The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes

University of Utah Western Political Science Association
The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes Author(s): Robert H. Dix Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), pp. 554-573 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447341 . Accessed: 01/05/2013 11:23
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THE BREAKDOWN
OF AUTHORITARIAN
ROBERT H. Dix
REGIMES
RiceUniversity belatedlyby part students of comparative politicsto the clearlyrelated,thoughhardly most identical, questionofthebreakdownof democratic regimes. Similarly, studentsof military and of authoritarian governments, regimesgenerally, have been far more interested in the reasons for militaryintervention in thanin thecauses or processofthedemiseofauthoritarianism. politics Only latelyhas thisbegun to change. In recentyears,forexample, there have been a spate of scholarly analyses of Latin America's latestversionof the bureaucratic-authoritarian authoritarianism, (B-A) regime.2 In the earlier writingsconcerningsuch regimes it was often at least implicitly treatedas the new paradigm of Latin America's politicalfuture,following upon those earlier,failedparadigmsof democracyand socialistrevolution. That is, B-A regimeswere presumedto be boththewave ofthe future and a relatedas theywere to Latin America's situation condition, semi-permanent ofinternational dependencyand the supposed end ofthe import-substitution of economic phase development. More recent scholarship,however, has and to address such begun to questionor qualifysome of thoseformulations ofsuch regimes, as well as the questionsas theweaknessesand vulnerabilities causes and conditions oftheir possibledemise.3 littlecomparative attention Nonetheless,there still has been remarkably breakdown4(apart, thatis, paid to how and whyauthoritarian governments fromstudiesof certainparticularcases). Can some generalpatterns be dis-
ofscholarly concern withtheconditions ofdemocracy have 5YrEARS been followedrather recent attentionon the of
'For the conditionsof democracy see, in particular, Dahl (1971); forthe pioneeringwork on democratic breakdowns see Linz and Stepan (1978). 2Such regimeswould include contemporaryBrazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, as well as, by some Mexico, and Peru (1968-80). Their characteristicsare usually said to include dominadefinitions, tion by a coalition consistingof the military(acting as an institution in contrastto militaryleaders acting personalistically), civilian technocrats, the industrial bourgeoisie, and the agents and managers of foreigncapital. B-A regimes are "exclusivist" in that they remove fromthe effective political systemmany (particularlyamong the lower classes) of the previouslymobilized; they are, in addition, typicallyhighlyrepressive. On B-A regimes see especially Collier (1979), especially the chapter by Guillermo O'Donnell; also Malloy (1977), and O'Donnell (1973). 3This is particularly true of Collier (1979), though also see the chapter by Douglas Chalmers in Malloy (1977), and Chalmers and Robinson (1980). 4The term "breakdown" will be used here to encompass overthrow,collapse, "voluntary" exit or any combination thereof that implies the demise of a regime. "Breakdown" at any given point in time does not of course necessarilyimply an indefinitely prolonged condition. However, in three of our cases (see below), breakdown has (so far) meant a "permanent" change in the political system. Thus, two countries, i.e., Colombia and Venezuela, have become democracies (after briefinterformof authoritarianism). regnums); Cuba has become Communist (at the least, a very different The other three countries-Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Peru-have experienced varying periods of democratic and authoritarian rule since the "breakdown" discussed here. See Wiarda (1980: chapter 2) foran analysis of such cyclical patternsin Latin American politics.
TheBreakdown Regimes 555 ofAuthoritarian cerned?Is thereeven a kind of model of breakdown?And ifso, how might from such a pattern or model differ thatofdemocratic breakdown? In an initialattempt to throwsome lighton such questions,the following six cases of dictatorship have been selected: Juan Per6n in Argentina, Manuel Odria in Peru, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Marcos Perez Jimenezin Venezuela, FulgencioBatistain Cuba, and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Togethertheyconstitute the universeof clearcutcases a specified ofauthoritarian breakdown within regionand timeperiod. All are fromLatin America, thus making it possible to hold such variables as cultureand historical constant.Too, each of backgroundrelatively in questionfallsbroadlywithin thecountries themiddle "stages" ofdevelopment, as do most Latin American countries,at least as measured by such standardindicators as GNP per capita, level of urbanization,and literacy.5 All our cases are fromthe years 1955-61. The international contextis thus held roughlyconstant,while the distance in time fromthe presentpermits reliance on substantialaccumulated scholarship.Each of the regimes in a particuquestionwas led by a military strongman. Togethertheyrepresent lar variantof authoritarianism, the personalistic dictatorship (i.e., in which as a cortheregimeclearlycenters on one man, as distinct from themilitary poratebody). Six cases have the advantage of constituting a much broader empirical basis forthe construction than the singlecase of generalizablepropositions study,while stillremainingmanageable in number and allowing forsome to the design as detailed treatment. Obviously, thereare limitations fairly well. Six cases may be betterthan one in certainrespects,but theyare still to one time,one region,and one sub-type of onlysix; and theyare confined can onlybe suggestive, theauthoritarian phenomenon.Any derivedpatterns and a call forfurther therefore verymuchto thepoint. comparisons Our immediate purpose, then, is to analyze the above-citedcases of authoritarian commoncauses and patterns collapse witha view to extracting thatseem to applyin at least theseinstances. (as well as to denotedifferences) The larger,more tentative, intentis to providesome comparativereferents forthe analysis of the breakdownof authoritarian regimesgenerally,and even perhaps for the breakdown of regimes of whateverkind, wherever found.
THE CASES IN BRIEF
We beginwithshort ofthesix cases ofbreakdownin orderto descriptions an our evidential base for provide analysis.6These followin chronological orderofthefinalcollapseoftherespective regimes.
5Basing theircategorization on data fromthe 1950s and very early 1960s, Bruce Russett et al., (1964: 293-303) classifiedthe nations of the world into five "stages of development." All of the countries analyzed here were classifiedas either Stage III ("transitional" societies) or Stage IV ("industrial revolution" societies). Within this middle range, however, there was considerable variation, from Peru and the Dominican Republic at itslower reaches, to Argentinaand Venezuela at the higher.
6Descriptions of the rise and fall of five of the six regimes discussed here (all except that of Trujillo) appeared in Szulc (1959).
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(uan Domingo Peron)7 Argentina Colonel Juan Peron was a memberof a group of officers who in 1943 of Argentina.From his engineereda coup against the civiliangovernment of labor (in additionto his post in the positionas thehead of the department war ministry) Per6n was able to use the influence he acquired over the labor movement,plus his wife,Eva's, timelyassistancein mass mobilization,to win the presidencyin a substantially freeelectionin 1946. Per6n's victory came despitethe oppositionof mostofthe extantArgentine politicalparties, the United States government, and even some among Per6n's erstwhile comrades. military Peron's earlyyearsin powerwere characterized of by the nationalization various foreign of national(as well as by othermanifestations enterprises ism), by extensivewage increases and other benefitsforworkers,and by measurestakenagainsthis opponentsin thepress,the increasingly repressive the courts,and elsewhere. Reelected in a somewhatless than universities, freeelectionin 1951, Per6n began to experienceincreasing oppositionto his rule. He had alienatedArgentina'selites,much of itsmiddleclass, and even the Church, which had initially looked on him with favor. The economy foundered forseveral reasons: lavish concessionsto labor and an attendant decline in productivity, sectorin the penalties imposed on the agricultural ofwould-beindustrialization, interest and theexhaustion offoreign exchange reservesbuilt up duringWorld War II. Even Peron's nationalismbecame in domesticoil exploration. suspectwhen he agreed to foreign participation military Attempted coups occurredin 1951, again inJune 1955, and finally, theone thattoppledhim,in September1955. Peru (Manuel Odria)8 economic situation, and an attempted coup Strikes, a deteriorating elements of the Alianza Popular against a civilian government by leftist Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) party, triggereda militarycoup in October 1948, led by General Manuel Odria, in at least tacitalliance with Peru's landed and commercial elites. Though confirmedin power by a single-candidateelection in 1950, Odria's alliance with the so-called oligarchybecame more and more tenuous as the resultof actions which includedsome tentative efforts to build his own base of support,especiallyin theslumsof Lima, and an increasing reluctance on the partof some military to continuetheirde factosupportof the "oligarchy." Initialstepsto officers effect theelectionof a compliantsuccessorprovedabortivein thefaceofboth and civilianopposition,withtheresultthatOdria peacefully military yielded office to an electedciviliannot of his choice at the end of his scheduledterm in 1956.
7Principal sources forthe followingdescriptionof Peron's fall, and the subsequent analysis, included: Potash (1972, 1980), and Whitaker(1956, 1964). "Principal sources on Odria's fall, and for the subsequent analysis, included: Collier (1975); Arnold Payne (1968); James Payne (1965); and Pike (1967).
TheBreakdown Regimes 557 ofAuthoritarian Colombia (Gustavo Rojas Pinilla)9 In 1953 Colombia was under the civilian,thoughessentially authoritarthe led Laureano Gomez. rule of the faction of Conservative ian, by party With the countrywracked by violence between Liberal and Conservative partisans, and with the Conservatives sharply factionalized, General assumed power in June 1953 with Gustavo Rojas Pinilla ratherreluctantly the connivanceof the anti-G6mezwing of the Conservativesand the good wishesofmostLiberals. It was not long, however,beforeit became clear that Rojas was more a Third in perpetuating in power-and even in founding interested himself labor confederation Force politicalmovementand a government-sponsored to help accomplish that end-than he was in returningpower to the country'scivilianpoliticiansin any near future.Repressiveactionsnotably includedthecensoring, and eventualclosing,of severaloftheleading organs of the nation's press, and the so-called "bullringmassacre" of February5, oftheregimewho 1956, when agentsoftheregimeattackedand killedcritics in public. By 1956 most Liberals, the dared to demonstrate that criticism and and even many among the Conservativefaction Church,moststudents, had turned some in the military who had originally him, against supported when earlyin 1957 Rojas soughtto legitimize Rojas. Oppositioncrystallized his rule (througha regime-selected Constituent Assembly)foranotherfour a "civic strike" involving years. The resultswere studentdemonstrations, thevoluntary banks and and the defection of the of businesses, closing many thedictator's cause. Rojas fellfrom armyfrom powerMay 10, 1957. Venezuela (Marcos PerezJimenez)'0 Marcos Perez Jimenezwas one of a military triumvirate that succeeded to power when the army overthrew a civilian governmentin November 1948. By 1950 he had become the clearlydominantleader upon the assassination of the head of the junta. In 1952 Perez Jimenez had himselfconfirmedin power by means of a blatantlyfraudulent electoralcount. His regime was characterizedby the brutal repressionof the main civilian labor and opposition party, Accion Democratica (AD) and its affiliated of massive public works,and by peasant organizations, by the construction blatant corruption.In the process Perez Jimenez alienated many among civilianpoliticiansand the clergywho had originally withthe sympathized Massive civilianpromilitary's depositionof the pre-1948AD government. test demonstrations and strikes,as well as business opposition,led to his deposition by themilitary inJanuary1958. Cuba(FulgencioBatista)"I When FulgencioBatistarelinquished in 1944 he had been the presidency
9Principal sources on the fall of Rojas Pinilla, and for the subsequent analysis, included: Berry, Hellman and Solaun (1980); Dix (1967); and Martz (1962). '?Principal sources on the fall of Perez Jimenez, and forthe subsequent analysis, included: Alexander (1964); Blank (1973); Levine (1973) and Taylor (1968). "Principal sources on the fallof Batista, and forthe subsequent analysis, included: Dominguez (1978); Gonzalez (1974); MacGaffey and Barnett(1962); Gude (1969); Perez (1976); and Thomas (1971).
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the predominantfigurein Cuban politics since 1933 when, as an army officers. sergeant,he had led a revoltof noncommissioned Followingeight to power rule, Batistasoughtto return yearsofcivilian(albeit rather corrupt) as a candidatein the 1952 election.Facing certaindefeat(and by by running now a colonel), he assumed power as the leader of a military coup. A subto his rule. sequent"election" (1954) soughtto givean aura oflegitimacy of the Ortodoxo party(includingFidel Students,and civilianpoliticians Castro) activelyopposed Batista fromthe start,withan uprisingoccurring on July26, 1953, led by Castro. Acts of urban terrorism, as well as guerrilla his rule, but warfare,plagued Batista from several quarters throughout Castro's return from exile in December 1956 to lead the 26th especiallyafter ofJuly movementfromthe mountainsof easternCuba. With his army increasinglyineffective against the guerrillas,and with the United States' aid withdrawn military earlyin 1958, Batista's regimemore or less disintethe end by installinga puppet president grated. The attemptto forestall in a election in November (chosen rigged 1958) failed,and BatistafledCuba onJanuary1, 1959. Dominican Republic (Rafael Trujillo)12 As commanderof the National Guard which had been organized and trainedby United States Marines duringthe 1920s, Rafael Trujillo seized power in 1930 and for the ensuing thirty years remained dictatorof the Dominican Republic. At times he personallyoccupied the presidency;at other relatives or otherpuppets. Increasingly over junctureshe ruledthrough theyearshe (and his family and close associates)tightened their hold overthe and mostotherareas ofnational economy,as well as overthepoliticalsystem a kindofpersonalfiefdom. life,makingofthecountry Considerablemodernization ofa materialkindtookplace in the Dominican Republic duringTrujillo's yearsin power; at the same timethemethods of rule were unusually harsh and tyrannical.Trujillo was finallybrought down by assassinationin 1961, triggered thatincludedsome by a conspiracy ofhis erstwhile close associates,althoughmembersof his family carriedon a brief for several months thereafter. post-regnum
THE CAUSES OF BREAKDOWN
To what, then, may we attribute the causes of breakdownof these six authoritarian in regimesa generationago? Clearly there were differences detail and circumstance. But were therefactors in common? Is theresuch a thingas a generalizableprocess of breakdown(at least as applied to these cases)? Failure ofPerformance An initial,and plausible, suppositionwould be that poor regime performance-especiallyin the economic area-had played a major role in the in question. After all, inflation, collapse of the governments unemployment,
'2Principal sources on the fall of Trujillo, and for the subsequent analysis, included: Wiarda (1968, 1980).
TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian Regimes 559 declinesin ratesof growth or personalincome,and othereconomicills seem to have been associatedwithunscheduledchangesofgovernment throughout muchofmodernhistory.13 The evidence in our six cases is nonethelessdistinctly mixed. There is littleindication,forexample, thateconomic factors were an important contributionto the fall of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, although there was at some of his extravagant on public worksand his resentment expenditures neglectof ruralareas; and therewas a modesteconomicslump in 1957. But investment, by such standardindicatorsas economic growthrates, foreign revenues,and thelike,theyears 1950-57in themain comprised government a boom era. Unemployment,though always high in Venezuela, was no thanusual; norwas therea particular inflationary problem. higher offin economicperAlthoughin Peru after1953 therewas some falling formance, especiallyin the exportsector,the Odria yearswere on the whole prosperousones.14 There is, moreover,littleevidence that opposition to Odria's continuationin officecenteredaround questions of the country's overalleconomicperformance. in a satisfacThe Cuban economy duringthe Batista years performed if and accord economics fashion, only a tory, unspectacular, many analysts small role in the downfallof the Batista dictatorship (Draper, 1962: 3-59; considerable(though Suarez, 1967: xiii). Dominguez, however, attributes still secondary) importanceto an economic decline in Batista's last year and among (1958) thathelped to alienate many in the business community organized labor who had previouslyacquiesced in his rule (Dominguez, 1978: 121-22). Coffee prices rose sharplyduring the early years of the Rojas Pinilla regime,thenslumped by early 1957. That "bad luck," plus a higherinflation rate and various signs of economic mismanagement,contributedto withRojas. Yet the groundswell business' disaffection of oppositionto the well was under before such economic downturn,and for dictatorship way most of Rojas' antagonists the oppositionappeared to have primarily noneconomicroots. In the case of the Dominican Republic there was a distinctfall-off in after economicperformance about 1955, whichseems to have led to increasamong businessmento the fateof the Trujillo regimeand, ing indifference to outright eventually, oppositionon the partof some of them. Interestingly, however,Wiarda argues thateconomic decline was in thisinstancein substantial part only the indirectresult of both internal and international on Trujillo whichin turn led to variouseconomiccostsand excesses pressures lavish on and securityforces)that proved armaments expenditures (e.g., damagingto theregime(Wiarda, 1968: 160).
3For example, most Latin American countries experienced one or more such changes in the wake of the worldwide depression thatbegan in 1929.
14Though a depression hit Peru's exports followingthe end of the Korean War in 1953, the ochenio
(eight-yearrule) was on the whole an economic success. The rate of increase in the cost of living declined, and real wages rose, in almost every year between 1948 and 1956. Foreign investment, and with it industrial, mining, and petroleum production, soared, while government revenues tripled; seeJames Payne (1965: 20, 24, 33); Pike (1967: 290-93); and Szulc (1959: 194, 200).
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did appear to On thefaceofitthePeron regime'seconomicperformance ofthe government. have a directand primary impacton the stability Having reservesin the nationalizaexpendedArgentina'swartimeforeign currency tionofthe British-owned and havingdecreed railwaysand otherenterprises, a seriesof generouswage and benefit increasesforArgentine workers-resultingin a gain in real wages-Peron after1949 (and especiallyafter1952) was faced with increasinginflationary pressures,declines in productivity in (especially agriculture),foreigninvestment,and foreignexchange reserves,and a partialreversalof the earlierincreasesin real wages. Not only did such setbacksserveto solidify the earlyoppositionof Argentina'smiddle and upper classes to Per6n, but they made it impossible to continue his "shirtlessones"). His largesseto his favoreddescamisados (workers,literally economicwoes also led Per6n to sanctionan oil exploration contract witha U.S. company and to seek generallyto encourage foreign investment contraryto his highlytouted nationalism. Even so, it remains doubtfulthat economic failureswere the leading cause of oppositionto Per6n, or of his finaloverthrow.15 In short,economic performance did tend to weaken toward the end of all of our cases, comparedto the strong virtually showingsin the earlyyears of the respective have There been of a "J-curve" regimes. may something effect at workwhere,so James Davies (1969: 690) has argued, "a prolonged and gratifications is followed periodof raisingexpectations by a shortperiod of sharp reversalduringwhichthe gap between expectations and gratifications quicklywidens and becomes intolerable," resulting in "revolution." Yet the economic downturns were not reallyverysharp in most cases, and overalleconomicperformance was more impressive than in mostof the previous or subsequent regimes. More important,the preponderanceof the evidence indicates that serious opposition tended to precede weakening economic performance and to centeron other,more directly political,conwas forthe most part a cerns,as we shall see. In all, economicperformance cause of the fallof (at least secondary(thoughnot necessarily unimportant) regimes.16 these)authoritarian To be sure,thereare aspectsofeconomicperformance otherthangrowth balance of trade, unemployment, and the like-income rerates, inflation, forexample, or agrarianreform. Yet thereis little in distribution, suggestion the literature that failureto carryout such policies was a factorin regime breakdown(unless one were to argue that thoroughgoing revolution might have assured long-termstability).17 Attemptsby Per6n and, much more hesitantly, Rojas and Odria, to favorworkersor the "popular classes" in one or anotherrespectprobablydid help to alienate important groups and
'5Thus, according to Potash (1972), there was little involvement in policy matters during the Peron years on the part of the militarythat overthrewhim, and there is every indication in his analysis (and others') that the motivationsforPeron's overthrowwere primarilynoneconomic. In fact, as Potash concludes elsewhere, the economic situation in 1954-55 was much improved over that of 1951-52 and "the economy was not in a stage of imminentcrisis" (Potash, 1980: 170-71). '6In general, according to Nordlinger (1977: 199), the economic growth performance of military regimesin the Third World is neithermuch better,nor much worse, than thatofcivilian regimes. '7See Huntington(1968: chapter 5) forthis general argument.
TheBreakdown Regimes 561 ofAuthoritarian thus contributeto the demise of their governments.Such considerations draw us somewhataway fromeconomicperformance, however,and will be laterin anotherconnection. treated A criticalaspect of regimeperformance otherthan the economic is the maintenanceof public order. With but one exception,however,failureto preservethe domesticpeace was not a principalfactorin breakdown(other thantheobvious factthatall but Odria wereeventually overthrown by force, and thatin Batista's case violentefforts to depose him were continuousforat least two yearsbeforehis collapse). The exceptionwas Colombia, wherethe factthat rural violence had once more accelerated aftera year or two of decline was an important "negative" in the eyes of Rojas' eventual In none ofour cases was defeatin war or similarforeign failure opponents.18 a significant factor in breakdown. Regime Delegitimation Ifnot,at least forthemostpart,performance, thenwhat? Most Latin Americansocietiestend to be "praetorian" in Huntington's sense thattheirgovernments, of whateverpoliticalstructure or complexion, tend to lack legitimacy in the proceduralsense that thereis no commonlymeans of winningand retaining agreed or definitive power. Every political actoremployshis or her own means and resourcesto make himself or herself felt in thepoliticalprocess,mediatedonlyweaklyor intermittently directly by such entitiesas aggregativepoliticalparties or legislatures.Every governmentor governing coalitionis necessarily"tentative."19 This problemis, if accentuatedin the case of authoritarian take anything, regimesthatinitially even a formal constitutional mandate. powerwithout There is, however,anothersense in whichmostoftheregimesunderdiscussion had a fairlywidely accepted claim to rule. That is, they were or appropriategovernment under the politicalcirregardedas the necessary cumstancesby a significant segmentof the society.In the cases of at least Per6n and Rojas Pinilla, supportfortheirinitialclaims to office probably of the population. The Venezuelan coup of comprisedan absolute majority 1948 had the active or tacitsupportof most non-AD sectors,and the 1948 Peruviancoup thebackingofmostanti-Apristas, who wereweekingan end to turmoil and of defense the statusquo. Both Trujillo socioeconomic political and Batista at first lacked the same kind of "secondary" or "crisis" legitimationas the others;both essentially forcedtheirway to power in order to forestall electoraldefeat. Yet Trujillo, at least, was able over the ensuing forhis rule in the eyes of a great yearsto establisha real aura of legitimacy lack claimsto thiskindof manyDominicans. Even Batistadid not altogether "legitimacy,"although theyweretheweakestamong thesix dictatorships. Yet in the absence of a generallyaccepted mode of attainingpower, ifit can be called that,are regimesdependenton such secondarylegitimacy,
sThe violence, when it resumed in 1954, also appeared to take on a new potentialformass mobilization and class warfare,in addition to its basic nature of a partisan conflictamong the followersof the elite-ledConservative and Liberal parties; see in thisconnection Dix (1980).
"gForthe concept of praetorianismsee Huntington (1968: chapter 4); forthe tentativenature of Latin American regimessee Anderson (1967: chapter 4).
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ofcourseextraordinarily in dependenton regimebehavior,and effectiveness out promisedtasks,whether or to carrying theybe oppositionto corruption, of order and stability;or the promotionof communism; the enforcement materialprogress, Thus Peron, whojustified or socialjustice.20 nationalism, his actionsin part on the groundsthathe would build a new Argentinafree offoreign to domination,in thelatteryearsofhis regimeturnedincreasingly investorsto pull his countryout of its economic difficulties. foreign Rojas Pinilla,as earliernoted,failedto put an end to theviolence.Pressureto bring an end to the regimesof Rojas, Perez Jimenez, and Odria came to a head when it became clear that theirclaims to temporary rule in order to right certainwrongsofthepreviousorderhad been forgotten in the interest ofperin themselves Batista's claims to sort of were power. petuating any legitimacy weak fromthe start,but theblatantcorruption of the regime,itsties bothto the U.S. government and to U.S. privateinterests, and its failureto maintainpublicorder,notonlyin thecountryside but (against Castro's guerrillas) in the citiesas well, helped dissipatesuch claims as he did have. Lastly, in arena where his rule was at first Trujillo's case it was in the international most seriouslyand importantly questioned. Of this,however,more will be said laterin anotherconnection. Each of the dictatorships did seek formallegitimation, throughsuch devices as elections,legislatures, constitutional changes, and the like. Such devicesdid not in any case reflect the real bases of power, nor did theyconstitute thedictators'principalclaim to legitimacy (exceptperhapsin the case of the 1946 election in Argentina). In fact, some of these "legal" actions actually accelerated the downfallof the regime by making its fraudulent claim to power, or the prospectfor its indefinite continuance,that much more patent.This was notoriously the case in Venezuela wherethe aborted 1952 electiondrove a number of the regime's erstwhile collaboratorsinto opposition,and again in 1957 when a plebiscitewhich "re-elected" Perez Jimenezprovedthefinalstrawformany. An additionalsourceofputativelegitimacy formostoftheseregimeswas theimprimatur oftheCatholicChurch,granted either because ofreal or proclaimed actionson behalfof Church interests and values, or because of the commonpolicyof the Church of accommodatingitself to incumbents in the ofinstitutional interest survival.Yet in virtually case state and Church every came into conflictand the regime lost that importantsanction of moral as well. Thus Peron, forexample, eventuallyturnedagainst the legitimacy Church, whose blessinghe had earlier sought to invoke in supportof his claim to embodythetraditional values oftheArgentine nation. in the sense thatmost regimesin any case are in praetorian Illegitimate theseauthoritarian also tendedto lose-some politicalsystems, governments much more rapidlythanothers-theirinitialclaimsto represent the national or to resolve criticalnational problems. Regimes of exception to interest beginwith,theyfailedto live up to their proclaimedreasonsforbeing. It was in this sense that theirperformance fell short. They came increasingly to appear as mere personalistic dictatorships seekinglittlebeyond the perpetuationin powerofa man and a clique.
20For thetrade-off between and effectiveness, see Lipset legitimacy (1959).
Regimes 563 TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian " Coalition " andthe"Negative "Narrowing Regime A kind of delegitimation was, then, one aspect of the process of breakwas theerosionofthe linked but analytically down. Another, distinct, closely and its coalition initial replacement by a "negative support regimes' of the groupsand indicoalition" based largelyon the perceivedself-interest in the sense we have used the term, viduals involved.While deligitimation, and of the regimein the popular imagination, servedto loosen the moorings affected the more to have a broadlydiffuse directly impact,regimenarrowing makeupoftheregimeitself. Militarycoups in modern Latin America are seldom the work of an came to Each ofour six dictators and his band offollowers. individualcaudillo of an the tacit at least the active or with array acquiescence, support, power of interests, groups, and social classes (fairlybroad in scope in cases like Peron and Rojas Pinilla,least so in thecases ofTrujillo and Batista). Regime of the resultof the strengthening breakdownwhen it came was not primarily of opposition,althoughthisof course occurred,but of the theoriginalforces "narrowing" oftheinitialsupportcoalitionto thepointwhereusuallyonlya clique of regimeintimatesand hangers-onadhered to the waning cause.21 of a "negative coalition" therewas an attendantformation Concomitantly, of the in to the continuance common regime, even when its opposed else. membersmay have agreedon little when army officers Thus politiciansoftenbecame disaffected theyhad counted on to assuage a tumultuouspolitical situation and then shortly them to power not onlyfailedto do so, but began to extendrepression restore of the oppositionto criticsamong theirerstwhileallies. Efforts by Peron, a mass base fortheirgovernments Rojas, and Odria to broaden or solidify the opposition of those among their original supadditionallyintensified in such actions. who saw a threat to themselves porters the regime'soveralleconomicperfrom Policies and budgets(as distinct at were course also of typically issue.22Money spent, and taxes formance) or on lavish levied,in orderto buy thecontinuedsupportofthearmed forces, republic works,or to hold the allegiance of mass publics, were frequently sentedby businessmenand the middle sectors.Policies promotinggreater ran counterto businessmen'spercepin theeconomyoften stateinvolvement tions of appropriateeconomic behavior. Thus the editor of one of Peru's leading newspapers-originallya backer of the Odria coup-came to view of democracyas the only suitablecontextforthe laissez-faire the restoration he favored approach (Cotler, 1978). at least a tacitadherentofeach ofour regimes,and The Church,ifitially in the cases of Per6n,-Perez Jimenez,Trujillo, and Rojas clearlymore than that,sooneror laterbecame in thesecases an elementof the negativecoaliof their own ideologies, mystiques,and tion. The dictators' construction withparallel came in some cases intodirectconflict dependentorganizations attributes oftheChurch. In all fourcases the(usually increasingly) repressive
2 See Fitch oftheoriginal coalition. a gooddiscussion oftheerosion pro-coup (1979) for and outcomes, see Almondand Powell(1978), and Schmitter between thisdistinction 22For outputs (1971).
564
natureof the regimes,and theirgrowingestrangement frommany of their led theChurchto identify bothitsmissionand thelong-run citizens, requirementsofinstitutional survival withforces otherthanthoseofthedictatorship. Thus the dictators lost not only the aura of legitimacy accorded by initially theChurch (as notedearlier)but the supportof Church-related resourcesas well. In at least two of our cases (Peron, Rojas Pinilla) the cause of the Church even became something of a focusforthe counter-legitimacy claims oftheopposition. In everycase at theheartof the narrowing processseems to have been a tendencyto center both the decisions and perquisitesof the regime on a smallerand less representative group of the dictator'sintimates.Partlythis was a matter of personalself-indulgence, in thedictator'snotorious reflected of the or (as with Peron life," enjoyment "high gross personal immorality and PerezJimenez),or personalcorruption (as in all ofour cases exceptthat of Odria). Partly it was a matter of favoritism, nepotism, or the lavish expenditureof public funds on "show" projects of questionable general In any event, therewas a diversionof resourcesfromthe presumed utility. purposesof the originalsupportcoalition(howeverbroad or narrow)to the ofa narrower and narrower benefit particularistic clique. There was, as well, an increasingsensitivity to criticismon the part of the dictatorand his whichoftenled to extremeand counter-productive cohorts,a sensitivity (in the sense thattheystirred Such yet further opposition)acts of repression.23 seem to be inherent vices of at least the kind of personalistic dictatorships under discussionhere. The self-indulgence and and paranoia of the dictator his associatesindeed seem to be centralto theprocessofbreakdown. TheDefection Elites ofRegime Absolutelycrucial to the breakdownof authoritarian regimes(although and narrowing certainlynot unrelated to the processes of delegitimation is the ultimate of the dissolution political keyregimeelite, alreadydiscussed) thearmed forces. The leadersofall six regimeswereprofessional men and came to military withkey backingfromthe armed forces.On the otherhand, power initially werein everycase either reluctant of some, at least,in themilitary supporters the seizure of power or opponents of the coup leader. To retain crucial military support,and to keep to a minimum the inevitabledivisions and oppositionwithinthe armed forces,were therefore paramount considerations forall of these regimes. Each of the dictatorswent out of his way to currymaterial favor with the military.Most increased militarybudgets; severalbuiltlavish military clubs and hospitals;otherspecial privileges and services(e.g., access to importedgoods at discountprices) were common. Yet in the end the same military that played a key role in instituting these regimes,and was pampered by them, played an importantpart in their ultimatedemise, eitherby theiropposition,theirinternaldivisions,or their virtualdisintegration in the face of militarily weak opposition(the case of
23Afewexamplesamong manythatcould be cited includethe above-noted massacrein bull-ring Colombiain February harshmeasures Cuban students; 1956;Batista's (including torture) against and someofPeron'sactions theCatholic Church. against
TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian Regimes 565 Batista's Cuba). In fact,in everyinstance,even well beforethe finalcollapse there were one or more attempted militarycoups, or at least serious from internal thiskeyregimeelitedemandingan earlyend to the pressure,24 dictatorship. One element in disaffection seems to have been the process we have the in the discussed: already weakeningofthe regime'srationaleof rulership the of of civilian and the or of elites, eyes generalpublic key narrowing the regime'sciviliansupportcoalition.The resultwas an increasingisolationof an increasing thearmed forces from therestofthesociety and, often, posture of confrontation as the armed forces were called upon to suppressthe rising civilian opposition. This is not a positionthat the armed forcesare comfortable as withover a long periodof time(i.e., fighting theirown citizenry, itwere, and thuslosingthe military's claim to be the embodiment of national interest and unity). else was at work,however.For thereappears to have been an Something inclinationfor these dictatorships to have become more exclusivist,more withrespectnot onlyto the societyat large, but withrespectto personalistic the armed forcesas a body or institution. In several of the cases-those of Per6n, Perez Jimenez, Rojas, and Odria, quote clearly-there was a real sense in whichthe armed forcesat first had collegiallyassumed the reinsof Yet as timewenton each of thedictatorships became more and government. more closely controlledby one man and an attendantclique of military officers (plus some civilians), with promotions,appointments,and other favorsgoing preferentially to familymembersor close personal associates. The mostnotorious case was thatofTrujillo,who by thelast yearsofhis rule controlled (eitherpersonallyor throughhis familyand friends)perhaps as much as three-quarters of the means of production in the Dominican Republic.25 Yet anothersourceof military resentment was the effort by mostof these men to establishbases of poweror controlapart fromthose(i.e., the armed forces)who had made themwhat theywere. In the case of Per6n it was the unions; in thecase ofRojas Pinilla it was a so-calledThird Force; in thecase of Perez Jimenez it was a dreaded secretpolice apparatus that soughtout dissidents within thearmedforces as well as in othersectors ofsociety. at continuismo, in (i.e., self-perpetuation Finally,therewere the attempts whichmade the regimeappear more a vehicleof a personthan of the office) armed forcesand, not incidentally, blocked access to power forthe potenambitiouswithin themilitary itself. tially Whateverthe specificreason or circumstances, the leaders of all of the on buildingthemselves a regimesin questionbecame more and more intent circleofpersonalpower,and less and less broadlybased on thearmed forces. In theend thedictators could not relyon whathad originally been theprinci24Thus in August 1956, some nine monthsbeforehis fallfrompower, Rojas Pinilla was forcedto make a number of policy concessions (including dropping the idea of a Third Force as a new movement or partydistinctfromthe traditionalLiberals and Conservatives) in the face of militarydemands for his resignation;cf. Szulc (1959: 238-40). 25Trujillo's assets included an estimated 50-60 percent of the arable land in the country,and control of 80 percentof the volume of business in the capital city; Wiarda (1968: 83 and chapter 5 generally).
566
of theircommand. "Narrowing" had occurrednot only in pal instrument relationto the societyat large, but withrespectto important of the segments keyregimeelite,themilitary. Coalescence Opposition Elements of civilian oppositionwere of course presentfromthe start, especiallyon the part of thosepoliticiansor partiesdeposed by the military. with dictatorship. Students,too, oftencame into early conflict Moreover, and broadened in withthe delegitimation tandem grew oppositionnaturally oftheregimeand the narrowing of itssupportcoalition.Yet such opposition tendedto be fragmented, focusedon the particularobjectivesand perspectivesofvariousgroupsand parties.Initially to reverse many soughtprimarily individualpoliciesor actions,not to bringdown thegovernment It was itself. onlywhen the oppositionof a numberof different groupscame to centeron thenecessity ofdismantling theregimeitself, and when thediversestrandsof civilianopponentsof the dictatorship eitherformed into a coalitionor tacitly accepted the dominance of one of them (e.g., Castro and his 26th ofJuly Movementin theCuban case) thattheregime'scollapse was made possible. Such cohesionof theoppositionhad the added consequence of creatinga new counter-legitimacy to the incumbentswhich clearlywent beyond the meredelegitimation notedabove. Perceivingthis,themilitary could thenact to give the finalpush to the dictatorin the name of the new national consensus. Not merely the strength of opposition, then, but its coalescence around the agreed minimum goal of ridding the countryof a particular was critical to theend ofauthoritarianism. dictator, TheInternational Dimension as well as domestic Opposition can of course come frominternational sources, in the formof overt intervention, or, more often,throughwithdrawal of militaryor economic aid or of political approval. There is, evidencethatoppositionderiving from however,little foreign (notablyU.S.) sourcesplayed any significant role in the fallof fourof our six dictatorships. In fact,U.S. aid or sanctionwas continuedright up to theend in threeofthe to preventPer6n's election in countries-Argentina(despite initial efforts Colombia, oppositionwas little 1946),26Venezuela, and Peru. In a fourth, more than symbolicand played no apparent role in Rojas' overthrow.27 In fact,the contrary mightwell be argued in these cases, i.e., thatthe United States played something of a role in sustainingthe regimes.On the whole, and such though, despite gesturesas awarding a decorationas "honorary submariner"to PerezJim6nez,and some measureof economicand military aid, it is improbablethatthe U.S. played a criticalrole eitherin the launchor overthrow ofthesefourgovernments. ing,maintenance,
before Per6n's fall in September 1955, one U.S. official,"upon being received by Peron, 26Shortly made a speech comparing him with Lincoln to the disadvantage of Lincoln." See Porter and Alexander(1961: 192). 27U.S. displeasure with Rojas was shown in several ways: Ambassador Philip Bonsal's attendance at an affairhonoring an opposition newspaper editor, and threatsto withdraw economic assistance; cf. Szulc (1959: 11, 236). There is no evidence, however, that such pressuresplayed any significant role in Rojas' downfall.
TheBreakdown Regimes 567 ofAuthoritarian It is ratherin the two instanceswhere the U.S. had the clearest supportiverole at one stage that the withdrawalof its supportproved highly damaging, even fatal,to the regime. This was the case in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Thus the U.S., as chiefmilitary supplier,halted all arms shipmentsto Cuba in March 1958, thus probably hastening the ofBatista's army,althoughhardlyin itself demoralization and disintegration cause. the External supportforCastro fromCuban exile politicians being and fromotherLatin American countriesmeanwhileproved invaluable to the Castro forces,while the famous interviewswith Castro by Herbert in February1957, gave Castro a Times Matthews,publishedin theNew York at and he needed the time. visibility credibility badly In the case of Trujillo, the foreign impact on his demise (both personal and political)was even more directand dramatic.In fact,Howard Wiarda, probablythe leading North American studentof the Trujillo dictatorship, to have been environment adjudges the pressuresfromthe international thattriggered largelyresponsibleforactionsby the government (or at least the forces thateventuatedin the assassinationof Trujillo greatly intensified) in 1961. Thus in thewake of diplomaticand economicsanctionsimposedon theDominican Republic in 1960 by theOrganizationofAmericanStatesfor assassinationof Presiacts againstVenezuela (i.e., the attempted aggressive dent Romulo Betancourt)Trujillo began to spend lavishlyforarms, in turn imposingheavy taxes on many of those who had been his chiefsupporters. Moreover, according to Wiarda, "the United States Central Intelligence and, in later Agency (CIA) assisted in bringingtogetherthe conspirators and even arms to the assasstages,may even have providedencouragement In sum, the externalenvironment role in the breakplayed a significant in only two of our six cases-those two whichby down of authoritarianism and economics were most vulnerableto U.S. and other size, propinquity, outsideinfluences. "Exit" Guarantees A finalelementin our would-be model would seem to be more nearly universal.It is the need for"exit" guaranteesforkey elements-especially but not necessarily of theregimebut onlythemilitary-originally supportive in subsequently willingto desertit, thustippingthe balance of forcesfinally favorof the opposition.Thus Peron, Rojas Pinilla, and Perez Jimenezwere each followedby a period of military rule, or by a military-civilian junta, witha short-term to electoralpolitics.The depositionof objectiveof a return the dictatorwas thus less traumaticforthose in the military reluctantto restore civilianrule. Other,often implicit, guaranteesassured thatassociates of the former dictator would not be treatedtoo harshly(e.g., theymightbe
28Wiarda(1968: 171). The exact U.S. role in the assassination plot is unclear; thus there is some indication that the U.S. triedto abort the conspiracy at the last moment (see Diedrich, 1978). However, there stillseems littlequestion that the United States had withdrawnits imprimaturfromTrujillo his downfall. The primaryU.S. motive seems and that its actions played a major role in effecting to have been the desire to avoid "another Cuba" in the wake of reaction to a repressivedictatorship. Too, Venezuela was insistenton action against Trujillo if it was to join a united American front against Castro.
sination [of Trujillo]. '28
568
retired but not broughtto trial foralleged misdeeds), and that the forcibly be would assured an honoredplace in the successorcivilianregime. military In Odria's case, the major candidates in the successorelectionapparently affordedsomewhat similar guarantees (Pike, 1967: 294-95). Batista, of overthrown course,was ultimately by defeatofhis armyon thebattlefield (or more accurately the However, army's internaldisintegration).29 perhaps by therelevantguaranteesin thiscase were the democraticassurancesgivenby Castro to Cuba's upper and middle classes as an incentiveto forsake Batista.30.In fact,moderatesdominated the first post-Batistagovernment. The fact that the apparent guarantees ultimately were not kept does not in the Dominidetract from theirimportance at the time.The circumstances can case were,finally, quite unusual. Trujillo's assassins,among whom were in an exitplan thatat former close associates,saw guaranteesforthemselves the last momentwent awry. The consequence was thatotherTrujillo associates and family memberswere able to retainpower forseveralmonths,at thecostofthelivesofa numberoftheconspirators (Wiarda, 1968: 172). The point, however,remains: in everycase the factthat key erstwhile of the dictatordefectedto the oppositionwas in part crucially supporters thattheywould not be ill-treated dependenton at least theperception by the regimewhichfollowed.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
TheBreakdown Process The end oftheauthoritarian regimeswithwhichwe have been concerned came in a variety of ways: Peron by action of the military; Rojas Pinilla and Perez Jimenez by streetdemonstrations and "civic strikes" which in turn precipitated military coups; Odria by "voluntary" exitand elections;Batista and thecollapseofhis army;and Trujilloby assassinaby popular revolution tion.The durationoftheregimesalso varied,from Trujillo's thirty-one years to Rojas' four. The governments that immediately succeeded the dictatorfromthreeyears of military rule, followedby elections ships also differed, without the in to democratic electionsin Peru and (but Peronists) Argentina, socialismin Cuba. There were likewisesome contrasts in the revolutionary natureof theregimesthemselves, theirbases of support,and the oppositions that eventuallycoalesced to overthrow them. Thus Trujillo's rule was in a classic in the many way dictatorship predatorystyle (the rule of the Somozas in Nicaragua having been anotherprimeexample), while Per6n's rule had a strong mass base and was legitimizedin 1946 by genuine elections. In spite of such contrasts,these essentiallyauthoritarian governments shareda numberof keyelementsin a common processof breakdown.None of them came to power throughcommonlyaccepted, constitutional prothe powerhe alreadyheld by means of cedures,althoughPeron did confirm
29See Perez (1976) foran analysis of the reasons forthat disintegration. of power to a 30Attempts by top militaryofficials,spurred by the United States, to arrange a transfer militarysuccessor failed(Perez, 1976: 164-65).
TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian Regimes 569 a substantially freeelection.Each did stakea claim to thekindof "secondary legitimacy."Yet each proceededto lose even thatmeasure of legitimacy by actions which ran counterto those initialclaims, oftenincludingblatantly at continuismo. each of the regimesbegan with fraudulent attempts Similarly, a significant degreeof supportor at least of acquiescence. At whateverlevel a conspicuofadherencetheybegan, however,all sooneror laterunderwent ous "narrowing" as theycame more and more to centeraround the person and his close associates,military and civilian.Time tendedto ofthe dictator to isolation,and paranoia, leadingtypically self-indulgence, bringincreasing unwise actions which further underminedthe regime (e.g., Per6n's war againsttheChurch,PerezJimenez' 1957 plebiscite). Under these circumstances two other things eventually occurred. but most important, more unifiedand Opposition grew not only stronger, more concertedtoward the goal of the dictator'sdeposition. And serious divisions When, finally, began to appear in thekeyregimeelite,themilitary. of the dictatorship erstwhile who had the most to lose by its key supporters demise were affordedapparent guarantees that a new order would not them,thefateoftheregimewas sealed. undulythreaten The steps in the process have theirown sequence in logic, though in realitytheymay of course overlap, and theirtimingmay be hastyor proand narrowing thepriorstagesand tend to constitute longed. Delegitimation occur more or less in tandem. Opposition coalescence and military disaffectionare the next,again roughly Exit are the last, parallel, steps. guarantees condition of The model is as therefore follows: precipitating regimecollapse.
Opposition Coalescence
_
Delegitimation RegimeNarrowing
0 Exit
Elite Divisions
Guarantees
_Regime
Breakdown
in such areas as economicsand public order Surprisingly, performance or narrowing was earlierseen as contributory in some cases to delegitimation oftheregime'ssupportcoalition,but not forthe mostpartas directcauses of breakdown.In fact,regimeperformance in thissense was onlyof secondary in most of the have cases we examined. importance externalactors,while playingan important role in the fallof Similarly, Batista and a probablycriticalone in Trujillo's case, were not a generally element.Where present,theytended to have an impacton such significant phases of the breakdownprocess as delegitimation, regimenarrowing,and elitedivisions. andResearch Directions Comparisons The questionremainsof whether, or to what extent,such a model might informour understandingof other regime breakdowns, authoritarianor A model ofauthoritarian otherwise. breakdownwhichplaces itsemphasison the increasingly isolativeand self-indulgent behavior of a dictatoror ruler
570
would appear largelyto fit such recentcases as thoseofAnastasio Somoza in Shah Iran. There is one major qualification:the key and the of Nicaragua elites in these cases remained more or less loyal and more or less military to the veryend, thus in turnrendering exitguaranteesnot effective virtually relevant. Cuba's Batista of course, was, similarly broughtdown particularly intentand was, in a by an oppositionled by persons with revolutionary sense, defeated"in the field." But, as noted, his army did forall practical purposes deserthim, and Castro had given implicitexit guaranteesto the can add non-revolutionaries Revolution,nonetheless, among his supporters. a dimension to breakdown not fullyconsidered in our more consensual the model if the model. Thus revolutionmay interrupt to short-circuit fails to defect from the military regime.31 breakdownand those Any parallelsbetweenour model of authoritarian likeBrazil,Argenofcontemporary bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) regimes tina, Chile, and Mexico that are more corporatein nature is more problematic. Less dependent on the whims or capacities of one man, these to such problemsas isolation, could be expectedto be less susceptible regimes and individualparanoia. More firmly rootedin institutions self-indulgence, -or at any rate one institution, the military-theyshould generallyprove and less susceptibleto international more stable and long-lasting, pressures characterof the B-A than in two of our cases.32 Given the technocratic regimes, and the central support role typicallyplayed by foreignand domesticbusiness elites, it would be logical to hypothesizethat failuresin would play a larger role in the breakdownof B-A economic performance than in thecases discussedhere. Lastly,thegreater regimes degreeofinstituin regimeswhererulership is more corporatein nature,as well tionalization as the new self-perceived militaryrole of permanentinvolvementin the politicalprocess, may mean that "liberalization" or "opening" is a more thanis outright outcomeforsuch regimes likely collapseor deposition.33 Proof of any parallels in the patternsof breakdown between the two varietiesof authoritarian regimemust remain for anothertime and place; In any event, and in the end the contrasts mightoutweighthe similarities. theclearcutcases of thebreakdownof corporateauthoritarian rule are as yet
31On the other hand, the perceived prospect of radical change, and the apparent failureon the part of credible exit guarantees, may have foreclosedthe military's defectionfrom the opposition to offer the regime and made a more revolutionary outcome all but inevitable in the cases of both Nicaragua and Iran. 32An exception to the latter could be defeat in foreignconflict,as potentially with Argentina in the Falkland (Malvinas) Island dispute withGreat Britainduring the springof 1982.
33The clearest case of the breakdown of a B-A regime to date in Latin America has been the regime initiatedby the militaryin Argentina in 1966. It ended in 1973 when the military"voluntarily" gave way to a returnofJuan Peron and his supporters; a more thoroughoingB-A regime, again dominated by the military,was restored in 1976. Performance failures and mounting popular demands, not isolative behavior, were the causes of the regime's breakdown. International pressures played no discernible role; see Snow (1979). The Peruvian militaryalso made a voluntary exit from a regime (1968-80) of a corporate military type (although it was reformist,not conservative or reactionary, in nature); see Palmer (1980). The 1974 demise of a Portuguese regime which mightbe dubbed B-A in nature-see, e.g., Graham (1975)-came as the resultof a coup by elements of a key regime elite-the military. The motives were primarilyobjections to regimeperformance,thistime in the area of Portuguese colonial policy.
TheBreakdown Regimes 571 ofAuthoritarian and few,and little scattered studied.For thepresentwe willmerely hypothesize that the basic lineamentsof our model would remain in place forthe more corporatetypesof authoritarian Nonetheless,the more a rulership.34 end of the continuumof authoriregimeinclinedtoward the personalistic tarianrule, the more likelyit would be to accord withour model; the more militaryrule (or party rule, as in nearly it was based on institutional have our expectations of the more we would to modify the Mexico), likely above. breakdown processin thedirections suggested Any parallels with breakdowns in democraticregimes are necessarily of whichAlfredStepan and more tenuous. Thus the kindsof macro-factors othersspeak in TheBreakdown ofDemocratic appear to be less germane Regimes in thecases oftheauthoritarian To wit,increasing regimesexaminedhere.35 are in good partforeclosed by thenatureof populardemandson government the regimes,while variationsin the government'sextractivecapabilities, while hardly irrelevant, may in the main be superseded by more directly considerations. political theleadershipvariableon whichmostofthecontributors to Nonetheless, to be TheBreakdown Democratic stress does place preeminent of Regimes appear sense. Thus it was not so much the dicyetin a ratherdifferent important, and tacticsin handlingsupporters and enemies of tators'choice of strategy the regimethat broughtabout theirpoliticaldemise, as was the case with rulers.It democratic breakdowns,but rathertheirbehavioras personalistic which caused these men was not the sworn opponentsof authoritarianism nor theirideologicalopponents,but rather their greatest politicaldifficulties, theirown erstwhile alienated by the dictators'aggrandizingand supporters isolative behavior. Our analysis would thereforetend to confirm the variableby theauthorsofBreakdown. emphasisplaced on theleadership In conclusion,then,we have triedto put forward a tentative model ofthe breakdown of authoritarianregimes, based on an analysis of six Latin Americancases from theyears1955-61.We have also briefly some suggested in the processes of breakdown between different differences varieties of authoritarian government and between authoritarian and democratic regimes.What is stillverymuch at issue, however,is theextentto whichthe analysisof otherkindsof authoritarian systematic regimes,or of democratic would confirm,refine,or discard the proferred model of governments, breakdown.Extensionof the comparativeuniversein both space and time would likewisebe in order.The agenda is long, withtheultimate objectivea ofregimebreakdown, bothauthoritarian and democratic. theory
34Forthe basic problems oflegitimationin such regimes,see O'Donnell (1979) and Linz (1973). 35See particularly Stepan's section on the overthrow of Joao Goulart in Brazil in 1964, where he such as increasingdemands on the system develops a kind of model involvingboth macro-factors, and declining governmentalextractivecapabilities, and micro-factors such as the skills and tactics of individual leaders.
572
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