Southern Political Science Association

Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? Inter-Ethnic Contact and Support for Illiberal Parties Author(s): Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 2009), pp. 414-428 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30218961 . Accessed: 09/05/2013 22:32
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DoesFamiliarity Breed Inter-Ethnic Contempt? Contact andSupport for Illiberal Parties*

S. Kopstein ofToronto University Jeffrey

Jason ofCalifornia, University Berkeley Wittenberg

Does contact between ethnic lead togreater Research on this in theU.S. debate groups support forliberal parties? is contaminated context levels and a truncated This the party palette. paperaddresses byhigh ofmobility problem an examination elections in Czechoslovakia, where through ofthe1929and 1935national parliamentary mobility and thespectrum was limited was broad. We on an database employ ecological inference original ofparties of election and census results thousand to estimate ethnic and forseveral municipalities group support forliberal nonliberal across a variety Theresults showthatinterethnic contact parties oflocaldemographic configurations. has indeterminate electoral no uniform exists either across or within effects: ofsupport forliberal parties pattern Theelectoral ethnic and the studied groups. impact ofcontact depends uponthepeculiarities ofthegroup being national context under which contact In and ofitself contact occurs. between ethnic breeds demographic groups neither norcontempt. amity

ne

condition is for key sustaining democracy thecontinued demofliberal predominance ocratic within the Where parties party system. radical mass the parties gainsufficient popular support, ofdemocracy isbleak. fate Multiethnic democracies are seenas especially vulnerable tothepolarizing andzerosumpolitical that breeds communal concompetition ethnic and flict, resentments, simmering outbidding, increased for ethnic hatred support parties espousing and antiliberal politics(Chandra2004; Dahl 1971; Horowitz1985). The purposeof thispaperis to intherelationship between ethnic vestigate demography and masselectoral for democratic preferences liberal and illiberal political parties.' who study the politicsof ethnic Comparativists tend to focus on how national andregional-level voting structures eliteethnic and demography cooperation how it shapestheprobability ofcrossethnic conflict, and evenhow demography determines the alliances,

of democracy. long-term stability (e.g.,Posner2005; Radnitz2004). We acknowledge the importance for democratic offactors suchas thenumber of support ethnic their overall size relative to significant groups, one another, and thepotential for cleavcross-cutting Such macrolevel however, approaches, ages. neglect the local demographic context within whichvoters theirelectoral formulate Our aim is to preferences. how of the ethnic analyze dispersion groupsacross a fixednationaldemographic localities(but within affects mass supportforliberaland configuration) illiberal Does breedcontempt? Or parties. familiarity are multiethnic localitiesthe best hope for liberal democratic parties? scholars still Despitedecadesofresearch, disagree on whycontact in between leads some cases groups toward more inclusive while inother peaceful, politics, casestoward increased mutual and antipathy illiberal sentiments. There arebasically twoschools ofthought

*Thanks to MichaelDean, DannyHidalgo,and Dusan Radivojevic forresearch and to TaekuLee, Ken Scheve, D. Stephen assistance, reviewers forcomments on earlier drafts. A preliminary version of thispaperwas presented at the 2005 Voss, and fouranonymous of theAmerican Political Science Association. We also benefitted from seminars at UC Berkeley, UCLA,Yale,and Oberlin, meetings LiCEP. For research we thank theNationalCouncilforEurasian and EastEuropeResearch, theNationalScienceFoundation support theBerkeley Committee on Research, and theSocialScienceand Humanities Research Councilof Canada. (SES-0217499), to competing committed forpowerusingthe institutions and 'By liberaldemocratic partieswe mean thosepartiesideologically ofliberal Linz(1976) and Sartori meanspragmatic ofthecenter-right and (1976),thisusually procedures democracy. Following parties center-left. Vol. 71, No. 2, April2009,Pp. 414-428 TheJournal ofPolitics, A 2009 Southern Political ScienceAssociation doi:10.1017/S0022381609090367 ISSN 0022-3816

414

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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT?

415

of thesalu1954;Forbes1997). Proponents (Allport effects ofethnic tary proximity arguethatintergroup is rootedin individual of other antipathy ignorance thelevelof contact groups.In thisview,thegreater and communication between themoreeach groups, learns about the the and the other, group greater realization ofshared interests andvalues.ForDeutsch was a necessary (1953) such"socialcommunication" condition fortheemergence of a common"political in multiethnic states. Withinthe U.S. community" research tradition contact is seento lead topolitics ward a diminution of negative stereotypes, greater mutualtolerance, and increased social and political and Miller1988;Siegelman cooperation (e.g.,Brewer and Welch 1993; Siegelman et al. 1996;Welchand the contact 2000). To the extent Siegelman hypothesis holds, then liberaldemocratic partiesshould wellin ethnically areas. perform heterogeneous oftheso-called threat take Proponents hypothesis theopposite tack. While notdenying the theoretical adofcontact, howdemographic vantages emphasize they balanceinfluences thedegree to which one group perceives other as a threat. Threat groups perception may be rootedin actualcompetition overresources and or in hazier fears of social and vulnerjobs political to peoplewhoareseento havedifferent values ability and ways oflife. Either thepropinquity ofethnic way, to inducesuspicionand hostility groupsis thought ratherthan mutual tolerance(e.g., Blumer 1958; Blalock1967;Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Thisview underlies the consociational model for interethnic in divided in whichpolitical societies, amity stability is attained of through mutually agreedsegregation to antagonistic groupsand a sharedcommitment effective at the government powersharing through level(Lijphart 1977).To theextent supra-communal the threat then to holds, hypothesis partiesseeking should findtheir capitalizeon intergroup hostility successin ethnically areas. greatest heterogeneous Thetension between thetwoviews liesas muchin research andmethod as itdoesintheory. Much design ofthework hasfocused on racerelations andpolitics in theUnitedStates, thewideavailability where of detailed andecological datahasfacilitated survey sophisticated to bridge thetheoretical divide(e.g., attempts Oliver andWong2003;Stein, Post,and Rinden 2000). As troubled as racerelations havebeenin theUnited there aretwofeatures oftheAmerican States, however, context thatcomplicate efforts to testthetwo comextreme levelsof residential First, peting hypotheses. and professional mean that it is difficult to mobility determine thedirection ofcausality. Forexample, the correlation between contact and tolerance intergroup

may be less a resultof learningthan the prior decision oftolerant mixed peopleto livein ethnically

areas. In the latter itisliberal values that leadto case,

interethnic rather thanvice versa.To avoid contact, thisconundrum, somescholars haveshifted from observational to experimental research, wherethe variablesatwork canbe manipulated in a semicontrolled (Glazer2003). Of course,whatis gainedin setting the conclusionstravelverywell back to the real world. The secondtroublesome feature oftheU.S. context concerns itstruncated The political party palette. dominance oftwoliberal democratic and the parties institutional barriers to the success of alternatives meansthattheU.S. party does not reflect spectrum whatever mass constituencies existforexpotential or antiliberal Instances ofpolitical clusionary politics. extremism suchas George Wallace'spresidential canand David Duke'svarious to capture didacy attempts stateoffice in Louisianado provideimportant opto testthe threat portunities (Giles and hypothesis Bruckner 1993;Voss 1996;Wright 1977),but these are theexceptions thatprovetherule.We simply do not knowwho would supporthypothetical African or fascist iftheU.S. singleAmerican, Hispanic, parties member district which system, discourages third-party werereplaced with entry, proportional representation.

islostinexternal howmethodological rigor validity: ever realistic theexperiment, itis notat allclear that

ResearchDesign
In this we examine thepolitical of paper consequences ethnic a detailed examination of proximity through electoral behaviorin interwar Czechoslovakia. The of Czechoslovakia is thatit proprincipal advantage videssomeremedy forthetwoaforementioned deficiencies of theU.S. case. First, thecountry although was undergoing urbanization at thetime, thelevelof in Czechoslovakia was farbelowthatofthe mobility War II UnitedStates. The great waveof post-World to othercountries had ceased after out-migration WorldWar I, and although the citiescontinued to attract ruralfolk, neither the labornor thehousing markets wereflexible to givemany theluxury enough of choosing where could live. Most they peoplewere stuck where were.The analysis willtherefore be they lesscontaminated effect. bytheselection interwar Czechoslovakia's electoral Second, system featured a combination of proportional representationand relatively lowthresholds to enter parliament.

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416

JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

ment on usageoftheterms "ethnic" or "national" in reference to themany in theregion. In theremainder ofthispaperwe groups willuse bothterms.

it enjoyed a remarkably diverse in general andto amicable ethnic to therepublic Consequently, array fealty ofviablepolitical The interwar inparticular. boththe1929and relations parties. periodmaybe Byanalyzing bestknown forauthoritarianism, butit was a golden 1935elections we areable to see how changing peakfor Fascism and communism had level ethnic tensions are refracted local demage political diversity. through not yetbeen discredited, and they competed along- ographic configurations. side nationalist and liberaldemocratic in The paperproceedsas follows. We elaborate partiesfor in masssupport. We discuss variouspolitical more detail the and context of electoral parties demographic thefollowing section. interwar inCzechoslovakia andoutline theecological Interwar Czechoslovakia has two otherfeatures ference methods on whichour analysis is based.Our that makeitan excellent venuefor thisresearch. First, mainresults we explore comenext, where theethnic ethnic basesofparty there is goodreason to expect Czechoslovakia's in the 1929and 1935national support determinant ofpolitical parliamentary to be a powerful elections. We thenperform robustness demography behavior. The lands comprising Czechoslovakia had checksby reestimating a fewkeyresults whileconand numerous stereo- trolling beenmultiethnic for centuries, forlevels ofindustrialization. The conclusion andmutual hadarisen under types prejudices Habsburg follows. rule. Thearrogant, andbackward, To anticipate ourresults, we find that neither the German exploitative clerical Slovak hadbecome a staple ofCzechliterature. contact northethreat holdsgeneral hypothesis sway In the Slovakpopularimagination the Czechswere within does Czechoslovakia. Localethnic demography na- not exercise theHungarians or sustained urbansophisticates, a consistent hypocritical impacteither tionalist for its across a over time. or for discourse, part, usurpers. Hungarian groups given group Generally heldSlovaks in disdainand suitable forforced assim- speaking, thethreat holdsfor theethnically hypothesis ilation(King2002; Seton-Watson Czechsand formerly in 1908;Wiskemann dominant ruling Hungarians The after World of the new states Slovakia: were at their most moderate 1967). founding they politically War I gavenewlifeto these local isolationfromother byreshuffling when livingin relative prejudices theethnic Czechswhowereinferior to the national For theSlovaks, corulers hierarchy. groups. nominally in theethnic in in Germans order the but fact subordinate to the contact Czechs, pecking Habsburg appears erabutsuperior intheethnic order to Slovaks, to moderate pecking politicalbehavior.They provedmost now ruledin tandem withtheSlovaks overGermans vulnerable wereconto extremist appealswhenthey in their ownlocalities. Evenhere, and Hungarians This reversal of ethnic centrated however, (and Jews). fortunes rendered interwar ethnicrelations thatreligion deterparticu- we find maybe a morepowerful minant se. volatile. class and of choice than rural/urban larly political ethnicity per cleavages Although werepronounced in Czechoslovakia and throughout Although we offer for different plausible explanations East-Central tolocalethnic each Europe in the interwar period,most behavioral responses demography, historians maintain thatthe deepestand most im- requires from of contact or departing anysingle logic in divides societies were ethnic threat. that the broader literature these Our results portant (e.g., suggest from sucha departure as well. Polonsky 1972, Rothschild1974).2 wouldbenefit heldregularly scheduled Second,Czechoslovakia free andfair national elections. We exaparliamentary minetwo, in 1929and 1935.The advantage ofthese is Partiesand EthnicGroups that tookplaceunder different cirthey political very cumstances. Whereas the1929election occurred before Interwar ofthe Czechoslovakia was,bythestandards the global economiccrisisand subsequent internaa solid democracy. Four nationalelections octional the1935election tookplace day, turbulence, political in 1920,1925, and 1935.Moststudents of curred, 1929, wellafter the theNazi seizure ofpowerin Germany, theeraconsider them to be free and fair, evenifin the turn to Stalinism in theSoviet Union,and thegeneral eastern there wasa modest amount ofthecountry part authoritarian turn in Europeas a whole.The dissoluof administrative to the pressure applied minority tion of democracy in neighboring and in countries, Czechoslovakia's proportional represenpopulation.3 inparticular, emboldened the German, Czech, Germany tationsystem fertile a provided groundforcreating and Slovakfascist elitesto shed some of their prior and regionally based largenumberof class,ethnic, in all more than 50 duringthe seemsto be little scholars of East Europethere 2Among agree- politicalparties,
3Thisarea,Subcarpathian from theanalysis. Rus,is excluded

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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT?

417

interwar era. Understanding the impact of ethnic balanceon voting for intolerant and polarizing parties in Czechoslovakia a short ofthemain requires precis in thispaper. and blocs of parties of interest parties The full ofparties breakdown and party blocscan be seenin Appendix from theauthors. One I, available in interwar Czechoslovak important politics cleavage dividedthose partieswelcoming the creationof a and thosethatdid democratic Czechoslovak republic not.Becauseofthehighly rules, proportional voting stablegovernment the cooperation of the required achievedby the pro-republican parties, something of the five Czech leadership largest republican parties to social demfrom running bourgeois-conservative of the ocraticin the quasi-corporatist institution Pitka.4The pro-republican on impartiesdiffered portantquestionsof domesticand foreign policy. Whattheysharedwas a commitment to building a Czechoslovaknation within a liberal democratic Czechoslovak state. A second important politicalcleavagedivided based extremist ethnic parties groups. Ethnically opthe liberal of the Czechoslovak universalism posed ofliberal state andtheinstitutions democracy, though these partiesfrom such hostility did not prevent foroffice in elections. campaigning Theydid so, and from andleft sometimes with boththeright skill, great ethnic Germans sideofthepolitical spectrum. Among theextremist and irredentist NationalParty German NationalSocialist Workers (DNP) and the German a (DNSAP), proto-Nazi rejected organization, Party liberal andvilified antisemitism, preached democracy, theCzechoslovak state. After 1932bothparties were the "Sudeten" German superceded by pro-Nazi Party KonradHenlein, from relative whoseleader, emerged as a gymnastics instructor to capture 15% of obscurity thenational votein 1935, thelargest share ofanyparty in Czechoslovakia.5

in thePitkaweretheAgrarian, theSocialDemocrats, 4Theparties the NationalSocialists based in Bohemia left (a moderate party and Moravia), the CzechoslovakPopulists (a clericalparty to Catholics), and theNationalDemocrats (a bourgeois catering conservative Luebbert (1991), we characterize party). Following theP~tkaas quasi-corporatist becauseit evolved from a coalition into a regularized consultative mechanism thathammered out In between ofland,labor, and capital. agreements representatives from thiswayitprevented socialantagonisms many beingfought out on theparliamentary The "quasi" qualifier indicates it floor. remained informal and at various times failed to meet. mostly

theethnic In contrast totheGerman extreme right, was clerical in orientaSlovaks right among primarily ofAndrej a tion.It revolved around thefigure Hlinka, and his SlovakPeople'sParty CatholicPriest, (SPP). for was The mainboneofcontention theSlovak right Slovakia's shareof powerwithin the country. Many Slovakshad hoped fora federal but Czechoslovakia, the finalproductmore closelyresembled French a modelthatthreatened theplace of the centralism, in Slovakeducation Catholic Church and publiclife. Czechsdominated thecivil service atthenational level and, alongwithSlovakProtestants, occupieda disshareof highprofile within proportionate positions Slovakia itself 1997,Leff (Janos 1988). The SPP thus tradedon resentment Slovaks among againstCzech domination masked ideolsupposedly by theofficial the (Felak 1994). Although ogy of Czechoslovakism demand of SPP was for the activists primary autonomy, within witha theparty often combined thismessage and frequently anti-Semitic virulently anti-Hungarian It wouldbe an exaggeration to Slovakparticularism. theSPP as outright thepresence fascist, regard though of an organized militia Rodobrana (the paramilitary of theHlinkaGuard) and open admirers and, later, within Mussolini and Hitler itsranks, atleast suggests a family resemblance (Jelinek 1971).6 The SPP conreceived thehighest of anyparty in sistently support ofthe 28% oftheSlovakportion Slovakia, garnering national votein 1929and 30% in 1935. Classconflict also existed and on theextreme left was theCommunist of Czechoslovakia (KPC). Party Likeitssister inother itemerged after countries, parties with intheaftermath ofthe a split theSocialDemocrats Russian revolution and espouseda universal message ofclasssolidarity. somewhat of Initially independent the Sovietparty, had purgedits by 1929 the party elements andfully bolshevized. Thesame independent could declare year partyleader KlementGottwald in parliament thathisparty's revoluopenly "highest is actually Moscow" (Oschlies, tionary headquarters of theKPC called 1979,180). The electoral platform fora workers' revolution and a dictatorship of the the was to all open proletariat. party Although ethnic it enthusiastically ethnic groups, exploited grievances whenpolitically ifit couldbeespecially advantageous, with nefit from dissatisfaction minority pro-republican The Communist around10% in votehovered parties. 1929and 1935.

did not 5AsKing(2002, 166) notes, theterm "Sudeten German" thefounding state comeintousageuntil oftheCzechoslovak and to the Germans in the solidlyGerman-speaking came to refer in theNorthand West.Hereafter, we use theterm 6Mann(2004,26) includes borderlands a paramilitary as one of organization of a fascist "Sudeten"without scarequotes. thekeytraits party.

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418

JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

correlates for German verywell with preferences across theBohemian landsas a whole. political parties we arriveat a similarconclusionif we Werely onthe 1930 census toenumerate Czechoslo- Moreover, vakia's ethnic which included how manyareasmight have significantly Czechs, Slovaks, investigate groups, Germans thanthecensusindicates. To deterGermans, Ruthenians, Poles,and Jews. higher Hungarians, Censusesneverperfectly reflect as Kertzer minethiswe countedthe number of municipalities "reality," and Arel (2002) have shown.The questionforany where thevoteforGerman was 25% or more parties census is howlarge thedistortions are.Themost higher thanthenumber ofrecorded on the Germans, given obvious oftheCzechoslovak census wasthe assumption that "extra"votes for Germanparties peculiarity ofCzechs andSlovaks intoonecategory wouldbe coming from Germans classified as Czechs amalgamation of "Czechoslovaks" for purposesof enumeration. in thecensus. to only53 localities, Thisamounted or thedesireto assert theunity of thenew 1.5 percent of all communities. the Apartfrom Thus, although Czechoslovak theprimary motivation was all irregularities inthe1930census nation, reported byZahraand too obviousto observers at the time:if Czechsand others exist and areimportant, shouldnotdeter they Slovaks were counted wouldout- theuseofthedatawrit Germans as an indicator ofnational separately, large number Slovaks. Thisquirk ofthedatadoesnotaffect identity. theanalysis almost allCzechs inBohemia because lived and Moravia, while mostSlovaks livedin Slovakia. have recently Some historians called into quesEstimation Methods tion the accuracy of bothHabsburg and Czechoslotheenumeration of vakcensuses, especially regarding Our data are ecological:1930 censusdata and the Czechsand Germans in Bohemiaand Moravia.King actualresults from the 1929and 1935national parlithefluidity (2002) and Judson (2006) bothdocument elections. We collected these data at the of nationalidentities in the late Habsburgperiod, amentary lowestlevel at whichtheycould be matched, the whilefor theCzechoslovak Zahra(2004,2008) period In thecase ofPrague, we use municipality. municipal demonstrates how Czech enumerators deliberately butmost oftheobservations arevillage (obec)seized ofCzechs. districts, to maximize thenumber opportunities level. The result is a datasetofover15,000 settlements We acknowledge thesearguments, but do not feel for which we havematching ethnic data. and electoral invalidate our that the 1930census, they assumption Thisis roughly 50 times moredatathanhavehitherto writ can be taken largeand appropriately interpreted, been used to address in local ethno-electoral politics as an accurate reflection of thepopulation's senseof interwar Czechoslovakia. Othersocial and economic its own nationalidentity. our reading of both First, data are availableonly at one administrative level is thatthe case forthe predomKing and Judson abovethemunicipality, theokres(district) level.We inanceof linguistic or regional rather thannational discusstheokres-level data further below. in the Bohemian forthe lands is stronger identities We employ to estimate ecological inference group thenewCzechoslovak state Habsburg periodthanfor for Our is to estipreferences political parties.' goal and thatthe case fornationalidentities strengthens matethedistribution ofvotesacrossethnic in groups the 1920's.Second,bothKing(2002, 164-68) during settlements different forms of ethnic hetexhibiting and Zahra (2008, 118-25) note that in compariThe issue isbest understood Table1 erogeneity. visually. son withthe 1921 census, the 1930 censusreliedon illustrates the ecological inference forBoheproblem moreascriptive criteria of nationality, the rendering miain 1935.We are given therow(censusdata) and sortsof manipulations carried out in theearly 1920s column (votes foreach party/bloc) and marginals, moredifficult to execute, ofcoursesomestill though occurred. we do not havean independent Third, although measure ofnational which tocheck the 7No survey data are availableforthisperiod,but even if there identity against there aregood reasons be unreliable for our why they might censusdata,we do havesome dramatic indirect evi- were, It is well known in research that are purposes. survey respondents dencethaton thewholethecensusis reliable. Across oftenreticent about expressing to their unpopularsentiments in Bohemia andMoravia, there is interviewers. 3,718municipalities of politicalpreferences will Consequently, surveys the actuallevelof support forextremist an astounding .95correlation between the1930census tendto underestimate may be heightened by ethnicdifferences dataon thefraction ofethnic Germans andthevotefor parties.This effect between theinterviewer and therespondent. Of courseit would a German in the 1929 parliamentary election. be bestto havebothkindsofdatato testforconsistency party between Whatever is beingtappedin the census,it thetwo,buthistorical research on method. placeslimits identity

Ethnic Groups

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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT?

419

TABLE1

The Ecological Inference Problem, Bohemia 1935 PoliticalParties/Blocs Communist Republican ? ? ? 49% Fascist ? ? ? 10% German ? ? ? 10% Nazi ? ? ? 21% Other ? ? ? 1% 67% 32% 1%

Czechs Germans Jews Total

? ? ? 9%

theinterior cellsofthetable, thegoalis to estimate a given ofeachsocial that thefraction group support party/bloc. Werely ontwo modes ofecological One, analysis. deterministic limits the method ofbounds, establishes that ofinterest can onthe values the possible quantity ofvotes take onbasedon thedistribution andethnic Suchbounds canbe readily from computed groups. orfrom in thedatafor themarginals anysettlement
Table 1. For example, if 67% of the populationis receive Czech,and the communists only9% of the vote,thenwe knowthatthe upperbound of Czech forthe Communists (whenall Communist support are Czech) is 9/67, 13%. The lower voters or roughly boundis 0.8 We willsee thatin manycasesthe bounds themselves are quite narrow, lendingextra confidence thattheresults are not a consequence of statistical assumptions. arbitrary mode of analysis Our secondand primary uses infer on oursettlement to estistatistics sample point ofinterest, mates ofthequantities theinterior cellsof the tablessuchas Table 1. Although popular, highly

theauthors.9 In the absence of systematic data on the actual

inAppendix somedetails ofthis model from II, available

ofcontact national andnature between degree groups, we use proximity as a proxy. We recognize therisks in this strategy. Much like in the United inherent wheredifferent ethnic dwellin States, groupsmight areasoftown butrarely ever seeoneanother, adjoining itis possible that EastEuropean national lived groups
two pieces of evidence "in separateworlds." We offer in defenseof our assumption. First,the bulk of our observationsare villageswith small populations. The median population of our Czechoslovaksettlements is only 434. It is not so easy to lead a separateexistence

whenthere is atmostone market, one postoffice, and national forexample, in Germans Consider, groups.

oneschool. andmore the historSecond, importantly, ical literature reveals relations multilayered among In some ofCzechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia. portions Germans lived on their own and needed largely actually

withCzechs.However, in the to have littlecontact citiesof Bohemianot onlywas thereextensive and intensive contact between Czechs and but method inKing Germans, estimation (1997)is noteasily applicableinethnically and politically situa- historians havedocumented that the quitecarefully heterogeneous tionswhere there aremorethantwonational moved back and forth between groups same people frequently and ex- these communal identities.The contact between the and parties. We triedGoodman'sregression Achen and in manyplacesthatby tensions (1995) but two groupswas so intensive proposedby Shively thatwereoften less thanzero 1930, many Germanswere in the process of becoming estimates they yielded in the Czechs, a process that naturally than 100%,whichare nonsensical raised alarms among or greater context ofourproblem. we the nonleaders of the German Instead, employ community (King 2002, 165-68; linearleast squaresapproximation of the multino- Wiskemann 1967, 231-34). Much the same can be in Rosenetal. (2001). said forthe Hungarian minority. mial-Dirichlet modelpresented

The principal ofthismodel is that it readvantage

thelogicofthedeterministic boundsandyields spects for tables. Weprovide consistent estimates arbitrarily large
8We assume fullturnoutacross nationalgroups.This is not In 1929, unreasonable. theonly for which wehavetherequisite year data, turnoutaveraged92% across Bohemianand Moravian and 90% acrossSlovaksettlements. Thesenumbers settlements, ifanalysis isrestricted topredominantly do notappreciably change or Slovak settlements. than 95%) Czech, Hungarian, (greater Turnout washighand remarkably uniform acrossethnic groups.

Results
We begin our analysiswith the 1929 national parlia-

of the social bases elections. Our estimates mentary

in R 2.2.0with thecode described wereperformed 9Allestimates in Wittenberg and Bhaskar et al. (2007) (2007). See Wittenberg foran updatedversion of thissoftware.

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420

JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

1 Czechoslovakia FIGURE 1929: Social Bases of PartySupport

1929 Bohemia, 1 O
I I

Fraction Germans 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

I I I I I

1929 Moravia,
I

0
I

0I O
c cxG.

Fraction Germans 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

I I I I I I

0
I

0 1=
oo

d .

......'

___R Czechs ---Germans -

o_,
1
=

o 6 :
=-- c o0)

..t.-'<'
N'"
I -

- Czechs -- Germans
"
I I I I

o0 cu (tA o I

N ....-e

0.0

RI

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Fraction Czechs

I R-

- -' _
I

1AoC_:0 "-d"
'---'_,.
I I I I I

--N. G"-

1.0

96

0.0

R' R I .....

c- zc
-I I I

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Fraction Czechs

1.0

Slovakia, 1929Fraction FractionHungarians 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

o
0 0

0
I Key forParties (Czechoslovak) C=Communist N=G. Natlist/Nazi

"- I - --- Huns

I Slvk , Slovaks

HunR=Republican
-

So

E --

_
O)c,.J

.P

G=German P=Populists (Hlinka) E=Ethnic min. non-German

2 0 0.0
I i

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Fraction Slovaks

1.0

blocs appear in Figure1. Since entnational and Moraof the main party Thus,in theBohemia groups. Czechoslovakia was constructed out of territories that viapanels, Czechvoting solidlines behavior, represent lines German. Theletters had beena partofother eachofwhich had a whereas thedashed represent empires, used on thelinesstandforthenamesofblocs.Thus, different ofnational we present a groups, configuration eachregion. In eachpanel, thehori- forFigure1, we have (G)ermanparties(ethnicbut separate panelfor thefraction in theRepublic), zontal axisrepresents ofthetitular (R)epublican parmajor- fullparticipants from theextreme Czechs and Slovaks, zero(settlements ties,the (C)ommunist Party, ity, ranging right-wing orSlovaks) to one (purely for Hunwithout Czechor German (N)ationalist (E)thnic parties, parties anyCzechs and Slovak The numerical of minorand Poles, Jews, settlements). garians, Hlinka's (P)opulist strength is inversely to the Slovak People's Party.'0For example,in Bohemia in a settlement related itygroups hori- we estimate ofthemajority thatroughly 70% ofCzechswho resided Thus,theupper strength groups. in were settlements that 20% to 40% Czech voted zontalaxis indicates the fraction of minority groups, and one on theleft. with zeroon theright Thevertical for (R)epublicanparties(the leftmost R), whereas that livedin Czech-dominated axes represent the fraction of a particular national over80% ofGermans that a given (G)erman (therightsupported parties group supported bloc/party, againranging (60-80%) areas x supported from zero(no onein group blocy) to one mostG). A similar logicholdsforthe otherpanels, in group x supported blocy). (everyone all liberal include democratic "Czechoslo10(R)epublican parties Eachpoint(denoted a letter) by capital represents vak" parties, notjust theCzechoslovak These Republican Party. an individual estimate. Theinterpolated lines connect- partiesdid not run as a singlebloc; theirplatforms frequently differed on important socioeconomic and foreign policyissues. indicate howa group's for a ingthesameletter support to liberal and a Whatthey shared was a commitment democracy with thedemographic blocchanges of Czechs strength and solicit either to admitmembers voters from other willingness and Slovaksacrosssettlements. Different line types ethnicgroups or work with the partiesof these groups in foranalytical We groupthemtogether usedtoconnect letters differ- government. (solid, dashed)represent purposes.

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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT?

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and willhold forother theidentities figures, though of theparties and thenational We groups mayvary. also display95% confidence as vertical intervals, forthoseparties a lines,aroundestimates receiving of portion a group's significant vote.1l these takes somegetting usedto, Interpreting plots butit'sworth theeffort, because it make they quiteeasy to seewhether ornotthere is an effect to be explained: theflatter theline, thelesscontact In Figure matters. 1 this is most visiblein Germanvotingbehaviorin Bohemia for(G)erman (dashed lines).Support parties was roughly 80% in bothGerman-dominated settlements(theleftmost well as as Czech dominatedG) settlements. Supportforthe German(N)ationalists andthe(R)epublican remained (Czechoslovak) parties mired at under 10%. Part of the stability of the German voteis rootedin therichpalette of German which allowed for muchvoteswitching within parties, thebloc.Indeed, twoofthemainGerman the parties, Social Democrats and the Agrarians, had servedin andhad resisted with their government, amalgamating Czechoslovak beideological counterparts primarily causethiswouldhavecededthenational to question the rejectionist 1989, 48-75). A parties(Wingfield nontrivial of(G)ermans extreme proportion supported German in (N)ationalist parties, especially Moravia. theGermans remained immune Although largely to theproximity oftheir national thesamecanrivals, notbe said for theCzechs, where theupward sloping linesindicating for(R)epublican support partiesin Moravia(andto a muchlesser extent shows Bohemia) thatCzechpreference forsuchparties with decreased theincreased of Germans. overall presence Although Czech supportof thesepartiesremains quite high, there is nonetheless moderate evidence forthethreat as Czechsmovefrom to (local) majority hypothesis:

toward the(C)ommunists in minority, they gravitate Bohemia and (G)erman in Moravia.12 parties aremorecomplicated in theSlovak half of Things therepublic. FortheSlovaks there wouldappear to be clearsupport forthe contact hypothesis. Theywere muchmore tovotefor Slovak likely Hlinka's (P)opulist when were in the local People'sParty they majority; as theirproportion of a givensettlement falls, they becomemorelikely to votefor(R)epublican parties. Unlike inBohemia andMoravia, this however, finding confessional effects. maybe masking important Hlinka's SPP was led by a diverse of conservative group Catholic ofwhom weredeeply clerics, antisemimany tic and opposedto socialmodernization, whichthey fearedwould significantly reduce the role of the Churchin education, and cultural life.The family, clear Catholic thesalience ofa party's appealreinforced confessional a significant minSlovaks, cleavage among of whomwereProtestant. to ority Hlinkaattempted this divide Slovak bridge byemphasizing oppression by theHungarians, and later Attheoutset bytheCzechs. oftheRepublic, Slovaks hadbeenledtobelieve that the state wouldcontain elements offederalism, significant when infact itsstructure much more the approximated French model. The SPP its unitary pitched message at thissourceof resentment directly amongSlovaks and preached evenat the "priceof the "autonomy" republic"(Felak 1994, 54). The campaignmessage was really that ofa "catch-all with protest party" prosometimes exclusive statements, grammatic mutually Hisones,aimedat a diverse rangeof socialgroups. torians a broadsocioeconomic stress basefor theSPP, from educated smalltowntraders, smallholdpoorly to theunderemployed or unemployable ingfarmers, urbanintelligentsia (Hoensch1979,317-18). In fact, theconfessional cleavage amongSlovaks was electorally stark. To show thiswe estimate Roman Catholicand Protestant forparties in support "We report confidence intervals based bootstrapped percentile than Slovak 99%) ethnically homogeneous (greater on 500 bootstrap Due to limited variance and hence replications. settlements. Whereas 65% (A .1%) of Catholics uncertain in mostcaseswe do notgenerate estimates ofa results, behavior that when group'svoting groupis less than20% of a supported Hlinkaand only30% (A .1%) (R)epublisettlement's population. can parties, over 94% (+ .1%) of Protestants went 12Czech forthe communists in Germanareaswas not Protestants support their sta(R)epublican. clearly preferred a votefor ethnic intolerance butitwasa logical necessarily response tusas favored interlocutors withtheir Czechcorulers to a perceived ethnic threat. The Communist a Party represented in a federal state to an uncertain status under a small butimportant illiberal ofthepublic nonethnic, yet part sphere where morefully Germans andCzechs autonomous intolerant Czechs clerical, Catholic-dominated, comingled. Ethnically should havesupported theCzechfascists oroneoftheright ofcenter Slovakregime and Luia 1973,78; Roths(Mamatey "Czech"parties--parties that werein anycasewilling to bourgeois child 1974,120). Unfortunately it is not possibleto work with moderate German ingovernment. Theanomalous parties estimates forCatholic and Protestant for from districts suchas Hlucin, obtainseparate (G)erman support parties emerges where thelocalMoravians, whohadundergone a semi-Germaniza- Slovaks in nonhomogeneous settlements. We can to register as Czech in the census.See tion,had been forced infer that levels of Slovak for support (R)epublican Wiskemann it is not possibleto (1967, 231-34). Unfortunately and Hlinka's(P)opulists in evenly splitand majority thecensus dataofthese identified Czechsbecause we purge falsely lacktherequisite dataon these Slovak areasrepresent an average ofdisparate Catholic disaggregated irregularities.

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422

JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

and Protestant Whattheconfessional repreferences. sults tell us is that atleast as far as support for is Hlinka thekeyidentity for behavior is not concerned, political butreligious. ethnic, For Hungarians the threat seemsto hypothesis hold.As they localmajority to localminority, go from for from their falls (R)epublican support parties rougtheir hly20% to nearzero.Atthesametime, support and especially for(C)ommunist rises. (E)thnic parties ForHungarians, the(C)ommunists and (E)thnic then, two different to the partiesrepresented responses Slovak threat. Bothtypes ofparties actively supported and linguistic forHungarians, but the cultural rights did so as part of a universalist and (C)ommunists within the Czechoslovak state, cosmopolitan message whereasthe (E)thnic partiessoughtnationalselfdetermination forHungarians and greater autonomy forother groups.13 minority

1935
Let us turn now to the 1935 electionresults. In in a contrast withthe 1929election, whichoccurred context of relative the amityamongethnicgroups, and Stalin 1935votetookplaceafter theriseofHitler had emboldenedextremist Czechoslovakpolitical Czech Fascists now received over7% entrepreneurs. ofthevote.KonradHenleinhad assumed leadership of the German extreme and had established a Right Nazi Sudeten German that wonover15% ofthe party vote, becomingby far the largestGermanparty. had begunto advocatean Hlinka'sSlovakpopulists Slovak staterather than merely independent autowithin Czechoslovakia. Our is nomy prediction that the increased "ethnification" of politicsat the national level should increasesupportforthe threat at the local level.Germans and Slovaks, hypothesis dissatisfied citizens of the previously merely Republic, as posinga threat now couldbe seenbyothers to the This well existence. could drive Republic's very very Czechsand Hungarians fearful intothehandsoftheir own extremists. the social bases of bloc/party Figure2 displays in 1935, in a setofpanelsthat is analogous to support of thisfigure. Figure1. Thereare two keyfeatures First,comparing Figures1 and 2, the change in
13The shiftfrom (C)ommuniststo (E)thnic parties among as a local minority Our hunch is noteworthy. Hungarians living is thatthe (C)ommunists devotedlittleeffort to organizing in weredominated these areasbecausethey or Germans, bySlovaks forcommunism elsegroupsthathad evincedlittlesympathy wherein Czechoslovakia.

overall German electoral is clearly visible preferences and Moravia in theBohemia where the (N)azi panels, SudetenGermanParty, whose predecessor parties at mostone-third obtained oftheGerman vote,now over50% ofthat vote.Thiscameat theexpense grabs of the moremoderate whichstill (G)ermanparties, received a large of not the but as vote, portion nearly largeas in 1929. The increasing radicalization of theSlovakProtis not portrayed in theSlovakpanel,but the estants numbers reveal their forHlinka's preference growing for 'autonomist' their (P)opulists: support the(R)epufrom blicans 94% to73% (+ .1%),while their dropped "autonomist" fromnil to increased Hlinkasupport still 13% (+ 1%). Protestants favored overwhelmingly liberal buteventheir was breaking. resistance parties, Slovak Catholic support for the (P)opulists and at around remained (R)epublicans remarkably steady 65% and 5%, respectively. The riseoffascism among Germans in Bohemia and Moraviaand thecontinued ofthe(P)opulist SlovakPeople'sparty in the strength heartland didnotpushCzechsintothearms Slovak of theirown extremists. Therewas a slightuptickin forCzech (F)ascistparties, but it was only support visible on thepanels. 4-8%, and is barely theconsequenSecond,ourprediction regarding cesofincreased national-level ethnic tensions for local of threat is not borne out. Indeed, perception generally theappearance and popularity ofHenlein's excepting the mostremarkable (N)azi SudetenGerman Party, feature of Figure2 is how littleit differs fromthe 1929 outcomein termsof Czech, Hungarian, and Slovakvoting behavior. Thereis a smallbut noticeable trend for the (N)azis in Bohemia: the less were exposedto Czechs,the more likely Germans wereto support the(N)azi party. Thisis entirely they with the contact hypothesis. consistent Although liberal German voters were many suspiciousof the Czechoslovak thattheir state,theyalso recognized livelihoods wereboundup withdemocratic practices sentiments would havebeen 2002,537). Such (Kirnik particularly strongamong Germanswho dwelled and interacted withtheirCzech co-citizens, among to lesssupport for the(N)azis in these leading areas.'4 Althoughthe 1935 electoralcampaignwas quite acrimonious 2003; Kelly (see,forexample, Campbell 1995, 122; Wingfield1989, 126), there is little
thedevastating economicdownturn in thehighly 14By contrast, industrialized German majority areas of NorthernBohemia of duringthe greatdepression-a stapleof the historiography the 1930s-may have produceda deepersenseof ethnic threat and the subsequent levelof supportforthe discernably higher Nazis in thesecommunities.

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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT?

423

FIGURE 2 Czechoslovakia 1935: Social Bases of PartySupport

1935 Bohemia, Fraction Germans 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2
C

0
I I

1935 Moravia, Fraction Germans 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

o
-

0
I I

- --

-- Czechs

Germans

-------R
. '

---Germans

Czechs

a"R
OC0

A
:3

CO

6 ...-.N

6c

N.

Or cu
(3

G-----G--------A ' :

Or cA c
a :3

G--I

0.0

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Fraction Czechs

1.0

0.0

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Fraction Czechs

1.0

0 o

1935 Slovakia, Fraction Hungarians 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

o
o

--

Slovaks
Huns

0
I

o,
2
.

c3 d
_

E. . .FEC

EA
C

Parties Keyfor R=Republican (Czechoslovak) C=Communist N=Nazi (German) G=German P=Populists (Hlinka) F=Nat Dems andFascists E=Ethnic min. non-German

:_o ,9 o

2 0

o-

0.0

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Fraction Slovaks

I I

1.0

evidence that elevated for theSudeten German support within morehomogenously German areaswas Party a of coercion. The was primarily consequence party keento maintain itslegalstatus amidpressure forits dissolution. Thisdid notprevent aggressive campaignat its rallies, but it would ing and even altercations have precluded intimidation. large-scale pre-election to Mamateyelectionday itself"passed According without incident" (1973, 153).

Discussion
Thusfar wehavefound mixed for results therelationand mass ship betweenlocal ethnicdemography electoral ForCzechsand Hungarians our preferences. outcomes areconsistent, on thewhole, with thethreat eachgroup's for liberal isat hypothesis: support parties its maximum when it dwellsas the local majority. from contact: Slovaks, by contrast, appearto benefit areat their leastliberal whenthey arein thelocal they

German behavior is largely immune majority. political to thepresence ofCzechs. Theseheterogenous outcomes are intriguing but To checkthe reliability of our findings unexpected. we now present some results usingthe methodof bounds. Recall that the bounds can be computed without deterministically, anystatistical assumptions. are generally consistent with Thus,to theextent they 1 and 2, we can be moreconfident thatour Figures estimatesare not epiphenomenal of questionable statistical For reasons of space we assumptions. boundsonlyforsomeofour more present summary results. areavailable in theonline (Others prominent 3 has four eachofwhich III). Figure Appendix panels, illustrates theaverage lowerand upperboundsfora of a particular or bloc. Thus, group'ssupport party theupper-left paneldisplays average upperand lower bounds(solidlines)ofCzechsupport for Republican with partiesin Moravia in 1929 acrosssettlements of Czechs.We can see thatthe varying proportions averageupperbound on Czech supportof Republican partiesin Moravia is approximately 70% in

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424

JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

3 Deterministic BoundsAcrossLevelsof EthnicHeterogeneity FIGURE

a,
0n 0X. 0) A

MORAVIA1929

, SLOVAKIA1929

..,
go

I--0

t,_

rn

0.0

0.2Fraction 0.4 Czechs 0.6

0.8

1.0

0.0

0.2Fraction 0.4 Slovaks 0.6 0.8

1.0

"1A o

ono

~,BOHEMIA 1935 rA I
N Or

,, 0 a

"1 BOHEMIA 1935

dd-

0 o o

ra Oco

d,

0"

o Fraction Germans

Fraction Czechs
0.

8 o Ao I 0.0

I 0.2

I 0.4

CF

I 0.6

I 0.8

I1 1.0

0.0

I 0.2

I 0.4

! 0.6

I 0.8

I 1.0

thatare 30% Czech(theleft-most dashed settlements we use local vertical theseresults line). To generate curves (LOESS) to fit polynomial regression weighted to theaverage valuesoftheupperand lowerbounds a spline across valueson thehorizontal axis,and then the curves. to smooth withthe The bounds in Figure3 are consistent 1 in and 2. Consider corresponding findings Figures the 3, in particular againthetop left panelof Figure bounds whereCzechs live as a minority (.3) and wheretheyare a securemajority (.9), indicated by vertical The fact there is virtually dashed lines. that no thatregardless between the two indicates of overlap each set of bounds, wherethetruevalueslie within as in the the slope betweenthemwill be positive, A similar situation of 1. panel Figure corresponding holds forthe upper-right panel of Figure3, which the bounds of SlovaksupportforHlinka's displays in 1929.The nonoverlap ofthetwosetsof (P)opulists bounds is consistent with Slovak preferences for areas, as (P)opulist parties in Slovak-dominated of notedin Figure1. The bottom-left 3 panel Figure showsthatour earlier estimate oflow Czechsupport

for (C)ommunists was no fluke:except in overdicareas the boundsvirtually German whelmingly veinthebounds tatesingle In a similar digit support. of Germansupport forHenlein'sNazi party (lower with the estimates are point panel) compatible right from 2. Figure Thusfarour results havebeenpresented without because tellsus on other factors theory conditioning that interethnic should matter. class contact However, issomeoverlap conflict alsoexisted, andthere between classand ethnic In the Bohemian lands the cleavages. was disproportionately Germanand in bourgeoisie Slovakia itwasdisproportionately Jewish; Hungarians and wereoverrepresented amonglargelandowners; Slovaksconstituted thebulkof thepeasantry. What andSlovaks or as conflict between appears Hungarians havemoreto do couldactually Czechsand Germans with economic tensions thanwith ethnic competition se. Is a for economic interest? per ethnicityproxy We now condition some of the keyfindings on one socioeconomic factor: in industry employment and manufacturing. We choosethisbecauseCzechoslovakiaexhibited in its dramatic variation regional

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DOES

FAMILIARITY

BREED

CONTEMPT?

425

ofindustrialization. ofBohedegree Significant parts mia and Moraviawereas developed as anyregion in otherindustrialized whereas other areas countries, andmuchofSlovakia were Moremainly agricultural. of East-Central have shown over,historians Europe thatindustrial tracks other sociemployment closely oeconomicindictors such as literacy, consumption, and urbanization (e.g., Berend and Rinki 1974). Industrial is thusan excellent indicator employment fora congeries of factors besidesethnic contact that influence thevote. might the economicdata are available Unfortunately at one administrative unitabovethemunicipalonly ity,the judicialokres(or the politicalokresin the case ofSlovakia). thisyields over300 units, Although thereare insufficient data to reproduce all the estimateswhilefully forrelevant economic controlling conditions. we focus on one ofourmost Instead, prominent results: the risein Slovak(P)opulistpreferencesas they becomethelocal majority in 1935.We created of municipalities based on whesubsamples therthe districts thatcontainthesesettlements are above or below the medianlevelof employment in and all Across districts in industry manufacturing. 19% of those employed Slovakia, approximately worked in theindustrial and manufacturing sectors. We thenreestimated results in each key subsample. In particular, we estimated Slovaksupport forthose that interest us in areas each where parties groupwas a clearminority 10 and 40% of thepopu(between a clear lation) and in thosewheretheyconstituted than of the local 80% majority (greater population). Our unconditioned will be robustif there results remains a similar in preferences forliberal gradient democratic within both the industrial and parties nonindustrial subsamples. Slovaksupport forthemajorparties and blocsin Slovakiaare presented in Table 2, withthe top two rows of estimates the designating sampleswithout economic covariate(for reference), the next two the highmanufacturing designating sample(greater than19% ofemployment), and thelasttwothelowmanufacturing sample(less than 19%). In each case 95% confidence intervals arelisted in squarebrackets besideeach estimate.15 The one caveatis thatjust as
fromthe fullsamplelies 15Ina few cases the point estimate outsidethe 95% confidence interval as computed from slightly the posterior of the bootstrapped The difference, replications. neverhas substantive We acknowledge however, significance. theseinstances the confidence interval to include by extending thefullsampleestimate and reporting thatend ofit in italics. In all caseswe roundoff to thenearest In manyinstances integer. theintervals are so smallthatbothendpoints of theinterval are thesamenumber.

when we estimated the unconditioned we effects, were not able to factorin the effects both of confession and degreeof contact. We will continue to use ethnic itbeingunderstood that Slovak identity, for Catholic and support Hlinkarepresents disparate Protestant behavior. Table 2 presents theseestimates, whichclearly confirm theunconditioned effects from 2. First, Figure for(R)epublican columnof (thefirst support parties in minority Slovaklocalnumbers)remains higher itiesthanin majority ofwhether ones,regardless they are located in industrial or nonindustrial districts. This result remains evenwhenpreference forethnic (in thiscase theHungarian-German alliance) parties is takenintoaccount.Contact withotherminorities causesSlovaks to votemoreliberal ofhow regardless one classifies theHungarian-German and in alliance, bothindustrial and agricultural areas. oftheSlovakresponse to the Second,thenature of their ethnic rivals presence increasing dependson thesocioeconomic context inwhich contact occurs. To seethis, consider Slovak behavior where are voting they in the minority (10-40% Slovaks).In industrialized theCommunists (18%) to Hlinka regions prefer they in lessindustrialized areasthey much (11%), whereas (8%). The prefer Hlinka(21%) to the Communists Communist in industrialized superior performance areasundoubtedly reflects regreater organizational twice as well in sources,but theystillperformed Slovakcommunities (18%) thanin majority minority Slovakones(9%). Thissuggests that theCommunists also have succeeded in on thethreat may capitalizing Slovaks from their morenumerous perceived Hungarianneighbors, evenifthespecific Communist solution tothis threat didnotrely on theexclusionary repertoire ofethnically intolerant parties.16

Conclusion
Does familiarity breedcontempt? Our primary conclusionis thatin and of itself, the politicalconsethere is First, quencesof contactare indeterminate. no uniform across ethnicgroups.By and pattern largeforCzechs and to a lesserextent Hungarians contact withother has deleterious effects. For groups Slovakspropinquity withHungarians is associated
16We rana similar ofthetherisein Czechpreference for analysis (R)epublican parties as they become the local majorityin Moravia in 1929. It suggests thatthe observation of increased communist voteamongCzechsas thelocalproportion ofCzechs fallsis primarily a phenomenon restricted to more industrial areas.The results are available from theauthors.

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426

JEFFREY S. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

TABLE 2

Slovakia1935: Local Ethnic Balanceand theSlovakVotein Industrial and Agricultural Districts. 95 percent confidence intervals are in brackets beside each estimate
Republican 58 [57,74] 43 [42,43] 58 [53,80] 40 [39,40] 58 [58,74] 47 [46,47] Ethnic 10 [1,11] 1 [1,1] 10 [2,15] 0 [0,1] 10 [2,10] 2 [1,2] Rep+Ethnic 68 44 68 40 68 49 Communist 13 [2,16] 8 [7,8] 18 [3,22] 9 [8,9] 8 [2,11] 4 [4,4] Hlinka 17 [15,18] 47 [47,48] 11 [8, 11] 48 [48,48] 21 [15,21] 47 [46,47]

Sample Type No Econ Controls 10-40% Slovaks 80-100% High Manuf/Industry 10-40% Slovaks 80-100% Low Manuf/Industry 10-40% Slovaks 80-100%

withgreater whileGermans seem impertolerance, vious to the presenceof their Czech neighbors. ofethnic is notcontheimpact Second, demography ForCzechstheperceived sistent within ethnic groups. is primarily an industrial Germanthreat phenomforSlovaks theindustrial environment enon,whereas alterthe benefits of contact. does not significantly of 1935 slightly The ethnically atmosphere charged of condiminishes theearlier consequences negative butlargely tactforCzechsand Hungarians, preserves forSlovaksand neutral ones for the positive effects Germans. are discordant with Thesecontradictory findings ofwhich contact theliterature, thevastmajority finds to have positive effects. and Tropp (2006, Pettigrew limitation research has a key ofcontact 767) notethat that focuson circumstances been its single-minded facilitate beneficial contact. that scholars Theysuggest to devotegreater to inhibitory oughtinstead energy shed factors. Taken together, our disparate results determinants. The first on at leasttwopotential light One mighthave expected is nationaldemography. and Hungarian German similarities between political behavior. Both wereformer dominant nationalities who were unwillingand unhappy minorities in Czechoslovakia. Yet the Germansprovedfarmore thantheHungarians. The differimmune to contact ence maylie in their numbers. Germans constituted of theCzechoslovak population roughly one-quarter and nearlyone-third of Bohemia,a demographic weightthat supporteda broad range of political thatmay have repartiesand economicinfluence ducedfears ofCzechpolitical domination. Thiscould forthe presence of explaintheirpoliticaldisregard constituted less Czechs.The Hungarians, bycontrast, than5% of Czechoslovakia and onlyaround17% of the Slovaksa fargreater Slovakia, potential making threat to them thantheCzechswereto theGermans.

The secondfactor is national-level ethnic politics, This which muchinfluence. does notappearto exert ink the volume of is a remarkable finding given of ethnic and the spilledon the dangers outbidding of amicablepeak-level ethnicrelations. importance As notedearlier, and Hungary were by 1935Germany ever more openlyfor territorial revision, agitating and each,alongwiththeSovietUnion,was supporting "their"partieswithinthe Czechoslovak party system.Even the most isolated of Czechoslovak citizens could not have entered thevoting boothin 1935 unawareof the steadydeterioration in interethnic relations and thethreat posed to therepublic. Yet none of thisfundamentally altered the logic of contactas it existedin 1929,even if it did slightly reduce the magnitudeof some effects. German masse to Henlein's Nazi did shift en Sudeten support but even those gains occurredmore or less party, German and mixedGerequallyin homogeneously man-Czech settlements. Our results breathe newlife intotheold adagethatall politics is local. A third of our findings concerns the implication between the of contact and the relationship degree nature ofthehypothesized outcome. Closeinspection of Figures1 and 2 reveals nonmonotonic potential in roughly withan inflection effects, pointoccurring balancedsettlements (40-60% Czech/Slovak). evenly Such behavior German appearsto characterize supfor and (N)azi parties, (G)erman port Hungarian and Slovaksupport supportforthe (C)ommunists in 1929;and Czech support for(R)epublican parties for the (C)ommunistsand Slovak support for and (P)opulistsin 1935.This pattern (R)epublicans is based on relatively fewdata pointsand requires further but investigation, thereare good theoretical reasonsforbelieving that evenlydividedlocalities be different. For example, about might uncertainty which kindofparty willemerge victorious, politically

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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT?

427

and the likelihood that authority is likelyto shift in the all groupsto future, again might encourage to This is in contrast supportmoreliberalparties. areas in which a group is a small minority or In theformer case extremoverwhelmingly majority. ist votingposes littlethreat to the rulingmajority the majority can vote group,whereasin the latter extremist fear without of retaliation bytheminority. This logic may be more pertinent to local thanto national butnonetheless and bothGermans elections, Slovaks notCzechs)are at their mostliberal (though in evenly balancedsettlements. We conclude withan implication forcontempoethnic communism and fasrary politics. Although cismare no longer electoral other threats, significant kinds of racistand xenophobicpartiesremaina fixture of democratic Our findings serveas politics. a reminder faith in thenecessarily thatliberal benign localities politicsof multiethnic may be misplaced. Time willtell,forexample, whether the reconstructionofBosniaalongmultiethnic or lineswillincrease decreasethe propensity of Croats,Muslims,and Serbsto support illiberal Much dependson parties. the particularities and local demographic distributionsof thegroupsin question. We leaveforfuture researchthe vexing question of why contact is beneficial forsome groups but not others.

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S. Kopstein is professor ofpolitical science, Jeffrey ofToronto, Toronto, ON, M5S 3K7. University Jason is assistant ofpolitical Wittenberg professor of California, science, University Berkeley, Berkeley,

CA 94720.

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