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1 Mapp v. Ohio (1961) Justice Clark 1. Facts of the Case: The police entered the home of Ms.

Mapp without a search warrant and proceeded in a thorough search of her home. During the search they found obscene material that Mapp was convicted on. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Should the exclusionary rule, which excludes evidence at trial that has been obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment rules of search and seizure, be applicable to the states? 3. Holding: The exclusionary rule as a means of protecting the 4th Amendment rights against search and seizure is applicable to the states just as it is applicable to the federal government. 4. Rationale: Wolf v. Colorado selectively incorporated the 4th Amendment to the states via the 14th Amendment, but did not do this with the exclusionary rule This is being applied to the states to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right Since the 4th Amendments right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government The admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure The State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, had served to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence

United States v. Leon (1984) Justice White 1. Facts of the Case: After an extensive drug investigation, police submitted an affidavit and received a search warrant. Upon entering Leons home they seized significant amounts of drugs. The trial court

2 threw out much of the evidence because the affidavit did not meet previously established standards. The Court of appeals upheld the decision. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Should the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecutions case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause? 3. Holding: Suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-bycase basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. (Established the good-faith exception). Court of Appeals is reversed. 4. Rationale: The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates There exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion There is no basis for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate The marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion The officers reliance on the magistrates probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause Hudson v. Michigan (2006) Justice Scalia 1. Facts of the Case: Police were executing a warrant to search Hudsons home for drugs and firearms and announced their presence but did not wait more than 3 to 5 seconds. Hudson moved to have the evidence suppressed because the premature entry violated his 4th Amendment rights. The trial court granted the potion but the appellate court reversed.

3 2. Legal Questions Presented: Is the exclusionary rule the appropriate remedy for violation of the knock-and-announce requirement? 3. Holding: The social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are considerable and the incentive to such violations is minimal. Therefore, suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified. 4. Rationale: Wilson v. Arkansas established the knock-and-announce requirement as a command of the Fourth Amendment. Exceptions to this requirement occur when there is a threat of physical violence, if there is reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed, or if knocking and announcing would be futile Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house (arguing inevitable discovery exception) Interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are different than those of protection against warrantless searches including: protection of human life, protection of property, and the elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected is ones interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable What constitutes reasonable wait time in a case or if there was reasonable suspicion for the Richards exceptions would be difficult for courts to determine Another consequence of applying the exclusionary rule would be police officers refraining from timely entry after knocking and announcing Hudson could use S1983 to seek damages for violation of his civil rights Herring v. United States (2009) Chief Justice Roberts 1. Facts of the Case: Officer Anderson spotted Herring, and knowing he has criminal history, asked the countys warrant clerk to check for outstanding arrest warrants for Herring. She found none, but the clerk of a neighboring county did. Anderson arrested Herring and found drugs and a firearm in his possession. It was later found that the arrest warrant for Herring in the neighboring county

4 had been recalled. Herring claimed the evidence should be excluded. The district court denied this motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: If an officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant and finds contraband in the search incident to the arrest, should this evidence be excluded if it is discovered the search was a 4th Amendment violation due to negligent bookkeeping errors by a police employee? 3. Holding: In the circumstances of this case, the jury should not be barred from considering all of the evidence. The exclusionary rule should not be applied. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. 4. Rationale: The exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in appreciable deterrence To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. The error in this case does not rise to that level Franks v. Delaware negligent police miscommunications in the course of acquiring a warrant do not provide a basis to rescind a warrant and render a search or arrest invalid We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule, however California v. Greenwood (1988) Justice White 1. Facts of the Case: A police officer received information that Greenwood might be involved in narcotics trafficking. The officer asked the trash collector to separate Greenwoods trash from the rest and bring it to her. After going through the trash, the police found evidence of narcotics. Based on this probable cause, police got a search warrant and arrested Greenwood. The same was repeated resulting in a second arrest of Greenwood. The Superior Court dismissed the charges based on People v. Krivda which said warrantless trash searches violate the 4th Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Does searching the trash left on the side of the road for trash collection violate the 4th Amendment rights of the person whose trash it is?

5 3. Holding: Greenwood did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, therefore the search of his trash does not violate the 4th Amendment. The Court of Appeals is reversed. 4. Rationale The search and seizure of the garbage bags would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable By placing his garbage on the street, Greenwood left it accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public therefore he has no reasonable expectation of privacy What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection Katz Police cannot be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public Florida v. Riley (1989) Justice White 1. Facts of the Case: After observing a partially covered greenhouse from a helicopter 400 feet above it, the police saw that the owner was growing marijuana inside and took legal action against the owner. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court answered that this violated the 4th Amendment requirement for a warrant before executing a search. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Does surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above the greenhouse constitute a search for which a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment? 3. Holding: The surveillance does not constitute a search requiring a warrant under the 4th Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court is reversed. 4. Rationale: California v. Ciraolo controls in this case In Ciraolo it was decided that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police traveling in the public airways at the altitude of 1000 feet to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye

6 In this day, it is not reasonable to believe there could be no aircraft flying over ones property in which any member of the public could see the illegal material The helicopter was flying at a legal altitude, therefore, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy The Court noted that this does not mean that the inspection of the cartilage of a house from an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law Kyllo v. United States (2001) Justice Scalia 1. Facts of the Case: Police used a thermal imaging device to determine that the heat emanating from certain areas of Kyllos home was indicative of an indoor growing of marijuana. Based on this, as well as tips and utility bills, police obtained a search warrant and found the indoor growing of marijuana. Kyllo moved to have the evidence suppressed but was denied and then entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: What are the limits upon the power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy? Does the use of thermal imaging on a home constitute a search under the protection of the Fourth Amendment? 3. Holding: The use of thermal imaging on a home does constitute a search under the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals is reversed. Remanded to the District Court to decide about the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the illegal search and invalid search warrant. 4. Rationale: Obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use Taking into consideration future developments in through-the-wall surveillance technology Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to intimate details would be wrong in principle and would be impractical in application Spinelli v. United States (1969)

7 Justice Harlan 1. Facts of the Case: Spinelli was convicted of traveling to Missouri from Illinois with the intention of conducting gambling activities illegal under Missouri law. Spinelli challenged the constitutionality of the search warrant that allowed the FBI to uncover evidence necessary for the conviction. The Court of Appeals upheld the search warrant. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Is there probable cause behind the search warrant in which the FBI found evidence used to convict Spinelli of his crime? Does the informants information on the affidavit meet the Aguilar test? 3. Holding: The informants tip even when corroborated to the extent indicated was not sufficient to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. The Court of Appeals is reversed. 4. Rationale: Aguilar v. Texas an affidavit was inadequate because it failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity of the informants conclusion and the affiant-officers did not attempt to support their claim that their informant was credible or his information reliable The fourth allegation in the affidavit of this case had the fundamental place in this warrant application. This allegation was that the FBI had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that Spinelli was conducting illegal gambling Applying the Aguilar test Though the affiant swore that his confidant was reliable, he offered the magistrate no reason in support of this conclusion The tip does not contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation Draper v. United States held an affidavit legitimate and the warrant legal because the informant had given great detail from which one could reasonably infer that he had received his information in a reliable way This case does not meet that standard. Illinois v. Gates (1983) Justice Rehnquist 1. Facts of the Case: The police department received an anonymous letter detailing illegal drug trafficking by Lance and Sue Gates. The police investigation confirmed that some of the details of the anonymous letter were correct. Based on this, the police got a search warrant and found marijuana in the

8 Gates home and car. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered suppression of the evidence on the ground that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause. This was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Supreme Court of Illinois. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Was there sufficient probable cause for the search warrant that led to the police finding the illegal drugs in the possession of Lance and Sue Gates? 3. Holding: The two-pronged test is abandoned, in its place the totality of the circumstances analysis is reaffirmed. The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause to search the Gates home and car existed. The Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed. 4. Rationale: The totality of the circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific tests be satisfied by every informants tip The two-pronged test (the informants veracity or reliability and his basis of knowledge) are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indica of reliability The totality of circumstances approach recognizes that affidavits are normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation If the affidavits submitted by police are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might develop at the time of search The traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrates probable cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. Maryland v. Pringle (2003) Chief Justice Rehnquist 1. Facts of the Case: A police officer pulled over a vehicle for speeding. 3 men were in the car, including Pringle in the front seat. After a search of the car, the officer found a large sum of cash in the glove box and cocaine stored behind the armrest of the passenger seat. None of the three men confessed

9 to ownership of the cocaine and the officer arrested all three of them. The next day, Pringle confessed to having sole ownership of the cocaine. The trial court denied Pringles motion to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest, holding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Did the officer have probable cause to believe that Pringle committed the crime? 3. Holding: The officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Pringles arrest therefore did not violate the 4th and 14th Amendments. The Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed. 4. Rationale: Based on the facts, it is a reasonable inference that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly Pringles attempt to characterize this case as a guilt-by-association case is unavailing. Maryland v. Garrison (1987) Justice Stevens 1. Facts of the Cases: Baltimore police executed a warrant to search McWebb and the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment. The police believed there was only one apartment on the third floor. Upon executing the warrant, the police realized that the third floor consisted of two apartments, one belonging to McWebb and the other belonging to Garrison. Before this realization though, police had found contraband in Garrisons apartment on which he was charged. The trial court did not suppress the evidence and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals for Maryland reversed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the seizure of the contraband in Garrisons apartment violate the 4th Amendment? What is the proper interpretation of the warrant? Is the warrant valid and was it executed reasonably by police? 3. Holding: The warrant was valid when it was issued. The police acted reasonably in their execution of the warrant. There is no 4th Amendment violation. The Court of Appeals is reversed.


4. Rationale: The Warrant Clause of the 4th Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of a warrant except one particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized This requirement ensures that eh search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit The question is whether the factual mistake made by the police in regards to the number of apartments on the third floor invalidated the warrant that would have been valid if it had reflected a completely accurate understanding of the buildings floor plan The discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant Hill v. California an officers reasonable misidentification of a person does not invalidate a valid arrest; this is equally applicable to an officers reasonable failure to appreciate that a valid warrant describes too broadly the premises to be secured Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) Justice Stevens 1. Facts of the Case: Police obtained a search warrant for Richards hotel room to search for drugs. The attempted to obtain a no-knock warrant but the magistrate deleted these portions of the warrant. The police approached Richards hotel room, with at least one officer in uniform, and others disguised. Richards answered the door, recognized the police, and then shut the door again. Police then forced entry. The trial court denied Richards motion to suppress the evidence and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, also concluding that police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Is the Wisconsin Supreme Courts blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule legal under the 4th Amendment? Were Richards 4th Amendment rights violated by the polices search and seizure in his hotel room? 3. Holding: Wisconsins blanket exception the knock-and-announce rule is reversed. Richards 4th Amendment rights were not violated by the officers no-knock entry because they had reasonable suspicion he was destroying evidence.


4. Rationale: Wilson v. Arkansas Reasons the State gave for their blanket exception: violence involved in drug investigations and the easy potential for disposal Not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree In these situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry. Wisconsins blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cases from judicial review The reasons for creating an exception in one category (felony drug investigations) can, relatively easily, be applied to others If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable albeit hypothetical risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendments reasonableness requirement would be meaningless In each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement The fact that the magistrate did not issue a no-knock warrant does not alter the reasonableness of the officers decision, which must be evaluated at the time the entered the hotel room United States v. Watson (1976) Justice White 1. Facts of the Case: An informant told a federal postal inspector that Watson was supplying stolen credit cards and would be supplying more at their next meeting. At this meeting, the informant signaled the inspector that Watson had the cards and the officer arrested Watson without a warrant. The court of appeals held the arrest unconstitutional because the inspector failed to secure an arrest warrant although he had time to do so. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Is an arrest without a prior arrest warrant in violation of the 4th Amendment? 3. Holding: An arrest warrant is not required to make an arrest in a felony charge. There is no 4th Amendment violation. The court of appeals is reversed. 4. Rationale:

12 Section 3061 is a judgment by Congress that it is not unreasonable under the 4th Amendment for postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant provided they have probable cause The Court should be reluctant to decide a search authorized by Congress was unreasonable and the Act therefore unconstitutional There is nothing in the Courts prior cases indicating that under the 4th Amendment a warrant is required to make a valid arrest for a felony The balance struck by the common law in generally authorizing felony arrest on probable cause, but without a warrant, has survived substantially intact. IT appears in almost all of the States in the form of express statutory authorization Whren v. United States (1996) Justice Scalia 1. Facts of the Case: Officers were patrolling in plain clothes in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused by a car occupied by Whren and Brown. After making a U-turn to head back towards the car, petitioners turned off without signaling and sped away at an unreasonable speed. The officers then caught up with the petitioners, pulled them over, and found them in possession of illegal drugs. Petitioners then argued the stop was not justified by probable cause to believe, or even reasonable suspicion, that petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity and the reason of the traffic violations was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Are minor traffic violations legitimate as probable cause for an officer to perform search and seizure by pulling over a vehicle if the officers real suspicions were of some other crime for which they had no probable cause? 3. Holding: The officers had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred, and therefore had probable cause to stop the car. The stop is therefore reasonable and evidence admissible. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. 4. Rationale: An automobile stop is subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be unreasonable under the circumstances Petitoners argue that to avoid the danger of automobile stops to investigation violations under the pretext of a traffic stop, the 4th Amendment test for traffic stops should be, not the normal one of whether probable cause existed to justify the stop; but rather,

13 whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given The Court has never held (outside the context of inventory searches or administrative inspection) that an officers motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the 4th Amendment; but has repeatedly held the contrary United States v. Robinson established that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officers action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action The making of a traffic stop out-of-uniform does not remotely qualify as an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been broken outbalances private interest in avoiding police contact There is no principle to allow the Court to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) Justice Souter 1. Facts of the Case: Atwater was pulled over for violation of a Texas law requiring front seat passengers to be buckled up in a car. The police officer decided to arrest Atwater for the violation that carried the penalty of a fine between $25 and $50. Atwater filed suit in a Texas state court under Section 1983 against the officer, the police chief, and the city. The city removed to federal district court which granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the 4th Amendment forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine? 3. Holding: If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 4th Amendment, arrest the offender. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. 4. Rationale: Atwater claims that common law supports her argument, the Court decided it did not Atwater argues for a modern arrest rule, one not necessarily requiring violent breach of the peace, but nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when

14 conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling need for immediate detention If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail The Court has traditionally recognized that a responsible 4th Amendment valance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review Atwaters general rule and limiting proviso promise very little in the way of administrability The costs to society of the under-enforcement that would result from Atwaters rule could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked Tennessee v. Garner (1985) Justice White 1. Facts of the Case: Memphis police were informed of a nighttime burglary in progress by a neighbor. When the police arrived, Officer Hymon went around behind the house and saw the suspect, Garner, trying to escape. Hymon noted that Garner was young and small and did not believe he was armed. Hymon ordered Garner to halt and when Garner did not do so, Hymon shot him in the back of the head, from which Garner died. Hymon was legally allowed to do this under a TN statute which provided if, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest. Garners father filed suit under Section 1983for asserted violations of his sons constitutional rights. The District Court found the TN statute and Hymons actions constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Is a seizure by the means of deadly force constitutionally allowable under the 4th Amendment in all felony cases? 3. Holding: The use of deadly force is not automatically constitutional in all felony cases. It is not constitutional in the situation of an unarmed, un-dangerous suspect such as the current situation. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. 4. Rationale: The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable

15 A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The TN statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects The state is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry In light of the rules adopted by those who must actually administer them, the older and fading common law view is a dubious indicium of the constitutionality of the TN statute now before the Court Officer Hymon could not reasonably have believed that Garner young, slight, and unarmed posed any thread. Hymon never even attempted to justify his actions on any other basis than the need to prevent an escape Agrees with the dissenters that burglary is a serious crime, but cannot agree that it is so dangerous as automatically to justify the use of deadly force Payton v. New York (1980) Justice Stevens 1. Facts of the Case: Police arrived at Paytons apartment with the intent to arrest him. There was no response to their knock although music was playing inside, so they forcibly broke into the apartment. Payton was not there, but police did find a weapon that was used as evidence against him. 4 years later, police went to the home of Riddick to arrest him. His young son answered the door and police entered before Riddick was given a chance to consent to entry. In their search of Riddicks immediate area, they found drugs on which he was charged. The New York Court of Appeals, in a single opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Riddick and Payton. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the execution of an arrest without a warrant inside a persons home violate the 4th Amendment? 3. Holding: Home invasions for arrest should be treated as home invasions for search, requiring a warrant. Since no arrest warrant was obtained in these cases, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed. 4. Rationale:

16 The Court of Appeals treated both cases as involving routine arrests in which there was ample time to obtain a warrant, and this Court will do the same. Thus, there is no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation (exigent circumstances) that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose or arrest or search Judge Leventhal of the Court of Appeals for D.C. reasoned that the constitutional protection afforded to the individuals interest in the privacy of his own home is equally applicable to a warrantless entry for the purpose of arresting a resident of the house The Court found this reasoning persuasive and in accord with prior 4th Amendment decisions Any differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and entries to arrest are merely ones of degree rather than kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individuals home The Court rejected the States argument that only a search warrant based on probable cause to believe the suspect is at home at a given time can adequately protect the privacy interests at stake and since such a warrant requirement is manifestly impractical, there need be no warrant of any kind Chimel v. California (1969) Justice Stewart 1. Facts of the Case: Police went to the home of Chimel to arrest him for burglary of a coin shop. When they arrived at the home the wife let them in and they waited a few minutes for Chimel to return home. Upon his arrival, the arrested him, for which they had a warrant, and then searched the entire home, for which they did not have a warrant. They found coins and medals that were used to convict Chimel. The appellate court affirmed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Can a warrantless search of the petitioners entire house be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest? Does a full search of the house of a person being arrested without a search warrant violate the 4th Amendment rights of the arrestee? 3. Holding: If the search of an arrestee extends beyond his person and the area within his immediate control, a search warrant is required under the 4th Amendment. The appellate court is reversed. Rabinowitz and Harris are reversed. 4. Rationale:

17 United States v. Rabinowitz warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the possession or under the control of the person arrested. That doctrine as applied to this case is not rational and possibly not rational even limited to its own facts There is ample justification for a search of the arrestees person and the area within his immediate control construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence Searching that include rooms other than that of the arrest or closed or concealed areas, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be done only under the authority of a search warrant Arizona v. Gant (2009) Justice Stevens 1. Facts of the Case: Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a police car. Police then searched his car and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the 4th Amendment warrant requirement as defined in Chimel and applied to vehicles in Belton did not justify the search in this case. 2. Legal Questions Presented: What are the limitations on the search-incident-to-arrest exception under the Belton decision and the 4th Amendment? 3. Holding: Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Otherwise, search of the vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show another exception to the warrant requirement. The State Supreme Court is affirmed. 4. Rationale: New York v. Belton held that when an officer lawfully arrests the occupant of an automobile, he may, as an incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile and any containers therein. This holding was based in large part on our assumption that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of the automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within the area into which an arrestee might reach

18 We hold now that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of search We also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case, thus the search is unreasonable The privacy interest one has in his vehicle is still important and deserving of constitutional protection California v. Acevedo (1991) Justice Blackmun 1. Facts of the Case: Daza picked up a package the police knew contained marijuana and took it to his apartment. Acevedo entered that apartment shortly after and left carrying a brown paper bag the size of one of the wrapped marijuana packages which he placed in the trunk of his car. Police stopped his car, opened the trunk and bag and found marijuana. The California Court of Appeals held the marijuana should have been suppressed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the Fourth Amendment require the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car? 3. Holding: The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained. The Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle. 4. Rationale: U.S. v. Ross Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll doctrine could include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search was supported by probable cause U.S. v. Chadwick a person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than he does in his automobile Arkansas v. Sanders extended Chadwicks rule to apply to a suitcase actually being transported in the trunk of a car Thus, in Ross the Court took the step of saying closed containers in cars could be searched without a warrant because of their presence within the automobile. Despite

19 the protection Sanders purported to extend to closed containers, the privacy interest in those containers yielded to the broad scope of an automobile search The privacy protection under Chadwick-Sanders is minimal The Chadwick-Sanders rule has also confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law enforcement It is better for the Court to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) Justice Scalia 1. Facts of the Case: An officer pulled over a car for traffic violations. Respondent was one of two passengers in the front of the car. The officer noticed the driver had a syringe in his pocket and when he asked the driver why he had a syringe the driver told him it was for drugs. Backup officers then asked for identification from the two passengers and respondent falsely identified herself and claimed she had no ID. The first officer began a search of the car in light of the drivers admission. In the backseat he found a purse which respondent claimed as hers. Upon search of the purse an ID with respondents real name and methamphetamine was found. The trial court denied suppression but the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding the search of the purse violated the 4th and 14th Amendments because the officer knew or should have known that the purse did not belong to the driver, but to one of the passengers and because there was no probable cause to search the passengers personal effects. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Can police search containers belonging to passengers in an automobile without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe the driver has committed a crime? 3. Holding: Police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. 4. Rationale: Using balancing test privacy interests vs. legitimate governmental interests; weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passengers belongings If the rule of law that Ross announced were limited to contents belonging to the driver, or contents other than those belonging to passengers, one would have expected that substantial limitation to be expressed (in that decision) When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers like customs officials in the Founding era 0 to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one

20 A passengers property rule would dramatically reduce the ability to find and seize contraband and evidence of crime If we were to invent an exception, why should it protect only property belonging to a passenger rather than (the more logical choice) property belonging to anyone other than the driver Terry v. Ohio (1968) Chief Justice Warren 1. Facts of the Case: A plainclothes officer observed suspicious behavior between three men indicating they may be planning a burglary and could be armed. The officer approached the men and asked their names but they just mumbled a response. The officer patted down Terry and found a pistol and also found a pistol the same way with another of the men. A frisk of the third man did not indicate he was armed and therefore he was not searched further. Terrys motion to suppress the evidence was dismissed, the state court of appeals affirmed and the state supreme court dismissed the appeal. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Is it always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest? Does violation of 4th Amendment rights through a stop and frisk make the exclusionary rule applicable? 3. Holding: An officer can conduct a limited search of the outer clothing of persons he reasonably believes to be armed and dangerous in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is reasonable under the 4th Amendment and any weapons seized may be introduced as evidence. 4. Rationale: A rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime Dual inquiry in determining whether the seizure and search were unreasonable: (1) whether the officers action was justified at its inception and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place Balancing test

21 More is involved than the governmental interest in investigating crime, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed Petitioner argues it is unreasonable for an officer to search for weapons until the situation evolves to a point where there is probable cause to make an arrest Two weaknesses of this argument: (1) recognizes no distinction between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons and (2) assumes that the law of arrest has already worked out the balance between the particular interests involved here, the neutralization of danger to the policeman in investigative circumstance and the sanctity of the individual There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime In this situation, it was reasonable for the officer to believe the men were armed and dangerous; he confined his search strictly to what was necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them Florida v. J.L. (2000) Justice Ginsburg 1. Facts of the Case: Someone called in an anonymous tip that a black male at a certain location wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Police were sent to this location and on arriving conducted a frisk of three black males at that locale, only one of which was wearing a plaid shirt. J.L., wearing the plaid shirt, was found with a gun, and the other two males were found with nothing. The trial court suppressed the evidence. The intermediate appellate court reversed and the Supreme Court of Florida held the search invalid under the 4th Amendment. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Is an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, sufficient to justify a police officers stop and frisk of that person? Does the tip pointing to J.L. meet the indicia of reliability? 3. Holding: An anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams and White does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm 4. Rationale:

22 The tip in this case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White (which was considered a close case) and essential to the Courts decision in that case The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search An automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would go too far The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability The requirement that an anonymous tip bear standard indicia of reliability in order to justify a stop in no way diminishes a police officers prerogative to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been legitimately stopped Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) Chief Justice Rehnquist 1. Facts of the Case: Officers were patrolling in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. When Wardlow saw the officers, he fled. The officers caught up to him and one patted him down and in this process found a handgun on which he was arrested. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Wardlow based on the facts of the case? 3. Holding: The officer was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity and therefore in investigation further. The officers stop did not violate the 4th Amendment. 4. Rationale: While the location in a high crime area alone is not enough for reasonable suspicion, officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion This decision is consistent with Florida v. Royer in which the Court held when an officer approaches and individual the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business; unprovoked flight is different than mere refusal to cooperate The fact that flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity does not establish a violation of the 4th Amendment. Florida v. Royer (1983)

23 Justice White 1. Facts of the Case: Royer purchased a one-way airline ticket to New York City under an assumed name. Detectives had observed him and believed he fit the drug courier profile. Upon request, but without oral consent, Royer produced his ticket and identification. He explained the discrepancy in names by saying a friend had purchased the ticket under the assumed name. Without returning his ticket or ID, he was asked to accompany them to a small room. Without Royers consent one of the detectives retrieved his luggage. While he did not respond to the request that he consent to a search of the luggage, he did present the key and marijuana was found. The trial court did not suppress the evidence and he was convicted. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that respondent had been involuntarily confined without probable cause and at the time his consent to search was obtained the involuntary detention had exceeded the limited restraint of Terry and such consent was therefore invalid. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Was Royer being illegally detained? Should the evidence obtained from consent to search during the illegal detention be suppressed? 3. Holding: Because we affirm the Florida District Court of Appeals conclusion that Royer was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search. 4. Rationale: An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. The investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officers suspicion in a short period of time Statements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will If the events in this case amounted to no more than a permissible police encounter in a public place or a justifiable Terry- type detention, Royers consent, if voluntary, would have been effective to legalize the search Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the 4th Amendment Police had adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him. Had Royer voluntarily consented to the search of his luggage while he was justifiably being detained on reasonable suspicion, the product of the search would be admissible. However, at the time Royer produced the key to his suitcase, the

24 detention to which he was then subjected was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity Had Royer consented to a search on the spot, the search could have been conducted with Royer present in the area where the bags were retrieved by Detective Johnson and any evidence recovered would have been admissible against him The Florida District Court of Appeal cannot be faulted in concluding that the limits of a Terry-stop had been exceeded United States v. Drayton (2002) Justice Kennedy 1. Facts of the Case: Drayton and Brown were travelling on bus together. During a stop, 3 police officers entered the bus as part of a drug interdiction. One officer stationed himself at the front of the bus, one at the back, and the other walked up the aisle, speaking to passengers. When they came to Brown and Drayton, they asked to search their bag. The men consented and no contraband was found. Noticing the baggy clothes the men were wearing, the officer asked to pat them down. Brown consented and the officer found drug packets on which he was arrested. Drayton then proceeded to consent and was also arrested based on a finding of drug packets. The trial court did not suppress the cocaine, but the respondents prevailed on appeal. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Were the passengers of a bus seized in terms of the 4th Amendment when police entered the bus for the drug interdiction? 3. Holding: Applying the Bostick framework to the facts of this particular case, we conclude that the police did not seize respondents when they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers. 4. Rationale: Florida v. Bostick Florida Supreme Court had adopted a per se rule that due to the cramped confines onboard a bus the act of questioning would deprive a person of his or her freedom of movement and so constitute a seizure under the 4th Amendment The Court reversed, saying the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers requests or otherwise terminate the encounter Now, the 11th Circuit has adopted what in effect is a per se rule that evidence obtained during suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard buses must be suppressed unless the officers have advised passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to a search The Court of Appeals erred in adopted this approach

25 The fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does not on its own transform standard police questioning of citizens into an illegal seizure Officer Hoovers position at the exit does not tip the scale in respondents favor The arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by police. If anything, Browns arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the officers questions Brendlin v. California (2007) Justice Souter 1. Facts of the Case: Following a traffic stop conceded to be illegal for lack of reasonable suspicion, passenger Brendlin was found to have an outstanding arrest warrant. He was arrested and drugs were found on his person and in the car on a search incident to arrest. Brendlin claimed the evidence should be excluded because the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure. The California Supreme Court rejected this, claiming as a passenger, Brendlin had not been seized by the vehicle being stopped. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Does the stop of a vehicle constitute a seizure of the passenger of that vehicle? 3. Holding: In the circumstances any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission. Therefore, the passenger was also seized by the stop of the vehicle and the seizure was illegal. The California Supreme Court is reversed. 4. Rationale: United States v. Mendenhall a seizure occurs if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave A traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger has chosen just as much as it halts the driver It is reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety To the extent that there is anything ambiguous in the show of force the test resolves the ambiguity, and here leads to the intuitive conclusion that all the occupants were subject to like control by the successful display of authority

26 Brendlin had no effective way to signal submission while the car was still moving on the roadway, but once it came to a stop he could, and apparently did, submit by staying inside Holding that the passenger in a private car is not (without more) seized in a traffic stop would invite police officers to stop cars with passengers regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of anything illegal

United States v. Place (1983) Justice OConnor 1. Facts of the Case: Place was stopped in two different airports and questioned by police because they believed him to be transporting narcotics. In the second airport Place was questioned at, police asked to search his luggage and he refused. The police then seized the luggage and transported it to another location where they had drug dogs sniff the luggage. 90 minutes later the police got a search warrant for the luggage and found large amounts of cocaine on which Place was charged. He attempted to have the luggage contents suppressed and the District Court denied. The Court of Appeals reversed. 2. Legal Questions Presented: Should Terry be applied to cases involving detention of luggage based on the polices reasonable suspicion that it contains narcotics? If so, did the police act reasonably in this case or were the 4th Amendment rights of Place violated? 3. Holding: When an officers observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principle of Terry and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigation the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that investigative detention is properly limited in scope. The detention of respondents luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. Court of Appeals is affirmed. 4. Rationale: Where the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a reasonable belief that a travelers luggage contains narcotics, the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial When the police seizure luggage from the suspects custody the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the persons luggage on less than probable cause

27 Under this standard, it is clear the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop Although the 90 minute detention of respondents luggage is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to inform him of the place they were taking the luggage, the length of time they would possess it, and of arrangements for the return of the luggage if nothing was found.