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45459; 13 MAR 1937] Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of

Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government. GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981] Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed: a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the

Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated. Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated. Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [405 SCRA 497;GR 153888; 9 JUL 2003] Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic

organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office. On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Issue: Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. Held: It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a

food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, Ilocos Norte [GR 27588, 31 December 1927] Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, Ilocos Norte [GR 27588, 31 December 1927] En Banc, Avancena (J): 5 concur Facts: The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the municipality of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public streets. On the south side is a part of the church yard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, containing an area of 1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north side is an old cemetery with two of its walls still standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower, the base of which may still be seen, containing a total area of 8,955 square

meters. As required by the provincial board, the Church paid on 3 July 1925, under protest, the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent and the lot which formerly was the cemetery with the portion where the tower stood. The Church filed an action for the recovery of the sum paid by it to Board by way of land tax, alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal. The lower court absolved the Board from the complaint in regard to the lot adjoining the convent and declared that the tax collected on the lot, which formerly was the cemetery and on the portion where the tower stood, was illegal. Both parties appealed from this judgment. Issue: Whether the churchyard, the adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, and the old cemetery, besides the church and the convent, are exempt from land taxes. Held: The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c] Administrative Code) refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. It therefore must, in this sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the use of larger tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes under the exemption. Also, land used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, not for commercial purposes, comes within the exemption. It cannot be taxed according to its former use (cemetery).