fnan &e c o r uanv dav loam adalia felt a &
1952
I . Y A I *
1952
.
1
d a b m 4 m n o d Clkirnb maical
aut6tandthurrgprdlasottkirpertbermtta, = tbtnerrtmum = % F . - 2 E L p a d m
amties. In*thewoalegiwn
anlamcdaaexphnationofwhat
lennrmodd#mthebestdthe!ir
FOR TANKERS
ismbeexpedcddtrwm,notan npdogltbpttbeyhavebcarQaftcd Aftathitkiet talkthe Adjutant divides tbt gmup mm d k iaarmenB and turns d of these over toaperriouslydaignatsdnoacom
thwwpanatannto Cumpany "A";
guidon until the day he h the military savice. Fhn tbe caa~pany supply room he draws a weapon and thc equipment
naxaorytotrpinwith. H e i s t h e n ossigpea to a ToctE slot in a recon plntoaq i s given a bunk, helped to rmd scow his equipment. fed
?bcnext'mamingJonesbegmsa cych equally dividedbetween military subjects and his own m q , the latter having been tcmpOrariy -ed by the Deeds o f the platoon in conjunction with any s p e d aptitudes which J-mightpoacs. -cPclepr*
a
r baldcddown.
$d
have bcen bng-timemembers explain the vviour traditions and on the day whcn his Recruit status is ended a d be k p t e d his fust pas he is presented with a set of tbe lllth's ~esrs to wear on his new dress unifarm. TherrEae, witbout even thmking about it. Jona gradualla v comes to beliewe that company "4"111th Armmd cavalry Regiment is the finatd i t a x y orpization which has ever edsted. Moreva, he feels that bc himself.hY a direct, unavoidable
Ins, are directly dependent upon bispcokhcy. Ccmnarcntty, our friend is painSUbcaascioUSl~ Ipdocbrm?tcdwtth blstayof th2 l l l k Muds on the Day Room ffnlkdcpict someof the moR farinating events of the unit's plst From time t o time ollkers and men who
*e ! &
, 1952
. -
'
p , 1952
F R O M THESE PAGES
10 Y -
Ago
48
1952
..
Obsolescence or Renaissance?
1
.... _ .
, ,
~.
. .
-,.
. , .. .
I
I
Batsdlus
THE
BOOK
__-______---____---_____________________------------------------------------------
* -
1952
...
I.:
P , 1952
WINSTON
A-orof-s
s. CHURCHLU
spcuhesbcginningwitharomipg in .May. 1938 thrargh World War II 10 the 6aml viccap ..... .J15.00
Painter
.Rs
cdorful
....................53.75
d n ~ r a d ~ d g p , m ~rrantdepdopmarainch
ph+l worId navies
harbecndded,wirhpbaOgn*
.... .522.50
A MIRROR FOR A M E R I C A N S
intbaethrrcunnautwhmKs: zifcintbcEas&"~Cacam
P 1952 ,
. . .. . . . _
.-,
'
......... . .
-~
..
I
.LXI. 1952
.........No.1.p.B ............................
................. .................
4
4
Na
B o o k : "
A
m J
m NI Rse
6
u l l i u r d . L L '.........................
w , Y U
-IbQ-rV br.akka m m p
pkirett.ucd.Ge!argeB,ar
~ * c . P t F h d e r k k A .
20
34 PT
10
2l
re. T k ..............................
58
p i e b r h l Patnxe:
=- ir
4
w . Ibo ....................
W " -
..................... ................... C14,Uc.LYL .......................... .................... CktM4rnImGc .................... -1l.C.LmumdE ................ C1.r9,4g-&+X ...................... cIIL..GaJ.frr?i ...................... c.L..8.L1y.ir.. ........................ . Ihm4-6aX.I ............ N a l . p # a c . L V . l r a G ............ N a t p 6 -UC.LB.PIE ......................
S 6
46
Pmner.M&I11.rMeF
hky,-
I 1 2
61 19
67 61
s
6 2 6 5 2
34
m
.
ZB 46 3a
19
t
5 6 I 5. 1
5
54
rn
42 2@
! a
6 20
6 6
42 -S
17
.................. i 61 rn-k ... .................... s t ( m f h L I k b e r t K ........................ 2 -J .P.C. .............................. 1 .. 60 - , a . m H .......i. .............. 4 98 . m&!&mbH&&etrl ....................... 6 51 m arnrC.ILlaJnrS ...................... 6 6 2 0 HyI.cI, a ...................... 6 % k b , c . L a J . .......................... 4 4 6 X&h&r. L B ......1..................... 5 10 ~ I A c d . k F....................... . 61 Iml.Dr.hraL A . . . .............No.bp.34 4 i s ................. 2 10 Ichb.u c . Lw , J r 1 2 16 a 4 Ibse;llljkL. P........................... $ 6 7 P i V I w* .-. ...................... 2 4 2 U M - L a r D ...................... I%;gltIh&J .................. : ........ 5 z l I , ............................. 5 5 @
mW-T.R
5
1
6 4
eZ
61 18
..................... eo ...................... t9 .......................... eo ........................ 80 61 ..............No.4.p.39 ~ y . S h C h u l t m L .................. . 6 w 8b.r.h...................N0.t.p.W 5 40 ~ C I p c a U a r........................ c 5 6 4 saith.CapLLioyd&.Jr: ........i........... a 20 &ihwl&-J.raL ..................... 6 1 36 ~ 1 8 t L & .................. ~ W 4 s t r e ! i u . c 8 p L ~ ~..................... W 38 T.nbr.Dr.canpb ......................... 6 73 Tborg.or.C.ptwilEamP ................... 6 20 -U,cdJ.M. ................. 2 21 Tnbr.UO.W.Jr ......................... 1 42 Tumer. U c d C I m r h G.................... 2 1 s UaQIwl ........................... 6 28 ma Qll.4 At~gast-Viktor .................... 3 24 W d d c a C . p t E t r u d S.. .................. 6 20 W . L 0 4 L t . ~ ................... ~ W 6 12 White. -Gem L D........................ 5 28 whdme&y. serr. lubart E . ................... 5 20
Wood.,Lt.COLJobnO WJ.tt.Lt.~WubmO
4 2 4 5 2 5
(Vd V) M -
............. ...
.........
t
4
m
32
tt
5 6
se
73 24 10
Combat Tank (Sum and -1: CMins, No 6. p 2 0 . Wbebesky. Na 5, p 20; Miller No. 5. p W Roth, No 5. p re; F a i t .
B8tcldddBsrbar................ Alnphibba8 ............. Army'. Atomic C;rm ...................... Rrraoti.rY'sibility white ..........................
................................
a
4
5 6
tf
1
28
4
U 4
. . .
3
1-
23
csnrrhutofpiraR.i.ar
in-%bcLLao
.....................
30
56
=Khld.-
..................
.......
1 5
4
2
a 6
46
Recipe for ARMOR ...................... AHnioP.bk y.tta ..................... Y I b c R d C J d o f W u " ............. Aaorba AIud Bcich.rehr .ad BcpobiL. Tnber .............
TheAsma&alpraidcncr
. .
...............
t
4 4 6
..........................
5
4
e8
4
....................... ....................
TlTLEs
2
2
18 15
.................... ~ ~ ~ ~ o f T h i 8 y y . r No.1. p.a :Na . % p.41: No.S , p.W. No.4, p. 1%; No.5.p. 15 ........................ .. rd I h f t i n g inthe ciril War. FedurlBcerPltay Lord ......................... N 3 . p.31
18.000
............. ........ . h... T b e G m a d s d d i r ...................... on an Army-Wh A8meuam . dmArmyWidaMagaXim .....: ................... odaarcudidab adulol ..................
Bda4
2 4
1 s
14
.............. sccrpitlrfortbcFreeworld~ ......... Soldicr's~.&Rtroa .................. s o m a ~ ~ ~ ~ . c* dd c d SomcTborUhclmDiui@n& uolh .......... S w i e t A r w r T v t i q H u m d ........ ....... Soviet Armor Tactics: SEdbr Openam, - m e (Ammymu8) ............................
acpLccwPtSyStelIbTbe, SccltL
1
6
It 50
20 10 r 6 n64 s 6 m 1 e
6
6
6
16
17
2 24 S t o r y o f ~ A r m o ~ A a a a l l t ~ u l d a. h 6 i l l tB
46
h
6
MdrcrMor,tbcu.s.draaor~collins .. 1
Mp.hncattoAtomkW&,~Pron~er Araror = o f k . . nmor (Year RuliDg -1) AIudto~p0n:Cdctr cortitrtbr .ad m I a w 8
.......
6 20
Cury Owe0 and G b t y . For. Morri.on, Jr...... 6 . . Gas TurM~es for T u b ? Ogmbwnx ........ 5 HomurEugbdug.Atoelfor&mor.Burke .. 6
~nqoirg~ntotbcyilf~rtyiad.ylylrran~ a LiddeUEart.oaCvhr. Icb 6 LitLkThinss'l!htcrpa+Harin 2
tbeArmoredDiririor,smitb 3 6 c Tankem : 5 at HarcbrsrL. 24 Tank I&n&h&h > for . T Faa......... 6 18 69 Tank.-T a m r a L (QIQ . r lm): M c F a l k Jr. No. 2. p 16; Evams, Na 2 p 17; WOOQ No 2 p 18; Turner. Na 1 p . ls; 51 Byonun No. f p 19; Reagor. Na 2, p eb; 63 Thmckmorba 2 fl 16 Tank-Infantry T a m r o r t in Korea, Nonmm .nd
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
..............
............................
46
cucp
...................................
.................
......
..........................
m-
u
4
*.
........
16 19 18 12 17 45 46 10
H47 M d w a TU&, Ilbo h f 8 Mobile Amtitad W a p o m in A m u d Wuiuh, Ddrta 6 Mobile Artilky in the Team ISum and S u b stance): C k d a n d , N o .4 p to;bley No. 4.
............. 8 NW ..........
.....................................
Tanks in P m Wadam, . W a b m 4 Tanka in tbc Mantry Dirbioa. Ddria......... 2s -T& POat Chip ' Y w N j 4 ! 2 pict;ctt, Jr............................... Task P o w Hucl t o Ch 'Unch'aab Brma 30 Teo &ea of Tank Tbs Cbukmnu . . .......... 6 Three c i wua shr .....................
Top colwn8d in Tbe Top corrmund i n the Par East, The
2f
..........
54
6 2
12 6
34
......
4 5
84
10 5 42 25
a
2
'p1I&(.ALIkakuo.
~ I J 6 r 6 e R m H . ................
&
..
.J,
t b l
5 1 6 $ 2 0
6
2
4 6
a Ir
w I h . t *
.............................. t
* ........................
.....................
......
............... ...................
t
5
24 46 29 39 6 40 40
4 D a 6 N m Nutea: Na l . p 40; No. 2 p . 44: No. S, p 4 8 ; No. 4, p e: Na 5, p 44 6 N 0 d o d i d . l Rmhh.wnL for MhOr olfews Rymm 3
. . T4n .................................
. ........
. ........... . ..................................
..................
42 60
................ t ............ 2 TmhbgTankclFTr~ .................. 1 so tbe Tank C m Bums... 5 38 ~ i n ~ ( Armomd Tprlrcjr A r m mscbed. d s c bwy8tt o d R ............. a c n t . t i a e1 l ) 3a 2 u u. s. yilitvp ACdemy: c h . .of 1%2 hlnbor G r d p r t g ............................... t 9
w h t W d You Do? (hnwE?dsehod pracb totion) No 1 p 46; No 2. p . 34; No.b p 60; No 4. p 58; No. 5. p 48 6
o-or06cerAnda-An, 0pentiOaFk.botaqM
. . ................... a@ 38 Y o u N e e d T . n k t o T d n T a u k e r s . c o t h r r l l ..
70
61
. .
. ...
66
66
p . 1952
' I ,
T H R E E . BATTLES
ARNAVIALlZJnO AND SCHMIDT
George Washington
,
I
I
Volume V
'ORDRFORM
100111 . I
1 -
K w,N.W., Worynrfon 6, D. C.
Armor
I
m
App0Pr;k
fM
Au Occrsims
. .
I _
..
In March of 1885
a d g m u p a p f e ! s s k d s a the d i l e armof the ground foras
j o i d together to form the first ofthe combat arms military associations, adsaietydesigDedtopromotethequaliktimof
.
itsmembersinthekldofmobilewarfate.. .
. .
m a compelling f d d
. . . Membership in the
AnrmrAssociationis~emarkofthepnofesdona~mobilewarfare.. .
In Januaryof 1953
h te -
. .
If-
mobile, d-@d
field,
1727 K
m . N.W.
WASHINGTON 4 D .C