Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana

Lessons for Nigeria

O. J. Para-Mallam, PhD.
10/5/2011

Submitted for peer review for the Nigerian Journal of Policy and Strategy Vol. 16 No. 2

Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011

Introduction
Since Nigerias return to democratic governance in 1999 the expanded political space opened up opportunity for voicing grievance and discontent expressed through identity-based communal conflicts, particularly of ethno-religious coloration. Such conflicts have increased in quantity and intensity over the last few years with severe costs and alarming implications for national security and political stability. Are there lessons we can draw from the management of identity-related crises in neighbouring West African states? This is the central exploration of this paper. The post-Cold War upsurge of identity politics has transformed several African states (including Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and increasingly Jos, Nigeria) into a theatre of violent conflicts (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007). Such conflicts entail the manipulation and mobilization of primordial identities, such as ethnicity, religion, occupational gender, sex orientation, disability etc.) around shared political, economic, social or ideological goals (Jinadu, 2007). However, such conflicts are not unique to the African continent as seen in places like Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and the indigenous peoples of Latin America, to name a few. Nevertheless, among numerous identity markers ethnicity and religion, especially the former, constitute the dominant axis around which violent conflicts have revolved in Africa (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007:12). Indeed, Mary Kaldor (1999) refers to ethnic identity and difference as the new wars. Samuel Huntington (1996) famously alluded to the great clash of civilizations depicted in the new wave of ethno-religious conflicts around the world, most notably as a fall out of the globalization of western ideology, culture and capital with attendant resistance from other cultural systems. Ethno-religious conflicts in Africa are a reflection of the rich cultural makeup that is characteristic of most African states. Yet, ethno-religious pluralism does not provide a sole explanatory cause for violent conflict as examples of ethnically and religiously diverse, yet peaceful nations exist. Hagg and Kagwanja (2007) make the point that ethnicity is not always a cause of violent conflict as homogenous societies may erupt in hostilities (as in Somalia) while heterogeneous societies abide in peace (Osman, 2007). A complex web of cultural, religious, social, political and economic factors weaves through most identity-based conflicts in Africa. This paper demonstrates that for diversity and difference to be an asset rather than a liability they must be managed through an operative policy and legislative framework that intentionally promotes nationalism and integration. Without such a framework violent conflict and state implosion are inevitable. After a brief review of the changing nature of conflict on the global scene the paper considers some conceptual road marks for locating ethno-religious conflicts within a broader understanding of identity-based politics. It then discusses and critiques Jinadus (2007) cultural theoretical model for the management of ethno-religious, and investigates the merits of the model in light of examples from Liberia and Ghana. In this regard, the paper explores the comparative management of ethno-religious conflicts in Ghana and Liberia in order to draw lessons for Nigeria on possible institutional mechanisms and approaches to peace
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 building and fashioning national cohesion. The scope of the paper does not include an indepth discussion of the specificities of any given conflict beyond sketching basic elements to enable a comparative analysis of how they were managed or resolved. The analysis is further supported by research data collected during the NIPSS Senior Executive Course 33 Study Group Three Tour of Liberia (2nd 16th May, 2011). It concludes by applying potential lessons from Liberia and Ghana to the Nigerian situation, with specific emphasis on the Jos conflict. The Changing Nature of Conflict In Understanding Conflict Resolution Peter Wallensteen (2007) asserts that in the 21st century global armed conflicts made significant shifts in nature, location and focus. Before the Second World War armed conflict occurred primarily on large scale between states. Consequently, they frequently held off-shore in foreign territory and were focused on national territorial or resource claims. However, Post-World War II conflicts, taking place within the context of decolonization and emerging independent states, occur increasingly within states as part of the contradictions and contestations in the state formation process. Intra-state conflicts tend to be more frequent and more numerous and, as noted earlier, are rooted in identity-based politics. Identity politics has been at the heart of violent conflicts in Africa and are rooted in colonial politics (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007). As newly independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America turned towards nation building they were left to deal with an inherently conflict-ridden legacy of colonial administration. This is not to suggest that pre-colonial societies were devoid of ethnic or religious conflict or that the colonial regimes are solely to blame for the current spate of violent conflicts in Africa. African historians have highlighted several examples of ethno-religious conflicts brought about by empire building and expansionism characteristic of great pre-colonial empires such as the Songhai, Mali, Asanti, Fanti, Benin, Oyo, Kanuri and the Islamic Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio. Most significantly, violent identity-related conflicts persist despite, and often as a result of, the resurgence of democratic systems of government in places like West Africa since 1990 (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). However, the intense and combustive nature of such conflicts within the context of state formation took on new dimensions as a result of distortions introduced into the diverse mix of ethnic nationalities during the colonial era. Such distortions are intensified by long years of military rule. Ifeka (2000) and Matinussen (2002) contend that while industrialized states evolved over a long period of time naturally from ethnic nationalities into territorially defined political entities (nation-states) post-colonial countries were artificially contrived states forced into political union by the agglomeration of diverse ethnic-nationalities. In fact, Ifeka argues outright that a country like Nigeria is not a nation at all but an amalgamation of ethnic nationalities forced to struggle to forge a non-existent unified identity. In the words of Matinussen (2002:321) by the nature of their historical process in state formation postcolonial states are more appropriately defined as state-nations. This reverse pattern of state
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 formation in post-colonial states greatly differentiated the task and challenges in nation building in post-colonial states from that of those in the Northern Hemisphere, particularly western democracies. Globalization is another critical determinant in ethno-religious conflict in which the fluidity of international capital, markets and media is bringing diverse cultures and people groups into close and contesting relationships that revolve around the competition for global resources. This has led to the globalization of ethnicity and the localization of civil wars over copper, diamonds, land, oil and other incentives for the control of state largesse. Consequently, the changing nature of global conflict brought about by the peculiar characteristics of state formation processes in Africa history as well as the effects of contemporary forces of globalization call for alternative conceptual and theoretical frameworks than those previously used to analyse armed conflicts.

Some Conceptual Road Marks

Historically, political scientists and conflict resolution analysts tended to apply liberal or Marxist conflict resolution models to explain or seek solutions to African conflicts. Hagg and Kagwanja (2007) argue that such models recorded only limited success and provide evidence that identity-based conflicts, particularly of the ethno-religious type, require re-configured analytical frameworks. Ethno-religious conflicts are best understood within the broader context of identity-based conflicts because ethnicity is but one of a variety of markers which may occur singly or in concert with others (such as religion or class) in a given conflict situation. Volf (1996:16) makes this point succinctly in Exclusion and Embrace when he says, the problem of ethnic and cultural conflicts is part of a larger problem of identity and otherness. This larger problem refers the tendency for people groups to derive a sense of belonging together from shared cultural, physical symbolisms and rituals and then exclude others on the basis of that shared identity (Woodard, 1997). This paper adopts a working definition of ethnicity based on Irobis (2010:2) understanding of an ethnic group as a community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth, and origin. Tradition often includes sacred beliefs and symbols. These identity markers are deeply embedded within the psychology of individuals because they are signifiers of belonging, entitlements and meaning. When challenged or threatened they can evoke powerful responses. In summary, When premised on essentialist claims to a shared identity such as a historical past, cultural heritage, religion or biological traits - difference can lead to conflict, war and dominance. (Para-Mallam, 2007:34) Before we review how select countries have effectively managed identity-based conflicts, it is important to consider some general explanatory frameworks on why they occur and, why they are so pervasive, combustive and intractable across African states. Hagg and Kagwanja (2007:12) draw on the analyses of a variety of scholars to explain why ethnic conflicts, in particular, are so common. In reference to Endalew (2002) they assert that,

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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 The ubiquity of identity wars is based on the fact that ethnic identity is indeed particularly strong in traditional societies embodying the deeply-embedded sense of belonging to a group with unique identity markers, such as myths of common ancestry, shared memories, cultural values, traditions and symbols, and ownership of territory. With specific emphasis on ethnicity, Hagg and (2007) refer to the work of several scholars to distil the following reasons for the preponderance of identity-based conflicts in Africa: The legacy of colonial politics: The colonial administration set up systems of political development and artificially contrived territorial agglomerations of ethnic nationalities whose erstwhile cultural identities became translated into political identities. Thus, through the political elevation of one or a few ethnic groups and the relegation and marginalization of others, colonial politics bred political tribalism in emerging states characterised by patrimonial client networks for the conduct of governance. The most frequently cited case of this is the implication of Belgian and French colonial policies in the Tutsi-Hutu conflict in Burundi and Rwanda. Others include British colonial administration that saw the elevation of the Ashanti in Ghana and the Hausa-Fulani emirate system, first over ethnic minorities in Northern Nigeria and subsequently over the political system in the newly independent state (Salawu, 2010). Notwithstanding the inherent animosities bred by colonial divide-and-rule tactics, it appears the diverse ethno-regional and ethno-religious entities were able to initially subsume their differences under the banner of nationalist struggles for independence. In this regard, Bruce Berman (1998 in Hagg, 2007:14) contrasts emancipatory nationalism of anti colonial liberation movements with uncivil nationalism characteristic of post-independence intra-state regional and communal conflicts fought on the basis of identity labels and sensibilities in the contestation for power. This ethnicisation of politics owing to the construction of ethnicity as a legal entity by various colonial administrations, polarized many African societies along settler/migrant and native/indigene fault-lines (p. 16). Hagg and Kagwanja contend that, Africa is still struggling to bridge the gap created by these bifurcated spheres inherited from the colonial society, which has produced two patterns of rights and obligations (p. 15). To buttress this point, they refer to the work of Peter Ekeh (1975) who identified a clear dichotomy between a civic public - amoral and governed by a system of rights - and a primordial public - moral and governed by custom. In the case of the former, access to state resources is ideally open to all citizens within a seemingly neutral system of legislative and policy frameworks. In the latter instance, and in reality, access depends on an intricate array of kinship networks or other primordial associations. This system of networks and associations was carried forward into the modern state differentiating citizens into stratified aggregations of first-class, second-class and third class citizens and undermining the
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 potential for state neutrality in conflict management (Jinadu, 2007:10). Thus, the compromised character of the state is also a key factor in identity-related based. The Character of the African State: Hagg and Kagwanja (2007:18) contend that the majority of African states remain weak, dysfunctional and predatory and formal institutions and processes of governance continue to rely on a neo-patrimonial logic for resource allocation and upward mobility. Joseph (1999) speaking in reference to Nigeria compounds this equation with the introduction of personality cult type leadership in the context of a predatory state that turns on its citizens and uses ethno-religious sensibilities to deepen allegiance within and rivalry between groups. This rivalry is further intensified by the liberal model of majoritarian democracy in which the winner in first-past-the-post electoral systems takes all thereby excluding other contestants and their patron-client networks. Hence, Hagg and Kagwanja (2007:11) poignantly declare, At the heart of the African crisis is the failure to bring identities to the centre of democratisation and institution building processes, both before and after conflict. The nature of clientelism in a neo-patrimonial state entails that ethnicity or religion, or a combination of both, constitutes a key eligibility criterion for access to socioeconomic resources instead of the liberal democratic approach that relies mainly on citizenship. Herein lays the ambiguity and confusion inherent in the indigeneity/settler conundrum. In this regard, despite the political posturing of government authorities to draw up national integration policies, (e.g. the Federal Character principle in Nigeria) the state itself is conceptualised as a partisan player, rather than a neutral arbiter, in ethno-religious conflict. Indeed, analysts have long recognized that, in the conduct of its governance functions, allocation of socioeconomic and political resources, the state is strongly involved in the construction and perpetuation of identity politics and identity-based conflict (Oluksoshi, 1998; Allan and Eade, 2001; Jinadu 2007). It is also important to acknowledge the complication of identity politics by other intervening variables such as socioeconomic status, corporate interests and other sectarian interests including occupational and gender identity. Nevertheless, it is often the case that there is some congruence between ethno-religious identity, and other identity markers, particularly class identity, a reality underscored by the effects of globalization, which Hagg and Kagwanja highlight as another factor in ethno-religious conflicts. Globalisation and regional conflict complexes: Citing Appadurai (1998) Hagg and Kagwanja (2007:14) assert that Ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusions and chaotic environments created by economic globalisation resulting in what they refer to as regional power conflicts and economies wars in the face of poverty and underdevelopment. A situation scholars allege is compounded by the preponderance of longstanding military rule, notably in the West African sub-region (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). It is within this construct that they locate the instrumentalist conception of ethnicity evident in the political manipulation of ethnic and religious identity by civilian and military elites struggling
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 for power in order to gain access to globalized capital. However, they dispute the greed and grievance and politics of the belly theses of scholars like Braathen (2000), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Collier and Sambanis (2005) that situate identity-based conflicts solely within the crass struggle for state patronage opting for a more nuanced analysis that takes cognizance of the role of regional powers in instigating and prolonging local or civil conflicts. Hagg and Kagwanja do not conclude fatalistically that ethnic identity and diversity is a sure recipe for violent conflict. Rather, they affirm the standpoint of organizations (AU, 2005) and individuals (Jinadu, 2007; Tan, 2006; Lonsdale, 1994) who see cultural diversity as important assets in peace making, national building and social re-engineering. In this regard, they highlight Lonsdales typology of ethnicity as a useful model in differentiating between moral ethnicity and political tribalism where cultural identification serves as a basis for tolerance and mutual peaceful coexistence in the former and unhealthy rivalry in the latter. It is this cultural theory of ethno-religious conflict, as expounded by Jinadu (2007) that is the subject matter of the next section. A Cultural Theoretical Model Jinadus extrapolation of a cultural theory of democracy begins with the acknowledgement that ethnic diversity and conflict are fundamental and irreducible components of the social demography and political tapestry of the African state, and so must be managed constructively and creatively (p.21). They are the indelible marks of our history and cannot be simplistically wished away. Jinadu presents statistical evidence to demonstrate that between 1990 and 2002 ethnic-related conflicts constituted a considerable number of the 58 major armed conflicts, and 19 of these occurred on African soil. In terms of their root cause, Jinadu affirms the analyses of Hagg and Kagwanjas and others to the effect that the neo patrimonial State described above engenders ethno-political conflicts which are, fuelled by a combination of potent identity-based factors with wider perceptions of economic and social injustice regarding the distribution of or means of sharing economic, social and political resources within the state (Harris and Reilly, 1998:9). He views traditional African cultures to be an authentic foundation for re-engineering autochthonous political systems that draw from indigenous values, methods and styles. One must hasten to aver that this is not a call to return to a non-existent ideal past. Rather, Jinadu hypothesizes a home-grown regime, within the contemporary realities of modern democratic governance, of constitutional and political arrangements aimed at the pragmatic management [rather] than [] the resolution or removal of these deep-seated, identity-related conflicts. He points to the existence of traditional African political systems that promoted the values of power dispersal with checks and balances to counter the excessive use of power. Jinadu, like Ake (2003), sees ethnicity as a potentially positive force in the democratisation
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 process. Consequently, he (p. 22) contends that there is a need for modern African states to fashion out a new political architecture and culture of mutuality and reciprocity between ethnic groups (Emphasis mine). In this model he espouses a political model of handling ethnic difference and divergence by channelling diversity towards accommodation, cooperation and healthy competition. To accomplish this Jinadu abstracts from the dense literature on ethnocentric conflict three basic principles for constitutional and political engineering: First is the recognition and accommodation of collective ethnic rights in a manner that is truly representative, consultative and constitutive of effective mechanisms for redress if such rights are contravened. Second, is the devolution of power by way of self-government to ethnic and sub-ethnic groups within their ethnic heartlands giving them considerable control over local resources; third, is the consociational principle of a power sharing formula that includes devices such as mutual veto, proportionality and quotas at national and sub-national levels. At this third principle, Jinadu departs from Hagg and Kagwanja in their criticism of the majoritarian democracy and recommends a winner-takes-all configuration within the context of a grand coalition of ethnic groups in national government. Jinadu admits that this principle is problematic, yet surprisingly attests to its merits over potential deficiencies despite the fact that it cannot forestall the emergence of ethnic asymmetry and dominance of a single or few powerful groups, as has often been the case in many African states, including Nigeria. This highlights the centrality of electoral systems and the appropriate management of electoral processes to securing legitimacy for political leaders without which African democracies tend to implode in violent conflict (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). Another limitation of Jinadus model is that is does not take sufficient cognizance of the diffuse nature of ethnicity as not being always coterminous with geographical boundaries. Neither does it adequately address the complicity of religious identity as a mobilizing force within and across ethnic communities to forge supra-ethnic identities such as the Muslim Ummah and the Christian Body of Christ. These identities transcend ethnicity and follow unique trajectories rendering ethno-religious conflicts even more complex and intractable. However, despite the limitations of Jinadus take on the cultural theory of democracy, the emphasis on mutuality, reciprocity, effective redress, functional power decentralization in the form of representative/inclusive government and resource control at all levels reflect current wisdom in conflict analysis. In addition, one could make a case for two approaches to counteract the weaknesses in Jinadus model. First, studies have shown that direct proportional representation; where ethnic groups are guaranteed representation in national and sub-national governments in direction proportion to their numeric incidence in the population, tend to mitigate the mutual fear and suspicion that foment identity-related conflicts. This principle appears closer to Akes notion of participative negotiated consensus (Ake, 2003:32). Second, there is an urgent need for a critical interrogation of religious ideologies to the extent that they promote dogmas and behaviour codes at variance with the democratic principles of tolerance, equality, and respect for the sanctity of life. In this regard, through consultation and consensus building it should be possible to arrive at
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 common values, norms and rules of engagement predicated on obedience to secular authority. This implies that religion and religious ideology do change in response to social pressure. This point is made clearly by Harman (1999) who offers a materialist analysis of religious ideology to demonstrate that the role of religion in history, particularly in conflict, does not occur in isolation of material reality. Using the example of the Roman Catholic Church, he argues further that, People have always been capable of giving different interpretations to the religious ideas they hold, depending on their own material situation, their relations with other people and the conflicts they get involved in. History is full of examples of people who profess nearly identical religious beliefs ending up on opposite sides in great social conflicts (p.6). By this assertion religion, just like ethnicity, is a readily malleable tool for the pursuit of underlying social, political and economic interests. This fact is borne out in the first phase of the Liberian conflict.

A Comparative Review of Conflicts: Liberia and Ghana

The Case of Liberia At the start of the first civil war in 1989 Liberia had a population of 2.6 million people. By 1997 one third of the population had been killed or displaced (Kieh, 2007). The modern Liberian State was established in 1822 by the American Colonial Society and attained formal independence 1847. Although Liberia was never colonized by a western power, it was colonized by the freed American slaves, who imposed a system of ethnicized and racialized politics on the indigenous groups in the country between 1822 and 1926 (Kieh, 2007). With the influx of foreign capital the dominant axis around which power struggles revolved among the privileged elite shifted from only ethnicity to include class such that by 1980 national wealth was controlled by 4% (predominantly Americo-Liberian elite also later referred to as Kongos) of the populace. In 1980 Samuel Doe, a Christian of Krahn extract, staged a coup dtat against the Americo-Liberian hegemonic administration of William Tolbert. This saw the reintroduction of ethno-centric politics as a means of mobilizing ethno-religious affinities in order to counteract opposition to his refusal to institute democratic reforms. Kieh, (2007:4) argues that although a majority Christian state, with influential presence of the Church clergy in state politics, Doe cultivated an opportunistic relationship with Islamic clergy which served as a countervailing religious force. Kieh asserts further that, pro-status quo Islamic clerics served as a bulwark for the Doe regime against the criticisms emanating from the progressive Christian leaders, and as a vehicle for legitimating the regime. (p.4)

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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 Oritsejafor (2009) explains further that Doe incurred the allegiance of the Mandingo settler community who were also Muslims and largely regarded as migrant aliens by most of the population. He appointed the Mandingo to important executive positions. In spite of this religious dimension, however, E.K. Bensah (2001:URL) contends that the first wave of violent conflict in Liberia erupted on the platform of ethnic rather than religious sentiments. He summarises the Liberia Conflict and its ethnic ramifications thus: On Christmas Eve 1989, "a full scale guerrilla war erupted as rebels known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor, a former minister in the administration of President Samuel Doe, invaded Liberia from its border with Ivory Coast. According to Comfort Ero "it degenerated into ethnic carnage that threatened to engulf the whole country." Taylor went on to terrorize the country with his campaign in Nimba county, home of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, which greatly suffered under Doe". Allegations of genocide soon followed as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) slaughtered those tribes; consequently, reprisals by the NPFL brought even greater suffering. The conflict cost Liberia 200,000 citizens and displaced almost a third of the population. On the other hand, Bensah demonstrates that ethnicity was not an important mobilizing force in the two subsequent Liberian wars as it was in the first. Young (2008) agrees with this assertion. According to him, The Liberian civil war of 1989 to 1990 was characterized by brutal, ethnic conflict. However, the subsequent civil wars of 1992 to 1993 and 1994 to 1996 were defined by factional affiliation that was increasingly independent of ethnic identity. In the first violent outbreak, all the key warlords, Samuel Doe and his Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Thomas Quiwonkpa, his defecting war general and a Gio, Charles Taylor also a Gio of the National Patriotic Liberian Front (NPLF), and Prince Yormie Johnson (a Gio) and his NPLF splinter group, effectively manipulated ethnic sensibilities to stoke conflict and perpetuate civil war. However, after Taylor had managed to control 90% of Liberian territory he abandoned ethnic politics in favour of other factional affinities to secure allegiance to his administration, a situation that continued after he became President in 1997. Nevertheless, the civil wars led to the near total collapse of the state, which lacked the capacity and legitimacy to forge peace and deal with the serious humanitarian crises, and the internal and cross-border displacement of up to 1 million Liberians. The Liberian population suffered immeasurable social and material upheaval and dehumanization in the form of child soldiers, sexual slavery of women and girls, cannibalism and extreme brutality. Eventually, these wars were only brought to a close through the bottom-up initiatives of the womens peace movement in Liberia on the one hand (Berkley Case Study Series, 2008), and an arduous externally-driven process of fitful peace keeping missions and peace accords in Abuja and Accra spearheaded by ECOMOG and the Nigerian government on the other. The
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 wider international community initially wanted no part of the peace keeping responsibility, owing ostensibly to more pressing commitments in Somalia and Bosnia. Thus, much of the credit for the successful resolution of the war goes to home-grown and sub-regional initiatives. The role of Liberian womens activist groups, notably the Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET) and to a lesser extent the Mano River Womens Peace Network (MARWOPNET) has been hailed worldwide as an exemplary bottom-up, indigenous peace initiative. Ultimately, it was the ability of women to mobilize across ethnic, religious and political divides that compelled political actors, including warring factions to take the necessary decisions that would end the war. Indeed, it was the dogged and concerted peace activism of Christian and Muslim Liberian women of diverse ethno-political backgrounds that finally drove Charles Taylor from years of misrule in 2003 and forced the establishment of the postwar Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Monrovia in 2006. Their efforts were well rewarded as the process led to an expansion of the political space for women. In February, 2006 Liberia elected Africas first female President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf who has continued Taylors practice of running an ethnically inclusive government to encourage a nationalistic outlook in national development policy and planning. Interactive sessions held during the SEC 33 Study Tour highlighted certain strategies employed by various arms of the administration to do this include the following: 1. Merit-based Public Sector Recruitment: Employment into the Liberian Civil Service and Armed Forces is conducted through a transparent process with pre-set recruitment criteria that are strictly adhered to and internally and externally monitored. For example, according to the Liberian Minister of Defence (09/05/2011), in recognizing that cultural diversity is part of the composite identity of Liberia the MOD is committed to equality, equity and inclusiveness across all sectors of the economy to ensure no group feels disenfranchised on account of minority status or social category such as ethnicity, religion or gender. Consequently, the New Defence Act (2008) provides a legal basis for recruitment and career progression in the Army based on merit and performance. Through the Act the MOD initiated a broad postwar recruitment process across the 16 Counties based on a non-political, non-quota system ratified and certified by the Joint Personnel Board. The Board consists of an MOD staff, international partners (Donor group and the UN), and civil society represented by the Dean of the law society. 2. Educational Sector Reform: In order to address the heavy urban-rural (particularly centred in Monrovia) imbalance in the educational the post-war administration initiated a 10-year education plan and established primary and secondary schools, with standardized educational curriculum delivery, in the hinterland where most of the non-Kongo indigenous groups reside. Certain public secondary schools include boarding facilities to stem rural-urban drift. The Minister of Education (09/05/2011) confirmed that exam results are fairly standard across the country. In addition,
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 tertiary education has become increasingly de-centralized by opening up satellite campuses of some of the major universities, such as the University of Liberia. Meritbased recruitment policies entail a competitive employment procedure across all administrative Counties to ensure that all indigenous groups have equal opportunity to gain employment. 3. Increased Administrative Decentralization for Enhancing Resource Control: Liberia runs a unitary system of government such that resource allocation is centralized from the Government in Liberia to the 16 Counties. As a result of historical oppression and over-centralization socioeconomic development is concentrated in Monrovia. Recent government policy initiatives have increased the Counties access to and control over resources, including those locally generated. Oversight for ensuring the transparent management of funds includes the democratic election of local chiefs who work in collaboration with County officials appointed by the central government. 4. Psychological Profiling of Army and Police Force Personnel: The Minister of Defence and the Inspector General of Policy, during separate interactive sessions, provided information on an identified need to conduct psychological profiling of all force personnel as a means of addressing underlying post-war traumas and ascertain mental fitness to serve the Liberian people dispassionately. 5. Political Access: In order to broaden the political space and make political processes more accessible to the grassroots the Liberian Constitution allows for independent candidacy as well as the election of local chiefs. Independent candidacy is still in an experimental phase and not all the political elite are in favour of it. However, it has given local communities wider choice and enabled them bypass unpopular candidates put forward by the party system. Moreover, the voting system adopted in Liberia promotes inclusive democracy through broader representation of geopolitical and gender-based minorities than the First-Past-the-Post system adopted in Nigeria, which was strongly criticized in the Justice Uwais Electoral Reform Committee Report for not making the vote of every Nigerian count. 6. Professionalism in the Political System: In interactive sessions with civil society groups (10/05/2011) political parties (13/05/2011), both activists and opposition groups attested to the fact that the ruling Unity party had demonstrated professionalism in handling the rule and function of the political parties. In addition, the National Electoral Commission was allowed to function as truly independent. The central government makes a clear distinction between the administration of government and the management of political parties. Most of the 2006 bye elections were won by other parties than the ruling party. The multiparty system is widely adjudged open, free and fair and not muzzled. According to a member of the National Patriotic Party (which emerged from Charles Taylors National Patriotic Front of Liberia), this helped to diminish political conflict and violence.
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011

However, despite these strategies and the largely positive outward picture of peaceful ethnoreligious coexistence, post-war Liberia exhibits underlying signs of potential conflict that could reverse some of the gains of the current administration. Latent signs of discontent became apparent during the SEC 33 study tour and are summarized below: 1. Census Data: The official census figures depicting Christians (85%), Muslims (12%) and African Traditional Religion (0.5%) is strongly contested by Muslims, particularly the Mandingos. According to Sheikh A. Konne, of the National Muslim Council of Liberia (Interactive Session 06/05/2011), ATR practitioners constitute the majority of the population at no less than 40%, followed by Muslims and then Christians (though he did not provided estimates for the latter two religions. The Sheikh also cited documents that provide evidence of a long history of prejudice against the Mandingo ethnic group, who are predominantly Muslims and who migrated to Liberia in the 10th Century as traders. Despite their long history in Liberia they are still perceived as foreigners and marginalized in political appointments. Various reasons were given for this by people from diverse ethno-religious backgrounds including jealousy of Mandingo business acumen and their refusal to integrate with the indigenous population in terms of religious conversion and marriage (of their girls to non-Muslims) etc. 2. Constitutional Issues: The Liberian Constitution does not allow for citizenship or naturalization of people of non-negro descent. According to a top-level executive (Interactive Session 09/05/2011) of the Liberian Chamber of Commerce (LCC) this limits the chances of long-term investments by those who would want to stay in Liberia permanently, thereby undermining the business environment. On the other hand, a senior executive member of the Liberia Business Association (LIBA) countered that the LCC represented the economic interests of foreigners and their Americo-Liberian affiliates to the detriment of indigenous entrepreneurs and traders. 3. Incidents of Ethno-Religious Violence: The Study Group was informed of a few outbreaks of ethno-religious violence since 2010 in Nimba, Lofa and Bong Counties between Muslims and Christians. The conflicts had underlying economic causes, such as land or property boundaries, as well as ideological contestations that revolved around historical animosities. 4. Land Disputes: The issue of land is a ticking time bomb throughout Liberia. One of the Senior Bureaucrats in the Liberian Civil Service (Interactive Session, 12/05/2011) made bold to say that if there is a future war in Liberia it is likely to be because of unresolved land disputes. In fact, the Minister of Interior estimated that there were over three million on-going court cases over land in a country with an estimate population of 14 million people? A good number of the claims to land are based on un-regulated kinship ties among the various communities.
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 The Case of Ghana According to Boafo-Arthur (ibid.) Ghanas ethnic composition is made up of seven main groupings (some sources say four e.g. Langer, 2007) and some smaller ones administered under 10 regional units. The three largest ethnic groupings in Ghana are the Akan (49.1% consisting of the Asanti and Fanti 15% and 10% of total population respectively), the Mole Dagbani (16.5% - a loose grouping of 10 sub-ethnic groups) and the Ewe (12.7%). Many of these ethnic nationalities have distinct political histories, languages, dialects and customs although the bigger groups (i.e. the Akan and Ewe) tend to share strong cultural trajectories and symbols. Ghana is a predominantly Christian country; it has a religious profile of approximately 70% Christians, 16% Muslims and 14% other religions (Ghana Housing and Population Census, 2000 in Langer, 2007:6). Muslims comprise 42% of the three Northern regions (Upper East, Upper West and Northern), and 56% of the latter. Conflicts around religious identity per se have not been discretely articulated in contrast to ethnic identity. Among the ethnic groups, the Akan constitute a demographic majority in five of the countrys 10 regions and have dominated political life with sizeable representation of the Ewe in the military and the civil service (Boafo-Arthur, 2008:61). Consequently, power struggles between the Akan and the Ewe since the 1969 elections were evidence in a series of coups in which the latter played a leading role. In this wise, BoafoArthur acknowledges the potential for the Ghanaian military to be polarized along ethnic lines and draws attention to the dire implications of an ethnically compromised military. Furthermore, voting patterns in the 1969, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections reflected ethnic cleavages. But the most severe ethnic conflicts occurred among the Mole Dagbani in the Northern region as a result of the marginalization of ethnic sub-groups and, according to Langer (2007:2) their relegation as second-class citizens. The most serious violent outbreak occurred in 1994 between the Nanumba and Kokomba leading to almost 2000 deaths and mass migration out of the area. However, these conflicts were largely localized with no serious fall outs or reverberations at the national level. According to Langer, for the most part, identity-based discontent in Ghana is articulated around a shared sense ethno-regional socio-economic deprivation among Christians, Muslims and traditionalists of the less privileged Northern regions. Yet, unlike Liberia and Nigeria, Ghana has enjoyed comparative political stability and relatively contained ethno-religious violent conflicts and tense ethnocentric dichotomies between regions or between the predominantly Muslim North and Christian South have not emerged. Boafo-Arthur (2008:9) accounts for this on the basis of three factors: the incremental and qualitative growth in democratic norms through effective and consensual management of the electoral process (particularly after extensive electoral reforms in 1992 and 1996) in a comparatively transparent mode and the ability to arrive at a consensus regarding the rules governing the contestation for political power. He alludes to Max Webers rational-legal conceptualization of state legitimacy to explain how adherence to the rule of law by political actors in the conduct of free and fair elections built the confidence of the
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 citizenry in the political system institutions and leaders. The second factor relates to Ghanas ability to effectively manage conflicting and competing interests. The third factor is the durability of the political system over time owing to the standardisation of consensual politics and the efficient mechanisms for redress in the conflict resolution process. In addition, Langer (2007:12) underscores a fourth factor, namely attempts by the Kufuor Administration in 2004 to implement economic policies aimed at benefitting the North disproportionately in order to address poverty and inequality in the region. From the foregoing, there is a strong alignment between the factors outlined by Boafo-Arthur and Langer and the three principles underlying Jinadus cultural theory of democracy. Besides these four factors, it is possible to look to two features of Ghanas historical development and traditional make-up that lend themselves to relative political cohesion and stability. One is the visionary nation-building skills of its first premier, Nkwame Nkrumah, who resolved the national identity question by promoting a de-tribalized perspective of one Ghana that persists in the psyche of the average Ghanaian today. Nkrumah refused to be identified on the basis of his ethnic origin or to form political alliances on that platform; this is in contrast to the ethno-regional politics that prevailed in Nigerias First Republic. The second feature concerns Ghanas strong traditional institutions which wield significant influence in providing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, they cannot be said to have been high jacked by the elite as is the case in Nigeria, but remain largely apolitical. However, Boafo-Arthur (2008) warns of the growing danger of ethnic conflict below the faade of peaceful coexistence. In his words, it appears the nation is sitting on a time bomb likely to explode if the socioeconomic gap between the north and the south, which is still substantial, persists or widens. The congruence ethno-regional and socioeconomic identity markers provide ready fodder for the fire of violent communal conflict.

Lessons for Nigeria

By sheer population (over 140 million) and size Nigeria is easily Africas most ethnically diverse nation with over 400 ethno-linguistics groups. Our own painful experience of the 1960-1966 war and bitter experience of protracted civil strife in other African countries such as Liberia warrants that all necessary measures are taken to avoid the escalation of ethnoreligious conflict. The central challenge facing Nigeria concerns how to reconfigure the political system in such a manner as to make appeal to identity markers for political purposes unnecessary or unprofitable (Jinadu, 2001). Since 1994, especially 2001, the perennial Jos crisis has progressed into an all-out ethnoreligious confrontation between indigenous and non-indigenous Christians on the one hand and the non-indigenous Hausa-Fulani on the other. The most recent causes of the conflict date back to the creation of the Jos North Local Government by the Babangida Administration in response to the significant Hausa-Fulani population but in defiance of the
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 wishes of the indigenous population. Contestations over ownership, however, date back to the era just prior to the close of colonial administration (Best 2004; PIDA, 2010). The Jos conflict, like communal conflicts in other parts of Nigeria (e.g. Ife/Modakeke, Jukun/Tiv/Fulani), revolve around the quest for political and economic control. On the surface, it seems to be a straightforward contest between the predominantly Muslim Hausa town dwellers and Fulani pastoralists on the one side and the predominantly Christian indigenous populace on the other, with the non-indigenous migrant population thrown into the fray relevant to their religious affiliation. In addition to the strong ideological undertones to the mobilization of ethno-religious sensibilities, analysts pinpoint underlying manipulations of the gullible grassroots by the political elite for self-centred material interests as well as the pervading failure of the state to provide effective governance and thereby create the conditions for ethno-religious harmony (Best, 2001, 2007; Adetula, 2005; Gwamna, 2006; Egwu, 2009; Ostien, 2009; Adam, 2010). Jos, and by extension Plateau State, is now seriously polarized along ethno-religious lines, particularly with regard to residential areas, social interaction and political mobilization. People reside in religiously defined communities and limit or eliminate movements to potentially dangerous locations. In the wake of the 2010 violence new safe markets sprung up in Gyel, Rukuba Road and Bauchi Ring Road to further minimize socioeconomic contact between Christians and Muslims etc. Political polarization throughout the state was quite evident during the 2011 Presidential elections, as in other parts of Nigeria. Plateau State election results showed a clear voting pattern where predominantly Christian LGAs voted for President Goodluck Jonathan and largely Muslim LGAs voted General Muhammadu Buhari. The Jos conflict has raised national and international concern because of the likely spill over effects if left unchecked. Amidst widespread allegations and evidence of the complicity of political actors and an ethno-regionally and religiously compromised military, the Jos crisis, as in Ghana, also threatens to be a ticking time bomb. Once it is detonated there is no telling who it may blow to pieces or where the shrapnel will fall. Consequently, the foregoing discussion on Liberia and Ghana highlights some critical learning points: 1. The use of alternative cultural mechanisms for political re-engineering and conflict management needs to be explored in order to address feelings of alienation and marginalization in the polity. The Federal Character commission should be empowered with legally backed requisite compliance powers to provide effective redress for citizens, with free access to Legal AID services from federal to local levels. 2. The functional devolution of power away from the centre giving more autonomy and resource control to ethnic nationalities in a proportional power sharing arrangement, such as in Ghana, is crucial for confidence building in the political system. In Ghana monies designated for redressing patterns of disadvantage in development in the
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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011 Northern regions were to be managed directly by local communities based on selfdefined needs and priorities. 3. The Liberian crises is a clear warning to those fanning the flames of ethno-religious sentiments in Nigeria, particularly in the Jos conflict that the resultant violence is beyond the prediction of those who stoke the embers of identity-based hatred. 4. From the successes of WIPNET in Liberia we also learn the value of including all constituencies in peace building and post-war reconstruction. 5. Political professionalism towards broad-based and inclusive democracy will serve to defuse political tension. A credible, transparent, free and fair electoral system lies at the heart of promoting nationalist sentiments over primordial cleavages as the systems in Liberia and Ghana clearly demonstrate.

Conclusion
This paper drew on conflict research and practical lessons from Liberia and Ghana to argue that identity-based conflicts are here to stay and cannot be wished or even legislated away. Conversely, they must be effectively managed and their positive elements channelled towards accommodation, consensus and healthy competition. This calls for a consultative process of constitutional and political re-engineering, as argued by Jinadu (2007) within a framework of African traditional values and institutional mechanisms in a manner compatible with inclusive democratic principles. For further study, it would be useful to investigate the exact nature and effectiveness of formal mechanisms (laws, policies, organisations and schemes) put in place for national integration in Liberia, Ghana and similar cultural contexts in other developing countries. This would serve to highlight good practices employed to maximize the potentials and minimize the pitfalls of cultural diversity as a viable stepping stone to accelerated national development.

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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011

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