On the intention of the Comrade in Platos Hipparchus

In the Hipparchus1, Socrates appears to misunderstand the intention, and to thereby misunderstand the words, of the Comrade. This essay will explore whether or not that appearance is deceptive. Socrates apparent misunderstanding begins with the very first words spoken by the Comrade: [lovers of gain] are those human beings who think it worthwhile to make a gain from worthless things. It is clear that the Comrade is thinking of men who pretend that their worthless goods are valuable in order to swindle their buyers and make money. But Socrates responds as if he thought the Comrade was talking about farmers who plant worthless seeds and hope to obtain a good harvest. Yet Socrates response is somehow fair to the spoken definition if not the silent intent of the Comrade. For the Comrade had said that the lovers of gain make a gain from worthless things. But a worthless thing could be a thing that is worthless simply such as garbage or it could be a thing that is worthless relatively such as a well-crafted shoe that is too small for our feet, and therefore worthless for us. Now, the Comrade speaks as if the lovers of gain are concerned with worthless things in the first sense: with things that have no practical use of any kind. And yet, if this was what he meant, then it would not be intelligible that the swindler is able to use these things to make gain: because if they were worthless simply, how could they be used in order to acquire profit?2 Socrates initial mistake his identification of the lovers of gain with incompetent artisans - arises out of a genuine ambiguity in the speech of the Comrade.3 Let us therefore correct this ambiguity in the light of the evident intention of the Comrade. If the things sold by the swindler are not worthless simply, they must be worthless in some respect. But this respect is, of course, obvious: they are worthless to the swindled customers. Therefore, making this substitution, the Comrade would say that [lovers of gain] are those human beings who think it worthwhile to make a gain from things that are worthless for others. And yet while this new formulation is a clearer expression of the Comrades intent, it also for that very reason leads to further questions.

This essay assumes that the reader has read Platos Hipparchus at least once, with enough care to be perplexed by it. An excellent translation of the Hipparchus can be found in The Roots of Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas L. Pangle. Regarding the question of the dialogues authenticity, it is sufficient to note that Leo Strauss treats it as authentic; cf. Strauss, On the Minos. 2 In fact, the things sold by swindlers necessarily differ from worthless things in one decisive respect: they appear to be useful; and this appearance is either immediately manifest to the eye, or comes into being through the lies told by the swindler. But as the example of garbage makes clear, not everything can be made to appear useful. And therefore the swindler does not sell simply worthless things. 3 We might say that it is foolish or unfair of Socrates to misunderstand an ambiguity in an ordinary mans speech. But we must not forget that this ordinary man is the product of the extraordinary art of Platos writing. And we must therefore wonder why Plato chose to intentionally produce an ambiguity that would in ordinary conversation perhaps be a mere unintentional accident.

To begin with what is most problematic, the Comrade attempts to define the lovers of gain as those human beings who think it is worthwhile to make a gain from unscrupulous means. And yet, as the Comrade admits later, he himself wishes to obtain all good things i.e., he himself wishes to obtain all gains. It would therefore seem that both the Comrade, and the lover of gain, think it is worthwhile to make a gain of any kind. Even further, according to the Comrade all human beings think that this is worthwhile. This consequence would mean that there is no difference between the lover of gain and any other human being.4 There would therefore be no difference between the lover of gain and any other human being. What at first appeared to be yet another mistake of Socrates the identification of the lovers of gain with all human beings is again the result of an ambiguity in the Comrades speech. In order to understand the Comrades words, we must again correct his ambiguous speech in the light of of his evident intention. The Comrades intention was to provide a characteristic that separated the lovers of gain from decent men. Yet, this cannot be thinking it worthwhile to gain: for all human beings love the good. Nor can it be the difference between wicked gain and decent gain: for this difference already presupposes the distinction between wicked men and decent men; and by defining the lover of gain the wicked man who pursues gain we are searching for, and cannot presuppose, a definition of the wicked man. Is there then no characteristic provided by the Comrade which satisfies his intention to distinguish the wicked from the decent? In fact, only one such characteristic is provided. This characteristic is given by the Comrade, not in his definition, but in the blame that surrounds it. For the lovers of gain are said to be daring and shameless. If to be daring is to act without having our actions be restricted by fear, and if to be shameless is to act without being restricted by the fear of disrepute5, then these two words would signify one and the same thing: the lover of gain pursues gain without being halted in any way by the fear of others. By an obvious consequence, the Comrade and in the Comrades opinion, all decent men do pursue gain only insofar as it does not cause them excessive fear. According to the Comrade, the different degrees of fear in various human souls are the natural root of the distinction between decent men and wicked men a distinction that, in the eyes of the lovers of gain, would be the distinction between the bold and the weak.6 Having articulated the Comrades words in accordance with his intent, it is perhaps no longer surprising that he initially spoke so ambiguously: for his true definition is that wicked men are those human beings who fearlessly pursue the good.

This consequence was concealed before by the ambiguous phrase worthless things, which rendered doubtful whether the lovers of gain actually attained gain through their crime. Thus the first two responses of Socrates seem to be an ascent upwards from the surface of the Comrades speech into deeper and deeper ambiguities in its meaning. 5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1128b11 b15. 6 Glaucons speech at the beginning of the Second Book of the Republic, as well as Nietzsches criticisms of the weakness of decent men, are both somehow the unspoken implications of the most ordinary moral indignation, as it manifests itself in the Comrade. Accordingly, both Glaucons and Nietzsches sophisticated opinions are somehow contrary to all appearances moral opinions.

If the Comrade were not contrasted with Socrates, we would perhaps be tempted to consider whether Plato is providing subtle arguments for a life of crime. And yet this contrast between Socrates and the Comrade is constantly present, and reminds us of a fact that is as simple as it is obvious: the Comrade is not wise. Therefore, the secrets of the Comrade his unspoken implications - are by no means necessarily wise secrets; it is quite likely that what the Comrade believes in his heart of hearts, but hides from himself and others, is as deficient in wisdom as his more explicit utterances. Now, the essence of this secret wisdom is that criminals do profit. But this wisdom presupposes something more fundamental: that to make a gain, i.e, to obtain money, is the primary meaning of to get what is good; and this view, in its turn, presupposes that the enjoyment of purchasable goods as well as the delusions of immortality that arise from the acquisition of stable and changeless objects is the true source of happiness. A single glance at the life of Socrates would be sufficient to raise not a few doubts about this claim.7 We have restricted ourselves to interpreting the Comrades first words in the light of his intention, in order to determine whether or not Socrates misunderstood those words. In the course of our interpretation, we have found that the Comrades speech, though apparently simple and decent, concealed many depths. To understand whether or not Socrates adequately understood these depths would require both a fuller articulation of those depths themselves, and an interpretation of the remainder of the Hipparchus. For now we conclude our essay with the merely probable suggestion that, in the light of the true meaning of the Comrades speech, Socrates responses are most astute, and more appropriate, than they might first appear.

Consider especially Xenophons Memorabilia, Book 1, Chapter 6, Paragraphs 11 14.