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21 January 2002 *>
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SUBJECT: Interview With Major Gregory A. Krager, United States Air Force (USAF),
Air National Guard (ANG) C-4 Senior Permanent Party Staff, ANG Crisis Action Team
1. Krager is a regular USAF officer. Has been assigned to the National Guard Bureau
(NGB) for four years in the C-4 organization. Has been working at the ANG CAT
2. Krager said biggest problem has been that the USAF and the NGB do not understand
each other. Access to the ANG is confusing and too many people are involved. We
limited our mistakes hi the ANG C-4 call-ups this time, compared to Operation Allied
Force hi 1999, by not mobilizing our units instantly upon getting call-up messages.
Have waited this time for validated requirements. Can tailor the requirements for
mobilization. In Allied Force, lots of people mobilized who were not needed.
3. Air Control Squadrons (ACS) and Ah" Defense Sectors (sectors already there?) were
stood up first in the C-4 community in response to terrorist attacks on the CONUS on
11 September 2001. ACS try to help you find enemy aircraft and then shoot them
down. Our ANG aircraft controllers were sent to Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) centers to validate threats that showed up on the latters' radar and then to get
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authority for NORAD's CONR [i.e., Continental United States Region] region to
shoot down those threats. Total of 30 aircraft controllers sent to FAA (10 centers x 3
controllers each). Controllers would also monitor gaps in radar coverage. Still doing
all of this. Relied on a combination of ANG volunteers and then partial mobilization
4. Base communications support was critical after our ANG bases went to 24/7
operations on 11 September 2001. Had to make sure all ANG wings had classified
and unclassified computers and telephones. Volunteers for this mission tapered off
after 60 to 90 days. Had to rely then on partial mobilization. Units with fighter
combat air patrols (CAPs) had the biggest requirements for increased base
5. Needed better radar coverage within the CONUS. Turned to Air Control Squadrons
(ACS). Wisconsin unit (128th) with radar sent to cover Chicago. Oregon unit (116th)
sent to Washington state to cover Whiteby Island. Kansas unit (134th) sent to
6. Starting in late September and then into October, sent mainly combat
communications units overseas first [for Operating Enduring Freedom]. Also sent
communications units sent to Turkey and central Asia. Sent initial teams to scope out
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what was required then sent the rest to set up long haul communications, SATCOM,
and microwave communications. Have about 200 of these folks in theater. No big
difficulties..
7. Most surprising aspect of the current situation has been the need of the active duty
Enduring Freedom requirements]. ANG did not like this. USAF borrowed land
mobile radios, repeaters, UHF satellite equipment, arid (?). USAF had to upgrade a
lot of this borrowed equipment to meet its requirements. Some doubts whether ANG
8. Basically a three-step process in deploying our ANG C-4 assets overseas for
Operation enduring Freedom. First to go were the combat communications units that
set up long haul satellite communications and UHF radios. Then, eventually we got
lots of E&I people over there after bed down locations were established in the AOR.
They wired the bases for communications. Combat Communications folks were
supposed to leave at this point but were kept in theater for sustainment purposes.
Finally, as airfields were captured, air traffic control assets and air control assets
were sent in to determine threats and then to direct attacks on those threats.
9. When special operations (193rd SOW?) went in to the AOR, had to send in 193 SOW
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10. Eventually had to mobilize ANG personnel for the Aerospace Expeditionary Foeces
(AEFs). Began deploying such persLel on 1 December 2001. Mobilized for 120
days with 90 days in the sand for mission. Rest of the time was for spin-up time
(ANG mob requirement has been 72 hours for decades with no spinup?), leave, and
spin downtime. Did mobilization for AEFs 9 and 10. Only 51 ANG C-4 community
11. ANG C-4 community getting ready to support the 2002 Winter Olympics. Providing
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CHARLES J. GROSS, Ph.D.
NGB-PAI-H
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