CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
THE SUDAN TO 1956
This chapter is an introductory background on the study of Sudan up to
the period of 1956 when she fully attained her independence. Three factors
predominate in modern Sudanese territory. The first is the indigenous tradition,
itself the product of the intermingling of Arab Muslims with Africans. The fusion
began over a thousand years ago, and as allusions to the problem of the
southern Sudan will show, is still a contriving process. This lies at the base of
Sudanese nationality, religion and culture.
The two other factors are the influence of Egypt, which in its earlier phases
was late ottoman rather than purely Egyptian in quality, and the Sudan is seen in
its history from the time of Muhammad Ali’s conquests until the present day.
Egyptian rule ended until the Mahdist revolution, British administration with the
coming of independence, but the modern Sudan is politically and materially very
largely the heir of these earlier regimes.
Medieval Muslim geographers gave the name of Bilad al-Sudan (the land
of blacks) to the belt of African territory to the south of the Sahara desert. In the
more restricted sense of the territories lying southwards on Egypt, which formed
the Anglo-Egyptian condominium from 1899 until 1955 and which now constitute
the republic of the Sudan. The term Sudan is of nineteenth-century origin, a
convenient administrative designation for the African empire acquired by
Muhammad Ali pasha, the victory of Egypt and his successors. The Sudan in this
sense excluded the vast regions West of Darfur which in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were to pass under French and British colonial rule on
the other hand. It included territories which did not form part of the Sudan as
traditionally understood- Nubia,the land of the Beja and the Shoman ports of the
red sea coast.
Traditionally, the name of Nubia was applied to the whole riverian region
from the first cataract to the Sabaluqa Gorge, not far north of the confluence of
the blue and white Niles. It was divided into two (2) portions, Lower Nubia, called
Berberistan by the Shomans, which extended from the first to the third cataract
and this included territory both north and south of the modern Egyptian-
Sudanese frontier. It was nominally at least, dependent upon the Shoman
viceroys of Egypt and the upper Nubia above the third cataract which was under
the Suzerainty of the fun, rulers of Sennar. These two positions had separate
histories from the early sixteenth to the early nineteenth century.
The land area of the present-day republic of the Sudan is nine hundred
and seventeen thousand, three hundred and seventy-four square miles (917,374
sq m (2,376,001 sq km): the square miles (967 493 sq m 2 505, 810 sq km).
geographically, the greater part of the country is an immense plain. This may be
divided into three (3) zones in the north is rocky desert and semi desert: south of
this is a belt of undulating sand passing from semi-desert to savanna south of
this again is a clay belt, which widens as it stretches eastward from the south of
Darfur to the mainland’s and semi-desert lying east of the Blue and main Niles.
The red sea hills, a northerly prolongation of the Ethiopian highlands, separate
the great plain from the narrow coastal strip.
There exists a broad distinction, which is nevertheless slowly being
modified by the process of history, between the northern and southern parts of
the northern Sudan. The north is, with certain important exceptions, Arabic in
speech and its people are largely arabized in culture and outlook. Its indigenous
Christians are composed of the descendants of immigrants from Egypt and
Lebanon since the Turco-Egyptian conquest. The southern Sudan, on the other
hand, contains a bewildering variety of ethnic groups and languages. Unlike the
northerners its peoples are not generally Muslims, nor do they claim Arab
descent; although there has been some degree of islamization and arabization.
These tendencies were restrained during the condominium periods, when
European and American missionaries effected a limited Christianization of the
region.
Sudan is situated in northeast Africa and is the largest country the Africa
continent, measuring about one-fourth the size of the United States. Its neighbors
are Chad and the Central African Republic on the West, Egypt and Libya on the
north, Ethiopia and Eritrea on the East and Kenya, Uganda and Democratic
Republic of the Congo on the South. The red sea washes about Five hundred
(500) miles of the eastern coast. It is traversed from north to south by the Nile, all
of whose great tributaries are partly or entirely within its borders.
What is now northern Sudan was in ancient times the Kingdom of Nubia,
which came under Egyptian rule after 2600 B.C. An Egyptian and Nubian
civilization called Kush flourished until A.D 350. converted the region to
Christianity in the 6th century, but an influx of Muslims Arabs, who had already
conquered Egypt eventually controlled the area and replaced Christianity with
Islam. During the 1500s a people called the Funj conquered much of Sudan and
several other black African groups settled in the south, including the Dinka,
Shilluk, Nuer, and Azande. Egyptians again conquered Sudan in 1874 and after
Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. It took over Sudan in 1898, ruling the country in
conjunction with Egypt, it was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan between 1898
and 1955.
Three (3) southern tribes will appear fairly frequently in the following
pages. The Shilluk now occupy a comparatively small area on the western bank
of the White Nile; it was that their range was formerly much more extensive. As
late as the mid-nineteenth century their northern limit was the island of Aba, thirty
years later to be the cradle of the Mahdia until the early years of the Turco-
Egyptian regime they raided the Arab settlements down the white Nile and one
such raid is said to have led to the foundation of the funj kingdom by a band of
shilluk warriors. The arabization of the northern Sudan resulted from penetration
of the region by tribes who had already migrated from Arabic to Upper Egypt.
Arab descent has been a source of pride and distinction. Hence it is not
surprising that stress is laid on a common Arab ancestor. A further genealogical
sophistication makes Ibrahim ja‘al a descendant of al-abbas, the prophet’s uncle.
Thus the Epithets Ja-ali and Abbasi have become virtually synonyms in the
genealogies of the eastern Bilad al-Sudan. In spite, however of the anxiety of the
genealogists to provide the Ja’ali group with a common Arab Ancestor, it would
be more realistic to regard the submerged Nubian substratum as the common
ethnic element among these tribes. This hypothesis does not; of course reject the
undoubted historical fact of immigrants and the older Nubian population. From
this intermingling the present Ja’ali group derives their markedly Arab
characteristics and their Muslim cultural.
The name of Ja‘aliyyin (plural of Ja’ali) is specifically applied to one tribe of
the group, dwelling between the Atbara confluence and the Sabulaqa Gorge. The
Ja’alliyin in this restricted sense formed from the sixteenth century until the
Turco-Egyptian conquest a tribal kingdom, dominated by the royal clan known as
the Sa‘dab, the region of Berber was the homeland of the Mirafab, another tribe
of the Ja’ali group who also used to form a tribal kingdom.
Muhammad Ali’s conquest of the Sudanese provinces has similarities to
Ozdemir Pasha’s conquest of lower Nubia and the red Sea littoral, nearly three
centuries previously. Both expeditions were primarily private ventures of
ambitions servants of the ottoman sultan. In 1820, Muhammad Ali pasha was the
autonomous viceroy of Egypt, and could draw considerable military and
economic resources in order to secure his rule, over the Sudanese provinces. He
was the founder of a dynasty which until the Mahdist revolution and the British
occupation of Egypt, he held on tenaciously to the territories he had acquired.
Muhammad Ali’s primary motive in undertaking the invasion of the Sudan was
probably political. In the early days of his rule over Egypt, his most dangerous
opponents had been the man likes, the survivors of the military and governing
elite whose chiefs had been in previous centuries, the real masters of Egypt’s.
The embassy served a more practical purpose in spying out the military
weakness and the political fragmentation of the Nilotic Sudan. The political
disorder on the middle Nile had almost stopped trade with Egypt, and also the
desire to revive commerce was one of Muhammad Ali’s motives in making the
conquest. The Viceroy had however greater ambitions than to restore the old
trading relations.
THE PEOPLE
Sudan is situated in northeast Africa and the largest country in the African
continent is characterized by high level of ethnic and linguistic diversity and in
some cases, by intergroup tensions. Over two hundred ethnic groups are
dominant in the Sudanese population who speak 134 languages. Arabic
however, is the official language and other languages inherent in the Sudanese
population include Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic,
Sudanese languages and English. Some of the Sudanese culturally district, who
are descendants of the earliest residents of the areas in which they reside and
who seek to maintain their lands resources and identity. A vivid example of such
a population in Sudan is the Nubian, Non-Arabs peoples who reside in a hilly and
mountainous region in the central part of the country. From an ethnographic
perspective, the Sudanese and predominantly Muslims, urban dwellers and rural
agricultural, cattle and camel herding groups who claim Arab heritage. However
in its ethnicity or race, the blacks constitute 52%, Arab 39% Beja 6%, foreigners
2 % and other groups constitute 10%.
THE LAND
The Egyptian Sudan formed an immense block of territory extending from
the second cataract to the equatorial lakes and from the red sea to the pretty
sultanates on the western frontier of Darfur. The main Nile runs through semi
desert and desert. Its course is marked by a narrow strip of cultivation irrigated
by the Shadif and the Saqiya. Among these are the most notable proceedings
from north to south are the Mahas, the Danaqla, the Shaiqiya and the Ja’alayin.
The territory of the Mahas lies to the North of the third cataract. The Danaqia
occupy the reach of the river between the third cataract and Kurti.
The great deserts beyond the narrow cultivated areas are the home of
Nomadic camel growing tribes. The Abada controlled the Nubian desert on the
end bank and without their assistance; no traveler could pass over the route from
Kurusku by the wells of Almurat to Abu Hamad on the great bend of the Nile.
They assisted Muhammad Ali’s expedition and in reward were given the
monopoly of state transport across the Nubian Desert. The peninsula of the
desert enclosed by the great bend of the Nile is known as the Bayuda. A great
area of seasonal grasslands known as the butane lies between the Atbara the
Blue Nile and the main Nile.
 In the far east of the Sudan, the read sea Hill forms a northern
continuation of the Abyssinian highlands. These hills with the narrow coastal
plain on the east and the broad descending to Tabara and Nile on the west are
the home of the Bija tribes. Meanwhile, from the roughly latitude of the Khartoum
southwards, the rains become sufficiently abundant to allow annual cultivation
away from the river and the character of the country changes. The most fertile
portion of the central Sudan is the northern part of the peninsula between the
blue and white Niles known as Gezira. However its largest cities are Omdurman
2,103,900 and Port Sudan 450, 400.
THE GOVERNMNET
Sudan from its inception operated a military form of government. After five
(5) years of military rule. Ali Khurshid Pasha was sent from Egypt to the Sudan
as its first Governor-general with full civil and military power. He converted
Khartoum from a military base to an administrative capital. He also established
the framework of provincial government.
The Sudan was then ruled by Ottoman type of government. A Governor-
General and central services were located in Khartoum. Each principal territorial
sub-division was ruled by a governor. The government was divided into districts
each under a district officer. As under the funj, every ethnic group was
represented by a Sheikh, a paramount Sheikh was given the title “shaykh
Almashaykh” which literally means “Sheikh or Sheikhs’.
The era of Egyptian rule was extended by successive stages in 1840; the
Egyptians defeated the hadendowas of Taka and established the provinces since
known as Kassala. The ports of suakin and Massawa (now in Ethiopia) were
leased to Egypt in 1864 and ceded in 1863, in 1969 in the name of Egyptian
government Sir Samuel baker, the British Governor of equatorial province,
annexed to Egypt the region between Gondokuro and the great lakes under
Egyptian ruler the whole of the Sudan was brought under a single government.

THE POPULATION MOVEMENT

The Sudanese territories are within three (3) population movements and
significantly affected the tribal pattern and influenced the course of history. The
first of these was the southward and westward migration of the northern riverine
tribes-Mahas, Danqia, Shaiqiya and Ja’aliyin. This migration had been going on
for centuries before the Egyptian conquests. Its cause was partly economic,
since the limits of population which the narrow strip of cultivable land could
support were soon reached. At times, it was caused by political troubles in the
river valley. The pressure of this Saiqiyan on the Danaqia in the 18 th century
caused a westward migration to kurodofan and Darfur, so that the Danaqia were
an important element in the social and economic life of the sultanate.
THE WAR AND REVOLT
The Sudan did not play any direct part in World War I. A minor campaign in
1965 against the autonomous sultanate on Darfur had its origins in the
deteriorating relations between the sultans. These annexations worried Khartoum
because no delimitation of borders was agreed neither was any possible so long
as Ali Dinar maintained his independence. While the Sudan government had
decided as early as August 1915, to move against Ali Dinar, favorable
circumstance were presented only in February 1916, when the Sultan reinforced
a border garrisons, thus providing the Sudanese government with the pretext for
a war had become inevitable.
RELIGION
The Sudanese had a third loyalty that was stronger than even a tribal
sentiment and incomparably more vigorous than any allegiance to the Khetive.
Islamic religion dominates in the Sudan also known as the Sunni and this is
precisely in the north. The faith had been spread by pious men connected with
one or the other of the numerous religious orders which were found throughout
the Islamic world. Some of the orders are the institutional expression of Sufism,
Islamic mysticism, an aspect of the religion which greed from ascetic and Gnostic
roots in the first three (3) Hijria centuries. However other religions apart from
Islam are also present in the Sudan. Islam (Sunni) constitutes about 70% (in
North), indigenous 25%, Christianity 50% (mostly in south and Khartoum).
THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN
 In 1896, British and Egyptian forces began to conquer the Sudan from
Egypt progressing slowly they defeated the Mahdist soldiers through superiority
of firearms. On September 2, 1898, the battle of Umdurman resulted in the death
of the Khalifa. a joint agreement was signed on January 19, 1899 between Britain
and Egypt establishing the joint sovereignty of the two (2) countries over the
whole of Sudan under the condominium arrangement, the British and Egyptian
government on the recommendation of the British government lord Kitchener, the
Sirdar Commander in chief of the Egyptian was appointed the first Governor–
General.
On November 24 1899, troops under the command of Major general Sir
Francis Regional Wingate defeated and killed Khalifa Abdullah Umm Diwaikarat
and in December another Egyptian column occupied Al-ubayyi. Earlier in 1989 Ali
Dinar, a member of the former royal capital had seized the throne in 1901; the
government in Sudan recognized him as sultan of Dafur on the condition that he
paid an annual tribute to the government of Khartoum.
On November 19, 1924, Sir Lee Stack was assassinated in Cairo Street.
The British government demanded the immediate withdrawal from the
Sudan of all Egyptian officers and troops, but the Egyptians refused. There were
further minorities of Sudanese units of the Egyptians army who were then formed
into Sudan Defense force with British and Sudanese officers. The Governor-
general of the Sudan leased to be the Sidar of the Egyptian army. In March 1928,
the Egyptian government rejected a British draft of anew treaty on the status of
the Sudan but in May 1929, Britain and Egypt entered in a comprehensive
agreement in the development of the Nile for irrigation purposes. In the 1920s the
Gezira irrigation scheme was developed by the British to grow cotton (many of
the farm settlers of the scheme were among the numerous migrants from
Nigeria). While the Sudan was all for political purpose a British colony, it was not
so legal, it’s administrative service, the Sudan political service was separate from
the colonial service. In Egypt the sense of grievance are the loss of the Sudan
was never forgotten.
In the Sudan, the British encouraged the Mahdist followers the Ansar
under the leadership of the original Mahdi son, Abdal Rahman al-Mahdi (1885-
1959), to counteract Egyptian influence. The Ansar became rivals of the
government headed by Ali Ibn Mohammed Uthman al-Mirghani (1978-1968).
The first organized Sudanese congress was formed in 1938. Ismail Al-Azhari
became its secretary in 1939 and its president in 1940. Meanwhile the Sudan
was heavily involved in World War II. The Sudan defense force took the strain of
the Italian pressure in the frontier and in 1941, assisted in the rout of the Italian
forces in Eritrea and Ethiopia.
On October 8, 1931, Egypt unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian
treaty of 1930, which re-affirmed the condominium arrangement over Sudan and
proclaimed king Farouk as King of Egypt and Sudan. After the Egyptian coup
d’etat of July 1952, which brought General Mohammad Egypt changed its policy
towards the Sudan. On November 2, 1952, general Neguibi, himself partly
Sudanese announced the Sudanese right to independence.
END OF CONDOMINIUM
On February 12 1953 Britain and Egypt signed an Accord ending to
condominium arrangement and agreeing to grant Sudan self-government within
three (3) years. Thus agreeing to grant Sudan council of ministers and House of
Representatives by an international commission. Although the national Unionist
party (NUP) had won the elections in a policy of union with Egypt, it soon
changed its attitude and relations between the NUP and the administration in
Khartoum and the Egyptian government in Cairo deteriorated on August 16,
1955. The Sudanese parliament unanimously adopted a revolution saying that
sudanization had been completed and asking Britain and Egypt to put in motion
arrangements for self-determinations.
INDEPENDENCE
On December, 19, 1955 the parliament unanimously voted that the Sudan
should become “a fully independent sovereign state”. British and Egyptian troops
left the country on the 1st of January, 1956 (Jan, 1 1956) and independence was
proclaimed on this same day. A five-man council of state was appointed to take
over the powers of the Governor-general until a new constitution was agreed
upon. Shortly after independence, El-Azhari, was replaced as prime minister by
Abdalah with the popular Democratic Party (PDP) and the Liberal party (LP).
After elections on March 1958, the National Unionist party (NUP) joined the
coalition. However, the national name of the Sudan is Jamhuryat as Sudan and
its monetary unit is Dinar.

ENDNOTES
29. Holt P.M. The History of the Sudan: from the
coming of Islam to the present Day.
(London: Weidenfield and Nicolson
1961). Pp 1-4, 47-48
30. Osborn and R.K Hitchock Endangered people of Africa
and the Middle East (West Port Green
Wood Publishing Grove) pp 15-16
 31. Theobala Ali Dinar Last Sudan of Darfur 1898-
1916 (London 1965) P. 174-
176
32. Yusuf Fadal Hassan. Studies in Sudanese History.
Khartoum Sudan: Sudantek Ltd,
P.O. Box 3223, 2003 Jan 2003.
33. Niblock T. Class Class and Power in Sudan: the
Dynamic of Sudanese Politics
1898-1985, Albany, New York:
State of University of New York
Press. 1987
34. Republic of the Sudan
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107996.html
35. A. Bing et al (Eds) Africa Today (London: Ab ltd.
1991) pp. 17. 64-1782

CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND TO THE DARFUR CRISIS
This chapter reviews the background to the current crisis in Darfur. This is
vital in order to understand the origin of key features of the current crisis. An
alternative approach would be adopted to understand the nature of the conflict
and its impact on livelihood and analyze the local national, regional and
international processes and factors operating at each level and their role and
constitution to the conflict.
For the pasts Two (2) centuries, at least three (3) major features have
shaped and influenced the political, social and economic life of Dafur and also of
the central riverain state and Darfur neighbors. These critically important factors
are Islamism, trade and tribal identity which have contributed to the social
importance and dominance of religious leaders, tribal leaders and merchants.
These factors combined with the diverse ecology of Dafur, shed light on the
rationale underlying the distribution and used of the agricultural and pastoral
resources.
The Dafur crisis is an outcome of the struggle between Sudan central
government and peripherals. Simmering structural violence finally exploded into
physical conflicts and genocidal campaigns when Khartoum imperialist goal was
threatened.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AS A STRUCTURAL CAUSE
The structural causes of the Dafur conflict are rooted in two major
elements. The legacy of colonialism in the Sudan and the formation of a post-
colonial predatory state.
COLONIAL LEGACY IN THE SUDAN
The Sudan or Bilad at Sudan (the land of the Blacks) is the largest country
in the African continent Sudan’s vast territory is rich in natural resources including
oil, gold and various other minerals. Its territory is also dominated by the Nile and
its tributaries therefore; Sudan enjoys major resources for hydropower. In
addition, the fertile soil along the Nile is the key hub for agricultural development
that made Sudan the bread basket of the continent. Sudan administrative
government was established and located in the northern region of the Khartoum,
but recruited labor (slaves) and exploited resources (mostly agricultural products
such as cotton, grains, spices and later, oil revenue) hail from the southern and
western regions. Thee metropolis economy created by the colonial structure left
a heavy imprint on the modern Sudan state which inevitably became dependent
on the exploitation of its regional resources in both natural and human (labor)
matters. Central government relied on regional economic resources to maintain
its political and military power.
The government in Khartoum had never been freed from the impact of
colonial policy Khartoum, the administrative and political capital was built on
exploitative and divisive culture dating back to the Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-
Egyptian colonial periods in the 18th century. Sudan post-colonial politics are
unstable because of the constant conflict between rival groups either in political
or identity ideology. Since independence on January 1956, Sudan has seen
periods of civilian multi-party governments (January 1956-November 1958 and
October 1964 to May 1969). A military dictatorship (November 1958-October
1964), an army coup d’etat that transformed itself into a one-party system (may
1969-April 1985) and a return to civilian multi-party government in 1985, which
was ‘cracking at the seams after only two years.
The central governments politics is a continuant of the struggle over
control of the national territory and resources. The central government
dependency and exploitation of the peripheral resources is as old as Sudan’s
history but became extreme during the 1980’s when sharing was declared that
law of the land. Divided between the north and south since the dawn of
independence, Sudan’s northern government have faced the scarcity of
resources since “the bulk of the Sudan’s resources needed for the nations
revitalizations-oil, water, fertile soil and various minerals are to be found mainly in
the southern region. The transference on southern wealth to northern rulers
became an inflammatory issue because the south was dominated by Christian
blacks.
“(1983), oil discovered within the southern
territory (although close to the Northern province) tempted the
government to redefine the relevant northern boundary, expanding
it southward. Sharia was declared the laws of the land. This action
legally limited the Southern representatives over their own
territories and even the fruits of their homelands wealth to only
those wiling to convert to the Islamic faith
Khartoum imperialist actions violated the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972
that dictated autonomy for southern Sudanese states. War broke out when the
Sudan peoples Liberation movement/ Army (SPLM/A) was formed and led by the
Christian blacks in the south to resist Arab expansion and exploitation. The
struggle over control of territory and resources continued uprising against the
government spread throughout the country. Khartoum has also been at odds with
the Nubian in the north. The Beja in the east and now Darfur rebels in the West in
the quest for control and exploitation of resources.
THE POST-COLONIAL “PREDATORY” STATE
The formation of the current authoritarian government is a critical
landmark of the struggle for power inside Sudan. This government is ruled by an
Arab led party that has the characteristics of a predatory state. Like other African
predator states, the Sudanese state operate under “ the politics of the belly” and
“ a process of individualization of ruling classes” that makes the state “entirely
patrimonialised by the political elites for their own personal profit. As a result, it
produces exploitative and discriminatory practices for personalized accumulation
of wealth and power, as well as political factions, clientelistic networks and
alliance to excessive pillage and violent confrontation to attain power which often
resulted to averted clashes and instability.
The Khartoum government is politically dominated by Arab elites. The
state is headed by President Lt. Gen. Umar Hassan Ahmad al- Bashir who
created the ruling machine known as the Lingaz (salvation) regime. The regime
includes as alliance of the military junta and the National Congress party (NCP) -
formerly known as the National Islamic Front (NIF) or the Sudan’s Muslim’s
brotherhood (SMB). The NCP’s “Group of ten” including General Bashir ad nine
Muslim leaders ‘reincarnated’ from the NIF is the patronage of the state of
Sudan who try to attain the absolute impersonal ‘appropriation of stages’ by
establishing an Arab clientelistic network. The vampire junta not only manipulates
its Arab network to recruit resources but use Arab militias throughout the country
as a proxy to decentralize the status and development of its opposition. Creating
its own war-torn conditions the state also relied on kindness and intentions of the
outside powers to milk foreign assistance and investment. For decades
international aid to the war-torn country has been subjected to government
execution. When its war efforts failed in the south, Khartoum’s power weakened
by the loss of much of its economic resources. In the throes of death, the patron
of the state revealed after their face. They ordered the looting and destruction of
the livelihood of the population.
The continuation of war and conflicts is a basis for the elites to exploit
national resources and accumulate personal wealth. The government of Sudan
continued to benefit from the manipulation of the war-torn conditions. The
manipulation of population displacement, slavery and the exploitation of oil are all
inextricably linked in the war effort that produce the opportunity for the
government to maintain:
A war economy of which both the government and the guerilla
involves in different degrees, the capture of labor, as much as the
capture of territory (and) in a reinforcing circle, the economic
strategy for the development of the country has produced the war
as much as nit had been a product of war (for decades).
An arms trade largely benefits Khartoum rulers, Khartoum reportedly
conducted clandestine activities and use Arab militias to destabilize the south
and even its neighboring countries ford the sake of war. The ceasefire with Darfur
rebels is broken “roughly once a day”. Since April 2004. An Arab Sheik, a born
criminal who reportedly ordered multiple raids and murder of African villagers,
drain free in Darfur. Topping a list of seven Janjaweed commanders, all accused
of war crimes, issued by the U.S. departments of state but rather than go hiding,
he assumed a very public presence in Khartoum and made himself available to
western journalists, even inviting them on trips to his tribal hometown in Darfur
North which usually involves transport abroad Sudanese government aircraft.
Musa Hilaa, who commanded multiple militia campaigns in Darfur, is an example
of a government proxy criminal exercising pilage with impurity for the benefits of
Arab elites at the cost of civilian lives
Finally, government dictatorial rules were to help the government to return
legitimacy and power over the country, even when its exploitation policy created
violence, resistance and insecurity. Khartoum assumed a state of impurity under
sharia-islamic law that legally favoured Muslim Arabs which allowed them to
dominate the states and effect brutal punishment against any challenger to the
states authority. Black African’s are considered as slaves. Although Arabs and
Africans have intermingled and their religions do not play a primary role in the
Darfur conflict, the Arab-led government uses Arab-ethnocentric policy-which
dictates superiority and supremacy of the Arab race in Sudan and manipulates
Islamic ideology to deepen the ethnic division under this policy and ideology,
Arab leadership is considered “unfavorable”
In order to preserve Arab clientelistic network promotes division along
ethnic regional resources, the Arab clientelistic network promotes division along
ethnic lines in Sudanese society to carry out the Khartoum ‘divide rule’ strategy. It
has become an appendage to assist Khartoum predatory rulers in strengthening
its grip on the region. Darfur violence was triggered by the predatory states policy
to expand and exert absolute power on the peripherals that policy paved the way
for the Arab militias to begin the genocide campaign against African opposition in
Sudan in general and Darfur in this particular case.
PROXIMATE CAUSES
Discrimination along ethnic line, marginalization of the African tribes from
the central government power, and uneven distribution of national wealth has a
long history and has produced overt violence in the Sudan; the protracted north-
south civil war is an example. Pervasive resistance has been a constant threat to
Khartoum authority over the country. Therefore,
Whether in the interest of security, access to
Resources, ideology, race or religion and sometime all of the
above, Sudan’s government is willing to destroy the lives and
livelihood of millions of its citizens to maintain its grip on power
Entry to schools in Darfur had been strictly controlled to the virtual
exclusion of the sons of low paid ghaffirs, petty merchants and police. Ingleson,
the governor of Darfur 1934-41 succinctly put it
“We have been able to limit education to the sons of chiefs and
 native administration personnel and can confidently look forward to
keeping the ruling class at the top of the education tree for many
years to come’’
The education policy in this regard, had been carefully thought out with a
view to the education of the sons of tribal chiefs only
DARFUR POWER RELATIONS WITH KHARTOUM
About the size of France, Darfur is a place of superlatives. More than a
desert area, infact, Darfur is astride one of Africa great migration and caravan
routes and has always been one of the continents richest melting pits. It is not a
remote aid area of western Sudan, but is the heartland of North Africa that is
geographically and economically important to Khartoum. First, Darfur’s
agricultural products and considerable oil revenues account for a large amount of
Sudan’s domestic income. Its manpower contributes a large proportion of both
Sudan’s labor and 40% of Sudanese military force. Owing to hundred miles of
western Sudan borderline, Darfur occupies major regional trade routes including
a regional path for arms trade that keeps flow running smoothly within the
tumultuous western African region. Although there is no publicized statistics, the
Sudanese government has benefited largely from arms trade with Chadian
factions during the internationalized Chadian civil war in the 1980. The Sudanese
government then allied itself with the United States. Taking advantages of the
cold war alignmnets0 and benefited greatly from the large amounts of arms
transferred to Chad through Darfur
DARFUR STRATEGIC LOCATION AS A THREAT
Darfur’s strategic position to Khartoum turned into a deadly factor when
Khartoum feared that there would lose their power over the region to Darfurian
rebels. Khartoum’s exploitation and discrimination created resistance. Violence in
Darfur erupted as the disenfranchised population rose up. African rebels justified
their action as a counter-marginalization movement” They claim to take up arms
to fight against the legacy of decades of discrimination for more political power
and a share of Sudan’s and 1 million per day oil revenue. The revolt is a threat to
Khartoum’s authority.
 Concerned that Darfur rebellion would cause the failure of the Arabization
programme, Khartoum began a “ top down’ war with the calculation that
eliminating that threat would secures ‘arabization and control of Darfur as well as
the expansion, power exertion and accumulation of wealth on one hand and
politics of ‘us: and “them” is the driving force of policy towards Darfur. In identity
difference Connolly argued that
Threat is posed not merely by actions argued that might take to
injure or defeat the true identity by the very visibility of its mode
of being as the other
In his study in final solution, mass killing and Genocide in the twentieth
century, he suggests that a final solution is best understood when the
phenomenon is from a strategic perspective.
The strategic perspective suggests that mass killing is most
accurately viewed as an instrumental policy. A brutal
strategy designed to accomplish leader’s most important
ideological or political objectives and counter what they see
as their most dangerous threats
Darfurian rebels and population (as resources for rebels) are a danger to
Khartoum’s attempts to exert power over the region. The revolt is a threat to
Khartoum authority. Having already been challenged and threatened by the
uprising population throughout the country, Khartoum used Arab militias not only
to retaliate but to eliminate an increasing threat it perceived from Darfur. The
government-backed militia is reportedly carrying out deliberate attacks on Darfur
civilians with the order not only to put down a rebellion but also to “kill all the
slaves” decades of government structures violence reached the tipping point
when Darfurian rebels-fighting in the name of the people of Darfur-feared their
people were excluded in the national power sharing agreement signed only
between Khartoum and the SPLA (Sudan people’s Liberation Army). For fear of
complete disenfranchisement, the rebels began their own revolution. In
retaliation, with its weak military power and poor diplomatic capacity, the
government sponsored and equipped militia genocidal campaigns to secure its
authority over Darfur.
The existence of the Africans who dominated the territory has always been
a challenge to Arab id entity and supremacy in the Sudan. But more than a quiet
on perceived threat, the African rebels action was a clear and prominent threat to
Khartoum. On the other hand, Khartoum did not seem to have a better alternative
when encountering the immediate challenge. The African rebel’s action
challenged Arab leadership, its authority and identity, giving its decreasing
authority and influence over the peripherals, self-preservation has become
Khartoum’s first strategic priority. As a result, when the threats to its authority and
power arose, ethnic cleansing and genocidal warfare became the instrumental
policy. In addition, Valentino (2004) also put forward, the argument that:
A final solution is chosen when leaders believes but their victims
pose as a threat that can be countered only by removing them
from society or by permanently destroying their ability to organize
politically and militarily
As the African population became the threatening, orders to permanently
eliminate that threat was not only a strategic goal but also an immediate and final
solution for Khartoum to preserve its authority.
The decade-long north-south civil war in the Sudan resulted in a peace
agreement. The Comprehensive peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9th of
January 2005, but was only signed by Khartoum under intensive international
pressure. No positive steps have been tokens to provide for security under this
agreement. On one hand, the national elite engaged in war to exercise their
powered into extract goods, cash or labor resources ford personal accumulation
of wealth and preservation of power. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement has
become a ‘paper’ agreement.
These whole political skirmishes are a result of the resistance to the
exploitative and discriminatory practices that Khartoum rulers exercise on groups
other than themselves. The current regime known as the ‘salvation regime” came
to power 1989 through a military coup that ousted the only elected government in
Khartoum. Today the Khartoum government is politically dominated by Arab
elites. The state is headed by a military dictator who as earlier, created the Ingaz
(salvation) regime.
Although the name Darfur means the homeland (dar) of the Fur, Dafur has
never been an ethnically homogenous area. There are three major ethnic groups
that have occupies the Dafur since the times of the Dafur sultanate in the 1650’s.
The ‘blacks’ including the non-Arab sedentary farmer’s such as the Fur Massalit
and other millet-cultivating tribes, inhabit mainly central Darfur, the Zaghawa
camel nomads dominate northern Darfur. The Baqqara Arab-speaking cattle
nomads settled in southern Dafur. Most of the Darfurian educated elites are
descended mainly from the Fur and dominated Darfur politics and society, thanks
to British favoritism. In contrast, the islamization of Sudan after independence in
1956 and imposition of Sharia code favoured the Arab-speaking population and
created a Muslim majority within Darfur’s political elites. Although Africans and
Arabs were deeply divided during and after the British occupation, Darfurian
identity has not historically been clearly asserted in the region. In the
competition for land and resources intermingling and intermarriages have made
the Darfurian identity interchangeable between the Fur farmers and the Arab
nomads.
Identity clashed, however were promoted and fuelled by Khartoum’s
“islamization” during the fight over natural resources in the 1980’s deadly
drought. When the salvation regime came to power in 1989, it attempted to
obtain greater control of the western Sudan using the same divide and rule
strategy that it did in the south using authoritative and exploitative means to
contain the regions resources. Darfur’s multi-ethnic background makes it a major
target of the Sudanese politicians ’arbization” campaign to exert central control
over its people and resources.-Its rich territory
 ENDNOTES
36. Ibrahim F. Ideas on the Background of the
Present conflict in Darfur, Germany:
University of Beyreuth, 2004: May 2004
37. M.Khalid The Government they Diverse: The role
of Elite in Sudan’s Political Evolution
(London: Kegan 1990 pp. 36-62
38. Khalid M. The Government they Diverse: The role
of Elite in Sudan’s political Evolution
(London : Kegen, 1990) p. 75
39. O. Johnson The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil War
(Oxford Indiana University press, 2005)
p. 46
 40. J. Spaulding and S. BEs wicks (eds) White Nile, Black
Blood War Leadership and Ethnicity
from Khartoum to Kampala (the Red Sea
Press, 2000) p. 16
41. M. Kastells End of Millennium: The predatory State
(Oxford Blackwell, 19998) pp. 96-105
42. J. Hoagland “The Politics of Misery” The Washington
Post 19 August, 2004, pp, 112-114
43. Hoagland “The politics of Misery” The Washington
Post, 19 August, 2004. pp 143-144
44. E. Wax “Sudan rebels Reach Accord on Darfur”
The Washington Post, 10 November.
10. S. Anderson “How did Darfur Happen?” The
Washington Post, October, 2004.
11. R.O’ Brien “More than Words for Darfur”, The
Washington post, 26 October, 2004.
12. “International Crisis group report on Sudan”
http://www.icg.org
13. Lefkow, “Don’t Trust Khartoum” The
International Herald Tribune, 10 August
2004
14. Dan Connell, “Politics of Slaughter in Sudan, “The
Middle East Report, October 24, 2004.
Http: // www. Sudan tribune.
Com/fact/content/? 040830fa fact 1

15. Daly D.D. Imperial Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian

Condominium 1934-1956. Cambridge
University Press, 1991 p. 107
16. Burr Jm Collins R.O Africa Thirty Years Wars: Libya
Chad and the Sudan, 1963-1993, 1999.
 p.74
17. W. Connolly. Identity Difference (Minneapolis
Democratic negotiation of Minnesota
Press) p. 66
18. Valentino Final solutions: mass Killings and
genocide in the twentieth century
(Cornell University press, 2004) p.3
19. M. Dallaire “Looking at Darfur, seeing Rwanda”,
The New York Tunes, 16 October, 2004.
20. S. Power “It’s not enough to call it genocide”
Times magazine, 4 October, 2004. p. 6,
p. 5. p. 14

CHAPTER THREE
THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE DARFUR CRISIS
This chapter is a research work on efforts that have been made so far by
the international community to resolve the conflict and the causalities recorded
so far as a result of the conflict in Darfur. In this regard attention would first of all
be placed on the reaction of neighboring states within African states to the
current conflict basically under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and then
extensively reactions so far from the international community at large. Attention
would in this regard be drawn on the United Nations (UN) involvement in Darfur
so far.
In the 20th century, it is estimated that while 40 million people were killed in
wars between states, more than four times that number some 160 million people
were killed by their own governments. The conflict in Darfur, directly responsible
for the deaths of over 300 thousand people. Approximately 90% of these victims
were non-combatants. Since 2003, the Sudanese government and janjaweed
militia conducted a brutal campaign of mass killings and ethnic cleansing in
response to the uprising of two (2) rebel groups in Darfur. The Sudan Liberation
movement/Army (SLM/A) and the justice Equality movement (JEM). Recent
survey placed the number of deaths caused by direct violence between 73,700
and 172,154. By January 2005, deaths from malnutrition and preventable
diseases in camps for internally displaced persons (IDP) stood at 105, 588 while
an additional 25,000 were thought to have died in accessible regions. In total, the
UN New York Times reporter, Scott Anderson describes his meeting with a
member of the Janjaweed.
“He sat warily on the very edge of his chair, his mouth set in a
steady nervous grin. He would not use his real name-Bashom, he
called himself-out of fear that he would be arrested for Crimes he
had committed as a Janjaweed in his native state of West Darfur-
Bashom claimed to have parted company with his band of
Knights several years ago, well before the marauding and
massacres that have devastated Darfur and Drawn international
condemnation”.
Nonetheless, he was worried that his past could come back to haunt
him“Because we did many things on these raids, you know?” He said
“And if the government is serious now about moving against the knights,
well maybe they will come for me”. When I asked what these “bad things”
were, Bashom wouldn’t elaborate. Instead, he fixed me with his unsettling
grin, and his voice, already a whisper, becomes even softer. “Everything
you can think of maybe some other things too”.

In English, Janjaweed means “devils on horseback” although the militias

were small, less than a few thousand soldiers; they were capable of wreaking
vast amounts of destruction. Very little has been done to disarm them. The
Janjaweed rode through Darfur killing with impunity, raping women and burning
villages and food supplies. Their victims fled into neighboring countries. The
conflict escalated into war.
The Janjaweed profited immensely from the conflict. Reporter, Dan
Connell describes them as “a mob of armed thugs cashing in on the opportunity
to look at will”

AFRICAN REACTION TO THE CRISIS

The Africa Union (AU) on December 18, 2004 made a statement
concerning the AU-sponsored peace talks on Darfur. AU Chairman in 2004,
Oumar Konare highlighted the significantly deteriorating security of Sudan, which
has intensified the conflict in Darfur. The African Union (AU) had threatened to
suspend the peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria if both parties did not withdraw to their
previous positions immediately and negotiate in good faith. The civil conflict in
Sudan’s Darfur region has resulted in massive violation of human rights and
humanitarian law, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of people. According
to the UN, an estimated 1.45 million are internally displaced and some 200
thousand have been forced into exile in neighboring Chad.
The African Union (AU), the continents most authoritative political body
has taken on the main responsibility for facilitating a solution. It has done so both
by sponsoring peace talks and by fielding a modest peace keeping mission to
monitor the agreements.
The first Au-mediated ceasefire agreement was signed in N’Djamena
Chad in April. However, the rebel movements initially refused to sign the
negotiated protocols on improving the security and humanitarian situations until
agreements on other issues had been reached. Finally, at the AU’s urging, they
and the government signed the protocols in early November in Abuja Nigeria.
On the ground, the AU is also leading international efforts to boost
security. It has pledged to send a total of 3,300 troops and possibly up to 5,000.
As of December 2005, the AU’s African mission in Sudan (AMIS) had in place,
just over 100 military observers, protected by 800 troops. The mission has made
some modest contributions including presiding over prisoner exchanges and
recovering stolen aid vehicles.
“The AU is doing its best”, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, chairperson of the
organization executive commission, said in December, in response to accusation
by human rights groups that it should be doing more. “While it is true that there
are difficulties in rapidly deploying men on the ground, we are there and we are
helping”. African political analysts point out that Darfur crisis poses a notable
challenge to the continental body “ if it cannot help restore peace in Sudan, we
will take a long time to recover our credibility” a senior Au political officer, Mr.
Jean Baptiste Natama, to the Sudan tribune in November.
STRICT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
In addition to limited financial backing, the Au mission is also operating
under strict rules of engagement. AMIS troops are authorized only too verify
whether the government and rebel groups are fulfilling their obligations under the
N’Djamena ceasefire agreement. Their mandate does not authorize them to
protect civilians, intervene in fighting or disarm warning factions. Despite those
restrictive rules, President Paul kegame of Rwanda insisted that the troops from
his country participating in the AMIS mission would not stand aside of civilians
are threatened. “In my view” he said, “It does not make sense to give security to
peace observers, while the local population is left to die’’.
So far, the Sudanese government has decided to consider a formal
expansion of AMIS mandate. It argues that foreign troops would only complicate
the situation. The government has however agreed to an increase in the number
of the AU troops.
AU EFFORT TOWARDS RIGHTS AND SECURITY
The AU’s efforts in Sudan are taking place amidst sharp international
criticism of the Sudanese government’s rights violation. The US authorities have
characterized the situation as one of the “genocide” while others refers to it as
“ethnic” cleansing or massive human abuses.
The European Union (EU) proposed a resolution to condemn the atrocities
in Darfur, in the UN General Assembly Third Committee which deals with social
humanitarian and cultural issues. Led by African representatives, a majority of
delegates voted to take “no action” on the resolution. The African group of
delegates explained that while there is no denying the human rights violation, it
did not agree with “the double standards” by which only certain countries are
condemned. Moreover, it pointed out, the EU had failed to consult with the AU
mediators, thereby detracting from the principle of African political leadership in
resolving the crisis.
The UN Secretary-General special representative for Sudan, Mr. Jan
Pronk of the Netherlands, has pointed out that violations have also come from
the rebel side.
In mid-December, two employees of the UK-based save the children Aid
Agency were killed in South Darfur apparently by SLA rebels. The UN office for
the co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs urged greater support for the AU
mission, noting that security on the ground is essential for saving Sudanese lives.

3.1 THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS)

The 8 April, 2004 ceasefire agreement between the government of Sudan
and the rebels set out a mandate for the African union ceasefire monitoring
mission in Darfur. This mission will have 130 military observers, accompanied by
300 troops to protect them. At the end of 2005, there were 60 AU ceasefire
monitors on ground, supported by 150 troops. After some initial delays, the
monitors have been able to operate from El- fasher, Nyals and the bases. The
presence of these monitors has had a positive impact on security, but their
operations are still encumbered by bureaucratic delays and technical problems.
More vehicles and communications equipments are needed to ensure that the
teams can be mobile as much as possible and respond to current indications of
cease fire violations as well as investigation past abuses.
The African union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was on African Union (AU)
peacekeeping force operating primarily in the country’s western region of Darfur
with the aim of performing peacekeeping operations related to the Dafur conflict.
Originally founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops, by mid-2005, its number
was increased to about 7,000. Under United Nations Security Council resolution
1564, AMIS was to “closely and continuously liaise and co-ordinate at all levels”.
Its work with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). AMIS had the only
external military force in Sudan Dafur’s region until UNAMID was established. It
was not able to effectively contain the violence in Darfur. A more sizable better
equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally proposed for September 2006,
but due to Sudanese government opposition, it was not implemented at that time.
AMIS mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006, while the situation in
Darfur continued to escalate until AMIS was finally replaced by UNAMID on 31
December, 2007.
AMIS originated in early July 2004, when both the African union and
European Union sent monitors to monitor the Darfur crisis ceasefire signed in
April 2004. In August 2004, the African union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to
protect the ceasefire monitors. It however, soon became apparent that 150
troops would not be enough, so they were joined by 150 Nigerian troops. During
April 2005, after the government of Sudan signed a ceasefire agreement with
Sudan people’s Liberation Army (SLPA) and the Justice Equality movement
(JEM) which led to the end of the second Sudanese civil war, the AMIS force was
increased by 600 troops and 80 military observers. In July 2005, the force was
increased by about 3,300 (with a budget of 220 million dollars). In April 2005,
AMIS was increased to about 7,000 (at a cost of 450 million dollars).
3.2 THE UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN DARFUR
International attention to the Darfur conflict largely began with reports by
the advocacy organization Amnesty International in July 2003. However,
widespread media coverage did not start until the outgoing United Nations
resident and humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapilla called Darfur
the “World’s greatest humanitarian crisis” in March 2004.
The world response to Darfur crisis was tepid. The UN Security Council
adopted an ambiguous position. On one hand, it failed to impose serious
sanctions on Sudanese officials and it did not publicly contemplate using force to
protect civilians or humanitarian aids. On the other hand, it eventually placed
limited sanctions on specific individuals authorized arms embargo and no-fly-
zone and took the momentous step of referring the Darfur Case to the
International criminal Court (ICC)
DEBATING DARFUR IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
In early 2004, Mukesh Kapilla, the UN coordinator for Sudan accused
Arab militia backed by the government of “ethnic cleansing” and warned that left
if unchecked; the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur would be comparable to the
1994 Rwandan genocide. Later that year Koffi Annan drew similar parallels when
he said that unfolding events in Darfur.
...Leave me with deep sense of foreboding. Whatever term is used to
describe the situation, the international community cannot stand idle... It
must be prepared to take swift and appropriate action. By “action” in
such situations, I mean a continuum of steps which may include military
action.

In response to such concerns, in April 2004, the UN commission on

Human Rights dispatched a fact-funding team to Dafur. It found a disturbing
pattern of disregard for basic principles of human rights and humanitarian law “for
which the armed forces of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible”. The
team concluded that there is reign of terror in the Darfur and that the government
and its proxies were almost certainly guilty of widespread crimes. However,
before the commission could vote on a resolution based on the draft report, its
content was leaked to the press. Pakistan and Sudan condemned the leak and
called for immediate inquiry. Unwillingly to force the issue, and concerned that a
strongly worded resolution would be rejected by the commission African and
Asian members, The European Union (EU) members watered down a draft
resolution they had been preparing. The redraft resolution neither, condemned
Sudan nor mentioned its crimes. It was passed with 50 votes in favour and only 3
against (Australia, Ukraine and the US).
The underlying dynamics of the Security Council’s attitude to Darfur
became apparent when it met on 11 June 2004 to unanimously pass resolution
1547. This resolution expressed the councils willingness to authorize a peace
operation to over see the so-called comprehensive peace Agreement between
the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese people Liberation movement/Army
(SPLM/A) although the resolution did not relate to Darfur, some council
members nevertheless, reaffirmed Sudanese sovereignty and expressed deep
skepticism about humanitarian intervention. Pakistan, for instance reminded the
council that
The Sudan is an important member of the African union, the
organization of Islamic Conference and the United Nations. As a
United Nations member state, the Sudan has all rights, privileges
incumbent under thee United Nations charter, including rights to
sovereignty, Political independence, unity and territorial integrity.
The principle that form the basis of international relations.

That this was not a case of an isolated minority in the council, was
demonstrated by fact that the resolution’s drafter felt it necessary to insert a
passage “reaffirming its commitment to sovereignty independence and unity of
Sudan” Pakistan, China and Russia believed that the scale of human suffering in
Darfur was insufficient to provoke serious reflection on whether Sudan was
fulfilling it’s responsibilities to its citizens and the US, UK and France were
reluctant to force them to do so. The western democracies that contributed to the
11th June debated made pointed remarks about the Darfur emergency and tacitly
referred it to the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes, yet
none of these states cast doubt on Sudanese sovereignty. Germany for instance,
noted that peace in Sudan was indivisible and requires “an end to the sweeping
and widespread human rights violations” without suggesting how this must be
achieved. Similarly, the United States pointed towards a literacy of human right
abuses in Darfur, but simply confirmed its support for all initiatives.23
In September 2004, the United Nations Security council passed resolution
1564, which gave Sudan the ultimatum of accepting an expanded AU force or
facing sanctions of their oil industry. The African union (AU) had hoped to have
3,000 more additional troops in place in the region sometimes in November, but
could not do so because of lack of money and difficulty with logistics. The Au
resolved that all parties involved would wait on the AU’s peace and Security
Council to meet on October 20, 2004 and decide on the expanded duties and
numbers of the force. It was decided that these Nigerian and Rwandan Au troops
would be deployed by October 30
ATTEMPTED RECONCILLIATION (2005)
On November 9, the government of Sudan and the leading rebel groups,
the justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army
(SLA) signed two short term peace agreements aimed towards progress in
ending the conflict. The first treaty established a no-fly zone over rebel-controlled
areas of Darfur, a measure designed to end the Sudanese military bombing of
rebel villages in the region.
The second accord granted international humanitarian aid agencies
unrestricted access to the Darfur region. The accords were the product of African
union sponsored peace talks in Abuja that began October 25, 2004.
To support the comprehensive peace agreement signed by the
government of Sudan and the Sudan people’s liberation movement on January 9,
2005 to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance protection,
promotion of human rights, and to support AMIS and the UN security council
established the United Nations Missions. In Sudan (UNMIS) under resolution
1590 on March 24 2005 because the Security Council deemed the situation in
Darfur to be a “threat to peace and International security”,
July 2005 said that there had been no major conflicts since January, and
the number of attacks on village was dropping. At the time, there were about two
major rebel groups... however, the SLM faction refused to be present and
according to a BBC reporter the SLM “will not recognize anything agreed at the
talks” after a government supported Arab militia attacked the Aro Sharrow
refugee camp on September 28, killing at least 32, the African union on October
1 accused both the Sudanese government and rebels of violating the ceasefire
agreement. The Associated press reports the African union as condemning the
government acts of calculated and wanton destruction that have killed at least
44 people and displaced thousands over two weeks.

ATTACKS ON THE AFRICAN UNION (2005)

Forces from the Sudanese rebel group, the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) have assisted in liberating 38 African Union (AU) personnel that
were taken on October 9. The kidnapped which consisted of the original 18
hostages and later a 20 man rescue team-were released on October 10. Initially,
two hostages remained but were freed following a reported short out with the
kidnappers. A splinter group of JEM was blamed for the attack, but Mohammed
Saleh, the head of the dissident faction, has denied the allegation.
Saleh was the military head of JEM when it signed a ceasefire agreement
in April, but later split with the group’s leadership. It is said that he now
commands “thousands” of troops in the Darfur region, and is looking for a seat at
the ongoing peace talks. He accused the Au of taking sides, and stated that he
will not honour the ceasefire. While speaking with Reuters Saleh said, “we want
the AU to leave, and we have warned them not to travel to our areas. We don’t
know and don’t care what is happening to the AU, they are part of the conflict
now”.
Violence in the region has continued to rise. According to BBC
correspondent Jonah Fisher, hostilities towards AU peacekeepers are becoming
more common. It has been noted that aid agencies are refusing to travel with
African union personnel, stating that the mere presence of the peacekeepers
may draw fire. Koffi Annan, at a press conference in Geneva, responded to the
rising violence by suggesting aid to the region may be partially suspended.
“Both rebels and government must understand, if these
incidents continue, it will impede humanitarian assistance
and delivery”.
This marked the first time the African union has suffered causalities in the
region, three personnel were killed in attacks believed to be perpetrated by the
Sudan liberation Army (SLA).
Despite the violence, the SLA, JEM and the AU have promised to continue
the peace talks which are being held in Abuja. In November 2005 due to attacks
on African union troops, the government of Sudan agreed to the deployment of
105 armored personnel carriers from Canada which should arrive on November
17, also another round, and the seventh peace talks started on November 21,
2005.
FAILED UN HANDOVER AND MANDATE EXTENSIONS (2006-2007)
On 31 March 2006, the mandate of AMIS would have run out, with the
African Union force already on the ground to be incorporated into a UN
peacekeeping mission. Nevertheless, during a march 10, 2006 meeting of the
African union’s peace and Security Council, the council decided to expand the
mission for six months until 30 September 2006. On August 31, after United
nations security council resolution 1706 failed to see the implementation of its
proposed UN peacekeeping force of 20,000 due to opposition from the
government of Sudan, on October 2, the AU extended AMIS mandate further until
December 31, 2006 and then again until June 30, 2007.
In May 2007, the AU declared that AMIS was on the point of collapse. In
previous month seven peacekeepers had been killed, while lack of funding had
caused soldiers salaries to go unpaid for several months. Rwanda and Senegal
warned that they would withdraw their forces if UN member nations did not live
up to their commitment of funding and supplies. John Predergast of the
International crisis group noted,
The big money problem is that Americans and the Europeans
promised over the last decade that as long as the Africans deployed in
these kinds of situations, we would pay for the soldiers and equip them.
And we haven’t done it.

ON 31 July 2007, the United Nations Security council finally approved by

United Nations security council resolution 1769, the mandate of UNAMID which
was to take over operations from AMIS by 31 December 2007. A joint African
union/united Nations hybrid operation in Darfur was authorized by Security
Council resolution 1769 of 31st July 2007. The council, acting under chapter VII of
the United nations charter, authorized UNAMID to take necessary action to
support the implementation of the Darfur peace Agreement, as well as to protect
its personnel and civilians without “prejudice” to the responsibility of the
Government of Sudan”. The council decided that UNAMID shall start
implementing its mandated tasks no later than 31 December 2007. AMIS was
finally merged into UNAMID on 31 December 2007.

END NOTES
45. R.L. Rummel Death by Government (New Jersey:
Translation Books, 1994), P. 21
46. UK House of Common International Development
Committee 2005. P.3
47. J. Coebergh “Sudan: The Genocide has killed more
Than the Tsunami” parliamentary brief,
February 2005. P. 7
48. Scott Anderson “how did Darfur Happen?” The New
York Times. October 17, 2004
http://www.NYTimes.
Com/2004/10/17/magazine/17DARFUR.
Html? Page wanted=2&Dref =
logon
49. “70,000 Darfur Dead, since March”, BBC, October 15,
2004.http://news
Bbc.co.uk/1/hi/Africa/3723812.stm.
50. whp://www.international.gc.ca/Africa/Sudan-crisi
51. K.Glen and E. wax “Sudan Main rebel Group Sign
Peace Deal” The Washington Post, 5
May, 2006. P. 9
52. J.B. Natama “AU’s Efforts in the Sudan “Swam
Tribune, 20 November, 2005 p. 11.
53. R. Falk, “Humanitarian Intervention, A Forum,
Nation” 14 July, 2004.
54. “Darfur: Donors must Address Atrocities fuelling
Crisis” Human Rights watch New York:
27 September, 2004 P. 19
55. S/PV. 5027, 2 September, 2004. P.16
56. Glenn and Wax, Sudan Main Rebel Group Sign peace
Deal” The Washington post, 5 May,
2006, P. 15
57. “ The Situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan”,
African Union, December 2004-October 2005
58. “UNMIS and the African Union”, United Nations
Mission in Sudan 2005.
59. Henri Boshott, “The African Union Mission in Sudan:
Technical and operational dimensions”,
institute for Security Studies, 2005.
60. Http://en. Wikipedia org/wiki.dafur-conflict. 9/4/2006
61. H.Slim, “Dithering over Dafur?” A Preliminary
Review on the International Affairs,
2005. pp. 811-828
62. BBC “Mass rape Atrocity in West Sudan”.
BBC News World Edition 2004 19 March News, Bbc. Co.uk
63. K. Annan, Speech to the Both Session of the UN
Human Rights Commission, New York:
7th April 204 accessed 23 March 2005.
 64. UN High Commission for Human Rights, “Situation of
Human Rights in Darfur region of the
Sudan”, commission on Human Rights
Session 61, 7 May 2004, accesses 23
March 2005.

65. E/cN: 4/2004. L11/Add 2004, 23 April

66. S/PV 4988, 2004, 11 June, p. 4
67. Resolution 1547, 2004, 11 June
68. “Sudanese Flesh out Final Deal, “ BBC, October, 7 , 2004 Http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa.3723812.stm
69. “The Situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan”,
African Union, December 2004-october
2005.
70. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070930/ap on re
af/Sudan Darfur
71. : African Union Force Low on Money Supplies and
Morale” The Washington Post, may 13,
2007.
72. Security council Authorizes Deployment of United
Nations-African Union ‘hybrid’ peace
operation in Bid to resolve
73. Sudan tribune article: Darfur Hybrid force to take
over from AU troops on Monday.

CHAPTER FOUR
PERSPECTIVE OF STUDY ON DARFUR CRISIS
FOUR POSITIONS ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The debate about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention hinges on
the relative value accorded sovereignty, self-determination and the ban on use of
force on the one hand and ideas of universal human rights on the other. It is
possible to identify at least four broad positions. According to whether they
prioritize natural law or positive law and offer a permissive or restrictive account
of humanitarian intervention. This chapter briefly outlines each of these positions.
COMMUNITARINISM
Communitarians argue that communities in nations have intrinsic values.
They claim that nations enjoy a common life and should be free to determine
their own system of governance. There is a fit, they argue, between political
communities and the state and it should be assumed that the latter enables the
former to develop and protect its own ideas about how its members ought to live
LEGAL POSITIVIST RESTRICTIONIST
Contemporary restrictionist suggests that common good is best preserved
by maintaining a ban on the use of force except in self defense or when
authorized by the United Nations Security Council. This position suggests that
international society in based on rules that permit communities to pursue their
own conceptions on the good life without infringing on others right to do likewise.
In a world characterized by radical disagreements about how society should
govern themselves would create disorder as states wage war to protect their own
way of life and force others to live by their ethical preferences
LEGAL-POSITIVISTS: COUNTER-RESTRICTIONIST
The counter restrictionist perspective holds that diverse communities can and
do reach agreements about substantive moral standards and that states have the
authority to uphold those standards. They argue that there is a customary right
(but not duty) of intervention in supreme humanitarian emergencies. Counter
reactionist claim that there is agreement in the international society that cases of
genocide, mass killing and ethnic cleansing constitute entailed. Pivotal states and
their allies might use amixture of coercive measures to elicit host state consent
making it harder for traditional opponents of intervention in the Security Council
to block action. An example of this sort of action was Washington use of
economic pressure to persuade the Indonesian government to consent to a
deployment of an Australian –led and UN-authorized force in East Timor in 1999.
The key question and one that remains unresolved by the ongoing
process of Security Council reform, is how to proceed in the force of
humanitarian crisis when the council is deadlocked. The problem is heightened in
Darfur case because none of the great powers were willing to act outside the
council or even try and force the council’s hand. The main hope for change al
though it comes too late for Darfur civilians are to increase the number of actors
we look to for action in such cases. The most obvious candidate in this case, is
the AU, butt in spite of article 4 of its new charter (the constitute act) the
organization has neither the capability nor a political consensus and under
staffed African union peacekeeping force.
The AU mission in Darfur was the only external military presence deployed
in Darfur. Though the Au mission force reduced the conflict. It was unable to
bring it to a halt.
CONCLUSION
The situation in Darfur is discouraging. Darfur seems to provide a problem
for every solution. While there are no easy or guaranteed answers it may be
possible to transform the violence in Darfur into something more constructive.
There is common ground between Darfur’s residents. In fact, the nomads
and the farmers have traditionally depended on each other for survival. Nomads
relied on the farmers land and water and farmers relied on the nomads herds to
fertilize their land and carry their crops to market. But now neither group can see
a path to reconciliation.
In situation like this one, where a powerful group victimizes a relatively
powerless group, peacekeeping troops are almost always necessary to stop the
bloodshed. The African union troops are a good first step, but they need to be
well armed and funded. If these troops could set up safe havens for the refugees
and provide them with enough fund and medical treatments, they could stop the
immediate crisis caused by the everyday violence and terror in Darfur. The next
step would be a peacemaking process in which representatives from the
government, the Janjaweed and the SLM would negotiate the terms for a
permanent ceasefire.
However, simply ending this round of violence will not be enough to create
stable peace in Darfur. After the violence ends, there are whole new rounds of
problems to deal with.
The first is the question of the refugees. The homeless Dafurians will need
help returning into their land, which is now barren with many of the fields and
houses burnt. The return of over one million refugees is likely to rekindle the
same tension that started the conflict in the first place, except now those disputes
will be laced with fear and distrust.
One solution that many countries recovering from violent conflict have
used is a truth commission. These are independent bodies used to bring about
some form of reconciliation through restorative justice. Truth commission is
especially useful in cases of states sponsored terror to rebuild trust between the
government and the people. In addition, many of the victims are probably
traumatized by the violence they have witnessed. Trauma can damage the
victim’s mental states and they may need to heal and rebuild their lives.
Once the victims have been addressed, the perpetrators will also need
attention simply punishing those who have committed war crimes will not create
a lasting peace. If the only future the janjaweed have to look forward to be
unemployment and jail, then they will be unlikely to go along with the peace
agreement. The Janjaweed need to be reintegrated into society and offered an
alternative to killing and looting. In addition to dealing with the perpetrators,
peace building will be needed to address the deepest roots of the conflict,
eventually paving the way for reconciliation. In the case of Darfur, drought relief
will be a key beginning. Darfurians may need to be provided with food until they
can find a viable way of supporting themselves. If drought relief had been
instituted early on, it may have been able to prevent the current crisis in Darfur.
Darfur will also need help with reconstruction, building the roads, schools
and medical clinics the Dafurians need to conduct their everyday business.
Finally, the Darfurians will need trustworthy conflict resolution systems to resolve
future disputes non-violently whether these systems are tribal or government-
sponsored; they must be unbiased and efficient.
None of these suggestions guarantee peace in Darfur, Sudan is a country
faced with intense poverty, environmental challenges and a bloody history of
injustice. However, hopefully these changes can help the people of Darfur start
the process of transforming their conflicts into something more constructive than
violence
www.obamawonder.blogspot.com